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EXAMINING THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S REPORT

ON IRANIAN PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN

HEMISPHERE 19 YEARS AFTER AMIA ATTACK

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 1, 2013

Serial No. 113–65

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., director and senior fellow, Stein Program on 

Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 15

Mr. Michael A. Braun, co-founder and managing partner, Spectre Group 

International, LLC (former Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration) ............................................................................................................... 32

Mr. Eric Farnsworth, vice president, Council of the Americas and Americas 

Society ................................................................................................................... 41

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina: Letter to the Honorable John Kerry, Secretary of State, 

dated August 1, 2013 ........................................................................................... 8

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 18

Mr. Michael A. Braun: Prepared statement .......................................................... 34

Mr. Eric Farnsworth: Prepared statement ............................................................ 43

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

Written response from Mr. Eric Farnsworth to question submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Luke Messer, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Indiana 63

(1)

EXAMINING THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S 

REPORT ON IRANIAN PRESENCE IN THE 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 19 YEARS AFTER 

AMIA ATTACK 

THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The joint subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and Ranking Member Sires for 5 minutes each for our 

opening statements, I will then recognize other members for their 

1-minute statement should they seek recognition. We will then 

hear from our witnesses, and, without objection, your prepared 

statements will be made a part of record. Members may have 5 

days in which to insert statements and questions for the record, 

subject to the length limitation in the rules. And Mr. Deutch is in 

another committee. He is finishing up there, and as soon as he finishes, if we are already on the witnesses, we will yank you out of 

that microphone—no, we will just briefly interrupt so he can make 

his opening statement. 

So thank you, Chairman Salmon, who chairs our Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, and thank you to Ranking Member Sires, 

who is the ranking member on that subcommittee. 

And the Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.

I came into Congress in 1989 and was here 19 years ago when 

the AMIA attack occurred in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1994. 

Fast forward to today, and the Iranian presence in Latin America 

is on the rise and poses a greater threat to our national security. 

Two months ago the special prosecutor for AMIA, Alberto 

Nisman, released a 500-page report citing extensive evidence of 

Iran’s intelligence and terrorist networks alive and well in various 

Latin America nations. This report reaffirmed that Iran continues 

to use its diplomatic and cultural centers as a facade to infiltrate 

the region. 

2

As our two subcommittees continue to do our due diligence and 

shine the spotlight on the Iranian presence in the Western Hemisphere, it is important to examine this problem through the prism 

of the Obama administration’s failed policies in Latin America. 

Time and again we have seen the Obama administration fail to 

hold oppressive regimes accountable for the human rights violations, constitutional revisions, and a breakdown of rule of law in 

the region. 

The ALBA nations of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia, and to a certain extent now, sadly, Argentina, continue to undermine U.S. efforts in the region, and it is not surprising that 

those same countries have opened up their arms to embrace the 

Iranian regime. 

Just yesterday the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 

Africa held a hearing on the Iran-Syria nexus, and Ambassador 

John Bolton stated, and I quote, ‘‘The largest Iranian diplomatic facility in the world is in Caracas. Caracas, Venezuela, because they 

are laundering their money through the Venezuelan banks.’’

In order for the Obama administration to get serious about this 

issue, it cannot ignore the close ties between Venezuela and Iran, 

but it has become abundantly clear that the administration continues to put politics over national security. To admit that there is 

a problem in the hemisphere regarding Iran, the administration 

would first have to put the blame on the Venezuelan regime, the 

same regime that it continues to attempt to normalize relations 

with. The decision is misguided and will only embolden the corrupt 

Venezuelan leadership. 

One month ago the Department of State presented to Congress 

a report on the Iranian influence in Latin America, and we thank 

our colleague for passing a bill making that possible; a report that 

was required thanks to the efforts of Mr. Duncan. 

Our responsibility as policymakers is to do our best to prevent 

problems from becoming even worse. We cannot wait until this 

threat increases to such a level that it cannot be contained, so we 

must be proactive and not reactive. That is why I was extremely 

disappointed that the report failed to reach its objectives required 

by U.S. law and failed to connect the dots on what is really going 

on in the hemisphere with Iran. 

The report lacked a coherent and detailed strategy on what the 

Department of State and other Federal agencies are doing to combat the Iranian threat in our region, and drastically underestimated that threat. For example, the report states the U.S. intelligence community works with our allies in the region to collect information on Iranian activities. What it failed to mention is the 

fact that there is a large intelligence gap within our own intelligence community to gather accurate information on Iranian activities, and this administration has failed to appropriately address 

this threat. 

In March of this year, the Commander of SOUTHCOM testified 

before Congress and said, and I quote, ‘‘I would be remiss, however, 

if I did not share with the Congress my assessment that the U.S. 

Southern Command’s limited intelligence capabilities may prevent 

our full awareness of all Iranian and Hezbollah activities in the region.’’ This is why I offered an amendment to the NDAA this year 

3

that authorizes the Secretary of Defense to deploy assets, personnel, and resources to the Joint Interagency Task Force South in 

coordination with SOUTHCOM to combat narcoterrorism and the 

Iranian threat in the region. 

The links between terrorism and drug trafficking are well 

known, which is why it is easy to assume why the Iranian regime 

and its proxies are in our hemisphere that continues to battle drug 

trafficking. What this administration fails to comprehend is that 

terrorists fighting in the Middle East, in Syria, in Iran, in Yemen, 

in Lebanon are financing their illicit activities from drug trafficking proceeds being collected from right here in our own region. 

Whether it is the foiled plot by an Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

Corps member to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. on 

U.S. soil, or the DEA-led investigation into the Lebanese Canadian 

Bank, and Operation Titan, it is clear that the Iranian regime is 

supporting operatives in our region. So it is in our national security 

interest to dismantle these transnational criminal organizations, 

and we cannot and must not turn a blind eye to this imminent 

threat. 

And with that, I am pleased to yield for his opening statement 

to Ranking Member Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon, and thank you to our witnesses for being here 

today. 

This month marked the 19-year anniversary of the AMIA Jewish 

Community Center bombing in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people. Two years earlier in March 1992, a car bomb exploded in front 

of the Israeli Embassy in the same city, killing 30 people and injuring 242. On both occasions Hezbollah, along with Iranian officials, 

were implicated by Argentine authorities in what today remains 

amongst the most devastating terrorist attacks Latin America has 

experienced. Tragic still is the fact that today justice remains elusive, all of which makes a Joint Truth Commission between Argentina and Iran to review the case a puzzling proposition that does 

more to pour salt over the wounds of the victims’ families than 

seek justice. 

In recent years pervasive anti-Americanism fueled Iran’s relationship with countries like Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and 

Venezuela. The leftist leaders, the so-called ALBA group, and 

Iran’s Ahmadinejad found favor and ideological kinship with each 

other. Their regional encounters, often led by former Venezuelan 

President Hugo Chavez, involved the announcement of improbable 

joint ventures and U.S. antagonism. 

Nevertheless, these relationships begged the question of the underlying intent. On one side has been an Iran whose support of terrorism, international disregard and nuclear and vision has been an 

imminent threat to the global community. On the other are several 

regional state actors whose leaders have exhibited disregard for 

democratic principles and the goal of reducing U.S. influence in the 

region. 

U.S. intelligence officials have noted that the crippling effect of 

sanctions against Iran and attempts to defraud the international 

community gave way to an outreach effort within the hemisphere 

to reduce its international isolation. For the ALBA bloc of nations, 

4

their associations with Iran has provided shallow, yet symbolic economic opportunities; above all, it has given them an international 

platform to espouse anti-American rhetoric. While these interactions may be more about showmanship than brinkmanship, 

Iran’s presence and activities in the hemisphere must not be taken 

lightly and should remain a security concern of the United States. 

For instance, a 2011 failed assassination attempt against the 

Saudi Ambassador in Washington, DC, involved two Iranian nationals who sought the aid of Mexican drug cartels, reflecting a will 

by Iran to carry out an attack within the U.S. 

Moreover, the State Department’s 2012 report on terrorism noted 

that while there were no known operational cells of either 

Hezbollah or al Qaeda in the hemisphere, they remain ideological 

sympathizers, providing financial support in areas like the 

triborder region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. 

Partly for these reasons, Congress requested that the State Department submit an assessment of Iran’s presence and activity in 

the Western Hemisphere. The mostly classified report submitted to 

Congress late last month maintains that Iran’s influence in Latin 

America and the Caribbean is waning. Therefore, the purpose of 

this hearing today is to examine the State Department’s determination. 

This hearing and the reports released come at the heels of various significant events that have the potential to change the course 

of Iran’s presence and influence in the hemisphere. Venezuelan 

President Hugo Chavez died in March, and last month Hassan 

Rouhani was selected to be Iran’s new President. It is uncertain as 

to whether Iran and Venezuela’s new leaders will maintain the 

same level of interaction seen under Chavez. Additionally, Argentina’s prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, recently released a scathing report on Iran’s activities throughout Latin America. 

I remain skeptical of whether anything of substance is going to 

be achieved with the so-called Truth Commission. While I am deeply concerned about Iran’s involvement in this hemisphere, particularly on the financial and security front, I think it is imperative 

that as we move forward, we do so in a manner that does not set 

back our relations with our friendly neighbors. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony from our witnesses about 

the State Department’s determination of the Iranian threat and 

what directions our foreign policy should take in regards to the situation. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ranking Member Sires, for that 

great opening statement. 

And we are so pleased now to turn to the chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Mr. Salmon. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

I would like to thank Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for joining me in 

convening today’s hearing, and the witnesses who have taken the 

time to come before this joint hearing to show their thoughts on 

Iran’s presence in the Western Hemisphere, how this presence may 

affect our national security, and whether the State Department’s 

report provided Congress with an accurate picture of the potential 

threat. 

5

When the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, 

which was sponsored by our great friend and Representative from 

South Carolina, Jeff Duncan, last year and passed in December of 

last year, there was a reasonable expectation that the State Department would draft a thorough and thoughtful report in response 

to legitimate concerns that Iran and its proxies maintain influence 

throughout our hemisphere. 

Unfortunately, the State Department delivered a dismissive report that lacked the depth and seriousness this very important national security issue warrants. The unclassified State Department 

report concluded that Iran’s influence in the region is waning and 

based on that assessment—or based that assessment on several 

unfulfilled commercial agreements between Iran and some of the 

hemisphere’s ALBA countries. Nowhere did the report consider 

what most security experts agree is Iran and its proxy Hezbollah’s 

ability to slowly and methodically establish inroads necessary to 

launch acts of terrorism as they did in Argentina while planning 

the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association. 

Therefore, citing the lack of imminent Iranian or Hezbollah threat 

or anecdotal information that Iran has been unreliable after signing commercial agreements provides very little comfort to those 

dedicated to our Nation’s security. 

Moreover, the report failed to give proper consideration to the 

fact that the ALBA-aligned governments that have welcomed increased Iranian diplomatic presence over the past several years, 

Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, have been undermining democratic institutions in their respective countries, creating exactly the type of environment, complete with vitriolic antiAmericanism and a stranglehold on liberty, that makes for an ideal 

breeding ground for Iranian adventurism. 

As chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 

last week I asked Assistant Secretary Jacobson to come to the Hill 

to answer the many questions my colleagues and I have about their 

dismissive report. I convened today’s hearing jointly with Chairman Ros-Lehtinen to continue to dig in deeper into the nature of 

the threat posed by Iran and its proxies present so close to our 

homeland. The American people rightfully expect their Representatives to take the security of our Nation seriously. I am confident 

that today’s hearing will shed further light on the nature of Iran’s 

presence in our hemisphere, and I want to once again thank our 

witnesses for coming forth with testimony on this matter of national security. 

Finally, Madam Chairman, I would like to express a warm thank 

you to our subcommittee’s summer interns. We had two of them, 

and they were phenomenal: Emily King and Eric Meroney. Yeah, 

thank you, yay. We really appreciate—we really appreciate the 

great work that they have done. They brought with them an exceptional amount of professionalism, hard work, integrity, and we are 

just thrilled that they could work with us this summer. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Salmon. 

Now we are pleased to recognize members for their opening 

statements, and we will begin with Mr. Schneider. 

6

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to thank 

the witnesses for joining us today. 

I very well remember 19 years ago when the Jewish Community 

Center of Buenos Aires was bombed. My interest at the time was 

perhaps heightened because I was then a young leader in the Jewish community of Chicago. 

There were and continue to be very close ties between our communities, and we all share, as we do here, the same concern and 

disappointment that justice remains denied for the victims of Argentina. 

Let me jump forward to today. Last week we were encouraged 

see that the European Union acted to finally designate the military 

wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, a reality which the 

U.S. and many of our allies have known for years. Despite this designation, there is much work to be done. Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran continue to have global reach which threatens U.S. interests and those of our close allies. We cannot let up on the pressure 

on the European Union until they agree to join the U.S. and others 

in a comprehensive sanctions regime that would stifle Hezbollah’s 

global influence network. 

This hearing focuses on Hezbollah and Iran’s influence here in 

the Western Hemisphere. Despite the low occurrence rate of terrorist attacks in our region, this international organization continues to use its network of local banks, gangs and drug traffickers 

to launder money and finance regional destabilization efforts in the 

Middle East and elsewhere. I look forward to hearing from the 

panel on how the U.S. can best combat this international terrorism 

finance network, and what steps we might take to pursue an allinclusive sanctions regime. 

I thank the chair for calling this hearing today, and I yield back 

my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And I am now very pleased to recognize Mr. Duncan, who was 

the author and passage of the bill calling for the report on Iran’s 

presence in the Western Hemisphere was so successful. You were 

the only freshman to pass a bill. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank you. In this committee, anyway. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Okay. You are recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much, and it wouldn’t have happened 

had it not been for the leadership of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and 

so I want to applaud her and Chairman Salmon for holding this 

joint subcommittee hearing today to examine the threat from Iran’s 

actions in the Western Hemisphere, and assess the State Department’s recent report to Congress. 

Earlier this month, as chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee 

on the Homeland Security Committee, I held a hearing to examine 

the threat to the U.S. homeland from Iran’s extending influence in 

the Western Hemisphere. All of the witnesses highlighted the activities of Iran, and provided compelling evidence showing Iranian 

influence increasing, rather than waning as the State Department 

claims. 

Although Congress has held numerous hearings culminating in 

today’s hearing, and although Congress passed bipartisan, bicameral legislation that the President signed into law, the State 

7

Department’s report to Congress was inadequate in its lack of rigorous evaluation conducted in a comprehensive and coordinated 

manner. I question the State Department’s scope, methodology, and 

findings in its report to Congress, evidenced by the fact that the 

State Department did not reach out to even one ally or partner in 

this hemisphere to craft its assessment or strategy. The State Department also failed to consider all of the evidence in the extensive 

500-page report by general prosecutor of the AMIA bombing, 

Alberto Nisman. 

Although Iran has publicly stated that promotion of all-out cooperation with Latin American countries is one of its top priorities 

and among the definite and strategic policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this administration refuses to see Iranian presence in 

the Western Hemisphere as a threat to U.S. security. 

Testimony from the Oversight Subcommittee hearing found that 

Iran has exemplified steady patience in building networks within 

the Western Hemisphere. Iran has penetrated countries through 

mosques, Embassies, cultural centers, and recruited over 1,000 students in Latin America to travel to Iran for training. Iran also possesses the ability to obtain fraudulent passport documentation and 

exploit free-trade zones and loose border-security measures. Iran’s 

close cooperation with drug cartels and criminal networks in the 

region and expanding trade with countries like Argentina and 

Brazil should cause the administration to prove to the American 

people that Iran’s influence is actually waning rather than simply 

asserting it. 

Today I, along with several Members of Congress, including 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and Chairman Royce and Chairman 

Salmon, sent a letter to Secretary Kerry requesting specific answers to questions that have not been answered. I ask that this letter be submitted into the record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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82311d-2.eps
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82311d-3.eps
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82311d-4.eps
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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I look forward to the State Department’s response in a timely 

manner. 

I also expect the GAO to examine this issue in depth, and I look 

forward to their report in the coming months. 

And I will finish my comments by just saying in the written testimony of Mr. Levitt, he mentions 300 Lebanese were smuggled 

into this country in the car, in the trunk, and I hope you will mention this in your testimony, but in the trunk of his car across the 

Mexican border into this country. We can’t ignore this issue that 

Iran is a threat, and there is a possibility that by saying that it 

is waning and taking our eye off the ball, we could be a target and 

could result in implications and further complications. 

So with that I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. Vargas is recognized. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

I would also like to thank the respective chairs and ranking 

members of each subcommittee for this timely hearing and for the 

opportunity to speak here today. I want to express my deep concern 

regarding Iran’s growing presence and influence in the Western 

Hemisphere. 

As the world’s leading sponsor of international terrorism, Iran’s 

network of proxies and syndicates have conducted terrorist attacks 

such as the two bombings in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, and they 

continue to expand their reach in the region. Of particular concern 

are Iran’s efforts to develop ties with Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, 

Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. 

Trying to circumvent U.S. and U.N. sanctions meant to isolate 

them from the international community, Iranian officials have declared an all-out cooperation with Latin America countries, and 

have invested heavily in mosques, Embassies, cultural centers, and 

student recruitment in Latin America trying to seek favor. We 

must do all we can to stop Iranian influence in our hemisphere. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today, and I thank 

you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. 

Mr. Chabot is recognized, the chairman of the—what is the name 

of your subcommittee? 

Mr. CHABOT. Asia and the Pacific. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That’s it. That’s a big chunk of land. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Chairman Salmon, I want to 

thank both of you for calling this hearing. 

Iran’s threat to the U.S. is no secret. Iran’s deep-rooted linkages 

to rogue regimes around the world and those countries that are fixated on propagating anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are very 

real and must be taken seriously. Its ties to Syria threaten the stability of the entire Middle East, and similarly, its support to North 

Korea is destabilizing Asia. 

As we will discuss this afternoon, Iran’s growing influence in 

Latin America and throughout the Western Hemisphere is just as 

dangerous. The administration’s report on Iranian influence in the 

Western Hemisphere is troubling because saying that Iran’s influVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:55 Oct 28, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\080113\82311 HFA PsN: SHIRL
13

ence is waning disregards the real facts. It mistakes the trees for 

the forest. Tehran has developed a broad network through its 

Hezbollah proxy and relationships with local criminal organizations 

to support an extensive strategy that promotes terrorist activities. 

This report does not show that we are doing enough to deter Iranian-sponsored terrorist acts. Yesterday the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act was passed on the House floor, which is an important step 

in dramatically increasing the pressure on Iran to halt its nuclear 

ambitions and cut off its money-laundering schemes in the region. 

The question is, what do we do next? 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished witnesses here this afternoon, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Chairman Chabot. 

Mr. Meeks is—thank you, Mr. Meeks, sorry. Albio is a big guy. 

I didn’t see you there. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I want to thank 

you and Chairman Salmon for convening this hearing today to examine the security of our southern neighbors. And there is no 

doubt that there are nefarious elements in the region that need to 

be countered. Specifically, Iran and Hezbollah’s interests and activity in the Western Hemisphere are troubling and should be diligently countered by a robust and proactive United States foreign 

policy. International criminal networks connected by Hezbollah 

greatly threaten the security of the United States and undermine 

our efforts to promote stability and democracy in the region and 

around the world. 

We are here today to talk about what findings that the State Department had, and I wish we had a State—and maybe we do need 

a hearing where the State Department is here also so that we 

could hear a full and complete report as to what has taken place, 

what the State Department found, how they found it, how did 

they—what kind of information they have obtained, as opposed to 

just dismissing it and going with some—you know, some other 

place where I don’t know whether they had—I have had some hearings and some meetings, I should say, some classified, in regard to 

that, and I wish—can’t talk about all of those things here—but the 

State Department should have a seat here so that we could have 

them answer some questions, and they can tell you specifically 

what they found, how they found it, and why they found it, as opposed to just making a presumption that their report just means 

nothing, and all these things are going on. I think that we need 

to do a more holistic finding, a holistic type of hearing where we 

can then really get into the facts and not just fan fire when we 

don’t know whether it is or not. 

So I think it would be fair to have both sides here, have everyone 

here, so that everybody could hear all of the facts, all of the circumstances, and we then know which direction that we should 

head in. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Meeks. 

And we will be glad to have you cosign a letter that I routinely 

send to the State Department. We have been begging for 3 years 

to have them come testify. We would be pleased and honored to 

have you join us in that bipartisan effort. 

14

Mr. MEEKS. I would love it. I know every time we have had a 

classified meeting, they have been here and been willing to give us 

that information. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. They always do classified, but never open. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Meeks. We will turn that over to you. 

Ms. Meng, so pleased to recognize you for your opening statement. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you to our 

witnesses for being here today. 

Yesterday we passed H.R. 850, strengthening Iran sanctions, but 

this does not mean we can head off to our August work periods 

feeling content with our efforts on the Iranian question. The Iranian regime is smart and swift, and when we push it down in one 

area, it rises in another. That is why we must adopt a comprehensive diplomatic push against Iran. 

In Latin America, for example, the Iranian regime is seeking to 

circumvent its isolation and the sanctions directed against it. We 

are leading opposition to the Iran/Argentina Truth Commission, 

which is a sham ‘‘reinvestigation’’ of the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing, despite Iran’s clear culpability for this atrocious attack. 

I look forward to hearing from our panelists today on these important questions. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, ma’am. 

And now we are pleased to introduce our witnesses. First we welcome Dr. Matthew Levitt, senior fellow and director of the Stein 

Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy. Dr. Levitt has served a long and distinguished career working to counter international terrorism, having served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Analysis 

at the Department of Treasury from 2005 to 2007 and, prior to 

this, at the FBI as a counterterrorism intelligence analyst. 

Thank you for your service, Dr. Levitt. 

Next we welcome Mr. Michael Braun, who in 2008 retired from 

the Drug Enforcement Agency as Chief of Operations, Assistant 

Administrator after serving a 33-year domestic international law 

enforcement career. During this time he used his expertise in the 

confluence of drugs and terror to lead the DEA’s expansion in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2008, and served as Chief of Staff for the 

Minister of the Interior, Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. 

Mr. Braun is a Vietnam veteran, like my hubby, having served—

enlisted in the Marines in 1971 as an infantryman. Hooah. 

Then we welcome Mr. Eric Farnsworth—did I do okay? 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Perfect. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Vice president of the Council of 

the Americas and Americas Society. Mr. Farnsworth is an expert 

in various issues affecting U.S. relations in the Western Hemisphere, including economic development, trade, energy, security, 

and democracy. He has served in various government positions involving Western Hemisphere and trade issues, including at the 

State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and as a senior advisor to 

the White House Special Envoy for the Americas during the Clinton administration. 

15

We have quite a set of panelists here today, and, gentlemen, we 

will begin with Dr. Levitt. We are about to vote, and unfortunately, 

we have a three-vote series, and then 10 minutes motion to recommit, and then seven votes after that, so we will be gone for a while. 

Make yourself comfortable. 

We will start with Dr. Levitt. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, STEIN PROGRAM ON COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR 

NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you so much. 

Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, and Ranking Member Deutch, Chairman Salmon, and Ranking Member Sires, distinguished members 

of both subcommittees, it is an honor to appear before you this 

afternoon to discuss Iran’s presence in the Western Hemisphere, 

and, of course, it is an honor to share a dais any time with Eric 

and Mike. 

On the one hand, the State Department’s recent report on Iranian activity and influence in the Western Hemisphere, played 

down Iran’s activities in the region; on the other, the authors of the 

report themselves conceded in the unclassified annex of the report 

that some of their conclusions were actually based on certain assumptions. That is their word. One assumption noted that, and I 

quote, ‘‘Iranian interest in Latin America is of concern.’’ Yet another stated that as a result of U.S. and allied effort, and I quote, 

‘‘The Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning.’’

In fact, Iran not only continues to expand its presence and bilateral relationships with countries like Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, 

and Venezuela, but reportedly also maintains a network of intelligence agents specifically tasked to sponsoring and executing terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere. 

Iran and Hezbollah both have worked long and hard over many 

years to build up their presence and influence in Latin America. In 

my written testimony I provide a good deal of background on 

Hezbollah and Iran’s bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community 

Center in Buenos Aires 19 years ago last month. I included for 

your reading pleasure an excerpt on the AMIA bombing from my 

new book, and detailed Iran’s role in the attack, including funding 

it, providing cover to operatives, using diplomats and front organizations, and more. 

But as it happens, the same day that the State Department released its controversial report, Alberto Nisman released his 500-

page document laying out how the Iranian regime has, since the 

1980s, built and maintained, and I quote, ‘‘local clandestine intelligence stations designed to sponsor, foster, and execute terrorist 

attacks in the Western Hemisphere.’’ Nisman found that Iran continues to build intelligence networks, identical to the one responsible for the bombings in Argentina, across the region, from Brazil, 

Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, and Colombia to Guyana, Trinidad, and 

Tobago, Surinam, and more. It concluded, and I quote, ‘‘In other 

words, the AMIA bombing did not constitute an isolated event.’’

16

The driving force behind Iranian activities in the region at the 

time of the AMIA bombing was Mohsen Rabbani, who reportedly 

continues to engage in Iranian intelligence work focused on the 

Western Hemisphere today. 

Nisman pointed to the trial of four men in the Eastern District 

of New York who plotted to bomb the JFK airport in 2007. Rabbani 

offered to help the men connect with Iranians. They sought technical and financial assistance from Iran for the operation, which 

was code-named ‘‘Chicken Farm.’’ All four men were ultimately 

convicted in Federal court. Documents seized from one of the coconspirator’s home in Guyana demonstrated that he was a Rabbani 

disciple who built a Guyanese intelligence network for Iran much 

like his mentor had built in Argentina. 

In 2011, not long before the last defendant in the JFK airport 

bomb plot was convicted, evidence emerged suggesting Rabbani 

was still doing intelligence work in South America. In the words 

of one Brazilian official, ‘‘Without anybody noticing, a generation of 

Islamic extremists is appearing in Brazil.’’

In addition to Nisman’s reports, other branches of the U.S. Government have reached very different conclusions from the State Department. This March, General Kelly from SOUTHCOM testified, 

and I quote, that ‘‘members and supporters of Iran’s partner, Lebanese Hezbollah, have established presence in several countries in 

the region. The Lebanese Shi’a diaspora in the region may generate 

as much as tens of millions of dollars for Hezbollah through both 

illicit and licit means.’’

The U.S. Treasury Department, too, has thoroughly detailed Iranian activity in the Western Hemisphere in several recent designations in their press releases, and, of course, these include, bank 

sanctions for banks in Venezuela, that are helping Iran evade sanctions; June 2002 designation of individuals involved in the drug 

kingpin network of Ayman Joumma, who is tied to Hezbollah—

Joumma himself had been designated in January 2011—and more. 

And then there is Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 

visit to Venezuela in January 2012, which seemed rather 

unremarkable beyond his normal inflammatory personality, but 

then, according to Western intelligence officials cited by 

ProPublica, a senior officer in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

Corps secretly traveled with the Presidential delegation to meet 

with Venezuelan military and security chiefs and to set off a joint 

intelligence program between Iranian and Venezuelan spy agencies. 

While the State Department’s Iranian activity report downplayed 

Iran’s activities in the hemisphere, the Department’s annual terrorism report separately noted a noticeable increase in Iranian activity in all other parts of the world. At least some of that activity 

has been here in the Western Hemisphere. Just last week, for example, seven Iranians were caught using fake Israeli passports at 

the Vancouver International Airport. 

The growth of the Iranian extremist network in the Western 

Hemispheres has immediate repercussions for the security of the 

United States. The same day that Nisman and the State Department released their reports, an Iranian American used-car salesman from Texas was sentenced to 25 years in prison for his role 

17

in an Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the 

United States. The Director of National Intelligence assessed that 

that plot shows that some Iran officials, probably including the Supreme Leader himself, have changed their calculus and are now 

more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response 

to real or perceived U.S. actions threatening their regime. 

The bombing of the bus in Burgas a year ago last month was 

what spurred the European Union to even consider banning even 

just the military wing of Hezbollah, but that occurred on July 18th. 

Eighteen years ago that was the same day of the bombing of the 

AMIA center, which means that this hearing is well timed indeed. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Braun. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL A. BRAUN, CO-FOUNDER AND 

MANAGING PARTNER, SPECTRE GROUP INTERNATIONAL, 

LLC (FORMER CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION) 

Mr. BRAUN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, 

Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Deutch and Sires, honorable 

members of both subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to 

participate in this very, very important hearing today on Iran’s 

growing influence in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Europe, and 

Asia, Mr. Chabot, on the recent Department of State report that 

addresses the matter. 

It is hard to talk about what we don’t know with respect to this 

threat. So let us focus on what we do know, some of which you already talked about. But let me provide you a little bit more granularity that I think will be even more shocking to the statements 

that have already been made by many. 

So let us talk about the facts. Let us talk about the evidence that 

can, and already has, passed the judicial test in Federal courthouses right here in the United States. Let us talk about 

Hezbollah’s growing involvement in the Western Hemisphere, in 

Africa, Asia, and elsewhere; Iran’s most important terrorist proxy, 

as you have said. And let us talk about the RGC’s Quds Force and 

what they have been up to, more specifically, or most specifically, 

in the Western Hemisphere over just the past few years. 

Just about 18 months ago, as you have said, Quds Force 

operatives were attempting to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the U.S. right here in Washington, DC; in fact, just a 

few blocks from the White House. They thought they were recruiting members of the ultraviolent Los Zetas drug cartel in Mexico, 

which should be shocking in and of itself. Fortunately, they were 

recruiting DEA operatives, and the DEA and the FBI foiled that 

plot. 

The Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, 

partially at least also designated by the E.U. now, is heavily involved and has grown heavily involved over the past few years in 

the global cocaine trade, and it is involved heavily at the center of 

gravity for that activity. The center of gravity has always been, and 

always will be, the Andean region of South America and the transshipment routes that permeate and has been built over many years 

encompassing the north coast of Colombia and Venezuela, the 

isthmus of Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico. 

A growing number of international conspiracy investigations as 

a result of that activity by U.S. Federal law enforcement paint an 

ominous picture of Hezbollah’s presence in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere. 

Just one dimension of just one DEA investigative effort against 

Hezbollah focuses on the money-laundering aspect of their cocainetrafficking activities, and resulted in the seizure of $150 million by 

the Departments of Treasury and Justice just about a year and a 

half ago. The Beirut-based Lebanese Canadian Bank, long known 

to be heavily influenced by the Hezbollah and their preferred goto money-laundering financial facility, just recently settled with the 

33

Department of Justice as a result of that action, and the bank has 

agreed to forfeit $102 million. The bank was sold about 2 weeks 

after the PATRIOT Act 311 sanctions against that organization 

that were a result of the DEA and DOJ investigations. 

A more granular example, and I think even more shocking, 

though, is what is playing out, again, at a lower level, at a treetop level, Congresswoman, as your husband would probably say 

being a former marine, at a tree-top level, granular level, with the 

$20 million cash seizure made by the DEA and some foreign counterparts in Central America after a high-level Hezbollah associate 

actually delivered the bulk cash, $20 million, to an undercover 

DEA agent who was posing—who, by the way, spoke fluent Arabic 

and was posing as a money launderer. Remarkably, another $16 

million was supposed to have been delivered within 48 hours. Unfortunately that did not happen. The investigation was compromised, and I think is still being looked at. But suffice it to say 

that so much Hezbollah cocaine cash, bulk cash, was being 

amassed in Central America that they couldn’t figure out how to 

move it back to Lebanon—or to move it to Lebanon. 

Evidence clearly shows that Hezbollah is involved in the same 

kinds of activity that I have just described in Central America, in 

Africa, and other locations, as my statement for the record states. 

If anyone thinks for a moment, because there are some inferences 

in the Department of State report, that Hezbollah is on the rocks 

because they are reliant on funding from Iran, if anyone thinks for 

a moment that that is the case, they couldn’t be further from the 

truth. 

We have to look at things differently. It is the kind of criminal 

activity that I have just described above via Hezbollah, Iran’s most 

important proxy, and other terrorist organizations that make them 

organizationally and operationally sharp while they wait for the 

day of reckoning. It prepares them for war under very realistic conditions. It provides them with a real-world proving ground to continually test and refine their tactics, techniques and procedures as 

they continue to probe and prod those of their adversaries; namely, 

us. It is allowing them to prepare and shape the future battlefield 

right here at home. We need to somehow work harder at driving 

a wedge between these very powerful forces and keeping them separated. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Braun follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Farnsworth. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC FARNSWORTH, VICE PRESIDENT, 

COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS AND AMERICAS SOCIETY 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and Mr. Chairman, and ranking members, also members of the subcommittees, 

for this opportunity. I join my colleagues in expressing appreciation, and I thank you for the opportunity to testify with them as 

well. 

The State Department’s recent report on Iran’s presence in the 

Americas, as has already been mentioned, reminds us that Iranian 

interest in Latin America is of concern. Of course, we are dealing 

with imperfect information that is by its very nature shrouded, 

much of it classified or even unknown. What remains clear is this, 

however: Nations in the Americas that disrespect democratic principles tend also to be nations that offer aid and comfort to global 

actors who reject the norms of the international system. 

The best example of course, is Cuba, as you, Madam Chairman, 

and others, Mr. Sires, have clearly mentioned over many years, 

and we have seen that again as highlighted by the discovery in 

July of missiles and other weapons parts going through the Panama Canal intended for North Korea. 

It is also a fact that ungoverned regions within countries offer 

permissive environments for mischief making, and a weak interAmerican system offers little in terms of the ability to counterbalance extralegal or threatening acts from outside the region. 

Those countries where democracy is challenged, where the institutions of the state are ineffective, or where democratically elected 

leaders have curtailed sound democratic practices for their own 

purposes have proven to be the most likely portal through which 

unhelpful influences such as Iran are introduced into the region. 

Indeed, it was former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s intentional pursuit of Tehran and Tehran’s simultaneous need for allies 

that brought the two nations closer together and encouraged Iran 

to develop deeper ties with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Venezuela’s aggressive efforts to midwife Iran’s political and diplomatic 

entry into the Americas through reciprocal leaders’ visits, trade 

and commercial agreements, including direct air links, and friendly 

votes in bodies such as the United Nations and the International 

Atomic Energy Agency have been polarizing and counterproductive. 

The State Department report indicates that Iranian influence in 

Latin America and the Caribbean is waning. If so, in my view, that 

is largely due to the changing leadership matrix in the Americas, 

and potentially in Iran itself, in addition to the actions by the 

United States and its regional allies that the report describes. It 

is certainly possible that the death of Chavez will diminish Latin 

America’s appetite for Iran. It is also possible that despite the benefits to Iran that have clearly accrued from deepened relations in 

the Americas, the inauguration of new leadership in Iran may also 

diminish that country’s interest in the Americas; although support 

for Hezbollah activities, particularly in fundraising and money 

laundering, as we have heard, will certainly continue. This is something we need to watch carefully. 

42

However, if the bilateral relationship has been institutionalized 

to the point that it outlasts both Chavez and the outgoing 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and we have heard that it indeed is, it is 

also possible for the leaders, such as Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro, 

in attempting to build his own international profile and authority 

as Chavez’s rightful heir, may seek to develop the relationship further. This should be anticipated and steps taken in advance to 

limit the success of any such initiative. 

For the United States several actions are therefore appropriate 

in order to inoculate the hemisphere from further Iranian adventurism. First, we should continue to be watchful regarding Iranian 

influence in the Americas, while taking care not to act on incomplete information unnecessarily, or to take steps precipitously. 

Communication and coordination with our friends and allies in 

these matters, particularly law enforcement entities, is critical of 

course, as we work together to build an expected norm of responsible democratic behavior in the hemisphere. Sanctions against offending individuals and entities should continue to be employed. 

Second, we should continue to emphasize the hemispheric growth 

agenda, including trade and investment expansion, and the rule of 

law, which will help build strong and expanding middle classes and 

reinforce just, transparent societies that are less prone to authoritarian manipulations from elected leaders of any ideology. 

And finally, despite efforts to build democracy elsewhere around 

the world, the United States cannot be complacent about such matters closer to home. Democracy offers no guarantees, but we stand 

a much better chance of achieving our strategic goals in the hemisphere, including a peaceful, growing, vibrant region that works in 

tandem with us to address issues of common concern and rejects 

outside meddling, if democratic institutions in the Americas are 

strong. 

That requires doing the difficult work of democracy promotion, 

building institutions including separation of powers and electoral 

systems where the legitimate opposition has equal chance of contesting elections as government candidates do. It requires civic education efforts that inculcate democratic expectations among populations in order to reject the creeping authoritarianism that some 

democratic leaders have shown. It requires the United States to 

find its voice through more active and effective diplomacy to promote regional democracy. 

We need regional partners in this effort, but U.S. leadership will 

continue to be required. To the extent the United States is able to 

come alongside Latin America and the Caribbean to offer meaningful steps on a shared agenda, we will find that regional leaders 

may then reciprocate by becoming more actively engaged in support of U.S. priorities, one of which clearly must be to keep Iran 

and other malignant influences out of the Western Hemisphere. 

So I want to thank you again, Madam Chairman, Mr. Chairman, 

Ranking Members, for the opportunity, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farnsworth follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, gentlemen, and as a 

Cuban-born political refugee, I always say I never mind when I get 

interrupted by democracy at work. So with our deepest apologies, 

we have 1 minute and 47 seconds left to go vote, and if you could 

stick around and answer questions, we won’t be back until about 

an hour and a half. Democracy is like making sausage: It is not 

pretty, and it is long. So if you can stick around, we would welcome 

you. If not, we will ask one of you who can stick around. 

And with that—so I don’t want to impose upon you because it 

will take a while; a series of votes and a motion to recommit. So 

with that, our subcommittee will be adjourned, and we hope to 

hear also from Mr. Deutch’s opening statement when we return. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Great. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. All right. See you later. Hasta luego. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will once again resume. We 

have Mr. Meeks, and thank you, sir; and Chairman Salmon. So I 

will begin with my question. 

In the memo that we prepared for the members, it says here, 

Iran has 11 Embassies in the Latin America and Caribbean region, 

and you have all mentioned that. Since 2005, it has opened Embassies in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. 

This was in addition to existing Iranian Embassies in Argentina, 

Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela. Former SOUTHCOM Commander General Douglas Fraser testified to Congress in March 

2012 that Iran has 36 Shi’a cultural centers in 17 countries 

throughout Latin America. 

I think if more people in the United States knew this, they would 

be shocked, because usually Embassies are there to process visas 

for folks who want to travel, along with many other things. Some 

have called our Embassies ‘‘islands of democracy,’’ so I like that. 

Certainly that term cannot be applied to Iranian Embassies, and 

I can’t imagine that there are many Latin American citizens who 

in and of themselves would have decided, hey, I know where we 

should vacation. Let us take the kids and go to Iran. 

So one has to wonder, what are these 11 Embassies in Latin 

America and the Caribbean region doing, and what are these 36 

Shi’a cultural centers in 17 countries throughout Latin America 

doing? How good is our information on this? How many people are 

in these Embassies or cultural centers, because certainly they have 

got to be dens of plotting anti-American activities, anti-Semitic 

acts. And I wanted to ask our esteemed witnesses what your 

thoughts are about the Shi’a cultural centers sponsored by Iran 

and about the 11 Embassies in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

We will start with Dr. Levitt. 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you so much. 

The most honest and accurate answer to your question is we 

don’t know, certainly in the open source, and my sense is that 

there is an intel gap, too, as to exactly how many people and exactly what are they up to. But there is precedent, and the precedent, while not necessarily giving enough detail to answer for 

today, is telling. 

Again, if we go back to AMIA, we have detailed documentation 

of Iranian front companies, Iranian use of Iranian-built and -fundVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:55 Oct 28, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\080113\82311 HFA PsN: SHIRL
48

ed mosques, of the cultural centers, of import-export companies, 

travel offices, all of which were put to use for either operational 

logistical purposes or for espionage. Rabbani, for example, recruited 

a whole bunch of people in Argentina from within the Shi’a community. Others were Iranians who were employed at the Embassy 

under diplomatic cover. He himself got diplomatic cover just weeks 

before the bombing. And some of these people were referred to by 

members of the community as his, that is to say Iran’s, antennas, 

because it was well known that this is what they were doing. 

The real question for me also is not just the number, but in certain locations. I have been told that in certain locations there is 

very large Embassies completely out of proportion to Iran’s business or other interests in the country, in some very small countries, 

and that is something that we need to be concerned about. 

So some of the suggestions I have offered to Congress before on 

this is, you know, Iranians are allowed into this country because 

of their diplomatic presence in New York, but their travel is severely limited. What they can do is severely limited. And we should 

be pressing our allies in South America to do the same. You don’t 

necessarily have to shut down the Iranian diplomatic missions, but 

you do need to keep them to a certain size. We should convince 

them to limit their travel, limit the kind of meetings they can hold, 

because clearly there is stuff happening out of these facilities that 

goes above and beyond what would be considered normal diplomatic activity. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Braun. 

Mr. BRAUN. Thank you, ma’am. 

You know, what is going on, as Matt said, you know, we don’t 

really know. What concerns me most, though, is the Embassies, the 

cultural centers all provide cover, top cover, for the growing presence of the Quds Force, the IRGC Special Forces that are responsible for foreign operations, clandestine operations, which include 

assassinations. We talked about that earlier with the recent attempt on the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., his life, here in Washington, DC. 

What also worries me, and, you know, I lose sleep over this, is 

this concurrent growing presence of not just Quds Force, but, 

again, concurrently of Hezbollah all over Latin America, the Caribbean, and in some other parts of the world. You know, what exactly 

it means, I am not sure, but after 38 years in this business, it is 

not good. And, you know, I learned over many years to rely on my 

sixth sense, and my sixth sense again says, you know, this is potentially, you know, a disaster that is looming over our head, and 

we better get serious about addressing it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So you see a military tinge to this? 

Mr. BRAUN. Absolutely. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Farnsworth. 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Well, just very briefly, it is curious that this 

increase in activity, increase in personnel, increase in connection, 

if you want to put it that way, has been fairly recent. I mean, 

Iran’s relations in the Western Hemisphere actually go back quite 

a ways because of agricultural links and energy links and all that, 

49

but what currently exists seems to far outweigh certainly the traditional relations that Iran has had in the region, and they do seem 

to have tracked with a certain political emphasis that the Iranians 

have had in the Western Hemisphere, largely, again, in my view, 

brought into the region in that way through the Chavez regime in 

Venezuela. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Let me just ask, just out of curiosity, it seems as though—and 

I know Mr. Farnsworth has said that they had this agricultural, 

et cetera, but it seems like that Iran’s activities in the Western 

Hemisphere really grew in 2005 with the election of Ahmadinejad. 

And is it likely that Iran’s strategic objectives in the Western 

Hemisphere—I am just throwing this out—will change, or do you 

think it will be the same under this President Rouhani, which happens to, you know—and what happens to the relationship that 

Ahmadinejad may have fostered? Do you think that is going to 

change? Does it have anything to do with Ahmadinejad, or do you 

think that, you know, the same kind of thing is going to continue? 

Mr. LEVITT. First of all, while they might have increased under 

Ahmadinejad, the relationships go back to the 1980s, and especially agricultural issues, importing beef and chicken. And, in fact, 

when the Government of Argentina in the 1990s cancelled a nuclear agreement with Iran because of concerns that Iran’s nuclear 

program might not be peaceful—sounds familiar—Iran threatened 

to cut off all of this significant economic contact. 

But I worry that people have too much hope for this new President Mr. Rouhani. He is considered a moderate, but I include in 

my written testimony some declassified intelligence over the past 

years on the CIA’s assessment of past Iranian Presidents who were 

considered moderate, Rafsanjani and Khatami in particular, and 

they are noting at the time that while these people were moderate 

in some ways, their support for the nuclear program and their support for terrorism waned not one bit. And indeed, if there were a 

President who might be inclined to tamper down support for terrorism, which doesn’t seem to be the case, but if there were such 

a President, the President would not have the authority to do it, 

only the Supreme Leader would. 

Mr. MEEKS. One of the reasons why I asked the question, because I think you are right in that regard, but there was a relationship prior to Hugo Chavez, and I am nervous, and as well as the 

fact that, you know, when you look at Ahmadinejad, there was a 

lot of false promises he made to individuals there; for example, the 

billion dollars that he promised to Daniel Ortega that Daniel Ortega never got, you know. And I think one of you testified to the 

fact that there is new leadership that is being elected in Central 

and South America, and the new leadership will look at some of 

those issues, I think, also, and could that cause them to look at differing the ties, those that even may have ties now, with Iran. What 

do you think? Give me your thoughts on that, Mr. Farnsworth. 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Well, thank you very much, and thank you for 

your continued leadership, Mr. Meeks, on Western Hemisphere 

issues as well. 

50

I think that is something that we are watching very carefully. 

What we saw is really interesting. For example, in Brazil, when 

the previous President Lula da Silva was in power, you saw a state 

visit of the Brazilian leader to Tehran in 2010. You saw some outreach that was certainly uncomfortable for the United States and 

other Western countries, if not counterproductive. But since the 

election of Dilma Rousseff a couple of years ago, she has changed 

Brazil’s posture with reference to Iran. She has actually spoken out 

against the Iranian regime. And I think that is the type of thing 

we have to take seriously in terms of the Western Hemisphere. 

There are political changes under way. We don’t know where 

Nicolas Maduro is going to take Venezuela, but he has a lot of very 

difficult domestic political issues he has to resolve right now, and 

I think we can assume that at least in the near term he is not 

going to strike the same international posture with Iran that Hugo 

Chavez did because he has got a lot of political difficulties at home 

he has got to deal with to solidify his own base. 

In my view, again, the reason why Iran took advantage, and I 

do put it that way on purpose, of the Venezuelan invitation into the 

Western Hemisphere to really bolster their presence was they saw 

a target of opportunity, and for his own purposes Hugo Chavez 

really wanted to portray himself and build himself as the anti-imperialist, anti-American, anti-Western country, and in order to do 

that, he had to make common cause with some real rejectionist 

powers around the world, and so he actively pursued the Iranians. 

They saw a target of opportunity. They went in, they have moved 

aggressively. 

Now we have got a leadership change in Caracas. We don’t know 

what is going to happen, but we do have to watch it carefully, and 

I think we can look at similar changes that may be under way with 

other elections in the region. That is one reason why I think it is 

so important that as a hemisphere community we continue to focus 

on democracy development, and one of those aspects——

Mr. MEEKS. With that, because I have a limited amount of time, 

democracy development, is there a role for the OAS in this, in trying to help and work together? 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Absolutely. And I think one of the—what happens when leaders, even if they are serially reelected, if they remain in power for year after year after year, that can deepen actually those relations with Iran that a new President may not, in 

fact, find in his or her interests. And so that change at the top 

through democratic processes, I think, is, first of all, on its face an 

important aspect of democracy, but in the concept of national security, that also has important dividends to pay. And I think from 

that perspective absolutely the OAS has to be a part of that, and 

that is why I would like to see a more robust posture of the OAS 

toward things like election monitoring, and democracy development. 

And you have mentioned a couple countries; I would mention 

similar ones. But we are approaching now another round of elections in the Western Hemisphere in many countries. This year and 

next year it is going to be really important that democracy and the 

electoral process remains clean, open and transparent, and that the 

51

opposition has a legitimate chance to actually contest for those 

elections. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

I think the OAS is there to make the Senate look like an active 

body, but we shall see. 

My friend, my colleague Chairman Salmon is recognized. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Okay. So the statutorily required report that State Department 

recently rendered says that the influence of Iran is waning in the 

Western Hemisphere. As I listened to the testimony given today, 

I sure don’t sense that you echo that sentiment that it is waning. 

And so my first question would be—and I am calling for speculation, okay? So you can’t say, I can’t speculate. I want you to speculate. Why the report that kind of glosses over everything, why do 

you believe—what could be the motivation, or was it just that they 

looked at the wrong criteria? Anybody care to take it on? 

Mr. LEVITT. My colleagues will be happy to throw me under the 

bus and let me go first. 

I asked the same question you did, and I asked a lot of people 

around town, and I am convinced that this is an unexcusable classic example of left hand-right hand. My understanding is that the 

people who wrote this report did not in a timely manner consult 

with people who would have the information. Those people, both 

within the Department and elsewhere, are quite upset that they 

were not properly consulted. It is my understanding that the State 

Department as such, the building, does not agree with everything 

in this report. There are parts of the building that are quite upset 

with it. And those agencies and departments who have information 

that might have been able to be used in this report, I think, are 

quite annoyed. 

I haven’t—I no longer have my clearances, I didn’t see the classified version, but the unclassified version appears to have been written by an intern. 

Mr. SALMON. By an intern? 

Mr. LEVITT. By an intern. 

Mr. SALMON. I hope it is an A student intern. 

Mr. LEVITT. Well, I wouldn’t have given it an A. 

Mr. SALMON. An incomplete? 

Mr. LEVITT. I don’t think it is complete. And even the report 

itself indicates that some of the key points, the conclusion, if you 

will, that Iran’s activities are waning was itself put in the unclassified version at the very top under a section labeled ‘‘Assumptions.’’

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Anybody else? I don’t want to get you in any trouble, but I really 

am interested. 

Mr. BRAUN. Listen, I don’t think you are going to get any of us 

in trouble, but I would echo what Matt said. I think that the report 

obviously was written in a vacuum. I don’t think that the authors 

physically met with probably some of the most important players 

in town who aren’t going to typically—and I spent 33 years in government, so I have got a sense for how this stuff works. 

You know, a lot of this can’t be answered, you know, in open 

emails and that kind of thing. You ultimately have to reduce them 

52

to classified reporting to respond to—you know, to the questions or 

the inquiries that are coming in. So——

Mr. SALMON. Kind of like garbage in, garbage out? 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, there you go, left hand-right hand. 

Mr. SALMON. Right. 

Mr. BRAUN. You know, another analogy. 

You know, I think it was poorly put together, I think it was done 

so, just the unclassified piece of it. I have still got my clearances, 

but I don’t have a direct need to know, so I did not read the classified side of this either. 

You know, suffice it to say I think it was poorly written by unseasoned probably analysts that contributed, and I would sense 

that there wasn’t strong leadership involved as well, and, again, I 

base that not on direct knowledge, it is very much speculation, but 

that is based on 33 years in government. 

Mr. SALMON. And that is what I asked for. 

Did you care to make a comment? 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. No. 

Mr. SALMON. Okay. I have one other question. Given the many 

other ways in which Argentina is emulating Venezuela’s behavior, 

including its crackdown on the independent press, on the judiciary; 

its uncompensated nationalization of private assets; its defiance of 

U.S. and international legal judgment; its warming relations with 

other rogue nations, how far do you think Argentina is willing to 

go to work with Venezuela to continue increasing Iran’s ability to 

evade sanctions? 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, I think the question should be not only Argentina, but how far is Ecuador going, how far is Bolivia going, how 

far is Paraguay going? And, in my mind, I think you can take this 

back to, you know, pre—even pre-9/11, the pre-9/11 era when we 

packed up SOUTHCOM and moved from theater. You know, we 

moved SOUTHCOM to Miami. And Miami is a wonderful place. 

Miami is a wonderful place, and just recently visited again, but, 

you know, we don’t have—and then couple that, Mr. Salmon, with 

the fact that post-9/11 well over 60 percent of our military’s detection and monitoring assets packed up and moved to other parts of 

the world, and they have never returned. And you had a diminished or, I should say, a decreased level of Federal law enforcement 

presence in theater, and our intelligence services because they also 

went to other parts of the world, and look at what has happened. 

I mean, should this be any surprise to anyone? I think not. But 

it is something that I believe we can turn around. I don’t think it 

would cost us an enormous amount of money to do. But I will tell 

you, we better get focused on this at some very high levels before 

it bites us in the posterior. 

Mr. SALMON. I have run out of time. I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Excellent questions. 

Mr. Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And, Madam Chairman, if it is okay, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter 

my opening remarks into the record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you to the witnesses for coming and staying. 

53

One of my concerns about Iran’s role in the region is that it is 

increasingly attempting to use the relationships there as a mechanism for circumventing sanctions. And I am increasingly concerned 

about Ecuador, which I don’t think we have had a chance to discuss yet today. Not only has Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa 

repeatedly reaffirmed his support for Iran, but Ecuador and Iran 

have attempted to establish illicit banking channels, and, perhaps 

most importantly, Ecuador’s currency is the dollar. So our Iran 

sanctions regime has gone to great lengths to ensure that Iran does 

not have access to the dollar, but essentially any trade with Ecuador has the potential to undermine that. Therefore, given that we 

know that Iran often fails to follow through on their public promises, how significant is their bilateral trade, number one? What impacts could that have on our sanctions regime? And what should 

the U.S. be doing now to stop that? I would throw that out to any 

of you that would like to answer. 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Well, thank you for the question, Mr. Deutch, 

and let me simply say if I can that I think this has been one of 

the most troubling aspects of Iran’s entry into the Western Hemisphere, if you want to put it that way, the ability or the effort to 

evade international sanctions, no question about it. I would point 

to some of the financial issues that you did. I would point to the 

offers of gasoline from Venezuela that should clearly be in violation 

of international sanctions against Iran. And more importantly even 

than that, in my view, is the political imprimatur that relations 

with some of the countries in Latin America has given the Iranian 

regime as a legitimate global player. 

And this is a real problem when you are trying to create an 

international regime in a political science sense or an international 

institution of sanctions against a certain country to have other 

countries that willfully go out of their way to try to create avenues 

to break those sanctions. And I think some of the things you pointed to, we have seen reports of financial relations with Ecuador, and 

we have seen certainly some sanctions that the U.S. Government 

has taken against financial entities in Ecuador as well. 

I think those have to be watched very, very carefully. I haven’t 

seen the classified information around some of those activities, but 

I would suggest that the ability to circumvent some of the international sanctions by Iran certainly is one of the most troubling aspects of this whole scenario. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And before seeking your input, gentlemen, just to 

follow up a bit, in 2008, the Central Bank of Ecuador agreed to accept $120 million in deposits from the Export Development Bank 

of Iran, which Treasury sanctioned for advancing Iran’s WMD programs. In 2012, another state-owned Ecuadorean bank opened corresponding accounts with sanctioned Iranian banking institutions 

through a state-owned Russian bank. There have also been discussions of clandestine selling of the Ecuadorean bank to sanctioned 

Iranian banks. 

Obviously, this is all incredibly disconcerting, but the question is 

whether this type of behavior is a trend that we should anticipate. 

Iran trying to move into the region and what we have seen here 

in Ecuador, should we expect that they are going to try to replicate 

that throughout the region? 

54

Mr. LEVITT. Yes, in a nutshell. Ecuador may be unique because 

of the nature of the regime’s interest in sticking its finger in Washington’s eye and because it is based on the dollar, but we should 

expect to see more of this. 

The good news is that we actually have a whole lot of tools at 

our disposal for trying to deal with such behavior up to and including 311 action, and 311 action can be used, by the way, not only 

against a bank, as it has been used in the past. It can be used 

against a jurisdiction, it can be used against a country, it can be 

used against a part of a country, it can be used almost against any 

type of entity you can imagine. There are lots of ways, and before 

you use it, of course, it is diplomatic leverage to say you are considering such use. That would be devastating for the country in question, and so there are lots of ways to go about trying to convince 

them to change their behavior. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Braun? 

Mr. BRAUN. You know, I would, I think, a bit more forcefully just 

add to what I said earlier. I mean, what is happening in Ecuador 

is not uncommon. You know, we are seeing it play out through not 

only all of Latin America or much of Latin America, but we are 

also seeing it play out in West Africa, North Africa, and throughout 

Europe now. 

I don’t want to—you know, listen, I am the former Federal narcotics guy on this panel, and I don’t want to oversimplify it, but, 

sir, you missed a little bit earlier my opening comments. The 

Hezbollah is now responsible for generating hundreds of millions of 

dollars of revenue, contraband revenue, each year because of their 

expanding and growing involvement in the global cocaine trade, 

and all of the places that I have just discussed, not strangely it is 

pretty evident in my eyes after 33 years in this business it lines 

up perfectly. And, you know, when you factor in some other things, 

you know, that I have mentioned here, you know, the concurrent 

growing expansion of Quds Force and Hezbollah—let us never forget that it was the Quds that stood them up. They came up with 

the concept, they stood them up, they developed them, they have 

nurtured them over many, many years, and many experts now believe that it is the Quds that actually manage and direct some of 

the Hezbollah’s more sophisticated activities around the globe. 

You know, it is all part and parcel of this growing confluence between the international drug trade and other transnational criminal activity and terrorist organizations. The President himself has 

remarked about this on several occasions recently, you know, that 

he and the White House have seen this growing confluence, and, 

you know, we have to do a better job at, again, driving a wedge 

between these very powerful forces as they come together. 

We are drifting further apart, the good guys, quite frankly, in 

this town. You have got counternarcotics strategies, you have got 

counterterrorism strategies, and the two are not interlocking. The 

funding streams are absolutely separated; there are no singular 

funding streams. We have got to have interlocking strategies. We 

have got to have singular funding streams. As they grow closer together, we are drifting further apart. It needs to get turned around. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

55

And I am so pleased to turn to Mr. Duncan, who, as we had 

pointed out, was the author of the bill that called for this report. 

Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Isaiah 5:20: What are those who call evil good and good evil, who 

put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for 

sweet and sweet for bitter? 

I believe the State Department failed in its mission given to 

them by a bipartisan effort of Congress, signed into law by President Obama. I believe there was a preconceived or a predetermined 

conclusion, and that justified the methods in their report. 

So I have got a few questions, and bear with me, and I will start 

with Mr. Braun. 

Hezbollah was primarily formed in what country? Michael? 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, Lebanon, but, you know, suffice it to say that 

it was Iran that was managing the—I am sorry. You know, Iran, 

but——

Mr. DUNCAN. Primarily Lebanon. 

Mr. BRAUN. Yeah, Lebanon, but suffice it to say that it was Iran 

that managed and directed every bit of that through the Quds 

Force, the special—you know, the Iran special forces, the elite folks 

that are responsible for global clandestine operations. 

Mr. DUNCAN. It is an Iranian proxy primarily formed in Lebanon 

back in the late 1970s, early 1980s, and has been active ever since. 

So the triborder region, primarily a hub for activity of what nonforeign terrorist organization? 

Mr. BRAUN. You have had a long-standing interest on the part 

of Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda and others in the triborder 

area, the Western Hemisphere’s usual suspects, the FARC, the 

Sendero, and others. But, you know, Hezbollah and al Qaeda and 

Hamas have been at work in the triborder area not for years, but 

they have been down there for decades. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. AMIA bombings, the plan and the op was 

hatched and carried out from where? Dr. Levitt? 

Mr. LEVITT. Lebanon, Iran, and then in Argentina, the triborder 

area. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Triborder area, okay. 

When I met with the Paraguayans in the triborder region, they 

showed and shared with us the Hezbollah activity and as well as 

the Lebanese travel documents that allowed Lebanese individuals 

to come into the triborder region and change out, or forge, or 

change their identity and actually travel throughout the South 

American region, okay? 

Dr. Levitt, you mentioned in a statement on July 9th, a Homeland Security hearing that you couldn’t attend because you were in 

Europe convincing the European Parliament to do the right thing 

and name Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist organization, which 

thankfully they have done in the last 2 weeks. I am going to enter, 

without objection, his testimony to the Homeland Security Committee written July 9th. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

[The information referred to is not reprinted here but is available 

in committee records on the Internet at: http://

56

www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/

LevittTestimony20130709-House.pdf.] 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

On page 8, Dr. Levitt, you say that—you mentioned the 

Hezbollah activity in Latin America, and you specifically reference 

in at least one instance a highly trained Hezbollah operative, 

Mahmaoud—I pronounced that wrong—Youssef Kourani succeeded 

in sneaking across the border into the U.S. through Mexico in the 

trunk of a car. Kourani paid the owner of a Lebanese cafe in Tijuana $4,000 to smuggle him across the border in February 2001. 

The cafe owner—and I am not going to pronounce his name—admitted to assisting more than 300 Lebanese sneak into the U.S. in 

similar fashion over a 3-year period; is that correct? 

Mr. LEVITT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. So we know or we believe that there are Iranian Government officials in the U.S. right now. Some of them are 

spies for Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence Security, or MOIS. Others 

may be members of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard, 

IRGC, or Quds Force. Indeed IRGC members assigned to the Iranian mission at the United Nations in New York have repeatedly 

been expelled from this country for conducting preoperational surveillance of potential terror targets. 

So in light of what the State Department did or did not say in 

their assessment that the Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere is waning, what action are you to believe that State should 

take to mitigate this threat? And I ask that to Dr. Levitt and to 

Mr. Braun. 

Mr. LEVITT. There are lots of different things that can and 

should be done. The first is I think there is a need for a scrub of 

the next report that delves into these issues a lot more carefully. 

But there are lots of other things that can be done, and we 

should be trying to come at this through multiple different angles. 

In the current report the State Department stressed its success at 

leveraging diplomatic relationships, and that is not to be scoffed at. 

There is a lot that can be done by working with allies to make this 

region less hospitable to groups like the Quds Force or Hezbollah. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask you this: Did it surprise you that the 

State Department didn’t even talk to any of the allies in this region? 

Mr. LEVITT. It did. It did. It should not just be a diplomatic effort, though. Mike can tell you better than I, there is so much that 

can be done at the law enforcement level in terms of cooperation 

on counternarcotics or other things. And I will give you a tangible 

example that gets back to the AMIA case that we have centered 

this testimony around. 

After the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy from Buenos 

Aires, nothing was done all that serious, and then less than 2 years 

later the AMIA Jewish Community Center was bombed as well. 

One of the things that the U.S. Government—and some of the leadership here was from State Counterterrorism at the time—took it 

upon itself to lead through law enforcement and intelligence channels something that became known as Operation Double Tap. Operation Double Tap didn’t involve the T word, ‘‘terrorism,’’ and it 

didn’t involve the H word, ‘‘Hezbollah.’’ It just involved us working 

57

with our allies, their intelligence and law enforcement services 

with ours, to identify bad actors—almost every single one of them 

is also involved in all kinds of criminal activity, whether it is in 

the triborder, as you said, or elsewhere, the human smuggling 

cases cited or many, many others—and simply Al Capone-ing them 

and trying them for tax evasion, for example, or other things, and 

it was very successful. It was disruptive to their activities, and in 

some cases we actually saw people from South America leaving the 

region, even if they weren’t themselves targeted, but because the 

pressure was getting too hot, and going elsewhere; for example, to 

Africa. 

So there is lots of different tools in our toolbox, and I can’t tell 

you what we are or are not doing, because that is classified; and 

it is not that I know and can’t tell you, I don’t know anymore. But 

this report doesn’t suggest to me to reflect the reality as I understand it. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Braun? 

Mr. BRAUN. Mr. Duncan, I mean, you have heard me say this before. I think first and foremost the most important thing we have 

got to do is, again, demand interlocking counternarcotics/transnational criminal activity strategies with counterterrorism strategies. You have got departments and you have got agencies in this 

town that are attempting to address both threats, and they are not 

even talking internally, much less externally. 

There are strategies that are developed and have been developed 

routinely over the past few years; as an example focused on Latin 

America, a counternarcotics strategy for Latin America that doesn’t 

even mention the word ‘‘terrorism’’ anywhere. The Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia, for God’s sakes. The case study has 

been around since 1964. 

There are state sponsorship. The Soviet Union, or the old Soviet 

Union, comes apart at the seams, that funding stream dries up almost overnight. And what they had been fundamentally opposed to, 

diabolically opposed to, and that was getting involved in the cocaine trade, literally they made a decision unanimously, the FARC 

Executive Secretariat, with less than 5 minutes of discussion in the 

early 1990s, that they were making a monumental change. It was 

the only way they were going to keep their movement alive. 

And as we continue to successfully prosecute the global war on 

terror—that may not be politically correct these days—but as we 

continue to press hard on the global war on terror, you are going 

to see more and more of these groups that are left with no choice. 

They have got to and they will inevitably turn to transnational 

criminal activity, organized crime, to keep their movements alive. 

That is what Hezbollah is doing, Hamas, Abu Sayyaf. You know, 

you can go right down the line. Well over 70, 75 percent of all of 

the designated foreign terrorist organizations are now involved in 

this activity, and we are not doing enough to turn it around. 

A couple other things real quick. We have got to break our obsession with developing strategies to defend the 1-yard line, meaning 

our southwest border and our northern border. We can’t take our 

eyes off of them, but we need to get more resources downrange, like 

I talked about earlier, so that we can counter these threats when 

they are 1,000 miles out, rather than when they are on our border, 

58

or, God forbid, we have already talked about this, inside our border. The threat is already inside of our border. Let us, you know, 

gate it off, let us fence it off as best we can and get a handle on 

this situation. 

And then finally, and this is extremely important, we have really 

got to revitalize a focus on the traditional threats. If our Federal 

law enforcement, and State and local counterparts, and our foreign 

counterparts, as Matt was saying, you know, got refocused on 

drugs, guns, money, humans, counterfeiting, extremely important, 

countercorruption, those kinds of things take our law enforcement 

headlong straight in to terrorist operatives and the organizations 

that they represent. And we have seen that play out time and time 

again with the DEA investigations over the past few years that I 

have talked about and that Matt has talked about many times, and 

certainly that you all know about. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. 

The chairwoman has been very gracious with the time, but I will 

remind the committee of Isaiah 5:20. We have got to be able to talk 

about the enemy of this country and this war on terror. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Amen. 

Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your patience. You have been 

incredible witnesses. Not only was your testimony just so on point, 

but you were gracious enough to wait for us to do the people’s business, and for that we thank you. And I have every confidence that 

with the leadership of Matt Salmon and Albio Sires, we will finally 

get the State Department to come and testify in an open setting 

on the issue of Iran’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. May 

it be thus. 

Mr. Deutch and I say muchas gracias, thank you so much. It was 

a pleasure. And with that the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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