IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

DONNELLE HORSEY, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

B. MASON, 

 Respondent. 

 No. 4:24-CV-00825 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

DECEMBER 12, 2024 

 Petitioner Donnelle Horsey initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Horsey challenges his first denial 

of parole, claiming that the Pennsylvania Parole Board’s decision violated his 

constitutional rights. For the following reasons, the Court will deny Horsey’s 

Section 2254 petition.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Horsey is currently serving a 25- to 50-year sentence for—among other 

serious offenses—rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and statutory 

sexual assault, which sentence was entered in 2001 by the Court of Common Pleas 

of Philadelphia County.1

 His controlling minimum and maximum incarceration 

1

 See Doc. 13-5 at 4; Commonwealth v. Horsey, Nos. CP-51-CR-0904281-1999, CP-51-CR0904451-1999 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cnty.). 

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2 

dates are April 21, 2024, and April 21, 2049, respectively.2 Horsey was denied 

parole on December 26, 2023—his first such parole hearing and denial.3

 

In its denial, the Parole Board provided the following reasons for its 

decision: 

 [Horsey’s] risk and needs assessment indicating [his] level of risk to the 

community.

 Reports, evaluations and assessment/level of risk indicates [Horsey’s] 

risk to the community. 

 [Horsey’s] failure to demonstrate motivation for success. 

 [Horsey’s] minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the 

offense(s) committed. 

 [Horsey’s] refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed. 

 [Horsey’s] lack of remorse for the offense(s) committed. 

 Other factors deemed pertinent in determining that [Horsey] should not 

be paroled: repeat sexual offender. 

 The nature of [Horsey’s] crime.4

The Parole Board further noted that Horsey would next be reviewed for parole “in 

or after” December 2025.5

2

 Doc. 13-3 at 3. 

3

 See Doc. 13-6. 

4

 Id. at 2. 

5

 Id. at 3. 

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Horsey filed the instant Section 2254 petition on May 20, 2024.6 He then 

amended his petition several days later.7

 Respondent was served with Horsey’s 

amended petition and memorandum of law and timely filed a response.8

 Horsey 

eventually filed a traverse that complied with the Local Rules of Court,9

 and his 

Section 2254 petition is now ripe for disposition. 

II. DISCUSSION

Horsey contends that the Parole Board’s denial of parole was “unfair[], 

arbitrary[], capricious[], and unconstitutional[].”10 In his lengthy memorandum of 

law, he appears to assert two claims: (1) the Parole Board “abused its discretion” 

when it “compelled” him to admit to criminal offenses, including dismissed or 

voluntarily withdrawn (“nolle prosequi”) charges, in violation of his constitutional 

right against self-incrimination; and (2) the Parole Board “abused its discretion” by 

giving boilerplate reasoning for its denial to disguise racial discrimination and 

prejudice against sex offenders, violating Horsey’s Fourteenth Amendment 

substantive due process and equal protection rights.11 Neither claim is 

substantiated, and the Court will accordingly deny habeas relief.12

6

 See generally Doc. 1. 

7

 See generally Doc. 8. 

8

 See Docs. 9, 13. 

9

 See Docs. 15, 16, 18-20. 

10 Doc. 8 at 1. 

11 See Doc. 8 at 1; Doc. 8-1 at 8, 9, 14. 

12 Respondent alternatively contends that Horsey failed to exhaust administrative remedies, so 

his petition should be dismissed. The Court, however, may forgo an exhaustion analysis and 

deny a habeas petition that fails on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a 

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A. Claim 1 – Self-Incrimination

In his first claim, Horsey contends that the Parole Board violated his Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination as applied to the states through the 

Fourteenth Amendment. He maintains that the Parole Board “compelled [him] to 

admit to the past crimes including unconvicted [sic] crimes during his testimony at 

the parole board hearing,” thus “subjecting [him] to possible future criminal 

liability in order to make parole[.]”13

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no 

person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”14 

The Fifth Amendment applies with equal force to prisoners already convicted and 

imprisoned for an offense, prohibiting them from being compelled to bear witness 

against themselves or incriminate themselves in other criminal prosecutions.15 To 

establish a Fifth Amendment violation, a defendant “must demonstrate two key 

elements: compulsion and use.”16

Horsey’s Fifth Amendment claim fails at both elements. First, he has not 

alleged or established how he was compelled to admit to “unconvicted” criminal 

behavior. Horsey simply asserts—without elaboration—that the Parole Board 

writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant 

to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”). 

13 Doc. 8-1 at 11. 

14 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 

15 Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 

U.S. 420, 426 (1984)). 

16 Id.

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(somehow) “compelled” him to confess guilt to dismissed or voluntarily 

withdrawn charges. It is possible that Horsey is claiming that he was compelled 

through the threat of denial of parole. Yet to show compulsion, which is “the 

linchpin” of a Fifth Amendment claim,17 a prisoner must face “the threat of 

consequences so ‘grave’ as to leave him no choice at all.”18 Horsey has not made 

such a showing or even proffered an allegation thereof. The mere threat of denial 

of parole—to which Horsey has no right or entitlement under Pennsylvania law—

is not sufficient by itself to show compulsion for a Fifth Amendment claim.19

Horsey does not explicitly state that he was forced to choose between 

admitting to conduct underlying dismissed charges or being denied parole. In fact, 

the Parole Board provided multiple unrelated reasons for its denial, including 

Horsey’s risk to the community, his failure to demonstrate motivation for success, 

and his status of being a repeat sexual offender. Yet even if the Court assumes for 

the sake of argument that Horsey was faced with this binary choice, it would not 

rise to the level of compulsion required for a Fifth Amendment claim.20 Horsey’s 

“sentence has not been lengthened, nor have the actual conditions of his 

imprisonment been altered.”21 Simply put, Horsey’s allegations—even if 

17 Id. at 210. 

18 Id. at 211 (citation omitted). 

19 See id. at 214-15. 

20 See id.

21 Id. at 214. 

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construed in the most black-and-white terms and taken as true—would not 

establish compulsion under the Fifth Amendment. 

Second, Horsey has not established that his statements during the parole 

hearing were or could be used against him. That is, Horsey has not alleged or 

established the “use” element of a Fifth Amendment claim. In fact, it is unclear if 

Horsey admitted to the dismissed charges or exercised his right to remain silent. 

Regardless, even if Horsey is somehow arguing that an admission or refusal to 

admit was used against him in the parole determination itself, that argument is a 

nonstarter, as parole proceedings are not criminal prosecutions.22

B. Claim 2 – Substantive Due Process

In his second claim, Horsey contends that his substantive due process and 

equal protection rights were violated by the Parole Board’s denial. He alleges that 

the Parole Board used “boilerplate” reasoning to disguise “racial discrimination” 

and prejudice toward sex offenders. While invoking two separate clauses of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, Horsey is essentially claiming that his parole denial was 

based on impermissible criteria and thus violates substantive due process. 

The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause “contains a substantive 

component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of 

22 Cf. United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“A parole revocation hearing 

is not a criminal prosecution.”); see Richardson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 236 F. Supp. 3d 168, 

170-71 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Parole proceedings are not criminal prosecutions.”). 

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the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”23 With respect to parole 

determinations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held 

that a parole board’s decision can violate an inmate’s substantive due process 

rights if it applies “standards that are divorced from the policy and purpose of 

parole” or other “impermissible criteria.”24 Specifically, the specter of a 

substantive due process violation is raised only when “a parole board considers a 

factor that ‘shocks the conscience.’”25 If, however, there is “some basis” for the 

parole board’s decision, and that basis is not “constitutionally impermissible” or 

conscience-shocking, a substantive due process challenge will fail.26

Horsey’s substantive due process claim is meritless. His allegations that the 

Parole Board’s decision was driven by invidious discrimination are entirely 

speculative. His bald assertions that he “was denied parole because he is black and 

not white” and because he “is a black sex offender rather than a white sex 

offender”27 are conclusory and lack any supporting evidence, statistics, or 

23 Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 

113, 125 (1990)). 

24 See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Burkett v. Love, 

89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In Block, the . . . panel majority concluded that in [using 

arbitrary criteria for denying parole], the [Parole Board] violated substantive due process in 

grounding its action on constitutionally impermissible reasons.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

25 Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Newman, 617 F.3d at 782). 

26 See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001). 

27 Doc. 8-1 at 16; see also id. at 7, 17, 18. 

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comparator information.28 Moreover, the Parole Board’s decision included 

numerous, constitutionally permissible reasons for its denial of parole. None of its 

reasons are conscience-shocking or arbitrary. 

The Court does not discount Horsey’s claims that he has made significant 

progress toward rehabilitation during his incarceration.29 Such efforts are 

commendable. But his disagreement with the Parole Board’s decision does not 

establish a right to habeas corpus relief. “[F]ederal courts, on habeas review, are 

not to ‘second-guess parole boards,’ and the requirements of substantive due 

process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.”30 Horsey’s 

conclusory, unsupported allegations of discrimination simply do not provide a 

basis to “second-guess” the Parole Board. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Horsey’s petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court likewise declines to issue a 

certificate of appealability, as Horsey has failed to make a substantial showing of 

28 Horsey has proffered declarations from several inmates in support of his Section 2254 petition. 

See Docs. 17-2 through 17-6. However, these declarations, which appear to be identical, do 

not provide any evidence or testimony of racial discrimination or prejudice toward sexoffenders by the Parole Board. Rather, they contain the same conclusory allegations that 

appear in Horsey’s petition. See id. And while the declarants aver that they “have personal 

first-hand knowledge of the Pennsylvania Parole Board denying parole to prisoners of color 

and granting white prisoners parole unequally,” they do not provide any information or details 

as to what this “knowledge” entails or how they know the parolees were similarly situated to 

those denied parole. See id. 29 See Doc. 8-1 at 5-7. 

30 Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487). 

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the denial of a constitutional right,31 or that “jurists of reason would find it 

debatable” whether this Court’s procedural rulings are correct.32 An appropriate 

Order follows. 

 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

31 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

32 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

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