NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

MIA INGRAM, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

MARIO HERNANDEZ, Respondent/Appellant,

______________________________

In re the Matter of:

MARIO ALBERTO HERNANDEZ, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

MIA INGRAM, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0567 FC

 1 CA-CV 23-0735 FC

(Consolidated) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2023-001856, FC2023-090293

The Honorable William R. Wingard

The Honorable Richard J. Hinz, Judge

AFFIRMED

FILED 09-19-2024
2

COUNSEL

Mia Ingram, (Protected Address)

Petitioner/Appellee

Mario Alberto Hernandez, Las Vegas, Nevada

Respondent/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe

joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Mario Alberto Hernandez (“Father”) appeals the superior 

court’s ruling in his order of protection and dissolution proceedings with 

Mia Ingram (“Mother”). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father have two children, Liam and Olivia, and 

Mother has one child from a prior relationship, Thomas (we use 

pseudonyms to protect the children). Father petitioned for dissolution of 

his marriage to Mother in January 2023. Two months later, Father moved 

for temporary orders for legal decision-making and physical custody of the 

children, claiming that Mother absconded with the children after filing a 

“phony” order of protection in June 2022. But Father could not serve 

Mother the petition and motion because Mother refused service. She 

explained that she did not want Father to know her address because she 

feared he would hurt her and the children. 

¶3 Thereafter, in a separate action in the superior court, Mother

petitioned for an order of protection against Father. The court issued an 

order (“March Order of Protection”) covering Mother and Thomas. 

¶4 Mother responded to the petition for dissolution and 

temporary orders, alleging Father physically and emotionally abused her 

and their children. She accused Father of being a “compulsive liar” and a 
HERNANDEZ v. INGRAM

Decision of the Court

3

“con-artist.” Mother also requested a protected address because of the 

March Order of Protection, which the court granted. 

¶5 After an evidentiary hearing, the dissolution court issued 

temporary orders. The court awarded Mother temporary sole legal 

decision-making and gave Father supervised parenting time with Liam and 

Olivia for three hours every Saturday. 

¶6 On May 6, Mother and Father arrived for the supervised 

visitation. Father did not bring a supervising adult, so Mother refused to 

allow Father to take the children, walked away from Father, and called 911. 

When the police arrived, they served Father with the March Order of 

Protection. A few days later, Mother filed another petition requesting an 

order of protection that included all three children. The court issued an

Order of Protection (“May Order of Protection”) that included Thomas, 

Liam, and Olivia as protected persons. Father was served with the May 

Order of Protection in July. 

¶7 Father filed a “Petition to Enforce Parenting Time” after he 

did not see the children on May 6. He also asked the court to consolidate 

the divorce proceeding with the order of protection proceedings. Mother

challenged the temporary orders. She explained that Father showed up to 

the meeting without a supervisor, then chased Mother and the children 

around a parking lot when she refused to allow Fatherto take them, causing 

her to lock herself in a nearby restaurant until police arrived. The court, 

noting the “dysfunction in this family,” denied both parties’ motions and 

affirmed “all prior Temporary Orders.” 

¶8 In July 2023, Father requested a hearing to contest the March 

Order of Protection. Both parties attended the hearing and presented 

testimony and exhibits. The court found reasonable cause to continue the 

May Order of Protection, which modified the March Order of Protection,

because there “is reasonable cause to believe that [Father] has committed 

an act of domestic violence within the last year or could commit an act of 

domestic violence within the next year.” Father timely appealed. 

¶9 Leading up to the dissolution trial, Father and Mother each 

filed several motions with the court, and each failed to serve the other with 

some motions and responses. Father successfully filed and served a 

“Motion to Compel Discovery to Establish Fair Trial [and] Motion for 

Continuance.” Mother failed to properly file her response. The court denied 

the motion to continue and declined to rule on the motion to compel. And 
HERNANDEZ v. INGRAM

Decision of the Court

4

the court reserved for trial Father’s claim that Mother disobeyed the court’s

temporary orders by not letting Father see the children. 

¶10 The day before trial, Father moved to stay the dissolution trial 

pending resolution of the appeal in the order of protection case. 

¶11 Father did not appear on the day of trial, and instead filed 

another motion to compel discovery. The court did not address Father’s

motion to continue or motion to compel, held the trial without Father

present, and dissolved the marriage. A week after trial, the court denied 

Father’s motion to stay. Father moved for reconsideration of the dissolution 

decree, which the court denied. 

¶12 Father timely appealed the dissolution decree. This Court 

granted Father’s motion to consolidate the order of protection and 

dissolution appeals. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Appellate briefs must explain an appellant’s “contentions 

concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for 

each contention, and with citations to legal authorities and appropriate 

references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies.” 

ARCAP 13(a)(7). “An appellant who fails to make a bona fide and 

reasonably intelligent effort to comply with the rules will waive issues and 

arguments not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, 

or authority.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (2022). Courts hold 

unrepresented litigants in Arizona to the same standard as attorneys, and 

do not give them special leniency. Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83–84, ¶ 

24 (2017). We have done our best to discern Father’s arguments and will 

address those we have discerned. But we will consider waived any 

argument that Father did not clearly articulate in his opening brief. 

¶14 Father did not provide transcripts from the order of 

protection hearing or the dissolution trial. Our rules require parties to 

provide transcripts to this Court. ARCAP 11(c)(1)(A); State ex rel. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30, ¶ 16 (App. 2003) (“An appellant is 

responsible for making certain that the record on appeal contains all 

transcripts or other documents necessary for us to consider the issues raised 

on appeal.”). Because Father did not provide transcripts, we cannot review

(a) his argument that the court improperly admitted evidence in the order 

of protection and dissolution hearings or (b) his argument that Mother 

presented allegations at the order of protection hearing that were not 

included in the petition. See Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 38(d)(2)(A). For these 
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Decision of the Court

5

issues, we presume the transcripts would support the superior court’s 

ruling. J.F. v. Como, 253 Ariz. 400, 406, ¶ 31 (App. 2022).

¶15 Father argues the court erred by not consolidating the order 

of protection and the dissolution proceedings. But our rules expressly state 

“[t]he court may not consolidate a case involving an order of protection 

with a family law case.” Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 5(a)(4); see also Vera v. Rogers, 

246 Ariz. 30, 34, ¶ 16 (App. 2018). The court, therefore, properly kept the 

two proceedings separate. On appeal, Father argues the court made several 

errors in both proceedings, which we address in turn. 

I. Order of Protection 

¶16 First, Father argues he was not properly served the order of 

protection. We review service of process de novo. See Ruffino v. Lokosky, 245 

Ariz. 165, 168–69, ¶¶ 9–10 (App. 2018). The court can issue an ex parte order 

of protection if the court finds the defendant has committed or will commit 

an act of domestic violence. Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 23(e); A.R.S. § 13-

3602(L), (T), (V)(2). Once the court issues an order of protection, “the court 

shall provide the order to a law enforcement agency” or other authorized 

entity to serve the defendant. A.R.S. § 13-3602(I)–(K). “If a defendant is 

physically present with the plaintiff and has not yet been served, a peace 

officer may be summoned to the scene and may use the plaintiff’s copy of 

the protective order to effect service on the defendant.” Ariz. R. Protect. 

Ord. P. 31(h). Once service is complete, the officer or agency shall notify the 

plaintiff that the order has been served. A.R.S. § 13-3602(I). 

¶17 Father acknowledged receiving service of the order of 

protection when he attempted to pick up Liam and Olivia for supervised 

visitation. And a Phoenix Police Department officer declared that he 

personally served Father the March Order of Protection on May 6, which 

complies with Arizona Rule of Protective Order Procedure 31(h). In any 

event, by asserting his right to a contested hearing, Father waived service 

and rendered the order effective. See Montano v. Scottsdale Baptist Hosp., Inc., 

119 Ariz. 448, 452 (1978) (a party’s appearance despite lack of service 

renders service unnecessary). 

¶18 Father argues Mother failed to disclose the exhibits and 

evidence she used at the order of protection hearing. But order of protection 

proceedings have no disclosure requirement. Ariz. R. Protect. Ord. P. 37. 

¶19 Finally, Father argues that the court violated Section 13-

3602(H) when it ordered multiple orders of protection. But Section 13-

3602(H) prohibits only mutual orders of protection, when “opposing 
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Decision of the Court

6

parties separately file verified petitions for an order of protection” and the 

court grants both. The court here did not issue mutual orders of protection; 

only Mother requested an order of protection. The court issued initial 

orders and thereafter changed them at Mother’s request, taking into 

account Father’s subsequent interactions with Mother and the children. The 

court did not violate Section 13-3602(H). 

II. Dissolution 

¶20 Father argues the court erred by denying his motion for a 

continuance of the dissolution trial. We review the denial of a motion to 

continue for an abuse of discretion. State v. Barreras, 181 Ariz. 516, 520 

(1995). A party may request a continuance for good cause. Ariz. R. Fam. 

Law P. 34(a)(4). Father asked to continue the trial based on his incorrect 

assertion that the order of protection and dissolution cases should have 

been consolidated. Father lacked good cause for a continuance. The court 

did not abuse its discretion. 

¶21 Father also argues the court violated Father’s due process 

right to discovery, warranting a mistrial, by not ordering compliance with 

Rule of Family Law Procedure 49. But at the resolution management 

conference, the court ordered both parties to “complete all disclosure 

requirements required by Rules 49, 50, and 91.” Father correctly points out 

that neither party complied with this order. “Due process entitles a party to 

notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.” Curtis v. Richardson, 212 Ariz. 308, 312, ¶ 16 (App. 

2006). And we will reverse a decision based on a due process violation only 

if the error prejudices a party. Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 470, ¶ 26 (App. 

2014). Both Father and Mother received notice of their obligation to comply 

with the discovery requirements and failed to do so. The court did not 

abuse its discretion by proceeding with the hearing despite the parties’ 

mutual failure to abide by its disclosure order.
HERNANDEZ v. INGRAM

Decision of the Court

7

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm.