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<div class="ocr">Written Testimony
Admiral Thad W. Allen
U.S. Coast Guard
(Retired)

Good morning Chairman LoBiondo, Chairman Gibbs, Ranking Member Larsen, and
Ranking Member Bishop.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak before this joint hearing regarding
“Improving Oil Spill Prevention and Response, Restoring Jobs, and Ensuring Our
Energy Security: Recommendations from the National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.”

As the subcommittees are aware I am no longer in public service having retired
from the Coast Guard on 1 July 2011 and having departed government service as a
senior executive on 1 October 2011. Accordingly, my association with spill response
and recovery activities, current legislative and regulatory reviews, and policy
discussions regarding offshore oil and gas development has been limited to
information contained in the public realm.

However, in regard to information pertaining to my service as the Commandant and
National Incident Commander, I have had access to Coast Guard assistance. That
assistance has been guided by the "Anti-Lobbying Act” (18 U.S.C. § 1913), which
prohibits activities that are intended or designed (directly or indirectly) to influence
in any manner a member of Congress, a jurisdiction, or an official of any government
(Federal, state or local) to favor or oppose any legislation, law or appropriation.

I have been provided a copy of the Report of the National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. I have reviewed the
recommendations of the Commission. I am limiting my comments to the areas of
the report that relate to my duties as the former Commandant and National Incident
Commander. | would also add that while the Commission has issued its report there
are still several inquiries underway that will provide further detailed information
and recommendations regarding the accident, its causes, the response, and needed
changes to the current legal and regulatory structures. It is my personal
recommendation to the subcommittees that these additional investigative efforts be
included with the Commission Report in considering any legislative or regulatory
changes that may be considered.

For the purpose of this testimony I am providing what I consider are the high level,
strategic and policy issues that need to be considered as we move forward to
improve our safety and spill response preparedness in the future. The most
important areas for discussion in my view are:

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<div class="page"><p></p>
<div class="ocr">1. Oil Spill Response Governance and The Role of the National Response Team
(NRT)

Spills of National Significance and the National Incident Command

Oil Spill Preparedness and Research and Development

Use of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund

Interagency Coordination

International Offers of Assistance and Application of the Jones Act

Air Space Coordination

Implication of Deepwater Horizon Lessons Learned for the Arctic

ONAMAWH

OIL SPILL RESPONSE GOVERNANCE

The doctrinal response to an oil spill in the United States has evolved over 4 decades
and is codified at 40 CFR 300. Major changes were made to this doctrine following
the EXXON VALDEZ spill and those changes have been implemented over the last 20
years. Any discussion of oil spill response governance must start here. I defined, as
the National Incident Commander, “governance” to be the use of institutions,
structures of authority, and even collaboration to resource and coordinate or
manage activities.

Despite a governance structure that has been in place for over twenty years and the
proven effectiveness of the National Contingency Plan (NCP) in countless spills, the
system did not function as effectively as it could or should have in this event. While
there are number of factors that were considered by the Commission in their
review, I will discuss two here today that J feel merit attention.

The first is what I have termed the political and social nullification of the National
Contingency Plan and associated response doctrine during the response. The two
primary reasons for this were (1) a lack of understanding and acceptance of the
statutorily defined role and responsibility of a “Responsible Party” (RP) at all levels
of government and (2) the rejection of some state and local officials of the federal
authority, direction, and control of resources in the response.

On the first issue, the public’s fundamental concern, a concerned shared by many
political leaders, was that BP was not “trustworthy” to meet their responsibilities
under the law. Additionally, the response doctrine that calls for the RP to contract
response resources under the overall supervision and authority of the federal on
scene coordinator was not understood or accepted.

The latter issue can be best understood in the context of the very different
assumptions and legal authorities that form the basis for a response to a natural
disaster under the Stafford Act and the National Response Framework. In those
instancés the federal role is restricted to providing resources and assisting local
governments who have the legal responsibility for the response. In oil spill

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<div class="page"><p></p>
<div class="ocr">response there is a clear federal role that preempts local authority under the Clean
Water Act and federal regulations. .

At the federal level the governance of this spill was also complicated by the
overlapping structures contained in the National Contingency Plan which predates
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the role of the Secretary of
Homeland Security as outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 and
the Homeland Security Act which designate the Secretary as the Principal Federal
Official for incident management. While these roles were adjudicated and
integrated during the response, work remains to clarify how the two structures
interact to create unity of effort and a whole of government response.

Finally, an opportunity to address these key issues was lost in March 2010 (just
prior to the accident) when a Spill of National Significance exercise was held in the
Northeast United States. Because this exercise was not considered a Tier One
Exercise there was no mandatory participation by cabinet-level leaders. In my
opinion there should be another SONS Exercise scheduled and held within one year
to turn around lessons learned and increase our ir preparedness, including resolution
of NCP/HSPD-5 overlaps and gaps.

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (NRT)

When the Deepwater Horizon sank on 22 April, I requested a meeting of the National
Response Team (NRT) as the Commandant. My intent was to employ this long-standing
interagency coordinating body in support of the deepening crises and potential for a
catastrophic oil release. However, since we had not exercised the NCP with DHS
leadership, the role of the NRT was not fully understood. The NRT, an interagency body,
is comprised of 15 federal agencies responsible for developing, de-conflicting, and
reconciling intergovernmental policy issues that surface during oil spill response. The
EPA serves as the Chair and the Coast Guard serves as the Vice Chair of the NRT. When
a spill involves a substantial threat to public health and welfare, substantial amounts of
resources or substantial threats to natural resources, the NRT can be activated as an
emergency response team to monitor the response actions and provide counsel and
recommendations to the NIC to assist iri the response. Rather than serving its intended
purpose, direct engagement by Cabinet-level officials from the outset of this response
essentially redirected the NRT to the role of support to intra-Cabinet communications and
briefings, diminishing its ability to serve as a deliberative body and its value to the

_ response organization. To provide the originally intended functions of the NRT, a new
organization named the Interagency Solutions Group (IASG) was created within the NIC.
The IASG essentially assumed the doctrinal responsibilities of the NRT, and Proved
exceptionally adept in promoting interagency unity of effort.

In the future any recommendations made in this testimony or proposed changes the
Commission or other entities should be closely reviewed for integration into the existing
roles and responsibilities of the NRT. Most of the functions of the IASG (discussed later)
should be institutionalized in the NRT.

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<div class="ocr">SPILLS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND THE NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMAND

The only current official doctrine related to the designation of a National Incident
. Commander is contained in 40 CFR 300.323. Those responsibilities were further
refined in a draft Coast Guard Commandant Instruction (16465.1A), Spills of
National Significance Response Management System.

Before the Deepwater Horizon incident was designated a SONS and prior to my
designation as the NIC, Rear Admiral Mary Landry assumed the role of FOSC and
served as the Coast Guard lead federal official for strategic communication and
operational decision-making. In this capacity, RADM Landry worked with other
federal partners, senior BP officials, state, and local representatives to establish a
unified response organization. As the Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC), by law,
she was responsible for:

Providing access to federal resources and technical assistance.

Coordinating all federal containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources
during the oil spill.

Serving as the point of contact for coordination of federal efforts with the local
response community.

Coordinating, monitoring, and directing response efforts.

As this incident expanded across the entire Gulf Region, so did the need to involve
other national-level and international resources outside the span of control of the
FOSC. This response clearly called for a NIC. By design, the FOSC‘s responsibilities
are complementary to the NIC responsibilities. Strategic objectives and intent
should be clear and transparent and designating a single individual, responsible for
all aspects of the federal government's response, established a clear chain of
command for communications and decisions. .

As the NIC, I followed the doctrine outlined in the NCP and assumed the
responsibilities for addressing and coordinating national-level issues. In the 10 days
that passed between the fire, explosion, and subsequent sinking of the Deepwater
Horizon and my designation as the NIC, multiple federal government agencies acted
within their existing authorities to execute their particular agency responsibilities.
Initially, I viewed my role as the Unified Area Command's (UAC) relief valve for
political and national pressures and a national-level resource broker. To this end, I
created a —thin client, a lean NIC staff with a relatively small footprint located in .
Washington, D.C., and I traveled to the Gulf region frequently. I was also designated
as the primary national spokesperson for the Deepwater Horizon response. Given
the inténsity of media coverage and public interest, I spent a considerable portion of
my time briefing and interacting with national and local media to inform the public

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<div class="page"><p></p>
<div class="ocr">of the whole-of government's efforts. Significant effort was also focused on strategic
and policy issues using existing interagency resolution bodies as well as creating a
new policy resolution group, the Interagency Solutions Group (IASG). By assuming
these responsibilities, | enabled the UAC to focus on operational response issues.

Because the development and evolution of the National Incident Command was
precedent setting and unique | directed that our operating procedures, decisions,
and organizational structure be documented in a living document that was revised
continually. My initial guidance, Deepwater Strategy Implementation Version 1.0,
was issued on 23 June 2010 to codify direction that I had given to date and to
memorialize key decisions taken on 14 June during my meeting with the President.
It was 43 pages. The final Version 5.0 that was issued in my last week as NIC is over
600 pages. Finally, a 59-page National Incident Command Lessons Learned Report
was issued at the disestablishment of the NIC. Both should serve as useful tools in
considering a more formal doctrine for future SONS.

I also make the following specific comments and recommendations regarding NIC
authorities based on the complexity and size of a SONS in relation to smaller events.
These authorities shouldbe established and described in doctrine. I recommend the
following legal authorities for future NICs.

Presidential designation of a NIC

Currently the Commandant of the Coast Guard can designate a NIC for a coastal zone
SONS and the EPA Administrator can designate a NIC for a inland SONS (40 C.F.R. §
300.323). Since the NIC is responsible for coordinating the whole-of-government
response to include the Cabinet, the President should designate the NIC if required for a

SONS.

Establish standing delegation of. NIC Clean Water Act §311(c) and (e)
authorities

A NIC must have the authority to control significant aspects of a response to a major oil
spill, including directing the actions of a RP. When I was relieved as Commandant, I was
only able to retain the §311(c) authority through delegation by DHS Secretary —
Napolitano. Without this delegated authority I would not have been able to legally direct
the RPs actions, authorize removal, and approve expenditures against the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund.

In the future, a NIC, by designation, should have §311(c) and (e) authority organic to the
position. This should be explicitly articulated in the NCP and Executive Order rather than
delegated during a SONS. This will ensure all future NICs and response stakeholders
understand the authorities inherent to a NIC prior to a major pollution response.

Re-direct response assets nationally
During the response, the Coast Guard and the EPA issued an emergency temporary rule

that waived certain Plan Holder requirements across the country to allow resources to be
re-directed to the Gulf. Although this emergency rule was drafted, published and became

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<div class="ocr">effective within days, it was an unnecessary step in trying to get oil spill response
resources on-scene. The exigent resource requirements of a SONS require flexibility
regarding response plan requirements. I recommend that when a SONS is designated,
certain requirements contained in response plans be eased in order to free up equipment.
This will provide the NIC and the FOSC the ability to rapidly acquire critical resources
for response efforts. Area Committees should consider the potential of supporting a
SONS outside of their geographic area and incorporate contingencies into their Area
Contingency Plans, |

OIL SPILL PREPAREDNESS AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D)

The Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research (ICCOPR) has
served as the primary governmental body for oil spill response research and development
since 1991 directing interagency research and university grant programs. Unfortunately, —
Congressionally-directed funding to support ICCOPR was discontinued in 1995 and they
have struggled to maintain relevance in a post 9-11 security-focused R&D environment.
To ensure we have 21st century oil spill response capabilities available before the next
major oil spill occurs, we should amend the oil pollution research and development
program described in 33 USC §2761 to reinvest funds in the ICCOPR. The ICCOPR
should be required to conduct and sponsor research into oil fate and its effects, and the
enhancement of capabilities suitable for preventing, responding to, and mitigating the
impacts of spilled oil in the maritime environment. The ICCOPR should also be directed
to permanently establish a program similar to the Interagency Alternative Technologies
Assessment Program (IATAP) to evaluate new technologies before a spill occurs. The
ICCOPR must receive permanent funding for R&D through annual distributions from the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund or some other recurring funding source.

USE OF THE OIL SPILL LIABILITY TRUST FUND

The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) was created under OPA 90 and is used to pay
for costs not paid directly by the RP. As of September 19, 2010 (the last date in which I
was involved as the NIC), over $580 million in costs had been paid from the OSLTF. To
ensure funding remained available for the federal response, Congress passed Public Law
111-191 that allowed for unlimited advancements of up to $100 million from the
principal to the emergency fund, but only for the Deepwater Horizon response. As of
September 19th this additional advancement authority had been exercised five times,
providing $500 million in advancements to the emergency fund. Funding must be
adequate to support effective and efficient federal oil removal when there is a major spill
or a SONS. Accordingly, the changes made by Public Law 111-191 should be made
permanent.

The Deepwater Horizon response has also demonstrated the extraordinary public
expectations of prompt and effective compensation. While claims payments are currently
-available from the OSLTF, the cost to administer such payments, including adjudication
costs, are payable only through Coast Guard operating funds. The cost to the federal
government to administer and adjudicate claims in the event of a SONS would be

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<div class="page"><p></p>
<div class="ocr">enormous if there were no RP, or if the RP reached their limit of liability and refused to
pay. The Deepwater Horizon claims footprint consists of over 35 claims centers and over
1,500 staff with an estimated payroll of $42 million per month. While legislation has —
been proposed to eliminate this claims funding gap, it was not approved as requested.
Their remains-an urgent need to enact a legislative provision for surge claims funding out
of the OSLTF.

Additionally, there is a $1 billion limit on use of the OSLTF for a particular event, of
which only $500 million may be used for Natural Resource Damages. The costs that
count against this limit include removal and Natural Resource Damage Assessment
(NRDA) Initiate costs as well as any claims that ultimately might get paid from the fund.
An underlying tenant of OPA 90 is that "the polluter pays", and as of September 19th BP
had reportedly spent over $9.5 billion on the Deepwater Horizon response and has put an
additional $20 billion into a trust fund to pay Natural Resource Damages and additional
claims. That is nearly $30 billion the American taxpayers were not saddled with —
reinforcing the wisdom of the current system described in the NCP and OPA 90. -
However, even with a viable and cooperative RP, the $1 billion limit is clearly inadequate
for a SONS-level event and should be significantly raised if a SONS is designated in the :
future.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

In addition to my NIC staff, the National Response Team (NRT) would normally serve as
my primary advisory body to develop, de-conflict, and reconcile intergovernmental
policy issues that surface during a SONS. Once the NRT was diverted from its
traditional advisory role to provide daily high-level operational briefings to Cabinet
members and agency heads, the IASG, led by DHS Assistant Secretary for
Intergovernmental Affairs Juliette Kayyem, addressed many of the issues typically
adjudicated by the NRT. The IASG become a self-contained interagency body with
decision-making authority capable of resolving time-sensitive policy issues. The group
was staffed at the action officer level and had representatives from over 20 agencies and
Departments.

Along with adjudicating policy issues, the IASG assumed functions that were not .
anticipated in legal authorities or addressed in doctrine. For example, the IASG created
the Interagency Alternative Technologies Assessment Program (IATAP) to evaluate
thousands of offers of innovative response technologies from both domestic and
international entities. Likewise, the IASG stood up the Flow Rate Technical Group
(FRTG) composed of scientific technical experts, from government and academia, to
quantify the daily rate of release from the Macondo well and the total amount of oil
released into the Gulf. The IASG also chartered an Oil Budget Calculator Science and
Engineering Team to estimate the fate of the oil. They developed a tool called the Oil
Budget Calculator to estimate the fate of the oil (recovered, dispersed, evaporated,
residual, etc.). To provide oversight of BP‘s claim process, the Integrated Services Team
(IST) was created under the IASG. They oversaw over $875 million in claim payments
from over 200,000 individuals, businesses, and government entities, and served asa ~

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<div class="ocr">transition facilitator for the Gulf Coast Claims Center. The IST also deployed experts to
promote public awareness of the claims process and other social services programs.

- When the State of Louisiana submitted permitting proposals to construct a series of sand
berms, rock dikes, and pipe booms to protect sensitive areas from oil, the IASG identified
key issues to help address environmental and engineering concerns. The synergies
created through the establishment of this group directly supported planning efforts by the
Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Natural Resource Trustee Steering
Committee to consolidate countermeasure proposals for consideration by the FOSC as
removal projects. The 24 projects submitted, valued at over $500 million, were carefully
considered by the IASG and they developed recommendations on the merits of each
project against the criteria outlined in the Clean Water Act.

The scope and the magnitude of this spill surfaced a number of other critical issues that
would not normally arise during a routine or traditional oil spill response. The IASG was
challenged to resolve issues such as immediate and long-term behavioral and public
health monitoring, seafood testing, and social and economic impacts. This was especially
difficult since OPA 90 limits the use of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) for
cleanup and removal of the oil, and compensation for environmental damages. The
expectations of the federal government in crisis response grows with each new event and
transcends existing legal authorities and limits on the use of federal funding. Going
forward, we need to examine law, policy, and doctrine to account for what has become a
changing perceived social contract by the American public to provide a range of
immediate and long-term services as a result of a major domestic incident.

Cabinet-level Deputies Committee meetings were also convened to ensure senior
administration officials were regularly briefed on response efforts. Deputies Committee
meetings focused on key policy issues and friction points to ensure alignment throughout
the administration and were especially helpful in addressing challenges posed by issues
outside traditional oil spill response such as seafood safety. In the future, an incident-
specific Deputies Committee should be convened, chaired and moderated by the NIC.

INTERNATIONAL OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE AND APPLICATION OF THE JONES.
ACT

Offers of Assistance

The Deepwater Horizon incident required access to and use of spill response resources
from Oil Spill Removal Organizations (OSROs) around the country. An immediate and
on-going challenge throughout the response was the lack of a usable database listing
OSROs either domestically or globally, let alone listing equipment that might be
available to support the response. Domestically, while we could locate most OSROs, it
took time to identify what equipment they had to offer, and more time to determine how
moving the equipment they were offering to the Gulf of Mexico would impact the
response posture of the contributing region. These information gaps became critical in
determining the location of potential response resources to support the Deepwater

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<div class="page"><p></p>
<div class="ocr">Horizon incident and in ensuring that areas outside the Gulf of Mexico maintained
enough response capability to meet federal and certain state requirements. This
experience underscores the critical need for the establishment and maintenance of a
response resource inventory database that includes updated listing of all OSRO
equipment nationwide, including real-time location and status of all OSRO equipment so
that it can serve as a primary management tool for all major responses.

Internationally, in addition to the absence of a useful equipment database, the challenge is
that except for regional agreements for resource sharing with our neighbors in Canada,
Mexico and Russia, we had never engaged other countries regarding sharing response
equipment. The first task we faced was in sorting out who to talk with and what countries
had potentially useful resources to offer. We found that there was no common lexicon
regarding resource specifications (e.g., no common description of open ocean
containment boom and skimming systems). There were no protocols for making requests
or accepting offers, no mechanisms for reimbursing costs or even for determining costs in
the first place. The NIC staff did manage to work through all of these issues with many of
the offers, and to receive and employ some foreign resources, but the process was
needlessly arduous and inefficient. Another major challenge was contending with
political pressure to accept all international offers of assistance regardless of utility to the
response. Going forward, we need to expand the response inventory database described
above to include international oil response resources and establish processes and
procedures for review and approval of international offers of assistance to help speed the
delivery of critical resources in a future oil spill response. Finally, any offshore
containment and recovery system developed in the future should be integrated into this
system.

Application of the Jones Act

There was a misperception that the Jones Act (46 USC § 55102) impeded the use of
foreign flag vessels for Deepwater Horizon response operations. _In reality, the Jones
Act had no impact on response operations. As the NIC, I provided specific guidance to
ensure accelerated processing of requests for Jones Act waivers. This process was used to
expedite the Jones Act waiver requests for seven vessels engaged in source control
‘operations in the event they were forced to alter operations in a manner that might
implicate the Jones Act. This expedited process resulted in DHS Secretary Napolitano
approving the waiver request in less than 10 days from the initial request. During the
entirety of the response, there were no Jones Act waiver denials. Any decision not to use
a foreign flag vessel during the response was based upon an operational decision not any
limitations imposed by the Jones Act.

AIR SPACE COORDINATION

Historically, the coordination of aviation assets and sorties has proved to be a recurring
challenge for major responses. We also experienced difficulties during the initial stages
of the Deepwater Horizon response. With over a 120 aircraft and hundreds of daily
public, private, and military flights in support of the response, there was a high risk of
aerial collision and we experienced several near mishaps during the early stages of this

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<div class="ocr">response. We needed to quickly establish command and control over the airspace. This
required engagement and coordination at a national level with the U.S. Air Force and U.
S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to bring DOD capabilities and capacity to the

~ response. In collaboration with NORTHCOM, we established the based out of Tyndall
Air Force Base. The Aviation Coordination Center allowed us to control, de-conflict, and
monitor the air space over the-offshore waters and coastline of the Gulf and significantly
improved our ability to verify oil trajectory modeling and direct resources such as
skimmers, vessels of opportunity, and boom deployment to where it was most needed.

IMPLICATION OF DEEPWATER HORIZON LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE ARCTIC

The Commission has called for “an immediate, comprehensive federal research
effort to provide a foundation of scientific information on the Arctic.” The
Commission further states “countries of the Arctic should establish strong
international standards related to Arctic oi] and gas activities. Such standards
would require cooperation of policies and resources.”

I support these recommendations and offer these additional comments and
recommendations.

There is currently inadequate infrastructure to support extensive response and
recovery operations on the North Slope with the exception of the oil industry
facilities at Dead Horse in Prudhoe Bay. Point Barrow, the only location close to the
new Beaufort and Chukchi Sea lease areas, has limited access and no ability to
support large-scale operations. The closest port with any capacity is Nome and it is
restricted to vessels with 21-foot drafts or less.

In the absence of forward operating bases and infrastructure, seaborne command
and control capability will be vital in any response, including search and rescue and
other activities. The only vessels in the U.S. fleet capable of operating in those
environments in all ice conditions are Coast Guard icebreakers.

The current condition of the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet should be of great concern
to the senior leaders of this Nation. Two of the three vessels are currently
inoperable and key decisions regarding future icebreaking needs continue to be
delayed. The current funding mechanism for operating this vessel is dysfunctional
and should be changed. Thé National Science Foundation (NSF) current holds the
operating funds and requires the Coast Guard to submit an annual operating plan
for their approval. Congress has moved these funds back to the Coast Guard in
several previous appropriations only to see the funds requested in the following
year for the NSF in the President’s budget. This funding structure should not be
continued and operating funds for Coast Guard icebreaking operations should be
requested in the Coast Guard’s budget. Serious discussion must begin immediately
regarding the imminent loss of capability as two of these vessels have reached the
end of their service lives.

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<div class="ocr">In my previous discussions with the Office of Management and Budget I was advised
that there was no policy decision to change the status quo. I would submit that
National Security Presidential Directive 66, signed by President Bush and continued
by this Administration is adequate policy guidance to take appropriate and
responsible action regarding next steps in the Arctic.

Finally, in considering governing frameworks for response in the Arctic the United
States should move immediately to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. This treaty is
the de facto governing structure for the Arctic and should underpin any domestic
and international planning for spill response. We have waited Jong enough and the
Treaty should be ratified without delay.

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<div class="page"><p></p>
<div class="ocr">Thad William Allen
Admiral Thad W. Allen
United States Coast Guard
(Retired)

EMPLOY MENT/EXPERIENCE

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD Jun 1971 — May 2010
OS. Department of Transportation and U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Thirty-nine year military career culminating in service as the 23"! Commandant of the Coast Guard (2006-2010). Other
positions of responsibility included Chief of Staff (2002-2006), Atlantic Area Commander (2001-2002), Seventh District
Commander (Southeast US, Caribbean, Central/South America — 1999-2002), and Director of Resources (Chief Budget
Officer — 1996-1999). ;

Significant accomplishments:

Planned and implemented the most comprehensive modernization and reorganization of the Coast Guard since
World War II, including acquisition reform, restructuring and consolidation of the Service’s maintenance and
logistics organization, creation of a deployable specialized forces command, improved support and management
of the Coast Guard Reserve force, and improved financial management and audit readiness (2006-2010).
Extensive experience in federal budgeting, funds management, program/project management (annual CG
appropriations of $10b and 90,000 full, part time, and volunteer employees)

Transition Executive for the transfer of the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the Department
of Homeland Security (Chief of Staff, 2003).

Coordinated the planning and deployment of Coast Guard forces in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom (Atlantic Area Commander, Chief of Staff, Commandant — 2003-2010)

Chairman, Department of Homeland Security Joint Requirements Council. Reviewed and made
recommendations to the Secretary on all acquisitions and capital investments greater.than $50 million (Chief of
Staff, 2003-2006).

Led Coast Guard forces in response to 9/11 attacks. Closed posts of Boston and New York and Potomac River.
Coordinated water evacuation of nearly 1 million people from lower Manhattan. Provided waterborne logistics

: support for “ground zero” response. Deployed Coast Guard security forces to provide waterside and land security

for detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Executed a comprehensive port security risk assessment and
redirected resources to protect ports and waterways (Atlantic Area Commander, 2001-2002).

Coordinated interagency and private sector actions in support of the military action taken to rescue the master of
the MAERSK ALABAMA from pirates. As competent authority for the regulation of United States flag
shipping, issued a Maritime Security Directive in May 2009 requiring U.S. flag merchant vessels operating near
the Horn of Africa to conduct risk assessments related to piracy and submit plans to mitigate the risk of a piracy
incident. Led multinational group to develop international standards to reduce the risk of piracy (Djibouti Code
of Conduct). Established a permanent interagency coordination cell to manage maritime security events for the
U.S. government.

Directed Coast Guard forces in response to the Haitian Earthquake of 12 January 2010, led integrated effort with -
FEMA to deploy an incident management team to support the U.S. Ambassador, worked closely with the
Departments of State and Defense to reopen the Port of Port Au Prince for relief supplies.

Head of Delegation to annual North Pacific Forum (established 1996 by US, Canada, Russia, China, South Korea,
Japan, and China). Organizer and Head of Delegation to the initial North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum in
Stockholm in 2006 (European countries from the Iberian Peninsula north as well as the US, Canada, and Russia).
Participant in ongoing quadrilateral talks between US, France, New Zealand, and Australia regarding protection
of national exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the Southern Ocean.

Following the increase in piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Mumbai terrorist attacks consulted widely on behalf
of the U.S. government and at the request of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Significant engagements
included the Worldwide Military Planners Conference (Copenhagen), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (Vienna), U.S. African Command (Joint Task Force — Horn of Africa, Djibouti),
Commandant of the Indian Coast Guard (Delhi), NATO, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Central Command
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq).

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<div class="page"><p></p>
<div class="ocr">‘NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMANDER | May 2010 - Oct 2010
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

Following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon mobile drilling unit directed initial Coast Guard response
as Commandant (20 Apr— 1 May). On the designation of the incident as a spill of national significance (SONS) assigned
by President Obama as the National Incident Commander (NIC) and spokesperson for the response. Coordinated the
federal interagency response and directed the removal actions the Responsible Party (BP). Integrated response operations
across five affected Gulf States including local parish and county governments. During the peak operational period the
response involved over 45,000 personnel and over 7,000 vessels. Coordinated employment military forces with the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense, including military management of the Gulf air space.
Collaborated with the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Energy to deploy a science team to Houston to review BP
well containment plans. Provided oversight and direction to BP regarding claims processing and worked with Kenneth
Feinberg to stand up of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility. Continuous interaction with BP CEO and Chairman of the Board
throughout the incident, including high-level meetings with the President and White House staff to establish a $20 billion
fund for claims payment.

CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INTERDICTION COMMITTEE May 2006 - May 2010
Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (QNDCP)

Appointed Chairman of The Interdiction Committee (TIC) by the Director, ONDCP. Directed the development and
implementation of interdiction planning guidance for the Western Hemisphere and made recommendations to the
Director, ONDCP and the President on drug law enforcement issues. The-TIC interagency membership includes the
Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Defense, and State as well as the Intelligence Community. Conducted visits
and consultations on behalf of the U.S. government with heads of state-and senior officials in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Dominican Republic, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom, and Canada. Significant issues included U.S. landing rights for
surveillance aircraft in Ecuador, detection and interdiction of new covert self propelled semi-submersible craft for drug
trafficking, mitigating the impact of the loss of U.S. Army helicopters for drug enforcement in Bahamas to meet overseas
deployment demands, and the exploitation of cloud computing in an unclassified law enforcement domain to increase
information sharing and preserve individual privacy rights.

HEAD OF DELEGATION, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION May 2006 — May 2010
U.S. Departments of State and Homeland Security

Led of the U.S. delegation to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the international maritime governance body
of the United Nations. Presented United States positions and participated in negotiations regarding international maritime
governance and regulatory issues including piracy, maritime pollution, ship construction and safety standards, air
emissions from ships, climate change, and port security. Lecturer at the IMO sponsored World Mar itime University,
Malmo, Sweden.

PRINCIPAL FEDERAL OFFICIAL (PFO), HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA Sep 2005 — Feb 2006

Assigned by President Bush as Deputy Principal Federal Official for response operations in and around New Orleans on 5
September 2005 following incidents at the Super Dome and Convention Center. On 9 September relieved FEMA
Director Michael Brown of larger Gulf-wide response then directed federal response to Hurricane Rita (25 September).
Created structure to unify response of military, federal, state, and local governments to dewater community, conduct
search and rescue, recover the remains of deceased victims, and address issues of transition to long-term recovery.
Worked closely with White House staff, cabinet officials, 5 Gulf Coast governors and former Presidents George H. W.
Bush and Clinton (Bush-Clinton Fund).

COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN 2000 — 2009

Served as chair for the Combine Federal Campaign (CFC) in South Florida (2000), for the Department of Homeland
Security (2003), and the National Capitol Area (2006-2008). In the three years while serving as Chair of the National
Capitol Area CFC Campaign total fundraising exceeded $150 million.

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<div class="page"><p></p>
<div class="ocr">PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS AND PRO BONO WORK 2000 — 2010

National Academy of Public Administration
Council on Foreign Relations
U.S. Coast Guard Foundation

CURRENT STATUS

SENIOR FELLOW . Oct 2010 - Present
RAND Corporation, Washington DC

Research, consultation, writing and speaking on disaster response, maritime safety and security, border security, ocean
policy, Arctic issues, defense support to civilian authorities, and information sharing.

PUBLIC SPEAKER
Washington Speakers Bureau, Washington DC Oct 2010 — Present

Crisis leadership, change management

DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF PRACTICE Spring 2011
The George Washington University

Course: Leadership in Large Complex Organizations. Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration

EDUCATION

e Bachelor of Science, Engineering Management, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 1971

e Master of Public Administration, Concentration: Executive, Legislative, and Regulatory Management, The
George Washington University, 1986

e Master of Science, Management Science, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1989

e Department of Defense Capstone Fellow, National Defense University, 1998

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<div class="page"><p></p>
<div class="ocr">COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Truth in Testimony Disclosure

Pursuant to clause 2(g)(5) of House Rule XI, in the case of a witness appearing in a nongovernmental
capacity, a written statement of proposed testimony shall include: (1) a curriculum vitae; and (2) a
disclosure of the amount and source (by agency and program) of each Federal grant (or subgrant thereof}
or contract (or subcontract thereof) received during the current fiscal year or either of the two previous
fiscal years by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. Such statements, with appropriate
redaction to protect the privacy of the witness, shall be made publicly available in electronic form not
later than one day after the witness appears.

(Db Name Fh] [e). Nile )

(2) Other than yourself, name of entity you are representing:

SONNE

(3) Are you testifying on behalf of an entity other than a Government (federal, state,
local} entity?

YES If yes, please provide the information requested below and
attach your curriculum vitae.

x0 (IO

(4) Please list the amount and source (by agency and program) of each Federal
grant (or subgrant thereof) or contract (or subcontract thereof) received during the
current fiscal year or cither of the two previous fiscal years by you or by the entity

you are representing:

f\ 4
, Zfeel]
Signature Dale

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