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72–872 2012

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S ROLE 

IN VERIFYING EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 14, 2011

Serial No. 112–SS3 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means 

( 


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COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas, Chairman 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas 

PAT TIBERI, Ohio 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

ERIC PAULSEN, Minnesota 

RICK BERG, North Dakota 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

FORTNEY PETE STARK, California 

JON TRAUB, Staff Director 

JANICE MAYS, Minority Staff Director 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Advisory of April 14, 2011, announcing the hearing ............................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, United States 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 6 

Marianna LaCanfora, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Office of Retirement 

and Disability Policy, Social Security Administration ...................................... 21 

Tyler Moran, Policy Director, National Immigration Law Center ...................... 34 

Ana I. Anto ́n, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Computer Science, College 

of Engineering, North Carolina State University, on behalf of the Association for Computing Machinery ............................................................................ 48 

Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Directors of the American 

Council on International Personnel, on behalf of the HR Initiative for 

a Legal Workforce ................................................................................................ 70 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

The Honorable Mr. Dreier ....................................................................................... 94 

AARP ........................................................................................................................ 96

American Civil Liberties Union .............................................................................. 98 

American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees ....................... 109 

American Immigration Lawyers Association ......................................................... 111 

American Meat Institute ......................................................................................... 113 

Asian American Center for Advancing Justice ..................................................... 118 

Jessica St Pierre ...................................................................................................... 121 

Joint Committee on Taxation ................................................................................. 123 

National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare .......................... 132 

National Council of Social Security Management Associations ........................... 135 

National Immigration Law Center ......................................................................... 146 

Secure ID Coalition ................................................................................................. 150 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Questions and Responses for the Record: 

Ana I. Anto ́n, Ph.D. ................................................................................................. 154 

Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. .......................................................................................... 158 

Marianna LaCanfora ............................................................................................... 163 

Richard M. Stana ..................................................................................................... 166 


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(1) 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S ROLE 

IN VERIFYING EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY 

THURSDAY APRIL 8, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in Room 

B–318, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Sam Johnson [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

[The advisory of the hearing follows:] 


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HEARING ADVISORY 

Chairman Johnson Announces Hearing on the Social Security Administration’s Role in Verifying 

Employment Eligibility 

Thursday, April 07, 2011 

Congressman Sam Johnson (R–TX), Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security 

of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced that the Subcommittee will 

hold a hearing on the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) role in verifying employment eligibility. The hearing will take place on Thursday, April 14, 2011, 

in room B–318 Rayburn House Office Building, beginning at 2:00 p.m. 

In view of the limited time available to hear witnesses, oral testimony at this 

hearing will be from invited witnesses only. However, any individual or organization 

not scheduled for an oral appearance may submit a written statement for consideration by the Subcommittee and for inclusion in the printed record of the hearing. 

BACKGROUND: 

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire immigrants who were not authorized to work in the 

United States, requiring employers to examine documentation from each newly 

hired employee to prove his or her identity and eligibility to work. IRCA led to a 

process based on the Form I–9, Employment Eligibility Verification, requiring employees to attest to their work eligibility and employers to certify that the documents presented reasonably appear to be genuine and relate to the individual. The 

Social Security card is one of a number of documents the employee may use to demonstrate employment eligibility. 

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 required the then Immigration and Naturalization Service, which became part of the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, to conduct three pilot programs, including the Basic Pilot, to determine the best method of verifying an employee’s employment eligibility. 

Although initially a temporary program, the Basic Pilot’s authorization was extended and ultimately expanded to be available to employers nationwide. In the 

2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (Public Law 111–83), 

the Basic Pilot was renamed ‘‘E–Verify’’ and the program was extended until September 30, 2012. 

E–Verify is an internet-based system administered by the U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services within DHS in partnership with the SSA. The employer enters information into the E–Verify system from the Form I–9. Verification requests 

are first transmitted to the SSA, which checks whether the worker’s information 

matches the SSA’s records; those involving non-citizens are then routed to DHS. If 

a worker’s information does not match these government databases, a tentative 

‘‘non-confirmation’’ notice is sent and the worker then must contact either SSA or 

DHS to present needed documentation in order to keep their job. 

While E–Verify is free, and participation is mostly voluntary, some companies 

may be required to use E–Verify by State law (including Arizona and Mississippi) 

or Federal regulation. All Federal agencies are required to use E–Verify for their 

new hires and certain Federal contractors and subcontractors are required to use 

E–Verify for new hires and existing employees working directly under the contract. 

Since fiscal year 2005, the number of E–Verify requests each year has grown from 

980,000 to about 16.5 million in fiscal year 2010. Currently, about 254,000 employers (approximately 4 percent of all employers) are registered to use E–Verify at approximately 867,000 worksites. 


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In a recent report to the Subcommittee (Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Improve E–Verify, but Challenges Remain, GAO–11–146), the Government Accountability Office found the E–Verify system had made progress in improving accuracy 

with immediate confirmations rising to 97.4 percent. However, the study also noted 

the system was still vulnerable to unauthorized workers and unscrupulous employers presenting stolen or borrowed documents for the purpose of identity fraud. 

In announcing the hearing, Chairman Sam Johnson (R–TX) stated, ‘‘A broken 

federal worksite enforcement policy keeps Americans out of a job, leaves 

workers vulnerable to identity theft, law-abiding employers with uncertainty and unscrupulous employers able to exploit the system. We can and 

must do better.’’ 

FOCUS OF THE HEARING: 

The hearing will focus on the progress made and challenges created by E–Verify, 

including the potential burdens on employees, employers and the SSA. The Subcommittee will examine how the current shortcomings of the system could be improved to ease the verification process during this critical time of job creation. Finally, the Subcommittee will also review other proposals to expand employment eligibility verification, including enhancing the Social Security card with tamper-proof, 

counterfeit-resistant or biometric features and increasing enforcement through the 

sharing of taxpayer wage information. 

DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: 

Please Note: Any person(s) and/or organization(s) wishing to submit for the hearing record must follow the appropriate link on the hearing page of the Committee 

website and complete the informational forms. From the Committee homepage, 

http://waysandmeans.house.gov, select ‘‘Hearings.’’ Select the hearing for which you 

would like to submit, and click on the link entitled, ‘‘Click here to provide a submission for the record.’’ Once you have followed the online instructions, submit all requested information. ATTACH your submission as a Word or WordPerfect document, in compliance with the formatting requirements listed below, by the close 

of business on Thursday, May 5, 2011. Finally, please note that due to the 

change in House mail policy, the U.S. Capitol Police will refuse sealed-package deliveries to all House Office Buildings. For questions, or if you encounter technical 

problems, please call (202) 225–1721 or (202) 225–3625. 

FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS: 

The Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing 

record. As always, submissions will be included in the record according to the discretion of the Committee. The Committee will not alter the content of your submission, 

but we reserve the right to format it according to our guidelines. Any submission 

provided to the Committee by a witness, any supplementary materials submitted for 

the printed record, and any written comments in response to a request for written 

comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any submission or supplementary item not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed, but will 

be maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the Committee. 

1. All submissions and supplementary materials must be provided in Word or WordPerfect 

format and MUST NOT exceed a total of 10 pages, including attachments. Witnesses and submitters are advised that the Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official 

hearing record. 

2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not be accepted for printing. 

Instead, exhibit material should be referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material 

not meeting these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use 

by the Committee. 

3. All submissions must include a list of all clients, persons and/or organizations on whose 

behalf the witness appears. A supplemental sheet must accompany each submission listing the 

name, company, address, telephone, and fax numbers of each witness. 

The Committee seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. 

If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202–225–1721 or 202–226– 


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3411 TTD/TTY in advance of the event (four business days notice is requested). 

Questions with regard to special accommodation needs in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats) may be directed to the Committee as noted above. 

Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on the World 

Wide Web at http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov

f 

/. 

Chairman JOHNSON. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Welcome, everyone. 

Employers are on the front lines of ensuring a legal workforce, 

and it is a battle for these employers. Consider for a moment that 

due to our broken immigration enforcement system, the Pew Hispanic Center estimates there are over 8 million illegal workers in 

this country. With unemployment around 9 percent, these illegal 

workers often compete with lawful citizens for much-needed jobs. 

Today’s hearing will examine the employment verification systems available for employers’ use, including E–Verify, the largely 

voluntary system jointly administered by Social Security and 

Homeland Security. Since our last hearing on this subject nearly 

3 years ago, the use of E–Verify has expanded. Today there are 

over 250,000 employers. That is about 4 percent is all of all U.S. 

employers registered to use the system. In addition, the use of E– 

Verify has been mandated in three States, and for the Federal Government, and certain Federal contractors and subcontractors. 

Social Security is an integral partner in E–Verify because it has 

the only database that can confirm citizenship. I want to make 

clear, however, I am very uncomfortable that Homeland Security is 

checking on U.S. citizens. That said, Social Security and Homeland 

Security have, to their credit, worked together to make E–Verify 

more workable and more accurate. However, as we shall hear 

shortly from the Government Accountability Office, E–Verify remains vulnerable to identity theft and to employer fraud. 

As my Texas colleague and chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 

Lamar Smith, has said, perhaps the most valid criticism of E– 

Verify is the identity theft loophole. And I couldn’t agree more. If 

an employee presents a stolen Social Security number and fraudulent photo ID, E–Verify will erroneously indicate that the individual is authorized to work. The employer has been duped, and an 

innocent American may face years of financial and legal woe because his identity has been stolen. 

To build on the successes of E–Verify while making needed adjustments to ensure successful implementation, last Congress I introduced H.R. 5515, the New Employee Verification Act, or NEVA. 

NEVA would achieve three important goals: One, ensure a legal 

workforce, safeguard workers’ identities, and protect Social Security. 

It is true that Congress gave the American people an employment verification system that works while protecting Social Security’s ability to serve the public. I would hope that this is one immigration-related issue where both sides could find common ground. 

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ployers struggling in these trying times to get Americans working 

again. 

I appreciate all of you all being here. I think that we are going 

to have a good panel today, and I thank you for joining us. So I 

look forward to hearing our expert testimony from all of you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And I now recognize my friend and the 

ranking member, Xavier Becerra, for his opening remarks. 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today’s 

hearing to examine the impact of electronic employment 

verification eligibility verification systems and the impact it has on 

the Social Security Administration (SSA) and on our workers in the 

United States. 

The Social Security Administration has played a critical role in 

the verification of our workforce since 1997, when the basic pilot 

program began, which is now, of course, known as E–Verify. Today 

the majority of employees who are checked through E–Verify are 

cleared fairly quickly; however, some workers are not. Our witnesses today will describe what happens to a worker when they receive a tentative nonconfirmation that the information submitted 

by their employer does not match information contained on government databases. 

A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded that individuals often face significant difficulties in resolving nonconfirmations. This is not a trivial matter because the inability to resolve an erroneous nonconfirmation can lead to loss of 

a job. 

In addition, I am deeply troubled to learn that many employers 

do not comply with E–Verify program rules designed to prevent 

discrimination or abuse of the system. In this downturned economy, one job loss due to mechanical or technical error or employer 

noncompliance with E–Verify requirements is one job lost too 

many. 

Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to submit into the 

record the stories of Americans who have suffered greatly from 

problems with E–Verify. These illustrate the kinds of challenges 

U.S. citizens and legally authorized workers face in keeping their 

jobs. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection. 

Mr. BECERRA. Thank you. 

Mr. BECERRA. Many would like to expand the E–Verify system, 

but we should not do so unless we first address the kinds of problems with the existing system that is identified in today’s hearing. 

In addition, to be able to meet the needs of this growing program, 

more research has to be dedicated to it. 

While some have proposed making E–Verify a permanent, mandatory program, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated 

that this would cost the taxpayers nearly $18 billion over the next 

10 years. 

As we work forward and make progress in trying to improve this 

program, the ultimate solution to what we are trying to address 

through E–Verify is to reform our broken immigration system. In 

places like Arizona, where E–Verify is mandatory, some employers 

have resorted to paying their employees under the table or have 

simply just stopped complying with the program. The State has 


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also seen a loss of income tax revenue, confirming predictions that 

mandatory E–Verify in the absence of immigration reform simply 

drives employees into the underground economy. 

Chairman Johnson, I look forward to working together to jointly 

improve our electronic employment verification system, and I thank 

you for calling today’s hearing. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

Today we are joined by five witnesses. Our first witness will be 

Richard Stana, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, United 

States Government Accountability Office. Next is Marianna 

LaCanfora, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Office of Retirement 

and Disability Policies, Social Security Administration. Next is 

Tyler Moran, Policy Director, National Immigration Law Center. 

Next is Ana Anto ́n, Ph.D. professor, Department of Computer 

Science, College of Engineering, North Carolina State University, 

on behalf of the Association for Computing Machinery. And finally, 

Austin Fragomen, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the American Council on International Personnel, on behalf of the HR Initiative for a Legal Workforce. 

I welcome all of you, and we look forward to hearing your testimony. Each witness will have 5 minutes, and your written statements will be made part of the record in the event that you run 

over a little. So I thank you, and I welcome you. 

And thank you, Mr. Stana. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. STANA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Becerra 

and Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today 

to discuss the results of our work on E–Verify, which is a voluntary 

program that can be used to verify the work authorization of newly 

hired employees. 

I would like to discuss three points from our report, and then 

later I would like to briefly discuss some issues that may be of interest to the subcommittee on how it would affect the Social Security Administration. 

First let us discuss the TNCs, the tentative nonconfirmations. 

The USCIS has substantially reduced the number of TNCs from 

about 8 percent of all queries just a few years ago to 2.6 percent 

in fiscal year 2009, which was the subject of our study, down to 1.7 

percent last year. So that is moving in the right direction. This was 

done by expanding the number of databases that are queried. They 

now look at naturalization databases, and they look at passport 

data. USCIS also screens for common data entry errors like transpositions or a European date format that can be easily fixed. But 

erroneous TNCs continue to occur when employee names are misspelled, or they are transposed, or people with multiple surnames 

use different surnames in one document than they use in another 

document, and thus it triggers a TNC. 

Erroneous final nonconfirmations can occur when SSA field office 

staff do not update the EV–STAR system, which is an information 

system on workers who receive SSA TNCs, but SSA is addressing 

this issue, so we hope that this will be resolved soon. 


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Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Stana, we ask that you, instead of using the 

acronyms, mention the names of these programs, because a lot of 

folks who might be watching may not understand what a TNC and 

all those other things are. 

Mr. STANA. Okay. Thank you. 

An FNC is a final nonconfirmation, which is the final notice that 

you are not confirmed. It is not redressable. In other words, there 

is no appeal mechanism for that, which may get to the issue you 

both were talking about with Americans who are work-authorized 

but get a bad shake out of the system. 

So improving government data sets, increasing employee awareness, and making sure employees have a sufficient amount of time 

to redress the TNC notices is really what is needed here. 

Now, I would like to turn briefly to the issue of identity theft 

that both of you have mentioned. This is a very important issue, 

and it is one that the system has not been able to address. Identity 

theft can occur if I were not work-authorized and would use another person’s identity to say that my Social Security number is 

this, and my driver’s license number is this, and the E–Verify system says I am work-authorized when I am really not. 

Westat did a study on E–Verify a couple of years ago. They found 

that about 3 percent of the confirmed work-authorized people really 

aren’t. In other words, it creates a false positive. And sometimes 

this is done by individual workers getting an identity that works. 

Sometimes it is done with the complicity of the employer; the employer says these documents are valid, let us enter these into the 

E–Verify system, and we will put you on our payroll. 

USCIS has taken a number of steps to try to address this, like 

a photo-matching tool for 3 of the 26 documents you can use to 

validate your authorization to work in the United States. But 

again, this whole system hinges on the integrity of the employer. 

The employer looks at the photo on the screen, looks at the photo 

that you present, or looks at the person who is before them and either says it is or it is not a match. So that is an issue that they 

have to work on a little bit more, finding a key to unlocking the 

identity theft issue. 

Turning to some of the discrimination issues, there is concern 

that people who have hyphenated names may get a bad shake out 

of the system, or people who have hyphenated names may encounter certain challenges that those of us who don’t do not. They may 

order their names in a certain sequence differently on different documents. It is not against the law to do that, but it is going to trigger a tentative nonconfirmation. 

USCIS has a monitoring and compliance unit that they use to try 

to identify discriminatory behaviors among employees, such as seeing if a person is not given work assignments or reduced pay until 

a final confirmation comes through. This is against the law. But 

again, with about 80 people across the country in this unitand no 

on-site inspection—I take that back. There was one at the Social 

Security Administration—it is difficult to determine whether discriminating behavior exists. 

My last point from our report involves resources. Like the I–9 

system, unless the E–Verify system is properly resourced, it is not 

likely to work well. This is because you have to have someone on 


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site to make sure that the system is properly used and, to the extent possible, to make sure that identity theft is minimized or 

eliminated. USCIS has to rely on ICE for investigating, sanctioning 

and seeking prosecution of noncompliant employers, but given its 

priorities, ICE is not likely to devote many resources to this area. 

So policy decisions are going to have to be made on how many resources the Congress wishes ICE to put into worksite enforcement. 

Lastly, I’d like to discuss E–Verify’s impacts on SSA. First, to the 

extent that SSA staff needs to resolve tentative nonconfirmations, 

it does take time away from other duties. When the TNC rate goes 

down from 8 to 1.7 percent, that is helpful. If we go to a mandatory 

system, we may need more resources so it does not adversely impact the SSA workload. 

The other thing that could impact the SSA workload is the selfcheck system, where an employee or potential employee like you or 

me could query a system to see if the system would identify us as 

work-authorized. It is new. It is being piloted. While the pilot is ongoing, it doesn’t now seem to be stressing the SSA workload too 

much. If it becomes mandatory, or if the pilot is expanded nationwide, it could have an effect. But I will let the Social Security Administration discuss ant adverse impact. 

That concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any 

questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stana follows:] 


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f 

Chairman JOHNSON. Ms. LaCanfora, you are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARIANNA LACANFORA, ASSISTANT DEPUTY 

COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 

POLICY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. LACANFORA. Thank you. Chairman Johnson, Ranking 

Member Becerra and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to discuss SSA’s supporting role in E–Verify, DHS’s 

electronic employment eligibility verification system. I would like to 


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start by briefly describing the purpose of our Social Security numbers, or SSNs. 

Assigning SSNs is key to administering Social Security programs. We establish the SSN as a way for employers to report an 

employee’s earnings accurately. We use the SSN to credit wages to 

the earnings record that we maintain for each worker. The earnings record is the basis for determining eligibility for, and the 

amount of, Social Security benefits. 

The SSN also plays a key role in E–Verify. By law, all employers 

are required to verify the identity and employment eligibility of 

new employees. E–Verify is a voluntary, electronic tool that employers can use to comply with the law. When an employer submits 

information about a new hire, DHS sends this information to us 

electronically to verify the SSN, the name and the date of birth in 

our records. For new hires alleging U.S. citizenship, we also confirm citizenship based on the information that we have in our 

records. For any naturalized citizen whose U.S. citizenship we cannot confirm using our records, DHS verifies naturalization and 

thus the authorization to work. For noncitizens, if there is a match 

with our records, DHS will then determine the current work authorization status. DHS notifies the employer of the results of these 

verifications. 

So far this fiscal year, we have handled about 7.5 million queries. 

In fiscal year 2010, E–Verify handled over 16.5 million queries and 

automatically confirmed work authorization in about 98 percent of 

these queries instantly or within 24 hours. The remaining 2 percent received an initial systems mismatch. We call that a tentative 

nonconfirmation. Of that 2 percent, just under half contacted us at 

Social Security to resolve the mismatch. 

When an individual comes into one of our offices with a tentative 

nonconfirmation, we work to resolve the discrepancy. For example, 

the person may need to change their name in our records due to 

a marriage or a divorce that they had not previously reported to 

us. 

It is important to note that we need to verify the identity of any 

individual whose record we update. That is why we must process 

almost all of these updates during face-to-face interviews in our 

local offices. In some cases we may be unable to resolve the discrepancy the same day because the individual may need to obtain 

evidence, such as a marriage certificate. 

We use EV–STAR, which is a Web-based portal, to update the E– 

Verify system with the status of a pending case. Once we resolve 

the discrepancy by updating our records, or by determining that 

our records should not be changed, we again update EV–STAR to 

show the outcome of the case. The employer can check E–Verify for 

the status of the case and see the final confirmation or nonconfirmation. 

We have worked with the DHS over the last few years to improve the E–Verify system. For example, in 2009, we completed a 

significant improvement to our computer systems that support E– 

Verify. This improved system ensures that there is no interference 

between our mission-critical workloads and DHS’s E–Verify program. At the request of DHS, we designed the system to handle up 

to 60 million queries per year. With additional hardware and fundVerDate Mar 15 2010 23:10 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072872 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\72872.XXX GPO1 PsN: 72872

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ing, we could increase our capacity if the need arises. Even with 

this and other improvements we remain focused on further reducing the need for workers to visit our local offices. 

Each year DHS provides funds to cover our E–Verify-related 

costs. Our costs include systems maintenance costs and the cost of 

assisting individuals to resolve the tentative nonconfirmations. Receiving timely and adequate reimbursement from DHS for E–Verify 

is critical. 

In conclusion, I thank you for giving me this opportunity to discuss our role in assisting DHS to administer the E–Verify system. 

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, ma’am. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. LaCanfora follows:] 


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Chairman JOHNSON. Ms. Moran, welcome. You are recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TYLER MORAN, POLICY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 

Ms. MORAN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Johnson, 

Ranking Member Becerra and Members of the Committee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to testify on E–Verify. The National Immigration Law Center has worked on E–Verify since it was implemented in 1997, and I have personally advocated for improvements 

in this program for almost a decade. 


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E–Verify faces a number of challenges despite the progress that 

it has made, and these challenges would be greatly exacerbated if 

this program is made mandatory. That is why it is particularly 

troubling that there may be a bill in the House this year to make 

this program mandatory, because it almost certainly would pass. 

According to the Congressional Budget Office, a mandatory E– 

Verify bill would result in over $17 billion in tax losses because undocumented workers would not leave the country. They and their 

employers who are currently paying taxes would simply go underground to get around the system. 

SSA also testified in 2007 that over 3 million workers would 

have to go to SSA to stand in line and correct database errors or 

lose their jobs. And this is a system, as Mr. Stana has testified, 

that doesn’t detect half of undocumented workers. 

Additionally, if a mandatory system is put on line without legalizing the 8 million undocumented workers in our economy, it is 

going to set the system up for failure, not to mention to decimate 

industries like agriculture. 

I want to start by addressing the error rate. The 98 percent confirmation rate sounds very impressive, and there have been a lot 

of improvements to the programs. But I think it is more helpful to 

talk about the number of workers affected versus the percentage. 

Using Westat’s conservative estimates, in the mandatory system, 

1.2 million people would have to stand in line at SSA to correct 

their records or lose their jobs, and 770,000 people would likely lose 

their jobs. This is an underestimate because every employer that 

has audited, their own data comes up with higher error rates. For 

example, when Los Angeles County audited its use of E–Verify, it 

found on the low end that 2 percent of SSA TNCs were erroneous. 

To make this really concrete, a 2 percent error rate in Texas would 

mean 244,000 people going to SSA or losing their jobs. And in California that would mean 362,000 people—78,000 alone in L.A. going 

to only 7 SSA offices. 

So these are future projections, but using Westat’s statistics in 

fiscal year 2010 alone, 80,000 U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants 

lost their jobs. Jessica, a native-born U.S. citizen from southern 

Florida, is one of those people who called our office. She got a job 

offer that she accepted at a good-paying telecommunications company. They told her she got a TNC. She went to SSA. She provided 

the documentation. They said, you are all set, and provided her 

with paperwork that her name and SSN matched. She went back 

to her employer, who at first said okay. Three days later they said, 

I am sorry, you got a final nonconfirmation, we are going to have 

to fire you. She went back to SSA, waited in line and said, I 

thought it was okay. They said it is okay. She went back to the employer and the employer said, I am sorry. She was very frustrated. 

She called USCIS, DHS, and finally called us. She was out of work 

for 3 months, including over the Christmas holiday. And she now 

has a lower-paying job. 

The worst part about this is that there is no due process in the 

system, and there is nothing we can do for Jessica to get back her 

wages or to get back her job. So it is important to note that Jessica 

is not the only one that faces these challenges at SSA. People have 


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to take off time from work. It takes costs them money and often 

they have to go back multiple times. 

I want to highlight Arizona because I think it is a good window 

into what a mandatory system could look like without legalizing 

undocumented workers. Arizona is the first State to make E–Verify 

mandatory, and there is three main takeaways. One, undocumented workers didn’t leave the State, they didn’t leave the country; they went into the underground economy, or they are now popping up as independent contractors. Number two, employers are 

coaching workers how to get around the system. And number three, 

despite penalties and mandates, half of employers aren’t even 

using it. So you might think this is all worth it if the system works. 

But again, 54 percent of undocumented workers aren’t detected by 

the system. 

So what are the solutions? As I said in my opening statement, 

E–Verify has made a number of improvements, but it is just not 

ready for prime time. If and when Congress decides to make this 

program mandatory, there are a number of policies that have to accompany it, and they are in my written testimony, but I want to 

highlight three. 

Number one, it has to be paired with a path to legal status for 

the 8 million undocumented workers. People aren’t going to pack 

their bags because of E–Verify. They are going to stay here, and 

there are going to be major repercussions for the economy. 

Number two, we have to create due process so people have a way 

to challenge these errors, and that they get back pay if they lose 

their jobs. We have 9 percent unemployment. We can’t have 1 million workers losing their jobs. 

And number three, you should phase in E–Verify with performance evaluations along the way for database accuracy, privacy, and 

employer compliance to make sure the system works for workers 

and businesses alike. 

So in a year when Congress is all about cutting budgets and 

high-performance programs, mandatory E–Verify just doesn’t make 

sense. When this bill goes to the House floor, you are going to hear 

a lot about protecting jobs and undocumented immigrants, but I 

think the members of this committee can play a really key role in 

highlighting the impact on SSA and impact on U.S. citizens who 

are the people that are most affected by this program. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, ma’am. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Moran follows:] 


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Chairman JOHNSON. It sounds like you don’t like the program. 

We have got to do something to stop the illegal workers. 

Ms. MORAN. If we pair it with legalization, then we can talk. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Dr. Anto ́n, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you. 


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STATEMENT OF ANA I. ANTO ́ N, Ph.D., PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE, COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, 

NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, ON BEHALF OF THE 

ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY 

Ms. ANTO ́ N. Good afternoon, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Becerra and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the 

opportunity to testify. This statement represents my own professional position, as well as that of the Association of Computing 

Machinery’s U.S. Public Policy Council. 

By way of introduction, I am a professor of software engineering 

at North Carolina State University and the director of an academic 

privacy research center. In addition, I serve on several industry 

and government technical boards and advisors, including the DHS 

Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee. 

The E–Verify pilot system is intended to ensure that only authorized citizens and legal residents can be employed in the United 

States, a laudable objective, especially in a time of notable unemployment. Unfortunately the intent has not matched the realization. Complex systems such as E–Verify are fallible and often misused and subject to mission creep. One large-scale evaluation of E– 

Verify reported that the majority of illegal immigrants checked 

through the system were incorrectly deemed eligible to work primarily as a result of identity fraud. Thus E–Verify remains vulnerable to and incentivizes the use of identity fraud. 

Among the issues noted in my written testimony are three that 

are especially critical to consider from a systems engineering perspective. First, E–Verify must be able to accurately identify the individuals and employers authorized to use the system in a trustworthy manner before it is widely deployed. Second, proof of success with a pilot must be required before extensively expanding it. 

Third, complex systems such as E–Verify are often misused and 

repurposed in ways that violate sound principles of security and 

good software engineering. This should be considered in the design 

of the system and in supporting legislation. 

Given the identification-authentication concerns in E–Verify, it is 

important to distinguish between an identifier and an authenticator. Both have very special technical meanings and are often 

confused. In my written testimony I described the differences between identification and authentication. In brief, an identifier is a 

label associated with a person. An authenticator provides a basis 

to believe that some identifier accurately labels the person. 

Within the context of E–Verify, the self-check pilot system, which 

we heard of a few minutes ago, it authenticates individuals by requesting information that can easily be obtained via the white 

pages and public tax records by individuals other than the holder 

of the Social Security number. The requested information is not 

sufficient for proper authentication. The pilot allows unauthorized 

individuals and fraudsters to access the system, allowing them to 

check stolen information to determine if it can be used to craft a 

new fraudulent identity to obtain employment. As currently configured, mandated use of E–Verify would encourage an increase in 

computer fraud, abuse and identity theft. 

Additionally, to protect the innocent, employers who take action 

on nonconfirmation returns without informing applicants and proVerDate Mar 15 2010 23:10 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072872 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\72872.XXX GPO1 PsN: 72872

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viding them an opportunity to appeal and correct mistaken records 

must face strong penalties. Exceptions for cases of natural disaster 

or emergency should also be built in. Under such circumstances, requirements should be waived or suspended when seeking new employment. 

In the time remaining, I will highlight a few recommendations 

from my written testimony, again from a systems engineering perspective. First, it is critical to eliminate the weaknesses in E– 

Verify and objectively audit the pilot before it is scaled up or extended to individuals for anything other than employment. Lack of 

proper system validation and verification will almost certainly lead 

to cost and schedule overruns, system breakdowns, intrusions and 

perhaps obsolescence. 

Second, it is imperative that vulnerabilities be examined and 

risks addressed to protect the system as well as the identity of the 

individual whose information is contained within it. 

Third, adopting biometric technologies as a solution to the E– 

Verify authentication problem would be premature and is unlikely 

to solve some of the fundamental problems with the current system. 

In conclusion, we are encouraged by your attention to these 

issues, and the computing professionals that I represent stand 

ready to help you in your efforts. 

Thank you for your attention. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, ma’am. I appreciate your comments. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Anto ́n follows:] 


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Chairman JOHNSON. Mr. Fragomen, welcome. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., CHAIRMAN OF THE 

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON 

INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL, ON BEHALF OF THE HR INITIATIVE FOR A LEGAL WORKFORCE 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Becerra, Members of the Subcommittee. I wish to thank you for 

your kind invitation to share my thoughts on employment eligibility verification and the problems U.S. employers face. 


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Before we discuss E–Verify, I would like to acknowledge the fine 

job done by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services in expanding and improving the program. Based on the agency’s last 

numbers, enrollment is up to 254,000 employers, and you just 

heard that 98.3 percent of the queries result in automatic response 

within 24 hours, which shows a steady improvement over the past 

decade. However, the number of participants only represents about 

3 percent of all employers, and scalability is still a concern. 

While E–Verify has become very effective in matching a name 

with a Social Security number, it is not effective in making certain 

that the employee is who he or she claims to be on the form I–9. 

According to a December 2009 report, 54 percent of unauthorized 

workers who undergo E–Verify are erroneously confirmed as workauthorized. 

E–Verify has made some progress towards solving this problem. 

One example is the incorporation of photographic images from 

green cards, Department of Homeland Security work authorization 

cards and U.S. passports. And we appreciate that there are plans 

to include driver’s license data from motor vehicle departments 

around the country, but so far there is only one State involved in 

a pilot program. 

Over the past 2 years, the employer community has witnessed 

much more scrutiny by Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Agency, not that I am objecting to enforcement of the law, I think 

that is perfectly appropriate. But employers want certainty. Employers want to know they have a true safe harbor when they obey 

the law, and those are really the two cornerstones. 

Under the status quo, employers do not have clear guidance on 

what to do when informed of a Social Security record mismatch, or 

when the information does not match government records, there is 

no assurance that the employers are not victims of identity fraud. 

I believe the solution to the unauthorized employment problem 

and ultimately an important weapon in addressing illegal migration is reliable employment eligibility verification. Before we can 

eliminate false nonconfirmations in E–Verify, there must be sufficient resources allocated to the Social Security Administration to 

clean up its records. We also need clear guidance on what to do 

with Social Security number mismatches. However, we do not believe it is necessary for all employers to reverify their entire workforce. 

For the system to be effective, additional steps are necessary to 

stop identity fraud. Matching photographs, of course, will have a 

positive impact, but it does not eliminate subjectivity on the part 

of the employer. Instead, this will require incorporating biometric 

technology, such as that proposed in the Johnson-Giffords New Employment Verification Act, and other comparable technology. If we 

can stop identity fraud, it will give law-abiding employers a safe 

harbor and at the same time take away the subjectivity that encourages discrimination, either deliberate or inadvertent. 

Further, having an effective and reliable system would strengthen the argument for Federal preemption in immigration enforcement, something that business and immigrant rights advocates 

both want. 


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Finally, an effective eligibility program is a critical component of 

law enforcement filling the gaps that border control and visa tracking currently leave in the process. 

Thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fragomen follows:] 


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Chairman JOHNSON. What is the State that is using the driver’s license? 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. Mississippi. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

We have got a vote. There will be two votes. I am going to put 

the committee in recess for 30 minutes, or if we get back sooner. 

Thank you. We stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman JOHNSON. The committee will come back to order. 

I would like to ask Mr. Fragomen, the most critical issue facing 

America today is jobs. And I think without jobs and job creation, 


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our country is doomed to a lower standard of living for decades to 

come. What steps need to be taken, in your opinion, to ensure that 

employment verification, in particular an expanded E–Verify, 

doesn’t complicate or impede creating a job and hiring the right 

person for the job? 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. I think that is a very critical issue. The most 

important factor is to move into this slowly if we have mandatory 

verification, and to make sure that it is possible to scale the system 

to the level that it would need to be and to, as they say, get it 

right. Now, in order to get it right—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. When you say ‘‘scale the system,’’ what do 

you mean? 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. In terms of increasing it. The system now covers about 3 percent of employers. 

Chairman JOHNSON. We have been fighting that for years. 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. It needs to cover 100 percent, which means we 

have to add about 7.5 million employers to the system, which 

means that the volume of transactions that the E–Verify, for instance, would have to be able to accommodate would be multiples 

of what it is currently. And you know the problems that software 

encounters when you try to increase its capacity by that magnitude. And the second thing is—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. I know. But Social Security claims they 

have the most modern system available today. I mean, that is what 

they tell me. 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. They might. Except the number of tentative 

nonconfirmations, when you multiply it by that number of employees, becomes a very significant number if you figure about 1 to 

1.5% percent of the cases wind up as tentative confirmation. There 

are ones that don’t get resolved easily. 

The other aspect of it is that there be adequate resources dedicated to Social Security so that they do it right, that the system 

be fully electronic, that it incorporate biometrics or other fraud-prevention technology or software; and secondly, that we have a uniform law, that this applies everywhere, and it preempts the current 

State laws. 

I think it is very important that the employer is offered a safe 

harbor, because at the end of the day, it is really the government’s 

responsibility to get the system right to protect the employer, and 

to offer a safe harbor, and to protect the employees against potential discrimination. But to accomplish all of those goals, it really 

has to be a government-driven system that can prevent identity 

fraud. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Well, every expert we have talked to acknowledged the fact that E–Verify can’t detect identity fraud very 

well and may, in fact, encourage it. So that puts the employer on 

the frontline of trying to detect and prevent identity fraud. So can 

you tell us the challenges faced by your companies in their attempts to detect identity illegalities and yet fill the jobs that Americans need? 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. I think it is very frustrating to companies who 

have to go through this process, because essentially they have to 

accept the documentation that is given to them by the employee as 

long as it looks reasonable on its face. And there is really nothing 


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further, no further steps they can take. If they ask for additional 

documentation, they could easily be accused of discrimination. And 

the companies, of course, are generally very concerned about making certain they do things right and they don’t hire workers that 

aren’t legally authorized to work because, of course, they could lose 

these employees in an enforcement action, and then, of course, that 

would hinder their ability to deliver the service that they are delivering. 

So it is counter—it is a counterintuitive situation because you 

have—you are presented with documentation, you really don’t like 

the way the documentation looks, but you have no reason to say 

with certainty that there is anything inappropriate, you just have 

to accept it. So I think it puts the companies in an extremely difficult position. And of course, if it turns out that the documentation, in fact, is fraudulent, then the employer’s whole business is 

at risk, and an enforcement action, and he loses a big portion of 

his workforce. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

My time has expired. Mr. Becerra, you are recognized. 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I 

thank each of and every one of you for your testimony. 

I don’t believe there is a person in this Congress and, I suspect, 

sitting here in this audience who wouldn’t agree that as a sovereign Nation, we have to do everything we can to make sure that 

we understand who is in our country and who is securing employment in our country. And I know that we continue to try to figure 

out the best way to get there. So your testimony is important because Congress is going to make every effort to try to take us to 

a place where we can tell the world—not just Americans, tell the 

world—that we are going to determine the best way to figure out 

who should come into the country and who should be able to work 

in our country. And so I wish you great deal of good fortune as you 

continue to assemble the information and the data that will help 

us make the best decisions here. 

I am concerned about two things in particular: As we try to move 

forward in verification for employment, that we are not undermining the essential work that is supposed to be done by the agencies that might be placed in a position of charge to do the work. 

So in the case of Social Security Administration, you are already 

backlogged in trying to deal with disability claims from Americans 

who are trying to get their benefits. You are backlogged when it 

comes to trying to secure the different resources you need to do the 

other things that come from having the most popular identifier in 

the world, the Social Security number. So I am wondering if you 

can give us a better sense. 

Right now E–Verify is a program used in 2 or 3 percent of the 

employment community. And if you expand it and make it mandatory throughout the Nation, we are expanding it dramatically. And 

we have already heard the stories of the potential fraud, potential 

misuse of identity, and certainly the dramatic dislodgement of employment that an American may have secured rightfully and then 

loses it. How are we prepared, then, to move to a fully national 

mandatory system? 


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And so perhaps what I can do is ask Mr. Stana first to give us 

a sense if you think any of the Federal agencies that would be in 

charge of a nationwide mandatory system are equipped today with 

resources and personnel to go to ramp up to full 100 percent participation of the employment community. 

Mr. STANA. Well, I think, as you pointed out in your statement, 

the CBO estimated it would take billions of dollars to make sure 

that Social Security and DHS and whoever else would be involved 

would have both the technology and the personnel to make this 

happen. Currently do they have that to ramp up right away to a 

mandatory system? Probably not. But with proper resources, they 

could get there. 

The other questions you raised about the ID theft and making 

sure that you don’t have false negatives, the system will need adequate resources to get on top of these issues. The challenges do not 

pertain to the 95 percent of the population that is properly handled, it is about the 5 percent that is problematic. 

Mr. BECERRA. But the 95 percent of the population might pay 

the price as we try to deal with that 5 percent. 

Mr. STANA. You can’t ignore the 95 percent. 

Mr. BECERRA. But, Ms. LaCanfora, let me ask you this. Social 

Security in this tough budget environment is taking a hit in this 

2011 budget. Chances are it might take a hit in the 2012 budget. 

You are already having a difficult time dealing with all of these 

other responsibilities you have to our Americans who are applying 

for retirement benefits, for disability benefits, survivors’ benefits. 

Can Social Security ramp up to a 100 percent E–Verify participation without sufficient resources to do this? 

Ms. LACANFORA. The simple answer is no, Mr. Becerra. We appreciate and share your concerns about funding. It really depends 

largely on what you consider mandatory 100 percent expansion. 

Right now E–Verify is largely used for new hires, with few exceptions, and if you look at the current volume, we get about 16.5 million queries a year. If you ramp it up to new hires nationwide, that 

would be around 60 million queries a year. If you ramp it up even 

further to include current employees, you could be getting up to 

140 million queries a year or more. 

So it depends on the mandate. But certainly any mandate would 

have a significant impact on Social Security, increased traffic in 

our local offices, and we would need to be funded for that. 

And I would also support the comment made by one of my colleagues earlier to say that any mandatory move should be phased 

in so that we have the opportunity to ramp up and hire as needed. 

Mr. BECERRA. And, Dr. Anto ́n, and, I hope, Mr. Fragomen, you 

as well will continue to provide us with some information that 

helps us pinpoint some of what your testimony really focused on, 

and that is how you make this work. How do you collect the information? How do you deal with this Internet fraud that is out there? 

We really need that to be able to move forward. 

Ms. Moran, I hope you will continue to give us the real case, real 

live examples of individuals, U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents who have been impacted because we haven’t done this perhaps as quickly in implementing a workable program as we would 


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like. So as we continue to figure out how to ramp up, I hope you 

all will continue to give us information. 

Unfortunately my time has expired, but I would have loved to 

have gotten into it more with you all. But I appreciate very much 

your time with us today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. I appreciate your comments. 

Mr. Paulsen, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PAULSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fragomen, small businesses are top job providers. How much 

of a barrier is not having Internet access for using E–Verify for 

those folks? 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. Well, not having Internet access certainly 

makes it much more difficult. As you know, you could make 

verification available by telephone again, but that is not a particularly desirable way to do it. I suppose the good news is this is becoming less of a problem as telephones now are morphing into 

Internet-enabled devices. So I think it will become less of a problem over a period of time. But certainly it is an issue now. 

And the other big issue, too, I think, for small businesses is just 

the impact on the small businesses if they have a small staff. Since 

they tend to not have too many employees that have to go, quote, 

hang around the Social Security office with thousands of other people who will be doing the same thing at the same time, you can 

imagine what the impact of that would be on these smaller companies. 

Mr. PAULSEN. I was kind of wondering if you thought smaller 

employers essentially should be held to the same standard as larger companies in terms of a compliance measure. They can’t get access to the Internet like larger employers. Are you concerned that 

a work verification system might not only discriminate against the 

workers, but also against potential small employers? 

I should ask you, what about the situation where a potential 

worker is caught in a tentative nonconfirmation problem, and the 

need for communications between Social Security and the employer 

become critical? 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. Once again, that is a big issue. I think, in fact, 

most situations are going to require the employee to actually go to 

the Social Security office or whatever to try to get these problems 

resolved. I don’t know how many of them are really going to be successfully resolved electronically. But certainly, not having Internet 

access would be a big problem, and I think it would require on behalf of the smaller employers that they may just have to try, as I 

say—try to use some of these technologies so that they can get 

more in the game. 

Now, whether it would be reasonable to exempt them, I think 

that becomes difficult when you consider the number of small employers there are, and the fact that frequently these small employers are where the undocumented immigrants may be employed. So 

I think giving them sort of exemption would probably be a good 

idea maybe for a period of time. 

Mr. PAULSEN. That was my follow-up. I was curious if you 

thought it would be a reasonable option to give them an exemption 

for a certification for a business, the smaller ones in particular, if 


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they have shown to be good employers or they have had a goodfaith effort to actually abide by the law. 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. Yeah, I think it would be very reasonable to 

do that for, as I say, a period of time, because as we discussed a 

minute ago, it would be important to phase in the program, and 

the larger employers could be phased in first before smaller employers. 

Mr. PAULSEN. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Berg, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question, Ms. LaCanfora, concerns some new hires are authorized to work. We heard a little bit about receiving an erroneous 

tentative nonconfirmation from the E–Verify system. It seems like 

we have got too much bureaucracy in here that is really creating 

a problem for people that are obviously getting kicked or flagged 

with the system. So I guess my question is, we know Social Security can extend the deadline, and we have field office employees 

that can make the entry into the electronic system, the EV–STAR. 

What is SSA doing to try to improve this and keeping people from 

falling through the cracks? 

Ms. LACANFORA. Thank you for the question. Over the past 2 

years, we have worked closely with DHS to decrease the number 

of tentative nonconfirmations. It used to be somewhere, I think, as 

my colleague said, up around 8 percent. Right now tentative nonconfirmations are around 1.7 percent of the total, and less than 1 

percent actually come to Social Security. So the other tentative 

nonconfirmations may be resolved through DHS. So we get less 

than 1 visit for every 100 queries coming through the system. That 

is far lower than it has been in previous years. 

In terms of the EV–STAR System, we have, as a matter of fact, 

next week an enhancement to the system coming in where if someone walks into one of our offices as a result of a tentative nonconfirmation, they don’t have to tell our employee that. They can say, 

listen, I have some sort of discrepancy I need to resolve. And what 

will happen is when our employee goes into the system, an alert 

will pop up saying, check EV–STAR, so we can assure that we 

catch every one of these cases and then document it properly in the 

system. We expect that that enhancement will significantly increase our use of EV–STAR. 

Mr. BERG. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Smith, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fragomen, would you talk about the impact of the patchwork 

of laws on employers? If you could emphasize that, and then about 

the challenges this creates for Homeland Security in determining 

the volume of E–Verify workloads. 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. Well, impact is very significant. The State 

laws basically differ from each other. They frequently differ from 

the Federal law. States sometimes struggle with issues that would 

seem very simple, but in a modern economy, it becomes les obvious. 


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For instance, what is the place of employment; if you physically 

work in one location, but you report into and you are paid by an 

employer or an office that is in the State; or perhaps there is no 

office at all in the State, but you actually, in fact, render services 

that benefit, for instance, a company with whom you have a contract in that State. So they have a lot of difficulty identifying what 

the different standards are. And then, of course, you have your virtual employees who are just working at home. 

So the bottom line is that it is a very, very expensive proposition 

for corporations to try to track all of these different rules and try 

to comply with them on a State-by-State basis. 

Mr. SMITH. And, Ms. LaCanfora, everything is fully reimbursed 

at Social Security, right? 

Ms. LACANFORA. Yes. DHS reimburses us for all of our costs. 

Mr. SMITH. Can you elaborate how that reimbursement takes 

place? 

Ms. LACANFORA. Sure. What happens is at the beginning of 

the year, DHS will estimate the number of queries that they expect. We at Social Security estimate the amount of the fallout that 

we expect to happen; in other words, the number of people that will 

actually walk into a field office. And with those two numbers, we 

then estimate the amount of money that DHS should reimburse us 

for the year, and they pay us that money up front, and then at the 

end of the year, after we know how many queries we actually got 

and how many field office visits we actually got, then we reconcile 

those numbers and we sort out the change. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Tiberi. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I left, I told Mr. Fragomen—just to let everybody else know 

before I ask the question—just this morning I had an employer talk 

to me about this issue. A family-owned business, participating voluntarily in the E–Verify system, has been very frustrated with the 

lack of continuous continuity in the system. Sometimes it takes up 

to 7 days for verification. At that point, usually if it takes that 

long, the applicant that he is going to hire is gone and goes to another employer who doesn’t have an E–Verify system. So he is frustrated from that perspective. 

He is frustrated that this small business owner who owns 12 restaurants in Ohio was audited in a voluntary manner by ICE and 

found that 83 of his employees in total that were E–Verified had 

given him incorrect information on the I–9 form, so he got fined. 

He fired the 83 employees, and they are probably working somewhere else. And here is an employer who is actually trying to participate in the system. 

So I have grave concerns about how a mandatory system would 

work when clearly the voluntary system is not working for employers—some employers today. So I would like to ask each of you— 

and we can start at the end here, what do I tell my constituents 

about why I should support a mandatory system when clearly the 

voluntary system is not working? 


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Mr. STANA. When we did our work that resulted in the report 

that was issued a few months ago, we went out to the State of Arizona and North Carolina and a few other places and talked to employers and employer groups, and asked them what they wanted in 

an E–Verify system. Some of the issues you are bringing up today 

really weren’t on their radar screen. They said they want something that is reliable, fast and not burdensome. And they are worried about other employers having a competitive advantage because 

they misuse the system. They fear they could lose an employee who 

later goes down the street to another employer who misuses the 

system and gets hired. 

So I think what I would say to your constituent is that to the 

extent that this system is reliable, fast and not burdensome, it 

would be ready for prime time, in our estimation. 

Mr. TIBERI. But today he would argue—I am not sure it is not 

reliable—the E–Verify system is not reliable, sometimes takes up 

to 7 days, and in this case not very timely or accurate. 

Mr. STANA. Without knowing the facts and circumstances of 

that case, maybe he described it differently. He shouldn’t have sent 

the information into the E–Verify system until he actually hired 

the individual. You shouldn’t use it for screening. That is a no-no. 

But if it takes 7 days to get a response, that is an exception. If 

such delays happen a lot, then that is of concern. 

Mr. TIBERI. It happens a lot, he said. 

Ms. LACANFORA. I would say SSA has a very limited role in 

E–Verify. We obviously have a database, as was mentioned earlier, 

with over 450 million records of Social Security numbers, which include dates of birth and some citizenship information. But DHS is 

responsible for all other aspects of the E–Verify system. I have to 

defer to them largely to respond to your question. 

Mr. TIBERI. Ms. Moran. 

Ms. MORAN. I am not going to convince you to support a mandatory system. In fact, I don’t think that you should. What we need 

to do is find a solution to the broken immigration system. The employer in your state wants those 83 employees. They need employment. We need to just find a solution so that employer in good faith 

isn’t liable for immigration violations, and he or she can get the 

workers that they need. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thanks. 

Ms. ANTO ́ N. I would just like to point out there is another issue 

that has been raised that affects small employers, which is the fact 

that small employers generally don’t have the resources to properly 

secure their systems. And so in addition to being fined for that 

kind of thing, they are going to have data breaches, they are going 

to have databases which contain information that identifies other 

people, and they are going to be easy targets for people to hack into 

their systems, insider or out. So that is another consideration is 

they don’t have the resources; not just Internet access, but the fact 

that their systems are vulnerable to botnets they don’t even know 

that are on there, viruses, et cetera. 

Mr. TIBERI. Great point. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. Well, it seems to me that if the government 

mandates that you go through this process, that they then have to 

assure that as a trade-off, that the system will be certain, and you 


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will be given a safe haven if you do what you are supposed to do. 

So before the system, in my mind, is ready for prime time, it has 

to be—it has to be improved to the point where that is possible. 

And it has to address this whole issue of identity fraud. And until 

it addresses identity fraud, has adequate resources, fully electronic, 

et cetera, it should not be mandated because it is not reliable. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Brady, you are up. 

Mr. BRADY. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. 

I really appreciate the comments of all of the witnesses today. I 

am convinced in the broader issue that we have to close the back 

door of illegal immigration so that we can keep open the front door 

of legal immigration. Workforce verification being timely and accurate is the key to that, to do it successfully and fairly. 

Dr. Anto ́n, you had an interesting comment in your testimony 

about mission creep and how databases start to tie into one another, and before you know it, you are going to have a dangerous 

situation. Some have suggested that Social Security, IRS and 

Homeland Security share taxpayer data in the workforce hires. We 

hear that often. We, the committee, have been very apprehensive 

about any sharing of taxpayer data. Now, our jurisdiction regarding Section 6103 in the IRS Code prevents it. In fact, our staff 

asked the Joint Committee on Taxation to prepare a report on 

these provisions in preparation for this hearing, and, Mr. Chairman, I request that this report be entered into the hearing record. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection. 

Mr. BRADY. So, Doctor, can you speak to the taxpayer data 

issue and mission creep and workforce issues. 

Ms. ANTO ́ N. Certainly. So from a privacy point of view, clearly 

when you start commingling IRS data with other databases in the 

United States, that raises a lot of red flags. 

As a technologist, I can say that requiring, for instance, authentication—for authentication, let us say that you had to provide 

what was the figure on line 19 of your IRS statement from tax returns from last year. That is something that no one else can get. 

That is something that only I can look at. So, from that perspective 

as an authenticator, it is pretty strong. But the concern, then, is 

that that raises a lot of risks once you start providing that kind 

of access between systems, and every time you start piggy-backing 

databases, then you are ultimately increasing the risk of security 

problems, transmission of information, data leaks, data peeping, 

like when there is celebrity peeping, et cetera. So it raises a lot of 

the different risks that have to be considered, and how do you secure all of those transactions as well. 

Mr. BRADY. In laymen’s terms, businesses and agencies today 

focus on keeping their data secure. How much greater does the risk 

increase when you start sharing those types of data across agencies? 

Ms. ANTO ́ N. Ultimately the more data that you have about 

someone in a database, the easier it is to access a lot more information and cobble together new identities, and so it becomes a very 

rich target for attack. So that is something the government has to 

think about is what do we really—there is no such thing as a seVerDate Mar 15 2010 23:10 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072872 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 I:\WAYS\OUT\72872.XXX GPO1 PsN: 72872

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cure system. We have centuries of experience with war to show 

that there is no such thing as a secure system or country, et cetera. 

And so with that knowledge, we have to think about do we really 

want a system that will eventually be broken into, that will make 

it easier for people to propagate identity fraud. 

Ms. ANTO ́ N. So there are just different risks that we have to do. 

And we need to consider how do you design the system in such a 

way that we address the real problem at hand instead of patching 

things on in the hopes that we keep putting Band-Aids on—okay, 

well, maybe if we just check people to see whether or not they are 

eligible to work—and then we have all of these other problems. 

And the real problem, I think, is an immigration problem. So I will 

just throw that there. 

Mr. BRADY. Got it. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Brady. That is interesting. You know your line 19 on your IRS form? 

Ms. ANTO ́ N. I don’t. I just threw that out there. But the point 

is that I would have to look it up. And if I have to look it up, then 

someone else can’t use it. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I am not sure I could find mine 10 days 

after I file the form. 

You know, all of you, use of biometric data is always another proposal for ID and authentication. We have been talking about that 

for a long time, and, of course, it is not perfect either. But can each 

of you comment on biometrics and what you think of this? 

Mr. STANA. Let me answer that two ways. First off, it could be 

very expensive to do it right. And to do it right might be something 

other than putting a chip in a card and sliding it into a reader, because those kinds of systems have been hacked in a matter of 

hours. So that is not good. You have to have a separate data set. 

So that could be very expensive, but maybe in some form necessary 

to make this thing work. 

Second, biometrics raise all kinds of privacy concerns. How much 

of your identity should the government have? That is a question 

that I am not ready to answer. Should the government have my 

retina scan? Should the government have my fingerprint? Well, 

they already have my fingerprints, but how much information do 

you want the government to have? And then you get into the data 

privacy and security issues. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I would like to give it to them so I can get 

through the airport quicker. 

Mr. STANA. Well, that is the other thing. Some people would be 

perfectly willing to give it up if they could bypass the system somehow; they’d like to put their hand on a reader, and instantly be 

work-authorized. Others are very sensitive about that. 

Ms. LACANFORA. I will preface my comment by saying I am not 

an expert in biometrics, but I do agree that incorporating biometrics into E–Verify would be a costly proposition. DHS, it was 

mentioned earlier, is allowing employers now to access passport 

photos and is working to obtain driver’s license photos. And looking 

at photos is one means of identity assurance, although not foolproof. I think decision makers need to weigh those options against 

the biometric option to see what is cost-effective and what gets the 

job done to the extent possible. 


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Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Ms. MORAN. So the cost and the accuracy issues have already 

been mentioned. And I encourage you to look at some studies of the 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential, the TWIC card. It 

is like a billion dollars, huge error rate, it is kind of in a mess. So 

I would encourage you to look at that. I think it is the closest 

thing. 

The point is that—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. It worked, though. 

Ms. MORAN. I mean, for some it does, but there has also been 

some very high error rates, and also the census folks got a 20 percent error rate on fingerprints when they tried to do it for the 

workers last time around. 

So I think the point is that E–Verify, biometrics, nothing is a 

magic bullet. Again, not to repeat myself, but if you still have undocumented workers in the economy, just like E–Verify, they are 

just going to go underground and get around the system. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Ms. ANTO ́ N. So I would just note that if you also add biometrics 

to a database, that becomes a very, very rich, wonderful asset for 

anyone who wants to gain access to it. 

And another challenge with biometrics is this is another singlefactor authentication approach. And so we really are advocating a 

layered approach where we have multiple ways to authenticate 

people. 

There are places in which biometrics, I think, work very well. 

For instance, to enter in the Olympic Village, there is always hand 

geometry, and your hand geometry gets compared to your badge. 

That isn’t retained in any database. So I have to have my credential with me to get in. And so that is a very nice way, approach 

to do it because you don’t have the responsibility of having a database with all the biometrics stored in it. 

On the other hand, it is extremely expensive because it means 

you have to have a reader every single place, and there can be 

hardware failure associated with that. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. If over half of the unauthorized workers who 

undergo E–Verify are erroneously confirmed as work-authorized, it 

seems as though we are creating a pretty vast system which impacts on the whole populace, and we are not being very effective 

at ferreting out unauthorized workers. So it seems to me that as 

problematic as it might be because of the cost, you still must stop 

the use of false breeder documents which can lead to issuance of 

fraudlulent identification suggesting you are someone different 

from who you really are, and which can cause obvious data security 

problems. It seems to be that unless we tackle identity fraud and 

false breeder document problems, at the end of the day, I don’t 

know that we are being very effective in keeping unauthorized 

workers out of the workforce. 

Chairman JOHNSON. It is a cumbersome idea, but it might 

work. 

Mr. Becerra, do you care to question? 

Mr. BECERRA. You actually inspired a question that sort of 

stems from something Dr. Anto ́n mentioned earlier. You mentioned 


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that trying to expand E–Verify when is prone to errors, prone to 

intrusion, and loss of privacy, and at the very end you close by saying it is almost as if we are trying to build a system that hasn’t 

been proven to work effectively because we have a decrepit immigration system that is not helping us keep tabs of folks in the first 

place we are authorized to work. So it sounds like we are piling on 

top of a broken system. 

Other systems that we are not quite sure are ready for prime 

time may cause difficulties for Americans’ privacy and security and 

may lead to a lot of businessmen and women having to go through 

some expense and perhaps difficulties with their business if they 

must go through a system that doesn’t always give them the check 

they need. And so it seems like we would rather than pile on, we 

should clear the dust and deal with the foundation of why we are 

talking about coming up with a verification system in the first 

place. 

Ms. ANTO ́ N. Yes, I wholeheartedly agree, and as you were 

speaking, it reminded me of everything we would read about business process for engineering during the late 1980s, early 1990s, 

where one of the problems is that people were building systems 

that automated existing broken business processes and practices. 

And so that is why systems become obsolete. 

And so I think it is really good to think out of the box and think 

it would be really big, this is a grand challenge, if you will, and 

how do we solve a problem; and then build a system that really 

supports a well-designed business practice. 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Fragomen, a question for you. If you could 

take control of this, could you devise a system that would work for 

verification purposes? 

Mr. FRAGOMEN. Well, I think it would be possible. You have 

to start with the premise that you have to try to limit the number 

of persons that enter the U.S. illegally. That has to be the first 

step. You have to have more effective border security. You have to 

have better systems to keep persons who enter legally from overstaying their status and becoming illegal. 

You have to then—once you have a more secure entry system 

and better control, it seems to me then you definitely have to have 

a workplace enforcement system that is driven by bioidentifiers. 

Interior enforcement doesn’t work. For instance, the law that Arizona passed and, of course, was just found unconstitutional, it 

doesn’t really work, and it never has, because you can’t basically 

formulate reasonable suspicion to believe who is in the U.S. illegally, which would then arguably give you a right to question that 

person; reasonable suspicion to believe that they are an alien unlawfully present in the U.S. So you really can’t do that without 

using racial appearance as a primary factor. So that is never going 

to work. 

So really your only shots at this are border enforcement, a legal 

immigration system that allows a larger number of people to come 

into the country to work legally, and workplace enforcement. I 

think you need those three things combined. 

Mr. BECERRA. It sounds like you have just read off the litany 

of things that most people say we need for comprehensive immigration reform. 


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Mr. FRAGOMEN. It is certainly a number of those pieces. 

Mr. BECERRA. Thank you. I appreciate all of your testimony, 

and we will probably have you back again soon. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you all for being here. I appreciate 

you taking the recess with us. We did do two votes, and, you know, 

the world is still turning. 

Thank you all so much. This meeting is adjourned. 

[Submissions for the Record follow:] 

Prepared Statement of The Honorable Mr. Dreier 


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Prepared Statement of American Civil Liberties Union 


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Prepared Statement of American Federation 

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Prepared Statement of American Immigration Lawyers Association 


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Prepared Statement of American Meat Institute 


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Prepared Statement of Asian American Center for Advancing Justice 


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Prepared Statement of Jessica St Pierre 


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Prepared Statement of Joint Committee on Taxation 


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135 

Prepared Statement of National Council 

of Social Security Management Associations 


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136 


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137 


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138 


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139 


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140 


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141 


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142 


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143 


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144 


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145 

f 


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146 

Prepared Statement of National Immigration Law Center 


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147 


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148 


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149 

f 


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150 

Prepared Statement of Secure ID Coalition 


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151 


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152 


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153 

f 


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154 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Questions from Ana I. Anto ́n, Ph.D. 


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155 


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156 


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157 

f 


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158 

Questions from Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. 


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159 


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160 


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161 


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162 

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163 

Questions from Marianna LaCanfora 


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164 


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165 


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166 

f 


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167 

Questions from Richard M. Stana 


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168 


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169 


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170 

Æ 


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