## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at For t Worth

__ _________________________ No. 02

- 19

- 00337

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 324th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 324

- 340223

- 02

Before Kerr and Bass el , JJ.; and Lee Gabriel (Senio r Justice, Retired,

S i tt ing by Assign ment) Memorandum Opinion by Justi ce Gabriel 

### K AMI 

### M ARTIN 

### G AFFIN 

### , Appellant

V



### . W ILLIAM 

### K

ELLY 

### P ULS 

### , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OPINION In this appeal, we must consider two separate orders that the trial court
entered: (1) an order dated August 23, 2019 , which appellant, Kami Martin Gaffin , claims is void , and (2) an agreed enforcement order dated June 19 , 20 0 9 , whi ch the
trial court fou n d in the 2019 order to be voi d

. In her first and thir d issues, Gaffin argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction or plenary power in 2019 to va cate the 2009 agre ed en forcement order ; thus, the 2019 order is void. See Tex

. R. Civ. P.
329b (f ). In her second issue, Gaffin contends that the trial court erred by fin ding the
2009 agreed enforcement order to be void and by concluding that it did not h ave plenary power to modify the 2003 divor ce decree in the 2009 agreed enforcement
order

. Gaf

fi n contes ts the trial court ’ s 2 019 findings arguing that her enforcement
motion resultin g in the 2009 order sought to enforce a child

- support oblig ation

–– the
chi ldren ’ s tu ition expenses

–– which can be modified in an enforcement action. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 155.003. In Gaffin ’ s fourth issue , she argues that in 2019 th e trial court imp roperly considered appellee W. Kelly Pul s ’ s testimony and imprope rly
found t hat Puls had p a id the children ’ s tuition because Puls had agreed to the 2009 agreed enforcement order, which concluded that he had not paid the children ’ s tuition

. In her final issue, Gaffin contends that even if vacating the tuition provision
in the 200 9 agreed enforcemen t order was appropriate, vacating the property

e nfo rcement award was not because the re is no finding to support vacatur o f the 2009
property

- divi sion enfo r ce m ent. We hold that the June 19, 2009 agreed enforcement3

order is not void becaus e the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to e nter the

consent o rde r and that the or de r is not a modification of the or iginal agreed decree. The trial court erred by finding otherwise

. We further hold that the August 23, 2019
order is void because th e trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter tha t order. Accordingly , we v acate the August 23, 2019 order , and we rei nstate the May 17, 2019
order that the August 2019 order improperly vacated

. I. BACKGR OU ND
P uls fil ed for a divorce to dissolve h is s ixteen

- year marriage to Gaff i n in 2002.
T he relevant facts of this case date back t o a January 28, 2003 a greed f inal d ecree of
d i vorce . At the time of the divorce, the couple had three children wh o were thir teen, nine , and four. 1 There are two pro v ision s i n the divorce decr ee that are pivotal in the saga that follo we d the decree. Un der a heading entitled “ Children of the Marriage , ” there are many sub titles

— one of which is “ Education

. ” 2 T he fol lowing langua ge is found under that specific sub ti tle:
I T I S ORDERED that

. . . Puls shall pay for the children ’ s pr ivate
s chool t uition and c ollege expenses, provided the child is a full

- time student and maintains at least a “ C ” or equivalent grade

- poi nt average towar d the completion of a college bache l or ’ s degree . This obligation includes tuition, activities fees, laborator y fe es, books, room and board, health insurance and related uninsured health

- care expenses, college

1 C learly , all of th e children are now adults.

2 The sub titles , appearing in order u n der th e headin g “ Children of t he Marriage , ” inc lude “ Con se rvat ors h ip and Support, ” “ Possession Order , ” “ Child Support, ” “ Chi ldren ’ s He alth Insura nce, ” “ Education, ” and “ Chil dr en ’ s A utomo bile

. ”4

sorority and frater n ity due s a nd expenses, and other charges normally relat ed to s uc h educati on. Said payments shall be made to the school or org anizati on directly within 10 days after receipt of the tuition or organization payment statement. The second provision in disput e , in Gaffin ’ s motion to en force , appears under the heading “ Division of M arital Estat e ” and under the sub title “ Cash Settlement. ” T he
f ollowing is the lan guage in dispute:
The [c] ourt finds that in the interest of equalizing the communit y estat e, . . . Puls has agreed to pay [Gaff in] a total sum of $192,000.00. There f or e, IT IS ORDERED that

. . . Puls will pa y [Gaffin] $192,000 paid in i nstallme n ts of $320 0 for 60 months by electronic transfer or by check u ntil such electronic transfer is set up to an a cco unt of [Gaffin ’ s ] direction on th e 15 th of each month with the first of such payments beginning on January 16, 2003. IT IS FURTHER ORD ERED that

. . . Pul s may pay the cash settlement amount in full or in part for a credit towards future months at anyti m e pr ior to the terms of th is s c he dule without penalty. Th is m oney is not to be considered con tractual ali mony, and carries with it no at tendant tax consequ ences. In 2007, Puls allegedly stopped mak i ng child

- support payments to Gaffin , failed to p ay the children ’ s pr i va te

- sch o o l tuition for the 2006

- 07 and 2007

- 08 school
years , and failed to pay installments on the $192,000 property

- divis ion equalization.
O n December 28, 2007, Gaffin filed a motion for enforcement of the child

- supp ort and property

- divisi on pro v ision s, sought to ho ld Puls in contempt , and req uested a

“ confirmat

ion of all arrearages and rendition of judgment plus interest. ” Puls the n filed fo r bank ruptcy protection, which abated the enforcement ac tio n. The case was rei n stated o n February 2, 2009, and the moti on f or enforcement was set for a March 20, 2009 hea ring. Before the hearing, Gaffin filed an amended5

motion for ch ild

- support enforce ment alleg ing that Puls had not paid child su pp ort between February 2008 a n d March 2 009

. At the heari n g, th e trial court “ dis posed ” of
the child

- suppo r t ar rearages that had occurr ed between February 2008 and
March 2009. 3 Gaffin then fi led a supplemental motion for child

- suppor t e nforceme nt and a mot ion to enforce the property div i s ion on June 4, 2009 , argui ng t hat Puls had
fail ed to pay child support between April 2007 and January 2008, had failed to pay the
children ’ s tuition for the 2 00 6 through 2009 sc hool years , and had fai led to make installment pa yments on the cash settlement si n c e June 20 04. Gaffi n again requested

contem pt punishment and “ confirmation of all arrearag es and rendition of judgment plus interest. ” On June 19, 2009, the tria l c ourt sig ned an agreed order o n the supplemental motion, find ing that P ul s had failed to pay th e cash settlement and the
children ’ s tui tio n . The trial court rendered a judgment in f a v or of Gaffin, awarding her $222,039.86 plus interest. 4 Gaffin an d Puls signed th e order , affirming that they each agreed to the o rder ’ s f or m and content. 5 Puls was als o held in contempt in a
sep ar ate order

. Ne ither party appealed th ese order s or ti mel y filed a bill of review.

3 The record do es not incl ude the re po rter ’ s record f rom this hear in g .
4 O f this amo un t , $72,364.58 w as t ied to t he un p aid tuition; the remaining amo unt presumably was for the unp aid cash

- se ttlement installments.

5 It is relevan t to note that P uls has b een a practicing attorney , at a ll times , during this case.6

After Gaffin sou ght satisfaction of her Jun e 19, 2009 agreed enforcement order
throu gh Puls ’ s law

- firm distr i but io ns, the trial cou rt signed a turnover order as to the proceed s. Gaffin later soug ht to hold Puls in contempt for failin g to comply with the
turnover order. A hearing w as held on Gaffin ’ s amended second motion for

contem pt on December 6, 20 18 , and the trial court ’ s order on this motion was
rendered on May 17, 2019 , finding that Puls ha d disobeyed the turnover order but vacating the turnover order and awarding Gaffin a money judg ment ins tead

. 6 On Ju ne 1 7, 2019, Puls filed a motion a sking t he trial court to take an assortment of actions including ( 1 ) setting asid e th e agreed enforcement order dated June 19, 2009 , on G affin ’ s amended second motion for contempt ; ( 2) vacating t hat sa me orde r ; ( 3 ) decla ring the sa me June 19, 2009 agreed enforcement order void; ( 4) order ing two cash bonds to be immediately rel eased to Puls; ( 5) dismissing the cas e with prejudice; ( 6) orderi ng all monies paid by Puls to Gaffin or her attorney to be im med iately
returned to him ; o r, in th e alternative , ( 7 ) grant ing Puls a new trial. Pu ls ask ed that the
2009 agreed enforcement order be declared void because it had impermissib ly
modified the div orce decree and thus was enter ed outside the co urt ’ s plenary pow er. At the h eari n g on P uls ’ s motion, he was allowed to testify, over Gaffin ’ s objection ,

6 Puls fi led a notice of appeal from th is o rder on August 15, 2019 , but we dismissed the appeal as moot based on Puls ’ s motion to dis miss, which stated that the trial court had declar ed the 2009 enf orcement order void. See Puls v. Gaffin , No. 02

- 19

- 00302

- CV, 201 9 WL 450 9208 , at * 1 (Tex. App.

— Fort W orth Se pt. 19, 2019 , no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. o p.)

.7

that he had paid “ 100 percent ” of his children ’ s private

- school and co llege tuitio n totaling $1,1 56 ,00 0 in payments an d that ther e were “ no outstanding educ ational

e x penses to be pa i d. ” On August 23, 2019, the trial court declared the June 19, 2009 agreed
enforcement order void and vacated the May 17, 2019 order

. 7 In findings of fact and
conclusions of law, t he t rial c ou rt specif i cally foun d that Pu l s had “ ful fil led [the]

contra ctual [tuition] obligation ” and that by ordering P uls to pay the tuition expenses directly to G af

f in in 2009 , the trial court had impe rmissibly modified the original
decree. Rea soning that th is mod ificati o n was not allowed, t he trial c o urt fou nd that
there was no juris diction to enter the 2009 agreed enforcemen t order. Four days later, Gaffin filed a mandamus petition in this court arguing that the
2019 order was void because it was entered o utsi de th e trial c ourt ’ s ple n a ry powe r . This court denie d the petitio n . In re G affin , No. 02

- 19

- 00315

- CV , 2019 WL 4132504 , at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug. 30, 20 19 , orig. proceeding ) (mem. op.), mand.
d enied , 2022 WL 2183301 , at *1 (Tex. June 17, 2022)

. On Sep tember 1 0, 2019 , Gaffin filed a petition fo r w rit of m andamus in the Tex as Supreme Cou rt. Nine days later,
Gaffi n filed h e r notice of appeal to this cou rt
. On June 17, 2 022, the Supreme Court denied the petition for w rit of mandam us . In r e G affin , No. 19

- 080 5, 2022 WL

7 The trial co urt did not grant a new trial.8

2183301 , at *1 (Tex. June 1 7, 202 2) (ori g. p roceedin g)

. This appeal has remained pending.
II. STANDARD OF REVIE W
A trial court ’ s findings of fact have the same force a nd dign ity as a jury ’ s

answer s to jury questi ons. And erso n v. City of Seven Po ints , 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.
19 91). Unchallenged fact

- f indings are en titled to the same weight as a jury ’ s verdict

a nd are bi nding on an appellate court unles s either the contra r y is established as a

mat ter of law or n o evidenc e su pports the finding. McGalliard v. Kuh lmann,
722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); In im itable Grp. , L.P. v. Westwood Grp. Dev. II, Ltd ., 264 S.W.3d 892 , 902 & n.4 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). In other word s, we defer to unchallen ged fact

- findin gs that are supported by some evi dence. Tenaska
En ergy, Inc. v. Po nderos

a Pine Energy, LLC

, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2014).
We review the trial court ’ s ruling on a motion for enforceme nt under an abuse

of

- discr etio n standard. Murray v. Mu rray , 27 6 S.W. 3d 138, 1 43 ( Tex. App.

— Fort
Worth 2008, pet. dism ’ d ). A trial cour t abus es it s discretion w hen it acts unreasonably , arbitrarily, or wit hout reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id

. We review the trial co urt ’ s conclusions of law de novo

. Hegar v. Am. M ulti

- Cinema Inc. , 605 S. W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. 2020).
As with other fin al, unappealed j udgments that are regular on their face , divorce decrees and judgments are not vulnerable to collateral attack. Hagen v. Hag en , 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (

Tex. 200 9). T he decree mus t be void, not voida ble, for a9

collate ral attack to be permi tted. Id

. Errors other than lack of jurisdiction over the parties or the subje ct matter render the judgment voidable and may be corrected only through a direct appeal. Id

. II I
. TW O QUESTIO NS This appeal boils do wn to two question s that the parti es dis agree on. Fi rs t, d id

t he tr ial court have jurisdiction to enter the 2009 agreed enforcement order? Gaffin
says “ yes , ” and Puls says “ no. ” Seco nd, did th e trial court h ave jur isdict ion in 20 19 t o declare the 2009 agreed enforcement or der void? Unsurpris ingly , Gaffin says “ no , ”
and Puls sa ys “ yes . ” Th e a nswer s to thes e two questions, which are raised in the first three issues by Gaffin , resolve this appeal

.

A. Did the trial c ourt h ave juri sdiction to enter the 2009 agreed enforceme nt ord er?
In h er se cond i ss ue, Gaffin argues that the trial court had plenary power over the 2009 agreed enforcement order because her e nf orcemen t acti on sought to enforce
a child

- support obligati on , wh ich can be modified in an enforcement action. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § § 155.003 (a) , 157.00 1

. She conte nds that the trial court had continuing exclusiv e juris diction over the children and express statutor y authority to enforce or modify the order r elatin g to the support of the parties ’ children. See i d. Puls, on the other h and, seems to conte nd t hat the tu itio n pay ments are part of the
property division

. Pul s offers no authority to support t his a rgument. He also argues
that t he trial court made a fi nd ing of fact after the 2019 or der that “ [ n ] owhere in the10

origina l decree d oes it state that

. . . Pul s ha d the obligation to pay educati onal
expe nses either to

. . . Gaffin or as add itional child support. ” Puls argues that because
the trial court ’ s f

inding of fact is not challenged by Gaffin on appeal, that find ing is binding o n this court

. Th e decree speaks for itself , an d w e reco gnize and agree that
the decree d id not order the tuition payments to be paid to Gaffin and that the decree
does no t expl icitly place those payments into a specific category. Thes e payments were orde red un de r the sec ti on of the agreed decree entitled “ Children of the Marriage , ” and they were payments ordered for the benefit of the children. The question of whether day

- care and t uition payments w ere child

- s upport payments was before t he Supreme Court in Ochsner v. Och sn er . 517 S.W.3d 7 17 , 728 (Tex. 2016 )

. In th at case, the major i ty disa greed with the dissent of two justices and
their position t hat under the decree in quest ion, t he payments were not child su pport

a s a “ counter intuitive reading of the decree ” and foun d that a “ c ommon

- sen se reading ” of the provisions conc erning the childre n led to the conclusion that the tuition payments were “ a f orm of child support. ” Id

. ; s ee In re H.L.B ., No. 05

- 18

- 01061

- CV , 2020 WL 104623 , at *4 (Tex. A pp.

— Dallas J an. 9, 2020 , no p et .) (mem. op.) ( holding that regardle ss of the label plac ed upo n it, fath er ’ s obligation to pay
minor child ’ s school tuition was an obligatio n undertaken to fu lfill a duty owed directly to the minor and, as a result, was a form of child s upport). C ommon se ns e would tell us that these a greed pay ments from an unchallenged decree were des igned

to aid the children by paying for their education and not to di vide the prope rty of the11

marital estate

. Because of our re solu tion of this issue, whic h is explained be lo w, whether the direct

- tuition payments ordered in the agreed decree wer e child

- su pport payments o r payments made pursuant to a pr operty division does not matt er. N or does i t matter if the 2009 order was a permissible modifica tion under the Family Code

se ct ion argued by Gaffin

. Gaffin contends that t h e trial court had plena ry power to ent er the 2009 agreed
enforcement order due to the motion to enforc e. Puls arg ue s that the 2009 agreed
enforcement order is void and unenforceable bec au se it i mpermissib ly m odifies or changes the agreed decree and was signed after the t rial co urt ’ s plenary power had
exp ired

. Puls does not now and has never challenge d the tuitio n pa ym ents ordered in the agreed decree

. O n appeal, Puls does not contend t ha t the 2 009 agreed

e nf orcement order changed the amount that he was required to pay for tuit ion as set forth in the unchallenged decree but instead confines his attack to the chan ge of payee from the “ sch ool or organization , ” as con tained in the decree , to Gaffin. He posits that this change of payee amends, modifies, alters , or changes the actua l substanti v e division of pro perty. As a result, he argues that the 2009 order is void becau se it was
entered outside the plenary jurisdiction of the court.
A fte r a trial court iss ues a divorce decree, it retain s continuing subject

- matter jurisdiction to enforce and implement the orders containe d in the decree. See Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 9.002 ; Gainous v. Gainous , 219 S.W.3d 97 , 10 6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dis t. ] 2006, no pe t. ) (op . on reh ’ g)

. Specifically, the court has12

continuing jurisdiction to render further ord er s to enforce the decree of divorce and

“ to assist in the implementation of or to clarify th e prior order. ” Te x. Fam

. Cod e Ann. § 9.006(a). Puls con tends that t he 2 0 09 agreed enforcement order v iolated
S ection 9.007 of the Texas Family Code , 8 which provid es that (a) [a] court may not amend, modify, alter , or change t he divis ion of property made or approved in the decree of divorce or ann ulment. An or der to enforce t he division is limited to an order to assist in the implementation of or to clarify the p r ior ord e r and may not alter or change the substantiv e division o f proper ty
. ( b) An order under th is section that amends, mod ifies, alter s , or chan ges the actual, s ubs ta nti v e division of property made or approved in a final decree of di

v orce or annulment is beyond the power o f the divorce court and is unenforceable.
Id. § 9.0 07

. I t bears repeating that Puls agreed t o the amount of tuition , that he fai led to
pa y it , and equally important, that he agreed the a mount should be paid to Gaffin
rather than the scho ols his children ha d been attending. 9 So the question remains : did

t he tri al cour t have jurisdiction to enter the 2009 ag reed enforcement order ? Because
the 200 9 ag reed order did not modify or alter the agreed decre e , t he answer is yes. It
is true that a judgment is void if the trial court ha s no jurisdiction to enter th e

8 T his provision deals only with change s to t he division of propert y.

9 On appeal , Puls argues th at there was no ev iden ce that Gaffin had paid any o f the education expense s. Ther e was no evidenc e be fore the trial court at al l b ecause the parties submitted an agreed enforcement order

. Further, Pul s a rgued to the trial court and seems to suggest on appeal that he ag reed to the 2009 agreed enforcement order to avo id going to jail. Why he agreed is not an issue befor e th is court

.13

part icular judgment. Cook v. Cameron , 733 S.W.2d 1 37 , 1 40 (Tex. 1987); Gain ous 219 S.W.3d a t 1 05. It is further true that “ [s] ubject [

- ] matt e r jurisdicti on cannot be conferred by conse n t
. ” Saudi v. Brieve n , 176 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Tex. App

. — Houston [ 1st D ist.] 2004, pe t. denied) (quoting Tournea u Hous

. , Inc. v. Harri s C n ty

. Apprais

al Dis t. , 24 S. W.3d 907, 910 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dist.] 2000, no pe t.) (op. on reh ’ g) )

. B ut c ontrary to Puls ’ s argument, the trial co urt had con tinuing jurisdiction to
enfor ce it s decree , and the c hange of payee is not a n alteration or modification of t he original agre e d decree tha t required Puls to pay the children ’ s tuition

. See Go mez v . Gomez , 632 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Te x. App.

— El Paso 2020, no pet.) ( holding that t he court ’ s enf orceme nt of the divorce decree by an aw ard of a money judgment did not violate
the rule that a de cree ma y no t l ater be a m ended under the guise of an enforcement action) ; DeGr

oot v. DeGroot, 369 S.W.3d 918 , 923 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2012, no pet.) ( holding that t he c ourt properly awarded a money judgment where prio r order of
payment was made i mpossible by husba nd a nd when t he order wa s not an impermis sible substantive change from the decree )

. We c an anal o giz e this 2009 agreed enforcement order

— requiring Puls to mak e paymen ts to Gaffin instead of to t he organization or school

— to a n amen ded QDRO
that requi res payments to b e made to a different alternate payee. In Quij ano v. Quijano , the appellant contended that an amended QDRO was void because it made the child
of th e marriage the alternate payee when the decree had named the wife as the original
alternate payee. 347 S .W.3 d 345 , 3 53 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 4th Dist.] 2011, no14

pet .)

. Fat h er argued that the trial court change d the substantive division of property
i n the decree in violation of Family Cod e S ection 9.007. Id. In Quijano , the court held
that “ th e designat ion o f th e child as the alternate payee in the amended QDRO was
proper a nd did no t change the substantive div ision of property contained in the
decre e. ” I

d

. at 354

– 55 ; s ee Reiss v. Reiss , 118 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. 2003) ( holdi ng that

t he QDRO ha d serve d its int ende d purpo se of implementing the unappealed divorce
decree and d id not imper missibly alter, mo dify , or change that decree ) ; Thomas v.
Daniel , No. 02

- 21

- 00182

- CV, 2022 WL 623474 , at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Mar

. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( holding that t he t ria l court may render a postdecree enforcement order or QDRO to effectuate the div ision of property or dere d by the

court )

. The agreed orde r at i ssue simply changed the payee to effe ctuate the agreement
that Pu ls woul d pay the education al expenses for the children and did not change the

su bstantive order for support or the division of property. We hold that t he t rial cour t did have jurisdict

ion to enter the 2009 agreed enforcement order

. We s ustain Gaffin ’ s second is sue. B. D id th e tr ial court have j uris diction in 2019

t o declare the 2009 agreed ord er void ? Neither party ap pealed the original agreed divorce dec ree. Neither party directly appea l ed th e 2009 agreed enforcement order or ti mely filed a bill of review

c ontesting that orde r. Puls waite d ov er ten years to challenge the 2009 agreed15

enforc ement order. Gaffin argues in her first and third is sues that beca use t he t rial

cour t had ju risdic tion to approve and render the 20 09 agreed order , the trial court did

no t have plenary powe r, ten years l ater , to find it void. Thus, she contends that the
2019 o rd e r is void. Puls responds by maintaining tha t the 2009 order is vo id and can
b e atta cked c ollaterally at any time.

“ A collateral attack does not attempt to sec ure the ren dition o f a single, correct judgment in place of a former one, b ut [ ] instead seeks to avoid the effect of a judgment through a proceed ing brought for some other pur p os e. ” G ainous , 219 S.W.3d at 105; Armento r v. Kern , 178 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex. A pp.

— Houston [ 1st
Di st .] 2005, no pet.). To prevail on a collateral attack, a par t y to the original judgment has the burden to prove the c ompla ined

- of judgme nt is void , n ot simpl y void able. Hag en , 282 S.W.3d at 902. “ A judgment is void only when it is ap parent that the c ou rt rendering judgment ‘ had n o ju risdiction of the parties , no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to en ter t he ju dgment, o r no capacity to act as a c our t
. ’ ” Cook , 733 S.W

. 2d at 140 (quoting Browning v. Placke , 698 S. W .2d 362, 363 (Te x. 19 8 5) ) . A
decr ee or order must be v oid, not voidable, for a c ollateral attack to be permitted. Hagen , 282 S.W.3d at 90 2.
We must als o recogni ze that t he 2009 o rder w as a “ consent judgment

. ” The
Texas Supre me Court clarified the procedure for attack ing a “ c ons e nt judgment ” in
Middleton v. Mur

ff , 689 S.W.2d 212 , 213 (Tex. 1985) (op. on reh ’ g) . The court held t hat
in a case in which a conse n t judgmen t was ren dere d by a court with “ jurisdictional16

power , ” a bill of review was the exclusive re medy when the time for appeal fro m th e consent ju dgment ha d expired. Id

. ; s ee Tex. R. Civ. P 329b(f). In so finding, the court
stated , “ We find it un nece ssary to d e cide whet he r the con sent judgment was void or merely voidable. ” Midd

leton , 689 S. W.2d at 213. “ Jurisdiction al power ” was defined as

“ jurisdictio n ov er t he subject matter, the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the particular one belongs

. ” Id

. Indisp utably , t he trial court , in
this case in 2009 , had jurisdictiona l power pursuant to this definition.
The 2009 order wa s a consent j udgm ent , which Puls did not directly appeal. Ten ye ars later , he filed a “ Verified Motion for New Trial, Mot ion to Decla re t he June 1 9, 2009 Order Void [,] and Motion to Immediat ely Releas e Cash Bonds. ” Thi s motion does not conform to t h e requ irem ent s of a bill of review , which was the only remedy available to him in the trial court. See Deen v. Kirk , 508 S.W.2 d 70 , 72 (T e x. 1974)

. Thus , the answer to the second question

— did th e trial co urt h ave jurisdi cti on in 2019 to declare the 2009 agre ed o rder void

— is no. We sustain Gaffin ’ s first and
third issues.
IV. CONCLUSION As discussed extensively above, the 20 09 agr eed enforcement or de r is not vo id.
The trial court erred by finding that it was. In 2019, Puls collaterally attacked the 2009 agreed enforcement order bu t did no t d o so through a bill of review. For all the
reasons d iscussed, t he trial court did n ot ha v e jurisdiction in 2019 to find the 2 009 agreed ord er void a nd the 2019 or der is itself void

. See i d

.17

W e conc lude that Puls ha s had a full opportunity to seek rel ief. T he re cord
does not justify a rema nd for further l itigation on the iss ues before this c ourt
. Where
the issue was fully develo ped , re ndition i s appro pr ia te. Te x. R. App. P . 43.3

. Accordingly , we vacate the August 23, 201 9 or der as void, and we reinstate the May
1 7, 2019 order

. 10 /s/ Lee Gabriel
Lee Gab riel Justice
Delivered: March 2 , 202 3

10 As a result of this disposition, we need not address Gaffin ’ s rem aining iss ues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.