Filed 10/9/20 In re April V. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re APRIL V., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B302749

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP04546A)

APPEAL from findings and orders of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.

Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant 

County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________
2

Father Jaime W. appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

findings and disposition order removing his young daughter April 

V. from his custody due to domestic violence. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The dependency petition at issue was based on a 2019 

domestic violence incident between father and mother A.B. while 

April was present in the home. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. 

(a)(1), (b)(1); all statutory citations refer to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.) The sustained petition alleged father 

“grabbed the mother’s neck and pushed the mother to the 

ground,” then “repeatedly struck” her with his fist and 

“repeatedly kicked mother’s face, body and legs inflicting pain to 

the mother’s head and stomach.” Mother “bit the father’s chin, 

inflicting pain, redness and a laceration to the father’s chin,” and 

“pulled and scratched the father’s earlobe . . . inflicting pain and 

redness to the father’s earlobe.” Mother was arrested for the 

incident. The petition alleged the parents had a history of 

domestic violence and mother failed to protect April because she 

allowed father to reside with April and have unlimited access to 

her in violation of a juvenile court order granting father only 

monitored visitation. 

The petition was later amended to add a sustained 

allegation that mother placed April at risk by failing to live with 

maternal grandmother in violation of court orders to do so. 

According to the police report of the fight, father told police 

the dispute arose because he told mother he was going out and 

she said she was also going out. Father told her not to leave or 

he would put her belongings outside. When mother still tried to 

leave, father told her he wanted to break up with her and started 
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placing her belongings outside. Upset, mother warned him to 

stop or “he would regret it.” 

Outside the home, father started his car and went back 

inside, but mother turned off the car and took his keys. Back 

inside their bedroom, father told mother he was going to throw 

away her personal items. As he tried to do so, mother bit him 

once on his chin and grabbed his earlobe. Father said both April 

and the paternal grandmother were in the room, although only 

the paternal grandmother saw the incident. Father screamed for 

mother to stop, and he pretended to call 9-1-1 so mother would 

calm down. Mother went outside and actually called 9-1-1. 

Father overheard her tell the dispatcher he choked and kicked 

her, which he denied. The police officer observed visible injuries 

on father’s chin and earlobe. 

Mother described the incident to police in a similar way, 

but she told police that when she blocked the door to prevent 

father from placing her personal items outside, he grabbed her by 

the neck, pushed her down, and hit her several times with his 

fist. He also kicked her several times in her body and face. 

She then called 9-1-1. The police officer observed no injuries to 

her, although she complained of pain to her head and stomach. 

She claimed April was not in the room and claimed she did not 

hit or touch father. 

Paternal grandmother told police she saw mother bite 

father and pull his right ear. She did not see any previous 

altercation described by mother. 

Paternal grandfather reported he did not see or hear 

anything. 

The police arrested mother based on father’s visible injuries 

and statements from him and paternal grandmother. 
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When later interviewed by a social worker, mother and 

father described the incident in mostly the same way. Father 

denied having hit or kicked mother. He said he overheard her 

tell police he choked and beat her, and he claimed “mother ended 

up telling the police that she lied.” He said April was first with 

the paternal grandfather then an adult roommate during the 

fight. 

According to mother, father “went crazy” and “started 

throwing her belongings outside the house.” He “pulled her” 

when she tried to put her things back inside. She “thought father 

was going to head butt her and she pushed him back and 

scratched him.” She did not say whether he hit, kicked, or 

choked her. In a later interview, mother said “I know I did add a 

lot to what really happened and what he did to me. He did grab 

me from my arms and pushed me on the ground and kicked me 

on the legs.” 

Paternal grandmother told the social worker the same 

details she gave police. She did not mention that father had 

kicked, hit, or choked mother. She said April was with an adult 

roommate during the altercation. She said she told father she 

didn’t want mother in the house anymore, saying she “does not 

like mother because mother is jealous and had father fired from a 

previous job.” She had seen the parents argue but had not seen 

them “get physical.” 

April told the social worker she was not in the bedroom 

during the fight, but she “heard” it. 

This was not the first physically violent altercation 

between the parents. In 2015, a juvenile petition was sustained 

after father violently attacked mother in front of April. It was 

reported father “initially forced his way into a locked bedroom 
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using a butcher’s knife to open the door and ultimately injuring 

mother’s arm with the knife. He threw her down some steps 

which possibly led to the death of the fetus that mother was 

impregnated with and father displayed a gun before fleeing the 

home.” Mother also had reported prior domestic violence 

incidents to family and the social worker, yet she continued to 

return to father with April. Father had also abused marijuana 

and “possibly other substances,” and was under the influence 

while caring for April. The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction 

with a family law order granting sole physical custody to mother 

and monitored visitation to father. 

The court sustained the allegations in the current petition 

and exercised jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a) 

[“child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child 

will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon 

the child by the child’s parent or guardian”], and subdivision 

(b)(1) [“[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that 

the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result 

of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately 

supervise or protect the child”]). 

For disposition, the court ordered April removed from both 

parents’ custody and found she would be placed in substantial 

danger if returned home. The court refused to release her to 

either parent because they did not follow prior court orders, 

including the standing custody order. 

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction

The jurisdictional findings in this case were based on both 

mother’s and father’s conduct. Because mother has not appealed, 

we may affirm without addressing father’s contentions. (See 
6

In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Nonetheless, 

we exercise our discretion to review the merits both because a 

favorable decision may make father a non-offending parent and 

because the finding forms the basis for the disposition order he 

challenges on appeal. (In re Christopher M. (2014) 228 

Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316–1317; In re Drake M. (2012) 211 

Cal.App.4th 754, 762–763.) 

We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for 

substantial evidence. (In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 

428, 438.) We find substantial evidence supported the court’s 

exercise of jurisdiction here.

There is no dispute exposing a child to domestic violence 

can support jurisdiction under both subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) of 

section 300. (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 134 [subd. 

(b)(1)]; In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 599–601

[subd. (a)].) Father’s position on appeal is that insufficient 

evidence showed he engaged in any domestic violence that posed 

a risk to April. The juvenile court reasonably concluded 

otherwise.

In light of the varying accounts of the fight between the 

parents, the juvenile court could have credited mother’s 

statement to police that father hit, choked, and kicked her. Her 

statement was at least partially consistent with her later 

statement to the social worker that he did in fact grab her arms, 

push her down, and kick her. It was also consistent with father 

going “crazy” and throwing mother’s belongings outside, which is 

itself an aggressive and hostile act. The court could have 

discounted the fact that police arrested mother and not father 

because the police report noted the arrest was based on father’s 

visible injuries, as well as father’s and paternal grandmother’s 
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accounts of the incident.1 The court could have rejected paternal 

grandmother’s account of the incident since she admitted she did 

not like mother and did not want mother in the house anymore. 

Those were credibility assessments we cannot disturb on appeal. 

(In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.)

The juvenile court’s finding is further supported by the 

parents’ 2015 sustained petition for domestic violence, which 

demonstrated an ongoing cycle of violence. (See In re Christopher 

R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215 [“A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast 

conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason 

to believe that the conduct will continue.’ ”].) Father’s conduct 

during that prior incident was shockingly violent—he used a 

knife and cut mother; he pushed her down the stairs, possibly 

causing her to lose her unborn baby; and he brandished a gun. 

He did this all in April’s presence. The incident understandably 

resulted in the juvenile court limiting him to only monitored 

visitation with April. From this history, the juvenile court could 

have readily rejected father’s attempt to minimize his role in the 

current fight and shift blame to mother for attacking him.

The court could have further concluded that April was 

either in the room or nearby when the violence occurred, exposing 

her to serious risk of harm. Everyone agreed April was in the 

house at the time. Father told police she was in the same room, 

and the juvenile court could have credited that statement. Even 

if she wasn’t in the same room, April herself told the social 

worker she “heard” the altercation. Father threw mother’s 

belongings outside, suggesting the parents may have been 

1 Father contends mother “later admitted that she lied and 

he did not hit her.” He cites only the police report, which noted 

mother denied she hit him, not the other way around.
8

moving through the house during the fight. That created a 

significant risk of the physical violence spilling over into other 

parts of the home and catching April in the crossfire. Even more 

so, the parents knew April was present, and yet they still 

physically assaulted one another, deliberately exposing April to 

the risk of harm.

Notwithstanding father’s argument, April’s exposure to the 

incident was sufficient to demonstrate she was at serious risk of 

harm under both subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) of section 300. “[T]he 

cycle of violence between the parents constituted a failure to 

protect [April] ‘from the substantial risk of encountering the 

violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it,’ ” 

as required by section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (In re T.V., supra, 

217 Cal.App.4th at p. 135; see id. at p. 134 [physical violence 

between parents was ongoing and likely to continue, posing risk 

to child; child was aware of incidents but not present].) Likewise, 

April’s exposure to the parents’ repeated domestic violence placed 

her “at substantial risk of suffering[] serious physical harm 

inflicted nonaccidentally by” father, as required by section 300, 

subdivision (a). (In re Giovanni F., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

598–599; see In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 720–721.)

April was also at risk of future harm, despite father’s 

contrary view. As noted, this record shows the parents are 

caught in a cycle of domestic violence. Notwithstanding the 

seriousness of father’s 2015 attack, they reconciled, leading to the 

most recent altercation. After the current fight, they apparently 

reconciled again, given the juvenile court found mother and April 

were residing with father in violation of the standing custody 
9

order.2 Father told the social worker he and mother “always had 

an on and off relationship.” The juvenile court could have readily 

concluded the violence between them would continue, putting 

April at risk of future harm. (See In re T.V., supra, 217 

Cal.App.4th at p. 135 [history of violence supported reasonable 

inference violence was likely to continue].)

Disposition

Father also challenges the juvenile court’s removal of April 

from him. Removal is proper if the juvenile court finds by clear 

and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial 

danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or 

emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned 

home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s 

physical health can be protected without removing the minor 

from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. 

(c)(1).) 

We review the disposition order for substantial evidence, 

keeping in mind the trial court had to find clear and convincing 

evidence supporting removal. (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 

147, 155.) We must decide “ ‘whether the record as a whole 

contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder 

could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ ” 

(Ibid., citing Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–

996.)

Substantial evidence showed with a high probability that 

removal was proper. The pattern of violence supporting 

jurisdiction was prima facie evidence that April would face 

substantial danger if she were left in the parents’ custody. 

2 The parents’ cohabitation also violated mutual restraining 

orders.
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(See In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 135 [“The 

jurisdictional findings are prima facie evidence the minor cannot 

safely remain in the home.”].) Further, the juvenile court noted 

neither parent had complied with prior court orders. Most 

egregiously, the court found mother and April were residing with 

father in violation of the standing custody order, which was 

designed to protect April from future violence. The parents’

decision to disregard a court order meant to protect April, coupled 

with the propensity of the parents to fight in April’s presence, 

demonstrated April would be exposed to future danger in the 

parents’ custody. There was also an indication father was 

unwilling to accept responsibility for the fight with mother, was 

not cooperative with social workers, and was not forthcoming 

that mother and April were living with him. (See In re V.L., 

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 156 [“A parent’s denial of domestic 

violence increases the risk of it recurring.”].) The record 

contained sufficient evidence to demonstrate that April’s removal 

from father was warranted.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.

BIGELOW, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J. WILEY, J.