COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

CHARLES LEON FREEMAN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2244-93-1 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 AUGUST 15, 1995 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 

Westbrook J. Parker, Judge 

 Timothy E. Miller, Public Defender (Lori B. 

 Galbraith; Office of the Public Defender, 

 on brief), for appellant. 

 Robert B. Condon, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, 

 on brief), for appellee. 

 Charles Leon Freeman appeals his conviction for driving 

after having been adjudged an habitual offender. He contends the 

trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence 

obtained from an allegedly illegal stop of his vehicle in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

 At approximately 9:30 a.m. on a Sunday morning, Officer A.P. 

Bremer, Jr., observed a car being driven in the center lane of 

three eastbound traffic lanes at speeds of ten to fifteen miles 

per hour less than the posted fifty-five miles-per-hour speed 

limit. Officer Bremer followed the car for two miles, during 

which time he saw the car weave three to four times within its 

lane of travel. On two occasions, other cars passed the car in 

the right lane. On these facts and from Officer Bremer's 

experience, he suspected the driver to be under the influence of 
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intoxicants. 

 Officer Bremer turned on his emergency lights but received 

no response from the driver. When Officer Bremer turned on his 

siren, the driver immediately pulled his vehicle over and 

stopped. Charles Freeman, the appellant, was driving the car. 

When Officer Bremer asked to see Freeman's driver's license, 

Freeman stated that he did not have one. A DMV check indicated 

that Freeman was an habitual offender. Bremer arrested Freeman 

for driving after having been declared an habitual offender. 

 At trial, Officer Bremer testified that the normal speed for 

cars travelling on the section of the six-lane highway where he 

observed Freeman is fifty-five miles per hour. Bremer testified 

that from his past experience as a police officer, a car that is 

being driven slower than the normal speed, particularly when the 

car is not travelling in the far right lane and is being passed 

on the right by other vehicles, indicates that the driver 

"possibly" is under the influence of alcohol. 

 Officer Bremer testified that the slow speed of Freeman's 

vehicle in the center of three eastbound lanes and the fact that 

vehicles were passing Freeman on the right first focused the 

officer's attention on Freeman. Bremer stated: 

 I noticed the car was running between forty 

and forty-five miles an hour and had some 

indication of weaving. Not over the line, 

but just going from the right to the left, 

towards the yellow lines on both sides of the 

road in the center lane. And through my past 

experience when a car sometimes is driving 

slower than the normal flow of traffic it 

indicates possibly the operator could be 
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under the influence of alcohol. 

 On appeal "the burden is on the [appellant] to show that the 

trial court's denial of his suppression motion constituted 

reversible error." DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 

583, 359 S.E.2d 540, 544 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 985 

(1988). The trial court's suppression ruling will not be 

disturbed unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

Greene v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606, 608, 440 S.E.2d 138, 

139 (1994). 

 A police officer may stop the driver or occupants of an 

automobile for investigatory purposes if the officer has "a 

reasonable articulable suspicion, based upon objective facts, 

that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Jacques 

v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991) 

(quoting Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340, 288 S.E.2d 475, 

478 (1982) (citations omitted)). To determine whether an officer 

has articulated a reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity, 

a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, 

including the officer's knowledge, training, and experience. 

Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 

(1989). "[A] trained law enforcement officer may [be able to] 

identify criminal behavior which would appear innocent to an 

untrained observer." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 384, 

388, 369 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1988). 

 Other jurisdictions have considered whether similar 
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circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a driver 

is intoxicated and have held that weaving within a traffic lane 

or travelling at an inordinately slow rate of speed under the 

circumstances is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. 

State v. Malaney, 871 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo. App. 1994) (weaving 

within the lane); State v. Aubin, 397 S.E.2d 653 (N.C. App. 1990) 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 842 (1991) (slowing of speed and weaving 

within the lane); People v. Loweks, 481 N.E.2d 1086, 1087 (Ill. 

App. 1985) (weaving within lane); State v. Ratliff, 728 P.2d 896, 

898 (Ore. App. 1986), aff'd, 744 P.2d 247 (1987) (proceeding at 

least ten miles per hour below speed limit may be indication of 

driving under the influence); Sell v. State, 496 N.E.2d 799, 800 

(Ind. App. 1986) (finding sufficient basis for a stop where a 

driver was moving fifteen to twenty miles per hour below the 

speed limit for two to three minutes). 

 Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court 

found that Officer Bremer had a reasonable suspicion that the 

driver of the car was intoxicated and that Bremer was justified 

in stopping the vehicle to investigate his suspicions. The 

circumstances that provided justification for the officer's 

actions included Bremer's observations of similar conduct over 

his twenty-one years of experience, his familiarity with the 

traffic patterns of the area on a Sunday morning, Freeman's slow 

speed in the center lane of a six-lane highway, and his weaving 

within the lane of travel. Driving at a slow rate of speed so as 
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to impede traffic constitutes a traffic violation, Code 

§ 46.2-877, and weaving within a lane of traffic, depending on 

the circumstances, may reasonably indicate to an officer that the 

driver is impaired. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

denying Freeman's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a 

result of the stop. 

Affirmed.