Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu r

Report to the

Secretary of Energy

Ja n u ary 2012

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

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The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC) was formed by the Secretary

of Energy at the request of the President to conduct a comprehensive review of policies for

managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and recommend a new strategy. It was cochaired by Rep. Lee H. Hamilton and Gen. Brent Scowcroft. Other Commissioners are Mr.

Mark H. Ayers, the Hon. Vicky A. Bailey, Dr. Albert Carnesale, Sen. Pete Domenici, Ms. Susan

Eisenhower, Sen. Chuck Hagel, Mr. Jonathan Lash, Dr. Allison M. Macfarlane, Dr. Richard A.

Meserve, Dr. Ernest J. Moniz, Dr. Per Peterson, Mr. John Rowe, and Rep. Phil Sharp.

The Commission and its subcommittees met more than two dozen times between March

2010 and January 2012 to hear testimony from experts and stakeholders, to visit nuclear

waste management facilities in the United States and abroad, and to discuss the issues

identified in its Charter. Additionally, in September and October 2011, the Commission

held five public meetings, in different regions of the country, to hear feedback on its draft

report. A wide variety of organizations, interest groups, and individuals provided input to the

Commission at these meetings and through the submission of written materials. Copies of all

of these submissions, along with records and transcripts of past meetings, are available at

the BRC website (www.brc.gov).

This report highlights the Commission’s findings and conclusions and presents

recommendations for consideration by the Administration and Congress, as well as interested

state, tribal and local governments, other stakeholders, and the public.

PREAMBLE

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January 26, 2012

The Honorable Dr. Steven Chu

Secretary of Energy

U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Ave., SW

Washington, DC 20585

Dear Secretary Chu:

At the direction of the President, you charged the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future with reviewing 

policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and recommending a new plan. We thank you for choosing us to 

serve on the Commission.

We approached our task from different perspectives but with a shared sense of urgency. Put simply, this nation’s failure to come 

to grips with the nuclear waste issue has already proved damaging and costly. It will be even more damaging and more costly 

the longer it continues: damaging to prospects for maintaining a potentially important energy supply option for the future, 

damaging to state–federal relations and public confidence in the federal government’s competence, and damaging to America’s 

standing in the world—not only as a source of nuclear technology and policy expertise but as a leader on global issues of 

nuclear safety, non-proliferation, and security. 

We have sought to ensure that our review is comprehensive, open and inclusive. Our Commission has heard from thousands of 

individuals and organizations on a wide range of issues through formal hearings, site visits, and written letters and comments 

submitted through the Commission web site. We have visited several communities across the country that have a keen interest 

in the matters before the Commission and have also visited a number of other countries to gain insights as to how the United 

States might proceed. We are indebted to the many people who have offered us their expertise, advice and guidance. 

Attached for your consideration is the final report of our Commission. Our report includes recommendations covering topics 

such as the approach to siting future nuclear waste management facilities, the transport and storage of spent fuel and high-level 

waste, options for waste disposal, institutional arrangements for managing spent nuclear fuel and high-level wastes, reactor and 

fuel cycle technologies, and international considerations. We also make recommendations regarding critical changes needed in the 

handling of nuclear waste fees and of the Nuclear Waste Fund. The majority of these recommendations require action to be taken 

by the Administration and Congress, and offer what we believe is the best chance of success going forward, based on previous 

nuclear waste management experience in the U.S. and abroad. We urge that you promptly designate a senior official with sufficient 

authority to coordinate all of the DOE elements involved in the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations.

You directed that the Commission was not to serve as a siting body. Accordingly, we have not evaluated Yucca Mountain or any 

other location as a potential site for the storage of spent nuclear fuel or disposal of high level waste, nor have we taken a position on 

the Administration’s request to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application. What we have endeavored to do is recommend 

a sound waste management approach that can lead to the resolution of the current impasse; an approach that neither includes nor 

excludes Yucca Mountain as an option for a repository and can and should be applied regardless of what site or sites are ultimately 

chosen to serve as the permanent disposal facility for America’s spent nuclear fuel and other high-level nuclear wastes.

We are committed to seeing action taken on our recommendations because we believe it is long past time for the government to 

make good on its commitments to the American people to provide for the safe disposal of nuclear waste. This generation has an 

obligation to avoid burdening future generations with finding a safe permanent solution for nuclear wastes they had no part in 

creating, while also preserving their energy options. To that end we commit ourselves to provide whatever assistance you deem 

necessary as you consider how to act on the final recommendations of our Commission. Please do not hesitate to call on us at 

any time. 

Respectfully submitted,

Lee H. Hamilton Brent Scowcroft

Co-Chairman Co-Chairman

c/o U.S. Department of Energy • 1000 Independence Avenue, SW • Washington, DC 20585 • http://brc.gov

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Mark H. Ayers Vicky A. Bailey

Albert Carnesale Pete V. Domenici

Susan Eisenhower Chuck Hagel

Jonathan Lash Allison M. Macfarlane

Richard A. Meserve Ernest J. Moniz

Per F. Peterson John W. Rowe

Phil Sharp

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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

EXECUTIVE ARY

America’s nuclear waste management program

is at an impasse.

The Obama Administration’s decision to halt work on a

repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada is but the latest

indicator of a policy that has been troubled for decades and

has now all but completely broken down. The approach

laid out under the 1987 Amendments to the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act (NWPA)—which tied the entire U.S. highlevel waste management program to the fate of the Yucca

Mountain site—has not worked to produce a timely solution

for dealing with the nation’s most hazardous radioactive

materials. The United States has traveled nearly 25 years

down the current path only to come to a point where

continuing to rely on the same approach seems destined to

bring further controversy, litigation, and protracted delay.

The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear

Future (the Commission) was chartered to recommend a new

strategy for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.

We approached this task from different perspectives but with

a shared sense of urgency. Put simply, this nation’s failure to

come to grips with the nuclear waste issue has already proved

damaging and costly and it will be more damaging and more

costly the longer it continues: damaging to prospects for

maintaining a potentially important energy supply option

for the future, damaging to state–federal relations and public

confidence in the federal government’s competence, and

damaging to America’s standing in the world—not only as a

source of nuclear technology and policy expertise but as a leader

on global issues of nuclear safety, non-proliferation, and security.

Continued stalemate is also costly—to utility ratepayers, to

communities that have become unwilling hosts of long-term

nuclear waste storage facilities, and to U.S. taxpayers who face

mounting liabilities, already running into billions of dollars, as a

result of the failure by both the executive and legislative branches

to meet federal waste management commitments.

The need for a new strategy is urgent, not just to address

these damages and costs but because this generation has a

fundamental ethical obligation to avoid burdening future

generations with the entire task of finding a safe permanent

solution for managing hazardous nuclear materials they had

no part in creating. At the same time, we owe it to future

generations to avoid foreclosing options wherever possible so

that they can make choices—about the use of nuclear energy

as a low-carbon energy resource and about the management

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

of the nuclear fuel cycle—based on emerging technologies 

and developments and their own best interests.

Almost exactly one year after the Commission was 

chartered and less than five months before our initial draft 

report was due, an unforeseen event added yet more urgency 

to our charge and brought the problem of nuclear waste 

into the public eye as never before. A massive earthquake off 

the northeastern coast of Japan and the devastating tsunami 

that followed set off a chain of problems at the Fukushima 

Daiichi nuclear power station that eventually led to the worst 

nuclear accident since Chernobyl. In the weeks of intense 

media coverage that followed, many Americans became 

newly aware of the presence of tens of thousands of tons of 

spent fuel at more than 70 nuclear power plant sites around 

this country—and of the fact that the United States currently 

has no physical capacity to do anything with this spent fuel 

other than to continue to leave it at the sites where it was 

first generated.1

The strategy we recommend in this report has eight key 

elements: 

1. A new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear 

waste management facilities.

2. A new organization dedicated solely to implementing the 

waste management program and empowered with the 

authority and resources to succeed.

3. Access to the funds nuclear utility ratepayers are 

providing for the purpose of nuclear waste management.

4. Prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal 

facilities.

5. Prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated 

storage facilities.2

6. Prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large-scale 

transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to 

consolidated storage and disposal facilities when such 

facilities become available.

7. Support for continued U.S. innovation in nuclear energy 

technology and for workforce development.

8. Active U.S. leadership in international efforts to address 

safety, waste management, non-proliferation, and 

security concerns.

The elements of this strategy will not be new to those who have 

followed the U.S. nuclear waste program over the years. All 

of them are necessary to establish a truly integrated national 

nuclear waste management system, to create the institutional 

leadership and wherewithal to get the job done, and to ensure 

that the United States remains at the forefront of technology 

developments and international responses to evolving nuclear 

safety, non-proliferation, and security concerns. 

A few general points about the Commission’s proposed 

strategy are worth emphasizing before we discuss each of the 

above elements in greater detail. First is the issue of cost. In this 

time of acute concern about the federal budget deficit and high 

energy prices, we have been sensitive to the concern that our 

recommendations—particularly those that involve launching 

a new approach and a new organization for nuclear waste 

management—could add to the financial burden on the U.S. 

Treasury and on American taxpayers and utility ratepayers.3

Certainly it will cost something to implement a successful U.S. 

waste management program; however, trying to implement a 

deeply flawed program is even more costly, for all the reasons 

already mentioned. In fact, U.S. ratepayers are already paying 

for waste disposal (through a fee collected on each kilowatthour of nuclear-generated electricity)—but the program they’re 

paying for isn’t working. Taxpayers are paying too—in the form 

of damage payments from the taxpayer-funded Judgment Fund 

to compensate utilities for the federal government’s failure to 

meet its contractual waste acceptance commitments.

Overall, we are confident that our waste management 

recommendations can be implemented using revenue 

streams already dedicated for this purpose (in particular 

the Nuclear Waste Fund and fee). Other Commission 

recommendations—particularly those concerning nuclear 

technology programs and international policies—are broadly 

consistent with the program plans of the relevant agencies. 

Another overarching point concerns timing and 

implementation. All of our recommendations are interconnected 

and will take time to implement fully, particularly since many 

elements of the strategy we propose require legislative action to 

amend the NWPA and other relevant laws (see text box).

Nevertheless, prompt action can and should be taken in 

several areas, without waiting for legislative action, to get the 

waste management program back on track. The last chapter of 

this report (chapter 13) identifies a number of concrete next 

steps; in addition, the text box on page ix of this Executive 

Summary lists several ways to get started on the specific task of 

siting new waste disposal and consolidated storage facilities. 

Finally, there are several questions the Commission was 

not chartered to address. We have not:

• Rendered an opinion on the suitability of the Yucca 

Mountain site or on the request to withdraw the license 

1 “Spent fuel” is sometimes also referred to as “used fuel.” The difference in terminology in fact reflects a profound policy issue as to whether the material should be seen as a 

waste or a resource. We use the term “spent fuel” in this report, but, as discussed in chapter 11, we believe it is premature to resolve that policy debate.

2 As used in this report, the term “disposal” is understood to mean permanent disposal; the term “storage” is understood to mean storage for an interim period prior to 

disposal or other disposition.

3 Most ratepayers are, of course, also taxpayers (and vice versa). For clarity, we refer to taxpayers and ratepayers as distinct groups here and in the main body of the report.

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application for Yucca Mountain. Instead, we focused on 

developing a sound strategy for future storage and disposal 

facilities and operations that we believe can and should be 

implemented regardless of what happens with Yucca Mountain.

• Proposed any specific site (or sites) for any component of 

the waste management system.

• Offered a judgment about the appropriate role of nuclear 

power in the nation’s (or the world’s) future energy 

supply mix.

These are all important questions that will engage policy-makers 

and the public in the years ahead. However, none of them 

alters the urgent need to change and improve our strategy for 

managing the high-level wastes and spent fuel that already exist 

and will continue to accumulate so long as nuclear reactors 

operate in this country. That is the focus of the Commission’s 

work and of the specific recommendations that follow. 

1. A New Consent-Based

Approach to Siting

Siting storage or disposal facilities has been the most consistent 

and most intractable challenge for the U.S. nuclear waste 

management program. Of course, the first requirement in 

siting any facility centers on the ability to demonstrate adequate 

protection of public health and safety and the environment. 

Beyond this threshold criterion, finding sites where all affected 

units of government, including the host state or tribe, regional 

and local authorities, and the host community, are willing to 

support or at least accept a facility has proved exceptionally 

difficult. The erosion of trust in the federal government’s nuclear 

waste management program has only made this challenge 

more difficult. And whenever one or more units of government 

are opposed, the odds of success drop greatly. The crux of the 

Fully implementing the Commission’s recommendations will 

require several changes to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act or 

other legislation:

Establishing a new facility siting process – The 

NWPA, as amended in 1987, now provides only for the 

evaluation and licensing of a single repository site at 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The Act should be amended 

to authorize a new consent-based process to be 

used for selecting and evaluating sites and licensing 

consolidated storage and disposal facilities in the future, 

similar to the process established in the expired Nuclear 

Waste Negotiator provisions of the Act (but under new 

organizational leadership, as described below).

Authorizing consolidated interim storage facilities – 

The NWPA allows the government to construct one 

consolidated storage facility with limited capacity, but 

only after construction of a nuclear waste repository has 

been licensed. One or more consolidated storage facilities 

should be established, independent of the schedule for 

opening a repository. The Act should be modified to allow 

for a consent-based process to site, license, and construct 

multiple storage facilities with adequate capacity when 

needed and to clarify that nuclear waste fee payments can 

be used for this purpose.

Broadening support to jurisdictions affected by 

transportation – The NWPA provides funding and technical 

assistance for training public safety officials to states and 

tribes whose jurisdictions would be traversed by shipments 

of spent fuel to a storage or disposal facility. The Act should 

be amended to give the waste management organization 

the broader authorities given to DOE in the WIPP Land 

Withdrawal Act that supported the successful large-scale 

transport of transuranic waste to WIPP (including a public 

information program, support for the acquisition of equipment 

to respond to transportation incidents, and broad assistance 

for other waste-related transportation safety programs).

Establishing a new waste management organization – 

Responsibility for implementing the nation’s program for 

managing spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 

wastes is currently assigned to the U.S. Department 

of Energy. Legislation will be needed to (1) move this 

responsibility to a new, independent, government-chartered 

corporation focused solely on carrying out that program 

and (2) establish the appropriate oversight mechanisms.

Ensuring access to dedicated funding – Current 

federal budget rules and laws make it impossible for the 

nuclear waste program to have assured access to the fees 

being collected from nuclear utilities and ratepayers to finance 

the commercial share of the waste program’s expenses. 

We have recommended a partial remedy that should be 

implemented promptly by the Administration, working with 

the relevant congressional committees and the Congressional 

Budget Office. A long-term remedy requires legislation 

to provide access to the Nuclear Waste Fund and fees 

independent of the annual appropriations process but subject 

to rigorous independent financial and managerial oversight.

Promoting international engagement to support safe 

and secure waste management – Congress may need 

to provide policy direction and new legislation to implement 

some measures aimed at helping other countries manage 

radioactive wastes in a safe, secure, and proliferationresistant manner, similar to the expired NWPA provisions for 

technical assistance to non-nuclear weapons states in the 

area of spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal. 

Proposed Legislative Changes

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challenge derives from a federal/state/tribal/local rights dilemma 

that is far from unique to the nuclear waste issue—no simple 

formula exists for resolving it. Experience in the United States 

and in other nations suggests that any attempt to force a topdown, federally mandated solution over the objections of a state 

or community—far from being more efficient—will take longer, 

cost more, and have lower odds of ultimate success. 

By contrast, the approach we recommend is explicitly 

adaptive, staged, and consent-based. Based on a review of 

successful siting processes in the United States and abroad—

including most notably the siting of a disposal facility for 

transuranic radioactive waste, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 

(WIPP) in New Mexico, and recent positive outcomes in 

Finland, France, Spain and Sweden—we believe this type of 

approach can provide the flexibility and sustain the public 

trust and confidence needed to see controversial facilities 

through to completion.

In practical terms, this means encouraging communities 

to volunteer to be considered to host a new nuclear waste 

management facility while also allowing for the waste 

management organization to approach communities that it 

believes can meet the siting requirements. Siting processes 

for waste management facilities should include a flexible and 

substantial incentive program.

The approach we recommend also recognizes that successful 

siting decisions are most likely to result from a complex and 

perhaps extended set of negotiations between the implementing 

organization and potentially affected state, tribal, and local 

governments, and other entities. It would be desirable for these 

negotiations to result in a partnership agreement or some other 

form of legally enforceable agreement with the organization 

to ensure that commitments to and by host states, tribes, and 

communities are upheld. All affected levels of government 

must have, at a minimum, a meaningful consultative role in 

important decisions; additionally, both host states and tribes 

should retain—or where appropriate, be delegated—direct 

authority over aspects of regulation, permitting, and operations 

where oversight below the federal level can be exercised 

effectively and in a way that is helpful in protecting the 

interests and gaining the confidence of affected communities 

and citizens. At the same time, host state, tribal and local 

governments have responsibilities to work productively with the 

federal government to help advance the national interest. 

In this context, any process that is prescribed in detail up 

front is unlikely to work. Transparency, flexibility, patience, 

responsiveness, and a heavy emphasis on consultation and 

cooperation will all be necessary—indeed, these are attributes 

that should apply not just to siting but to every aspect of 

program implementation.

This discussion raises another issue highlighted in numerous 

comments to the BRC: the question of how to define “consent.” 

The Commission takes the view that this question ultimately has 

to be answered by a potential host jurisdiction, using whatever 

means and timing it sees fit. We believe a good gauge of consent 

would be the willingness of affected units of government – the 

host states, tribes, and local communities – to enter into legally 

binding agreements with the facility operator, where these 

agreements enable states, tribes, and communities to have 

confidence that they can protect the interests of their citizens. 

All siting processes take time; however, an adaptive, 

staged approach may seem particularly slow and open-ended. 

This will be frustrating to stakeholders and to members of 

the public who are understandably anxious to know when 

they can expect to see results. The Commission shares this 

frustration—greater certainty and a quicker resolution 

would have been our preference also. Experience, however, 

leads us to conclude that there is no short-cut, and that any 

First, the Environmental Protection Agency and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission should develop a 

generic disposal standard and supporting regulatory 

requirements early in the siting process. Generallyapplicable regulations are more likely to earn public 

confidence than site-specific standards. In addition, having 

a generic standard will support the efficient consideration 

and examination of multiple sites.

Once the new waste management organization is 

established it should:

•	 Develop a set of basic initial siting criteria – These 

criteria will ensure that time is not wasted investigating 

sites that are clearly unsuitable or inappropriate.

•	 Encourage expressions of interest from a large 

variety of communities that have potentially suitable 

sites – As these communities become engaged in the 

process, the implementing organization must be flexible 

enough not to force the issue of consent while also 

being fully prepared to take advantage of promising 

opportunities when they arise.

•	 Establish initial program milestones – Milestones 

should be laid out in a mission plan to allow for review 

by Congress, the Administration, and stakeholders, 

and to provide verifiable indicators for oversight of the 

organization’s performance.

Siting New Nuclear

Waste Management Facilities – 

Getting Started

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attempt to short-circuit the process will most likely lead 

to more delay. That said, we also believe that attention to 

process must not come at the expense of progress and we 

are sympathetic to the numerous comments we received 

asking us to include a more detailed and specific set of 

milestones in our final report. Obviously there is an inherent 

tension between recommending an adaptive, consent-based 

process and setting out deadlines or progress requirements 

in advance. But we agree that it will be important—without 

imposing inflexible deadlines—to set reasonable performance 

goals and milestones for major phases of program 

development and implementation so that Congress can hold 

the waste management organization accountable and so that 

stakeholders and the public can have confidence the program 

is moving forward. Other countries have taken this approach, 

in several cases identifying target timeframes, rather than 

specific dates for completing stages in their process. For 

example the implementing organization might consider a 

range of, say, 15 to 20 years to accomplish site identification 

and characterization and to conduct the licensing process for 

a geologic repository. A notional timeframe for siting and 

developing a consolidated storage facility would presumably 

be shorter, perhaps on the order of 5 to 10 years.

2. A New Organization 

to Implement the Waste 

Management Program 

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor 

agencies have had primary responsibility for implementing 

U.S. nuclear waste policy for more than 50 years. In that time, 

DOE has achieved some notable successes, as shown by the 

WIPP experience and recent improvements in waste cleanup 

performance at several DOE sites. The overall record of DOE 

and of the federal government as a whole, however, has not 

inspired widespread confidence or trust in our nation’s nuclear 

waste management program. For this and other reasons, the 

Commission concludes that a new, single-purpose organization 

is needed to provide the stability, focus, and credibility that are 

essential to get the waste program back on track. We believe 

a congressionally chartered federal corporation offers the best 

model, but whatever the specific form of the new organization 

it must possess the attributes, independence, and resources to 

effectively carry out its mission.

The central task of the new organization would be to site, 

license, build, and operate facilities for the safe consolidated 

storage and final disposal of spent fuel and high-level nuclear 

waste at a reasonable cost and within a reasonable timeframe. 

In addition, the new organization would be responsible for 

arranging for the safe transport of waste and spent fuel to or 

between storage and disposal facilities, and for undertaking 

applied research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) 

activities directly relevant to its waste management mission 

(e.g., testing the long-term performance of fuel in dry casks 

and during subsequent transportation).

For the new organization to succeed, a substantial degree 

of implementing authority and assured access to funds must 

be paired with rigorous financial, technical, and regulatory 

oversight by Congress and the appropriate government 

agencies. We recommend that the organization be directed by 

a board nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, 

and selected to represent a range of expertise and perspectives. 

Independent scientific and technical oversight of the nuclear 

waste management program is essential and should continue 

to be provided for out of nuclear waste fee payments. In 

addition, the presence of clearly independent, competent 

regulators is essential; we recommend the existing roles of 

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in establishing 

standards and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

in licensing and regulating waste management facilities 

be preserved but that steps be taken to ensure ongoing 

cooperation and coordination between these agencies.

Late in our review we heard from several states that 

host DOE defense waste that they agree with the proposal 

to establish a new organization to manage civilian wastes, 

but believe the government can more effectively meet its 

commitments if responsibility for defense waste disposal 

remains with DOE. Others argued strongly that the 

current U.S. policy of commingling defense and civilian 

wastes should be retained. We are not in a position to 

comprehensively assess the implications of any actions that 

might affect DOE’s compliance with its cleanup agreements, 

and we did not have the time or the resources necessary 

to thoroughly evaluate the many factors that must be 

considered by the Administration and Congress in making 

such a determination.4

 The Commission therefore urges 

the Administration to launch an immediate review of the 

implications of leaving responsibility for disposal of defense 

waste and other DOE-owned waste with DOE versus 

moving it to a new waste management organization. The 

implementation of other Commission recommendations, 

however, should not wait for the commingling issue to 

be resolved. Congressional and Administration efforts to 

implement our recommendations can and should proceed as 

expeditiously as possible.

4 These factors should include (but not be limited to) those contained in section 8 of the NWPA; see detailed discussion in section 7.3 of this report.

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3. Access to Utility Waste 

Disposal Fees for their

Intended Purpose 

The 1982 NWPA created a “polluter pays” funding mechanism 

to ensure that the full costs of disposing of commercial spent 

fuel would be paid by utilities (and their ratepayers), with no 

impact on taxpayers or the federal budget. Nuclear utilities 

are assessed a fee on every kilowatt-hour of nuclear-generated 

electricity as a quid pro quo payment in exchange for the federal 

government’s contractual commitment to begin accepting 

commercial spent fuel by January 31, 1998. Fee revenues go to 

the government’s Nuclear Waste Fund, which was established 

for the sole purpose of covering the cost of disposing of civilian 

nuclear waste and ensuring that the waste program would not 

have to compete with other funding priorities. In contrast, costs 

for disposing of defense nuclear wastes are paid by taxpayers 

through appropriations from the Treasury.

The Fund does not work as intended. A series of 

executive branch and congressional actions has made annual 

fee revenues (approximately $750 million per year) and 

the unspent $27 billion balance in the Fund effectively 

inaccessible to the waste program. Instead, the waste program 

must compete for federal funding each year and is therefore 

subject to exactly the budget constraints and uncertainties 

that the Fund was created to avoid. This situation must be 

remedied to allow the program to succeed.

In the near term, the Administration should offer to 

amend DOE’s standard contract with nuclear utilities so 

that utilities remit only the portion of the annual fee that is 

appropriated for waste management each year and place the rest 

in a trust account, held by a qualified third-party institution, 

to be available when needed. At the same time, the Office of 

Management and Budget should work with the congressional 

budget committees and the Congressional Budget Office to 

change the budgetary treatment of annual fee receipts so that 

these receipts can directly offset appropriations for the waste 

program. These actions are urgent because they enable key 

subsequent actions the Commission recommends. Therefore, 

we urge the Administration to act promptly to implement these 

changes (preferably in fiscal year 2013). For the longer term, 

legislation is needed to transfer the unspent balance in the Fund 

to the new waste management organization so that it can carry 

out its civilian nuclear waste obligations independent of annual 

appropriations (but with congressional oversight)—similar 

to the budgeting authority now given to the Tennessee Valley 

Authority and Bonneville Power Administration.

We recognize that these actions mean no longer counting 

nuclear waste fee receipts against the federal budget deficit 

and that the result will be a modest negative impact on 

annual budget calculations. The point here is that the federal 

government is contractually bound to use these funds to 

manage spent fuel. The bill will come due at some point. 

Meanwhile, failure to correct the funding problem does 

the federal budget no favors in a context where taxpayers 

remain liable for mounting damages, compensated through 

the Judgment Fund, for the federal government’s continued 

inability to deliver on its waste management obligations. 

These liabilities are already in the billions of dollars and 

could increase by hundreds of millions of dollars annually for 

each additional year of delay.

4. Prompt Efforts to Develop a

New Geologic Disposal Facility 

Deep geologic disposal capacity is an essential component 

of a comprehensive nuclear waste management system for 

the simple reason that very long-term isolation from the 

environment is the only responsible way to manage nuclear 

materials with a low probability of re-use, including defense 

and commercial reprocessing wastes and many forms of 

spent fuel currently in government hands. The conclusion 

that disposal is needed and that deep geologic disposal is the 

scientifically preferred approach has been reached by every 

expert panel that has looked at the issue and by every other 

country that is pursuing a nuclear waste management program. 

Some commenters have urged the prompt adoption of 

recycling of spent fuel as a response to the waste disposal 

challenge, as well as a means to extend fuel supply. It is the 

Commission’s view that it would be premature for the United 

Disposal, intended as the final stage of waste 

management, is isolation that relies in the long term only 

on the passive operation of natural environmental and 

man-made barriers, does not permit easy human access 

to the waste after final emplacement, and does not require 

continued human control and maintenance. Storage, 

intended as an intermediate step in waste management, 

is isolation that permits managed access to the waste 

after its emplacement, with active human control and 

maintenance to assure isolation. After a period in storage, 

waste is subject to disposal. As used in this report, the 

term “disposal” is understood to mean permanent disposal; 

the term “storage” is understood to mean storage for an 

interim period prior to disposal or other disposition.

The Difference between 

“Storage” and “Disposal”

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

States to commit, as a matter of policy, to “closing” the nuclear 

fuel cycle given the large uncertainties that exist about the merits 

and commercial viability of different fuel cycles and technology 

options. Future evaluations of potential alternative fuel cycles 

must account for linkages among all elements of the fuel 

cycle (including waste transportation, storage, and disposal) 

and for broader safety, security, and non-proliferation 

concerns. Moreover, all spent fuel reprocessing or recycle 

options generate waste streams that require a permanent 

disposal solution. In any event, we believe permanent 

disposal will very likely also be needed to safely manage at 

least some portion of the commercial spent fuel inventory 

even if a closed fuel cycle were adopted.

We recognize that current law establishes Yucca 

Mountain in Nevada as the site for the first U.S. repository 

for spent fuel and high-level waste, provided the license 

application submitted by DOE meets relevant requirements. 

The Blue Ribbon Commission was not chartered as 

a siting commission. Accordingly we have not evaluated 

Yucca Mountain or any other location as a potential site for 

the storage or disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 

waste, nor have we taken a position on the Administration’s 

request to withdraw the license application.5

 We simply 

note that regardless what happens with Yucca Mountain, 

the U.S. inventory of spent nuclear fuel will soon exceed 

the amount that can be legally emplaced at this site until a 

second repository is in operation. So under current law, the 

United States will need to find a new disposal site even if 

Yucca Mountain goes forward. We believe the approach set 

forth here provides the best strategy for assuring continued 

progress, regardless of the fate of Yucca Mountain. 

5. Prompt Efforts to Develop

One or More Consolidated

Storage Facilities

Safe and secure storage is another critical element of an 

integrated and flexible national waste management system. 

Fortunately, experience shows that storage—either at or 

away from the sites where the waste was generated—can be 

implemented safely and cost-effectively. Indeed, a longer period 

of time in storage offers a number of benefits because it allows the 

spent fuel to cool while keeping options for future actions open.

Developing consolidated storage capacity would allow 

the federal government to begin the orderly transfer of spent 

fuel from reactor sites to safe and secure centralized facilities 

independent of the schedule for operating a permanent 

repository. The arguments in favor of consolidated storage 

are strongest for “stranded” spent fuel from shutdown plant 

sites. Stranded fuel should be first in line for transfer to a 

consolidated facility so that these plant sites can be completely 

decommissioned and put to other beneficial uses. Looking 

beyond the issue of today’s stranded fuel, the availability 

of consolidated storage will provide valuable flexibility in 

the nuclear waste management system that could achieve 

meaningful cost savings for both ratepayers and taxpayers 

when a significant number of plants are shut down in the 

future, can provide back-up storage in the event that spent 

fuel needs to be moved quickly from a reactor site, and would 

provide an excellent platform for ongoing R&D to better 

understand how the storage systems currently in use at both 

commercial and DOE sites perform over time. 

For consolidated storage to be of greatest value to the 

waste management system, the current rigid legislative 

restriction that prevents a storage facility developed under 

the NWPA from operating significantly earlier than a 

repository should be eliminated. At the same time, efforts 

to develop consolidated storage must not hamper efforts to 

move forward with the development of disposal capacity. 

To allay the concerns of states and communities that a 

consolidated storage facility might become a de facto disposal 

site, a program to establish consolidated storage must be 

accompanied by a parallel disposal program that is effective, 

focused, and making discernible progress in the eyes of 

key stakeholders and the public. Progress on both fronts is 

needed and must be sought without further delay.

Even with timely development of consolidated storage 

facilities, a large quantity of spent fuel will remain at reactor 

sites for many decades before it can be accepted by the federal 

waste management program. Current at-reactor storage 

practices and safeguards are being scrutinized in light of the 

lessons that are emerging from Fukushima. In addition, the 

Commission recommends that the National Academy of 

5 At the March 25, 2010 meeting of the Blue Ribbon Commission, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu told Commissioners “This is not a siting commission.” The same point 

was reiterated in a February 11, 2011 letter from the Secretary to the BRC Co-Chairmen. Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which governs our proceedings, the 

Department of Energy sets the Commission’s agenda.

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Sciences (NAS) conduct a thorough assessment of lessons 

learned from Fukushima and their implications for conclusions 

reached in earlier NAS studies on the safety and security of 

current storage arrangements for spent nuclear fuel and highlevel waste in the United States. This effort would complement 

investigations already underway by the NRC and other 

organizations. More broadly, it will also be vital to continue 

vigorous public and private research and regulatory oversight 

efforts in areas such as spent fuel and storage system degradation 

phenomena, vulnerability to sabotage and terrorism, full-scale 

cask testing, and others. As part of this process, it is appropriate 

for the NRC to examine the advantages and disadvantages 

of options such as “hardened” onsite storage that have been 

proposed to enhance security at storage sites. 

6. Early Preparation for

the Eventual Large-Scale 

Transport of Spent Nuclear

Fuel and High-Level Waste to 

Consolidated Storage and

Disposal Facilities

The current system of standards and regulations governing the 

transport of spent fuel and other nuclear materials appears to 

have functioned well, and the safety record for past shipments 

of these types of materials is excellent. But the current set 

of transport-related regulations will need to be updated to 

accommodate changes in fueling practices. Moreover, past 

performance does not guarantee that future transport operations 

will match the record to date, particularly as the logistics 

involved expand to accommodate a much larger number of 

shipments. Experiences in the United States and abroad, and 

extensive comments to the Commission, indicate that many 

people fear the transportation of nuclear materials. Thus greater 

transport demands are likely to raise new public concerns.

As with siting fixed facilities, planning for associated 

transportation needs has historically drawn intense interest. 

Transport operations typically also have the potential to affect 

a far larger number of communities. The Commission believes 

that state, tribal and local officials should be extensively 

involved in transportation planning and should be given the 

resources necessary to discharge their roles and obligations in 

this arena. Accordingly, DOE should (1) finalize procedures 

and regulations for providing technical assistance and funds for 

training to local governments and tribes pursuant to Section 

180(c) of the NWPA and (2) begin to provide such funding, 

independent from progress on facility siting. While it would be 

premature to fully fund a technical assistance program before 

knowing with some certainty where the destination sites for 

spent fuel are going to be, substantial benefits can be gained 

from a modest early investment in planning for the transport 

of spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites.

Planning and providing for adequate transportation capacity 

while simultaneously addressing related stakeholder concerns 

will take time and present logistical and technical challenges. 

Given that transportation represents a crucial link in the overall 

storage and disposal system, it will be important to allow 

substantial lead-time to assess and resolve transportation issues 

well in advance of when materials would be expected to actually 

begin shipping to a new facility. For many years, states have 

been working cooperatively with DOE to plan for shipments, 

often through agreements with regional groupings of states and 

in ways that involve radiological health, law enforcement, and 

emergency response personnel. As has been shown with the 

WIPP program and other significant waste shipping campaigns, 

planning, training and execution involves many different parties 

and takes time. In addition, specialized equipment may be 

required that will need to be designed, fabricated and tested 

before being placed into service. Historically, some programs 

have treated transportation planning as an afterthought. No 

successful programs have done so.

7. Support for Advances in 

Nuclear Energy Technology and

for Workforce Development 

Advances in nuclear energy technology have the potential 

to deliver an array of benefits across a wide range of energy 

policy goals. The Commission believes these benefits—in 

light of the environmental and energy security challenges 

the United States and the world will confront this century—

justify sustained public- and private-sector support for 

RD&D on advanced reactor and fuel cycle technologies. 

In the near term, opportunities exist to improve the safety 

and performance of existing light-water reactors and spent 

fuel and high-level waste storage, transport, and disposal 

systems. Longer term, the possibility exists to advance “gamechanging” innovations that offer potentially large advantages 

over current technologies and systems.

The Commission believes the general direction of the 

current DOE research and development (R&D) program is 

appropriate, although we also urge DOE to take advantage 

of the Quadrennial Energy Review6

 process to refine its 

nuclear R&D “roadmap.” We are not making a specific 

recommendation concerning future DOE funding for 

6 For more information on the Quadrennial Energy Review and Quadrennial Technology Review, see http://energy.gov/articles/department-energy-releases-inauguralquadrennial-technology-review-report.

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nuclear energy RD&D; in light of the extraordinary fiscal 

pressures the federal government will confront in coming 

years, we believe that budget decisions must be made in the 

context of a broader discussion about priorities and funding 

for energy RD&D more generally.

One area where the Commission recommends increased 

effort involves ongoing work by the NRC to develop a 

regulatory framework for advanced nuclear energy systems. 

Such a framework can help guide the design of new systems 

and lower barriers to commercial investment by increasing 

confidence that new systems can be successfully licensed. 

Specifically, the Commission recommends that adequate 

federal funding be provided to the NRC to support a robust 

effort in this area. We also support the NRC’s risk-informed, 

performance-based approach to developing regulations for 

advanced nuclear energy systems, including NRC’s ongoing 

review of the current waste classification system. Changes to 

the existing system may eventually require a change in law.

Another area where further investment is needed is 

nuclear workforce development. Specifically, the Commission 

recommends expanded federal, joint labor-management and 

university-based support for advanced science, technology, 

engineering, and mathematics training to develop the skilled 

workforce needed to support an effective waste management 

program as well as a viable domestic nuclear industry. 

At the same time, DOE and the nuclear energy industry 

should work to ensure that valuable existing capabilities 

and assets, including critical infrastructure and human 

expertise, are maintained. Finally, the jurisdictions of safety 

and health agencies should be clarified and aligned. New 

site-independent safety standards should be developed by the 

safety and health agencies responsible for protecting nuclear 

workers through a coordinated joint process that actively 

engages and solicits input from all relevant constituencies. 

Efforts to support uniform levels of safety and health in the 

nuclear industry should be undertaken with federal, industry, 

and joint labor–management leadership. Safety and health 

practices in the nuclear construction industry should provide 

a model for other activities in the nuclear industry.

8. Active U.S. Leadership in 

International Efforts to 

Address Safety, Non-Proliferation and Security Concerns

As more nations consider pursuing nuclear energy or 

expanding their nuclear programs, U.S. leadership is urgently 

needed on issues of safety, non-proliferation, and security/

counter-terrorism. Many countries, especially those just 

embarking on commercial nuclear power development, have 

relatively small programs and may lack the regulatory and 

oversight resources available to countries with more established 

programs. International assistance may be required to ensure 

they do not create disproportionate safety, physical security, 

and proliferation risks. In many cases, mitigating these risks 

will depend less on technological interventions than on the 

ability to strengthen international institutions and safeguards 

while promoting multilateral cooperation and coordination. 

From the U.S. perspective, two further points are particularly 

important: First, with so many players in the international 

nuclear technology and policy arena, the United States will 

increasingly have to lead by engagement and by example. 

Second, the United States cannot exercise effective leadership 

on issues related to the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle 

so long as its own program is in disarray; effective domestic 

policies are needed to support America’s international agenda.

The Fukushima accident has focused new attention on 

nuclear safety worldwide. Globally, some 60 new reactors 

are under construction and more than 60 countries that 

do not have nuclear power plants have expressed interest 

in acquiring them. These nations will have to operate their 

facilities safely and plan for safe storage and disposition of 

spent nuclear fuel. The United States should help launch 

a concerted international safety initiative—encompassing 

organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) as well as regulators, vendors, operators, and 

technical support organizations—to assure the safe use of 

nuclear energy and the safe management of nuclear waste in 

all countries that pursue nuclear technology.

Nuclear weapons proliferation has been a central concern 

of U.S. nuclear policy from the earliest days of the nuclear 

era. These concerns are still prominent, especially where the 

deployment of uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and recycled 

fuel fabrication technology is being contemplated. As countries 

with relatively less nuclear experience acquire nuclear energy 

systems, the United States should work with the IAEA, nuclear 

power states, private industry, and others in the international 

community to ensure that all spent fuel remains under effective 

and transparent control and does not become “orphaned” 

anywhere in the world with inadequate safeguards and security.

Longer term, the United States should support the use 

of multi-national fuel-cycle facilities,7

 under comprehensive 

IAEA safeguards, as a way to give more countries reliable 

7 The term “multi-national fuel cycle facility” is commonly understood to encompass facilities associated with all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Commission wishes to 

stress that our support for multi-national management of such facilities should not be interpreted as support for additional countries becoming involved in enrichment or 

reprocessing facilities, but rather reflects our view that if these capabilities were to spread it would be far preferable—from a security and non-proliferation standpoint—if 

they did so under multi-national ownership, management, safeguards, and controls.

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access to the benefits of nuclear power while simultaneously 

reducing proliferation risks. U.S. sponsorship of the recentlycreated IAEA global nuclear fuel bank is an important step 

toward establishing such access while reducing a driver for 

some states to engage in uranium enrichment. But more 

is needed. The U.S. government should propose that the 

IAEA lead a new initiative, with active U.S. participation, to 

explore the creation of one or more multi-national spent fuel 

storage or disposal facilities. 

In addition, the United States should support the 

evolution of spent fuel “take-away” arrangements as a way 

to allow some countries, particularly those with relatively 

small national programs, to avoid the costly and politically 

difficult step of providing for spent fuel disposal on their soil 

and to reduce associated safety and security risks. An existing 

program to accept highly-enriched uranium fuel from research 

reactors abroad for storage in the United States has provided a 

demonstration—albeit a limited one—of the national security 

value of such arrangements. The capability to accept limited 

quantities of spent fuel from foreign commercial reactors could 

be similarly valuable from a national security perspective. As 

the United States moves forward with developing its own 

consolidated storage and disposal capacity, it should work with 

the IAEA and with existing and emerging nuclear nations 

to establish conditions under which one or more nations, 

including the United States, can offer to take foreign spent fuel 

for ultimate disposition. 

The susceptibility of nuclear materials or facilities to 

intentional acts of theft or sabotage for terrorist purposes 

is a relatively newer concern but one that has received 

considerable attention since 9/11. The United States should 

continue to work with countries of the former Soviet Union 

and other nations through initiatives such as the Nunn-Lugar 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to prevent, detect, and 

respond to nuclear terrorism threats. Domestically, evolving 

terrorism threats and security risks must be closely monitored 

by the NRC, the Department of Homeland Security, and other 

responsible agencies to ensure that any additional security 

measures needed to counter those threats are identified and 

promptly implemented. The recent events at Fukushima have – 

as they should – prompted the NRC and the industry to 

re-examine the adequacy of “mitigative strategies” for coping 

with large-scale events (like an explosion or fire) or catastrophic 

system failures (like a sudden loss of power or cooling); as 

noted previously, we also recommend that Congress charter the 

National Academy of Sciences to assess lessons learned from 

Fukushima with respect to the storage of spent fuel.

Tying It Together

The overall record of the U.S. nuclear waste program has 

been one of broken promises and unmet commitments. And 

yet the Commission finds reasons for confidence that we can 

turn this record around. To be sure, decades of failed efforts to 

develop a repository for spent fuel and high-level waste have 

produced frustration and a deep erosion of trust in the federal 

government. But they have also produced important insights, 

a clearer understanding of the technical and social issues to be 

resolved, and at least one significant success story – the WIPP 

facility in New Mexico. Moreover, many people have looked at 

aspects of this record and come to similar conclusions. 

The problem of nuclear waste may be unique in the 

sense that there is wide agreement about the outlines of the 

solution. Simply put, we know what we have to do, we know 

we have to do it, and we even know how to do it. Experience 

in the United States and abroad has shown that suitable 

sites for deep geologic repositories for nuclear waste can be 

identified and developed. The knowledge and experience 

we need are in hand and the necessary funds have been and 

are being collected. Rather the core difficulty remains what 

it has always been: finding a way to site these inherently 

controversial facilities and to conduct the waste management 

program in a manner that allows all stakeholders, but most 

especially host states, tribes and communities, to conclude 

that their interests have been adequately protected and their 

well-being enhanced—not merely sacrificed or overridden by 

the interests of the country as a whole.

This is by no means a small difficulty—in fact, many 

other countries have not resolved this problem either. 

However, we have seen other countries make significant 

progress with a flexible approach to siting that puts a high 

degree of emphasis on transparency, accountability, and 

meaningful consultation. We have had more than a decade 

of successful operation of WIPP. And most recently, we have 

witnessed an accident that has reminded Americans that we 

have little physical capacity at present to do anything with 

spent nuclear fuel other than to leave it where it is. Against 

this backdrop, the conditions for progress are arguably 

more promising than they have been in some time. But 

we will only know if we start, which is what we urge the 

Administration and Congress to do, without further delay.

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CONTENTS

PREAMBLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....................................................................vi

LIST OF ACRONYMS and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. FOUNDATIONS OF A NEW STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.1 Elements of a Successful Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.2 Core Interests and Objectives for U.S. Waste Management Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2.2.1 Public and Occupational Health and Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2.2.2 Environmental Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2.2.3 Cost-Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2.2.4 Non-Proliferation and National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.3 Core Values and Principles for a Successful Waste Management Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.3.1 Ethical Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.3.2 Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.3.3 Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.3.4 Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.3.5 Informed Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.3.6 Governance and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3. TECHNICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3.1 Overview of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3.2 The Nature and Longevity of Hazard Posed by Different Types of Nuclear Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3.3 Scale of the Waste Management Challenge in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

3.3.1 Current Inventory of Spent Nuclear Fuel Being Managed by the 

 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

3.3.2 Current Inventory of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste Being Managed by DOE . . . . . . 16

3.3.3 Navy Spent Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3.4 History of Nuclear Waste Management Policy in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.4.1 Early U.S. Policy on Nuclear Waste Management (1940s–1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.4.2 U.S. Policy under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1982–present) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3.4.3 Experience with the Yucca Mountain Repository Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.5 Utility Initiatives...................................................................... 24

3.6 Current Waste Acceptance Commitments and Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

3.7 Linkages between the Back-End of the Fuel Cycle and the Future of Nuclear Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3.7.1 State Moratoria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3.7.2 NRC Waste Confidence Proceeding............................................... 25

3.7.3 Impact of Waste Management Uncertainty on Nuclear Plant Investment Decisions . . . . . . . . . . 26

3.8 International Context/Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

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4. THE NEED FOR GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

4.1 The Rationale for Developing Disposal Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

4.2 The Case for Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

4.3 Options for Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

4.4 Retrievability and Reversibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

4.5 Cost of Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

5. STORAGE AS PART OF AN INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . 32

5.1 The Role of Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

5.2 The Case for Consolidated Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

5.2.1 Consolidated Storage Would Allow for the Removal of ‘Stranded” Spent Fuel 

from Shutdown Reactor Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

5.2.2 Consolidated Storage Would Enable the Federal Government to Begin Meeting 

 Waste Acceptance Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

5.2.3 Consolidated Storage Would Provide Flexibility to Respond to Lessons Learned 

from Fukushima and Other Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

5.2.4 Consolidated Storage Would Support the Repository Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

5.2.5 Consolidated Storage Offers Technical Opportunities for the Waste Management System . . . . . 39

5.2.6 Consolidated Storage Would Provide Options for Increased Flexibility and 

 Efficiency in Storage and Future Waste Handling Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

5.3 Practical and Strategic Considerations and Next Steps for Proceeding with Consolidated Storage . . . . . 39

5.4 The Case for a New Approach to Prioritizing the Transfer of Spent Fuel from 

 U.S. Commercial Reactor Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

5.5 Safety and Security Considerations for Storage Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

5.5.1 Storage Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

5.5.2 Storage Safety Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

6. A CONSENT-BASED APPROACH TO SITING AND DEVELOPING FUTURE

FACILITIES FOR NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

6.1 Lessons Learned from U.S. Experience in Siting Nuclear Waste Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

6.2 Experience with Nuclear Waste Facility Siting in Other Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

6.3 Key Elements of a Phased, Adaptive Approach to Siting and Developing Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

6.4 Specific Steps in an Adaptive, Staged Facility Siting and Development Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

6.5 Support for Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

6.6 The Role of States, Tribes, and Communities in an Adaptive, Consent-Based Siting Process . . . . . . . . . . 56

6.7 Benefits to Host States, Tribes, and Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

7. A NEW ORGANIZATION TO LEAD THE NATION’s WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM . . . . 60

7.1 The Rationale for a New Waste Management Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

7.2 Options for Structuring a New Waste Management Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

7.3 Scope of Responsibilities for a New Waste Management Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

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7.4 Governance/Oversight Recommendations for a New Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

7.4.1 Congressional Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

7.4.2 Management Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

7.4.3 Independent Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

7.4.4 Scientific and Technical Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

7.4.5 Financial Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

7.5 Stakeholder Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

7.6 Interactions with Affected States, Tribes, and Local Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

7.7 Transfer of Contracts and Liability to a New Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

7.8 Near-Term Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

8. FUNDING THE WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

8.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

8.2 Current Treatment of the Nuclear Waste Fund in the Federal Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

8.2.1 A Case of Unintended Consequences and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

8.2.2 Disadvantages of the Appropriations Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

8.3 Fixing the Funding Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

8.3.1 Near-Term Non-Legislative Action to Increase Access to Fee Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

8.3.2 Legislative Action to Provide Budgetary Autonomy (Subject to Oversight) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

8.4 Paying for the Defense Waste Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

8.5 Dealing with Ongoing Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

9. TRANSPORTATION ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

9.1 Background and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

9.2 Regulatory and Technical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

9.3 The Role of State, Local, and Tribal Governments and the Importance of Early Planning 

for Future Transport Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

9.4 Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

10. REGULATORY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

10.1 Issues and Challenges in Regulating Storage Facilities and Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

10.2 Issues and Challenges in Setting Regulatory Standard for Disposal Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

10.2.1 Timeframe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

10.2.2 Compliance Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

10.2.3 Standard of Proof for Compliance Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

10.2.4 Other Protection Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

10.2.5 Division of Regulatory Responsibility between EPA and NRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

10.3 Recommendations for Developing Future Disposal Facility Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

10.4 Occupational Safety and Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

10.5 Waste Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

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11. ADVANCED REACTOR AND FUEL CYCLE TECHNOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

11.1 Advanced Technologies and the Nature of the Nuclear Waste Management Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

11.2 Results of a High-Level Comparison of Reactor and Fuel Cycle Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

11.3 The Case for Continued Public and Private Investment in Nuclear Energy RD&D and 

the Status of the Current DOE Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

11.4 Workforce Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

12. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

12.1 International Nuclear Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

12.2 Non-proliferation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

12.2.1 The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

12.2.2 Multilateral/Multi-national Fuel Cycle Services Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

12.3 Security and Counter-Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

13. NEAR-TERM ACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

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FIGURES

Figure 1. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Figure 2. Fuel Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Figure 3. Wet Pool Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Figure 4. Dry Storage System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Figure 5. Shipping Container for Spent Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Figure 6. Composition of spent nuclear fuel after 10 years of cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Figure 7. Comparison of Radiation Doses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Figure 8. Radioactive Decay of Typical Spent Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Figure 9. Operating and Shutdown Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Figure 10. U.S. DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Figure 11. U.S. DOE High-Level Waste Inventory in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Figure 12. Mined Geologic Disposal Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Figure 13. Deep Boreholes Disposal Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Figure 14. Dry Cask Storage Facility at the Decommissioned Maine Yankee Reactor Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Figure 15. EPRI Projection of Cumulative Spent Nuclear Fuel from Commercial Nuclear Power Plants 

in Pool Storage and Dry Storage, 2010 - 2060 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Figure 16. Operation and Maintenance Costs of Stranded Spent Fuel Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Figure 17. Nuclear Waste Program: Budget Requests versus Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Figure 18. Cumulative Nuclear Waste Fees, Budget Requests, and Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Figure 19. Casks Being Transported By Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Figure 20. Worldwide Distribution of Civil Nuclear Energy Generation Capacity in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

TABLES

Table 1. Quantities of Stranded Spent Fuel in Storage at Shutdown Commercial U.S. Reactor Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Table 2. Status of DOE-Utility Standard Contract Litigation (as of January 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Table 3. Recommendations of the NAS Going the Distance Report and their Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Table 4. A Comparison of the Existing Once-Through, Conventional Light-Water Reactor 

Fuel Cycle with Representative Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems in the Long Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

APPENDIXES

Appendix A – BRC Commissioners, Staff, Senior Consultants and Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Appendix B – Full Commission, Subcommittee and Regional Comment Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Appendix C – Status of Nuclear Waste Management Programs in Other Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Appendix D – BRC Commissioned Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

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LIST OF ACRONYMS and abbreviations

AEA Atomic Energy Act

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

AMFM Alternative Means of Financing and 

Managing

BEA Budget Enforcement Act of 1990

BRC Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s 

Nuclear Future

C&C consultation and cooperation

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CRA Congressional Review Act

CSA comprehensive safeguards agreement

CUTGO cut-as-you-go

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

DRR Domestic Research Reactor

EDRAM Environmentally Safe Disposal of 

Radioactive Materials

EM DOE Office of Environmental Management

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

ERDA Energy Research and Development 

Administration

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

FRR Foreign Research Reactor

FY fiscal year

GAO Government Accountability Office

GRH Gramm-Rudman-Hollings

GTCC Greater than Class C

HAZMAT hazardous material

HEU high-enriched uranium

HLW high-level waste

HOSS hardened on-site storage

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

INL Idaho National Laboratory

ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

LEU low-enriched uranium

LLW low-level waste

LWR light water reactor

LWT legal-weight truck

MC&A material control and accountability

MOX mixed oxide 

MRS monitored retrievable storage

MTHM metric tons heavy metal 

MTU metric tons of uranium 

NAS National Academy of Sciences

NEA Nuclear Energy Agency

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NGO non-governmental organizations

NNPP Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

NNWS non-nuclear weapon states

NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRF Naval Reactors Facility

NWF Nuclear Waste Fund

NWMO Nuclear Waste Management Organization

NWPA Nuclear Waste Policy Act

NWS nuclear weapon states

NWTRB Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board

O&M operations and maintenance

OCRWM Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management (DOE)

OFF oldest fuel first

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration

PAYGO pay-as-you-go

PFS Private Fuel Storage, LLC

PWR Pressurized Water Reactor

R&D research and development

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

RD&D research, development, and demonstration

SNF spent nuclear fuel

SRG state regional group

STGWG State and Tribal Government Working Group

TEC Transportation External Coordination

TRU transuranic

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

WINS World Institute for Nuclear Security

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

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The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear

Future (BRC) was formed by the Secretary of Energy,

at the direction of the President, to conduct a

comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end

of the nuclear fuel cycle and recommend a new plan.

The Commission charter and a list of Commissioners may be

found in appendix A.

As required by our charter, a draft of this final report

was released for public comment on July 29, 2011. This

report reflects comments received on the draft report,

which generated thousands of written submissions to the

Commission, as well as input gathered at five public meetings

that were held in Denver, Boston, Washington D.C.,

Atlanta, and Minneapolis in September and October 2011 to

solicit feedback on the draft report. A comprehensive record

of comments and feedback received on the Commission’s

draft report, along with other materials and work products

generated in the course of the Commission’s work are

available at the Commission web site at www.brc.gov.

Fulfilling our charter has required the Commission to

investigate a wide range of issues. To aid our investigations,

we sought and obtained the approval of the Secretary of

Energy to form three subcommittees: one to examine

disposal issues, a second to address issues of transportation

and storage, and a third focused on reactor and fuel cycle

technology. We also requested and received DOE approval in

late 2011 to establish an ad hoc subcommittee to investigate

the issue of commingling of defense and civilian wastes.

The ad hoc subcommittee reported its findings at a public

meeting held on December 2, 2011, but did not make a

recommendation to the full Commission. The disposal,

transportation and storage, and reactor and fuel cycle

subcommittees issued draft reports for public comment in

1. INTRODUCTION

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June 2011. Updated versions of these reports will be issued 

shortly after the submission of this final report and will 

likewise be available—along with a white paper developed 

by the ad hoc committee on commingling— on the 

Commission web site.

Throughout, we have sought to ensure that our review 

is comprehensive, open and inclusive. To that end, the 

Commission and its subcommittees have heard from 

thousands of individuals and organizations through formal 

hearings, site visits, written letters and comments submitted 

to the Commission web site. We have visited several 

communities across the country that have a keen interest 

in the matters before the Commission. We have also visited 

a number of other countries to gain insights as to how the 

United States might proceed. A list of Commission meetings 

is included in appendix B. We are indebted to the many 

people who have given us the benefit of their expertise, 

advice, and guidance. 

As the Commission prepared its draft report, an 

earthquake and tsunami of historic proportions struck the 

eastern coast of Japan triggering the worst accident at a 

nuclear facility since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.1

 Various 

parts of four reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 

power station suffered significant to massive damage when 

cooling systems failed due to the loss of primary and backup power. Substantial amounts of radiation were released, 

contamination has occurred offsite, and people were 

evacuated from a large area around the plant.

Commission members and staff were deeply saddened by 

these events. We are also acutely aware that the Fukushima 

disaster has altered the technical, social, and political context 

into which our findings and recommendations are being 

released. To the extent possible we have tried to reflect in 

this document, if not the lessons of Fukushima (since those 

lessons are only beginning to be elucidated and understood) 

then at least the recognition that U.S. policy going forward 

will have to be responsive to the new knowledge and changed 

circumstances brought about by the accident. This report 

also reflects an awareness of the changing and far from 

certain global outlook for nuclear power and the effects of 

America’s diminishing ability to influence where and how 

nuclear energy is used. 

As more information about the Fukushima accident 

has emerged, we have sought to ensure that it is reflected in 

this report, recognizing that many of the expert inquiries 

now underway have not been completed as this report 

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goes to press. That said, we are confident the strategy we 

are proposing—with its strong emphasis on flexibility, 

adaptation, responsiveness, accountability, and continuous 

learning—is the right one for a post-Fukushima world 

and can help the United States recapture some of its lost 

influence over international nuclear developments.

While the scope of our review has been broad, it has not 

been without limits:

• The Commission is not a siting body. We have not 

made any findings about the Yucca Mountain repository 

site or about any alternative sites; in fact, we have not 

recommended specific locations for any component or 

facility of the U.S. nuclear waste management system. 

• The Commission was not asked to make 

recommendations regarding the advisability or the 

appropriate level of future U.S. reliance on nuclear power. 

Some witnesses urged the Commission to recommend 

that nuclear power plants be shut down until a disposal 

solution for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is found, while 

others urged the Commission to encourage a widespread 

expansion in the domestic use of nuclear energy. 

These questions fall outside our charter and we have 

declined to address them. We have, however, considered 

multiple scenarios for the future of nuclear energy in the 

United States to ensure that our recommendations can 

accommodate a full range of possibilities. 

As we have listened to testimony and public comment, we 

have been constantly reminded of the lack of trust that exists 

today in the federal government’s ability to meet its waste 

cleanup and management obligations. Past decisions—first 

to truncate the siting process for two repositories that was 

established in 1982; then to limit all efforts to a single site 

at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; and then, after more than 20 

years of work on the site, to request to withdraw the license 

application for that site—have only increased this deficit 

of trust, particularly among nuclear utility ratepayers and 

in communities that host nuclear waste storage facilities. 

These people and others believe they have been let down 

repeatedly by a government that has yet to make good on 

its commitment to provide a disposal solution for the most 

hazardous nuclear wastes. 

By contrast, we are convinced by our investigations 

that such a disposal solution can be found. While there is 

no reasonably foreseeable technology that could eliminate 

the need for a high-level nuclear waste disposal facility, 

progress on deep, mined geologic repositories—particularly 

in Sweden and Finland, but in other nations as well —has 

dramatically increased confidence in the ability to identify 

and license acceptable sites. Here in the United States, more 

than 10 years of operating experience at the Waste Isolation 

Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, which is successfully 

accepting and disposing of certain radioactive wastes from 

our nation’s nuclear weapons program, show that nuclear 

wastes can be transported safely over long distances and 

placed securely in a deep, mined repository.

In this report, we focused on developing a sound strategy 

for future storage and disposal facilities and operations that 

we believe can and should be implemented regardless of what 

happens with Yucca Mountain. We are confident this strategy 

can dramatically increase the U.S. waste management 

program’s chances for success regardless of what site or sites 

are chosen to provide for the ultimate disposal of America’s 

SNF and other high level nuclear wastes. 

This report is organized as follows: Chapters 2 and 3 

provide policy context and background information on the 

nuclear fuel cycle, the history of U.S. waste management 

efforts, and existing waste and spent fuel inventories. Chapters 

4 and 5 then describe the underlying rationale for expeditious 

action to establish geologic disposal and consolidated 

storage capacity for SNF and high-level waste (HLW) in the 

United States. The next three chapters (chapters 6 through 

8) describe the key institutional and policy changes that we 

are recommending in pursuit of those objectives, including 

changes in the approach to siting new facilities, the need for 

new institutional leadership of the nation’s waste management 

program, and the need for fundamental reforms to the way the 

waste program is being financed. Chapters 9 and 10 discuss 

transportation and regulatory issues. Chapters 11 and 12 take 

up the subjects of advanced reactor and fuel cycle technologies 

and international issues, respectively. The last chapter discusses 

next steps for Congress and the Administration to implement 

the new strategy the Commission is recommending.

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2. FOUNDATIONS F

A NEW RATEGY

ur charter directs the Commission to focus its

attention on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Based on the information we gathered and the input

we heard, we are optimistic that a new strategy can (1)

better meet the challenge of managing nuclear waste

and providing for its long-term disposition in a way that

meets this generation’s ethical obligations to current and

future generations; (2) help address the safety, weapons

proliferation, and security concerns that could otherwise

accompany the international spread of nuclear technology;

and (3) allow future generations to rely on nuclear power

if they so choose. Implementing the strategy we propose

will not be quick or easy, but we believe it is doable. This

chapter describes the important program features, policy

objectives, and guiding principles that we believe will be

central to success.

Our charter also recognizes that the nuclear power

industry is not the only source of spent fuel2

 and HLW in

need of management and disposal; indeed, it gives equal

attention to the need to consider alternatives for disposing

of wastes from the nation’s defense programs. The first HLW

and spent fuel were produced more than 60 years ago as part

of the U.S. defense program and a large quantity of these

materials is now being stored at U.S. Department of Energy

(DOE) sites with the expectation that they will be sent to a

repository for disposal. While the activities that generated

most of those materials ceased decades ago, the nuclearpowered vessels of the U.S. Navy continue to be a small

but important source of spent fuel. Safe disposal of these

materials is a national obligation that will exist regardless of

the future use of civilian nuclear power.

2.1 Elements of

uccessful Strategy

Effectively managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle

requires a vision and a strategy. Both have been lacking in

the U.S. waste management program to date. The vision

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must be stable, comprehensive, clear, and compelling. The 

strategy must combine durability with flexibility so that it 

can endure over the years and decades needed for policies 

and programs to unfold while being continually responsive 

to new experience and information and changes in values 

and circumstances, such as the future use of nuclear power. 

Multiple views and interests will need to be balanced and 

decision-making processes will need to be designed so as to 

not only facilitate, but actually benefit from the participation 

of a wide range of stakeholders. 

A comprehensive strategy must be attentive to the 

scientific, technical, political, and societal dimensions of 

nuclear fuel cycle choices and it must account for impacts 

and risks from “cradle to grave” (i.e., from the mining of 

uranium ore to the disposal of wastes). It must accommodate 

a range of perspectives and interests and advance broadly 

held policy goals with respect to safety, security, the 

environment, economics, non-proliferation, equity, and 

public and political acceptance. Importantly, it must 

respect the sovereignty, aspirations, and realities of other 

nations while preserving America’s own options and her 

interest in retaining a position of international leadership in 

technology and global efforts to promote safety, security, and 

environmental protection. Finally, the U.S. nuclear waste 

management program must consistently honor promises and 

commitments in order to regain the trust and confidence of 

important constituencies.

Obviously the full ramifications of recent events in Japan 

have yet to be felt but they warrant a thorough reexamination 

of the safety performance and other operational features, 

both of the current fleet of nuclear plants and of new designs 

that are being constructed or proposed. Indeed, Fukushima 

will prompt re-assessments, not only of reactor design and 

performance, but of different management strategies for 

storing, transporting, and ultimately disposing of spent fuel. 

Prudence would dictate that the United States continue to 

insist on rigorous efforts by the industry and its regulators 

to improve the existing fleet, while also promoting the 

development of new plant designs that demonstrably improve 

safety, security, economics, and performance. Agencies with 

regulatory oversight authority will likewise be scrutinized 

for demonstrating independence from short-term political 

considerations and an unwavering focus on safety and security.

2.2 Core Interests and

Objectives for U.S. Waste 

Management Policy

Success in the complex, controversial, and long-term endeavor 

of implementing a sound strategy for the management and 

disposition of SNF and high-level radioactive waste will 

require careful and continuous attention to a number of core 

interests and objectives. These are not interests or objectives to 

be traded off in a zero sum sense. Rather they are synergistic 

interests that can all be served through an approach that 

consistently strives to meet high standards of organization, 

implementation, governance, and leadership.

2.2.1 Public and Occupational 

Health and Safety

The first objective in all decision-making regarding nuclear 

materials or activities must be to protect public health and 

safety and to protect the health and safety of the nuclear 

workforce. This must also be the U.S. government’s priority 

when engaging the international nuclear community. It 

will not be possible to gain public trust at home or exercise 

leadership internationally if the U.S. program is seen as 

trading off or compromising public health and safety 

for other objectives. A commitment to continual safety 

improvement is essential to further reduce existing risks and 

to address new ones as they arise.

2.2.2 Environmental Protection

Understanding and awareness of environmental issues 

generally—and of the environmental impacts of different 

energy technologies in particular—has only grown over the 

more than 60-year history of the nuclear power industry. Since 

some materials generated by the back end of the nuclear fuel 

cycle will be radioactive over many millennia, they must be 

properly isolated from the biosphere to avoid posing a longterm hazard to other living organisms and ecosystems, as well 

as to human populations. The Commission’s view and that of 

many experts is that these risks can be managed, but the nature 

and longevity of the environmental hazard clearly demand 

an extra measure of care, rigorous planning, and continued 

vigilance. Environmental concerns and trade-offs must also 

be viewed in a broader context. All energy supply options 

have significant advantages and disadvantages. Nuclear power 

today provides two-thirds of the nation’s low-carbon electricity 

production. If this generation or future generations see an 

imperative to meet rising energy demand while substantially 

reducing carbon dioxide emissions, continued access to nuclear 

power as an established low-carbon energy option may have 

significant environmental, as well as economic and social, value.

2.2.3 Cost-Effectiveness

The purpose of civilian nuclear energy systems is to provide 

safe, reliable, and affordable energy. The nation’s strategy 

for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle must 

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

be consistent with that purpose. It must also reflect a 

recognition that the money to implement waste storage, 

transport, and disposal solutions will ultimately come from 

U.S. citizens—primarily from nuclear utility ratepayers in 

the case of commercial spent fuel and from U.S. taxpayers in 

the case of defense wastes. The federal government therefore 

has an obligation to ensure that all funds being collected 

from ratepayers (or appropriated from the federal budget 

in the case of defense wastes) are being used wisely and 

efficiently to achieve the nuclear waste program’s objectives. 

2.2.4 Non-Proliferation and

National Security

The growth and (more importantly) the diffusion of nuclear 

energy technology and expertise require careful attention 

to weapons proliferation and security considerations. 

While the vast majority of conventional (predominantly 

light-water) nuclear power plants in operation worldwide 

and the fresh low-enriched uranium fuel they use do not 

present significant proliferation concerns, the uranium 

enrichment facilities used to produce this fuel and the 

spent fuel that results do pose such risks. Enrichment and 

reprocessing facilities, in particular, have the potential to be 

misused to develop materials for nuclear weapons. Spent 

fuel contains plutonium which, if separated, could be used 

to make weapons. The United States has an important stake 

in ensuring that strong international norms emerge for 

safety, physical security, and non-proliferation. U.S. policies 

for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle must 

support these goals and must strengthen key elements of 

the international non-proliferation and security regimes, 

including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 

the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) in this 

domain. The U.S. nuclear industry also has an important 

role to play in meeting nonproliferation goals—indeed, this 

role is recognized in principles of conduct that were recently 

announced by nuclear power plant exporters.3

2.3 Core Values and Principles 

for a Successful Waste 

Management Program

2.3.1 Ethical Responsibility

Ethical considerations have been at the heart of many of the 

comments and presentations the Commission has heard. 

From this standpoint, the case for developing disposal 

capacity for the high-level radioactive wastes that have 

accumulated over decades of weapons program activity 

and commercial nuclear power production is clear: the 

generations who created these wastes and benefited from the 

activities that produced them have an obligation to ensure 

that the entire burden of providing for their disposal does not 

fall to future generations.4

 That means mustering, without 

further delay, the financial, programmatic, institutional, 

and political wherewithal to implement a functional system 

to manage these materials that provides for their safe 

transportation, consolidated storage, and disposal. While the 

process should not be rushed, the capability to provide for 

disposal must exist and the process of emplacing long-lived 

radioactive wastes, including particularly those materials with 

no realistic possibility of being re-used, must be underway 

within a reasonable timeframe.

Finally, this generation’s responsibility to future 

generations includes taking care not to foreclose options that 

future generations may see as being in their best interest. 

In this context, with the benefit of advances in technology, 

future generations may want to use spent fuel as an energy 

resource. A well-constructed waste management program, 

with the flexibility we recommend, can do both—provide a 

solution and leave choices.

2.3.2 Fairness

The ethical argument made in the foregoing section is 

grounded in the principle of intergenerational equity. But it 

will also be critical to provide a demonstrably fair process to 

those who are immediately engaged in and affected by the 

waste management program. The program must be—and 

must be viewed as being—both fair and inclusive. 

This is a significant challenge. Different and sometimes 

competing interests are at play. Communities with current 

and accumulating inventories of waste may see issues of 

fairness quite differently than communities being considered 

as potential host sites for storage or repository facilities. 

Communities near existing DOE sites where spent fuel and 

HLW are being stored and utilities that have entered into 

legal commitments with the federal government concerning 

the timing of spent fuel acceptance and disposition may 

have been promised actions that cannot be delivered. While 

there will be different perspectives, future decisions must 

be reached in a way that makes these fairness and equity 

considerations explicit. 

2.3.3 Transparency

Transparency is an important feature and one that deserves 

careful attention in designing a successful program. The 

aim should be openness and inclusiveness with respect to 

program plans and decisions, the handling of input from 

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

affected parties, and the application of different mechanisms 

for demonstrating accountability. 

Useful guidance for achieving transparency in practice 

can be found in an “Open Government Directive” developed 

by the Office of Management and Budget in late 2009.5

According to the directive: “Transparent decisions are 

decisions in which the decision maker clearly presents 

to others the normative and factual premises behind the 

conclusions and explains the reasoning leading from these 

premises to the conclusion. Transparency thus involves 

uncovering, describing, documenting and communicating 

all the argumentative steps in the line of reasoning. It also 

involves acknowledging the weighting of any evidence drawn 

upon in reaching the final decision. It is recommended 

that each decision should be accompanied by an audit trail 

describing the premises justifying it. Uncertainties should 

be presented in connection with each possible adverse 

effect to indicate alternative scenarios to the most likely risk 

characterization together with an evaluation of the reliability 

of each of the alternative scenarios.” 

2.3.4 Values

U.S. programs and policies for managing the back end of 

the fuel cycle must continually be informed by and reflect 

the values of those directly affected by the program and 

the values of the broader citizenry. These priorities and 

values will change with time, making it essential to design 

an adaptable and flexible program. In a context where 

conditions, interests, perceptions, and values are constantly 

shifting and where different parties hold different views 

and values, perfect consensus and solutions that satisfy all 

constituencies will be rare. In most cases, decision-makers 

will need to balance competing interests, make trade-offs 

in the face of uncertainty, and be willing to move forward 

without full consensus. In these cases, stakeholders and the 

public are entitled to a clear understanding of how decisions 

were reached and how different values and interests were 

considered and resolved in the process.

2.3.5 Informed Participation

In a democracy, informed participation is at the heart of 

durable solutions to significant policy challenges. Managing 

the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle is a technically 

complex, institutionally demanding, and inherently longterm task. This task is made both more challenging and 

more important by the fact that many Americans view 

the risks associated with radiation and nuclear energy as 

fundamentally different in nature from other kinds of risks. 

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

Radiation, in particular, has a number of properties that tend 

to heighten people’s fear of being exposed to it: radiation is 

invisible, it can be penetrating, its long-term health effects 

(which can include cancer and birth defects) can be severe 

but may not be immediately detectable, and some materials 

that are radioactive can remain so for extremely long periods 

of time. Broad public support for a new strategy will depend 

on some shared understanding of the nature and extent of 

the problem, available options for resolving the problem, 

and the consequences and risks associated with different 

actions—including the consequences and risks of further 

inaction. The job of better communicating information and 

effectively engaging different constituencies must be seen as 

one of the core missions of a revitalized waste management 

program. Likewise, the commitment of technical and 

financial support to enable informed participation by a wide 

range of stakeholders in key decision-making processes must 

be viewed as an appropriate and indeed necessary use of 

resources for successful program implementation. This point 

features prominently in the chapters that follow because we 

believe it is central to our recommendations.

2.3.6 Governance and Leadership

The key insight that permeates this report is that the best hope 

for greater success lies not in changing the objectives of the 

waste management program, but in changing the approach 

taken to reach those objectives. Central to this approach is 

establishing the institutional leadership and a governance 

framework matched to the challenges at hand. Both must 

endure over the very long timeframes involved in managing 

and planning for the disposition of nuclear materials. As 

discussed in more detail later in this report, the Commission 

has heard and considered many options and has concluded that 

the situation calls for a new waste management organization 

with a clear mission and the independent authority and access 

to resources needed to carry out that mission. At the same time, 

we recognize that no institutional change or policy reform 

can substitute for outstanding, inspired leadership—both at 

the level of the new organization itself and within Congress 

and the Administration. Whatever new strategy is adopted, it 

must encourage such leaders and give them ample opportunity 

to succeed, while also holding key policy-makers, oversight 

agencies, and the new organization accountable for results.

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We begin with a review of the nuclear fuel cycle and 

a brief history of nuclear waste management policy 

in the United States.

This chapter aims to provide basic context for the discussion 

and recommendations found in later chapters.

3.1 Overview of the Nuclear

Fuel Cycle

The nuclear fuel cycle is the series of industrial processes used 

to produce electricity from uranium in a nuclear reactor. 

The nuclear fuel cycle can be described as having three 

major parts (see figure 1): the “front end” where uranium is 

mined and processed into fuel for use in a nuclear reactor; 

the use of that fuel in a reactor; and the “back end” where 

the spent fuel is first stored and ultimately sent for disposal 

or reprocessing (if the spent fuel is reprocessed, remaining 

wastes would still require disposal). 

• Uranium enrichment – The nuclear fuel cycle begins 

with the extraction of uranium from ores or other natural 

sources. Uranium provides the basic fissile material or 

“fuel” for nearly all nuclear reactors. Extracted uranium 

consists almost entirely of two isotopes or types of uranium 

atoms,6

 mostly uranium-238 (99.3 percent) together with 

a much smaller fraction (0.7 percent) of the fissionable 

isotope uranium-235 or “U-235.” In its natural state, 

mined uranium is only weakly radioactive—meaning 

that it can be handled without the need for radiation 

shielding. Before it can be used in a commercial reactor, 

natural uranium must be purified and enriched to boost 

the amount of fissionable U-235 present in the fuel. Most 

of the commercial nuclear power plants in operation today 

are light-water reactors that require fuel enriched to a 

U-235 concentration of anywhere from 3 to 5 percent7

—a 

typical figure for fuel used in commercial U.S. reactors 

is 4 percent. Techniques for enriching uranium are well 

developed, with the most prominent methods involving 

gaseous diffusion or centrifuge technology.

3. TECHNICAL AND HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

• Use as reactor fuel – Enriched uranium oxide is cast

into hard pellets and stacked inside long metal tubes or

“cladding” to form fuel rods (figure 2). The fuel rods

are bundled into fuel assemblies (each assembly is about

12 to 14 feet long). The core of a typical light-water

commercial nuclear power reactor in the United States

contains anywhere from 200 to 500 fuel assemblies,

totaling approximately 100 metric tons of uranium

oxide. Inside the reactor, the enriched uranium sustains

a series of controlled nuclear reactions that collectively

liberate substantial quantities of energy. The energy

is converted to steam and used to drive turbines that

generate electricity. Meanwhile, the fission process

inside the reactor creates new elements or “fission

products,” and gives rise to some heavier elements,

collectively known as “transuranics,” which may take

part in further reactions (among the most important is

plutonium-239).

• Wet (pool) storage – Nuclear fuel will remain in a

commercial power reactor for about four to six years,

after which it can no longer efficiently produce energy

and is considered used or spent. The spent fuel that has

been removed from a reactor is thermally hot and emits

a great deal of radiation; upon removal from the reactor,

each spent fuel assembly emits enough to deliver a fatal

Figure 2. Fuel Assembly

Source: http://www.nrc.gov/images/reading-rm/photo-gallery/

20071114-045.jpg

NUCLEAR

REACTOR FUEL

FABRICATION

BACK END

OF CYCLE

FRONT END

OF CYCLE

ENRICHMENT

CONVERSION

MILLING

MINING

PLUTONIUM

URANIUM

INTERIM STORAGE

SPENT FUEL

REPROCESSING

FINAL DISPOSITION

Figure 1. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

radiation dose in minutes to someone in the immediate

vicinity who is not adequately shielded. To keep the fuel

cool and to protect workers from the radiation, the spent

fuel is transferred to a deep, water-filled pool where it is

placed in a metal rack. Typically, spent fuel is kept in the

pool for at least five years, although spent fuel at many

U.S. reactor sites has been in pool storage for several

decades (figure 3). Approximately 50,000 metric tons of

commercial spent fuel are currently stored in pools in the

United States.

• Dry (cask) storage – After the fuel has cooled sufficiently

in wet storage, it may be transferred to dry storage. Dry

storage systems take many forms but generally consist of

a fuel storage grid placed within a steel inner container

and a concrete and steel outer container (figure 4). The

amount of commercial spent fuel stored in dry casks in

the United States totals about 15,000 metric tons.

• Transportation – Because of the residual hazard it poses,

spent fuel must be shipped in containers or casks (figure

5) that shield and contain the radioactivity and dissipate

the heat. In the United States, spent fuel has typically

been transported via truck or rail; other nations also use

ships for spent fuel transport.8

• Reprocessing or recycling – Even after commercial fuel

is considered “spent,” it still contains unused uranium

along with other re-usable elements (primarily plutonium

which is generated within the fuel while it is in the

reactor) and fission products (elements produced by the

fissioning of uranium and plutonium in the reactor core).

Current reprocessing technologies separate the spent

fuel into three components: uranium; plutonium (or a

plutonium-uranium mix); and waste, which contains

fission products and so-called transuranic elements that

are produced within the fuel. The plutonium is mixed

with uranium and fabricated into new fuel while the

fission products and other waste elements are packaged

into a new form for disposal (the uranium can also be

re-used to make new fuel but because recovered uranium

is more difficult to use than freshly mined uranium, this

has only been done to a limited extent). Coupled with

new reactor types, future reprocessing technologies could,

if they can be successfully developed and deployed, allow

for a greater fraction of the material in spent fuel to be

recovered and re-used.

• Disposal – Regardless of whether spent fuel is reprocessed

or directly disposed of, every foreseeable approach to the

nuclear fuel cycle still requires a means of disposal that

assures the very long-term isolation of radioactive wastes

from the environment.9

 Many nations, including those

engaged in reprocessing, are working to develop disposal

facilities for spent fuel and/or HLW, but no such facility

has yet been put into operation. Every nation that is

developing disposal capacity plans to use a deep, mined

geologic repository for this purpose. Other disposal

options (e.g., deep boreholes) have been considered and

may hold promise in the long-term but are at a much

earlier stage of development.

Figure 3.  Wet Pool Storage 

Figure 3. Wet Pool Storage

BUNDLE OF

USED FUEL

ASSEMBLIES

CANISTER

STORAGE

CASK

Figure 4. Dry Storage System

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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

3.2 The Nature and ongevity

of Hazard Posed y Different

Types of uclear ste

Spent nuclear fuel and HLW are hazardous if not properly

managed and controlled, primarily as a result of the radiation

emitted by the radioactive decay of unstable elements in

the fuel. Spent fuel emits high levels of radiation and thus

requires shielding to be handled safely. In wet storage,

shielding is provided by a large volume of water in a storage

pool. In dry storage configurations, shielding is primarily

provided by thick layers of steel and concrete.

The other major hazard from spent fuel arises if its

radioactive constituents (see figure 6) are mobilized into air

or water. There is no risk of this occurring as long as fuel

assemblies are intact: the fuel is encased in metal tubes or

cladding; the tubes in turn are configured in bundles that are

designed to withstand four to six years of exposure to very

high temperatures and high levels of radiation in a reactor

core. But during the initial period after fuel is removed from

a reactor core, the rapid decay of short-lived fission products

generates sufficient heat that overheating has the potential

to damage the fuel cladding and release radioactive material

if sufficient cooling is not provided. Over the very long time

periods associated with geologic disposal, by contrast, the

concern is that gradual corrosion processes or disruptive

events (such as seismic or volcanic activity) may allow for

radioactive material to be mobilized in ground water and

migrate out of an engineered disposal facility.

High-level radioactive wastes arise from the chemical

reprocessing of spent fuel. Modern reprocessing facilities

convert waste streams into solid glass, ceramic, cement, or

metal waste forms that are typically contained in stainless

steel canisters (like SNF). Like spent fuel, HLW emits

high levels of radiation and thus requires similar shielding

and handling methods. Likewise, the concern from a

disposal standpoint centers on the possibility that corrosion

processes or disruptive events may, over a very long period

of time, mobilize radioactive material into groundwater.

Spent fuel and HLW may also contain materials that are

chemically hazardous; uranium is an example. While these

chemical hazards may have to be considered in developing

some regulations and undertaking safety analyses, they are

generally small compared to the radiation hazards associated

with high-level nuclear wastes.

Exposure to radioactive materials—whether natural

or man-made—can be damaging because many forms

of radiation have the ability to change the structure of

molecules, including the structure of molecules found in

the tissues of living organisms. Human beings are exposed

continuously to very low levels of naturally-occurring and

man-made radiation (see text box and figure 7). In most

IMPACT

LIMITER NEUTRON

SHIELDING SHELL

NEUTRON

SHIELDING

CLOSURE LID

BASKET

OUTER

STEEL SHELL

LEAD GAMMA

SHIELDING

INNER

STEEL SHELL

Figure 5. Shipping Container or ent Fuel

Generic Rail Cask

for Spent Fuel

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In a 2009 report, the National Council on Radiation

Protection estimated that the average American is exposed

to 6.2 millisieverts of natural and man-made radiation

each year. About half of this exposure comes from natural

sources (primarily radon gas, a decay product of U-238),

while the other half comes from man-made sources (almost

entirely from CT scans and other medical procedures that

involve nuclear materials).

Reprinted with permission of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, http://NCRPpublications.org.

Typical Radiation Exposures for the American Population

MINOR

ACTINIDES 0.1%

PLUTONIUM 0.9%

URANIUM

95.6%

STABLE FISSION

PRODUCTS 2.9%

OTHER

OTHER LONG-LIVED

FISSION PRODUCTS 0.1%

LONG-LIVED IODINE

AND TECHNETIUM 0.1%

CESIUM AND

STRONTIUM 0.3%

Figure 6. Composition of spent nuclear uel

after 10 years of ooling10

SPACE

INTERNAL (BACKGROUND) 5%

(BACKGROUND) 5%

RADON & THORON

(BACKGROUND) 37%

TERRESTRIAL

(BACKGROUND) 3%

COMPUTED TOMOGRAPHY

(MEDICAL) 24%

NUCLEAR MEDICINE

(MEDICAL) 12%

INTERVENTIONAL FLUOROSCOPY

(MEDICAL) 7%

CONVENTIONAL RADIOGRAPHY/

FLUOROSCOPY (MEDICAL) 5%

CONSUMER 2%

INDUSTRIAL <0.1%

OCCUPATIONAL <0.1%

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

cases the body responds to that exposure11 by repairing or 

replacing damaged molecules at the cellular level. In other 

cases, however, the harm that can result from radiation 

exposure can be very serious. The exposed individual could 

develop cancer, for example, or suffer genetic effects (i.e., 

mutations in the reproductive cells that could be damaging 

to offspring). Extremely high doses of radiation can cause 

burns or acute radiation damage, which can lead to death in 

a relatively short period of time (hours to weeks). 

For these and other reasons – including the legacy of 

nuclear weapons use, testing, and high-profile accidents 

at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and, now, Fukushima, 

many people have an understandable fear of radiation and 

of radioactive materials. Compounding this fear is the fact 

that radiation cannot be detected by any human senses and 

effects, if any, often show up long after exposure occurred. 

These concerns, combined with an oft-stated lack of 

confidence in government’s ability to protect the public from 

radiation hazards, play a large role in making it difficult to 

site facilities that handle nuclear materials.12

The materials associated with the back end of the 

nuclear fuel cycle (including both spent fuel and HLW), 

if not managed properly, can deliver much higher levels 

of radiation than humans are normally exposed to from 

natural background, medical procedures, and the like. Safe 

management is required to ensure that these materials don’t 

deliver elevated radiation doses to humans and other organisms. 

Some categories of nuclear waste (generally including 

all HLW and virtually all spent fuel) remain radioactive for 

thousands of years because of the long half-lives13 of some 

of the radioisotopes they contain. The radioactive decay of a 

typical spent fuel assembly over time is shown in figure 8. 

It is worth mentioning, however, that (1) radiation levels 

in HLW and spent fuel drop considerably over time and (2) 

very long-lived isotopes also tend to pose less of an external 

radiation hazard. By comparison the most dangerous isotopes 

tend to be those that decay more quickly (the more rapid the 

decay, the higher the initial level of radioactivity). 

3.3 Scale of the Waste 

Management Challenge in 

the United States

3.3.1 Current Inventory of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel Being Managed by 

the U.S. Commercial Nuclear

Power Industry

There are 104 commercial nuclear power reactors 

operating in the United States today; together they supply 

approximately 20 percent of the nation’s electricity needs. 

Given that each reactor uses about 20 metric tons of uranium 

fuel per year, the industry as a whole generates 2,000 to 

2,400 metric tons of spent fuel on an annual basis (1 metric 

ton equals about 2,200 pounds).14 At present, nearly all of 

the nation’s existing inventory of SNF is being stored at the 

reactor sites where it was generated—about three-quarters of 

it in shielded concrete pools and the remainder in dry casks 

above ground. The quantity of commercially-generated spent 

reactor fuel currently being stored in this manner totals close 

to 65,000 metric tons—roughly speaking, it would cover 

one football field to a depth of approximately 20 feet. This 

inventory includes approximately 3,000 metric tons of spent 

fuel in storage at nine sites where commercial reactors have 

been shut down and are no longer operating.

Figure 9 shows the location of operating commercial 

nuclear power reactors in the United States today, along with 

years of operation for each facility. 

How much spent fuel will be added to the existing 

inventory in the future, and at what rate, depends on a 

number of factors. Market conditions, climate policy, 

government support, the evolution of reactor technology, 

and nuclear-related regulatory and policy developments 

will all influence the nuclear power industry’s prospects 

going forward and will play a role in determining what 

type and quantity of nuclear waste is produced in the 

future. At present, some uncertainty surrounds all of these 

factors. Under a no-growth scenario that assumes continued 

operation of existing reactors to the end of their current 

licenses only, and no further expansion of the industry, the 

total inventory of spent fuel that will have accumulated 

by 2050 can be expected to remain below 150,000 metric 

tons. Under a high-growth scenario that assumes substantial 

numbers of new reactors coming on line in the next few 

decades, the nation’s accumulated spent fuel inventory 

would be predicted to substantially exceed 200,000 metric 

tons by mid-century. Even if all commercial reactors in the 

United States were shut down tomorrow, about 75,000 

metric tons—equal to the current spent fuel inventory plus 

the fuel currently in commercial reactor cores —would 

require disposal.

These figures illustrate the uncertainty inherent 

in making predictions about the future. Obviously 

changing any of the input assumptions—including not 

only assumptions about future nuclear-based electricity 

production, but also assumptions about future reactor 

technology and fuel cycle characteristics—would produce 

very different results. 

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

.1

.4

1

5

10

40

70

100

250

1

1.5

2.0

3.0

10

36

50

100

1

10

100

30

5

500

Eating a banana

Natural radiation in the human body

Using a cathode ray tube monitor for a year

Dental x-ray

Background dose received by an average person on

an average day

Flight from New York to Los Angeles

Living in a stone, brick or concrete building for a year

Chest x-ray

Release limit for a nuclear power plant for a year

EPA yearly limit on radiation exposure to a member

of the public

Spinal x-ray

Natural background radiation a human body is exposed

to per year

Mammogram

Average CT scan

Smoking 1.5 pack of cigarettes a day for a year

Maximum annual dose permitted for US radiation workers

Annual dose at which increased lifetime risk of cancer

is evident

Non-fatal radiation sickness (nausea, low blood cell count, etc.)

Fatal dose

Immediate severe vomiting and coma, death within hours

Death inevitable within 2-3 weeks

Generally leads to death within a period of a few months

or less

Short-term decrease in blood cell count, generally with a

return to normal in a few days

0.1 microsievert (μSv)

1.0 μSv

100 μSv

1,000 μSv (= 1 millisivert, or 1 mSv)

10 mSv

100 mSv

1 Sv (= 1,000 mSv)

10 Sv

100 Sv

Figure 7. Comparison of Radiation Doses

Source: BRC staff using information from various sources15

Note: Risk depends on both the total dose and how quickly it was received.

Rem is an older term for radiation exposure, now replaced by the sievert, with 1 Sv = 100 rem.

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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

3.3.2 Current Inventory of ent

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level

Waste Being naged y DOE

In addition to the spent fuel currently being stored at

commercial nuclear power plant sites around the country,

there are substantial quantities of spent fuel and HLW at a

number of government-owned facilities managed by DOE.

Most but not all of this material derives from national

defense nuclear activities and is therefore often referred

to as “defense waste.” It is important to be clear, however,

that these materials were produced and have always been

managed by DOE and its predecessor agencies, which had

responsibility for nuclear weapons production—not by the

Department of Defense.

DOE’s spent fuel was mainly produced at Hanford,

the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and the Savannah

River Site and most of it is still being stored there. Smaller

quantities of spent fuel have also been or are being produced

at other facilities, including at Oak Ridge National

Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and at various

university and commercial research reactors, but after a short

period of storage this spent fuel is transferred to one of two

sites—INL or the Savannah River Site.

The current inventory of DOE-managed spent fuel

represents a relatively small fraction of the nation’s total

spent-fuel inventory: approximately 2,500

metric tons. In general, DOE has not

taken commercial spent fuel for storage

at its facilities except in special cases. For

example, the damaged reactor core from the

1979 Three Mile Island (TMI) accident was

moved to INL for study; in addition, DOE

has assumed responsibility for spent fuel in

a graphite matrix from the unique, gascooled Fort Saint Vrain reactor in Colorado

(some of that spent fuel has been shipped to

INL for storage, while the rest is currently

being stored on site) as well as damaged

fuel removed from the TMI Unit 2 reactor.

The federal inventory also includes a small

quantity of spent fuel from nuclear reactors

that power the nation’s submarines and

other U.S. Navy ships. Spent naval reactor

fuel is shipped to INL for evaluation and

subsequent storage.

Figure 10 shows the quantity and

location of SNF at DOE sites. Both wet and

dry methods of storage are in use by DOE,

although at the Hanford site in Washington

State—where by far the largest portion of DOE’s current

SNF inventory is being stored—all spent fuel has been

moved to dry storage.

In addition, DOE accepts relatively small quantities of

spent fuel under the Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) and

Domestic Research Reactor (DRR) programs. The DRR

program accepts spent fuel from U.S. universities and

other government research reactors.16 The FRR program

was established to support U.S. nuclear security and

non-proliferation goals. It accepts spent fuel from research

reactors in other countries that operated on highly enriched

uranium (HEU), which poses particular concerns because

it could potentially be used without further enrichment in

nuclear explosive devices. So far, more than 9,000 spent fuel

assemblies (about 6 metric tons) have been accepted from 29

countries under the FRR program, which is currently slated

to run until 2019. Until recently, DOE had been processing

much of this HEU fuel through the H Canyon facility at

its Savannah River Site, where the HEU was recovered and

blended down for use as fuel in Tennessee Valley Authority

nuclear power reactors.

Along with SNF, DOE’s HLW inventory includes some

90 million gallons of HLW liquids, sludges and solids from

past fuel reprocessing operations for weapons production.

Most of this waste is being stored at DOE’s Hanford,

Figure 8. Radioactive Decay of ypical

Spent Fuel

100

10

1

0.1

0.001

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Dose rate (Sv/hr)

Time (Years)

PWR 50 GWd/tHM

PWR 33 GWd/tHM

Source: Adapted from International Panel on Fissile Materials, Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel

from Nuclear Power Reactors: Experience and Lessons from Around the World, edited by

Harold Feiveson, Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana and Frank von Hippel, September 2011.

10292_BlueRibbon_TEXT_X.indd 16 1/17/1
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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

INL, and Savannah River sites—for the most part in large

underground tanks made of stainless or carbon steel. More

recently, DOE has begun converting most of its inventory

of liquid HLW into glass forms suitable for on-site storage

in canisters. In addition, DOE manages a small quantity

of HLW from the short-lived operation of a commercial

reprocessing facility at West Valley, New York in the late

1960s and early 1970s. This waste is now stored dry in

the chemical process cell of the main plant and is slated for

dry cask storage pending the availability of a repository.

Figure 11 shows the geographic distribution of DOE’s

HLW inventory.

Figure 9. Operating nd utdown Commercial

Nuclear Power Reactors in the United tates

Years of Commercial

Operation

Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

0-9

10-19

20-29

30-39

shutdown

0

10

42

52

11

Number of

Reactors

WA

OR

ID

WY

MT ND

NE

KS CO

UT

NV

CA

AZ

AK

HI

NM

TX

OK

AR

MO

IA

MN

WI

IL

MI

IN

KY

TN

MS

LA

AL GA SC

NC

VA

FL

WV

PA

OH

NY

VT

NH ME

MA

RI

CT

NJ

DE

MD

Figure 10. U.S. DOE ent Nuclear Fuel Inventory in 2010

SAVANNAH RIVER

~30 MTHM

Defense: ~10 MTHM

Non-Defense: ~19 MTHM

OTHER DOMESTIC SITES

~2 MTHM

Defense: <1 MTHM

Non-Defense: ~2 MTHM

IDAHO

~300 MTHM

Defense: ~59 MTHM

Non-Defense: ~246 MTHM

HANFORD

~2,130 MTHM

Defense: ~2,102 MTHM

Non-Defense: ~27 MTHM

FORT ST VRAIN, CO

Non-Defense: ~15 MTHM

TOTAL

~2,480 MTHM

Defense: ~2,172 MTHM

Non-Defense: ~309 MTHM

~3,500 DOE Canisters

MTHM =

Metric Tons Heavy Metal

Source: BRC staff using information from DOE and other sources.

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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

To address state concerns about the indefinite storage of

spent fuel and HLW at existing federal facilities, DOE has

entered into agreements with Idaho and Colorado to remove

all spent fuel and other HLW by 2035. Failure to meet this

deadline will trigger monetary penalties and restrictions

on further shipments of waste material into these states,

including the shipment of Navy spent fuel into Idaho (see

further discussion of Navy spent fuel in section 3.3.3 below).

Finally, DOE has statutory responsibility for disposing

of greater than Class C (GTCC) low-level radioactive

waste. This category of waste includes activated metals from

decommissioned power plants, some sealed sources, and nondefense-related transuranic (TRU) waste. The current volume

of GTCC waste totals approximately 1,100 cubic meters;

future decommissioning of existing nuclear power plants is

expected to generate an additional 4,200 cubic meters. GTCC

waste may require deep geologic disposal. A path for the

ultimate disposal of this class of waste has yet to be identified,

although DOE has developed a draft environmental impact

statement that evaluates GTCC disposal alternatives and is

working toward a final environmental impact statement and

record of decision.17 The alternatives being considered include

disposal in a deep geologic repository and disposal in boreholes

at depths up to 1,000 ft.

3.3.3 Navy Spent Fuel

The federal inventory currently includes a relatively small

quantity of spent fuel—approximately 27 metric tons—from

naval reactors that power the nation’s fleet of 83 nuclearpowered submarines and aircraft carriers. The inventory

of naval SNF is growing slowly, at a rate of 1 to 2 metric

tons per year, due to the continued operation and necessary

re-fueling of reactors on these ships. The Navy’s current

projection is that a total of 65 metric tons will be generated

by 2035, all of which would be destined for disposal in a

repository (the Navy does not consider reprocessing as an

option for its SNF).18

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP),

an integrated program carried out jointly by the Navy

and DOE, manages spent naval reactor fuel, which for

many years has been shipped to INL for technical studies

and storage pending final disposal. Current practice is

to transport the Navy’s SNF from the shipyards where

refueling occurs by rail, in specially-designed casks, to the

Naval Reactors Facility (NRF) on the INL. At NRF, the

spent fuel is placed in a water pool similar to those used for

commercial and other DOE spent fuel, examined to confirm

that its actual condition is consistent with expectations, and

evaluated for other technical studies (e.g., to improve the

efficiency of future nuclear fuel). After an appropriate cooling

period, the SNF is transferred to specifically-designed multipurpose canisters suitable for dry storage at INL as well as

subsequent transportation and disposal; the naval SNF will,

under current plans, never be removed from these canisters.19

At present, the Navy has about 50 loaded canisters in dry

storage at INL; by 2035, it estimates there will be just over

Figure 11. High-Level Waste Inventory in 2010

SAVANNAH RIVER

~2,900 Canisters (2010)

~6,300 Canisters

 (Total Projected)

IDAHO

~3,590-5,090 Canisters

 (Projected)

WEST VALLEY

275 Canisters (2010)

HANFORD

~9,700 Canisters

 (Projected)

TOTAL

~3,175 Canisters (2010)

~19,865-21,365 Canisters

 (Total Projected)

Canisters =

HLW Canisters for Disposal

Source: BRC staff using information from DOE and other sources.

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

350 canisters ready for disposal. For perspective, the Yucca 

Mountain license application allocated space for 400 

canisters of naval SNF in the total of 11,000 canisters it was 

designed to hold.

In 1995, DOE and the Navy entered into a formal 

agreement with the State of Idaho (known as the Batt 

Agreement). Among numerous other provisions, the Batt 

Agreement covers the storage, treatment, and disposal of 

DOE and Navy SNF stored at INL.20 It allows limited 

quantities of naval SNF to continue to be shipped to INL 

(at an average rate of about 20 casks per year). It also sets 

two deadlines: first, that all SNF then at INL be placed in 

dry storage by December 31, 2023 and second, that spent 

fuel be removed from Idaho by January 1, 2035. If this 

last milestone is not met, the Navy will face a significant 

financial penalty of $60,000 for each day the waste remains 

in Idaho after January 1, 2035.21 (A 2008 addendum to 

the Agreement modified its terms to allow for continued 

management and technical evaluation of a modest inprocess inventory of naval SNF at NRF beyond 2035.) The 

Agreement also allows the State of Idaho to stop further 

shipments of Navy fuel to INL at any time if any key parts 

of the Agreement are not upheld. In a recent review of how 

the suspension of work on Yucca Mountain could impact 

SNF storage at DOE sites, the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) reported22 that the Navy’s “greater concern” 

was not the financial penalties in the Idaho agreement if the 

2035 deadline is not met, but instead the possibility that 

Idaho would bar further Navy shipments of SNF to the 

state. This would dramatically affect the Navy’s ability to 

refuel its nuclear fleet. 

The Batt Agreement also requires that naval SNF be 

included “among the early shipments to a permanent 

geologic repository or interim storage site.” However, 

at the BRC’s September 13, 2011 meeting in Denver, a 

representative of the State of Idaho stated that “It may not 

make sense to send DOE spent nuclear fuel to interim 

storage as most of that waste is already in dry storage and 

some of it (Navy fuel) is ready for final disposal.”23 The BRC 

Transportation and Storage Subcommittee reached a similar 

but more general conclusion, stating in its draft report that 

“[t]here appear to be no technical or safety-related reasons 

to move defense high-level waste and spent fuel from 

temporary storage at the DOE sites where these materials 

are now located, before final disposal capacity becomes 

available.” The Commission concurs with these conclusions. 

Furthermore, in comments on the draft BRC report,24

the Navy has stated that the focus should be on disposing 

of naval SNF in a geologic repository when one becomes 

available. The Navy’s comments point out that “naval SNF 

as a waste form is well suited for geologic disposal” and that 

“the NNPP has invested significant resources in a packaging 

and transportation infrastructure based on geologic disposal.” 

That said, it is important to stress that under current law, 

DOE (not the Navy) is responsible for final disposal of this 

federally-owned spent fuel. 

The importance of providing a path forward for the 

disposition of Navy spent fuel is yet another reason why the 

Commission recommends that the United States promptly 

resume a program leading to the development of one or more 

deep geologic repositories. 

3.4 History of Nuclear Waste 

Management Policy in the 

United States

Spent fuel and HLW have been produced in the United 

States since the 1940s, first as a byproduct of nuclear weapons 

research and production and later also as a byproduct of the 

civilian nuclear power industry. The record of past efforts to 

manage and dispose of these materials is long and complicated, 

so the overview presented here is necessarily condensed. A 

more complete history of nuclear waste policy in the United 

States is available from many sources (links to some of these 

sources are available at www.brc.gov).

3.4.1 Early U.S. Policy on Nuclear

Waste Management (1940s–1982)

In the 1940s, during the early days of nuclear weapons 

development in the United States, national security 

considerations took precedence over concerns about the 

safe disposal of nuclear waste. With the emphasis on rapid 

production of plutonium for use in weapons, storage in 

large, underground steel tanks was deemed adequate as an 

interim means of isolating the highly radioactive liquid 

waste that remained after acid was used to dissolve irradiated 

nuclear fuel as part of the plutonium separation process. 

Even at the time, however, the underground tanks were not 

considered a long-term solution; in a 1949 report the Atomic 

Energy Commission (AEC)25 emphasized that “better means 

of isolating, concentrating, immobilizing, and controlling 

wastes will ultimately be required.”

In 1957, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)26

issued a report (titled The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on 

Land 27) that looked specifically at the question of nuclear 

waste disposal. That report reached several conclusions, 

among them that “radioactive waste can be disposed of 

safely in a variety of ways and at a large number of sites in 

the United States” and that geologic disposal in salt deposits 

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

represents “the most promising method of disposal.” The 

NAS further concluded that solidification of liquid waste 

for transport and disposal would be “advantageous” and that 

transportation issues would need to be considered in the 

location of waste disposal facilities.

Prompted by these recommendations, the AEC began 

investigating mined geologic disposal options and potential 

salt bed repository sites in the late 1950s. Its early efforts 

included experiments with solids and liquids in salt mines 

and exploratory work on methods for solidifying liquid 

wastes. In June 1970, the AEC announced plans to investigate 

an abandoned salt mine in Lyons, Kansas as a potential 

demonstration site for the disposal of HLW and low-level 

waste (LLW). At the time, the AEC anticipated that the Lyons 

site could begin accepting LLW as early as 1974 and HLW by 

1975. By 1971, however, state opposition to the project was 

growing and in 1972, after a number of technical problems 

had emerged that called into question the geological integrity 

of the Lyons site, the AEC announced that it would seek 

alternative sites and also pursue the development of long-term 

surface storage facilities for the waste. 

During the same time period (i.e., in the early 1970s), 

the AEC—at the invitation of the local community—began 

exploring an area of deep salt beds near Carlsbad, New 

Mexico as a potential repository site for high-level radioactive 

waste. Disposal at the site, which became known as the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant or WIPP, was subsequently 

limited to defense-related TRU waste. Congress authorized 

WIPP to begin receiving waste as early as 1979 but it took 

until 1999, 20 years later, before the first shipments began 

arriving at the facility (see text box). 

The search for a suitable site for long-term geologic 

disposal of spent fuel and HLW continued throughout 

the 1970s, first under the AEC and later under its 

successor agency, the Energy Research and Development 

Administration (ERDA).28 Among the sites considered 

during this period were bedded salt formations in Michigan, 

Texas, and Utah; salt domes in Louisiana and Mississippi; 

basalt formations at Hanford; and welded volcanic tuff at 

Yucca Mountain in Nevada. Meanwhile, the focus of future 

waste management efforts had begun to shift as a result of 

policy changes prompted by weapons proliferation concerns.

Responding to these concerns, President Ford in 

1976 issued a presidential directive deferring commercial 

reprocessing and recycling of plutonium in the United 

States. In 1977, President Carter extended this deferral 

indefinitely and directed the relevant federal agencies to 

focus on alternative fuel cycles and re-assess future spent 

fuel storage needs. The Carter policy was later reversed by 

President Reagan but for a variety of reasons, including cost, 

commercial reprocessing was never resumed. 

Recognizing that the commitment to an open fuel cycle 

with no spent fuel reprocessing would have an impact on 

the quantity and type of waste produced by the commercial 

nuclear power industry in the future, a DOE-led Interagency 

Review Group in 1979 recommended that a number of 

potential repository sites for spent fuel and HLW be identified 

in different geologic environments and in different parts 

of the country. Specifically, the Interagency Review Group 

recommended “several repositories sited on a regional basis 

insofar as technical considerations permit.” The Group saw 

multiple regional repositories as a way to respond to several 

concerns, including: (1) accommodating uncertainties inherent 

in future nuclear waste inventory projections; (2) reducing 

system-wide transportation requirements; (3) promoting 

regional equity in the siting of high-level radioactive waste 

facilities; and (4) providing “redundancy that would hedge 

against the possibility of operational difficulties causing 

unexpected repository shutdown.” At the same time, the 

Interagency Review Group was aware that with a regional 

approach “there is a risk that organizational and political 

commitments might develop to particular regions or locations 

to such an extent that less than full attention would be given 

to safety, environmental and security considerations.” For this 

reason the Group urged DOE to “be certain that technical 

adequacy is a prerequisite for site selection” and to “provide 

adequate assurance to the public in this regard.”

3.4.2 U.S. Policy under the Nuclear

Waste Policy Act (1982–present)

Passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) in 1982 

marked the beginning of a new chapter in U.S. efforts to deal 

with the nuclear waste issue. The legislation was the product of 

four years of Congressional debate marked, on the one hand, 

by growing concern about an imminent shortage of spent-fuel 

storage pool capacity at operating reactors and, on the other 

hand, by an equally urgent concern on the part of individual 

states that they not be selected to host a repository site. 

Recognizing the need for a Congressional mandate 

to overcome opposition to the selection of any given site, 

Congress sought through the NWPA to establish a fair 

and technically sound process for selecting repository 

locations. In fact, to avoid the perception that any one state 

or locale would be asked to bear the entire burden of the 

nation’s nuclear waste management obligations, the Act 

provided for the selection of two repository sites (though 

not stipulated in the legislation itself, it was widely assumed 

that one of these sites would be located in the West, the 

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WIPP is the world’s only operating deep 

geological repository for long-lived nuclear waste. 

It is located in an ancient 2000-foot deep salt 

bed, 26 miles southeast of Carlsbad in Eddy 

County, New Mexico. WIPP is a DOE facility 

and accepts only defense TRU waste—that is, 

nuclear waste from past weapons programs 

that is not considered high-level waste, but 

that contains long-lived radioactive transuranic 

elements such as plutonium.

The Atomic Energy Commission first began 

looking at salt beds in southeastern New Mexico 

for the disposal of defense wastes in the early 

1970s. The current WIPP site was selected for 

exploratory work in 1974 after local officials 

expressed interest in being considered; five years 

later Congress authorized an R&D facility at the site. By this 

time, tensions had begun to emerge between the federal 

government and New Mexico, which was concerned about 

the inclusion of high-level waste and commercial spent 

nuclear fuel in some of the early plans for WIPP. Authorizing 

legislation adopted by Congress in 1979 stipulated that 

WIPP could not be used for the permanent disposal of 

spent fuel and high-level waste but it also heightened 

tensions by denying the state veto power and removing 

the project from the licensing authority of the NRC. Two 

years later, when DOE attempted to move forward with 

construction, New Mexico filed suit against both DOE and 

the U.S. Department of the Interior (which had jurisdiction 

over the land at the site). 

That suit was eventually settled out of court, but over the 

next decade difficulties arose in a number of areas, from 

problems with the design of transport casks to concerns 

about funding for road improvements, controversies over 

health and environmental standards, and plans for an 

early test phase during which waste could be stored at 

the facility without meeting final disposal standards. In 

1987, DOE began withdrawing land around WIPP from 

general use and announced that the facility would open 

in 1988. This proved unrealistic, as efforts to complete 

the land withdrawal failed over the next few years. In 

1991, the state again filed suit—this time to prevent the 

transfer of land from public uses to use for a WIPP testing 

phase. In response, the courts issued an injunction against 

proceeding with the facility according to DOE’s plans. 

Progress on WIPP resumed when Congress passed the 

Land Withdrawal Act in 1992. This legislation required EPA 

(not DOE) to certify that WIPP met applicable standards 

and gave the state authority to regulate mixed waste at 

WIPP under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

(RCRA), including issuing a hazardous waste permit for 

the facility. Other provisions prohibited high-level waste at 

WIPP, even for experiments; provided additional funding 

for highways and emergency preparedness; and directed 

DOE to prepare plans for retrievability and eventual 

decommissioning. DOE later announced that it would move 

radioactive waste experiments out of WIPP and into the 

national laboratories.

In 1998, EPA certified that WIPP met all applicable federal 

regulations for the disposal of TRU waste. Soon after, 

the 1992 court injunction was lifted and in 1999 WIPP 

received its first shipment of waste. As of mid-November 

2011, WIPP had received 10,181 shipments for a total 

waste volume of approximate 68,200 cubic meters. DOE 

currently estimates that work to begin closing WIPP could 

commence as early as 2030. In contrast to the years of 

controversy and delay that surrounded the development 

of the facility, WIPP now enjoys considerable support at 

the state and local level.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

other in the East). And to further ensure that the end 

result would not be a single, national repository, Congress 

included provisions explicitly limiting the capacity of 

the first repository to 70,000 metric tons until a second 

repository was opened. 

Beyond establishing a process for the selection of two 

permanent geologic spent fuel and HLW repositories, the 

NWPA included a number of other provisions:

1. Established a new Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management (OCRWM) within DOE, with a director 

appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

2. Authorized DOE to enter into contracts with utilities for 

federal removal of spent fuel from reactor sites beginning 

by 1998 in return for a fee on utilities’ sales of nucleargenerated electricity. 

3. Directed DOE propose a site and design for “monitored 

retrievable storage” of nuclear waste prior to its being 

shipped to a disposal site.

4. Provided for federal storage of civilian spent fuel/HLW 

on an interim basis in cases of need. 

5. Granted states certain rights with respect to oversight 

over waste storage or disposal sites within their borders 

and the ability to veto DOE siting decisions, subject to 

override by both houses of Congress.

6. Gave the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

responsibility for licensing the construction and 

operation of waste facilities, subject to public health 

and environmental standards established by the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

In May 1986, Energy Secretary John Herrington 

recommended the Hanford site in Washington State, Deaf 

Smith County in Texas, and Nevada’s Yucca Mountain for 

detailed site characterization as leading candidates for the 

nation’s first permanent high-level geologic waste repository. 

By that time, however, DOE’s efforts to identify promising 

sites—not only for the two permanent repositories but also 

for a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facility—were 

drawing strong opposition from the elected officials of all 

potentially affected states. (As an aside, we note that while 

the federal government’s performance on nuclear waste 

management has left a lot to be desired, state opposition has 

played a significant role in the federal government’s failures. 

As we discuss at length in later chapters, it is clear that the 

cooperation of affected state governments will be vital to the 

success of the nuclear waste program going forward.) 

Citing rising costs and lower projections for nuclear waste 

production in the future, Secretary Herrington announced 

that DOE was suspending efforts to identify and develop a 

second permanent geologic repository. This announcement 

also came in May 1986—not surprisingly, it served to 

intensify the opposition of the three states that had been 

selected as potential hosts for the first repository. 

Faced with a deteriorating political situation29 and 

growing recognition that the NWPA’s original timelines and 

cost assumptions were unrealistic, Congress revisited the 

issue of nuclear waste management in 1987. The resulting 

NWPA Amendments Act of 1987 halted then ongoing 

research in crystalline rock of the type found in the Midwest 

and along the Atlantic coast, cancelled the second repository 

program, nullified the selection of Oak Ridge, Tennessee as 

a potential MRS site, and designated Yucca Mountain as the 

sole site to be considered for a permanent geologic repository. 

The decision was widely viewed as political and it provoked 

strong opposition in Nevada, where the 1987 legislation 

came to be known as the “Screw Nevada” bill. 

To address concerns about the technical integrity of 

DOE’s assessments, Congress established a new federal 

agency—the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 

(NWTRB)—for the sole purpose of providing independent 

scientific and technical oversight of DOE’s waste 

management and disposal program. Congress also tried a 

new approach to overcoming state and local opposition: 

under the 1987 amendments, states could receive up to 

$20 million per year for hosting a repository and up to $10 

million per year for hosting an MRS site. The amendments 

also created the Office of the United States Nuclear 

Waste Negotiator with a presidentially appointed head 

authorized to reach agreements with states or Indian tribes 

to host nuclear waste facilities under any “reasonable and 

appropriate terms.”

At the time, a negotiated, voluntary agreement seemed 

the best hope for siting a MRS facility that would enable 

DOE to meet its obligation to begin accepting waste 

from commercial reactors by 1998.30 The hope was that a 

voluntary process that offered economic incentives might 

succeed where other siting efforts had failed.

This hope proved short-lived. The Office of the Nuclear 

Waste Negotiator closed in 1995, after just a few years 

in operation; the first head of the agency had not been 

appointed by President George H.W. Bush until 1990. And 

neither he nor his successor (who was appointed by President 

Clinton in 1993) succeeded in reaching an agreement despite 

reaching out to hundreds of potential host communities 

and Indian tribes and identifying a number of potentially 

promising candidate sites. 

At one point in 1992, seven communities (including five 

Indian tribes) had formally notified the government of their 

interest in being considered.31 Each of these communities 

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was entitled to receive $100,000 in DOE grants, while those 

that agreed to participate in a second phase of study could 

potentially have been eligible for several million dollars in 

grants. In no case, however, was a host state supportive of 

having the process go forward. 

3.4.3 Experience with the Yucca

Mountain Repository Program

Following the dictates of the 1987 NWPA Amendments, 

DOE continued detailed site characterization studies at 

Yucca Mountain through the 1990s and issued a formal 

finding on the suitability of the site in 2002—four years 

past the 1998 deadline by which the federal government 

was obliged to begin accepting commercial nuclear waste 

for disposal under the NWPA. The President’s subsequent 

recommendation of the site to Congress prompted Nevada, 

which had remained staunchly opposed to the project 

throughout, to file an official “Notice of Disapproval.” A 

Congressional resolution to override the state’s veto, however, 

was signed by the President, clearing the way for DOE to 

apply to the NRC for a license to commence construction. 

The latter step was supposed to follow fairly quickly (within 

90 days), but due to litigation over the repository safety 

standards, persistent funding shortfalls, and other problems it 

took another six years before the application for construction 

authorization was filed with the NRC. 

In the end, DOE succeeded in completing the world’s 

first license application for a HLW repository. Submitted 

to the NRC in June 2008, the license application was 

deemed suitable for review three months later. Within a 

year, however, the new Administration declared its intent to 

suspend further work on Yucca Mountain and later moved 

to withdraw the application for a construction license to the 

NRC. At this point, with key decisions by the courts and 

the NRC still pending, the future of the Yucca Mountain 

project remains uncertain.

Several attributes of the nation’s approach to nuclear 

waste management generally, and to the selection and 

characterization of the Yucca Mountain site in particular, 

are widely viewed as having contributed to the long delays 

and significant difficulties encountered in implementing the 

NWPA Amendments. First, DOE’s termination of the siting 

process for the second repository, combined with Congress’s 

subsequent action to short-circuit the site selection process 

established under the original NWPA and single out Yucca 

Mountain as the sole site for consideration, created a 

widespread perception that the repository location was being 

determined on the basis of primarily political, rather than 

technical and scientific, considerations.32 Second, neither the 

original site selection process established by the Act nor the 

subsequent legislative designation of Yucca Mountain as the 

sole site for consideration could be viewed as consent-based 

since the State of Nevada was not asked for, and did not 

provide, consent for the site to be selected for investigation. 

On the contrary, the state and a majority of its citizens 

strongly opposed the selection of Yucca Mountain as a 

potential repository site, although the project did have some 

support from local constituencies. (In comments submitted 

to the Blue Ribbon Commission during the course of its 

deliberations, several counties in Nevada—including Nye, 

Mineral, and Lincoln counties—have expressed support 

for the Yucca Mountain project or for at least allowing the 

license approval process for Yucca Mountain to go forward.) 

A third issue, and one that pre-dated the decision to focus 

only on Yucca Mountain, was the practice of setting unrealistic 

and rigid deadlines. As DOE failed time and again to meet 

various deadlines, confidence in the federal government’s 

competence to manage either the Yucca Mountain project 

or its broader obligations concerning the management of 

civilian and defense nuclear waste eroded among all parties 

involved. Key stakeholders, including not only citizens of the 

communities where these materials were being stored, but also 

nuclear utilities and their customers, who continued to pay 

into the Nuclear Waste Fund even as the repository program 

fell further and further behind, became increasingly frustrated. 

All the while, the federal government was also exposing itself 

(and U.S. taxpayers) to liability and large financial damages 

arising from its failure to comply with its obligations under the 

Act and DOE contracts with utilities (discussed in section 3.6) 

in a timely manner. 

Another fundamental flaw of the repository development 

process established under the 1982 Act, and one that carried 

over to Yucca Mountain after it was designated, was its 

relative inflexibility and prescriptiveness. This made it difficult 

to adapt or respond to new developments, whether in the 

form of new scientific information, technological advances, 

or (just as important) the expressed concerns of potentially 

affected publics and their representatives. The 1987 NWPA 

Amendments made no provision for an alternative path 

forward if Yucca Mountain proved untenable. This lack of 

adaptability further undermined confidence in the analysis 

and planning conducted by DOE and other federal agencies, 

making it easy to view these efforts as mere paper exercises, 

rigged to justify a preordained conclusion. Similarly, by 

directing EPA to develop safety standards specific to the Yucca 

Mountain site in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress 

undermined confidence that those standards represented an 

independent scientific judgment about what was necessary to 

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

protect human health and the environment.

These attributes of the Yucca Mountain siting process 

led to a serious erosion of trust, especially among the 

people of the state of Nevada. The recent decision by the 

Administration to attempt to withdraw the Yucca Mountain 

license application has further diminished confidence in the 

government’s ability to provide a safe and timely solution for 

the disposal of spent fuel and HLW. This is not a comment on 

the merits of the Administration’s decision; the Commission 

was not asked to examine that issue and offers no opinion. 

However, it is clear to the Commission that waste cleanup 

commitments were made to states and communities across 

the United States, and to the nuclear utility industry and its 

ratepayers and shareholders, that have not been upheld. The 

decision to suspend work on the repository has left all of 

these parties wondering, not for the first time, if the federal 

government will ever deliver on its promises.

3.5 Utility Initiatives

Following the federal government’s abandonment of efforts to 

site an MRS facility through the Office of the Nuclear Waste 

Negotiator, a group of eight nuclear utilities formed a private 

consortium, called Private Fuel Storage, LLC (or PFS), with the 

objective of finding a community willing to host such a facility. 

In 1996, PFS signed an agreement with the leadership of the 

Skull Valley Goshute Indian Tribe to open an MRS facility 

on the Tribe’s reservation in Utah. Details about the amount 

of compensation being offered have not been disclosed, but 

reportedly include millions of dollars in promised payments. 

The effort has generated controversy within the Tribe, however, 

and is strongly opposed by the state of Utah and a majority of 

Utah citizens, according to media reports.33

PFS subsequently applied for and received a license to 

construct the proposed facility from the NRC. In a comment 

letter from the Governor of Utah on the BRC draft report, 

one of the many reasons cited for state-level opposition to the 

PFS project was that the BRC-recommended “consent-based, 

transparent and standards- and science-based approach 

to nuclear waste management...was totally lacking in the 

NRC proceeding to license a private SNF storage facility.”34

The PFS project was later halted when the Department of 

the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs did not approve the 

Tribe’s lease of land for the storage facility (citing the risk 

that it would become a permanent repository by default) and 

the Bureau of Land Management denied needed railroad 

rights of way over federal land. These decisions were recently 

found by a federal court to be arbitrary and capricious and 

were remanded for reconsideration, leaving the future of the 

facility, according to a recent (2010) article that appeared in 

the Environmental Law and Policy Review, “uncertain.”35

3.6 Current Waste Acceptance 

Commitments and Litigation

The NWPA established the Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) 

and authorized DOE to enter into Standard Contracts 

with commercial reactor licensees. During the 1980s, 

DOE entered into 76 such contracts. Under the Standard 

Contract, DOE agreed to take title to spent fuel or HLW 

and, in return for a payment of fees to the NWF, dispose 

of the materials beginning not later than January 31, 1998 

(the fee amount was initially set at 1 mill or one-tenth of 

one cent per kilowatt-hour; it is reviewed annually to ensure 

that it is adequate to cover program costs and has never been 

changed). The NWPA also stipulated that the NRC may 

not issue or renew a commercial reactor license without a 

Standard Contract in place. In 2008, DOE amended the 

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Standard Contract for new reactors. Under the amended 

Standard Contract, DOE is not required to accept spent fuel 

until 20 years after the expiration of the reactor’s operating 

license and any extensions thereto. 

Despite the NWPA mandate to begin accepting spent 

fuel and HLW for delivery to and disposal at a permanent 

repository no later than January 31, 1998, no permanent 

repository has yet been licensed by the NRC. This has led 

numerous utilities to file suit to recover damages associated 

with the government’s failure to meet the 1998 waste 

acceptance deadline. The status of this litigation and of 

associated taxpayer liabilities, which are already running into 

the billions of dollars, is discussed in greater detail in section 

8.5 of this report.

3.7 Linkages between the BackEnd of the Fuel Cycle and the 

Future of Nuclear Power

All forms of energy production have impacts; in many cases, 

these impacts include generating wastes or by-products. The 

spent fuel from nuclear power reactors gets (and deserves) 

special attention because of the hazard it poses and because 

it contains certain elements (primarily plutonium) that can 

be extracted and re-used either for power production or in 

nuclear weapons.

For these reasons, the successful management of SNF 

has long been viewed as necessary if nuclear power is going 

to remain a viable energy option. As discussed earlier, 

the assumption in the early days of the industry was that 

uranium was scarce and that the back end of the nuclear fuel 

cycle should be managed in a way that provided plutonium 

and other elements to power future nuclear reactors. Several 

nations continue to extract plutonium (and uranium) from 

spent fuel for planned or ongoing re-use, but as uranium 

has been found to be more naturally abundant than first 

expected,36 many nations are now primarily focused on 

developing options for the near-term safe storage of HLW 

and spent fuel and for the long-term isolation of these 

materials from people and the environment.

The United States may someday find it advantageous to 

extract useful elements from spent fuel for re-use (later chapters 

of this report discuss the value of research, development, and 

demonstration (RD&D) to ensure that future generations have 

a wide range of nuclear fuel cycle options to choose from). In 

the nearer term, laws in several states that put a moratorium on 

new nuclear plant construction until certain waste management 

conditions have been met, together with the NRC’s Waste 

Confidence rulemaking, which was first initiated in October 

1979, create the most direct linkage between progress on 

nuclear waste disposal and the future prospects of the domestic 

nuclear power industry.

3.7.1 State Moratoria

Efforts to establish a formal legal link between the use of 

nuclear power and solutions for the back end of the nuclear 

fuel cycle began in California in the mid-1970s when it 

became clear that the prospects for successfully completing 

either reprocessing capacity or a waste disposal system were 

increasingly dim.37 At that time, the California legislature 

adopted a law that allows the state to grant permits for new 

nuclear power plants only if the California Energy Resources 

Conservation and Development Commission can make 

a finding that the federal government has identified and 

approved a demonstrated technology for the disposal of 

spent fuel/high-level nuclear waste. The California law was 

challenged on grounds that federal law preempts state statutes 

concerning nuclear power, but it was upheld by the Supreme 

Court, which found that California had acted on the basis of 

an economic rather than a nuclear regulatory rationale.

Subsequently, eight other states—Connecticut, Illinois, 

Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, West Virginia, and 

Wisconsin—adopted statutes that tied approval of new 

reactors to (at a minimum) progress on the issue of waste 

disposal.38 Recent years have seen efforts to repeal those laws 

in some states, although none have succeeded so far.

3.7.2 NRC Waste Confidence 

Proceeding

The NRC’s Waste Confidence proceeding grew out of an 

NRC statement that, as a matter of policy, it ‘‘would not 

continue to license reactors if it did not have reasonable 

confidence that the wastes can and will in due course be 

disposed of safely.”39 While the Waste Confidence Rule is 

narrowly applied so that waste management and disposal 

issues don’t have to be re-litigated every time the NRC 

reviews a license application, the NRC itself has indicated 

that this proceeding has broader policy implications. 

The NRC’s first waste confidence decision was issued in 

1984. In it, the NRC found reasonable assurance that safe 

disposal of HLW and spent fuel in a geologic repository 

is technically feasible, and that repository capacity would 

become available in the 2007–2009 timeframe.40 The NRC 

also found that HLW and spent fuel will be safely managed 

until repository capacity is available, that spent fuel generated 

in any reactor can be stored safely and without significant 

environmental impacts for extended periods, and that spent 

fuel storage will be available as needed. 

In its initial waste confidence rulemaking, the NRC 

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said it would revisit the issue periodically. Five years later, 

the NRC took another look and basically reaffirmed and 

expanded the original finding. Specifically, the NRC made 

clear that its confidence in the environmental soundness 

of on-site storage extended for at least 30 years beyond 

the licensed lifespan of operating reactors, including lifeextensions that might occur from license renewals. At the 

same time, the NRC clarified its thinking about repository 

timing to say that there was reasonable assurance one or 

more repositories would be made available within the first 

quarter of the 21st century.

In 1999, the NRC reviewed the matter again and found 

that experience and developments in the interim confirmed 

the confidence it had earlier expressed. The Commission 

said it would look at the issue again after the ongoing 

repository process had run its course, or if “significant” and 

“unexpected” events occurred that warranted a reassessment.

In 2007, the nuclear industry called on the NRC to 

reaffirm its waste confidence decision, citing concern that 

uncertainties about waste management were affecting 

investment decisions about new nuclear power plants.41

In 2010 the NRC issued revisions to the agency’s waste 

confidence findings and regulations. The revisions expressed 

the NRC’s confidence that: (1) the nation’s SNF can be 

safely stored for at least 60 years beyond the licensed life of 

any reactor and (2) that sufficient repository capacity will be 

available when necessary (though on this occasion the NRC 

did not specify an anticipated timeframe).42 The NRC also 

made clear, however, that by revising its earlier waste confidence 

findings it did not intend to signal that it was endorsing the 

indefinite storage of spent fuel at reactor sites.

On February 17, 2011, the Natural Resources Defense 

Council filed a petition for review with the United States 

Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit challenging the NRC’s 

most recent waste confidence rule. The states of New Jersey, 

New York, Vermont and Connecticut have also challenged 

the rule.

3.7.3 Impact of Waste Management 

Uncertainty on Nuclear Plant 

Investment Decisions

Beyond the formal linkages discussed in the preceding 

sections, there is a broader question about the impact of 

current uncertainty about waste management on decision 

making about new nuclear plants in the United States. As 

already noted, the NRC’s most recent waste confidence 

position was prompted by industry concerns, including 

specifically concerns related to uncertainty about the 

licensing process for Yucca Mountain (at the time, DOE 

had not yet submitted the license application). The decision 

to attempt to withdraw the license application appears 

to have heightened these concerns. A witness at a recent 

Congressional hearing on the subject argued that the current 

“complete lack of direction on nuclear waste management 

and...dereliction of responsibility on the part of the federal 

government...creates substantial government-imposed risk 

on the nuclear industry, which is the primary obstacle to an 

expansion of U.S. nuclear power.”43

3.8 International Context/

Comparison

In the course of its deliberations, the Commission sent 

delegations to Finland, France, Japan, Russia, Sweden 

and the United Kingdom to learn about these countries’ 

waste management programs. The Commission also heard 

presentations about the nuclear waste management programs 

of Canada and Spain. We found that the experiences of other 

countries, some of which are at or near the stage of licensing 

a deep geologic repository, offer many useful insights for the 

U.S. program. Some of those insights are discussed in chapter 

6 of this report which provides recommendations on a new 

approach to siting. In addition, appendix C summarizes the 

status of other countries’ waste programs drawing primarily 

from information collected by the NWTRB as part of a 2009 

report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy on the status 

of nuclear waste management efforts around the world.44

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This failure has occurred despite decades of efforts and a 

legislative mandate in the form of the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act (NWPA). The conclusion that disposal is needed and 

that deep geologic disposal is the scientifically preferred 

approach has been reached by every expert panel that 

has looked at the issue and by every other country that is 

pursuing a nuclear waste management program. Moreover, 

all spent fuel reprocess or recycle options generate waste 

streams that require a permanent disposal solution. 

Lack of disposal capability is not only at the heart of the 

U.S. government’s inability to honor its waste management 

obligations to date, it is—especially after Fukushima—a 

source of renewed concern to the general public, a growing 

liability to taxpayers, and a burden to nuclear utilities, their 

ratepayers,45 and the nuclear energy industry’s prospects 

going forward. One of our central recommendations, 

therefore, is that the United States should undertake an 

integrated nuclear waste management program that leads 

to the timely development of one or more permanent deep 

geological facilities for the safe disposal of spent fuel and 

high-level nuclear waste.

This chapter discusses the ethical, technical, and practical 

grounding for that recommendation and elaborates on the 

options available for developing disposal capacity.

4.1 The Rationale for

Developing Disposal Capacity

Spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes46

contain elements that present a potentially significant 

radiation hazard to exposed populations and ecosystems. 

These hazards diminish over time, often declining 

significantly in the first few hundred years and thereafter 

much more gradually. As detailed in chapter 3 of this report, 

the decay processes for some constituents of spent fuel 

and HLW take hundreds of thousands of years or more. 

Therefore, the central challenge for managing these materials 

4. THE NEED FOR 

GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL

The central flaw of the U.S. nuclear waste management 

program to date has been its failure to develop 

permanent disposal capability.

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

is to store and finally dispose of them in a 

way that provides adequate protection of 

the public and the environment over very 

long periods of time.

The need for a disposal solution 

is quite clear in the case of nuclear 

materials with a low probability of reuse—a category that includes defense 

and commercial reprocessing wastes 

and many forms of spent fuel currently 

in government hands. From a practical 

standpoint, the Commission believes it 

is also very likely that disposal will be 

needed to safely manage at least some 

portion of the existing commercial SNF 

inventory. This is because there is no costeffective way using existing technology to 

separate the most hazardous and longlived radioactive elements in spent fuel 

and convert them to short-lived or stable isotopes.47 In 

the meantime, the more frequently discussed option is to 

re-cycle and re-use some of the constituents of spent fuel. 

This option involves reprocessing spent fuel to separate and 

remove the still usable constituents for re-use as reactor 

fuel. Options for partially or fully “closing” the nuclear fuel 

cycle are the subject of ongoing research and development 

in the United States and elsewhere and are discussed in 

chapter 11 of this report. The central point is that all spent 

fuel reprocessing or recycle options generate waste streams.

Moreover, some of these waste streams contain sufficient 

amounts of long-lived radioactive elements that the need 

for a long-term disposal solution cannot be eliminated with 

any foreseeable separations technology.48

In concluding that disposal capacity will be needed, 

the Commission is echoing the consensus view, not only 

of numerous former expert panels49 that have looked at 

the situation in the United States but also of all countries 

with significant nuclear waste inventories (including those 

that are currently reprocessing spent nuclear fuel) and of 

major international organizations such as the IAEA and the 

OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).50,51

4.2 The Case for Disposal

The ethical case for developing disposal capacity for spent 

fuel and high-level nuclear wastes from the nation’s past 

weapons programs and civilian nuclear power industry is 

outlined in section 2.3.1 of this report, which highlights 

the obligation to avoid placing an undue burden on future 

generations. From a legal standpoint, the U.S. government’s 

general obligation to provide a timely disposal solution has 

been established for more than three decades. In fact, under 

current law the federal government was obliged to begin 

accepting commercial spent fuel by January 31, 1998.

Apart from commercial spent fuel, the federal government 

is also liable for the eventual disposition of waste from defense 

production facilities. Enforceable commitments to remove 

federally owned waste have been made in cleanup agreements 

with the host states of Washington, South Carolina, Colorado 

and Idaho. Direct disposal of both defense HLW and the West 

Valley HLW at an appropriate site (without interim storage at 

another location) should be pursued, as this material will never 

be further processed or re-used.

Finally, although much of the federally-owned HLW and 

spent fuel was generated to produce materials used in nuclear 

weapons, a smaller inventory of spent fuel exists and is being 

generated by the U.S. Navy’s nuclear fleet. Continued Navy 

operations to examine and store this fuel in Idaho depend 

upon the future availability of disposal capacity at a suitable 

repository site for this fuel.

As we have already noted, the Commission’s central 

conclusion concerning the need for disposal capability is 

consistent with decades of expert opinion and policy consensus 

in the United States and abroad. That the use of nuclear 

technologies—whether for defense purposes or for energy 

production—would necessitate a means for permanently 

disposing of their radioactive by-products has been known 

from the beginning. In short, because these materials exist, the 

ethical, legal, and practical obligation to dispose of them also 

exists. Regardless how one views the nuclear energy industry 

An underground chamber at the WIPP facility.

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or its future prospects, all parties should be able to agree that

there is little to be gained—and potentially a very high price

to be paid—for continued deferral and delay in developing

the capability for disposal. Moreover, only by moving forward

can some of the key questions and uncertainties about a future

disposal path for spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste be

identified and resolved.

4.3 Options for Disposal

While several options for disposing of spent fuel and high-level

nuclear waste have been considered in the United States and

elsewhere, international scientific consensus clearly endorses

the conclusion that deep geological disposal is the most

promising and accepted method currently available for

safely isolating spent fuel and high-level radioactive wastes

from the environment for very long periods of time.

52

In its deliberations, the Commission focused chiefly

on two deep geologic disposal options: disposal in a mined

geological formation and disposal in deep boreholes. The

former has been the front-running disposal strategy in

the United States for more than 50 years; it is also the

approach being taken in other countries with spent fuel

or HLW disposal programs. (An artist’s rendering of the

mined geologic disposal concept is shown in figure 12.)

By contrast, disposal in deep boreholes may hold promise

but this option is less well understood. Further RD&D

is needed to fully assess its potential advantages and

disadvantages and should be performed in parallel with

the development of an updated safety standard (consistent

with the new disposal safety standard the Commission

recommends for mined geologic repositories).

In a mined geologic repository, wastes would be placed

in engineered arrays in conventionally mined cavities deep

beneath the earth’s surface. The waste itself would be contained

in canisters or other packages appropriate to its particular

form, chemical content, and radiation intensity. As developed

and studied around the world, proposals for geologic disposal

also employ the concept of multiple barriers.53 These include

both engineered and geologic barriers that improve confidence

that radioactive constituents will not return to the biosphere

in biologically significant concentrations. Engineered barriers

include the waste form itself, canisters, fillers, overpacking,

sleeves, shaft and tunnel seals, and backfill materials. Each of

these components may be designed to reduce the likelihood

that radioactive material would be released and would be

selected on the basis of site- and waste-specific considerations.

Geologic barriers include the repository host rock and

surrounding rock formations. While engineered barriers would

be tailored to a specific containment need, geologic barriers

would be chosen for their in-situ properties with respect to

both waste containment and isolation.

The basic objective or standard of performance for a

permanent waste repository was articulated by the IAEA in a

2003 report on the scientific and technical basis for geologic

disposal of radioactive wastes: “to provide sufficient isolation,

both from human activity and from dynamic natural

processes, that eventual releases of radionuclides will be in

such low concentrations that they do not pose a hazard to

human health and the natural environment.”54

Decades of research and site investigations in the United

States and elsewhere suggest that a wide variety of rock types

and geologic environments could—in combination with

appropriate repository design—be suitable for achieving this

objective. The rock types that have been considered for a deep

geologic repository have included bedded and domed rock salts,

crystalline rocks (i.e., granite or gneiss), clay, shale, volcanic

tuffs, basalt, and various other types of sedimentary rocks.55

Figure 12. Mined Geologic

Disposal Concept

THE SITE

THE REPOSITORY

THE

SYSTEM

THE

PACKAGE

Host rock formation

(e.g., salt, granite, tuff)

Sleeve

Backfill

Overpack

Container

Waste

Form

Mined geologic disposal will use a system comprised of

engineered barriers (the waste package and the mined

repository) and naturally occuring barriers (the host rock

formation and the chemical and physical properties of

the repository site itself) to provide long-term isolation

of waste from the biosphere.

Department of Energy

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Each of these rock types and their particular 

geologic environments have advantages and 

disadvantages from a strictly technical perspective, 

and different geologic settings and emplacement 

methods may be better for particular types 

of waste. However, many or all of them may 

ultimately be found to demonstrate acceptable 

performance for a wide range of wastes. The 

geologic environment into which waste would be 

emplaced is a related and perhaps more important 

consideration than the type of rock by itself. The 

BRC has benefitted from visits to several facilities 

in different geologic settings in the United States 

and abroad. This exposure contributes to our 

collective observation that deep geologic disposal 

constitutes a vital element of all international 

waste management programs. It also reinforces 

our confidence that many geologic formations 

and sites that would be technically suitable for 

hosting a permanent repository can be found 

within the borders of the United States.56

Deep boreholes represent another form of deep geologic 

disposal that may offer benefits, particularly for the disposal 

of certain forms of waste. As we have already noted, however, 

this concept is less well understood than disposal in a mined 

repository and requires further exploration.57 Basically, a 

deep borehole is a cased hole on the order of 45 centimeters 

(approximately 20 inches) in diameter drilled into crystalline 

basement rock to a depth of 4 to 5 kilometers (2.5 to 3 

miles). In most designs, the bottom 1 to 3 kilometers would 

be filled with either vitrified HLW or spent fuel and some 

backfill or sealant would be added to fill in the gaps between 

the wastes and the well casing. Figure 13 illustrates the deep 

borehole disposal concept. 

A number of possible advantages have been cited that 

support further efforts to investigate the deep borehole 

option. These include the potential to achieve (compared 

to mined geologic repositories) reduced mobility of 

radionuclides and greater isolation of waste, greater tolerance 

for waste heat generation, modularity and flexibility in terms 

of expanding disposal capacity, and compatibility with a 

larger number and variety of possible sites. On the other 

hand, deep boreholes may also have some disadvantages 

in terms of the difficulty and cost of retrieving waste (if 

retrievability is desired) after a borehole is sealed, relatively 

high costs per volume of waste capacity, and constraints on 

the form or packaging of the waste to be emplaced.

Overall, the Commission recommends further RD&D 

to help resolve some of the current uncertainties about deep 

borehole disposal and to allow for a more comprehensive 

(and conclusive) evaluation of the potential practicality 

of licensing and deploying this approach, particularly 

as a disposal alternative for certain forms of waste that 

have essentially no potential for re-use. Likewise, EPA 

and NRC should begin work on a regulatory framework 

for borehole disposal, in parallel with their development 

of a site-independent safety standard for mined geologic 

repositories, to support the RD&D effort leading to licensed 

demonstration of the borehole concept.59

4.4 Retrievability and

Reversibility

The concepts of retrievability and reversibility have long been 

part of the discussion about how best to safely dispose of 

highly radioactive materials. While no standardized definition 

exists for either term, reversibility means the more generic 

ability to reconsider and reverse course at any time during 

the development and implementation of a geologic disposal 

program. By contrast, retrievability refers more specifically to the 

ability to retrieve waste after it has been placed underground in a 

geologic disposal facility.60,61 This could be considered a desirable 

or necessary feature of facility design for two main reasons: 

(1) so that it remains possible to monitor the nuclear waste to 

confirm the behavior of the repository and remove the waste if 

necessary and (2) to preserve the option of retrieving spent fuel 

for future reprocessing and recycling if that proves warranted.

The Commission considers retrievability and reversibility 

as closely related but distinct issues. Our view is that existing 

A number of alternative disposal concepts or alternative types of sites 

for geologic disposal have been advanced over the years. For example, 

disposal on or beneath unoccupied islands has been considered in the 

context of options for siting an international repository or monitored storage 

facility.58 Another option, sub-seabed disposal in stable clay sediments, 

was investigated in the 1970s and 1980s and was thought by a number 

of experts to hold potential advantages over land-based disposal. Other 

disposal concepts that have been proposed, at least for some forms of 

waste, include disposal by in situ melting (this was suggested in the 

1970s as a way to dispose of liquid wastes from reprocessing, perhaps by 

using already contaminated underground nuclear test cavities) or space 

disposal—that is, shooting nuclear wastes into solar orbit or even into the 

sun. For reasons of practicality, public and international acceptance, and/or 

cost these options have generally not received as much attention as disposal 

in a deep, land-based, mined geologic repository. In sum, based on the 

evidence available to date, the Commission sees no reason to change the 

current focus of the U.S. program on developing mined geologic repositories.

Other Disposal Concepts

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

requirements concerning retrievability at

mined repository sites (at 40 Code of Federal

Regulations [CFR] 191 and 10 CFR 60.111

(b)) are appropriate and should be retained.

These requirements are intended to ensure

that emplaced waste can be removed if the

repository is not behaving as anticipated or

if its performance is called into question for

any reason prior to permanent closure62—

they are not intended for the purpose of

retaining easy access to emplaced materials

for possible later recovery and reuse. Past

evaluations have indicated that a wide

range of candidate mined repository sites in

different geologic media (including granite,

salt and volcanic tuff) could meet these

existing retrievability requirements.

On the other hand, we recognize

that the same level of retrievability may not be practical or

necessary in the context of other disposal approaches, such as

deep boreholes. In that case, related regulatory requirements

and time periods can and should be reassessed as part of a

larger evaluation of disposal system performance objectives.

On the subject of reversibility, the Commission views this

attribute as an important part of what we believe should be a

staged, adaptive approach to waste management and disposal

in the United States more generally. The details of such an

approach are discussed at length in chapter 6 of this report.

For purposes of this discussion, it suffices to note that for a

program to be adaptive there needs to be some capacity to

reverse course, at least for a period of time. Flexibility of this

kind is needed because implementing a disposal program will

take at least several generations, during which technology

and values are sure to evolve—albeit in unpredictable ways.

While there is general consensus that we cannot rely on active

management of nuclear waste disposal facilities over the many

millennia of safety and environmental concern, an adaptive,

staged approach requires this flexibility in the near term,

when it is reasonable to have confidence that the institutional

oversight and management capacity to implement responsible

course corrections will be available.

4.5 Cost of Disposal

The Commission heard many comments regarding the costs of

nuclear waste management generally and the costs of nuclear

waste disposal in particular. While it is impossible to prepare

detailed cost estimates for an integrated U.S. nuclear waste

management system without knowing the specific facilities and

sites that will be used for waste management and many other

pertinent details, some general conclusions about cost can be

reached based on work performed for the Yucca Mountain

project and other information.

A 2008 DOE life-cycle cost estimate64 arrived at a figure

of $96.2 billion (in 2007 dollars) to license, construct,

operate and close a repository at Yucca Mountain of

sufficient size to dispose of a total of 122,000 metric tons

of commercial and defense-origin spent fuel and high-level

waste (note that the legislated capacity of Yucca Mountain is

70,000 metric tons until a second repository is in operation).

The cost share assigned to the 109,000 tons of commerciallygenerated wastes assumed for disposal was about 80 percent

of the $96.2 billion total, or approximately $77 billion.

That same year, DOE produced a detailed report “to

evaluate whether the collection of the [nuclear waste] fee will

provide sufficient revenues to offset the commercial utilities’

share of the total life cycle costs of the Civilian Radioactive

Waste Management Program.”65 The report concluded

that the “the fee is adequate and [DOE] finds no reason to

adjust the fee at this time.” This conclusion echoes past fee

evaluations which, over two-plus decades of the nation’s

nuclear waste management program, concluded that the

current one-tenth of one cent per kilowatt-hour collected

for spent fuel management would be sufficient to pay for

disposal of the nation’s spent commercial reactor fuel.

It is important to stress that judgments about the

adequacy of current fee payments to cover anticipated

disposal costs are separate from the question of whether the

current fee mechanism is working as intended to make fee

payments available to fund the waste management program.

The latter issue is the subject of chapter 8 of this report.

Figure 13. Deep Borehole Disposal Concept63

Mined

MR Repository

Sluggish flow or

diffusion at depth

Lateral hydraulic flow

- 30m in 105

 years

Increasing groundwater

salinity & density

Active near-surface flow

Disposal

zone

0

7

km

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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

5. RAGE AS PART F

AN GRATED WASTE

ANAGEMENT RATEGY

torage is a necessary and important element of a

comprehensive strategy for managing the back end of

the nuclear fuel cycle.

Implemented with a strong emphasis on safety and security

and designed for compatibility with other steps in the fuel

cycle, storage facilities have the potential to increase the

flexibility, resiliency, and robustness of the system as a whole.

Current arrangements for the storage of SNF in the United

States, however, have evolved in an ad hoc fashion. Changes to

the current approach are needed for several reasons: to support

progress toward the development of disposal capability; to

address immediate and growing financial and legal liabilities

stemming from the federal government’s failure to meet its

waste acceptance obligations in a timely manner; and to

improve confidence in the safety and security of current storage

arrangements, including addressing any new concerns that

emerge in the wake of the March 2011 accident at Japan’s

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power facility.

Having investigated a range of issues related to the

storage of spent fuel and HLW, the Commission has two

central recommendations.

First, we recommend that the United States establish

a program that leads to the timely development of one or

more consolidated storage facilities. Access to consolidated

storage capacity, even on a limited basis, would—when

coupled with a viable transportation system—provide

valuable flexibility as part of an integrated nuclear waste

management system. Without this capacity the federal

government will have essentially no physical capability to

accept spent fuel for emergency or any other purposes until a

permanent repository is in operation.

Second, we urge vigorous, ongoing efforts by industry

and by the appropriate regulatory authorities to ensure that

all near-term forms of storage meet high standards of safety

and security for the multi-decade-long time periods that

they are likely to be in use. Based on the evidence and safety

record to date, the Commission sees no unmanageable safety

or security risks with current storage arrangements. That said,

active research, monitoring, and continued responsiveness

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

to new information and lessons learned—including lessons

learned from a more complete understanding of recent events

at Fukushima—are clearly needed to sustain this confidence.

Any realistic assessment of the time it can be expected to take

to site, construct, license and begin operating consolidated

storage and disposal facilities underscores the need for

continued vigilance and attention to safety and security

concerns at existing storage sites.

This chapter elaborates on the above points and on

other recommendations developed by the Commission’s

Transportation and Storage Subcommittee. We begin by

discussing the role of storage as part of a comprehensive

waste management strategy, before developing the rationale

for consolidated storage. Subsequent sections of this chapter

discuss safety and security issues at existing dispersed storage

sites. Further discussion of these subjects can be found in

supporting Commission materials and in the report of the

Commission’s Transportation and Storage Subcommittee

(available at www.brc.gov).

5.1 The Role of torage

Storage in some form, for some period of time, is an

inevitable part of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is simply

because spent fuel, upon being removed from the reactor

core, needs to be allowed to cool before it can be handled

further. In the early days of the nuclear energy industry it

was assumed that storage times

for spent fuel would be relatively

short—on the order of several

years to a decade or two at most

before spent fuel would be sent

either for reprocessing or final

disposal. The current reality,

of course, is much different.

Storage is not only playing a

more prominent and protracted

role in the nuclear fuel cycle

than once expected, it is the

only element of the back end of

the fuel cycle that is currently

being deployed on an operational

scale in the United States. In

fact, much larger quantities of

spent fuel are being stored for

much longer periods of time

than policy-makers envisioned

or utility companies planned for

when most of the current fleet of

reactors were built.

Chapter 3 of this report describes how the current

situation—in which the vast majority of spent fuel is still

being stored at the reactor sites where it was generated—

arose by default as the U.S. government first decided not

to pursue reprocessing and then fell further and further

behind in developing a disposal repository. With DOE

in breach of its contractual waste acceptance obligations,

individual utilities have been left to cope on their own with

the problem of growing spent-fuel inventories. Over the

years, most of them have responded by packing spent fuel

more tightly in cooling pools and, increasingly, by moving

the spent fuel from wet storage to on-site dry cask storage

when available space in the pools is exhausted. At plants that

have implemented this form of storage, canisters containing

spent fuel are typically placed on concrete pads in an open air

enclosure or in horizontal concrete vaults on site where they

are monitored on an ongoing basis. Other storage methods,

such as dry vault storage for fuel from the St. Vrain plant and

wet storage at the GE Morris facility, have also been licensed.

Existing dry storage systems at nuclear facilities are

robust. In the most widely used type of dry storage system,

a canister containing used fuel is placed inside a concrete

structure. The canister typically consists of 1/2 inch to 5/8

inches thick stainless steel; it serves as the primary boundary

to confine radioactive material (see figure 4). Depending

on the cask system design, the canister may be oriented

Figure 14. Dry Cask Storage Facility at the

Decommissioned ine Yankee Reactor ite

Source: http://www.maineyankee.com

10292_BlueRibbon_TEXT_X.indd 33 1/17/1
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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

vertically or horizontally inside a thick reinforced concrete

structure. These reinforced concrete structures, which are

typically 2.5 feet thick for vertical systems and 3 feet thick

for horizontal systems, provide shielding from radiation and

protect the canister. The total weight of current dry storage

systems (canister and concrete structure) is typically between

160 and 180 tons (320,000–360,000 pounds).

After an initial period of cooling in wet storage (generally

at least five years), dry storage (in casks or vaults) is considered

to be the safest and hence preferred option available today

for extended periods of storage (i.e., multiple decades up to

100 years or possibly more). Unlike wet storage systems, dry

systems are cooled by the natural circulation of air and are less

vulnerable to system failures. Nevertheless, it is important to

emphasize that spent fuel pools are essential to operating a

nuclear power plant given the need to be able to cool newly

discharged fuel in a water-filled pool close to the reactor core.

Pools are also advantageous for the transfer of spent fuel into

and out of casks.

In the United States, pools remain the dominant form

of storage for spent fuel at still-operating reactor sites (pools

are currently also used for at-reactor and consolidated

storage in other countries, including France, Russia, and

Sweden). Currently, less than one-fourth of the nation’s

commercial spent fuel stockpile is being stored in dry casks,

although the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

projects this fraction will grow steadily in coming years

and that all operating power reactors will have dry storage

facilities in operation by 2025.66 Figure 15 shows EPRI’s

projection for the expected amount and distribution of

commercial spent fuel in dry versus wet storage over the

next several decades.67

While current storage arrangements have been judged

adequately safe and secure by the relevant regulatory

authorities—in fact, as discussed in chapter 3, the NRC in

2010 updated its “Waste Confidence Decision” to state that

at-reactor or away-from-reactor spent fuel could be stored

safely for up to 60 years after the termination of an operating

reactor’s license (with extensions up to 60 more years)68—it

is clear that today’s institutional arrangements and storage

technologies were not designed for the lengthy storage

timescales that now appear inevitable for at least some

portion of the nation’s spent fuel inventory.

Assuring safe and secure storage of SNF and HLW over

extended periods of time will require continued public and

private efforts—including efforts by the NRC, DOE, and

industry organizations such as EPRI —to conduct rigorous

research and oversight and continuously incorporate lessons

learned from new developments or events. For example, it

will be important to continue exploring fuel degradation

mechanisms in dry storage, particularly since many current

safety assessments are based on an examinations of fuel with

lower burnup than is now “standard” and

do not account for storage times of the

length now being contemplated. Further

research may identify unanticipated

problems with extended fuel storage (e.g.,

unexpected corrosion rates) and will help

ensure that problems are detected and

appropriately mitigated if they emerge.

Given the history of the U.S. waste

management program, it is perhaps not

surprising that the need for extended

storage has come to symbolize the

program’s larger failure to perform so

far. Nonetheless we find that developing

extended storage capacity, if approached

in a way that maximizes its system

benefits, could strengthen the U.S. waste

management program as a whole.

First, having extended storage

capability preserves options and enhances

flexibility while other elements of a

comprehensive waste management

system—including options for the final

Figure 15. EPRI Projection of Cumulative

Spent Nuclear Fuel from Commercial

Nuclear Power Plants in Pool Storage

and Dry Storage, 2010–2060

140,000

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0

2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060

Estimated dry storage

systems*:

2010: ~1,400 loaded

2025: ~3,700 loaded

2050: ~9,500 loaded

2075: ~10,800 loaded

2010: 65,000 MTU discharged

2025: 96,000 MTU discharged

2050: 133,000 MTU discharged

Dry storage at <70 sites by 2030

DRY STORAGE

INVENTORY

POOL STORAGE

INVENTORY

Cumulative SNF (MTU)

Aug 2010, Energy Resources International, Inc.

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

disposition of HLW and SNF—are developed and tested. 

The United States may ultimately dispose of spent fuel or 

make use of reprocess and recycle technologies if closing 

the fuel cycle becomes advantageous in the future. Storage 

capability preserves the option of going in either direction. 

If the ultimate disposition path for spent fuel involves 

disposal in a geologic repository, allowing the fuel to cool 

through a period of storage reduces the siting challenge for 

a disposal facility and/or increases the disposal capacity of a 

given facility. 

These system benefits apply whether storage is provided 

at consolidated facilities or at dispersed sites, as is currently 

the case. But the storage arrangements in place today 

were not designed to maximize operational efficiency at a 

system level or to respond to unforeseen events or changes 

in management strategy, much less for indefinite storage 

at reactor sites after the reactors themselves have been 

decommissioned. These issues are addressed in later sections 

of this chapter; below we turn first to the rationale for 

developing one or more consolidated storage facilities.

5.2 The Case for

Consolidated Storage

The fundamental policy question for spent fuel storage in the 

United States today is whether the federal government should 

proceed to develop one or more consolidated storage facilities as 

a way to begin the orderly transfer of the fuel to federal control 

pending its ultimate disposition through reuse or disposal. The 

Commission concludes that there are several compelling 

reasons to move as quickly as possible to develop safe, 

consolidated storage capacity on a regional or national basis.

5.2.1 Consolidated Storage 

Would Allow for the Removal 

of ‘Stranded” Spent Fuel from 

Shutdown Reactor Sites

There are currently nine shutdown commercial nuclear 

power plant sites in the United States (see table 1) and 

one DOE-owned spent fuel facility (at Fort St. Vrain in 

Colorado) where the reactor itself has been or is being 

removed and the spent fuel—often referred to as “stranded 

fuel”—is being stored on site. At seven of the nine 

commercial sites and at the DOE site, the spent fuel is in 

dry storage. At all of these sites, which are formally known 

as “independent spent fuel storage installations” or ISFSIs, 

the spent fuel is both monitored and well-guarded and 

hence is not thought to present immediate safety or security 

concerns. Nonetheless, the continued presence of spent 

fuel at shutdown reactor sites is problematic and costly. 

Most obviously, it prevents these shutdown sites from being 

reclaimed for economically productive or otherwise desirable 

uses that would benefit the surrounding communities. 

Moreover, these communities were never asked about, and 

never contemplated or consented to, the conversion of these 

reactor sites into indefinite long-term storage facilities. As 

a result, they generally also did not have an opportunity 

to negotiate for rights of participation or incentives and 

benefits of the sort that would likely be available to the host 

community of a dedicated storage facility. Finally, most of 

these shutdown reactor sites no longer have the capability 

to remove spent fuel from storage canisters for inspection if 

long-term degradation problems emerge that might affect the 

ability to transport the canisters. Consolidated storage sites 

can be developed to provide these capabilities.

Direct cost considerations alone provide a compelling 

reason to move stranded spent fuel as quickly as possible 

to a consolidated storage facility. This is because the cost 

attributable to storing spent fuel at plant sites increases 

dramatically once the reactor is shut down. Since the cost 

of loading fuel into dry storage casks has generally already 

been incurred at this point, continued storage involves 

little activity other than site security and monitoring. At 

an operating nuclear plant, security is already in place and 

only incremental effort is required to include the ISFSI 

within the plant’s security umbrella. The same is true for 

the personnel needed to monitor the status of the fuel and 

perform any routine maintenance. When the rest of the site 

is shut down, however, these structures, systems, equipment 

and people are still needed to tend the spent fuel, and the 

cost is substantial. Recent studies find that the operation and 

maintenance costs for spent fuel storage at shutdown sites 

range from $4.5 million to $8 million per year, compared to 

an incremental $1 million per year or less when the reactor is 

still in operation. Even assuming no further change in security 

requirements at shutdown sites, these cost estimates suggest 

that the savings achievable by consolidating stranded spent 

fuel at a centralized facility would be enough to pay for that 

facility.

69 Consolidation would also allow any new safety or 

security measures that might be required in the future to be 

implemented more cost-effectively.

These cost advantages will only grow as increasing 

numbers of reactors reach the end of their operating lives, 

starting around 2030. Assuming a 60-year operating life, 

on average, for current plants, the number of shutdown 

sites could reach 30 by 2035 and 70 by 2050. Of course, 

subsequent life extensions beyond 60 years could push this 

10292_BlueRibbon_TEXT_X.indd 35 1/17/1
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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

curve farther into the future, but it is also possible that not

all currently operating reactors will in fact have their lives

extended to 60 years. In that case, the number of shutdown

plants would increase more rapidly. And while additional

reactors have been proposed at some sites (which could

delay full decommissioning of these sites for decades), it

is impossible to know how many of these new units will

eventually be built or how they would affect cumulative fuel

storage costs.

Using the cost estimates cited previously, the added

security and monitoring expenses associated with keeping

stranded spent fuel at as many as 70 different shutdown

reactor sites could be in the area of $350 to $550 million per

year at today’s costs.

In sum, equity and cost considerations together argue

for moving as quickly as possible to transfer stranded spent

fuel from shutdown reactor sites to consolidated storage.

Given the significant direct benefits of transferring spent

fuel from these sites, both for the surrounding communities

and in terms of cost savings, the Commission recommends

that spent fuel currently being stored at shutdown reactor

sites be “first in line” for transfer to a consolidated

storage facility.

5.2.2 Consolidated torage

Would nable the Federal

Government to Begin Meeting

ste Acceptance Obligations

Developing consolidated storage capacity would enable

the U.S. government to begin fulfilling its legal obligations

(described in chapter 3 of this report) with respect to the

acceptance and removal of SNF from commercial reactor

sites. In this way, it would also begin to address a large and

growing source of financial and legal liability to the federal

government and ultimately U.S. taxpayers.

The Commission has heard the suggestion that DOE

Table 1. Quantities of tranded ent Fuel in Storage

at Shutdown Commercial U.S. Reactor ites70

Plant State

MTHM

tored

at Site

MTHM

in Pool

Storage

MTHM

in Dry

Storage

Number

of Casks

Estimated

Casks

Total Casks

(Actual Plus

Estimated)

Average

MTHM/

Cask

Big Rock

Point

Michigan 58 0 58 7 — 7 8.3

Haddam

Neck

Connecticut 412 0 412 40 — 40 10.3

Humboldt

Bay

California 29 0 29 5 — 5 5.8

LaCrossea Wisconsin 38 38 0 0 5 5 7.6

Maine

Yankee

Maine 542 0 542 60 — 60 9.0

Rancho

Seco

California 228 0 228 21 — 21 10.9

Trojan Oregon 359 0 359 34 — 34 10.6

Yankee

Rowe

Massachusetts 127 0 127 15 — 15 8.5

Zion 1 & 2b Illinois 1,019 1,019 0 — 61 61 16.7

Fort St. Vrain Colorado 15 0 15 NA* — NA —

NOTE: a Testimony to Commission indicates target completion in 2012.

b Decommissioning contract entered with Energy Solutions. NAC MAGNASTOR canister will be used with

capacity of 36 elements per cask. Target schedule for completion is 2013.

* Fort St. Vrain spent fuel is in vault storage.

Note: Some shutdown plant sites also have GTCC waste stored in dry casks.

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

should simply “take title” to the spent fuel that is currently 

being stored at reactor sites, even though DOE currently 

has no storage or disposal facilities to which it could transfer 

the spent fuel. The idea is that assuming management 

responsibility for this material would allow DOE to meet its 

contractual obligations under current law and end taxpayer 

exposure to further damage awards resulting from the federal 

government’s failure to accept spent fuel on schedule.71

Examining the case law, the Commission concludes that 

simply “taking title” would not change the ongoing taxpayer 

liability under DOE’s contracts with utilities. Performance 

under existing contracts would require that DOE not only 

take title to the spent fuel, but also remove it from reactor 

sites. If DOE were to take title but leave the spent fuel where 

it is, DOE could not use the Nuclear Waste Fund to cover 

resulting maintenance and security costs. A federal Court 

of Appeals has ruled that paying for at-reactor storage is not 

an allowed use of the Fund under the NWPA and under 

DOE’s existing contracts with utilities. (For the same reason, 

the Fund cannot be used to cover damage payments to 

utilities for providing at-reactor storage.) Thus, the costs of 

at-reactor storage—regardless which entity has title to the 

spent fuel—must ultimately be paid by taxpayers, whether 

this occurs through damage payments to utilities from the 

federal Judgment Fund or through direct appropriations to 

DOE if DOE were to assume management responsibility for 

the spent fuel. 

Moreover, taxpayers could remain liable for at-reactor 

storage costs even if the NWPA were amended to both allow 

DOE to take title to at-reactor spent fuel and allow the 

Nuclear Waste Fund to be used to cover at-reactor storage 

costs. Because the explicit language of the Standard Contract 

limits the “costs” for which the fee can be collected to those 

costs set out in the NWPA, current contract holders may 

sue for damages on the theory that the Nuclear Waste Fund 

can be used only for purposes authorized under the NWPA 

as it existed when DOE and the utilities entered into these 

contracts.72 The government could argue that the contract 

reference is to the Act as amended from time to time, and 

that paying for the cost of on-site storage effectively mitigates 

damages. How such litigation might be resolved, if it 

occurred, is difficult to predict—the outcome would depend 

on how legislation to authorize the “take title” approach was 

drafted and on the intricacies of federal contract law.73 It is 

reasonable to expect that taxpayers could ultimately remain 

liable for costs of at-reactor storage of spent fuel.74

Given the present situation, developing consolidated 

storage capacity could be the fastest and surest path for the 

federal government to begin performing under existing 

contracts and to ultimately achieve waste acceptance rates 

that can stop the further growth of taxpayer liability. The 

existence of functional consolidated storage capacity would 

also change the federal government’s ability to renegotiate 

contracts with utilities. 

Importantly, work toward a consolidated storage facility 

can begin immediately under the existing provisions of 

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which authorize the federal 

government to site and design a MRS facility and obtain 

construction authorization.75 Further legislative action would 

not be required prior to the designation of a MRS facility 

site (and potentially not until the construction phase), at 

which time Congress would need to amend the NWPA to 

allow construction to go forward independent of the status 

of a permanent repository. Meanwhile, NRC regulations for 

independent spent fuel storage installations have already been 

developed and have been used to approve several types of 

storage technologies.76 (For example, it took DOE between 

two and five years to obtain NRC licenses for dry cask and 

dry vault spent fuel storage facilities at the INL.)

As with developing disposal capability, the critical 

challenge for consolidated storage will be finding a site 

or sites. Because the technical requirements for this 

type of facility would be less demanding than for a 

repository, finding a suitable location with an accepting 

host community may be less difficult, particularly if it is 

accompanied by attractive incentives. The Commission has 

heard testimony indicating that potential host communities, 

states and tribes would be willing to participate in an open 

process that engages affected constituencies from the outset 

and gives them actual bargaining power. Nevertheless, the 

potential difficulty of siting consolidated storage and the 

need for a thoughtful approach to this task must not be 

underestimated. Our specific proposals for a new approach 

to siting radioactive waste facilities in general are discussed 

in chapter 6.

5.2.3 Consolidated Storage Would

Provide Flexibility to Respond to 

Lessons Learned from Fukushima

and Other Events 

A consolidated storage option (which would consist of dry 

storage, wet [pool] storage, or both) would provide flexibility 

to respond to changes in regulation or practice that might 

result from a fuller assessment of the events at Fukushima 

and of other unexpected and potentially disruptive events. 

While no determination has been made that current atreactor storage arrangements in the United States are not 

adequately safe, access to consolidated storage would be very 

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

helpful if, for example, the decision were made to reduce 

inventories of spent fuel in reactor pools. In that case, having 

one or more consolidated storage facilities with the pool 

capacity to accept relatively young spent fuel would allow 

nuclear plant operators to focus on reducing the heat load 

in reactor pools by preferentially removing the hotter spent 

fuel, should that be determined to be the best approach.77

After adequate additional cooling, the fuel could then be 

transferred to dry storage in a staged way.78

A consolidated storage facility with wet storage 

capacity would also provide the capability to remove even 

relatively hot, recently discharged fuel from reactor pools 

on relatively short notice and with minimum operational 

demands on reactor operators. The ability to move hot 

fuel off site could simplify the management of a postaccident situation at a reactor by, for example, removing 

an important potential source of risk and freeing up pool 

space for other purposes (e.g., storing radioactive debris).79

As Fukushima has shown, completely unexpected problems 

can arise suddenly. At present, the United States lacks any 

capability to receive spent fuel in emergency situations, 

although DOE’s standard contract with utilities would 

theoretically allow for the waste acceptance “queue” to be 

re-prioritized in such situations. 

Finally, consolidated storage could enhance the safety 

and security of the overall waste management system simply 

because facilities for this purpose could be located where 

there is a much lower probability of extreme events (unlike 

reactors, for example, a storage-only facility need not be 

located near a large source of water), where the risks of 

broad-based population exposures in the event of a disaster 

are lower, and where local conditions are conducive to 

effectively monitoring and managing security risks.

5.2.4 Consolidated Storage Would

Support the Repository Program

The Commission has concluded that siting and developing 

one or more consolidated storage facilities would improve 

prospects for a successful repository program.

First, the technical and institutional experience gained by 

siting, testing, licensing, and operating a consolidated storage 

facility, as well as planning for and executing a concurrent 

transport program, would benefit repository development 

and operation,80 especially because all the activities involved 

(apart from those uniquely associated with underground 

disposal) would be the same.

In addition, consolidated storage would provide the 

flexibility needed to support an adaptive, staged approach 

to repository development. This kind of approach was 

recommended as early as 1990 by the National Academies’ 

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Board on Radioactive Waste Management and is discussed 

in more detail in chapter 6 of this report. The main point 

for purposes of this discussion is that a consolidated facility 

would allow federal acceptance of spent fuel to proceed at a 

predictable, adequate and steady rate—both before a disposal 

facility is available and when it is in operation. 

Even after a disposal facility is open, consolidated storage 

would act as a buffer and provide valuable redundancy for 

the system as a whole. It would, for example, allow utilities 

to continue to ship spent fuel away from reactor sites as 

scheduled even if a repository had to slow or cease operation 

for a period of time for any reason. Alternatively, it could 

accommodate a surge of shipments from reactor sites if that 

were necessary, while allowing emplacement at a repository 

to proceed at a steady, pre-determined rate. To provide this 

flexibility, a consolidated storage facility would ideally be 

incrementally expandable (with the acceptance of the host 

community) in terms of its total storage capacity and fuel 

handling and management capabilities.

Consolidated storage also offers opportunities to simplify 

repository operations. For example, by accumulating a 

substantial inventory of spent fuel in one place, the storage 

facility could take over some of the thermal management 

activities that might be required for efficient repository 

operation (e.g., blending hot and cool fuel assemblies to create 

a uniform thermal load for waste packages). A consolidated 

storage facility could even offer the option of packaging the 

waste for disposal before it is shipped to the repository, further 

simplifying operations at the repository site. 

5.2.5 Consolidated Storage Offers 

Technical Opportunities for the 

Waste Management System

A federal facility with spent fuel receipt, handling and storage 

capabilities can support other valuable activities that would 

benefit the waste management system. These include long-term 

monitoring and periodic inspection of dry storage systems 

and work on improved storage methods. Many current dry 

cask systems lack instrumentation to measure key parameters 

such as gas pressure, the release of volatile fission products, and 

moisture. Some of this work can be done in laboratories, but 

key aspects require the ability to handle and open loaded spent 

fuel storage containers and examine the fuel. A consolidated 

storage facility with laboratory and hot cell facilities and access 

to a substantial quantity and variety of spent fuel would provide 

an excellent platform for ongoing research and development to 

better understand how the storage systems currently in use at 

both commercial and DOE sites perform over time.81

5.2.6 Consolidated Storage 

Would Provide Options for

Increased Flexibility and

Efficiency in Storage and Future 

Waste Handling Functions

Finally, a consolidated storage facility could provide flexible, 

safe, and cost-effective waste handling services (i.e., repackaging 

or sorting of fuel for final disposal) and could facilitate the 

standardization of cask systems. This in turn could reduce the 

need for extensive handling at many reactor sites and make it 

possible to use more cost-effective storage systems at a central 

facility.82 Such facilities could also offer enhanced remote 

handling capabilities, thereby reducing the potential for worker 

exposures.83 This capability could be particularly important 

if changes in the condition of the spent fuel over time make 

it necessary to open storage containers and repackage the 

fuel before moving it elsewhere for disposition.84 Dry storage 

facilities at shutdown reactors without pools do not have any 

of the fuel handling and recovery capabilities that would be 

provided in a consolidated facility—in effect, these facilities 

are simply well-guarded parking lots for storage casks. If fuel 

at these sites needed repackaging, a new fuel handling facility 

would have to be constructed at considerable time and expense.

Considering current uncertainties about long-term 

degradation phenomena in dry storage systems, it would 

be prudent to initiate a planned, deliberate, and reliable 

process for moving spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites to 

a central facility before any issues arise and where problems 

can be dealt with much more easily and cost effectively than 

at multiple shutdown sites. The importance of consolidating 

inventories of spent fuel before there might be a need to 

reopen dry storage containers increases as the period of 

storage being contemplated increases.85

5.3 Practical and Strategic

Considerations and Next 

Steps for Proceeding with

Consolidated Storage

For all of the reasons discussed in the foregoing section, 

the Commission recommends that the U.S. government 

proceed to develop consolidated storage capacity without 

further delay. The Commission has also heard and considered 

arguments against proceeding with consolidated storage. 

Of these, the most important objection and one that will 

need to be thoughtfully addressed is the concern that any 

consolidated storage facility could become a de facto disposal 

facility and—by reducing the pressure to find a long-term 

solution—thwart progress toward developing the deep 

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geologic disposal capacity that will ultimately be needed. 

This is not a new concern; it is why the 1987 NWPA 

Amendments explicitly tied the construction of an MRS 

facility to progress on a first repository and set capacity limits 

for the MRS facility so that it could not accommodate all the 

spent fuel in need of disposal.

Circumstances today, however, are different. Trust and 

confidence in the federal government’s basic commitment and 

competence to deliver on its waste management obligations 

have all but completely eroded since 1987. Restoring that trust 

and confidence must be the government’s first priority and 

is essential for getting all aspects of the nation’s nuclear waste 

program back on track. In this context, demonstrating that it 

is possible to muster the policy direction, technical expertise, 

and institutional competence needed to site and operate one 

or more consolidated storage facilities (while also vigorously 

pursuing final disposal capability) would by itself be enormously 

valuable. Near-term progress on a consolidated storage facility 

would not only address a major source of political, legal and 

financial liability that will otherwise complicate efforts to move 

beyond the current impasse in the repository program, it would 

also provide practical benefits in terms of gaining experience 

and providing the system-wide flexibility needed to support an 

adaptive, staged approach to repository development.

In sum, the Commission concludes that progress on 

consolidated storage will have a positive impact and indeed 

could play a crucial role in the success of a revitalized disposal 

program. Other concerns we have heard about consolidated 

storage—primarily related to the costs and potential worker 

exposures associated with handling and transporting spent 

fuel twice, once to move spent fuel from reactor sites to 

consolidated storage and then to move the fuel a second time 

to a permanent repository—are outweighed, in our view, by 

the increased flexibility, handling advantages, and potential 

cost savings that consolidated storage capability would provide.

That said, we do not underestimate the practical 

difficulties of siting a consolidated storage facility, 

particularly in a context of great uncertainty about the future 

of the repository program. If anything, the history of past 

efforts to develop a MRS facility show the same pattern of 

siting challenges as the repository program—and a similar 

record of failure in overcoming them. On the other hand, 

experience with the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator 

in the early 1990s also gives some grounds for hope. As 

quoted in a recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

report on nuclear waste storage issues, the first Nuclear Waste 

Negotiator, David Leroy, concluded that “the volunteer 

siting process can work provided that the negotiator is given 

the resources and time to negotiate the terms of an interim 

storage facility and benefit package,” although he also 

recognized that “the lack of a proposed repository makes the 

process more difficult.”86 Because siting and process issues 

are so important, and largely common to both disposal 

and consolidated storage facilities, they are addressed by a 

separate set of Commission recommendations and discussed 

at length in a separate chapter (chapter 6) of this report.

The salient point for purposes of this discussion is that 

the challenge of siting one or more consolidated storage 

facilities cannot be separated from the status of the disposal 

program. Many states and communities will be far less 

willing to be considered for a consolidated storage facility 

if they fear they will become the de facto hosts of a disposal 

site. This means that a program to establish consolidated 

storage will succeed only in the context of a parallel disposal 

program that is effective, focused, and making discernible 

progress in the eyes of key stakeholders and the public. 

A robust repository program, in other words, will be as 

important to the success of a consolidated storage program 

as the consolidated storage program will be to the success of 

a disposal program. Progress on both fronts is needed and 

must be sought without further delay.

It should be emphasized that the development of one or 

more storage facilities does not require, or even imply, an 

irreversible commitment to any particular long-term plan 

for moving fuel to these facilities or performing any specific 

set of activities at these sites. All of the capabilities that 

would ultimately be desirable do not have to be developed 

at once, particularly since it is not clear at this time exactly 

what features will be needed over the many decades such a 

facility or facilities would be in operation. A storage facility 

or system of facilities can be developed in a stepwise manner, 

as the need for expansion of capacity and capability becomes 

clearer. Furthermore, the initial cost to site, design, and 

license a storage facility is relatively low (less than $100 

million),87 so that the money put “at risk” in giving future 

decision makers the option to proceed with construction 

and operation of a storage facility is small compared to the 

potential benefits from having that option available. Siting, 

licensing, building and operating a storage facility with 

even limited initial capabilities would substantially resolve 

uncertainties about the costs and time required for these 

activities, including associated transportation needs, thereby 

providing a firmer basis for future decision-making with 

regard to potential expansion.

Finally, it is important to stress that other major 

Commission recommendations concerning the need for a 

new waste management organization, reliable access to the 

Nuclear Waste Fund, and a new approach to facility siting 

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apply equally to a consolidated storage program and are just 

as important to its success. These high-level, cross-cutting 

recommendations are covered in later chapters of this report. 

Recognizing that it will take time and new authorizing 

legislation to implement the Commission’s most important 

recommendations and recognizing that DOE remains 

responsible and ultimately liable for the government’s 

existing waste acceptance obligations in the meantime,89

it is important to reiterate an earlier point: that sufficient 

authority already exists under the NWPA to begin laying 

the groundwork for consolidated storage without further 

delay, assuming Congress makes appropriations available 

for this purpose. Specific steps that DOE could take in 

the near term include performing the systems analyses and 

design studies needed to develop a conceptual design for 

a highly flexible, initial federal spent fuel storage facility, 

The BRC’s Transportation and Storage Subcommittee 

heard and considered a number of arguments against

proceeding with consolidated storage. Most centered on 

three concerns: (1) that expending resources and effort on 

consolidated storage could slow or halt progress toward 

developing a permanent repository; (2) that consolidated 

storage would necessitate further handling of spent fuel 

and high-level waste, potentially increasing safety and 

security risks; and (3) that consolidated storage could 

increase overall waste management costs. 

The first of these concerns, that any consolidated 

storage facility could become a de facto disposal facility 

and siphon resolve and resources away from repository 

development, is a longstanding one. It is why the NWPA 

explicitly prohibits the construction of an MRS facility 

before construction authorization has been issued for a first 

repository. Based on the record of progress to date, the 

Commission believes that the benefits of moving forward on 

both fronts—consolidated storage and geologic disposal—

at the same time outweigh the potential downside risks. 

But clearly the challenge of establishing positive linkages 

such that progress on storage does not undermine, but 

rather supports progress on repository development 

remains an important one. The linkages that exist under 

current law clearly have not worked as intended. 

Similarly, the concern about increased handling risks as a 

result of potentially moving SNF and HLW twice, first from 

decentralized storage to consolidated storage and then 

from consolidated storage to a geologic disposal facility, is 

a legitimate but in our view manageable one. Clearly, there 

are trade-offs: some risks might increase but benefits to the 

system as a whole (such as the ability to learn early lessons 

by moving spent fuel from shutdown reactors to consolidated 

storage, and the creation of increased capability to respond 

to emergency situations, for example) could more than offset 

these impacts so that overall risk for the waste management 

system as a whole could decline. A 2007 study by the 

American Physical Society specifically looked at transport 

risks related to moving spent fuel twice and concluded these 

risks would be small.88 Ultimately, we believe the many safety 

and security benefits that would come with having one or 

more well-equipped, consolidated storage facilities outweigh 

objections centered on extra handling risks. 

The Transportation and Storage Subcommittee looked 

in some detail at the third issue, concerning cost. As 

discussed elsewhere in this section, it found potentially 

substantial cost savings associated with removing SNF 

from shutdown reactor sites and with accelerating the 

federal government’s ability to begin accepting waste in 

fulfillment of its existing contractual commitments (and 

thereby avoiding further damage payments to utilities). 

The Subcommittee also looked at estimates of the cost of 

providing consolidated storage based on eight studies of 

this subject published since 1985. The conclusion was that 

it would be impossible to arrive at a single point estimate 

of centralized storage costs given the large uncertainties 

involved. The more important conclusion, however, was 

that the extra cost to site, design and obtain a license 

for a consolidated storage facility was likely to be in the 

range of $50 to $100 million. While appreciable, these 

are small levels of commitment from the perspective of 

the overall spent fuel management program. At the same 

time, a wide variety of circumstances can be anticipated in 

which centralized storage facilities could prove invaluable. 

In these circumstances, savings on the order of billions 

of dollars are possible. With these findings in mind, the 

Commission concludes that it would be prudent to pursue 

the development of consolidated storage capability without 

further delay, recognizing that there will be an opportunity to 

make course corrections later as needed. 

Principal Objections to Pursuing Consolidated Storage

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assembling information that would be helpful to the siting 

process for such a facility, and working with nuclear utilities, 

the nuclear industry, and other stakeholders to promote the 

standardization of dry cask storage systems with an eye to 

facilitating later transport and consolidation in centralized 

storage and/or disposal facilities.

5.4 The Case for a New 

Approach to Prioritizing the 

Transfer of Spent Fuel from 

U.S. Commercial Reactor Sites

Once one or more consolidated storage facilities are 

available, future decisions about how to prioritize or 

sequence the transfer of spent fuel from operating 

commercial reactor sites to these facilities should be 

driven first by safety and risk considerations, and then by 

issues related to cost and other impacts. The Commission 

recognizes that existing contracts have created a “queue” 

in terms of federal commitments to accept spent fuel from 

specific utilities. Unfortunately, the existing queue was not 

set up to maximize efficiencies or to minimize the impacts of 

fuel handling and transportation. Hence, we believe it would 

be appropriate for DOE to re-visit the current schedule as 

it is already authorized to do under certain circumstances 

(for example, the Standard Contract authorizes DOE to 

give priority to spent fuel from shutdown reactors). Other 

changes to the current queue may require the Department 

and utility contract holders to re-negotiate some existing 

commitments. The Commission believes a more flexible 

approach would benefit all parties involved. 

Under DOE’s Standard Contract with utilities, priority for 

the acceptance of spent fuel is allocated to utilities according 

to the “oldest fuel first” or “OFF” principle. This does not 

mean that utilities would necessarily choose to ship their oldest 

fuel first, since they would have a contractual right to decide 

each year (subject to DOE’s approval) which fuel to ship from 

which reactor (with the overall amount being determined by 

the OFF allocation). The current approach, however, has a 

number of shortcomings, particularly from the standpoint of 

maximizing the value of at-reactor storage as one tool in an 

integrated management system.

First, the current approach may limit the ability to use atreactor storage as part of an integrated thermal management 

strategy. The ability to select which spent fuel is delivered 

for disposal at a permanent repository each year may avoid 

the need for additional storage to hold fuel that is too hot 

for immediate emplacement. However, since utilities can 

choose which fuel to deliver, they may prefer to send the 

hottest eligible fuel in their pools, assuming that the plants 

are still operating when waste acceptance begins. This may 

require more complex thermal management activities at the 

consolidated storage or disposal facility.

Second, the current system can add complexity and 

reduce efficiency in planning for shipments of spent fuel to 

a consolidated facility. For example, an analysis performed 

for the BRC90 showed that accepting fuel based on the OFF 

priority ranking could result in spent fuel being shipped 

from an average of about 60 nuclear power plant sites each 

year, compared to fewer than 20 if priority can be given to 

spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites.

While a robust transportation management system 

would be needed in either case, the planning challenge for 

transporting spent fuel from an average of about 60 sites 

annually would be considerably more complex than in a 

scenario where shipments are coming from one-third as 

many sites or even fewer.

Third, accepting spent fuel according to the OFF priority 

ranking instead of giving priority to shutdown reactor sites 

could greatly reduce the cost savings that could be achieved 

through consolidated storage if priority could be given to 

accepting spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites before 

accepting fuel from still-operating plants. Figure 16, which 

assumes that a disposal or consolidated storage facility begins 

operating in 2030, shows that the difference in cumulative 

operation and maintenance (O&M) costs between use 

of OFF and shutdown reactor priorities could amount to 

billions of dollars.91

The magnitude of the cost savings that could be achieved 

by giving priority to shutdown sites appears to be large enough 

(i.e., in the billions of dollars) to warrant DOE exercising 

its right under the Standard Contract to move this fuel first. 

Although this action would disrupt the queue specified in 

the Standard Contract, as utilities continue to merge and a 

growing number of reactors reach the end of their operating 

licenses, every utility (or nearly every utility) will have one 

or more shutdown plants. In that context, giving priority to 

moving fuel from decommissioned sites is likely to be seen by 

all parties involved as being in everyone’s best interest.

In sum, the Commission takes the view that a new, 

independent waste management organization should be 

directed (as part of enabling legislation) to take the lead in 

working on a cooperative basis with nuclear plant operators 

to identify measures that could reduce the overall costs and 

impacts of an integrated spent fuel management system. 

As part of this effort, the new organization should seek 

to renegotiate contracts as necessary to implement costsaving and risk-reducing measures, while also recognizing 

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Report to the Sec retary of E n erg y

the contractual rights of current waste owners as originally

established under existing statutes, and as subsequently

interpreted by the courts.

5.5 Safety and ecurity

Considerations for torage

Systems

Safety and security are obviously paramount considerations

in the storage and transport of SNF and HLW, under all

circumstances and regardless of the type of site or facility

involved. These are also issues that have drawn new attention

in the wake of the disaster in Japan.

On March 23, 2011, NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko

directed the formation of a Near-Term Task Force to examine

available information regarding the Fukushima disaster, and

to determine whether changes should be made to ensure

that the continued operation of existing reactors, and the

licensing of new reactors, remain safe. On July 12, 2011, the

Task Force released Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor

Safety in the 21st Century: the Near-Term Task Force Review

of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident. The report

found that it is unlikely a sequence of events similar to those

experienced at Fukushima would occur in the United States,

and concluded that “continued [reactor] operation and

continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk

to public health and safety.” The Task Force went on to make

12 overarching recommendations to improve safety and to

enhance the capability of reactor operators

to react in the event of an emergency.

The Task Force report specifically

looked at some issues related to spent fuel

storage, an area of particular interest to

the BRC. In its analysis of the Fukushima

disaster, the report noted that when the

station lost primary and backup power,

operators were unable to monitor the

water level and condition of the spent

fuel pools at reactor units 1, 2, 3, and

4, and were also unable to run pumps

that circulate water in the pools to keep

the spent fuel cool. The Task Force

observed that “operators were significantly

challenged in understanding the condition

of the spent fuel pools because of the

lack of instrumentation or because of

instrumentation that was not functioning

properly.” The loss of power and massive

damage at the site also made it impossible

for operators to add water to the pools as

the water levels dropped, although they were later able to

spray water into the pools using pumper trucks and high

booms. The Task Force made specific recommendations for

the NRC to consider that, in its view, would address “(1) the

instrumentation to provide information about the condition

of the pool and the spent fuel and (2) the plant’s capability

for cooling and water inventory management,” in the event

that a U.S. reactor suffered extended loss of AC power for

whatever reason.

The report further observed that the four pools of

concern “contained many fewer assemblies than typically

stored in U.S. reactor unit spent fuel pools.” In addition

to the six pools adjacent to the reactors, the Fukushima

facility also included a large storage pool away from the

reactors themselves, which contained nearly 6,300 spent

fuel assemblies. The report added that “U.S. reactor facilities

do not typically have an additional spent fuel wet storage

building like that at Fukushima Dai-ichi.” Instead, many

reactors have dry cask storage systems, which contain spent

fuel that has been removed from the reactor for several

years and can be cooled by air. The Fukushima plant had a

small amount of fuel stored in nine dry casks in a separate

building. It appears that the away-from-reactor storage pool

and the loaded dry casks at Fukushima survived the disaster

without suffering significant damage.

In a memorandum to NRC Commissioners dated October

3, 2011, NRC staff outlined recommendations concerning the

Figure 16. Operation and intenance Costs

of tranded ent Fuel Storage92,93,94

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Costs

(Million 2009 $)

Shutdown Reactor Priority

Oldest Fuel First

2,849

9,167

Repository 2030

3000 MTU/Year

Cost (Million 2009 $)

O&M COSTS OF STRANDED SPENT FUEL STORAGE

20102020203020402050206020702080209021002110212021302140

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prioritization of specific actions identified in the Task Force 

report.95 The memorandum also noted that NRC staff had 

identified “a number of additional issues with a clear nexus 

to the Fukushima Daiichi event that may warrant regulatory 

action but which were not included with the [Near-Term Task 

Force] recommendations.” Examining the transfer of spent 

fuel to dry cask storage was one of six actions that the NRC 

staff thought warranted “additional consideration for potential 

prioritization.” NRC staff agreed at the time to provide NRC 

Commissioners with further recommendations concerning 

these additional actions within nine months, but also promised 

to promptly inform NRC Commissioners if the conclusion 

were reached that any of them warranted re-prioritization as a 

recommended near-term action.

Based on a review of the evidence to date, the Commission 

sees no unmanageable safety or security risks associated with 

current methods of storage (dry or wet) at existing U.S reactor 

sites. However, continued vigilance and careful attention to 

the lessons learned from Fukushima will be necessary to ensure 

that this remains the case, especially in light of the timeframes 

involved in establishing dedicated, away-from-reactor storage 

and disposal sites. Simply put, it will take years to more than a 

decade to open one or more consolidated storage facilities and 

even longer to open one or more disposal facilities. This means 

that storage of substantial quantities of spent fuel at operating 

reactor sites can be expected to continue for some time.

To provide effective oversight, regulatory authorities and 

nuclear plant operators, designers, and vendors must also 

be able to adapt quickly to new or unanticipated risks, such 

as emerged in the crisis at Fukushima. The post-accident 

response to that crisis is still ongoing and will continue for 

many months, which means that it will still be some time 

before a thorough investigation is complete and the resulting 

safety implications are fully understood. Given the magnitude 

of the accident and its potential implications for future waste 

management policies, the Commission recommends that 

the NAS be asked to conduct an independent investigation 

of the events at Fukushima and their implications for safety 

and security requirements at SNF and HLW storage sites in 

the United States, once better information about the accident 

is available, including an analysis of the advantages and 

disadvantages of moving spent fuel from densely packed pools 

to on-site dry cask storage to facilitate low-density packing in 

the pools. This study would build upon the 2004 NAS study 

of storage issues (discussed in section 5.5.2 below) and would 

complement the other efforts to learn from Fukushima that 

have already been launched by the NRC and industry. 

Besides a full investigation of events at Fukushima, the 

Commission has identified a number of priority areas for 

ongoing public and private efforts to ensure the continued 

safety and security of current storage arrangements. Specifically 

we urge continued work by the NRC, DOE, industry 

organizations such as EPRI, and others to explore fuel 

degradation mechanisms, identify unanticipated problems 

with extended fuel storage (i.e., unexpected corrosion rates), 

better understand the behavior of dry storage systems and their 

contents over time, investigate the feasibility of enhancing 

instrumentation in existing dry and wet storage systems, and 

promote the standardization of cask designs.

Similarly, we support ongoing efforts by the NRC 

to reexamine security requirements for storage sites and 

transportation and evaluate the need for enhanced security 

measures in the future.96 As part of this process the NRC 

should examine the advantages and disadvantages of options 

such as “hardened” on-site storage (HOSS) that have been 

proposed to improve security at existing sites (discussed 

further below). Obviously, any hardened system could be 

implemented more cost effectively at a consolidated storage 

facility than at existing sites due to economies of scale. 

Finally, continued vigilance and research is needed to stay 

abreast of evolving security risks and terrorism or sabotage 

threats, particularly as storage times increase and spent fuel 

becomes potentially more susceptible to theft or diversion.97

Specific issues and concerns with respect to the safety and 

security of storage technologies are summarized below.

5.5.1 Storage Security 

Considerations

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, safety and 

security concerns specifically related to acts of terrorism or 

sabotage have received increased attention from agencies 

charged with regulating the storage and transport of nuclear 

materials.98 Over the last decade, for instance, the NRC 

has issued more than 70 security and threat advisories to its 

licensees; in addition, starting in October 2001, the NRC 

initiated a series of classified studies that analyzed potential 

vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies at plants.

Under current NRC requirements, plant operators 

must demonstrate physical protection of pools through 

force-on-force testing involving simulated assaults in which 

the adversary is attempting to cause reactor or spent fuel 

damage. Since late 2004, and as required by federal law 

since 2005, NRC-supervised testing is conducted at each 

operating power reactor once every three years (the operators 

conduct much more frequent tests on their own). This 

testing frequently includes simulated attacks on spent fuel 

pools. The NRC provides public and non-public reports to 

Congress every year on the results of these tests.99

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The NRC is also primarily responsible for security 

requirements at ISFSIs. Like the security at an operating 

reactor, licensees must implement a “layered defensive 

strategy” that includes on-site protective forces with 

appropriate skills, weaponry, and other response equipment, 

and security systems. The strategy must include procedures 

to defend against physical attacks, insider threats, and cyber 

attacks. Security systems also provide for means to detect, 

assess, and communicate information about potential threats 

to local law enforcement authorities in the event of an attack. 

Not surprisingly, security systems are tailored to the specific 

site, since relevant characteristics—such as the distance from 

storage facilities to the plant boundary—can vary from site 

to site. Licensees must conduct frequent performance drills 

and make internal assessments of force effectiveness; in 

addition, the NRC conducts its own periodic reviews of siteprotective force training and force effectiveness.100

The NRC is currently undertaking a rulemaking to revise 

existing security requirements that apply to the storage of 

spent fuel at an ISFSI and to the storage of spent fuel and/or 

high level waste at a monitored retrievable storage installation 

(it will not address requirements that apply to storage in 

reactor pools). The rulemaking is intended to (a) examine 

the effectiveness of security orders imposed after the 9/11 

terrorist attacks; (b) apply lessons learned from previous NRC 

inspections; and (c) ensure regulatory clarity and consistency 

between general and specific ISFSI licensees. The NRC issued 

a draft “regulatory basis” document in December 2009 and 

has received numerous comments on proposed technical 

approaches. Among other issues, the NRC is considering 

whether to require comprehensive “denial” capability on 

site—that is, sufficient security forces and weaponry for facility 

personnel to repel an attack on their own—or instead to 

require a detect/assess/communicate strategy that would rely 

on assistance from local, state and federal authorities.101

5.5.2 Storage Safety 

Considerations

The studies initiated by the NRC following 9/11 also 

addressed a number of issues directly related to the safety of 

pool storage, including the thermal response of fuel to fully 

drained and partially drained pool conditions, the structural 

response of spent fuel pools, options for mitigating spent-fuel 

heat-up or enhancing coolability, and confirmatory testing 

of analytical methods for calculating the thermal response of 

different types of fuel assemblies.

In February 2002, the NRC issued specific orders aimed 

at providing additional protection for spent fuel in pools based 

on the results of these initial studies.102 These orders are not 

available to the public, but they addressed strategies to restore 

or maintain core cooling and provide containment and spent 

fuel cooling under circumstances associated with the loss of large 

areas of the plant due to explosion or fire. Additional guidance 

specifically related to pools was issued in 2004 and 2005 and 

subsequently incorporated into guidance for the 2009 Power 

Reactor Security Requirements final rule (74 FR 13926).

In 2003, an independent study of safety issues associated 

with the storage of spent fuel in reactor pools (by Robert 

Alvarez et al.)

103 raised concerns about the trend toward 

increased loading and higher-density spent fuel storage 

configurations in pools and the possibility that under certain 

conditions in which water is drained from a pool, the fuel 

could overheat and ignite the zirconium cladding, leading 

to large releases of radioactivity. (This possibility had already 

been identified by analyses performed for the NRC.)104

The Alvarez report recommended that U.S. plant operators 

reduce their pool inventories and return to a more open 

storage configuration by transferring relatively older fuel 

to dry casks, which are passively cooled. The Alvarez study 

made other recommendations, such as installing emergency 

spray cooling systems and preparing to repair holes in spent 

fuel pool walls on an emergency basis, if called for.105

In a response to this study, the NRC argued that currently 

permitted, more densely arrayed pool storage could be carried 

out both safely and securely.106 This position has continued 

to be questioned by advocates of lower-density pool storage, 

especially since the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant.

Prompted by conflicting public claims about the safety 

and security of commercial SNF storage at nuclear power 

plants,107 the National Academies, at the request of Congress, 

completed an independent assessment of these issues in 

2004 (an unclassified public report, titled Safety and Security 

of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, was published 

in 2006).108 The NAS study concluded that a successful 

attack on a fuel pool, though difficult, is possible and could 

result in a large release of radioactive material if it led to a 

propagating zirconium cladding fire. It also found, however, 

that additional analyses were needed to better understand 

these vulnerabilities and that a number of steps could be 

taken to reduce the likelihood of such a fire (including 

changing the configuration of hotter and cooler spent 

fuel assemblies in the pool and providing back-up cooling 

through spray systems). The NAS study further concluded 

that dry cask storage has inherent safety and security 

advantages over wet pool storage but is only suitable for 

older spent fuel (more than five years post-discharge). It did 

not, however, address the question of whether the transfer of 

spent fuel from pool to dry cask storage should be accelerated 

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(the study simply notes that “further engineering analyses 

and cost-benefit studies would be needed before decisions on 

this and other mitigative measures are taken”109).

The NRC has since taken actions to address the risks 

outlined in the NAS study. In February 2005, following 

completion of the classified version of the NAS study, NRC 

staff provided guidance for implementing the orders that had 

been issued in 2002, including best practices for mitigating 

losses of large areas of the plant and measures to mitigate 

fuel damage and minimize releases. The NRC subsequently 

conducted inspections at operating reactor sites to assure 

compliance with these orders. In December 2006, the Nuclear 

Energy Institute (NEI) issued a document that provides 

guidance for implementing a set of strategies intended to 

maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel 

pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated 

with the loss of a large area of the plant due to explosions or 

fire.113 (The NRC endorsed this document as an acceptable 

means for developing and implementing the requirement for 

mitigation strategies.) The guidance related to pools includes 

adding make-up water to the pool and spraying water on the 

spent fuel. In addition to these measures, the industry has 

reportedly taken steps to implement the “checkerboarding” 

arrangement of hotter and cooler spent fuel assemblies in 

pools, as recommended in the NAS study.114

In 2002, a coalition of more than 150 national and local 

non-government organizations (NGOs) adopted a set of 

principles for at-reactor storage “based on the urgent need 

to protect the public from the threats posed by the current 

vulnerable storage of commercial irradiated fuel.”115 These 

principles include several points:

• Implement a low-density, open-frame layout for reactor 

fuel pools (which would involve accelerating the transfer 

of fuel older than five years to dry storage)

• Establish hardened on-site storage (HOSS – see text box) 

at reactors 

• Provide for greater protection of fuel pools 

• Require periodic review of HOSS facilities and fuel pools 

• Provide dedicated funding to local and state governments 

to independently monitor and protect sites 

• Do not reprocess spent fuel.

The recommendation to use HOSS, instead of conventional 

dry storage technology, at reactor sites is being considered 

as part of the NRC rulemaking that is currently underway 

to update nuclear plant security requirements. We believe 

the NRC rulemaking process is the appropriate venue for 

considering and assessing the technical merits of the HOSS 

concept at this time, since its principal objective is to increase 

resistance to terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, the question of 

whether steps should be taken to reduce the amount of spent 

fuel currently stored in reactor pools is distinct from the 

question of where and how the spent fuel should be stored 

if that were done. These issues are being reexamined by 

industry, the NRC, and others.

HOSS110 dry cask or vault systems have been proposed 

to enhance the safety and security of spent fuel storage. 

As described by proponents, HOSS is the preferred 

end-point of a process that involves moving spent fuel 

from dense-packed cooling pools and into dry storage 

systems at reactor sites. The HOSS concept adds berms 

and reinforced concrete vaults and overstructures111 to 

conventional dry storage systems with the intent of offering 

greater resistance to potential terrorist attacks using aircraft 

or conventional weapons.

Utilities and the nuclear power industry have generally not 

supported the HOSS approach to dry storage for a variety 

of reasons. Industry representatives have suggested that 

the primary objectives of the HOSS approach are effectively 

already being met through a combination of robust cask 

systems (see section 5.1) and physical security measures. 

They believe that continued reliance on NRC requirements, 

which use a design-basis threat assessment methodology, 

will ensure facilities remain safe and secure by requiring 

tiered security forces, active and passive response systems, 

and conservative, robust technology designs.112 The industry 

view is that the HOSS approach could increase risk rather 

than reduce it if the storage/vault system were to collapse 

under attack and then interfere with the cooling of the fuel.

The Hardened On-Site Storage (HOSS) Concept

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6. A CONSENT-BASED

APPROACH TO G

AND DEVELOPING FUTURE

FACILITIES FOR NUCLEAR WASTE

ANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL

We believe siting processes for all such future facilities are

most likely to succeed if they are:

(1) Consent-based—in the sense that affected communities

have an opportunity to decide whether to accept facility

siting decisions and retain significant local control.

(2) Transparent—in the sense that all stakeholders have

an opportunity to understand key decisions and engage

the process in a meaningful way.

(3) Phased—in the sense that key decisions are revisited

and modified as necessary along the way rather than

being pre-determined.

(4) Adaptive—in the sense that process itself is flexible and

produces decisions that are responsive to new information

and new technical, social, or political developments.

(5) Standards- and science-based—in the sense that

the public can have confidence that all facilities meet

Having examined decades of experience in siting

nuclear waste facilities in the United States and

abroad, the Commission concludes that the United

States needs to adopt a new approach to siting and

developing nuclear waste management and disposal

facilities in the future.

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rigorous, objective, and consistently-applied standards of 

safety and environmental protection.

(6) Governed by partnership arrangements or legallyenforceable agreements between the implementing 

organization and host states, tribes, and local communities.

The Commission recognizes that the NWPA and subsequent 

actions by Congress have established Yucca Mountain 

in Nevada as the site for a deep geologic nuclear waste 

repository, provided the repository license application 

submitted by DOE is found by the NRC to meet relevant 

requirements. The Commission takes no position on the 

Administration’s request to withdraw the license application. 

We simply note that the U.S. inventory of SNF will soon 

exceed the amount that can be legally emplaced at Yucca 

Mountain until a second repository is in operation. So 

under current law, the United States will need to find a new 

repository site even if Yucca Mountain were to go forward. 

We believe the approach set forth here provides the best 

strategy for assuring continued progress, regardless of the fate 

of Yucca Mountain.

The remainder of this chapter discusses the basis of 

this Commission recommendation—including key lessons 

learned from past siting efforts—and elaborates on the details 

of the adaptive and staged approach we are recommending 

for siting new facilities.

6.1 Lessons Learned from U.S. 

Experience in Siting Nuclear

Waste Facilities

The difficulty of siting any type of facility that handles, 

stores, or disposes of highly radioactive materials has been 

at the heart of the federal government’s failure to deliver on 

its waste management obligations to date. Three examples 

from the U.S. experience are particularly instructive for 

future siting efforts: the currently suspended program to 

develop a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, 

the successfully completed and currently operating WIPP 

disposal facility for transuranic defense waste in New Mexico, 

and a series of thus far unsuccessful public and private efforts 

to establish an MRS facility for commercial SNF. Each of 

these experiences is summarized as part of the historical 

overview provided in chapter 3 of this report. In this section, 

we highlight lessons learned from these past siting efforts that 

helped inform the Commission’s recommendations.

In the history of the U.S. nuclear waste management 

program, the contrasting experiences with Yucca Mountain 

and WIPP offer important insights. Yucca Mountain was 

singled out as the sole site to be considered for a first national 

geologic repository in the 1987 Amendments to the NWPA 

and the record since has been one of frequent regulatory 

and legal deadlock, extreme political controversy and strong 

state opposition, steadily escalating project costs, and delays 

measured in decades.

The problems that plagued Yucca Mountain from the 

outset and that have led to the current impasse are not hard 

to identify: 

• Short-circuiting of the initial site selection process that 

had the effect of tainting all subsequent state-federal 

interactions over the project

• Lack of appropriated funds to complete project 

milestones on time

• Overly prescriptive requirements and rigid deadlines that 

made it difficult to respond to stakeholder concerns

• Inconsistent program leadership and execution.

All of these flaws only served to exacerbate what was arguably 

the most important and most enduring problem of all—the 

fact that the project was strongly opposed, from the time Yucca 

Mountain was named in 1987 as the only site to be studied, 

by the majority of Nevada residents and by the state’s political 

leaders. That the project suffered from protracted delays and 

has now been suspended—after an investment of more than 

20 years and billions of dollars in resources—speaks volumes 

about the difficulty of siting a facility over the objections of 

the host community, state, or tribe and about the broader 

shortcomings of the U.S. program.

In stark contrast to Yucca Mountain, the WIPP facility 

in New Mexico has been operating successfully for more 

than a decade with broad local and state support, although 

that project too was often controversial, suffered numerous 

setbacks in the siting and licensing process, and took years 

longer to complete than originally planned. The crucial 

difference in the WIPP case was the presence—also from 

the outset—of a supportive host community and of a state 

government that was willing to remain engaged. Starting 

in the early 1970s and continuing to the present, elected 

officials and other local leaders in and around the WIPP 

site, particularly in the Carlsbad business community, 

made it very clear that they approved of the development 

and use of the facility to dispose of defense TRU wastes. 

This unwavering local support helped to sustain the project 

during periods when federal and state agencies had to work 

through disagreements over issues such as the nature of 

the wastes to be disposed, the role of different entities in 

providing oversight, and the standards that the facility would 

be required to meet. 

Even so, the path to successfully licensing and opening 

WIPP was neither straightforward nor quick (see text box 

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in section 3.4.2). On the contrary, it involved years of legal, 

regulatory, and political activity and complex negotiations 

between the State of New Mexico and the federal 

government. Ultimately, local support combined with other 

confidence-building measures proved sufficient to allay state 

concerns and allow the project to go forward. But no one 

could have designed the process that was ultimately followed 

ahead of time nor could that process ever be replicated. 

Attempts to site an MRS facility in the 1980s and 1990s, 

by contrast, have had more in common with the Yucca 

Mountain experience in the sense that none of them—

despite the availability of unspecified inducements under 

the 1987 NWPA amendments—succeeded in overcoming 

opposition at the state level. Outreach by the short-lived 

Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator in the early 1990s 

prompted a number of communities and tribes to express 

interest in being considered for a facility, but the program 

was closed down before any of those possibilities could be 

fully explored. A subsequent private initiative by several 

utilities to work directly with the Goshute Indian tribe to 

open a consolidated spent fuel storage facility on the tribe’s 

Skull Valley Reservation in Utah resulted in the NRC 

issuing a license but likewise encountered strong state-level 

opposition and is still being litigated.

In sum, U.S. experience to date clearly underscores the 

inherent complexity and difficulty of siting nuclear waste 

facilities, particularly in the face of state-level opposition. At 

the same time, the record, along with input received from a 

number of parties during the BRC’s deliberations, provides 

grounds for optimism that it can be done. The WIPP example, 

in particular, represents an affirmative demonstration that with 

adequate patience, flexibility, and political and public support, 

success is possible.

6.2 Experience with Nuclear

Waste Facility Siting in Other

Countries

In designing a new approach to siting, the United States 

can also look to a substantial body of experience in other 

countries. All of the countries the Commission studied 

(see appendix C) provided useful insights for the U.S. 

program going forward. Sweden and Finland are furthest 

along in selecting and developing a repository site, while 

other countries—like France and Canada—have also made 

substantial progress (of these countries, Canada provides 

perhaps the closest analogue to the United States in terms of 

political structure). In addition, Spain recently selected a site 

for a consolidated storage facility. Overall, the experience of 

these countries provides strong support for the Commission’s 

conclusion that a transparent, consent-based approach built 

on a solid understanding of societal values has the best odds 

of achieving success in siting, constructing, and operating 

key waste management facilities.116,117

In Finland, plans to develop a geologic disposal facility for 

SNF at the island of Olkiluoto have the support of the host 

community, Eurajoki (which initially vetoed its selection as 

a repository site).118 Finland’s efforts to site a deep geologic 

repository and undertake associated environmental impact 

assessments began in 1983, when the government issued a 

major policy decision on the management of SNF and on the 

schedule and process to be used for selecting a final repository 

site.119 The siting process entailed three steps. First, a countrywide screening study was undertaken between 1983 and 

1985. This was followed, from 1986 to 1992, by preliminary 

site investigations. In the third phase, from 1993 through 

2000, detailed site investigations and environmental impact 

assessments were conducted for four sites. 

All four sites were found to be technically suitable for 

the final disposal of SNF, but local support for a repository 

was strongest in the communities of Eurajoki and Loviisa 

where nuclear infrastructure already existed. Of these two 

sites, a larger area for surface support facilities was available 

at Olkiluoto. In addition, because of two existing reactors 

at Olkiluoto, a large portion of the country’s spent fuel 

inventory was already on the island. 

In 1999, Posiva Oy (the company responsible for 

managing spent fuel in Finland) applied to the Finnish 

government for a decision-in-principle to go forward with 

a repository at Olkiluoto. At that point, the government 

requested statements on Posiva Oy’s application from the 

municipality of Eurajoki and from the relevant regulatory 

authority. Eurajoki’s municipal council voted in favor (by 

20 votes to 7) and the Finnish government followed with 

a positive decision-in-principle in December 2000. After 

further discussion, Finland’s Parliament overwhelmingly 

ratified the government’s decision (by a vote of 159 to 3) in 

May 2001. Detailed site characterization studies at Olkiluoto 

began in 2004 with the construction of an underground 

research tunnel. A license application for the facility is now 

planned for 2012 with an anticipated start date for repository 

operations in 2020.

The Swedish waste management company, SKB, is 

likewise moving forward with the development of a geologic 

repository for spent nuclear fuel with the consent of the 

host municipal government. Between 1977 and 1985, SKB 

identified a number of “investigation areas” in different parts 

of the country. Such areas were selected for further studies on 

the basis of existing geological data as well as an assessment 

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of the ease of getting permission by the land-owner to carry 

out such investigations (including borehole drillings). This 

approach gradually met more and more opposition. In 

1985, SKB decided to stop these investigations, partly as the 

result of a governmental request. At that time, geological 

information had been collected from about 15 locations. 

An overall conclusion was that it is possible to find sites 

that meet the stipulated geological requirements for a deep 

geological repository in most parts of Sweden.

In early 1992 SKB initiated a new siting process. 

The process started with a letter from SKB to all Swedish 

municipalities (about 290) explaining SKB ́s task to find 

a site for a repository for spent fuel and inviting interested 

municipalities to voluntarily apply. SKB’s invitation resulted 

in two municipalities agreeing to a feasibility study. These 

feasibility studies were followed by referendums in both 

municipalities to ascertain public opinion regarding further 

participation in the siting process. In both cases, the 

referendums resulted in a rejection of further participation.

At that point, SKB conducted further feasibility 

studies and identified five potentially promising sites. Of 

these, SKB approached the three geologically appropriate 

communities that already housed nuclear facilities. In 2001, 

the government approved SKB’s proposal to undertake a 

detailed investigation of these three sites: (1) the existing 

Forsmark nuclear site near the municipality of Östhammer, 

(2) Oskarshamn, which was the site of an underground 

nuclear research laboratory constructed in the early 1990s 

and (3) an area in the northern part of Tierp. A few months 

later, the municipal councils in Östhammer and Oskarshamn 

consented to further investigations, while Tierp opted out 

(importantly, either Östhammer or Oskarshamn could 

have vetoed its selection as a disposal site for HLW).120

Ultimately, this process worked. Of the two remaining 

options, Forsmark—which already hosts a large nuclear 

power plant and an operating repository for short-lived lowand intermediate-level radioactive waste—was ultimately 

selected in 2009 because it offered better geology. In March 

2011, SKB applied to the Swedish government for permits to 

construct a repository in Forsmark.

A unique feature in the Swedish approach is that, before 

the final site decision was made, there was an agreement 

that the community not selected would receive a larger 

amount of compensation than the community that was 

selected. The rationale was that the community selected 

to host the repository would realize additional economic 

benefits, in the form of construction activity, infrastructure 

investments, permanent jobs to operate the repository, 

and ancillary development (e.g., research and fabrication 

facilities, etc.). The value of these benefits to the local 

economy was estimated at about $300 million.121 Ultimately, 

the community near Forsmark will receive approximately 

25 percent of this estimated value for hosting the repository, 

while the community at Oskarshamn, which was not 

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selected, will receive the remainder—approximately 75 

percent of the estimated benefits—for participating in the 

siting process. At this point, the anticipated start date for 

repository operations is 2025.

France established its Agency for Radioactive Waste 

Management (ANDRA) in 1991 to develop a strategy 

and perform research on managing the high-level and 

intermediate-level long-lived radioactive waste generated 

by that country’s nuclear reactor fleet (prior to this time 

the process was largely controlled by the industry and the 

national government). Lines of authority and decisionmaking responsibility were further clarified with the passage 

of the 2006 Planning Act, which established the decision 

in principle to develop a geological repository, to be located 

at a site and in a geological formation that had already 

been studied through an underground laboratory. To date, 

there has been community support for the siting process: 

local governments in the Meuse/Haute-Marne region 

volunteered to host an underground site-characterization 

program and can expect to benefit from a series of measures 

designed to support local development, including a 

dedicated tax on basic nuclear installations, along with 

additional projects. More recently, ANDRA signed a 

contract with a joint venture of two engineering companies 

to conduct industrial design work for a deep geological 

repository for France’s high- and intermediate-level 

radioactive waste. The first conceptual study phase is to be 

conducted in 2012 and will lead to a public consultation 

that will take place in 2013.122

Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management Organization 

(NWMO) was formed in 2002 after the failure of a decadeslong, technically-oriented effort to establish a repository. A 

commission chartered in the 1990s to review the Canadian 

program concluded that while the program had conducted the 

scientific and technical aspects of the program well, it did not 

enjoy public confidence and had not provided for “social safety.” 

This review led to legislation that established the NWMO.

The NWMO has adapted many lessons from the 

Finnish and Swedish experience to its approach to nuclear 

waste management in Canada and pioneered a number of 

novel steps in its approach as well. The very first step taken 

by the NWMO was to ask how its attempt to develop a 

repository would be any different from those of the past. 

The conclusion was reached that the NWMO should first 

seek to understand the deeply-held values of citizens, and 

only then review its options in light of that citizen input.123

After several extensive iterations with Canadian citizens 

and stakeholder organizations, the NWMO has explicitly 

adopted a phased, adaptive approach they call Adaptive 

Phased Management. This deliberate, transparent, and highly 

engaged process has led nine communities to volunteer to 

engage the NWMO in the earliest stage of discussion and 

information gathering, prior to considering whether to have 

surveys conducted. Canada went through an evaluation of its 

program by an external commission more than a decade ago 

and fundamentally restructured its approach as a result. 

Canada’s provincial-level government in some ways 

mirrors the intermediate level of government comparable 

to U.S. state government, which does not exist in Finland, 

France, or Sweden. Canada’s progress to date thus provides 

additional insights and enhances confidence in the siting 

process we are recommending. 

Spain provides the most recent example of a successful 

consent-based siting process for a nuclear waste facility—in 

this case, a consolidated storage facility for spent fuel from 

that country’s eight operating and two shutdown reactors.124

In December 2004 a resolution supported by all parties in 

the Spanish Parliament called on the government to put an 

end to dispersed spent fuel storage at multiple reactor sites 

by developing a central storage facility for the spent fuel, as 

well as for a small quantity of solidified high-level waste due 

to be returned from France. In 2006, an inter-ministerial 

commission of the national government was established 

to define siting criteria for the facility and to develop and 

supervise a transparent, democratic, and participatory siting 

process. In the same year, the commission initiated an 

information campaign aimed at municipalities in the country 

(the siting process had no formal role for the autonomous 

communities, i.e. the large regional governments such 

as Valencia and Andalucia that are analogous to states). 

ENRESA, the national waste management organization 

that would be responsible for designing, constructing, and 

operating the facility, supported the commission’s siting 

process by performing technical studies and providing 

information to stakeholders.

The proposed facility–described as a technology park– 

includes not only the storage facility itself (which will also 

accept intermediate-level radioactive waste from nuclear 

power plant decommissioning), but also other facilities 

intended to support local and regional development, 

including several laboratories. 

In December 2009, the government issued a call for 

proposals from communities interested in hosting the 

facility, and by the end of February 2010 eight communities 

with potentially qualified sites were accepted as candidates. 

Following an evaluation of the proposals, the commission 

proposed a preferred candidate site (Zarra, in Valencia) in 

September 2010, but the government did not formally endorse 

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the recommendation pending efforts to gain consensus at the 

autonomous community level. After delays due in part to an 

acceleration of the schedule for national elections, in December 

2011 the new government announced selection of a site in the 

autonomous community of Castilla la Mancha that had been 

one of the four top-ranked candidates and enjoyed broader 

support beyond the host community than had been the case 

with Zarra. The entire siting process, from establishment of the 

interministerial commission in 2006 through site selection at 

the end of 2011, took less than six years.

In addition to hearing from leaders of the Canadian, 

Finnish, French, and Swedish programs and visiting facilities 

in Finland, France, and Sweden, several Commission 

members had an opportunity to travel to Japan, Russia, 

and the United Kingdom to hear firsthand from leaders of 

those countries’ nuclear waste management programs. As an 

element of these fact-finding trips, members heard from local 

government officials and from a variety of non-governmental 

organizations and other stakeholder groups. In contrast to 

the U.S. situation, these officials and others expressed a high 

degree of confidence in the site identification and selection 

processes used to locate a repository and in the institutions 

responsible for implementing and overseeing those processes. 

Although the countries we visited were in various stages of 

the siting and licensing process, they stressed that several 

elements were critical in establishing a foundation for trust: 

• A clear and understandable legal framework 

• An opt-out option for the local affected community, up 

to a certain point in the process

• The availability of financing for local governments and 

citizen organizations for conducting their own analyses of 

the site and siting issues

• Compensation for allowing the investigation and 

characterization of the proposed site 

• A concerted effort to promote knowledge and awareness 

of the nuclear waste issue and plans for addressing it 

through mechanisms such as:

o Seminars, study visits, and reviews conducted by the 

local government

o Information to and consultation with local inhabitants 

o Socioeconomic studies and evaluations of impacts on 

local businesses 

• Openness and transparency among and within the 

implementing organization, the national government, 

local governments, and the public.

How these elements might be included in a new approach 

to siting future facilities for nuclear waste and spent fuel 

management and disposal in the United States is the subject 

of the next section.

6.3 Key Elements of a Phased, 

Adaptive Approach to Siting

and Developing Facilities

Based on the history of waste management efforts at home 

and abroad, the Commission concludes that the United 

States must commit to a new, more flexible and more 

adaptive approach to siting and developing facilities in 

the future. “Learning by doing” has produced substantial 

improvements in the reliability, safety, and performance of 

commercial nuclear reactors in the United States. It has also 

contributed to an impressive track record of safe transport 

and handling with respect to the transfer of defense TRU 

wastes to the WIPP facility in New Mexico. Compared to 

the prescriptive approach used in attempting to develop 

a repository for spent fuel and HLW at Yucca Mountain, 

other nations—notably Sweden and Finland—appear to be 

proceeding with less controversy using an adaptive, staged 

management approach (recognizing that some other nations 

using an adaptive approach have not yet succeeded in 

identifying repository sites). 

The notion that such an approach could produce better 

outcomes for this nation’s nuclear waste management 

program also is not a new one. In a comprehensive 2001 

report on the status of efforts to provide for the disposition of 

HLW and spent fuel,125 the NAS concluded that “geological 

disposal remains the only long-term solution available” and 

recommended that national waste management programs 

“should proceed in a phased or stepwise manner.”126

The Commission concurs strongly with the NAS 

recommendation. In our view, moreover, the events of 

the last decade only bolster the case for a phased, adaptive 

approach because they demonstrate that without political 

buy-in and trust, progress in the long and demanding process 

of finding a resolution to our nation’s waste management 

challenges will be extremely difficult to sustain.

Of course, the first requirement in siting any facility 

centers on the ability to demonstrate adequate protection of 

public health and safety and the environment. As part of a 

phased, adaptive approach,127 the Commission recommends 

that starting early in the process of exploring a potential 

site the waste management organization begin to develop a 

“safety case” that collects in one document the wide range 

of relevant technical and other information (including 

information on legal, financial, and managerial aspects of 

the waste management system) that together provides a basis 

for confidence in the safety of the proposed facility at the 

proposed site.128 The articulation of a safety case provides 

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makers, stakeholders, and the public; it also helps to promote 

a broader and more accurate understanding of the scientific, 

technical, and other bases for decisions about the facility, 

including ultimately the licensing decision. The purpose 

of the safety case would not be to expand on requirements 

already included in the existing licensing process,129 but 

rather to make the rationale for decisions about the facility 

accessible and understandable to the public and to a wide 

range of decision makers beyond the audience of regulatory 

experts who are already familiar with the full range of 

arguments being considered as part of the process.130

To support the consent-based siting process we have 

recommended, the safety case should (1) be easily accessible 

to all concerned stakeholders and to local, tribal, and 

state government representatives and (2) should strive to 

make clear and explicit all the assumptions and evidence 

that have been considered as part of building the case for 

confidence in the long-term performance of the proposed 

facility at the proposed site. In addition, the safety case 

should be updated as needed to provide an input to 

decisions throughout the facility development process. It 

should also be updated periodically after the facility begins 

operation if agreements with local communities, tribes, or 

states require a periodic revalidation of the facility’s ability 

to meet safety requirements.

One important implication of pursuing an adaptive 

staged approach is that the focus is on initial operation 

of a repository rather than on rapidly disposing of a large 

inventory of waste.131 This follows from the NAS description 

of the characteristics of a successful geologic repository 

program132 as one in which:

• A geologic site and engineered system, judged to be 

technically suitable using the particular country’s 

accepted regulatory, public, and political processes, have 

been identified

• Operational and long-term safety aspects are made 

consistent with the current scientific understanding of 

repository systems, safety features are reviewed; and the 

necessary licenses are granted

• An ongoing long-term monitoring and observation 

program designed to substantiate the current scientific 

understanding of the safety aspects of the repository 

system is in progress

• Sufficient societal consensus is achieved to allow 

operations to begin and continue

• Initial waste emplacement has taken place with plans for 

reversibility

• All necessary safety and security measures are set up to 

place additional waste, if decided

• Procedures and funding arrangements are agreed to 

for either:

o Backfilling (if used), closing, and sealing the 

repository (if technical and societal confidence in the 

long-term isolation properties continues), or

o Maintaining capability for long-term control and 

monitoring, and capability for treating wastes, if waste 

retrieval is necessary for technical or societal reasons. 

It is very important to recognize that these requirements 

in turn imply a need for substantial buffer storage capacity 

in the waste management system so as to decouple the 

program’s ability to accept waste from the emplacement of 

that waste in a repository for disposal. This in turn would 

First, the Environmental Protection Agency and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission should develop a 

generic disposal standard and supporting regulatory 

requirements early in the siting process. Generallyapplicable regulations are more likely to earn public 

confidence than site-specific standards. In addition, having 

a generic standard will support the efficient consideration 

and examination of multiple sites.

Once the new waste management organization is 

established it should:

•	 Develop a set of basic initial siting criteria – These 

criteria will ensure that time is not wasted investigating 

sites that are clearly unsuitable or inappropriate.

•	 Encourage expressions of interest from a large 

variety of communities that have potentially suitable 

sites – As these communities become engaged in the 

process, the implementing organization must be flexible 

enough not to force the issue of consent while also 

being fully prepared to take advantage of promising 

opportunities when they arise.

•	 Establish initial program milestones – Milestones 

should be laid out in a mission plan to allow for review 

by Congress, the Administration, and stakeholders, 

and to provide verifiable indicators for oversight of the 

organization’s performance.

Siting New Nuclear Waste Management Facilities – Getting Started

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provide the flexibility needed to develop repository capacity 

in a more gradual and stepwise manner. The need for buffer 

capacity is addressed by the Commission’s recommendation 

concerning the expeditious development of one or more 

consolidated storage facilities for SNF, as discussed in chapter 

5 of this report. 

6.4 Specific Steps in an 

Adaptive, Staged Facility Siting

and Development Process

Experience in other countries and from the WIPP facility 

in the United States suggests that an adaptive, phased, and 

ultimately consent-based process should start by encouraging 

expressions of interest from a large variety of communities 

that can offer a potentially suitable environment for the 

type of facility under consideration. The waste management 

organization should also be able to approach communities 

that it believes can meet the siting requirements. As 

communities engage the process, the implementing 

organization must be flexible enough not to force the issue 

of consent while also being fully prepared to take advantage 

of promising opportunities when they arise. Throughout, 

meaningful consultation with stakeholders to inform 

them of the status of the siting process and make needed 

adjustments (much as was done by the NWMO in Canada) 

will be critical to building credibility and confidence in the 

implementing organization.

Prior to launching a consent-based siting process, 

the implementing organization should develop a set of 

basic, initial siting criteria designed to ensure that time 

and resources are not wasted to investigate sites that are 

clearly unsafe, unsuitable or inappropriate for waste facility 

development. At the same time, it will be important to 

communicate with local communities and stakeholders 

about the nature of the risks involved in hosting a facility 

and about options for addressing and managing those risks. 

As the siting process continues and as various candidate 

sites pass initial screening criteria, additional sets of criteria 

should be applied to eliminate all but the most suitable 

sites for further characterization. These additional criteria 

might include geologic features, anticipated socioeconomic 

effects, transportation access and impacts, costs, and other 

important considerations. Obviously, as a candidate site is 

characterized in greater and greater detail it will be necessary 

to demonstrate not only that the preliminary criteria are 

satisfied, but that all applicable environmental, health and 

safety, and other requirements set forth by the responsible 

regulatory authorities can be met.

The Commission takes the view that any future site, 

provided it has met all regulatory requirements and has been 

selected with local- and state-level consent should require 

no additional approval, including congressional approval.133

Likewise, after a disposal facility enters operation, any 

modification or expansion of the facility’s mission should be 

consent-based. This approach is consistent with an overall 

framework that gives the new implementing organization 

authority—subject to congressional oversight—to make 

binding agreements with regard to developing key parts of 

the nuclear waste management system. As with other details 

of establishing a new management approach and a new 

implementing organization, the specific requirements for 

moving forward with a particular site would have to be set 

forth in new legislation.

The Commission also recommends that pilot, test, 

and demonstration facilities (including an in situ research 

and demonstration laboratory) be co-located with new 

waste management facilities, as appropriate, wherever 

feasible. This will make it possible to conduct tests aimed 

at improving operational efficiency and safety and signal 

a continuing commitment to R&D to reduce residual 

uncertainties.134 These facilities have also been used as 

excellent public communication tools in Sweden and 

France, for example, to explain to the interested public 

exactly how a repository operates.

The National Academies’ 2003 One Step at a Time report 

identified seven key attributes of adaptive staging:

1. Commitment to systematic learning. Project managers 

intentionally seek, are open to, and learn from new 

knowledge and stakeholder input. Stages are designed 

specifically to increase available scientific, technical, 

societal, institutional, and operational knowledge.

2. Flexibility. Project managers are able and willing to 

reevaluate earlier decisions and redesign or change course 

when new information warrants.

3. Reversibility. Project managers are able to abandon an 

earlier path and reverse the course of action to a previous 

stage if new information warrants.

4. Transparency. The decision-making process and the basis 

for decisions are documented and accessible in real-time 

and plain language to all stakeholders.

5. Auditability. Documentation for the basis of decisions is 

complete and made available to all interested parties for 

review purposes.

6. Integrity. Technical results are accurately and objectively 

reported and all uncertainties, assumptions, and 

indeterminacies are identified and labeled.

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7. Responsiveness. Project managers seek and act on new 

information in a timely fashion.

Finally, the Commission recognizes that reasonable milestones 

for major phases of program development and implementation 

are important to keep the program focused and ensure that it 

is moving forward. The Finnish waste management program 

demonstrates the usefulness of milestones as a mechanism 

to help sustain steady and meaningful progress. Since an 

adaptive phased approach requires both clear programmatic 

planning and flexibility, we recommend that the implementing 

organization establish reasonable time horizons for the major 

stages of the program. As one example, the implementing 

organization might contemplate a range of, say, 15 to 20 years 

to accomplish site identification and characterization and 

to conduct the licensing process. A notional timeframe for 

siting and developing a consolidated storage facility would 

presumably be shorter, perhaps on the order of 5 to 10 years. 

The implementing organization will be responsible for setting 

overall and intermediate milestones for each stage of the 

process. Of course, there will be unforeseen developments 

that could cause siting to take a longer or shorter period of 

time. This is why the program requires flexibility. Program 

milestones should be laid out in a regularly updated mission 

plan (as discussed in chapter 7) to allow for review by 

Congress, the Administration, and stakeholders, and to 

provide verifiable indicators for external oversight of the 

organization’s performance. Any needed changes would be 

presented in mission plan revisions for review as appropriate.135

6.5 Support for Participation

A noteworthy feature of the Swedish repository program is 

that funds from the nuclear waste management organization 

are set aside to be awarded to NGOs involved in the siting 

and repository development process. These funds are used by 

the NGOs to investigate technical and other aspects of the 

nuclear waste management program. 

In the course of the Commission’s deliberations, 

many participants emphasized the importance of citizen 

participation. For example, a letter from the South Carolina 

Governor’s Nuclear Advisory Council and others pointed 

out that “citizen participation results in better and quicker 

decisions that are accepted by the larger public.”136

For a complicated and technically-involved issue like the 

development of a nuclear waste repository, the inability of 

citizens and citizen groups to access the necessary technical 

expertise can be a major barrier to participation (see further 

discussion of this issue in section 6.6). In a large country 

like the United States, sheer distance can also be an issue; 

important meetings, conferences, and other events are 

regularly held in far-flung locations, and travel and lodging 

expenses can be beyond the means of individuals and groups 

who would otherwise wish to participate.137 Perhaps even 

more important, states, tribes, and affected communities—in 

order to gain trust and confidence in the decisions taken by 

the waste management organization—must be empowered to 

meaningfully participate in the decision-making process. This 

means being in a position to evaluate options and provide 

substantive input on technical and operational matters of 

direct relevance to their concerns and interests.138

In sum, the Commission believes that a new U.S. waste 

management organization should adopt the Swedish practice 

and set aside funding for participation by citizens, citizen 

groups, and other NGOs. The availability of funding should be 

widely announced and reasonable criteria should be established 

against which to evaluate applications for financial support. 

Every first-of-a-kind, long-term, and complex 

project develops in stages. With time, stages and 

schedules are inevitably revised in light of experience 

and knowledge gathered along the way. However, 

many national repository programs, including the 

U.S. program, have run afoul of rigid milestones for 

commencing full-scale waste emplacement.

By contrast, adaptive staging entails a flexible approach 

where the overall direction to be taken and its end 

points are outlined at the beginning and all parties, 

including stakeholders, acknowledge that the program 

can be revised as it progresses. Adaptive staging is 

less “error-prone” than a rigid approach and it allows 

the current generation to manage waste using the best 

available knowledge without foreclosing options if future 

generations decide to take a different approach. 

It is important to emphasize that these elements should 

not be implemented in a way that causes continual 

delay. Certainly, an adaptive staged approach may 

result in higher initial costs and a slower pace of waste 

emplacement in the beginning. But the point is to 

implement a process that is ultimately more efficient—both 

in terms of cost and time—because it corrects potential 

problems before they become expensive and time 

consuming. Finally, an adaptive staged approach implies 

continued investment in new learning, including support 

for science and technology development that can improve 

the performance of the whole waste management system. 

Features of Adaptive Staging

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6.6 The Role of States, Tribes, 

and Communities in an Adaptive, 

Consent-Based Siting Process

It has long been accepted that host states, tribes, and 

local governments should play an important role in siting 

nuclear waste management and disposal facilities.139 As one 

early study put it: “If the federal government is to make 

progress toward a permanent solution of the radioactive 

waste problem, it cannot go it alone—citizens will insist 

on assurances (other than federal assurances) that proposed 

actions will not involve undue risks to the host states.”140

In the debates leading up to the original NWPA of 1982, 

Congress considered a wide range of options for formalizing 

the host states’ role in repository siting—from merely 

providing for consultation to giving host states a complete 

veto over proposed projects within their borders. Ultimately, 

the formula adopted in the NWPA included provisions for 

“consultation and cooperation,” combined with some state 

oversight rights and the ability to veto a proposed site. The 

state veto, however, was subject to congressional override—

an option that was exercised when Congress overrode 

Nevada’s veto of the Yucca Mountain site in 2002.141

As we noted in our brief review of lessons learned from 

the U.S. experience so far, states have generally resisted—in 

some cases very strongly—efforts to site HLW and spent 

fuel disposal and away-from-reactor storage sites within their 

borders.142 By contrast, some local governments and tribes 

have viewed these facilities more positively—and in some 

cases have supported them strongly—primarily on the basis of 

anticipated job creation and economic development benefits. 

Indeed, some of the most supportive communities have been 

those with a long history of hosting nuclear facilities. Tribal 

and local support, however, has not usually been sufficient 

to overcome state-level opposition. This suggests that to 

be successful, a new waste management organization must 

find ways to address state concerns while at the same time 

capitalizing on local support for proposed facilities. 

What those concerns might be and how the tensions 

inherent in the federal–state and federal–tribe relationship 

might be successfully navigated in different siting contexts 

is impossible to anticipate in advance. Clearly, locating and 

constructing facilities for the management and disposal of 

SNF and HLW will require complex and possibly lengthy 

negotiations between the federal government and other 

relevant units of government. In these negotiations, it will be 

important to define the roles, responsibilities, and authorities 

of host state, tribal, and local governments both throughout 

the siting and licensing process and once a facility is 

operational.143 In addition, host jurisdictions should have 

the option to enter into partnership arrangements or other 

legally-binding, court-enforceable agreements with the 

implementing organization to ensure that all commitments 

concerning the development and subsequent operation of 

waste management facilities are upheld. A similarly consentbased approach should be used in the future in deciding 

whether modifications to the scope or mission of an existing 

facility are appropriate and acceptable.

Beyond engaging in substantive negotiations and binding 

agreements with other units of government as part of the 

facility siting and development process, the Commission 

believes that states and tribes should retain—or where 

appropriate, be delegated—direct authority over aspects 

of regulation, permitting, and operations where oversight 

below the federal level can be exercised effectively and in a 

way that is helpful in protecting the interests and gaining 

the confidence of affected communities and citizens. 

Such authorities could be included in legally-enforceable 

agreements or partnerships if such arrangements are 

negotiated between the implementing organization and 

states, tribes, and/or local communities that agree to host 

a waste management facility. We recognize that defining a 

meaningful and appropriate role for states, tribes, and local 

governments under current law is far from straightforward, 

given that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides 

for exclusive federal jurisdiction over many radioactive 

waste management issues.144 Nevertheless, we believe 

it will be essential to affirm a role for states, tribes, and 

local governments that is at once positive, proactive, and 

substantively meaningful and thereby reduces rather than 

increases the potential for conflict, confusion, and delay. 

At the same time, host state, local, and tribal governments 

have responsibilities to work productively with the federal 

government to help advance the national interest.

Several commenters have expressed a desire to see the 

Commission explicitly define the point at which potential 

host state, tribal and local governments could no longer 

unconditionally (that is, without cause) “opt out” of a facility 

siting process. These commenters correctly note that the level 

of state, tribal and community acceptance of a proposed 

waste management facility can and likely will fluctuate over 

time. The Commission believes that defining the point at 

which the right to unconditionally opt out expires must be 

part of the negotiation between affected units of government 

and the waste management organization. In our view, 

however, the right to opt out without cause should expire no 

later than the time when a license application for a proposed 

facility is submitted. 

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We believe this approach makes sense given that, under the 

process we have recommended, the potential host community, 

tribe, and state would have had to consent to be considered 

for a waste site, with full knowledge of the relevant safety 

standards and siting criteria. Further, the host state and 

affected tribal and local governments would have had to agree 

to the terms of site study and what was to be built prior to 

the submission of a license application. When studies were 

complete, a license application would be prepared, and the 

Commission believes the host state and affected tribal and 

local governments should be given the opportunity to sign 

off on it before submittal. After that time, the state and other 

units of government would only be allowed to opt out “for 

cause”—such as bad faith on the part of the facility operator. 

Formal agreements, of the type we have recommended 

elsewhere, would be in place to cover this situation. 

It is worth noting that in the context of the fundamentally 

consent-based facility siting and development process we are 

recommending, negotiations with host states, tribes, and local 

governments would obviate the need for a state-level veto, 

just as the veto/override provisions of the NWPA would not 

have applied to a repository or MRS facility sited through 

the voluntary Nuclear Waste Negotiator process established 

in the 1987 NWPA amendments. Meanwhile, legislation to 

establish a new waste management organization and associated 

funding reforms (discussed in detail in the next two chapters) 

must make it clear that the organization has the responsibility, 

authority, and resources to negotiate and comply with 

enforceable commitments.

Here, as in other aspects of facility siting, it is instructive 

to look again to the WIPP experience, since that project was 

controversial at the state level for many years despite strong 

local support from the Carlsbad business community. After 

years of delay and state–federal disagreements, an important 

development came when Congress required EPA (not DOE) 

to certify that the facility met applicable standards for 

waste disposal, including requirements under the Resource 

Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) for the disposal of 

mixed hazardous and radioactive waste.146 This meant that 

the State of New Mexico retained authority to regulate mixed 

waste at WIPP and that the New Mexico Environment 

Department had to issue a Hazardous Waste Facility Permit 

for the repository. Even though the state did not have direct 

regulatory authority over the radioactive components of the 

waste being brought to the facility,147 this development was 

very important in terms of giving state officials and residents 

beyond the local community confidence that the facility 

was safe. Similarly, DOE’s decision to work cooperatively 

with Carlsbad and the Western Governors’ Association 

to develop a safe transportation program for WIPP was 

extremely helpful in addressing transportation-related 

concerns. The resulting Western Governors’ Association 

WIPP Transportation Safety Program Implementation 

Guide includes many procedures that would otherwise be 

considered “extra-regulatory” and could not be mandated 

by the states without federal consent. And finally, the 

establishment of the federally-funded, university-housed 

Environmental Evaluation Group was important for gaining 

the trust of state officials and the local community because 

it provided an independent and credible source for technical 

information and review of the WIPP project.148

Trust, in fact, is often the core issue whenever different 

parties are involved in a complex adjudicatory process—

and it can be especially difficult to sustain when much of 

the power or control is viewed as being concentrated on 

one side. In a recent news article, former Governor Michael 

Sullivan of Wyoming pointed to a lack of trust as one of the 

central issues that led him to veto a proposed monitored 

retrievable storage facility in Wyoming in 1992.149 The 

WIPP example suggests that having some degree of direct 

state- or local-level control (in the WIPP case, this was 

possible through RCRA) can be helpful in instances where 

faith in federal agencies is lacking. In some cases, states have 

pursued formal agreements with the federal government 

that can be enforced in the courts, if necessary. In 1995, for 

Another question highlighted in numerous comments 

to the BRC is the question of how to define “consent.” 

Some stakeholders, for example, have suggested 

that consent within a state could be measured by 

a state-wide referendum or ballot question. On the 

other hand, the WIPP facility was sited, opened, and 

has been operated without the state’s elected leaders 

employing such consent-measuring mechanisms. The 

Commission takes the view that the question of how 

to determine consent ultimately has to be answered 

by a potential host jurisdiction, using whatever means 

and timing it sees fit. We believe that a good gauge of 

consent would be the willingness of the host state (and 

other affected units of government, as appropriate) to 

enter into legally binding agreements with the facility 

operator, where these agreements enable states, 

tribes, or communities to have confidence that they can 

protect the interests of their citizens.145 

consent

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example, the State of Idaho entered into an agreement with 

DOE and the U.S. Navy that allows DOE to ship a limited 

quantity of spent fuel (primarily from research reactors 

and from the Navy’s nuclear-powered fleet) to INL for 

storage over a 40-year period. The agreement also obligates 

DOE to move all spent fuel into dry storage by 2023 and 

to remove all naval spent fuel from Idaho by no later than 

2035. If DOE fails to meet any of the agreement milestones 

at any point, DOE is subject to fines of $60,000 per day 

and the State of Idaho may ask the U.S. District Court to 

halt any further spent fuel shipments to INL. The State of 

Washington recently entered into a similar agreement with 

DOE concerning the storage of wastes at Hanford.

The same issues of trust, consultation, and control arise 

in the context of the federal government’s interactions 

with Indian tribes, another important stakeholder group in 

the context of nuclear waste management decisions.150 In 

fact, because many existing and proposed nuclear sites are 

either on or near tribal lands, tribal governments have been 

involved in nuclear technology and nuclear waste issues 

for decades. The 1982 NWPA requires consultation with 

states and affected Indian tribes and specifically addresses 

the participation of tribes in repository siting decisions. In 

the wake of the 1987 NWPA amendments, several tribes 

expressed interest in exploring the possibility of hosting 

nuclear waste facilities on at least an interim basis. As was the 

case with local communities, however, these expressions of 

interest generally met with opposition at the state level. 

Intergovernmental relationships will require careful 

attention as the U.S. nuclear waste management program 

is revived. Experience shows that an unwilling state 

government can successfully stand in the way of tribal 

efforts to site nuclear waste management facilities and the 

Commission believes it would be unrealistic to attempt 

to locate a facility on tribal land in the face of determined 

state-level opposition. Yet unlike local communities or 

state governments, tribes have a unique “government-togovernment” relationship with the United States.151 Their 

right to make their own laws and be governed by them is 

limited only by their status as dependent domestic nations 

and by federal law. Therefore, the federal organization 

tasked with managing the waste problem will be required to 

work with federally-recognized tribes on a government-togovernment basis. 

Legally, states have a very limited role in Indian affairs. 

They do not have the power to regulate Indian tribes or 

tribal lands unless such powers are delegated to them by the 

federal government. Since 1975, moreover, federal policy 

has supported tribal self-determination. This means that 

meaningful consultation with tribal governments is required 

in the development of federal policies and practices that 

may impact tribal lands, people, or resources.152 The existing 

State and Tribal Government Working Group (STGWG) 

provides an example of one mechanism for facilitating 

regular consultation between states and tribes and the 

federal government. Established in 1989 at the request of 

10 state governors, the group grew to include 15 states and 

10 tribes who would meet with DOE to discuss the federal 

government’s cleanup activities at facilities that have been 

or are still part of the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. 

STGWG now meets twice annually. As with states, some 

precedent also exists for giving tribes a degree of regulatory 

control over specific facilities or operations in the nuclear 

waste management system. In 1991, the Shoshone-Bannock 

Tribe attempted to stop the shipment of commercial spent 

fuel across its reservation in Idaho. A lawsuit resulted and 

while the courts concluded that federal law (in this case, the 

Hazardous Materials Transportation Act) did not allow the 

tribes to ban spent fuel shipments from crossing their land, it 

did allow them to develop regulations for those shipments. 

In sum, whatever the specific authorities and resources 

of a given community, state, or Indian tribe, experience 

shows that determined opposition at any level of 

government can at a minimum significantly complicate and 

delay, and in many cases defeat, best efforts to site a facility. 

In this context, it is difficult to overstate the importance 

of support for a facility or site at the state, tribe, and local 

level (obviously, public acceptance is not the only criterion; 

to be considered, any site must also meet safety and 

technical criteria and other requirements). Support from 

Congress—for the new waste management organization 

and its activities as well as for participating states, tribes, 

and communities—is obviously also important. In the 

case of WIPP, Congress engaged with the siting process 

over a period of many years and at several critical junctures 

congressional intervention, far from undermining the 

process, helped build trust, resolve issues and ultimately 

achieve success.

6.7 Benefits to Host States, 

Tribes, and Communities 

In addition to conducting a process that is consent-based, 

transparent, and responsive to tribal, state, and local 

governments’ need for meaningful input and control, it will be 

important to demonstrate that the decision to host a facility can 

deliver real benefits (economic and otherwise) to the tribe, state, 

and local community.153 Affected states, tribes, and communities 

will reasonably expect incentives for helping to address the 

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important national issue of nuclear waste management. To be 

most effective, such incentives must be provided in ways that are 

generous, creative, and attentive to their symbolic content. 

Besides financial incentives, benefits could include local 

preferences in hiring and in the purchase of goods and 

services by the waste management facility, infrastructure 

investments (such as new roads or rail lines154), as well as the 

opportunity to host co-located research and demonstration 

facilities or other activities that would generate new 

employment opportunities and make a positive contribution 

to the local and regional economy.155 For example, Spain’s 

effort to find a volunteer host for a storage facility for spent 

fuel and a small amount of HLW included a technological 

research laboratory to deal with waste processing, waste 

forms, disposal of HLW as well as spent fuel, etc. as an 

integral part of the facility. Eight volunteer communities for 

the integrated storage/research facility were identified and a 

final site was selected in December 2011 (see section 6.2). 

As noted in section 7.4.1, we recommend that the 

responsibilities of the new waste management organization 

include promoting the social and economic well-being of 

communities affected by waste management facilities. The 

Commission also recommends that the benefits provided by 

the current NWPA156 be modified and expanded to give the 

waste management organization greater flexibility to promote 

economic development. Specifically, the Commission 

believes that the level of benefits currently specified in 

Section 171 of the NWPA is inadequate. Accordingly we 

recommend that the NWPA be amended to authorize a 

new federal corporation (described in the next chapter) 

to negotiate substantial benefits—potentially well above 

the amounts currently contemplated in Section 171—to 

state and local governments, communities, tribes, or other 

organizations as appropriate. The specific uses of these funds 

and the metrics that would determine their amounts should 

be an element of negotiation between the federal government 

and local communities and governments interested in 

hosting facilities, but we envision that benefit payments 

could be used for a wide range of uses, including for 

economic development purposes. All such payments should 

be subjected to external, independent auditing.

In addition to locating waste management-related 

activities in the affected state and community, these states 

and communities could also be given preference in the siting 

of other federal projects (provided they are otherwise suitable 

to host those projects). Section 174 of the NWPA, titled 

“Other Benefits—Considerations in Siting Facilities,” already 

specifies that the Secretary of Energy “in siting Federal 

research projects, shall give special consideration to proposals 

from states where a repository is located.” This approach can 

provide additional benefits to host communities and states 

without requiring new appropriations or increasing the cost 

of already planned programs or projects. The Commission 

recommends that this provision be expanded to include 

states that host any waste management facilities sited by the 

new waste management organization and to clarify that the 

special consideration applies to research, development, and 

demonstration facilities (not research contracts) that receive 

federal funding, including any federal matching funds. 

In addition to incentives and benefits, neighbors and 

others impacted by nuclear waste management facilities need 

assurance of reasonable compensation for real costs. The 

Commission believes that the framework for evaluating and 

providing compensation for direct impacts in the current 

NWPA is workable and should be left alone.157

Experiences in Sweden, Finland, and elsewhere have 

shown that it may not be possible or even advisable to specify 

incentives and compensation up front; rather, in keeping 

with an adaptive approach, these determinations are best 

left to the discretion of the implementing organization 

and potential host governments—including communities 

surrounding the host community. These stakeholders will be 

in the best position to determine what incentives are both 

appropriate and in their best interests.

Finally, it is important to recognize that Congress may 

ultimately have a role in providing or approving benefits and 

compensation for hosting nationally-needed nuclear waste 

facilities, particularly since some benefits—such as transfers 

of federal land to host states, tribes, or communities to 

compensate for land withdrawn for waste facilities—may be 

beyond the waste management organization’s authority and 

could require legislation.

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7. A NEW RGANIZATION

AD THE ATION’s WASTE

ANAGEMENT PROGRAM

This is one of the Commission’s central recommendations,

and it cross-cuts all aspects of the new strategy we propose

for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the

United States. We believe that new institutional leadership

for the nation’s nuclear waste program is clearly needed

and that a new organization offers the best opportunity

to establish—from the outset—the track record of

consultation, transparency, accountability, and scientific

and technical credibility needed to re-establish trust with

the public and key stakeholders. We urge that legislation

to establish this new institution be enacted soon, because

the sooner a new institution can take over the waste

management program, the sooner it can begin restoring

trust and building the relationships and the credibility

necessary for success over the many decades the nuclear

waste program will operate.

The remainder of this chapter elaborates on the rationale

for establishing a new waste management organization and

discusses related issues and design decisions, including the

form and structure of a new organization, key attributes,

Having examined the history of U.S. nuclear waste

policy over the last 60 years, the Commission

concludes that a new, single-purpose organization

is needed to develop and implement a focused, integrated

program for the transportation, storage, and disposal158 of

nuclear waste in the United States.

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scope of responsibility, governance and oversight issues, 

stakeholder participation, and the transfer of contracts and 

liabilities. The critical issue of funding is covered in the next 

chapter of this report.

7.1 The Rationale for a

New Waste Management 

Organization

For the last 60 years, the DOE and its predecessor agencies have 

had primary responsibility, subject to annual appropriations 

and policy direction by Congress, for implementing U.S. 

nuclear waste policy. DOE is a large cabinet-level agency with 

multiple competing missions, a budget that is dependent on 

annual congressional appropriations, and top management that 

changes with every change of administration, and sometimes 

more frequently than that.

Clearly, multiple factors have worked against the timely 

implementation of the NWPA and responsibility for the 

difficulties of the past does not belong to DOE alone. 

Nevertheless, the record of the last several decades indicates 

that the current approach is not well suited to conducting 

a steady and focused long-term effort, and to building 

and sustaining the degree of trust and stability necessary 

to establish one or more disposal facilities and implement 

other essential elements of an integrated waste management 

strategy. These considerations lead the Commission to 

agree with a conclusion that has also been reached by 

many stakeholders and long-time participants in the 

nation’s nuclear waste management program: that moving 

responsibility to a single purpose organization—outside 

DOE—at this point offers the best chance for future success. 

For example, a new organization dedicated to the safe, 

secure management and ultimate disposal of high-level nuclear 

waste can concentrate on this objective in a way that is difficult 

for a larger agency that must balance multiple agendas or policy 

priorities. A new organization will be in a better position to 

develop a strong culture of safety, transparency, consultation, 

and collaboration.159 And by signaling a clear break with the 

often troubled history of the U.S. waste management program 

it can begin repairing the legacy of distrust left by decades of 

missed deadlines and failed commitments. 

Finally, while the Commission recognizes that it will 

never be possible or even desirable to fully separate future 

waste management decisions from politics, we believe a 

new organization with greater control over its finances 

could operate with less influence from short-term political 

pressures. We do not propose that a new organization be 

less accountable for its actions—on the contrary, effective 

oversight by Congress and by a strong, independent regulator 

remains essential. But with greater control over year-toyear budgets and operations, we believe a new organization 

could more easily maintain the program-level continuity and 

mission consistency that has often been lacking at DOE. 

From an implementation standpoint, this is clearly 

among the most difficult recommendations advanced by 

the Commission. Nevertheless, it is also one of the most 

important, since even the wisest policies are likely to 

fail without an institutional structure that is capable of 

implementing them. 

7.2 Options for Structuring

a New Waste Management 

Organization

Proposals to establish a new waste management organization are 

not new. In 1982, the original NWPA directed DOE to study 

alternative approaches for constructing and operating civilian 

radioactive waste management facilities, including, specifically, 

the feasibility of establishing a private corporation for these 

purposes. More recently, legislation introduced in the 110th and 

111th sessions of Congress160 would have amended the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 to create a new federal corporation (called 

the “United States Nuclear Fuel Management Corporation”) 

that would “assume responsibility for the activities, obligations, 

and use of resources of the federal government with respect 

to SNF management.” Over the nearly three-decade period 

between the original NWPA legislation and this recent proposal, 

alternative means for financing and managing the nation’s HLW 

program have been extensively studied but never implemented. 

Though it is clear to the Commission from its study of this 

history that a new waste management organization could take 

a number of forms, we conclude that a federal corporation 

chartered by Congress offers the most promising model. This 

is also the organizational form proposed in recent legislation 

and recommended by an independent advisory committee (the 

Alternative Means of Financing and Managing or “AMFM” 

Panel) in 1984.161 We believe that an independent federal 

corporation with a well-defined mission, access to adequate 

resources, ability to make binding contractual commitments, 

and subject to rigorous external oversight is more apt to 

achieve the combination of attributes discussed in this 

section.162 The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which was 

established in 1933 to promote resource development in the 

Tennessee Valley region, may provide a useful existing example 

of such a federally-chartered, mission-oriented coporation.

Compared to simply creating a new single-purpose 

federal agency (even one housed entirely outside DOE), 

we believe a corporate organization will also (a) be less 

susceptible to political micromanagement, (b) have more 

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flexibility to respond to changes in external conditions, and 

(c) have a greater ability to manage costs and schedules. 

More important than the specific form of the new 

organization, however, is that it possess the attributes, 

independence, and resources to effectively carry out 

its mission. While a corporate structure appears to the 

Commission to offer particular advantages, previous studies 

have concluded that a number of different organizational 

forms could also get the job done.

Striking the right balance of independence and 

accountability is the key challenge, whether a new waste 

management organization is structured as a federal 

corporation or takes some other form. In any case, Congress 

must provide clear policy direction, exercise ongoing 

oversight, and establish the necessary funding mechanisms 

but should leave control of operational decisions and 

resource commitments for implementing the policy direction 

to the new organization. Those decisions and commitments, 

and indeed the performance of the organization as a whole, 

would, of course, be subject to policy, safety, security, 

technical, and financial review by appropriate government 

agencies and Congress. We recommend that a board of 

How a new waste management organization behaves and 

delivers on commitments is more important than what 

specific organizational form it takes. In presentations, public 

comments, and written submissions to the Commission, 

stakeholders and experts repeatedly stressed that actions 

and behavior, more than policies or promises, would be 

key to restoring trust in the nation’s waste management 

program and in the institutions responsible for operating 

that program. Policy makers should therefore consider what 

design features—including what organizational structure and 

operational ground rules—would foster the behaviors and 

attributes most critical to the new organization’s success: 

•	 Mission orientation—A well-defined, stable mission, 

and the organizational capability to focus resources, 

personnel, and attention on that mission, without being 

diverted by other priorities. 

•	 Performance—Ability to achieve and sustain 

high standards of technical, managerial, and craft 

performance through a skilled workforce supported by 

a high-reliability, safety-oriented culture.

•	 Integrity—The intent to be truthful, honest, accurate 

and open in conducting the program and to place 

ethical considerations and public well-being at the 

center of decision making.

•	 Empowerment—Sufficient authority and independence 

from political micromanagement to be able to 

implement the mission. 

•	 Continuity—Stability in terms of organizational structure, 

culture, and leadership, particularly at the senior levels.

•	 Flexibility—The ability to anticipate and adapt to 

new challenges, including sufficient organizational 

independence to do so. 

•	 Transparency—A clear, open, and transparent 

decision-making process.

•	 Participation—Straightforward paths for involvement 

by all interested parties, with adequate staff and funding 

dedicated to outreach.

•	 Responsiveness—The willingness and ability to 

respond effectively to the concerns and expectations of 

diverse stakeholders and constituencies.

•	 Funding—Assured financing to accomplish the mission.

•	 Accountability—Mechanisms to assure responsible 

action and to ensure effective oversight by Congress, 

independent regulators, financial and technical 

reviewers, and the public.

•	 Constancy—Commitment to behavior that builds trust 

and confidence, most importantly by delivering on 

promises, contracts, obligations, and deadlines. 

Two of these attributes—flexibility and responsiveness—are 

particularly important for program success. Not coincidentally, 

they are also supported by most of the other attributes listed. 

Flexibility is needed because the program must operate over 

very long timeframes in which major changes in technology, 

institutions, and societal values are inevitable but frequently 

unpredictable. The capacity to adapt will be essential. 

Responsiveness means the ability of the new organization to 

continually understand and reflect the values of stakeholders 

and the broader public. Finally, accountability to Congress, 

to other oversight bodies, to key stakeholders, and to the 

public is also critical to gaining and sustaining trust, as is a 

consistent commitment to transparency and communication 

about how decisions are being made and how competing 

values and interests are being balanced.

Key Attributes of a New Waste Management Organization

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directors be appointed by the President and confirmed by the 

Senate (for staggered seven-year terms). The fundamental role 

of the board would be to provide management and fiduciary 

oversight and operational direction. Members of the board 

should be selected to provide a range of perspectives and 

expertise and to ensure that key interests are represented.163

In addition to an engaged and highly competent board 

of directors, a new waste management corporation will need 

the leadership of a strong chief executive. It will therefore be 

critically important to define the position and powers of the 

CEO in terms that will attract candidates with exceptional 

management, political, and technical skills and experience. 

Under both the original AMFM Panel proposal and recent 

legislative proposals, the CEO would be appointed by the 

corporation’s board of directors. The Commission supports this 

approach. Other important questions concerning the scope 

of responsibilities for the new organization, oversight, and 

stakeholder participation are taken up in the next sections, while 

the critical issue of funding is discussed in the next chapter. 

7.3 Scope of Responsibilities 

for a New Waste Management 

Organization

The Commission’s strong view is that to be successful, a new 

waste management organization must be clearly focused 

on issues of direct relevance to its primary mission, which 

is the safe management and disposal of SNF and high-level 

radioactive wastes. 

Specifically, we recommend that the scope of the 

organization be limited to those functions already assigned to 

the government in the NWPA, as amended, including: 

• Responsibility for siting, obtaining licenses for, 

constructing, operating, and ultimately closing facilities for 

the disposal of civilian and defense HLW and spent fuel.

Size: Eleven members, including the CEO.

Appointment: appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate (with the exception of the 

Board-appointed CEO who serves ex officio).

General qualifications: To be eligible to be appointed as a member of the Board, an individual shall — (1) be a citizen of 

the United States; (2) with the exception of the CEO, not be an employee of the Corporation; (3) make full disclosure to 

Congress of any investment or other financial interest that the individual holds in the energy industry; and (4) affirm support 

for the purposes of the Corporation.

Composition: The composition of the board is intended to ensure the ability to exercise sound, professional managerial and 

financial oversight of the functions of the waste management corporation. The President and the Senate, in making these 

appointments, will consider individuals who bring that expertise, ability, and experience. 

Nominees should be selected from organizations contributing to the Nuclear Waste Fund, state public utility commissions, the 

environmental non-governmental organization community, representatives of workers involved in the construction or operation 

of radioactive waste management facilities, and others with demonstrated knowledge and experience relevant to the conduct 

of the activities of the organization, including technical, scientific, social science, community and stakeholder relations, siting, 

and public health and safety functions. Not more than six of the members shall be from any one political party.

Chairman: Selected by the Board.

CEO: Selected by the Board in its sole discretion, and serves as an ex officio member of the Board.

Compensation for members who are not federal employees would be provided through an annual stipend (e.g. TVA) 

or through compensation at a specified daily rate (e.g. proposed United States Nuclear Fuel Management Corporation 

Establishment Act) 

Term of office: Seven years, renewable once. Staggered terms, member would continue to serve until his/her successor is 

appointed. 

Subcommittees and consultants: The Board is authorized to form subcommittees and hire consultants and advisors as needed. 

Example of How the Nuclear Waste Management Corporation’s 

Board of Directors Might Be Structured

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• Responsibility for providing consolidated storage capacity 

for commercial spent fuel, either by directly siting, obtaining 

licenses for, constructing, and operating storage facilities or 

by contracting with private entities that have established and 

licensed such capability with the agreement of the host state, 

tribe, and other affected units of government.

• Responsibility for the transportation of commercial spent 

fuel once it has been accepted from utilities for disposition.

• Responsibility for conducting non-generic RD&D 

activities related to storage, transportation, and 

geologic disposal, as well as non-generic R&D on the 

social dimensions of nuclear waste management.164

(Responsibility for generic research in alternative disposal 

methods and advanced fuel cycle and waste form options 

should remain with DOE and private industry. In 

other words, it should continue to be funded by general 

appropriations and by industry.) 

We include a lead role in defining and funding related social 

science research among the new organization’s responsibilities 

because we believe public acceptance and policy preferences 

will continue to have an important, if not decisive, influence 

on nuclear materials management policies in the future. 

Current understanding of these attitudes and preferences is 

inadequate, and in any event social attitudes and preferences 

will undoubtedly change with time as views on safety, energy 

security, environmental protection, and other issues also 

change. Targeted social science research can help improve 

understanding of the public’s concerns and provide the 

foundation for an informed consideration of social issues in 

the research agenda and in waste management decisions. 

By contrast, research and other activities related to the 

development of new reactor and fuel cycle technologies 

should, in our view, be left to DOE and industry. That said, 

authorizing legislation should give the new organization clear 

direction concerning the need to work with industry and 

DOE to ensure that waste management considerations are 

integral to future reactor and fuel cycle developments and 

that the waste management system will have the flexibility 

to support such developments.165,166 The Commission notes 

that none of the past studies of organizational options for 

waste management have recommended broadening the scope 

beyond storage, transportation, and disposal; in addition, 

most countries that have confronted this question have opted 

to separate institutional responsibility for waste disposal and 

advanced fuel cycle facilities.

For example, France, which is one of the principal 

nations actively engaged in nuclear fuel reprocessing and 

recycling, has separated responsibility for waste management 

from other fuel cycle functions and has given that 

responsibility to an independent organization (ANDRA), 

distinct from the government agency (CEA) that is 

responsible for reactor and fuel cycle RD&D. 

Late in our review we heard comments from several 

states that host DOE defense waste in support of leaving 

responsibility for defense waste disposal with DOE. These 

states generally agreed with the proposal in the Commission’s 

draft report to establish a new organization to manage civilian 

wastes, but believe the government can more effectively meet 

its national security obligations and cleanup commitments if 

responsibility for defense waste disposal remains with DOE. 

The Commission also heard from interested parties, such as 

NEI, who provided credible arguments for why the original 

commingling decision should be sustained. Whatever one’s 

view of the pros and cons of the current policy, a decision to 

move responsibility for defense wastes to a new organization 

(versus leaving that responsibility with DOE) would have 

major implications for the scope of responsibility for the 

new organization, as well as for key questions of funding, 

governance, and Congressional oversight.

Since a 1985 decision by President Reagan that a separate 

permanent repository for defense high-level waste was 

not required,167 DOE has planned to dispose of all highlevel waste and spent fuel from national defense activities 

and from DOE’s own research activities in a repository 

for commercial waste developed under the NWPA. Any 

investigation of whether the United States should consider 

reversing the 1985 decision to commingle defense and 

civilian waste for disposal will require both a re-examination 

of the factors that were required by section 8 of the NWPA 

to be evaluated as part of the presidential decision, and an 

assessment of facts and factors that have changed since the 

presidential decision. These facts and factors include:

• The sharp shift in focus at DOE from the production of 

materials for nuclear weapons to the cleanup and disposal 

of legacy wastes from the Cold War.

• The establishment of legally-binding site clean-up 

commitments that require DOE to remove defense wastes 

from some sites where they are currently stored by 2035.

• The current lack of statutory authority to develop a 

repository at a site other than Yucca Mountain under the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

• Successful development and operation of a geologic 

repository (WIPP), with a mission explicitly limited 

to the disposal of transuranic waste only from defense 

nuclear activities.

• Our recommendation to establish a new organization 

outside of DOE to develop and operate repositories 

under an amended NWPA.

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We are not in a position to comprehensively assess 

the implications of any actions that might affect DOE’s 

compliance with its cleanup agreements, and we did not have 

the time or the resources necessary to thoroughly evaluate the 

many factors that must be considered by the Administration 

and Congress in making such a determination. The 

Commission therefore urges the Administration to launch an 

immediate review of the implications of leaving responsibility 

for disposal of defense waste and other DOE-owned waste 

with DOE versus moving it to a new waste management 

organization. This review should include an assessment of 

issues associated with the disposition of DOE-owned wastes 

from non-defense sources (e.g. a portion of the high-level 

waste now stored at West Valley, New York, and a variety 

of wastes now in storage at INL such as damaged fuel from 

the Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor). The implementation 

of other BRC recommendations, however, should not wait 

for the commingling issue to be resolved. Congressional and 

Administration efforts to implement our recommendations 

can and should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

7.4 Governance/Oversight 

Recommendations for a New 

Organization

This section turns to the issue of accountability in a new 

organization. As we have already noted, considerations 

of independence and accountability are fundamentally 

intertwined and must be carefully balanced. Put another 

way, a new waste management organization will only be 

entrusted with substantial operational and financial autonomy 

if Congress and the American public are confident that 

safeguards are in place to ensure that the organization behaves 

responsibly and uses public resources wisely to achieve national 

policy objectives. For this reason, all analyses and proposals 

involving new institutional leadership for the nation’s waste 

management program, starting with the AMFM Panel report 

in the 1980s, have paid considerable attention to issues of 

governance, oversight, and accountability. 

7.4.1 Congressional Oversight

Congress would play a central role in ensuring the 

accountability of a new waste management organization 

in several ways. First, Congress would define—through 

enabling legislation—the mission, structure, responsibilities, 

and powers of the new organization.168 Specifically, Congress 

must define:

• The national nuclear waste policy framework within 

which the organization must operate

• The institutional form of the new organization

• Financial resources and funding mechanisms for the new 

organization

• The roles of state, local, and tribal governments in siting 

waste management and disposal facilities, including the 

nature of public funding for state, local, tribal and other 

stakeholder participation

• The organization’s responsibility to promote the social 

and economic well-being of communities affected by 

waste management facilities,169 as well as the general 

nature of incentives to be provided and the manner in 

which states, tribes, and localities are to be funded during 

the siting process.

In addition, the organization should be required to prepare 

regular reports to Congress on its activities, expenditures, and 

progress. Review of these reports, along with periodic oversight 

hearings and Senate confirmation of the new organization’s 

board of directors would be the chief mechanisms through 

which Congress would exercise oversight.170

In defining these responsibilities, we encourage Congress to 

adopt an approach that provides the new management entity 

with as much latitude as possible in accomplishing its mission. 

While Congress would provide a policy framework at the 

outset, some mechanism for facilitating later adjustments 

or course corrections (after the initial policy direction is 

specified in law) may be desirable.171 One option would be 

to use the mission plan already required in the NWPA as a 

vehicle for ongoing Congressional oversight. The new waste 

management organization could submit a mission plan 

describing its planned activities, schedules and milestones, 

and supporting budget to DOE and Congress on a regular 

basis (e.g., every three to five years). The mission plan could 

also lay out a timeline or milestones specifying when and 

for what purposes the organization will require access to 

the corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund held by the Treasury 

(the Commission’s recommendations related to the nuclear 

waste fee and Fund are discussed in chapter 8). If desired, 

legislation establishing the new organization could include 

an expedited process similar to that provided by the 

Congressional Review Act (CRA) through which Congress 

could veto a proposed mission plan revision by passing a 

joint resolution, subject to presidential veto.172 This approach 

would allow substantial congressional control over changes 

of direction without requiring that legislation be passed to 

approve such changes whenever they are needed. 

7.4.2 Management Oversight

In many of the proposals for a new organization advanced 

to date (including by the original AMFM Panel, the 

proposed legislation cited above, and this Commission), 

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a first layer of accountability below Congress is provided 

by a board of directors. This would provide a degree of 

ongoing management oversight and control that is not 

normally present with a typical federal agency program; it 

would also be particularly appropriate for an organization 

that is engaged in a business-like, fee-for-service activity 

such as managing high-level nuclear waste. The board of 

directors would have the usual powers granted such bodies: 

it would set broad policies and objectives (within the 

statutory framework set by Congress); select top managers, 

establish the management structure, and define personnel 

policies; approve annual budgets; and report to external 

stakeholders on the performance of the organization. This 

approach appears to be the norm in other nations’ waste 

management programs. Having looked at organizational 

arrangements for radioactive waste management in 12 other 

countries, the Commission found that in all but two cases 

the implementing organization is overseen by a board of 

directors or supervisors.173

7.4.3 Independent Regulation

A new waste management organization would be subject 

to the same federal and applicable state health, safety, 

and environmental regulations as a private corporation. 

Currently, regulatory responsibility for various aspects of 

nuclear materials management is divided among several 

federal agencies: EPA and the NRC are responsible for 

radiological health and safety; EPA is responsible for 

other environmental impacts; the DOT is responsible for 

transportation safety (other than certifying transportation 

cask designs); the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA) and the Mine Safety and Health 

Administration are responsible for worker safety; and the 

NRC, DOT, and others (through the implementation of 

Department of Homeland Security [DHS] standards) are 

responsible for security. In addition and as discussed in 

chapter 6, the waste management organization should be 

authorized to accept additional state and/or tribal oversight 

and regulatory requirements as a part of any legally binding 

agreement or partnership arrangement negotiated with states, 

tribes, or local communities that consent to host a waste 

management facility.

7.4.4 Scientific and Technical 

Oversight

Many proposals for an independent waste management 

organization provide for broad independent technical 

oversight in addition to, and separate from, any specific health 

and safety or environmental standards that might apply to 

the waste management facilities built and operated by the 

organization. Independent scientific and technical oversight of 

the nuclear waste management program is essential and should 

continue to be provided for out of nuclear waste fee payments. 

The existing NWTRB currently provides this type of wideranging technical oversight.

Independent reviews of key aspects of the program on an 

ad hoc basis by independent organizations such as the NAS 

can also be useful in providing guidance and enhancing public 

confidence in the technical competence of the organization’s 

work. The waste management organization should therefore be 

given the authority and responsibility to implement programs 

and procedures aimed at facilitating such independent reviews, 

including authority to fund such activities, where appropriate. 

Assuring the relevance, quality, and comprehensiveness of 

the organization’s scientific and technical work is important to 

program excellence. It is also necessary to earn the confidence 

of the scientific community and larger public. A rigorous, 

open, and documented peer review process appropriate to 

the different types of work products developed by the new 

organization (e.g., peer review mechanisms for research 

would differ from those for engineering design) can play a 

major role in providing this assurance, in conjunction with a 

rigorous quality assurance program. Peer review provides one 

mechanism by which outside experts can critique analyses, 

studies, or proposals put forward by the waste management 

organization. Such evaluations can be used as management 

tools for verifying or validating the assumptions, results, and 

conclusions of the organization’s work. 

In sum, besides ensuring that interested parties and 

stakeholders have timely access to data and analyses, the 

new waste management organization should encourage and 

support the peer-reviewed publication of all work that is 

important to its activities, including site characterization 

work as well as analyses aimed at demonstrating the safety 

and suitability of plans for repository design and operations. 

The organization should also encourage and support its 

staff and the external research teams it funds—not only in 

publishing results in recognized professional journals, but 

also in delivering presentations and papers at scientific and 

technical conferences, as well as participating in national 

and international meetings. This will allow the organization’s 

work to benefit from full exposure to the broader scientific 

community and other interested stakeholders. We envision 

that a robust peer review effort will not substitute for, but 

rather will augment, the oversight provided by relevant 

regulatory authorities, the NWTRB, and other outside sources 

of expertise, while also improving decision-making by bringing 

other relevant work to the attention of the organization.

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7.4.5 Financial Oversight

With greater budget control and assured access to the NWF, 

the new organization must also be subject to independent 

financial oversight to ensure that public resources are being used 

appropriately in support of waste program objectives. Beyond 

a board of directors, most proposals provide for additional 

oversight in the form of independent audits of the new 

organization’s finances along with reviews by the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO). The NWPA already requires 

an annual GAO audit of the activities of DOE’s OCRWM, 

as well as a comprehensive annual report by OCRWM on its 

activities and expenditures and an annual report to Congress 

from the Secretary of the Treasury (after consultation with the 

Secretary of Energy) on the financial condition and operations 

of the NWF. These requirements could simply be extended to 

the new organization (except that the organization would not 

report to Treasury through DOE). A mechanism for Congress 

to review regular updates of the organization’s mission plan and 

budget would provide an additional vehicle for overseeing the 

organization’s use of funds. 

Particular attention must be paid to which entity has 

authority over the level of the nuclear waste fee. Under 

current law, the Secretary of Energy is required to make 

adjustments to the fee, as necessary, to ensure recovery of the 

full costs of managing and disposing of commercial SNF. The 

AMFM Panel recommended that a “Waste Fund Oversight 

Commission” be established for the specific purpose of ensuring 

that NWF fees are being used cost-effectively and to approve or 

disapprove proposed changes to the level of the fee. In its 2001 

update of the AMFM study, DOE instead recommended that 

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) serve this 

purpose. Giving authority to review and approve fee increases 

to an independent organization with suitable expertise and 

staff would enhance confidence that the increases are just and 

reasonable and are not simply the result of ineffective use of 

the program’s resources. Since the FERC already exists and 

deals with rate issues, the Commission recommends that it 

be used for this function.174 As it determines how to carry out 

this new responsibility, we encourage FERC to consider the 

development of a “joint board” with state commissioners as 

provided for under Section 209 of the Federal Power Act.

7.5 Stakeholder Participation

The NWPA states that “state and public participation in 

the planning and development of repositories is essential in 

order to promote public confidence in the safety of disposal 

of such waste and spent fuel.” The Commission agrees 

and recommends that legislation to establish a new waste 

management organization include appropriate mechanisms to 

facilitate and support constructive stakeholder participation. 

Such mechanisms should address two distinct areas of 

stakeholder participation: interaction with national stakeholder 

groups and interests and interaction with states, communities, 

and tribes that would be directly impacted by particular 

facilities or operations. Because providing for extensive 

stakeholder participation will require a significant commitment 

of staff and resources, enabling legislation should specify that 

this is an authorized use of the NWF and related activities 

should be covered in annual reports and long-term plans. 

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The list of stakeholders with an interest in the overall 

direction and conduct of the national waste management 

program is a long one. It includes, among others, utility 

companies; public utility commissions; taxpayers; states, 

tribes, and local communities that might be affected by 

waste facilities or activities; public interest groups; the 

nuclear industry; DOE; the U.S. Navy; the academic 

community; and the non-proliferation and nuclear security 

policy community.

Not all of these stakeholders could be represented on the 

board of directors of a new waste management corporation, 

nor would this necessarily be appropriate given that the 

primary role of the board of directors is not to represent 

all stakeholder views, but rather to carry out fiduciary 

responsibilities for management oversight. To provide an 

ongoing conduit for input from the full range of interests 

noted above, a larger and more widely representative 

stakeholder advisory committee should be established. 

This committee would report to the waste management 

organization’s CEO and/or board of directors (similar to 

DOE’s Environmental Management Advisory Board).175

This would not supplant direct interactions between the 

waste management organization and various stakeholders 

or interest groups, but it would ensure that the organization 

regularly hears the full range of perspectives represented by 

these different groups. Ongoing dialogue with a stakeholder 

advisory committee can help the organization develop 

broadly acceptable policies and plans and identify areas of 

disagreement that remain to be resolved. 

Of the activities the waste management organization 

will be involved in, siting will likely draw the most intense 

stakeholder attention and concern. The Commission 

therefore considered an option in which a different entity 

or authority—one not charged with developing and 

operating waste management facilities—would undertake 

siting as a separate function. Ultimately, the Commission 

concluded that siting should remain under the auspices 

of the same waste management organization, for several 

reasons. First, siting decisions will have a major impact on 

storage and disposal operations, and siting decisions and 

criteria must meet operational and design standards. Most 

crucially, the same waste management organization must be 

accountable on an ongoing basis for living up to all 

commitments made during the site selection, characterization, 

and approval process. 

Nevertheless, it will be important to recognize siting 

as a unique function of the organization for which active 

engagement with a broad range of stakeholders and 

other experts will be particularly critical. Throughout the 

siting process the waste management organization will 

need to operate with a high degree of independence and 

objectivity to maintain credibility with the wide range 

of stakeholders that will be involved. The Commission 

therefore recommends that a special subcommittee of 

the stakeholder advisory committee be established to 

provide specific guidance on the siting process. The special 

subcommittee would provide a conduit and focal point 

to ensure that stakeholder input on these issues is given 

serious consideration and acted on as appropriate. Members 

of this subcommittee could include representatives from 

the full stakeholder committee supplemented by other 

individuals with relevant expertise. Whether separate siting 

subcommittees should be established for consolidated 

storage facilities as distinct from disposal facilities is 

a question that should be decided by the new waste 

management organization.

Finally, it will be important for members of the general 

public to have an opportunity to review and comment on 

the ongoing activities of the waste management program. 

Requiring that the organization develop and regularly update 

its mission plan (as discussed above) and make that plan 

available for public comment would provide a mechanism 

for soliciting broad-based input.

7.6 Interactions with Affected

States, Tribes, and Local 

Governments

States, tribes, and local communities that are potential or 

actual hosts of waste management facilities176 have a special 

interest in being involved in the process of evaluating 

potential sites and developing and operating the facilities 

proposed for these sites. As the siting process narrows to 

consider specific locations, interactions with potential 

community, state, and tribal hosts will take on increasing 

importance. The NWPA makes extensive provisions for 

coordinated planning and consultation with affected 

states and Indian tribes. For example, section 116 of the 

NWPA requires OCRWM, after it has approved a site for 

characterization or upon request, to seek to enter into and 

negotiate consultation and cooperation (C&C) agreements 

with eligible states and affected tribes. The purpose of this 

type of agreement is to specify the procedures that will be 

followed in areas of mutual concern, such as public health 

and safety, environmental and socio-economic impacts, 

access to technical data and expertise, joint surveillance and 

monitoring of project activities, public education, resolution 

of conflicts and off-site concerns, financial assistance, and 

notification of waste shipments. 

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These provisions in the NWPA were modeled on the 

1981 C&C agreement between DOE and the State of New 

Mexico for the WIPP facility; they apply to all types of waste 

management facilities, although section 116 (the section 

containing these provisions) is focused on repositories. 

Although C&C agreements would be negotiated with state 

or tribes, it will also be important for the waste management 

organization to engage directly with local communities early 

and often throughout the process. Ultimately the range of 

issues that could come up in negotiations with potential host 

communities, states, and tribes is very wide; a few examples 

from past siting processes include environmental monitoring 

and testing; authority to issue needed water, waste discharge 

and construction permits; emergency response agreements; 

research and education agreements; and economic impact 

assistance payments. Clearly all levels of government must 

be involved from the first phases, but how the siting process 

unfolds and in what order different agreements are struck 

between different parties is not something that can or 

should be dictated in advance. This is also why the attributes 

described previously, including flexibility, responsiveness, and 

transparency, will be so important to the success, not only of 

a given siting process but of the waste management program 

more broadly. 

In this context, it is notable that the NWPA’s current 

consultation and cooperation provisions apply only to 

relations between the federal government and state or tribal 

governments, and do not extend to local governments.177

In visits to Sweden and Finland, Commission members 

saw first-hand how close involvement with the local host 

community was critical in winning acceptance for waste 

management facilities. Local involvement is likely to be 

critical in the U.S. context also. When a community task 

force in Oak Ridge, Tennessee evaluated a DOE proposal 

to site a MRS Facility in the area, the task force made its 

support for the facility conditional on the adoption of 

specific measures to enhance local authority. These included 

provisions for C&C agreements directly between DOE and 

units of local government (as well as between DOE and the 

state) and granting preferred status to local governments in 

interactions between the state, DOE, and NRC regarding 

the MRS facility.178 We therefore recommend that the waste 

management organization’s authority and responsibility to 

negotiate binding agreements with host states and tribes be 

extended to also include local host governments. 

7.7 Transfer of Contracts and 

Liability to a New Organization

Transferring responsibility for nuclear waste management 

to a new organization raises the difficult question of how 

to handle existing liabilities under DOE’s current contracts 

with utilities. (Earlier chapters have discussed the litigation 

currently underway with respect to the breach of these 

contracts.) Congress will need to give careful consideration to 

the treatment of existing contractual liabilities in legislation 

to establish a new waste management organization.179 A 

core question will be how to pay for damages accrued until 

federal facilities are available. A federal court has ruled 

that the NWF cannot be used to pay damages because 

at-reactor storage is not an allowed use of the Fund under 

the NWPA and DOE contracts with utilities, even if the 

federal government were to take title to the spent fuel 

at reactor sites. As a result, damages are now being paid 

out of the Judgment Fund, which receives a permanent 

indefinite appropriation from the Treasury. It will therefore 

be important to clarify responsibility for contracts and 

associated liabilities going forward. 

7.8 Near-Term Steps

The Commission strongly believes that new institutional 

leadership is critical to getting the nation’s nuclear waste 

management program on track. But we recognize that 

it could take several years for a new organization to be 

authorized, funded, staffed and fully launched. In the 

meantime, it will be important for DOE to keep the 

program moving forward through non-site specific activities, 

including R&D on geological media and work to design 

improved engineered barriers.

For instance, DOE’s Office of Used Nuclear Fuel 

Disposition Research & Development is implementing the 

Used Fuel Disposition Campaign. The objectives of the 

Campaign are to identify alternatives and conduct R&D on 

transportation, storage, and disposal options for SNF from 

existing and potential future nuclear fuel cycles. This program 

and other non-site-specific generic activities, such as support 

for and coordination with states and regional state government 

groups on transportation planning, should be continued.180

To ensure continued progress, we urge the Secretary 

of Energy to task a senior official with sufficient authority 

to coordinate all of the DOE elements involved in the 

implementation of the Commission’s recommendations.

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8. FUNDING THE ASTE

ANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Since 1983, nuclear utilities and their ratepayers have been

paying a nuclear waste fee into a Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF)

in the Treasury. The Fund is dedicated to covering the cost

of disposing of commercial radioactive waste, but for reasons

discussed below the money in the Fund is effectively unavailable

for its intended purpose. The Commission believes that the

success of a revitalized nuclear waste management program

will depend on making the revenues generated by the nuclear

waste fee and the balance in the NWF available when needed

and in the amounts needed to implement the program.

The Commission spent considerable time on this

issue. The remainder of this chapter details our specific

recommendations for implementing the funding reforms that

are required to support a revitalized U.S. waste program.

8.1 Background

The 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act created a “polluter

pays” funding mechanism181 to ensure that the full costs of

disposing of commercial HLW would be paid by utilities

(and their ratepayers), with no impact on taxpayers or the

federal budget. Nuclear utilities are assessed a full-costrecovery user fee on every kilowatt-hour of nuclear-generated

electricity as a quid pro quo payment in exchange for the

government’s contractual commitment to begin accepting

commercial spent fuel for disposal beginning by January

31, 1998. The fee is collected from utilities that own or

operate nuclear power plants; generally it is passed on to

utility ratepayers. The fee was initially set at 1 mill (0.1

cents) per kilowatt-hour (where it still is); however, the Act

requires the Secretary of Energy to review the adequacy

of the fee annually and adjust it as needed to ensure that

going forward the government can recover the full costs of

waste management and disposal. In recent years, the fee has

generated approximately $750 million in annual revenues;

the total amount collected through 2010 amounted to just

over $16 billion.

To succeed, a new waste management organization

must have the resources needed to implement an

effective program.

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Fee revenues go to the government’s Nuclear Waste 

Fund, which was established for the sole purpose of covering 

the cost of disposing of civilian nuclear waste. (Costs for 

disposing of defense nuclear wastes are paid by taxpayers 

through direct appropriations from the Treasury that do not 

pass through the Nuclear Waste Fund.) The unspent balance 

in the Fund is allowed to accumulate and accrue interest with 

the idea that it will be available as needed to fund program 

expenditures in future years. The current unspent balance in 

the Fund (known as the “corpus”) totals nearly $27 billion, 

including interest. Federal appropriators are supposed to be 

able to access the Fund when and in the amounts needed to 

implement the waste program without facing competition 

from other funding priorities.

The clear intent of Congress in establishing a selffinancing mechanism based on contractually-obligated 

user fees was to “provide an assured source of funds to 

carry out the programs and...eliminate...annual budgetary 

perturbations in an ever more constrained Federal budget,” 

while at the same time ensuring that “the Federal budget 

will not be burdened by repository program expenditures” 

(see text box). Congressional oversight through the annual 

appropriations process would ensure that expenditures from 

the Fund would be made prudently and for their intended 

purposes. But the Fund was clearly designed to ensure that 

the waste program’s needs and schedules determined its 

funding, rather than allowing federal budget constraints 

to limit the program’s progress. Indeed, the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act’s provisions for an expanded and accelerated 

repository program and its direction to DOE to assume 

contractual obligations for accepting waste on a defined 

schedule demanded an assured funding source to support the 

activities needed to meet these legal obligations.182

Senator James McClure, chairman of the Senate 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and floor 

manager of the Senate nuclear waste policy legislation:

“By establishing a 1 mill-per-kilowatt-hour user fee 

on nuclear generated electricity, this bill for the first 

time would provide a direct financial linkage between 

the beneficiaries of nuclear power and the cost for 

interim management and ultimate disposal for nuclear 

wastes...This funding mechanism would provide an 

assured source of funds to carry out the programs 

and would eliminate not only annual budgetary 

perturbations in an ever more constrained Federal 

budget, but the too often repeated shifts of policy 

direction under succeeding administrations. The nuclear 

waste policy, programs and required financing would 

be statutorily fixed and quite predictable under this 

approach.” Congressional Record-Senate, December 

20, 1982, pp. S15655 - S15656

Congressman Morris Udall, Chairman of the House 

Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and key sponsor 

and manager of nuclear waste legislation in the House:

“The cost of the waste disposal program will be borne 

by the generators of the waste. The program will be 

financed up-front by nuclear utilities, so that the Federal 

budget will not be burdened by repository program 

expenditures. Utility payments will be made into a 

Nuclear Waste Trust Fund set aside exclusively for 

repository development purposes... The Nuclear Waste 

Trust Fund will be isolated from other Federal programs, 

and will not be used to finance any activities other than 

repository development.” Congressional Record-House, 

September 30, 1982, p. H8163

American Nuclear Energy Council, Edison Electric 

Institute, and Utility Nuclear Waste Management Group: 

“The central concept of the financing plan which we 

support is premised on complete cost recovery of all 

reasonable facility costs. ...While the electric utilities 

do not endorse the precedent of collecting a tax, we 

recognize that nuclear waste management is a unique 

Federal responsibility resulting from joint effort of the 

government and industry to utilize nuclear energy for 

the public benefit. Such a financing arrangement is 

not viewed as a precedent, but rather an innovative 

mechanism for ensuring the financial viability of a 

successful long-term Federal waste management 

program. ...Again, we must emphasize that the full 

payment for reasonable costs of storage and disposal 

of commercial spent fuel and radioactive wastes will be 

paid by the utilities and will be included as part of the 

cost of the nuclear fuel.” Joint statement submitted to 

the House Committee on Science and Technology on 

October 5, 1981

Views on the Intent of the Nuclear Waste Fund

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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

8.2 Current Treatment of the

Nuclear ste Fund in the

Federal Budget

8.2.1 A Case of nintended

Consequences and Constraints

The Fund has not worked as intended to insulate the nation’s

civilian nuclear waste management program from the vagaries

of the federal budget process while at the same time insulating

the federal budget from the costs of the waste program. A

series of actions by successive administrations and Congresses

(see text box below) has made the approximately $750 million

in annual fee revenues and the unspent $27 billion balance

in the Fund effectively inaccessible to federal budgeters and

appropriators, forcing them to take money away from other

federal priorities to fund activities needed to meet contractual

waste management obligations. As a result, waste management

needs have had to compete with other priorities in DOE’s

annual budget request and in the Congressional appropriations

process (figure 17), subjecting the program to exactly the sort

of “budgetary perturbations” that the funding mechanism was

intended to avoid.

Senator Bennett Johnston, then Chairman of the Senate

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, pointed out

the problem in 1994:183

“We thought we had provided a guaranteed funding

source for the waste program when we created the

Nuclear Waste Fund in 1982. The Waste Fund consists

of money paid by electric ratepayers for the sole purpose

of funding this program...Unfortunately, the Waste Fund

has become entangled in budget rules adopted in recent

years to combat the deficit. The unintended consequence

of these rules had been to put most of the Nuclear Waste

Fund out of reach of the very program for which the

money is being collected.”

In other words, a program that was intended to be fully

self-financing now has to compete for limited discretionary

funding in the annual appropriations process, while

the contractual user fees intended to prevent this from

happening are treated just like tax revenues and used to

reduce the apparent deficit on the mandatory side of the

federal budget (which deals with expenditures and receipts

that are not subject to annual appropriations).

Figure 17. Nuclear ste Program:

Budget Requests versus Appropriations184

1,000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Millions of $

1983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010

Budget request

Appropriations

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These problems have also materially contributed to the 

failure of the federal government to meet its contractual 

obligations and to the government’s large and growing exposure 

to financial liabilities for resulting damages—damages that will 

have to be paid by taxpayers. We discuss this issue in detail 

in section 8.5, but for now it is worth pointing out that the 

damage payments being awarded to compensate utilities for 

the costs of continued at-reactor storage of spent fuel that was 

supposed to have been accepted by the federal government 

do nothing to advance the objective of providing for the 

permanent disposition of the fuel. Meanwhile, the unspent 

balance of fee revenues and interest accumulating in the Waste 

Fund represents a large and growing liability for taxpayers 

that must be paid at some point in the future. Because DOE’s 

contracts with utilities create a legal obligation, those funds can 

and must eventually be used only for the purpose for which 

they have been collected; the Treasury bills in the Fund that 

were issued as IOUs for the fee receipts and interest must at 

some point be redeemed either by future tax revenues or by 

borrowing from other sources that in turn must be repaid. 

Since the establishment of the NWF in 1982, Congress 

enacted several budget control acts that dramatically reduced 

the funding flexibility originally envisioned in the NWPA:

•	 The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 

Act of 1985, also known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 

(GRH), made the NWF subject to a government-wide 

deficit-reduction process. In implementing GRH, the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) “split” the 

NWF; fee receipts were placed on the “mandatory” 

side of the budget (dealing with activities controlled by 

permanent laws rather than annual appropriations), 

where they are treated like tax revenues and used to 

offset mandatory spending; while expenditures were 

placed on the “discretionary” side (dealing with activities 

controlled by annual appropriation acts), where they are 

subject to the deficit reduction process. 

•	 The 1987 amendments to GRH placed appropriations 

from the NWF under the spending cap applicable to 

all domestic discretionary programs, even though 

the NWF was self-financed. This had the effect of 

forcing spending for the NWF to compete with other 

spending programs, which did not have dedicated 

funding sources. As a result, OMB also dropped its 

historical practice of setting separate budget planning 

targets for the NWF, forcing it to compete against other 

DOE programs within a single DOE budget target for 

domestic discretionary spending.

•	 The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) set new 

caps on discretionary spending and established new 

pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirements to ensure that the 

net effects of legislative changes affecting mandatory 

spending were budget neutral. 

•	 In the Conference Report accompanying the Omnibus 

Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, spending from 

the NWF was included in domestic discretionary 

appropriation accounts for fiscal year (FY) 1991, and was 

therefore subject to the spending cap set in the BEA.

•	 The 1997 Amendments to the Balanced Budget Act 

extended caps on discretionary spending and PAYGO 

requirements for mandatory spending accounts through 

FY 2002. 

This layering of budget requirements seriously eroded the 

NWF’s funding capability in two ways: 

•	 It imposed annual spending and revenue controls on a 

fund that was designed to finance a 125-year program 

on a life-cycle cost basis; and

•	 It made the NWF dysfunctional by creating separate 

and unrelated rules applicable to the revenue and 

spending components of the Fund. 

The overall effect, in short, has been to prevent the NWF 

from being used for its intended purpose. Under PAYGO 

requirements, increased funding for the waste management 

program must be offset by cuts in other programs within 

the annual discretionary appropriations caps. The original 

NWPA requirement for annual appropriations from the NWF 

was intended to ensure that Congress retained control over 

the program; its purpose was never to limit the funding 

needed to implement the program.

The Layering of Budget Constraints on the Nuclear Waste Fund

Source: Alternative Means of Financing and Managing the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, 

U.S. Department of Energy, August 2001, DOE/RW-0546, pp. 12-13 

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8.2.2. Disadvantages of the 

Appropriations Process

Even if competition with other programs for limited 

discretionary funding were not an issue, the current 

statutory requirement that makes use of the NWF 

subject to appropriations has led to unforeseen difficulties 

caused by the appropriations process itself. Although the 

current system assures Congress explicit and extensive 

year-to-year oversight and control as intended by the 

NWPA, it has clearly proven to be a poor mechanism 

for financing a very long-term and complex effort. First, 

the annual appropriations process creates substantial 

funding uncertainty, which can make it difficult for 

the implementing agency to make and honor longerterm commitments, retain staff expertise, and exercise 

independent judgment about programmatic priorities and 

resource allocation. Second, Congress has increasingly failed 

to pass appropriations bills in a timely manner in recent 

years, forcing federal agencies to operate on continuing 

resolutions for extended periods of time while coping with 

the delayed availability of requested funds. 

A 2005 report on the management and funding of nuclear 

waste management programs in the 11 member nations of the 

International Association for Environmentally Safe Disposal 

of Radioactive Materials (EDRAM)185 noted that all these 

nations have applied the principle that waste producers should 

pay for the management of their wastes. Where EDRAM 

members differ is in how they estimate, collecte, and manage 

waste management fees. The United States stands out as the 

only nation where the national legislature directly controls, on 

an annual basis, the expenditure of funds collected for nuclear 

waste management purposes.186

8.3 Fixing the Funding Problem

The federal government’s failure to deliver on its statutory 

waste management obligations to date and the fact that 

the Waste Fund and fee are not working as intended have 

prompted the National Association of Regulatory Utility 

Commissioners, along with some nuclear utilities and 

the NEI, to pursue legal action against DOE aimed at 

suspending the collection of nuclear waste fees until such 

time as a new waste management plan for the country is in 

place. The outcome of this and other pending legal actions 

remains uncertain at present, but they underscore the 

growing frustration among state regulators, nuclear utilities, 

and consumer advocates about the continued lack of progress 

toward a durable waste management solution. In fact, there 

is a growing sense of outrage that the only aspect of the waste 

management program that has been implemented in full 

and on schedule is the part that involves collecting fees for 

a contractually required service that the federal government 

has never managed to deliver.

The Commission concludes that for the waste 

management program to succeed, the nuclear waste funding 

mechanism must be allowed to work as intended so that 

the ability to implement the waste program is not subject to 

unrelated federal budget constraints. If that is not done, key 

recommendations of the Commission will be undermined—

e.g., efforts to develop both storage and disposal facilities 

will be in conflict rather than mutually supportive and 

commitments to provide benefits to host communities over 

the life of the program will lack credibility. Fixing this problem 

requires extricating the nuclear waste fee and NWF from 

the web of budget rules that have made these user-provided 

resources effectively unavailable to federal budgeters and 

appropriators, forcing them to take limited discretionary 

funds away from other federal programs in order to pay 

for the activities needed to meet federal waste management 

contractual obligations and thereby put an end to growing 

taxpayer financial liability for failure to meet those obligations.

The Commission also concludes that a new waste 

management organization bound by a well-defined 

mission should be entrusted—subject to an appropriate 

level of oversight by Congress and relevant regulatory 

authorities—with greater autonomy and control of its 

budget over multiple year periods than is possible under the 

annual appropriations process, just as the TVA has control 

of the use of its receipts from electricity sales (subject to 

congressional oversight). This kind of authority is crucial, 

among other reasons, to allow the new organization to 

negotiate meaningful, enforceable, and ultimately credible

commitments with other parties—including with the 

communities, states, and tribes that will be most directly 

affected by its activities. Fixing the current funding problem 

requires removing waste program funding decisions, to the 

extent they concern activities related to the civilian wastes for 

which the nuclear waste fee is being paid, from dependence 

on the annual federal budgeting and appropriations process, 

while ensuring appropriate oversight by Congress and other 

third-party agencies.

The Commission recommends that this transition be 

accomplished in two stages:

1. Near-term non-legislative actions that would allow 

full access to future waste fee revenues subject to 

appropriations control but independent of competition 

with other funding needs. 

2. Legislative action as part of the establishment of an 

independent waste management organization that would 

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allow it to function as an autonomous self-financed

entity like TVA or the Bonneville Power Administration,

with full control of the use of its revenues subject to

congressional and other independent oversight and with

access to future fee receipts and, eventually, the current

corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund.

8.3.1 Near-Term Non-Legislative

Action to Increase Access to

Fee Revenues

The Commission recognizes that legislative action to create

a new waste management organization with full access to

the nearly $27 billion balance in the NWF will be difficult

in the current political and budgetary climate, despite the

fundamental equity arguments for this action. Therefore,

we urge the Administration to take prompt action aimed at

enabling appropriators to use the annual nuclear waste fee

revenues for their intended purpose, free from competition

with other spending priorities, while stopping further

additions of surplus revenues to the NWF until such access

has been guaranteed. We believe this can be accomplished by

adopting a combination of measures that are already allowed

under existing legislation.187

Specifically, the Administration should (1) change

the way in which the nuclear waste fee is collected so that

only an amount equal to actual appropriations from the

NWF is collected each year, with the remainder retained

by utilities in approved trust funds to be available when

needed for future use, and (2) work with the congressional

budget committees and the Congressional Budget Office to

reclassify the fee receipts from mandatory to discretionary

so that they can directly offset appropriations for the waste

program.188 Taken together, these steps would make the

nuclear waste program funding mechanism work essentially

as Congress intended in the NWPA, at least for future fee

revenues. Each is discussed further below.

Change the Timing of Nuclear Waste Fee Collections

Under the current approach, the entire 1 mill/kwh fee

is collected from contract holders each year (the total

collected amounts to approximately $750 million per

year) and deposited in the Treasury, independent of the

sum actually appropriated from the Fund for use by the

waste management program. This annual revenue stream

is counted in the federal budget baseline as an offset

to mandatory spending, which raises the criticism that

Figure 18. Cumulative Nuclear Waste Fees,

Budget Requests, and Appropriations189

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

$1,000,000 Year of Expenditure

1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

Cumulative fee receipts

Cumulative budget requests

Cumulative Waste Fund

plus defense appropriations

Cumulative Waste Fund

appropriations

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

the fee is simply being used to reduce the budget deficit 

instead of for its intended purposes. This criticism becomes 

more acute as the gap between annual fee payments and 

appropriations from the Fund widens. Figure 18 shows the 

large and growing gap between cumulative nuclear waste 

fee receipts (not including interest on the NWF balance) 

and appropriations from the NWF. The longer annual fee 

payments continue to accumulate in the Fund, the greater 

the budgetary and political difficulty of restoring the Fund to 

its intended purpose will be. 

To stop the flow of waste fees to an inaccessible account 

in the Treasury, to put an end to the perception that the fee is 

simply being used to reduce the federal budget deficit, and to 

take the first crucial step towards making future fee revenues 

accessible to appropriators, the Administration should adopt a 

modified version of an approach proposed by the Secretary of 

Energy in 1998 as part of a litigation settlement concept.190

The key element of that proposal was to change 

the timing of fee payments into the NWF through 

administrative action so as to match the annual flow of 

cash into the Fund with actual spending from the Fund in 

support of nuclear waste management activities. Specifically, 

DOE proposed to offer to amend its contracts with utilities 

to allow utilities to retain the portion of the 1 mill/kwh fee 

that exceeded the annual appropriations level. As soon as the 

federal government began to accept waste, utilities would 

pay the deferred fees plus interest at the Treasury rate.191

The modified approach proposed here would require each 

utility to place the unused fee receipts in an irrevocable trust 

account at an approved, third-party financial institution, 

allowing the money to be withdrawn only for the purpose 

for which the trust account was created, at the time and in 

the amounts needed to fund the federal waste management 

program. This would make the “waste disposal trust 

accounts” similar to the decommissioning “sinking funds” 

most utilities use to meet NRC requirements that they 

provide assured funding for reactor decommissioning. Funds 

in those accounts can only be used for decommissioning. By 

analogy, if a similar irrevocable trust account were created for 

NWPA purposes, the licensee could only pay out the money 

to the waste management organization as required to meet 

program needs. This approach would make the utility waste 

trust accounts collectively serve the function that the Nuclear 

Waste Fund was supposed to, providing a source of funds in 

reserve that can be used in years in which the waste program’s 

funding needs exceed the total annual fee receipts.

A key feature of this proposal is that it would be 

accomplished using the Secretary of Energy’s existing 

authority under the NWPA to establish procedures for 

the collection and payment of the fees.192 Under current 

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budget rules, any legislative action that has the effect of 

reducing NWF receipts to the U.S. Treasury will be subject 

to “pay as you go/cut-as-you-go” or “PAYGO/CUTGO” 

requirements.193 This means that new revenues or budget 

cuts will be needed to cover the change in funds flowing 

to the Treasury resulting from new legislation. However, 

any changes to fee revenues resulting from non-legislative 

action under existing law would have no PAYGO/CUTGO 

impact.194 At the same time, by ending the practice of 

counting revenues from the entire 1 mill/kwh fee in the 

federal government’s budget baseline, this step would 

substantially ease the PAYGO/CUTGO burden associated 

with subsequent legislative action to transfer fee receipts 

to an independent organization.195 Furthermore, tying 

annual fee collections to actual appropriations for the waste 

program would strengthen the rationale for reclassifying fee 

receipts as a discretionary offsetting collection, which is the 

second step required to implement our recommendations 

for interim funding.196

Reclassify Waste Fee Revenues from 

Mandatory to Discretionary 

The above-described step of splitting fee collections does not, 

by itself, address the problem that appropriations from the 

Fund are subject to caps on discretionary spending, because 

the fee receipts have been placed on the other side of the 

mandatory/discretionary spending firewall where they are not 

directly available to appropriators. A second step is needed 

to move the receipts to the discretionary side so they can be 

used by appropriators to fund the waste program without 

reducing funds available for other discretionary programs. To 

implement this approach, the Administration should work 

with the appropriate congressional authorities to re-classify 

waste fee receipts from mandatory to discretionary offsetting 

collections so that they can directly offset appropriations for 

the waste program. Combined with the previous step that 

would tie annual fee receipts to actual appropriations levels, 

this would enable a funding process similar to that used to 

fund the NRC (i.e., where funding is provided primarily by 

user fees that are set at the level of annual budgetary authority 

established in appropriations bills).

DOE’s 2001 analysis of alternative means of financing 

and managing the waste program, which was prepared at 

the request of Congress, specifically considered this option 

and concluded it would be feasible. Current practice would 

require OMB to seek the concurrence of the Congressional 

Budget Office and the congressional budget committees for 

this reclassification. In addition, appropriations language 

would be required to credit the fee to waste management 

appropriations; indeed, we urge the Administration to 

include such language in its FY 2013 budget proposal.197

Implications of the proposed approach 

The two-step approach we propose would accomplish 

several things:

• It would reduce PAYGO/CUTGO challenges for future 

legislative action to give a new organization access to 

the nuclear waste fee and Fund by lowering the baseline 

projection of fee receipts for federal budget purposes and by 

slowing the continued build-up of the corpus of the Fund.

• By eliminating surplus collections, it would address the 

concern of utilities and public utility commissions about 

the misuse of the fee and Fund to reduce the annual 

deficit instead of for the purposes of the NWPA. Instead, 

the surplus fee revenue would go into approved thirdparty trust accounts that would be available when needed 

to meet the operational costs of disposal, when program 

expenditures can be expected to exceed fee receipts.

• It would facilitate adequate appropriations for the 

program in the near term by giving appropriations 

from the Fund (up to the amount of revenue generated 

annually by the 1 mill/kwh fee plus any additional 

amount obtained from balances in the utility trust 

accounts) a net budgetary impact of zero, since the 

appropriation would be directly offset by the collection 

of an equal amount in fee revenues. As noted above, a 

similar approach is already being used to fund the NRC. 

• Finally, it would demonstrate the federal government’s 

determination to make the funding mechanism 

established in the NWPA work as originally intended. 

There are also several things this two-step action would not do:

• It would not reduce Congress’s oversight role in the 

budget process for the waste program. Under current 

practice, OMB would seek the concurrence of the 

Congressional Budget Office and congressional budget 

committees for reclassifying fee receipts, appropriations 

language would be needed to credit fee receipts against 

appropriations, and congressional appropriations 

committees would continue to control the annual level 

of program funding through the appropriations process. 

Legislation will be required to remove this funding from 

the annual budget process while retaining an appropriate 

degree of external oversight of program spending, as 

recommended earlier. 

• It would not increase access to the corpus of the NWF. 

This must be accomplished in subsequent legislation 

since DOE’s existing contracts with utilities create a 

legal obligation for the federal government to ultimately 

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expend these funds for the waste management purposes 

for which they were collected.

•	 It would not adversely impact the discretionary funding 

of any single program or agency since the changes would 

occur on the mandatory side of the budget, although it 

would—by removing projected fee revenues from the 

budget baseline—lead to a very small percentage increase 

in the federal government’s nominal annual budget deficit.

We understand that nearly 30 years of interpretation and 

application of general budget concepts and practices have 

led to the current treatment of the waste fee receipts and 

program expenditures. But the application of general 

concepts and practices to unique situations can sometimes 

have unintended and perverse results—as they have in this 

case. We cannot believe that anyone intended the current 

situation: the government is in default on a contractual 

obligation to dispose of spent fuel from nuclear utilities; 

the user fees being paid to the government to finance the 

activities needed to meet that obligation are used to offset the 

deficit, while expenditures for those activities are constrained 

under limits on discretionary appropriations; and all the 

while, taxpayer liabilities resulting from failure to meet the 

government’s contractual obligations continue to grow. The 

Financial Report of the United States Government for FY 

2011 reports that these liabilities totaled $49.1 billion—

including both the unpaid damages for non-performance and 

unspent Nuclear Waste Fund fees and interest.198

We believe that this situation must be changed, in order 

to put an end to the continuing damage to taxpayers, nuclear 

utilities and their ratepayers, and the credibility of the 

federal government’s commitment to meet its statutory and 

contractual obligations. To do so, we believe that budget policy 

leaders in the Administration and Congress can and should act 

in the same bipartisan spirit of cooperation that characterized 

passage of the NWPA to make whatever reinterpretations of, 

or even exceptions to, the decades of budget interpretations 

and practices that will be needed to make the waste 

management funding mechanism work as originally intended. 

We recognize that there may be concerns that the 

actions to give full access to the nuclear waste fee and Fund 

the Commission recommends might set precedents that 

would have broader implications for other federal programs. 

However, we believe that the current circumstances—

involving a highly unusual contractual arrangement 

mandated by the NWPA and the existence of growing 

taxpayer liabilities for failure to comply with the terms 

of that arrangement—are so narrowly drawn that any 

precedents that are set would have at most very limited 

implications elsewhere.199

8.3.2 Legislative Action to Provide 

Budgetary Autonomy (Subject to 

Oversight)

The above-described steps would enable appropriators to 

fund a restart of the waste program from future fee receipts 

without taking funds from other programs. However, 

growing delays and uncertainties in the overall federal 

appropriations process will continue to make long-term 

planning and commitments difficult; and eventually access 

to the unspent balance in the Nuclear Waste Fund will be 

needed. Legislation to establish a new waste management 

organization should give the organization the same authority 

to use its revenues to carry out its civilian nuclear waste 

obligations independent of annual appropriations (but with 

congressional oversight) as is now given to the Tennessee 

Valley Authority and Bonneville Power Administration. 

As noted earlier, legislation that has the effect of reducing 

nuclear waste fee receipts to the U.S. Treasury or increasing 

projected spending from the NWF will be subject to PAYGO/

CUTGO requirements, depending on when the changes 

will occur. The Commission recognizes that there have 

been numerous unsuccessful legislative proposals to increase 

access to the fee revenues and the NWF while addressing 

such requirements.200 Nonetheless, access to the corpus of 

the NWF will ultimately be needed to meet the fluctuating 

revenue demands of the waste management program going 

forward. This will include covering years when costs peak—

for example during the construction of waste management 

facilities. That the balance in the NWF (including accrued 

interest) would be fully accessible when and as needed was 

a fundamental premise underlying the commitments made 

in the NWPA—that premise must be restored. Anticipating 

that the near-term non-legislative actions proposed above 

may be able to provide adequate funding for a restarted 

waste program for the next decade or perhaps longer, the 

Commission recommends that legislation establishing a new 

waste management organization include a defined schedule 

of payments to transfer the balance of the Fund to the 

organization over a reasonable future time period, starting 10 

years after the organization is established.201

As we have already noted, our recommendations for 

separating the NWF from the congressional budget process 

are in no way intended to imply a diminished need for 

rigorous program oversight. On the contrary, we believe these 

budget and funding reforms—to be acceptable to Congress 

and the public—must be coupled with strong provisions 

to ensure that the waste program is being implemented 

effectively and is making appropriate use of the NWF and 

fees with which it has been entrusted.

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Finally, as discussed above, the Commission is aware 

that efforts to fix the use of the NWF could be caught up in 

broader questions such as the treatment of trust funds in the 

federal budget more generally. However, DOE has testified to 

Congress that proposals to correct the treatment of the waste 

fee and Fund are unlikely to create wider precedents beyond 

similar contractual fee-for-service situations (if any exist).202

8.4 Paying for the Defense 

Waste Share

The preceding discussion has addressed only the portion of 

waste program costs that are attributable to the management 

of commercial waste and that are paid for through the 

nuclear waste fee and NWF. Since current policy presumes 

that national defense wastes will be disposed of in a 

repository developed pursuant to the NWPA, a portion of 

the costs of the program are paid directly by appropriations 

from the national defense side of the federal budget.203 Using 

a methodology for allocating costs between governmentmanaged nuclear materials and commercial wastes that 

was first published in 1987,204 DOE’s 2007 Fee Adequacy 

Assessment estimated the defense share of total program costs 

at 19.6 percent for 2007.205 (The defense share adjusts each 

year as assumptions change.) 

Steady progress on implementing a disposal solution will 

require that appropriations for the defense share are made as 

needed to pay the full cost of defense waste disposal (note that, 

in the absence of a disposal facility, the GAO has estimated 

that continued storage of defense wastes at DOE sites will 

cost well over a billion dollars through 2040206). Historically, 

appropriations from the defense side of the waste management 

budget have not been nearly as constrained as those from the 

civilian side. Since the inception of the program through the 

end of FY 2010, defense appropriations (in nominal dollars) 

amounted to $3,756 million compared to $6,837 million 

from the NWF, or just over 35 percent of total waste program 

appropriations. By comparison, the defense share of total 

program cost over the life of the repository was estimated 

at 19.6 percent in 2007. In the last ten fiscal years, defense 

appropriations have represented over 61 percent of total 

appropriations for the waste program.207

Given this history, it would not appear that measures are 

needed to ensure adequate appropriations for the defense 

share of repository costs in the future.208 However, once it 

becomes necessary to fund the construction of a repository 

(whether that repository is for commingled civilian and 

defense wastes or for defense wastes only), consideration 

might be given to mechanisms like multiyear appropriations 

that are sometimes used with large defense procurements 

(e.g., for the construction of an aircraft carrier) to ensure that 

expensive and complex projects can be completed in a timely 

and cost-effective manner. 

8.5 Dealing with Ongoing

Litigation

For reasons discussed in other chapters, DOE was unable to 

begin accepting commercial spent fuel by January 1998, as 

required under the Standard Contract. DOE and utilities 

have been engaged in protracted litigation since then over 

the Department’s failure to perform its obligations,209 as 

shown in table 2. Some 78 lawsuits have been filed, dozens 

of lawsuits have yet to be tried, some utilities have reached 

settlements with the government, and courts have reached 

judgments in other cases that find DOE in “partial breach” 

of its contracts. This means taxpayers must pay damages 

incurred by utilities as a result of DOE’s failure to accept 

fuel,210 even as DOE remains obligated to do so in the future.

DOE currently estimates that total damage awards 

to utilities could amount to $20.8 billion if the federal 

government begins accepting spent fuel in 2020. DOE has 

previously estimated that liabilities could increase by hundreds 

of millions of dollars annually if the schedule for starting 

acceptance slips beyond 2020. DOE and the Department of 

Justice (DOJ) note a significant development in 2008 that 

substantially affects future damage estimates. The Court of 

Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled in one case that DOE 

was obligated to accept spent fuel at higher rates than were 

used in the settlements on which previous damage estimates 

were based, and directed the trial court to apply these higher 

rates in determining damages.211 The new rates have been 

assumed for future settlements and decisions in the most 

recent liabilities estimate, and are largely responsible for the 

increase over the 2010 estimate of $16.4 billion.

To date, damages and judgments in the amount of $2 

billion have been paid from the taxpayer-funded Judgment 

Fund, which is overseen by the DOJ. The Judgment Fund is 

being used because a federal court ruled in Alabama Power 

Co. v. United States Department of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300 

(11th Cir. 2002), that the government could not use the 

Nuclear Waste Fund to pay for damages incurred as a result 

of DOE’s delay. In addition, DOJ has incurred $188 million 

in costs for the cases it has litigated through 2011 and more 

cases are expected in the future. Because DOE is only in 

“partial breach” of the contracts, utilities can only file for 

actual damages incurred as of the date of filing. As a result, 

utilities must re-file periodically—at least every six years 

because of the statute of limitations—to recover additional 

damages after the previous claim was filed. For this reason, 

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a steady stream of lawsuits can be anticipated until either

(a) DOE has accepted enough waste to “catch up” with the

amount it should have accepted on the schedule determined

by the courts or (b) DOE has negotiated settlements with

all contract holders that would allow damages to be paid

without further litigation.

The litigation that has already occurred over the federal

government’s failure to meet its existing waste acceptance

obligations has been expensive, time-consuming, not

conducive to resolving the current impasse in the nation’s

nuclear waste management program, and detrimental to

the full and open communication among parties needed

for integrated planning concerning spent fuel management.

Because most of the major recurring issues have been

resolved in litigation and the outcomes are now more

predictable, moving toward a simplified claims process for

the purpose of settling existing lawsuits has been suggested,213

and since February 2011, the Department of Justice has

executed 13 additional settlements resolving claims covering

25 reactors and has authorization to enter another settlement

covering four reactors.214 Settling current and pending

lawsuits as quickly as possible would reduce unnecessary

litigation costs, make it possible to assess the cost impacts

of changing current spent-fuel acceptance priorities more

reliably, and facilitate more open communication and

coordination between the waste management organization

and contract holders. The Commission therefore urges all

parties to continue to work to conclude these proceedings

in a fair manner, either through settlement agreements or

through another process, such as mediation or arbitration,

consistent with the precedents set by past court decisions.

Table 2. Status of DOE-Utility Standard Contract Litigation

(as of December 2011)212

Standard contracts 76

Reactors covered by contracts 118

Cases filed through 2010

• Second-round

78

(12)

Claims $6.4 billion

Voluntarily withdrawn 7

Settled 23

Separate settlement agreements 21

Reactors covered by settlements 65

Final judgments

• Not appealable

• On appeal

24

(13)

(11)

Pending before the trial court 24

DOJ trials through 2010 30

Litigation costs through 2010

(Experts and support; no DOJ or DOE staff)

$188 million

DOJ trials expected 2011 through 2012 up to 6

Amount of judgments on appeal $509 million

Payments for final judgments and settlements to date $2 billion

Estimated total damages (if acceptance starts in 2020) $20.8 billion

Estimated increase for each year slippage Up to $500 million

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Overall, the set of standards and regulations that currently 

exists to govern the transport of spent fuel, high-level 

waste, and other nuclear materials has functioned well 

and the safety record for past shipments of these types 

of materials has been excellent. Indeed, states have been 

working cooperatively with DOE for many years to plan 

for shipments, often through agreements with regional 

groups of states and in ways that involve radiological health, 

law enforcement, and emergency response personnel. 

However, past performance and mere compliance with 

current regulations does not guarantee that future transport 

operations will match the record to date or that these 

operations will be conducted in a way that inspires public 

confidence, particularly as the logistics involved expand to 

accommodate a much larger number of shipments. This 

chapter discusses the Commission’s specific findings and 

recommendations with respect to the transport of spent 

fuel and nuclear waste in the context of the broader waste 

management strategy we are proposing.

9.1 Background and Context

In 2006, the National Academies issued a report titled 

Going the Distance: the Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United 

States.

215 The report concludes that there are “no 

fundamental technical barriers” to the safe transport of 

such materials, but it made a number of recommendations 

to improve safety, communicate risk, and conduct 

planning and other activities in preparation for a largescale transport campaign for spent fuel. Many of these 

recommendations have since been adopted, at least in 

part, by federal agencies such as the NRC, DOE, and the 

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).216 Table 3 

below summarizes the key NAS study recommendations 

and their current status. The Commission believes that 

other NAS recommendations that have not yet been 

implemented, for whatever reason, should be revisited and 

addressed as appropriate.217

9. TRANSPORTATION ISSUES

The ability to safely and securely transport nuclear 

materials is critical to implementing a comprehensive 

and workable waste management system.

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Table 3. Recommendations of the NAS

Going the Distance Report and their Current Status

Recommendation Current Status (as of January 2012)

Undertake full examination of spent

fuel transport security by independent,

cleared technical experts.

Members of the BRC and staff with appropriate clearances have

been briefed by NRC and DOE on transportation and storage

security analyses undertaken since 2006. However, the BRC does

not believe this constitutes the “full examination” recommended by

the NAS study and we are not aware of any other efforts that would

satisfy the NAS recommendation.

Be proactive in formally assessing

and managing “social risks.” Expand

Transportation External Coordination

(TEC) Working Group to include this

issue, establish external risk advisory

group, potentially under NWTRB

auspices.

Research on social risks and risk perception has been ongoing,

but the Commission is unaware of any specific changes that have

been implemented by DOE or other agencies as a result. The

TEC Working Group (now defunct) did not expand its scope to

address this issue. The NWTRB has periodically examined public

perceptions of transportation risks but has not established an

external risk advisory group.

The NRC should analyze very longduration fires, and implement regulatory

controls to reduce the chances of a spent

fuel shipment being involved in such

a scenario.

The NRC has made a practice of studying real-world fires and

analyzing how casks would perform under such conditions. The

NRC has also worked with the Association of American Railroads

to establish a “no pass” rule for tunnels that would be used to

transport spent fuel, effectively precluding the possibility that other

trains with flammable materials would be in a tunnel at the same

time. This would prevent a long-duration fire of any significant size.

Full-scale package testing should

continue to be used as part of package

performance evaluation. Testing to

destruction should not be required.

The NRC had planned to implement a Package Performance

Study that would involve a full-scale cask and would not “test to

failure.” The project was never begun due to lack of funding and

the eventual cancellation of the Yucca Mountain project. The study

would have involved use of a Transportation, Aging and Disposal

(TAD) canister in an overpack; initial design work for this canister

has been completed but none have been fabricated.

DOE should continue to ensure

systematic involvement of states and

tribal governments in decisions about

routing and scheduling for current spent

fuel shipments.

DOE has continued to involve states and tribes in transportation

planning, and has established a National Transportation

Stakeholders’ Forum for that purpose. After the Yucca Mountain

project was cancelled, DOE’s EM program and NRC’s Spent Fuel

Storage and Transportation office provided funding to state regional

groups (albeit at reduced levels).

DOT should ensure states rigorously

comply with requirements for sound risk

assessments in designating routes.

DOT has developed regulations for determining “preferred routes”

for highway shipments, and the NRC reviews routes for security.

DOE follows the same requirements for its shipments. The

Commission is unaware of any recent or proposed campaigns

where a state has attempted to re-route spent fuel shipments using

impermissible assessments or practices.

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9.2 Regulatory and

Technical Issues

Several transportation-related regulatory and technical issues

received particular attention in the course of the Commission’s

deliberations. For example, the BRC’s Transportation and

Storage Subcommittee heard testimony that DOE’s plans

to use its own self-regulating authorities under the Atomic

Energy Act sharply undercut credibility in the proposed

transportation program. The existing regulatory framework for

commercial transportation—which features extensive oversight

and involvement by the NRC, mode-specific administrations

of the DOT,218 and state and tribal officials—is proven.

Consistent with the recommendations articulated in chapter

7 of this report, the Commission believes that a new waste

management organization should be subject to independent

regulation of its transport operations in the same way that any

private enterprise performing similar functions would be—in

other words, the new organization should not receive any

special regulatory treatment. This will help assure regulatory

clarity and transparency.

Recommendation Current Status (as of January 2012)

Mostly rail has clear advantages; DOE

should complete the Nevada rail line

and examine how to reduce the need

for cross-country truck shipments by

expanding intermodal service.

The Yucca Mountain project had formally established a “mostly rail” policy

before the program was cancelled. Construction of the Nevada rail line

never commenced. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOE and some

state agencies began a pilot project to examine near-reactor infrastructure

and related intermodal issues, but that work too has been halted.

DOE should ship oldest fuel first to a

repository or storage facility. Conduct a

“pilot” campaign by shipping fuel from

shutdown reactors first.

This recommendation was never implemented, but is consistent

with the Commission’s recommendation to ship fuel from shutdown

reactors first.

DOE should identify and make public

its suite of preferred routes as soon

as practicable to support state, tribal

and local planning and preparedness,

following the research reactor fuel

program’s process of involvement.

The Yucca Mountain project began development of a formal route

assessment process based on DOE’s established practices, but this

effort too was halted. DOE programs continue to consult with states

and tribes on routing issues.

Immediately implement Section 180(c) of

the NWPA to provide funding and technical

assistance to corridor states and tribes.

This recommendation was never implemented, but it is consistent

with the BRC’s recommendation that funding should be provided to

implement Section 180(c) early in the planning process.

Federal agencies should develop clear

and consistent guidance on what and

how information about transportation

should be protected, and commit to open

access to information that does not need

such protection.

DOE and other agencies did develop a joint Transportation

Classification Guide for Yucca Mountain shipments, which have not

commenced. DOE programs continue to follow their own security

requirements.

DOE should fully implement its dedicated

train decision before large-quantity

shipments begin.

The Yucca Mountain project did issue a formal decision to use

dedicated train service for its shipments. The BRC is unaware of

any recent or proposed spent fuel rail shipments that would not

involve use of dedicated trains.

DOE and Congress should transfer

responsibility for spent fuel transportation

to an outside entity.

This recommendation was never implemented, but is consistent with

the BRC’s recommendation that a new entity is needed to manage

transportation (and everything else) related to SNF and HLW.

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Another transport-related issue that will need to be

addressed concerns the fact that the NRC has not yet

granted a license for the transport of higher burnup

fuels, which are now commonly being discharged from

reactors.219 It will be necessary to reexamine current

regulations and to develop a technical basis for assigning

burnup credit to ensure that these higher-burnup fuels can

be transported when needed. In addition, spent fuel that

has been stored for extended periods may be degraded and

may require additional handling and preparation before it

can be transported.

Finally, numerous parties have suggested that expanded

full-scale testing of transportation casks (in addition to

computer modeling) could be useful in enhancing public

confidence in transport safety. Full-scale testing is part of

the testing methodology used by the NRC in its integrated

evaluation program. The NAS Going the Distance study

endorsed the NRC’s approach and recommended that fullscale cask testing, as well as other accepted methodologies,

should continue to be used for technical reasons. In 2005, the

NRC approved a staff proposal for the full-scale testing of a

rail cask (like one shown in figure 19)—of the kind expected

to be used in transporting spent fuel to a HLW repository—in

a scenario involving a collision with a locomotive traveling at

high speed followed by a hydrocarbon fire.

DOE supported the proposed Package Performance

Study and suggested combining it with an emergency

response exercise to maximize the benefits of the study.

Plans to provide NRC with needed funding in 2009 did

not materialize because of budget constraints (the estimated

cost of the study was approximately $15 million) and

uncertainties about the Yucca Mountain project. The

Commission’s view is that funding for the proposed test,

if it has independent value, should be provided from the

Nuclear Waste Fund so that the NRC can update these

plans and proceed with those tests the NRC determines to

be most useful.

With regard to transportation security, the NRC has

existing security regulations and orders in place and is

currently undertaking a separate rulemaking to codify further

transportation security requirements.220

The proposed protective strategy for transportation

includes several elements:

• Advance planning and coordination with states

• Increased notifications and communications before and

during shipment

• Continuous and active shipment monitoring

• Use of armed escorts over the entire shipment duration

(previously, armed guards had been required only in

highly populated areas)

• Background investigations of personnel with access to

Safeguards Information.

In its Going the Distance report, the NAS noted that

“[m]alevolent acts against spent fuel and HLW are a major

technical and societal concern.” However, the report authors

were unable to perform an in-depth analysis of transportation

security due to informational constraints (primarily lack of

access to classified materials).221 Accordingly, the committee

recommended that experts with full access to all relevant

information conduct an independent assessment of security

Figure 19. Casks Being nsported By RaiL

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risks before any large-scale campaign to ship materials to a 

disposal or consolidated storage facility is launched.

In subsequent discussions with the NRC’s Office of 

Nuclear Security and Incident Response, BRC Commissioners 

and staff reviewed the additional analyses NRC has conducted 

following the release of the NAS report and others developed 

since that time.222 We found that the NRC has taken 

reasonable actions to respond to the vulnerabilities that 

have been identified to date and we expect the current NRC 

rulemaking process to be sufficient to ensure that any needed 

future changes will be made appropriately.

9.3 The Role of State, Tribal 

and Local Governments 

and the Importance of

Early Planning for Future 

Transport Needs

Extensive planning and preparation for transport 

arrangements will be required even if only the 2,800 metric 

tons of spent fuel currently being stored at shutdown reactors 

are slated for initial transfer to consolidated storage.223 The 

Commission has heard testimony indicating that advance 

planning timeframes on the order of a decade could be 

required to plan and coordinate a transport strategy and 

to establish the institutional and physical infrastructure to 

conduct a large-scale shipping operation.224 Historically, 

some programs have treated transportation planning as an 

afterthought. No successful programs have done so.

This lead time is important from a purely logistical 

standpoint because some critical elements of infrastructure and 

equipment do not currently exist and will need to be designed, 

fabricated, tested and licensed before significant amounts of 

waste can be moved. For example, the Association of American 

Railroads requires the use of cask cars, buffer cars and escort 

cars with special safety features for future rail shipments of 

SNF. No such cars currently exist, and developing and placing 

this type of equipment into service will require between five 

and seven years.225 The current commercial fleet of licensed 

casks is quite small and is primarily limited to legal-weight 

truck (LWT) casks. While a significant transportation 

campaign could begin using trucks and current LWT casks, 

a sizeable fleet of rail rolling stock will be needed to move 

larger quantities of SNF (such as those currently loaded 

in dual-purpose containers in dry storage at reactor sites). 

Moving significant quantities of spent fuel from reactor sites 

will require substantial new, specially-designed and dedicated 

equipment; it will also require infrastructure modifications 

and improvements at existing reactor sites, which vary widely 

in terms of their condition and accessibility. These logistical 

issues, which must be addressed sooner or later in any 

event, do not present large technical challenges, but they are 

nonetheless complex and will take time to resolve.

Substantial lead time is also needed to ensure that 

planning and institutional arrangements are in place and 

tested by the time major shipments commence. This means 

early efforts are needed to undertake planning activities 

that involve state, tribal and local officials. To that end, 

DOE should complete the development of procedures and 

regulations for providing technical assistance and funds 

(pursuant to section 180(c) of the NWPA) for training local 

and tribal officials in areas traversed by spent fuel shipments. 

Although the final destination of the material to be shipped 

(whether for storage, recycling or disposal) is not known, 

every origin site is known. DOE has a well-established 

practice of working with state and regional groups and other 

organizations to coordinate and provide technical assistance 

for transportation. Future programs should build upon these 

proven approaches. 

In particular, DOE has for many years supported 

cooperative agreements with state regional groups, or SRGs, 

to partner with local authorities through whose jurisdictions 

radioactive materials will be transported. Collaboration 

through the SRGs has proved important, not only because 

states have primary responsibility for protecting the health 

and safety of their citizens, but because they share (and 

sometimes disagree about) common concerns. Bringing 

corridor jurisdictions together under the auspices of these 

groups allows issues to be identified and resolved by all 

parties. It also means the shipper and carrier do not have 

to negotiate individually with jurisdictions that may have 

inconsistent or even conflicting priorities. States have extensive 

experience with transportation issues and important roles 

to fulfill with respect to issues such as routing, inspections, 

training, emergency preparedness, communications, public 

information, and security for radioactive materials and other 

hazardous shipments. 

The WIPP facility in New Mexico, for example, provides 

a longstanding and highly successful model for partnering 

with states to achieve shared success in addressing issues 

related to the transport of nuclear materials. Beginning 

with the Western Governors’ Association (WGA) and 

later expanding to include other SRGs, states worked with 

one another and DOE over a period of years to develop 

inspection protocols, training programs, information 

products and other areas of transportation planning. The goal 

of such efforts, according to one policy statement issued by 

the WGA, was to achieve “the safe and uneventful transport 

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of radioactive, radioactive materials, and spent nuclear fuel” 

by (among other things) conducting “early coordination 

and effective communications with state, tribal, and local 

governments.”226 On occasion, DOE agreed to go beyond 

regulatory requirements when doing so was reasonable and 

prudent, and would enhance overall safety. For example, the 

Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance developed an enhanced 

inspection standard to ensure that trucks carrying waste to 

WIPP, and spent fuel to other sites, were “defect free” before 

departure, and inspected again upon arrival. Over time, 

inspectors in “downstream” corridor states became confident 

that WIPP trucks were among the safest on the highway and 

would waive en-route inspections, allowing them to spend 

more time examining other trucks whose equipment was 

deficient and posed significant safety risks. This program, 

which was originally a voluntary “extra-regulatory” measure, 

was later incorporated into regulations. Overall it lowered the 

time-in-transit and related costs for WIPP shipments. 

In a paper examining the WIPP transportation record 

and safety program after ten years of operation, several 

participants on the WGA working group noted that:

Working Group members recognized that there were three 

key elements to achieving the Governors’ objectives of 

safe and uneventful transportation and public acceptance 

of the program: accident prevention; effective emergency 

response if there were an accident; and a successful 

public information program. They also recognized that 

a cooperative effort by federal, tribal, state and local 

governments was necessary to achieve the objectives.227

This basic approach to collaborative planning has been 

applied to other campaigns with the Southern States Energy 

Board and the Northeastern and Midwestern offices of the 

Council of State Governments. Spent fuel transportation 

programs (including those supporting research reactors 

and the Navy) continue to follow the same basic approach, 

with modifications as appropriate (for example, Navy SNF 

shipments are classified). The Commission believes that 

while DOE has frequently been criticized for its management 

of the civilian nuclear waste program more generally, the 

Department’s record of planning in cooperation with 

concerned stakeholders to address transportation issues has 

for the most part been quite successful. Any new entity 

charged with managing spent fuel and waste in the future 

should emulate and build on this success.

9.4 Next Steps

Under Section 180(c) of the NWPA, DOE is required to 

provide funding and technical assistance for the training of 

public safety officials to states and tribes whose jurisdictions 

would be traversed by shipments of spent fuel to storage 

facilities or to a repository. Over the course of more than a 

decade and several stops and starts, DOE’s Office of Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) developed 

a policy for implementing a 180(c) program. The BRC 

commissioned a paper on the background and history of the 

180(c) program in an effort to develop recommendations for 

the future implementation of this or a similar initiative.228 The 

results of this paper, in combination with the recommendations 

put forward by the NAS in 2006 and comments received by 

the BRC in the course of our deliberations, suggest that at least 

two actions are needed in the near term. 

First, early implementation of the 180(c) program as 

currently defined in the NWPA should be initiated by DOE 

and should be supported by the Nuclear Waste Fund, even 

before any potential storage or disposal site is identified. 

DOE should (1) finalize procedures and regulations for 

providing technical assistance and funds for training to local 

governments and tribes pursuant to Section 180(c) of the 

NWPA and (2) begin to provide such funding, independent 

from progress on facility siting. While it would be premature 

to fully fund a technical assistance program before knowing 

with some certainty where the destination sites for spent fuel 

are going to be, substantial benefits can be gained from a 

modest early investment in planning for the early transport 

of spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites. Consistent with 

the Commission’s recommendation that spent fuel from 

shutdown reactor sites be “first in line” for acceptance at a 

consolidated storage facility, initial routes from those sites can 

be easily identified, and pilot training programs for emergency 

responders along those routes should begin without further 

delay. This would be consistent with the recommendation 

of the Going the Distance study that DOE initiate transport 

“through a pilot program involving relatively short, logistically 

simple movements of older fuel from closed reactors to 

demonstrate its ability to carry out its responsibilities in a safe 

and operationally effective manner.” 

Second, legislation to implement the broader waste 

management strategy being recommended by the BRC 

should include amendments to Section 180(c) that would 

expand the authority and responsibility of the new waste 

management organization to include authorities equivalent 

to those given to DOE in the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act 

with respect to transportation to WIPP, including:

• A program to provide information to the public about 

the transportation of spent fuel or high level waste to or 

from a repository or storage facility. [WIPP LWA Sec. 

14(c)(1)(D)(iv)]

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•	 Authority and direction to assist states, tribes, and local 

governments, through monetary grants or contributions 

in-kind (subject to appropriation) in acquiring 

equipment for responding to an incident involving 

shipments covered by the law. [WIPP LWA Sec. 14(c)(2)]

•	 Broad authority and direction to provide in-kind, 

financial, technical, and other appropriate assistance 

(subject to appropriations) to states and tribes whose 

jurisdictions would be traversed by shipments of spent 

fuel to interim storage or to a repository, for the purpose 

of transportation safety programs related to such 

shipments that are not otherwise addressed in the law. 

[WIPP LWA Sec. 14(d)]

In March 1999, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 

in New Mexico received its first shipment of transuranic 

(TRU) radioactive waste. WIPP has received over 10,200 

shipments as of January 2012. The experience of the WIPP 

transportation system provides grounds for confidence 

that nuclear waste can be transported across the nation 

safely and securely. The system was designed by DOE and 

includes multiple coordinated elements aimed at assuring 

safe and secure transport. 

The Transport Container – All waste is transported in 

packages approved for use by the NRC. Several different 

types of shipping containers have been developed to 

enable shipment of different types of waste. All packages 

must meet NRC and U.S. Department of Transportation 

(DOT) radiation limits.

The Drivers and Carriers – DOT sets standards for drivers 

of trucks that carry hazardous cargo. DOE agreed to go 

beyond these requirements for its WIPP drivers and carriers. 

WIPP drivers must meet or exceed experience, licensing and 

training qualifications, and maintain good driving records. 

Once hired, drivers are also instructed in defensive driving, 

adverse weather, road hazards, and mountain driving, in 

addition to extensive WIPP relevant training, and are subject 

to stringent penalties if they deviate from specific procedures. 

Drivers work in pairs to ensure that the truck and payload are 

attended at all times and that drivers are rested while driving. 

WIPP drivers must stop and check their trucks and payload 

every 150 miles or three hours en route.

The Shipping Network and Emergency Preparedness 

and Response Systems – DOT regulations require 

radioactive materials to be shipped on the interstate highway 

system unless states designate other routes. WIPP shipment 

protocols and routes were developed through cooperative 

efforts between states, tribal governments and DOE. Prior to 

departing a TRU waste site, state police inspect WIPP trucks 

to Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Level VI standards, 

the most rigorous in the commercial trucking industry. 

WIPP drivers notify state officials two hours before entering 

each state and WIPP trucks are subject to inspections at 

each state port of entry. The states and DOE have agreed 

on procedures to monitor weather and road conditions 

so that shipments can avoid hazards. Shipments will not 

depart DOE facilities if they are likely to encounter severe 

weather along the route. If unexpected bad weather or road 

conditions are encountered, procedures for the selection 

and use of safe parking areas have been developed. 

Designated federal, state and tribal officials can also monitor 

the shipments. While designed to prevent accidents 

from occurring, the WIPP transportation system also has 

extensive measures in place to address emergency response 

in the event a shipment is involved in a serious accident. 

Specific plans and procedures for dealing with an accident 

are in place throughout all routes used in the transportation 

system; these plans cover notification, incident command, 

and response procedures. In addition, more than 26,000 

trained emergency response professionals are in place 

along the routes. In coordination with DOE, the states have 

developed a WIPP-specific training regimen for emergency 

first responders; this regimen has been incorporated directly 

into hazardous materials training programs for fire fighters, 

police and emergency medical staff along the routes. In 

1994, the National Academy of Sciences projected that 

WIPP’s planned shipping program would be “safer than 

that employed for any other hazardous material in the US.” 

Experience to date bears out this assessment.

The WIPP Transportation System

A Decade of Safe, Secure Shipments of Radioactive Waste

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10. Regulatory ISSUES

The federal government has sole authority to regulate SNF

and high-level radioactive waste. Under current law, the

two agencies with primary responsibility for regulating

facilities or activities related to radioactive waste management

are the NRC and EPA.229 Storage facilities for spent fuel

and HLW are regulated and licensed by the NRC, while

disposal repositories are subject to both EPA and NRC

regulation. Specifically, EPA is responsible for issuing

“generally applicable standards for protection of the general

environment from offsite releases from radioactive material in

repositories.” These standards apply to the management and

storage of waste during the operational period, as well as to

the performance of a disposal facility during the post-closure

period (i.e., after waste is no longer being actively emplaced).

The NRC, meanwhile, is charged with issuing “requirements

and criteria” to be used in approving construction, operation,

and closure of repositories. These criteria, which may not

be inconsistent with the standards issued by EPA, must

require a repository to use a system of multiple barriers

and must include any restrictions on the retrievability of

the emplaced waste that the NRC deems appropriate. In

addition, the NRC is responsible for regulations dealing with

nuclear materials safeguards and security and with protection

of facility workers from radiological exposures. Other

categories of worker protections are the responsibility of

OSHA. Finally, the DOT has direct regulatory responsibility

for important aspects of the systems and practices used

to transport radioactive wastes, while the Department

of Homeland Security and other agencies play a role in

addressing security and counter-terrorism-related issues

involving nuclear facilities and materials.

This chapter discusses a number of regulatory issues

that will have important implications for the future storage

and disposal of SNF and HLW. We focus particularly on

regulations for disposal facilities, as this is the area that presents

the most challenging regulatory issues. The discussion in this

Regulation is an essential element of a safe, secure,

environmentally responsible and ultimately effective

nuclear waste management strategy.

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chapter reflects current arrangements under which authority 

for establishing regulations and evaluating compliance is held 

by the federal regulatory agencies; as discussed in section 

6.6, we recommend that state and tribal governments have 

the opportunity to negotiate important roles in aspects of 

regulation, permitting and operational oversight.

10.1 Issues and Challenges 

in Regulating Storage and

Transportation

As noted in chapter 3 of this report, the NRC recently extended 

its “Waste Confidence Decision” to up to 60 years after the 

termination of an operating reactor’s license (with extensions 

up to 60 years).230 Several states have since filed suit against 

the NRC over this finding.231 In the meantime, the NRC has 

also begun researching the potential environmental impacts of 

storage over even longer timeframes—more than one hundred 

or even several hundred years. It is important to emphasize, 

however, that even if the NRC finds that storage can be safely 

implemented over these very extended timeframes, this would 

not mean that deferring disposal for additional decades to (in 

the worst case) centuries would be justified or would make 

sense—in either cost or risk management terms. 

In June 2010, the NRC launched a comprehensive review 

of regulations related to extended storage and transport 

including, specifically, the adequacy of existing mechanisms 

for ensuring safe and secure storage and transportation 

for extended periods beyond 120 years.232 This review is 

expected to be complete in 2017. A newer and unanticipated 

challenge involves developing an appropriate regulatory 

response to the events that occurred at Japan’s Fukushima 

Daiichi nuclear power station following the March 2011 

earthquake and tsunami. The NRC and other agencies, such 

as the IAEA, are in the early stages of conducting in-depth 

investigations of the crisis; in addition, the Commission 

is recommending a separate NAS study of Fukushima. 

As a result of these efforts, new storage-related regulatory 

requirements may be deemed necessary and appropriate and 

if so, should be implemented as expeditiously as possible.

More generally, the primary regulatory challenge for 

storage facilities (given a realistic appraisal of the time likely to 

be necessary to open and load one or more geologic disposal 

facilities) remains ensuring their performance over extended 

periods of time (120 years or more). This will require a better 

understanding of degradation mechanisms that could, over 

multiple decades, potentially affect the integrity of spent 

fuel or its cladding. It also requires better information about 

environmental conditions and the state of spent fuel inside 

existing dry storage systems. As noted in chapter 5, because 

these systems generally lack instrumentation, knowledge of key 

parameters such as (but not limited to) gas pressure, the release 

of volatile fission products, and moisture is limited to nonexistent for most dry cask installations. Some of these issues 

will be addressed as part of the Extended Storage Collaboration 

Program that EPRI has launched—in conjunction with the 

NRC, DOE, the Nuclear Energy Institute, individual utilities 

and dry storage system vendors—to research the technical basis 

for long-term dry storage of SNF.

The current regulatory system for assuring the safety 

and security of nuclear waste shipments, meanwhile, has 

functioned well to date. As discussed in chapter 5 of this 

report, however, the challenge will be to ensure that the 

current system can keep up in terms of managing health 

and safety risks and providing adequate physical security if 

the quantity and volume of waste shipments—including 

shipments of higher-burnup fuels—increase substantially 

in the future. A separate NRC rulemaking is currently 

underway to codify further transportation security 

requirements for future nuclear waste shipments.

10.2 Issues and Challenges in 

Setting Regulatory Standards 

for Disposal Facilities

Regulating facilities for the disposal of HLW and spent fuel 

presents unique challenges because of the extraordinarily 

long time periods over which these materials present health, 

safety, security, and environmental concerns. 

In its 2006 Safety Requirements report, the IAEA 

elaborated on the basic aims of geological disposal:233

• To contain the waste until most of the radioactivity, and 

especially that associated with shorter lived radionuclides, 

has decayed

• To isolate the waste from the biosphere and to 

substantially reduce the likelihood of inadvertent human 

intrusion into the waste

• To delay any significant migration of radionuclides to the 

biosphere until a time in the far future when much of the 

radioactivity will have decayed

• To ensure that any levels of radionuclides eventually 

reaching the biosphere are such that possible radiological 

impacts in the future are acceptably low

The task for regulators is to translate these general aims into 

specific standards or technical performance requirements 

that must be met before a facility can be licensed. Different 

countries have taken different approaches to this task 

with the result that regulatory requirements for disposal 

facilities vary around the world. Increasingly, however, there 

is some convergence in these requirements, particularly 

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as international organizations such as the Nuclear 

Energy Agency (NEA)234 and the IAEA have published 

recommendations or guidance in this area. 

In the United States, there are currently two sets of federal 

regulatory standards for high-level radioactive waste disposal 

facilities—one set that was developed specifically for Yucca 

Mountain and another, earlier set that would, under current 

law, apply to all other sites (this earlier, generic set of standards 

was essentially complete by the time Congress directed the 

development of Yucca Mountain-specific standards in 1992; 

see further discussion in the text box).235

Because the thinking about repository regulations evolved 

considerably during the development of the Yucca Mountain 

requirements, the Commission concludes that the generic 

regulations that would currently apply to all other sites will 

need to be revisited and revised in any case. In addition, the 

Commission has heard a range of views both about broader 

reforms to the current U.S. regulatory framework for geologic 

disposal facilities and about specific changes to existing 

repository requirements. We have addressed some of the 

broader reform questions, but have not attempted to develop 

specific recommendations concerning the appropriate form 

and stringency of regulatory standards for disposal facilities. 

Resolving these issues will involve societal value judgments that 

should be mediated through the normal regulatory development 

process. In that process, EPA, NRC, and other agencies can 

and should draw from an extensive literature and considerable 

regulatory experience to make appropriate determinations for 

assuring safe and secure nuclear waste disposal in this country. 

The remainder of this section briefly reviews some of the 

most important and controversial technical and policy issues 

to be resolved in setting performance standards for disposal 

facilities, before offering some general principles to guide the 

development of future regulations in the United States.

10.2.1 Timeframe

Since long-term protection of human health is one of the 

core functions of deep geologic disposal, quantitative limits 

on the public’s future exposure to radioactivity are typically 

included in disposal facility standards. These limits may 

take the form of a dose-based or risk-based standard (the 

two are essentially equivalent in practice) that limits the 

exposure to individuals resulting from radiation releases 

from the repository. Alternatively they can take the form of a 

release-based standard that limits the amount of radioactive 

material that is allowed to escape the repository (see text box 

describing U.S. disposal facility regulations).

A critical regulatory question then centers on the 

timeframe over which compliance with these numeric limits 

must be demonstrated. This has been a controversial question 

in the past, because the long-lived nature of the radiological 

hazard posed by SNF and HLW creates an inherent tension 

between the objective of protecting future generations on the 

one hand, and the practical difficulties of making very longterm projections about human and natural systems on the 

other hand. In the United States, the EPA initially proposed 

a compliance timeframe of 10,000 years for the proposed 

Yucca Mountain repository; however, this limit was later 

increased to 1 million years.236 Many individuals have told 

the Commission that it is unrealistic to have a very long (e.g., 

million-year) requirement for demonstrating compliance 

in a traditional regulation; the Commission agrees. Other 

countries have taken different approaches to this issue: 

some have opted for shorter timeframes (a few thousand 

to 100,000 years), some have developed different kinds of 

criteria for different timeframes, and some have avoided the 

use of a hard “cut-off” altogether and have instead opted to 

require a demonstration that the proposed facility is at very 

low risk for catastrophic disruptions that could lead to largescale releases of radioactivity. Some countries, such as Finland 

and Sweden, have more stringent regulations for the first 

few thousand years after repository closure, compared with 

the period from 1,000 years to 100,000 or 1,000,000 years. 

In doing so, they acknowledge the fact that uncertainties in 

predicting geologic processes, and therefore the behavior of 

the waste in the repository, increase with time. 

10.2.2 Compliance Methodology

As critical as the form and stringency of the standards to 

be applied to a disposal facility is the decision about what 

approach or methodology will be used to determine whether 

they have been met. An integral part of EPA’s standards for 

geologic disposal facilities is a requirement (embedded in 

the standards themselves) that compliance be demonstrated 

using a quantitative performance assessment to project 

repository performance over very long time periods: 10,000 

years in the case of WIPP and up to 1,000,000 years for 

Yucca Mountain.237 Over the last decade or more, however, 

there has been increasing attention worldwide to compliance 

methodologies that integrate quantitative and qualitative 

lines of argument to show that a repository will remain safe 

after our ability to monitor a repository is lost.238,239 This shift 

has been motivated in part by increasing recognition of the 

inherent limitations of quantitative projections over geologic 

time periods.240

Instead of focusing on comprehensive calculations of 

projected dose levels to populations hundreds of thousands 

of years or more in the future, for example, the safety 

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analysis used to support regulatory demonstrations of 

compliance might use such calculations for an initial 

period for which they would be most defensible, and 

then follow the evolution of troublesome radionuclides in 

the given geologic environment over the long term using 

other existing and compelling scientific knowledge.241 For 

example, Finnish regulators require quantitative assessment 

where possible, but also call for use of complementary 

considerations when quantitative analyses are not feasible 

or are too uncertain.242

Performance assessment is valuable as a systematic 

method for organizing the understanding of a geologic 

repository.243, 244 It is also valuable for focusing the 

information used to support a compliance demonstration.245

Furthermore, NRC regulations stipulate that additional 

factors (such as the demonstration of the effectiveness 

of multiple barriers, empirical observations, and a 

performance confirmation program) are to be considered 

in a licensing decision.246 Nonetheless, the heavy emphasis 

on quantitative performance assessment in U.S. disposal 

facility safety standards may lead to a focus on showing 

numerical compliance that could obscure understanding of 

the actual operation of the disposal facility system247 and 

divert attention from the overall strategy being employed 

to safely dispose of nuclear waste.248 While EPA recognized 

this concern when it extended the compliance period to 1 

“Generic” EPA and NRC Regulations

EPA standards for all sites other than Yucca Mountain are 

defined under 40 CFR Part 191, “Environmental Radiation 

Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes” 

(with additional implementation and compliance criteria for 

WIPP found in Part 194). This regulation was first issued 

in 1985, remanded by a federal court for reconsideration 

of certain provisions, and reissued in 1993 to apply only 

to geologic disposal facilities other than Yucca Mountain 

(see below). 

The core of Part 191’s disposal standard is a “containment” 

requirement designed to protect human populations 

by limiting the cumulative releases of key radioactive 

isotopes over the 10,000-year period following closure of 

a disposal facility. Compliance is to be demonstrated by 

use of quantitative performance assessments that take into 

account “all significant processes and events” to show that 

there is a “reasonable expectation” (not absolute proof) 

that cumulative releases for a number of specific isotopes 

will have a low likelihood (less than one chance in 10 for 

low releases and less than one chance in 1,000 for higher 

releases). The EPA regulation also includes an individual 

protection requirement, which stipulates that for 10,000 

years there should be a reasonable expectation that no 

member of the public will receive an annual dose greater 

than 15 millirems (150 microsieverts), considering only the 

undisturbed performance of the repository (rather than 

all significant processes and events, as required for the 

containment standard). 

NRC regulations for all sites other than Yucca Mountain 

are defined in 10 CFR Part 60, “Disposal of HighLevel Radioactive Wastes in Geological Repositories.” 

These regulations were originally issued in 1983 (before 

EPA’s first set of standards had been completed) and 

revised in 1987 to reflect the NWPA Amendments Act 

of 1987. NRC’s regulation incorporates EPA’s generally 

applicable standards by reference, and includes additional 

performance requirements for specified individual barriers in 

the repository system. 

Yucca Mountain-Specific Regulations

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed EPA to issue an 

individual dose standard for Yucca Mountain, based upon 

and consistent with recommendations by the NAS. The 

process to develop this EPA standard (40 CFR Part 197) 

and matching NRC implementing regulations (10 CFR 

Part 63) was complex—it involved an NAS study, multiple 

lawsuits, and another court remand that required EPA to 

reconsider certain provisions it had initially proposed. Thus, 

it was not completed until 2008. The EPA Yucca Mountain 

standard limits doses to members of the public (not total 

releases of specified radioactive materials) and extends to 1 

million years (consistent with a recommendation of the NAS 

study), with a 15 millirem limit for the first 10,000 years and 

a 100 millirem limit thereafter. The NRC Yucca Mountain 

regulations incorporate the new EPA standard and drop the 

performance standards for individual repository barriers that 

are contained in the generic regulations (10 CFR Part 60).

Current U.S. Disposal Facility Regulations

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million years for its Yucca Mountain standard in compliance 

with a judicial decision,249 the standard itself makes no 

distinction between the roles of the performance assessment 

in demonstrating compliance for the first 10,000 years and 

for the very long term—use of performance assessment is 

an integral part of the standard for both time periods. The 

need for flexibility in demonstrating compliance with any 

very long-term quantitative performance standard might be 

better met if performance assessment were included as one of 

a set of methods to be used in formulating the overall safety 

case for compliance, rather than being incorporated in the 

statement of the standard itself.250

10.2.3 Standard of Proof for

Compliance Demonstrations

The “standard of proof” required for compliance 

demonstrations should be viewed as integral to a long-term 

performance standard. While EPA disposal facility regulations 

(both generic and Yucca Mountain-specific) require the use 

of quantitative performance assessments to show compliance 

with quantitative standards, they also state that unequivocal 

proof of compliance is neither expected nor required because 

of the inherent limitations of such assessments.251 Thus, 

licensees must demonstrate a “reasonable expectation” of 

compliance with standards for the post-closure period. The 

NRC adopted EPA’s approach of applying a “reasonable 

expectation” standard to the post-closure period, while using a 

“reasonable assurance” standard for the operation of facilities 

during the pre-closure period (consistent with the NRC’s 

practice for other licensed operating facilities subject to active 

licensee oversight and control).

10.2.4 Other Protecion 

Requirements

Protection of the natural environment (along with, but 

distinct from, human health per se) is widely accepted as 

an important objective of geologic disposal; however, there 

has been less convergence internationally around how to 

assess this objective and develop appropriate criteria. A 

recent (2010) NEA review of regulatory developments 

pertaining to geologic disposal describes a number of 

national and international efforts—some ongoing—to 

develop ways of accounting for the long-term protection 

of flora and fauna. Existing regulations in some countries 

(e.g., Canada, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK) 

include qualitative requirements for the protection of nonhuman organisms and biodiversity; several countries also 

require that these impacts be explicitly included in future 

risk and performance assessments. In the United States, 

EPA standards for the disposal of high-level radioactive 

waste and TRU waste include a separate groundwater 

protection standard.

10.2.5 Division of Regulatory 

Responsibility between EPA 

and NRC

In the course of the Commission’s deliberations, numerous 

witnesses expressed the view that greater consistency was 

needed between the EPA and NRC regulatory systems. Some 

witnesses also suggested that any effort to rationalize or 

harmonize the EPA and NRC systems be undertaken before 

new disposal sites are identified, even for screening purposes, 

to avoid or at least minimize the perception that standards 

are being set to ensure that one or more (pre-selected) 

sites will meet them. This seems particularly important for 

individual protection requirements, which have been a clear 

point of contention in the past; however, it is likely to be 

•	 What should the basis be: a desired level of protection or 

what is reasonably achievable using today’s technology? 

•	 For how long must compliance be demonstrated?

•	 Who is to be protected—individuals or populations? 

•	 What is the desired level of protection?

•	 What is the measure of compliance (e.g., doses to 

individuals vs. releases to the environment)? 

•	 How should compliance be demonstrated—primarily 

through quantitative calculations or through a broader 

safety analysis that involves multiple lines of qualitative as 

well as quantitative considerations? 

•	 What level of confidence is required?

•	 How should the potential for human intrusion be addressed? 

•	 How should retrievability be addressed? 

•	 Can compliance take credit for institutional controls and 

if so, for how long?

•	 Should groundwater be separately protected?

•	 Should there be performance requirements for subelements of a disposal facility (e.g., the waste package 

or the geologic setting)?

Key Questions in Setting a

Regulatory Standard for Deep

Geological Disposal

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relevant for many other issues as well. Comments submitted 

by both the NRC and the EPA in response to the BRC’s 

draft report indicate that coordination between these two 

regulatory agencies has improved markedly in recent years.

The Commission also received and considered 

recommendations for a more fundamental redrawing of 

regulatory roles and responsibilities at the federal level (i.e., 

transferring all regulatory authority to the NRC or EPA). We 

concluded that while there are opportunities for improvement 

in the EPA/NRC regulatory process and in the working 

relationship between these agencies, the general division of 

roles and responsibilities that currently exists between EPA 

(establishing standards) and NRC (licensing and regulating 

waste management facilities) is appropriate and should be 

preserved. We return to this point in the next section.

10.3 Recommendations for

Developing Future Disposal 

Facility Standards

Without making specific recommendations regarding the 

standards to be applied to geologic disposal facilities in the future, 

the Commission recommends a number of general principles or 

propositions to guide the development of future regulations: 

1. The standard and supporting regulatory 

requirements to license a facility should be 

generic—that is, applicable to all potential sites. 

While there may be advantages to developing standards 

and requirements that recognize the specific features and 

characteristics of a particular site, experience with Yucca 

Mountain indicates that this approach can create suspicions 

that regulations are being tailored to make a pre-selected 

site “work.” Generally-applicable regulations are more likely 

to earn public confidence. A generic standard will also 

support the efficient consideration of multiple sites. 

2. Regulatory standards and requirements for 

compliance demonstrations (including the 

required level of confidence in the demonstration 

or “standard of proof”) should not go beyond 

what is scientifically possible and reasonable.

Both the standards themselves and the process used to 

demonstrate that they have been met must be credible 

to the scientific community and the public. The 

Commission has heard the view that some aspects of the 

current Yucca Mountain regulations lack credibility. A 

specific concern is the requirement that the compliance 

demonstration be primarily based on a complex 

quantitative projection of repository performance for 

1 million years. While making calculations over such 

a long time horizon might be appropriate as a part of 

establishing a broader safety case, the Commission 

believes that over-reliance on million-year calculations 

can reduce credibility rather than enhance it. As the 

IAEA has warned: “Care needs to be exercised in using 

the criteria beyond the time where the uncertainties 

become so large that the criteria may no longer serve as a 

reasonable basis for decision making.”252

Whatever the time frame, the standard of proof 

for compliance should likewise be based on what is 

scientifically achievable. As discussed above, both existing 

sets of generic disposal facility and Yucca Mountain-specific 

regulations emphasize that absolute proof in the normal 

sense of the word is not possible over long time periods. 

They therefore stipulate that compliance determinations 

should be based on a “reasonable expectation” that the 

standards will be met. This is also the standard of proof 

defined by EPA253 and ultimately adopted by the NRC for 

its Yucca Mountain regulations. This approach has proved 

workable in the WIPP context and we recommend that it 

be carried over into new regulations.

3. Rules for demonstrating compliance and for 

documenting the required level of confidence in 

the compliance demonstration (i.e., the standard 

of proof) should be defined at the same time that 

the performance standards are developed.

Rules for demonstrating compliance (including meeting 

the standard of proof) are integral to any regulatory 

standard. These rules should be included when developing 

the overall standard and should be applied in the way that 

was expected when the performance standard was adopted. 

This is particularly important when different agencies are 

charged with setting the standard (EPA) and implementing 

the standard (NRC). In these cases, the potential exists for 

different agencies to apply different regulatory philosophies 

to the same standard.254

4. Standards for a disposal facility should explicitly 

recognize and facilitate an adaptive, staged 

approach to development. 

Current EPA and NRC regulations were developed before 

international thinking about repository development 

shifted in favor of a more staged, adaptive approach (this 

is also the approach the Commission is recommending for 

the United States). The NRC, in particular, has a robust 

and exacting regulatory process for reactor operators and 

other facility licensees that generally requires very high 

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levels of design specificity and performance assessment at 

the initial licensing phase. This structure is not necessarily 

incompatible with a staged, adaptive approach; in fact, the 

NAS study of staged repository development observed that 

the “The U.S. licensing process already follows a staged 

approach” and concluded that “there are no restrictions 

precluding DOE from implementing Adaptive Staging.”255

However, future disposal facility regulations should be 

designed to accommodate a process in which decisions 

about design, construction, and operations might be kept 

open beyond the initial license application.256 In general, 

adaptive staging could make the licensing process more 

complex by increasing the number of changes made in 

the course of the process. This in turn would increase 

the number of regulatory review steps and the potential 

need for license amendments.257 Recent NRC planning 

documents suggest the agency has already recognized 

that it may need to develop new performance assessment 

tools that are flexible enough to accommodate different 

scenarios for the management of spent fuel and HLW 

(in part to respond to the findings of the BRC in its draft 

report).258 More broadly, we believe a revised regulatory 

structure for future disposal facility development should be 

designed with express attention to providing the flexibility 

needed to support an adaptive, staged process.

5. Safety and other performance standards and 

regulations should be finalized prior to the siteselection process. 

If site selection occurs before final performance standards 

are defined, there are two risks. The first is that time and 

effort could be spent on a site that should have been ruled 

out as unsuitable earlier in the process. The second risk is 

one of perception. The public and other stakeholders could 

suspect that standards are being adjusted to fit the site. 

These considerations argue for setting generic standards that 

would be applicable to any facility wherever it is located, 

before any particular site is selected for further study. In 

developing such regulations, however, it will be important 

to avoid setting excessively detailed and rigid requirements 

that could prove unworkable when applied to an actual site 

or that could have the effect of screening out potentially 

suitable and otherwise promising sites.259 The Commission 

believes there is no reason to wait to start the process of 

developing generic regulations for future geologic disposal 

facilities. As discussed below, we are not recommending 

any change in the current allocation of regulatory 

responsibilities and authorities that would require enabling 

legislation. Given that we are recommending a flexible 

process for finding new sites, standards development need 

not delay early progress on the siting front. Moreover, the 

fact that the regulatory issues to be resolved have been well 

defined and extensively analyzed over more than 30 years 

of EPA and NRC experience in this area, and the fact that 

some of the key issues have already been tested in court 

and in the regulatory process, should help expedite the 

process of developing generic disposal facility safety and 

performance standards. 

6. EPA and NRC should coordinate closely in the 

development of new disposal regulations.

Problems of coordination between EPA and the NRC 

in developing repository standards have been widely 

cited as having contributed to negative perceptions of, 

and loss of confidence in, the Yucca Mountain project. 

As we have already noted, the Commission has heard 

proposals for a fundamental redrawing of regulatory roles 

and responsibilities for disposal facilities at the federal 

level (e.g., by consolidating all regulatory authority in 

the NRC or the EPA). Broadly speaking, however, our 

examination of the roles of the NRC and EPA, with 

respect to nuclear waste management under existing 

law, suggests that while there are opportunities for 

improvement in the EPA/NRC regulatory process and 

in the working relationship between these agencies, the 

general division of roles and responsibilities that currently 

exists is appropriate and should be preserved. 

While we are not recommending a change in the 

regulatory roles of EPA and NRC, we believe the process 

of developing EPA standards and NRC regulations 

for implementing those standards should be carefully 

coordinated to avoid repeating past problems. For example, 

the Commission has heard testimony that the processes 

used to develop standards in the past were confusing and 

frustrating to the public,260 and that more coordinated 

and dedicated efforts are needed in the future to draw not 

only on the expertise of EPA and NRC but also on input 

from the knowledgeable public. We have also heard that 

public disagreements between these agencies over matters 

of regulatory philosophy can confuse the public and 

undermine confidence in the regulatory system,261 and that 

it is important that such disputes be resolved promptly.262

The Commission believes that a coordinated and open 

process should be used to develop new generic regulations 

for future disposal facilities, and that that any differences in 

regulatory philosophy between the two agencies be laid out 

clearly and resolved as early in the process as possible. We 

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further believe that actions to coordinate the development 

of new disposal regulations can be undertaken by the 

Executive Branch without additional action by Congress. 

Specifically, we recommend that EPA and NRC begin 

working together to define an appropriate process 

(with opportunity for public input) for developing a 

generic disposal facility safety standard and associated 

implementing regulations.263 In addition the two 

agencies should continue to coordinate efforts during the 

regulatory development process. This process should be 

designed to accomplish the following:

• A clear definition of the regulatory issues to be 

resolved,

• A comprehensive identification of alternative 

approaches to resolving these issues,

• A thorough and fair analysis of the alternatives,

• A clear explanation of the regulatory choices that 

are made,

• A shared understanding between the two agencies 

and with other stakeholders about the compliance 

demonstration methods and standard of proof that 

are to be used in implementing the standards.

We also recommend that the administration and 

Congress ensure that NRC and EPA have sufficient 

resources to complete this process in a thorough and 

timely way. The cost of delays in being able to move 

ahead with finding new sites would certainly be far 

higher than the cost of a process to establish the necessary 

standards as soon as possible.

7. The EPA and NRC should also develop a new 

regulatory framework and standards for deep 

borehole disposal facilities

As noted in chapter 4 of this report, the Commission 

has identified deep boreholes as a potentially promising 

technology for geologic disposal that could increase 

the flexibility of the overall waste management system 

and therefore merits further research, development, 

and demonstration. While a regulatory framework and 

safety standards for deep boreholes would have much in 

common with those for mined geologic repositories, the 

technologies also have key differences. For this reason the 

Commission recommends that the EPA and NRC develop 

a new safety standard and regulatory framework for deep 

boreholes (consistent with the new standard recommended 

for mined repositories) informed by RD&D efforts aimed 

at developing a licensed demonstration project. 

8. Security and Safeguards 

Robust security arrangements are needed at storage and 

disposal facilities for SNF and HLW, as well as during the 

transport of these materials, to prevent unauthorized access 

and acts of sabotage or theft. From a security standpoint, 

the most sensitive stages at a deep geological repository 

are when materials are above ground (transported or 

in a pre-load stage) and during the pre-closure period 

when materials are emplaced in the disposal facility, but 

the facility itself is not sealed and could therefore be 

accessed more easily.264 As the IAEA has recommended, 

the regulatory authority (for us, the NRC) will need 

to provide guidance to the implementing organization 

concerning the effective application of security measures. 

Such measures could include physical protection, control 

and accounting, and verification procedures. Recognizing 

the importance of international rules, the United States 

should offer to place all future geologic disposal facilities 

under IAEA safeguards monitoring.265

10.4 Occupational Safety 

and Health

Another important area of regulation for waste management 

facilities pertains to the health and safety of facility workers 

and personnel (as distinct from the protection of the general 

public). Currently, responsibility for occupational safety 

and health at nuclear facilities is the shared responsibility of 

the NRC, OSHA, and (in some cases) the Mine Safety and 

Health Administration. 

On the whole, a white paper commissioned by the BRC 

finds that the U.S. nuclear industry has had a much better 

occupational health and safety record than other energy 

sectors.266 However, the same report also determined that 

performance was not uniform across facilities and that 

further improvement could be achieved by assuring more 

consistent safety and health performance standards. In terms 

of occupational safety and health issues specific to the back 

end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the fact that the United States 

has not yet opened or operated a deep geologic repository 

or consolidated storage facility for spent fuel and HLW 

means there is no direct experience with these types of 

facilities. However, the United States has had experience 

with constructing two deep geological facilities (WIPP in 

the 1980s and the Yucca Mountain Exploratory Studies 

Facility in the 1990s) and more than a decade of experience 

operating WIPP. The overall occupational safety and health 

record for these facilities—and for more than a decade of 

waste transport operations in connection with WIPP—has 

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been excellent so far. But this record does not argue for 

complacency. On the contrary, occupational safety and 

health is an area where continued rigor is warranted and 

where experience with existing facilities and operations must 

be looked to for useful insights about how to manage risks to 

workers at waste management facilities in the future.267

For example, constructing facilities deep underground 

is in and of itself a complex undertaking that poses inherent 

risks. The major risks to workers at a deep geological 

repository are the same as those associated with any largescale underground construction project; they include, 

principally, traumatic injuries from working around heavy 

equipment and explosives, lung disease from both dust and 

diesel exhaust fumes, and noise-induced hearing loss. That 

said, current construction procedures and technologies make 

it possible to minimize the risk of traumatic injuries, suppress 

dust and other respiratory irritants, and protect workers’ 

hearing. Other kinds of facilities could present different risks. 

For example, deep boreholes do not involve the construction 

of underground facilities, but the surface facilities involve 

occupational hazards similar to those associated with oil and 

natural gas drilling.

10.5 Waste Classification

NRC regulations and other statutory requirements for the 

handling of nuclear materials rely on a system for classifying 

those materials. This section discusses the classification system 

that is currently in place in the United States for nuclear 

wastes. While there have been concerns about aspects of 

that system for some time, some of the (potentially) most 

important shortcomings of the current framework are 

especially pertinent to the wastes that would be generated by 

fuel cycles that include the reprocessing and recycling of SNF. 

Generally speaking, the purpose of waste classification 

systems is to facilitate the safe and efficient management of 

waste materials. This goal is best served if the classification 

system identifies groups or classes of wastes that could be 

handled and disposed of safely using essentially the same 

All classes of nuclear waste defined in federal law apply 

only to waste that contains radioactive material as defined 

in the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 [AEA, 1954]. The 

AEA defines three types of radioactive materials: source, 

special nuclear, and byproduct. Classes of waste have 

been defined in the AEA and its amendments, or in other 

federal laws; of necessity these definitions have been used 

in regulations (which, in some cases, have established 

sub-classifications). A description of the most important 

classes of nuclear waste—as defined under the AEA, its 

amendments or in other federal laws—follows:268

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF), also called “used nuclear 

fuel,” is fuel irradiated in a nuclear reactor that has not 

been reprocessed. When declared to be waste, SNF is 

generally assumed to be destined for disposal in a deep 

geologic repository.

High-level waste (HLW) is the highest-activity primary waste 

that results from reprocessing SNF. It is ultimately destined 

for disposal, such as in a deep geologic repository.

Transuranic (TRU) waste is waste other than SNF and HLW 

that contains concentrations of transuranic elements—

long-lived alpha-emitting radionuclides created during the 

irradiation of nuclear fuel (e.g., plutonium)—at levels that 

are sufficiently high so as to make the waste not generally 

acceptable for near-surface disposal. TRU waste is generally 

assumed to be destined for ultimate disposal in a deep 

geologic repository. There are two sub-classes of TRU 

waste: remote handled (meaning so radioactive that it must 

be handled in containers that shield workers from radiation) 

and contact handled (meaning it does not require shielding).

Mill tailings are solid residues from the processing of 

ores to recover uranium or thorium. Tailings are generally 

destined for disposal in large, capped piles on the land 

surface at or near the facilities that produce them.

Low-level waste (LLW) is waste other than SNF, HLW, TRU 

waste, or mill tailings. Most LLW is destined for disposal in 

near-surface facilities. LLW is further divided by regulation 

into three subclasses (A, B, and C) that contain increasing 

radionuclide concentrations. All of these subclasses of 

LLW are generally acceptable for near-surface disposal. 

A fourth subclass of LLW is defined by reference to the 

concentration limits for Class C wastes: LLW that has 

radionuclide concentrations in excess of the Class C limits 

is termed “greater than Class C” or “GTCC” waste. GTCC 

wastes are not generally acceptable for near-surface 

disposal. Disposal in a deep geologic repository and 

disposal in boreholes at depths up to 1,000 ft are among 

the alternatives being considered.

The Current U.S. Waste Classification System

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technologies, rather than classifying wastes primarily based 

on their source of origin. 

The most important overarching criticism of the U.S. 

waste classification system is that it is not sufficiently riskbased. Rather, it is (for the most part) directly or indirectly 

source-based—that is, based on the type of facility or process 

that produces the waste rather than on factors related to 

human health and safety risks. The legal definitions of SNF, 

HLW, and tailings are explicitly source-based. The definitions 

of TRU waste and LLW are indirectly source-based in that 

these classes of waste are defined by excluding one or more of 

the source-based waste classes.

A source-based classification system can confound efforts 

to manage and dispose of wastes based on the risks they pose 

because wastes in different classes can have essentially the 

same radionuclide composition and characteristics, while 

wastes in the same class can have substantially different 

radionuclide compositions and characteristics. For example, 

the radionuclide content of some of DOE’s HLW is similar 

to that of Class A or B LLW, but because of its source, the 

HLW must still be managed by disposal in a deep geologic 

repository. Generally speaking, it is more often the case 

that wastes are “over-classified”—in the sense that they are 

assigned to a more restrictive (and more costly-to-manage) 

classification than their actual hazard requires—rather than 

the reverse. Moreover, the requirement that specific disposal 

sites meet criteria to ensure safety (e.g., dose limits) is 

designed to prevent any “under-classified” waste from posing 

an unacceptable risk.

The definition of HLW, in particular, has attracted the most 

criticism. Much of this criticism focuses on three major issues.

1. HLW is currently defined solely in terms of its 

source (i.e., wastes from reprocessing), and not in 

terms of the characteristics that are relevant from a 

waste management standpoint (e.g., TRU content, 

radiotoxicity). To the extent that terms such as “highly 

radioactive,” “sufficient concentrations,” and “requires 

permanent isolation” are used to define HLW, they have 

not been quantified. This is potentially problematic 

because the liquid waste stream from the front end 

of a reprocessing plant can have a broad range of 

characteristics—including characteristics that may be 

altered by time (decay) or by subsequent processing 

(which DOE has done with many of its defense wastes). 

The waste that remains after these changes, while still 

classified as HLW, may have characteristics similar to 

TRU waste or LLW. Conversely, some TRU and LLW 

wastes that do not come from reprocessing can have 

characteristics similar to HLW. 

2. The current system creates obstacles to managing lowconcentration HLW as TRU waste or LLW. In 2003, an 

Idaho district court ruled that any material containing 

even very small amounts of the radionuclides in HLW 

had to be disposed of in a deep geologic repository. In 

response, Congress passed a law designed to allow DOE 

to close tanks and dispose of material containing HLW 

(defined as “waste incidental to reprocessing”), provided 

certain conditions could be met. Applying this exception, 

however, has proved challenging because of differing 

views concerning how much radioactive material can be 

left in tanks and differing views on the performance of 

vaults and closed tanks.

3. DOE recently decided to classify waste streams bearing 

radionuclides such as tritium, carbon-14, krypton, and 

iodine-129 as HLW, even though these radionuclides are 

not typically part of the HLW stream.269 This approach 

would have significant ramifications for spent fuel 

reprocessing because some of these radionuclides (especially 

tritium and iodine-129) are likely to be distributed in 

multiple process streams and wastes throughout a plant that 

uses current reprocessing technology.

As noted in chapter 11, most reprocess/recycle fuel cycles 

would be expected to generate larger quantities of LLW, 

compared to the once-through fuel cycle, but would reduce 

the front-end creation of mill tailings. As with HLW, several 

concerns have been raised in connection with the current 

classification system for LLW: 

• The current distinction between HLW and LLW has 

created practical problems in the context of DOE’s 

remediation efforts. A more straightforward approach 

would be to use a quantitative boundary—such as 

concentration limits on shorter- and longer-lived 

radionuclides, similar to the LLW Class C limits—to 

make this distinction. This would allow a particular waste 

to fall into either class depending on its characteristics; 

it would also allow the effects of waste processing to be 

taken into account.

• Currently LLW is subdivided into classes—Class A, B, C, 

or GTCC—according to a list of specified radionuclides 

and concentrations. If a waste contains only radionuclides 

other than those on the list it is automatically categorized 

as Class A, regardless of its radionuclide concentration 

or the level of hazard it poses. The NRC developed the 

current list of radionuclides in 1982 by anticipating the 

types of LLW that might be produced in the future. 

However, the NRC’s foresight was not perfect and wastes 

now exist, or have the potential to exist, that contain 

radionuclides not on the list. The most important current 

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example is uranium. More than 500,000 metric tons 

of concentrated depleted uranium currently exist in the 

United States, much of which is destined for disposal. 

It is considered Class A LLW but NRC staff analyses 

indicate that near-surface disposal of this material is not 

likely to meet performance objectives at some sites. There 

are many other examples that can be found. For example, 

closed fuel cycles would release gaseous krypton-85 

from spent fuel and current regulations would require 

that a substantial fraction of such releases would need 

to be captured and disposed of as waste. DOE has also 

considered separating the radioactive fission product 

cesium from spent fuel and allowing the cesium-137 

it contains (which has a 30-year half-life) to decay to 

innocuous levels in an engineered surface storage facility, 

after which it would be disposed of as LLW. However, 

cesium-137 is accompanied by long-lived cesium-135 

and, since the latter is also absent from the 10 CFR 

61 list, this leaves the appropriate classification of the 

decayed cesium open to question. Some of these wastes 

may be determined to be GTCC and, as a consequence, 

may become “orphans” for reasons discussed below.

• Because the definition of LLW is implicitly source-based 

and thus not risk-informed, LLW, TRU waste, and HLW 

can all contain similar radionuclide concentrations but 

would nevertheless be managed differently. Similarly, the 

sub-classification of civilian LLW into Classes A, B, C, 

and GTCC under 10 CFR 61 is not fully risk-informed. 

In addition, no disposal pathway has been specified for 

GTCC waste, which is currently orphaned with nowhere 

to go. DOE is currently developing an environmental 

impact statement (see endnote 17) aimed at identifying 

such a pathway and closing this gap (as noted previously, 

deep geologic disposal in either a repository or boreholes 

is being considered for this category of waste).

• Compared to the once-through fuel cycle, future 

fuel cycles that involve reprocessing would produce 

considerably more GTCC waste under the current 

classification system. Reprocessing would leave metal 

cladding hulls along with a wide range of waste forms 

generated in the process of recovering, purifying, and 

fabricating plutonium or other transuranic elements. 

These would be considered TRU wastes under certain 

EPA regulations and GTCC waste under NRC 

regulations. In both cases, these wastes would be 

orphaned because they are not considered SNF or HLW 

destined for a repository. Moreover, because the material 

is not of defense origin, it cannot be accepted at WIPP 

under current law.

In light of these shortcomings, a number of alternative 

classification systems, or changes to the current system, have 

been proposed—both by the NRC and the IAEA —over the 

years. As yet, however, no comprehensive reforms have been 

implemented in the United States. Instead, the NRC has 

used case-by-case exemptions to address issues with particular 

wastes as they arise. Adopting the most recent IAEA waste 

classification proposal would represent a major departure from 

current U.S. practice and would need to be carefully evaluated. 

Though many stakeholders believe the time has come for 

an overhaul of the U.S. waste classification system, there is 

also considerable concern that changes could have unintended 

consequences—especially considering the complex web 

of laws and regulations that rely on the current system. If 

changes are made, it will be important to assure the public and 

other stakeholders that wastes are not being inappropriately 

re-assigned into lower classes and that protections for human 

health and safety and the environment remain rigorous. The 

fact is that the current approach to classification—for nuclear 

waste generally, and for LLW in particular—appears to be 

working to provide adequate public protection, despite its 

shortcomings and complexities. Nevertheless, the decision 

to pursue alternative fuel cycles—especially if they include 

reprocess and recycle elements—seems likely to strengthen the 

case for a more comprehensive reconfiguring of the current 

waste classification system.

Recent developments suggest that the NRC may consider 

revising the LLW classification system. In 2009 the NRC 

directed its staff to include in a future budget request a 

proposal “for a comprehensive revision to risk-inform the 10 

CFR Part 61 waste classification framework ...” In 2010, 

an NRC official reported that the staff was working on the 

issue and is considering a range of options including specific 

changes to the current structure (e.g. along the lines of 

recent recommendations by the International Commission 

on Radiological Protection), a new classification system 

(e.g., one based on site-specific analysis), and other changes 

to 10 CFR Part 61 beyond the classification system.270

Additionally, the NRC staff is planning to identify a number 

of options for changing the definition of HLW as part of 

developing a framework for licensing fuel reprocessing 

plants and plans to send a paper on the framework to the 

NRC Commissioners by the end of fiscal year 2011. The 

Commission endorses and encourages efforts underway 

at the NRC to review and potentially revise the U.S. 

waste classification system (while recognizing that a 

comprehensive statutory revision to establish a risk-based 

system will eventually be required).

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11. ADVANCED REACTOR AND

FUEL CYCLE CHNOLOGIES

Technology has advanced in the several decades since, so

while reactors in operation today are required to meet all

relevant NRC safety standards, new plants are expected to

achieve still higher levels of safety, efficiency, and reliability

than their predecessors. Clearly, any comprehensive and

forward-looking strategy for managing the back end of the

nuclear fuel cycle in the United States needs to consider the

potential impact not only of current technology but of further

technology advances in the decades ahead.

More importantly, we cannot be sure today of the national

and global context that will determine which nuclear fuel cycle

technologies and systems will be considered for use in the

future. Concerns over global climate change and greenhouse

gas emissions, the cost and sustainability of alternatives to

nuclear power, and any number of other factors may appear

very different to future generations than they do to us today.

The integrated and flexible strategy that we propose for nuclear

waste management puts a premium on creating and preserving

options that could be employed by future generations to

respond to the particular circumstances they face. RD&D is a

key to maximizing those options.

To that end, the charter of the BRC asks the Commission

to evaluate existing fuel cycle technologies and R&D

programs in terms of specific criteria (those listed in

the charter include “cost, safety, resource utilization

and sustainability, and the promotion of nuclear nonproliferation and counter-terrorism goals”). Or, as

Energy Secretary Steven Chu expressed the charge to the

Commission in opening remarks at the Commission’s first

meeting in March 2011, our task was “to look at all the

science and technology and all the other things that would

influence how we deal with the back end of the fuel cycle.”

This chapter discusses the Commission’s conclusions

concerning the impact of new reactor and fuel cycle

All of the commercial nuclear power reactors operating

in the United States today were built based on reactor

designs that are at least 30 years old and in some

cases even older.

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technology developments, both for the nature and 

magnitude of the immediate and longer-term nuclear waste 

management challenges this country faces and in terms 

of the potential to provide options for advancing broader 

nuclear-energy-related policy objectives in the decades 

ahead. Additional information concerning the current DOE 

nuclear R&D program and nuclear RD&D infrastructure 

needs is available in separate Commission documents (at 

www.brc.gov). 

Finally, this chapter includes a short discussion of 

nuclear workforce needs. While clearly a cross-cutting issue 

we chose to cover it here because of its links to science and 

technology and to the kinds of entities (universities, national 

laboratories, reactor vendors, etc.) that would be involved 

in nuclear energy RD&D. An appropriately educated and 

trained workforce is obviously needed, not only to conduct 

RD&D work but to design, build, and operate all the 

facilities involved in the nuclear fuel cycle, from mines and 

enrichment facilities to commercial power plants and storage 

and disposal facilities.

11.1 Advanced Technologies 

and the Nature of the Nuclear

Waste Management Challenge

All of the commercial nuclear reactors operating in the 

United States today and the vast majority of reactors 

operating worldwide are light-water reactors operating on 

the once-through fuel cycle. This means ordinary water 

serves as the reactor coolant and enriched uranium is used 

only once in the reactor core and is then stored pending 

final disposition (as opposed to undergoing reprocessing to 

separate still usable constituents for re-use as reactor fuel).

Technologies exist today or are under development that 

would allow spent fuel to be at least partly re-used; systems 

have also been proposed that could—in theory and at some 

point in the future—possibly allow for the continuous 

recycle of reactor fuel, thereby fully “closing” the fuel cycle. 

Substantial uncertainties exist, however, about the cost 

and commercial viability of the more advanced of these 

technologies; in addition, significant concerns have been 

raised about their impacts on weapons proliferation risks 

and other aspects of the fuel cycle (e.g., the production of 

LLW) even if they could be successfully deployed. Without 

getting into these debates, the central point for purposes of 

this discussion is that expanded deployment of reprocess and 

recycle technologies would clearly affect the quantity and 

composition of nuclear material slated for final disposition 

and in this way have implications for managing the back end 

of the fuel cycle. 

At the same time, technological advances also hold 

promise for improving the efficiency and resource utilization 

of the once-through fuel cycle. To the extent that these 

improvements make it possible to increase the quantity of 

electricity produced for every unit of reactor fuel used, this 

will also have an impact on the overall quantity of spent fuel 

generated to meet a given level of nuclear power demand.271 

Thus, a central question for the Commission was whether 

any currently available reactor and fuel cycle technologies, 

or any not-yet commercial technologies that are now 

under development, have the potential to change either 

the fundamental nature of the nuclear waste management 

challenge this nation confronts over the next several decades 

or the approach the United States should take to implement 

a strategy for the storage and ultimate disposition of SNF 

and high-level radioactive waste.

To answer this question the Commission reviewed 

the most authoritative available information on advanced 

reactor and fuel cycle technologies, including the potential 

to improve existing light-water reactor technology and the 

once-through fuel cycle, as well as options for partially 

or fully closing the nuclear fuel cycle by reprocessing and 

recycling SNF. We concluded that while new reactor and 

fuel cycle technologies may hold promise for achieving 

substantial benefits in terms of broadly held safety, economic, 

environmental, and energy security goals and therefore 

merit continued public and private R&D investment, no 

currently available or reasonably foreseeable reactor and 

fuel cycle technology developments—including advances in 

reprocessing and recycling technologies—have the potential 

to fundamentally alter the waste management challenge 

this nation confronts over at least the next several decades, 

if not longer.

272 Put another way, we do not believe that 

today’s recycle technologies or new technology developments 

in the next three to four decades will change the underlying 

need for an integrated strategy that combines safe storage of 

SNF with expeditious progress toward siting and licensing 

a disposal facility or facilities. This is particularly true of 

defense HLW and some forms of government-owned spent 

fuel that can and should be prioritized for direct disposal at 

an appropriate repository.

The above conclusion rests on several practical 

observations. First, the United States has a large existing 

inventory (on the order of 65,000 metric tons) of spent fuel 

and will continue to accumulate more spent fuel as long as 

its commercial nuclear reactor fleet continues to operate. 

In addition, the U.S. inventory includes materials with a 

very low probability of re-use under any scenario, including 

high-level radioactive waste from past nuclear weapons 

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programs and some forms of government-owned spent fuel. 

Second, the timeframes involved in developing and deploying 

either breakthrough reactor and fuel-cycle technologies or

waste disposal facilities are long: on the order of multiple 

decades even in a best-case scenario. Given the high degree 

of uncertainty surrounding prospects for successfully 

commercializing advanced reactor and fuel cycle concepts 

that are, for the most part, still in the early R&D phases of 

development it would be imprudent to delay progress on 

developing disposal capability—especially since that capability 

will be needed under any circumstances to deal with at least 

a portion of the existing HLW inventory. The final and most 

important point, which further strengthens this conclusion, 

is that all nuclear energy systems generate waste streams that 

require long-term isolation from the environment: nuclear 

fission creates radioactive fission products.

Our conclusion concerning the need for geologic disposal 

capacity stands independently of any position one might 

take about the desirability of closing the nuclear fuel cycle 

in the United States. The Commission could not reach 

consensus on that question. As a group we concluded that 

it is premature at this point for the United States to commit 

irreversibly to any particular fuel cycle as a matter of government 

policy given the large uncertainties that exist about the merits 

and commercial viability of different fuel cycles and technology 

options. Rather, in the face of an uncertain future, there is a 

benefit to preserving and developing options so that the nuclear 

waste management program and the larger nuclear energy system 

can adapt effectively to changing conditions. Future evaluations 

of potential alternative fuel cycles must account for linkages 

among all elements of the fuel cycle (including waste 

transportation, storage, and disposal) and for broader safety, 

security, and non-proliferation concerns.

To preserve and develop those options, we believe 

RD&D should continue on a range of reactor and fuel cycle 

technologies, described in this report, that have the potential 

to deliver societal benefits at different times in the future. 

If and when technology advances change the balance of 

market and policy considerations to favor a shift away from 

the once-through fuel cycle, that shift will be driven by a 

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combination of factors, including—but hardly limited to—its 

waste management impacts. In fact, safety, economics, and 

energy security are likely to be more important drivers of future 

fuel cycle decisions than waste management concerns per se. We 

also note that other elements of our proposed approach to 

managing the back end of the fuel cycle—including, notably, 

our recommendations concerning the need to move forward 

with consolidated storage capacity—will provide the flexibility 

needed to take full advantage of advanced technologies if and 

when these technologies materialize. 

The remainder of this chapter summarizes the 

Commission’s findings with respect to the potential benefits 

and trade-offs associated with different broad categories of 

advanced nuclear reactor and fuel cycle combinations. We 

also briefly discuss the need for continued public and private 

investment in nuclear energy R&D, the status of DOE’s 

nuclear energy R&D program, and the adequacy of existing 

regulatory and legal frameworks to accommodate new types 

of technologies and facilities.

11.2 Results of a High-Level 

Comparison of Reactor and

Fuel Cycle Alternatives

As directed by our charter, the Commission undertook to 

evaluate existing fuel cycle technologies and R&D programs 

in terms of a set of broad criteria that will have a critical 

influence on the nuclear energy industry’s prospects going 

forward (e.g., safety, cost, security, etc.). In doing so, we 

relied on the numerous studies that have been undertaken 

in the last decade to assess and compare various reactor 

and fuel cycle options.273 It is important to emphasize that 

the Commission could not and did not attempt to draw 

definitive or quantitative conclusions about the relative 

merits of different technology combinations. This is because 

the numerous studies we considered—although collectively 

they analyze a wide array of strategies and technologies—use 

often very different underlying parameters and assumptions. 

As a result, the quantitative results of these studies are not 

comparable. Additionally, many of the potential technologies 

require considerable development before a defensible 

comparison could be made. Thus, it is impossible at this time 

to distill quantitative comparisons across alternative nuclear 

energy systems and then draw definitive conclusions based 

on those comparisons.

We approached the task of comparing advanced nuclear 

energy systems by first identifying three representative 

alternatives to the once-through light water reactor (LWR) 

strategy. One of these alternatives is already in use; the 

other two are substantively different from the once-through 

cycle and have received extensive previous study. We then 

focused on the major qualitative differences between these 

alternatives and the existing once-through LWR fuel cycle, 

based on the findings contained in the literature available to 

the Commission. The results, which are summarized in table 

5, indicated a wide range of trade-offs in terms of safety, cost, 

resource utilization and sustainability, waste management, 

and the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and 

counter-terrorism goals. These trade-offs complicate any 

effort to compare the relative merits of different nuclear 

energy systems, particularly given uncertainty about future 

technological developments and social conditions. Moreover 

(and as we have already noted) the conclusions reached 

by different technology assessments and comparative 

analyses are heavily influenced by input assumptions and 

by the relative weight given to different policy objectives 

(e.g., reducing waste vs. minimizing proliferation risk vs. 

maximizing resource utilization)—making it difficult to 

compare results across studies.

The four systems (one baseline plus three alternatives) 

considered in our qualitative comparison are characterized 

as follows:

• Once-through fuel cycle with light-water reactor 

technology: We chose this system as the baseline 

because it is the dominant fuel-cycle and technology 

combination currently in use in the United States and 

in the majority of the world’s nuclear nations. That said, 

future technology advances can be used to improve on 

this system; an example might include the ability to 

achieve higher fuel burnup using improved cladding and 

improved safety features.

• Modified open cycle using mixed-oxide (MOX) 

fuel with light-water reactor technology: This 

system was selected for comparison chiefly because it is 

the only alternative fuel cycle strategy that is currently 

being utilized on a commercial scale.274 Used in France 

since the 1970s, MOX fuel is also used in reactors in 

Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Japan. The United 

States is currently building a MOX fuel fabrication 

facility in South Carolina to utilize excess defense 

plutonium, and the United Kingdom, China, and Russia 

are also in various stages of operation or planning for the 

use of MOX fuel.

• Closed fuel cycle system with fast reactors: This 

system was considered because it has the theoretical 

potential to maximize the use of uranium resources 

and therefore to be sustainable for centuries while 

simultaneously reducing the amount of long-lived 

radionuclides in resulting waste streams. Lower amounts 

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of radionuclides would allow a larger quantity of waste to 

be placed in a given repository; in addition, this fuel cycle 

would greatly reduce uranium mining requirements and 

eventually eliminate the need for uranium enrichment.

•	 Once-through fuel cycle with high-temperature 

reactors: The defining feature of this fourth system is a 

high-temperature reactor that can achieve temperatures 

greater than 600°C (light water reactor outlet 

temperatures are about 300°C).275 It was selected because 

it has the potential to displace the use of fossil fuel 

across all energy sectors, not just electricity production. 

Examples of energy-intensive industries where hightemperature nuclear process heat could be used include 

cement and steel manufacturing, and petroleum refining. 

High-temperature nuclear process heat could also be used 

to produce hydrogen for transportation fuels by directly 

decomposing water instead of using electrolysis or 

decomposing natural gas, and the high power conversion 

efficiency can also make dry cooling and thermal 

desalination of seawater practical.

Many additional system options exist that have received 

varying levels of study. For example, nuclear energy systems 

that involve a fast-spectrum reactor capable of achieving 

very high temperatures by using a molten salt or gas coolant, 

or a thermal-spectrum, high-temperature molten-salt reactor 

using thorium have also been proposed. Such systems 

could potentially offer many of the combined benefits of 

the alternatives listed. However, these systems have not 

received systematic study and the component technologies 

for these types of systems are less well developed. Other 

concepts, such as fusion energy, are even further from being 

successfully demonstrated—but if they ever prove feasible 

they may have even larger impacts on fuel cycles and nuclear 

waste generation.

The results of this comparison for the baseline strategy 

and the three nuclear energy systems selected for comparison 

are shown in table 4. The entries in this table generally refer 

to a steady-state condition. The Commission recognizes that 

in some cases a long transition time is necessary to reach 

a steady state. Each of the four nuclear energy systems is 

assumed to produce the same amount of electric power and 

the outcomes are stated in relative terms in relation to the 

baseline strategy.

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Criterion Once-Through LWR Once-Through with High-Temperature Reactor

Nuclear Energy

Description

Clad uranium oxide

fuels irradiated in

LWRs with evolutionary

improvement

High-temperature reactors (such as those using graphitebased fuels) capable of temperatures over 600°C operating

on a once-through fuel cycle. Being pursued in DOE’s Next

Generation Nuclear Plant project

SAFETY

Reactor and fuel

cycle safety277

Baseline, with potential

for further improvement

Potential for improvement; all must meet similar regulatory

requirements

COST

Capital and

operating costs

Baseline Test reactors have operated well, but demo (Fort St. Vrain) was

unreliable. Fuel costs are uncertain and may be high. RD&D

is needed on to provide a basis for design, licensing, and

evaluating long-term economic viability.

SUSTAINABILITY

ranium utilization279 Baseline Similar uranium requirements although can vary by design

Climate change

impacts

Baseline Potential for major reduction in carbon dioxide by using nuclear

process heat in fossil-energy-intensive industries and to

produce hydrogen for non-carbon-based transportation fuels

Energy security Baseline Potentially large benefit in reducing petroleum imports now

used to fuel non-electricity sectors

NON-PROLIFERATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

on-proliferation Baseline Reference designs require similar enrichment capacity capable

of producing 8%-20% uranium enrichment. Fuel is more

difficult to reprocess than LWR fuel.

Counter-terrorism Baseline Similar to baseline

WASTE ANAGEMENT

Disposal safety:

toxicity and longevity

of waste

Baseline Repository: Similar to baseline

Fuel Cycle: Similar public and occupational risk from mining

and milling

Volume of waste280 Baseline ~10X increase in SNF volume going to repository.

About the same non-mill tailings LLW as baseline.

Repository space

requirements

Baseline ~25% reduction due to higher reactor efficiency.

Table 4. A Comparison of the Existing nce-Through, Conventional

Light-Water Reactor Fuel Cycle with Representative Advanced

uclear nergy Systems in the Long erm276

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LWR Modified Open Cycle Fast-Spectrum Reactor with Closed Fuel Cycle

Clad uranium- and mixed-oxide fuels irradiated in LWRs

with evolutionary improvements. MOX fuel is irradiated

once and then sent to repository.

Fast-spectrum liquid-metal-cooled reactors capable of continuous

recycle of actinides

SAFETY

Potential for improvement; all must meet similar regulatory

requirements

Potential for improvement; all must meet similar regulatory

requirements

COST

Capital cost increased because of need to build

reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication plants. Operating

costs also increased due to the high cost of fabricating

fuels containing Pu. Cost of electricity increased a few

to several percent. Technology is relatively mature with

evolutionary improvements largely in the hands of industry.

Previously built reactors (mostly prototype/demo) were often

unreliable and not economic. Significant capital cost for recycle

facilities. RD&D is needed to provide a basis for design, licensing, and

evaluating long-term economic viability.278 Operating costs relative to

baseline largely depend on the future price of uranium, fuel fabrication

cost, and operational reliability.

SUSTAINABILITY

 ~19% reduction in uranium requirements ~95% reduction in uranium requirements

About the same as the baseline About the same as baseline

About the same as the baseline Modest benefit from potential for long term reliance on indigenous

uranium resources

NON-PROLIFERATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

nvolves use of reprocessing, enrichment, and MOX fuel

fabrication technology, and deployment of facilities for same.

Increased proliferation risk from substantial normalized

inventory of Pu or Pu-plus other actinides in reactors and

the fuel cycle.

Involves use of reprocessing and plutonium-bearing fuel fabrication

technology, and deployment of facilities for same. Enrichment

technology needed during transition to fast reactors.

Increased proliferation risk from substantial normalized inventory of

Pu or Pu-plus other actinides in reactors and the fuel cycle.

Involves production and inventory of co-processed nuclear

materials (U/Np/Pu) and 5%-10% enriched uranium, and

fuels containing same.

Increased security risk due to separated materials and

additional facilities and transportation.

Involves production and inventory of co-processed nuclear

materials (U/Np/Pu) and fuels containing same.

Increased security risk due to separated materials and additional

facilities and transportation.

WASTE ANAGEMENT

Repository: Noticeable reduction in the amount of TRU in

wastes. Tailored waste form for ~90% of the HLW

Fuel Cycle: 15%–20% reduction in fuel cycle public and

occupational risk from reduced mining and milling. Although

there is an increase in emissions from reprocessing, overall

risk is reduced as a result of reduced risks on the front end.

Repository: Tailored waste form for fission products; potential

for reduction in long-term repository dose from TRU elements if

recycle is sustained for decades to centuries

Fuel Cycle: ~85% reduction in fuel cycle public and occupational

risk from reduced mining and milling, increase from emissions from

reprocessing

Similar repository waste volume: less SNF/HLW, more

secondary waste.

~20% decrease in near-surface wastes, esp. mill tailings

and depleted uranium. Besides mill tailings and depleted

uranium, about the same amount of LLW as baseline.

~40% increase in repository waste volume: less HLW, more

secondary waste.

~95% decrease in near-surface wastes, primarily due to mill

tailings and depleted uranium.

~40% decrease in non-mill tailings LLW due to greatly reduced

throughput in the front end of the fuel cycle.

Similar to baseline, with some reduction in long-term

decay heat generation.

~75% decrease in repository space required when TRU are recovered

and recycle is sustained over many decades to a couple of centuries.

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The fact that there are no clear winners among the main 

alternative fuel cycles summarized in the table and others 

considered by the Commission suggests that the United States 

should pursue a policy of keeping multiple options open. That 

said, certain fuel cycle strategies and technologies are clearly 

better developed than others—research in some areas has been 

underway for decades and it is possible that more mature 

technologies could be implemented more quickly, perhaps 

within a few decades. Other concepts are barely at the proofof-principle stage and would require substantial investments 

of time and funding (and in some cases a number of 

revolutionary technical developments) to bring them to a level 

of maturity sufficient to evaluate their suitability for further 

development and potential implementation. Consequently, 

the level and duration of R&D effort needed to advance these 

concepts varies widely. Ironically, near-term funding needs for 

technologies that are relatively more developed can be greater 

than for technologies still in an earlier phase of the RD&D 

process—particularly in the case of technologies that are ready 

to be demonstrated. At that point, large investments may be 

needed to provide the demonstration facilities required to 

make further progress. In the next section, we explore U.S. 

nuclear energy R&D plans and programs and offer suggestions 

for addressing the challenges facing those programs.

11.3 The Case for Continued

Public and Private Investment 

in Nuclear Energy RD&D and

the Status of the Current 

DOE Program

The results of our qualitative assessment suggest that while 

it is too early to select “winners,” advanced nuclear energy 

systems could offer a range of benefits in terms of broadly 

held policy goals with respect to safety, cost, security, etc. 

In a world facing rising energy demand and significant 

resource and environmental concerns, including the 

threat of climate change, preserving an improved nuclear 

energy option could be extremely valuable. Therefore, 

the Commission concludes that the United States 

should continue to pursue a program of nuclear energy 

RD&D both to improve the safety and performance of 

existing nuclear energy technologies and to develop new 

technologies that could offer significant advantages in terms 

of the multiple evaluation criteria identified in our charter 

(i.e., safety, cost, resource utilization and sustainability, 

waste management, and non-proliferation and counterterrorism). We believe a well-designed federal RD&D 

program is critical to enabling the U.S. to regain its role 

as the global leader of nuclear technology innovation and 

should be attentive to opportunities in two distinct realms:

1. Near-term improvements in the safety and performance 

of existing light-water reactor technology as currently 

deployed in the United States and elsewhere as part of 

a once-through fuel cycle, and in the technologies for 

storing and disposing of SNF and HLW.

2. Longer-term efforts to advance potential “gamechanging” nuclear technologies and systems that 

could achieve very large benefits across multiple 

evaluation criteria compared to current technologies 

and systems. Examples might include fast-spectrum 

reactors demonstrating passive safety characteristics 

that are capable of continuous actinide recycling and 

that use uranium more efficiently, or reactors that—by 

using molten salt or gas coolants—achieve very high 

temperatures and can thereby supply process heat 

for hydrogen production or other purposes, or small 

modular reactors with novel designs for improved safety 

characteristics and the potential to change the capital cost 

and financing structure for new reactors. 

At the same time the federal government and nuclear 

industry should ensure that necessary efforts and investments 

are made to maintain valuable existing capabilities and assets, 

including critical infrastructure and facilities such as are 

present at a number of DOE sites, as well as vital human 

expertise (in the form of highly trained nuclear scientists, 

engineers, and workers, etc.).

In making these recommendations, the Commission 

is mindful that federal RD&D funding of all kinds will 

be under enormous budget pressure in the years ahead. It 

will therefore be especially important to focus scarce public 

resources on addressing key gaps or needs in the U.S. nuclear 

RD&D infrastructure and to leverage effectively the full range 

of resources that exist in industry, the national laboratories, 

and the academic community. This could include funding 

well-designed, multipurpose test facilities that can be used to 

advance knowledge in several areas of inquiry. Such facilities 

would be available to scientists from different institutions 

around the country (an example is the Advanced Test 

Reactor National Scientific User Facility at Idaho National 

Laboratory) and exemplify the kind of RD&D infrastructure 

that could yield particularly high returns on public investment. 

Furthermore, while this Commission is charged with making 

recommendations to the government, we also want to clearly 

emphasize the importance and value of industry RD&D 

efforts, such as those of the Electric Power Research Institute, 

and the importance of continuing and stable industry RD&D 

investment in reactor and fuel cycle technologies.

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In recent years, DOE’s budget for nuclear energy R&D 

has totaled approximately $500 million per year. The 

Commission is not making a specific recommendation with 

respect to funding levels in future years, recognizing that 

this is a decision that will have to be made in the context of 

larger energy policy considerations and increasingly difficult 

federal budget constraints. Generally speaking, however, 

the Commission concurs with recent findings issued by the 

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 

concerning the need for better coordination of energy policies 

and programs across the federal government; for a substantial 

increase in federal support of energy-related research, 

development, demonstration, and deployment; and for efforts 

to explore new revenue options to provide this support.281

Meanwhile, with federal discretionary budgets under 

increasing pressure, the ability to articulate a clear direction 

or agenda for the U.S. nuclear energy R&D program, to 

prioritize elements of that agenda, and to set performance 

objectives and evaluate the effectiveness of related activities on 

an ongoing basis will obviously be critical.

To that end, the Commission believes that DOE’s nuclear 

energy R&D Roadmap provides a good, science-based step 

toward the development of an effective, long-term RD&D 

program. The Roadmap should be periodically updated in 

the future (we recommend once every four years) and in the 

process should be informed by broader strategic planning 

efforts, such as DOE’s recently launched Quadrennial 

Technology Review and Quadrennial Energy Review process. 

In addition, it should explicitly apply the evaluation criteria 

noted in the BRC’s charter and it should build in the flexibility 

needed to respond to unexpected technology developments 

and changing societal concerns and preferences. (The recent 

and still-unfolding events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 

power plant are just one example of the type of development 

that should be reflected in future updates of the roadmap.) 

Finally, we urge DOE to support future versions of the 

Roadmap with more detailed, frequently updated, and 

transparent research and implementation plans.

Additional principles or objectives that should guide 

DOE’s approach to nuclear energy RD&D in the future 

include the following: 

• System assessments and evaluations must account for 

the interconnections among the various elements of the 

nuclear fuel cycle (including transportation, storage, 

and disposal) and for broader safety, security, and nonproliferation concerns. For example, adding facilities to 

one phase or section of the nuclear fuel cycle could change 

overall system costs or otherwise affect the performance 

of the system as a whole. RD&D investment and 

technology choices can be made most effectively only if the 

interconnections between and among the elements of the 

fuel cycle system are well understood.

• Nuclear energy RD&D going forward will continue 

to involve a broad range of participants including 

universities, industry, and national laboratories in 

cooperation with international research partners. 

Integrating the efforts of these disparate participants 

will require a concerted effort and is essential if DOE is 

to maximize the value of the RD&D it supports. DOE 

should undertake efforts to strengthen coordination and 

organizational and mission alignment across laboratories, 

energy hubs, innovation centers, and other entities. 

• Federal cost sharing with industry to license new reactor 

designs has been extremely successful and should be 

pursued where practical. Indeed, federal support has 

bolstered U.S. technical leadership in the nuclear energy 

arena generally and played a role in developing the 

state-of-the-art AP-1000 and ESBWR282 reactor designs 

specifically. These designs employ the most advanced 

passive safety systems developed to date.

• Safety concerns, along with nuclear weapons proliferation 

and nuclear material safeguards and security (discussed 

in the following chapter), deserve special attention in the 

R&D roadmap and in plans for demonstration facilities. 

Integrating safety, security and safeguards considerations 

in future evaluations of advanced nuclear energy systems 

and technologies will allow the United States to maintain 

consistency between its technology development agenda, its 

commercial interests, and its international policy agenda.

• As a result of the focus on repository design issues 

specific to the Yucca Mountain site, generic R&D on 

deep geologic disposal for the last few decades has been 

assigned a lesser priority within DOE’s R&D portfolio. 

The move by DOE to absorb the R&D responsibilities 

of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 

into the Office of Nuclear Energy presents an opportunity 

to better integrate waste management considerations into 

the DOE nuclear energy research agenda.

• Going forward, the nuclear energy R&D program should 

include an emphasis on the development of disposal and 

waste form alternatives that are optimized to work with 

potential natural and engineered barriers in the disposal 

system. If alternative nuclear energy systems are deployed 

in the future, however, they will likely generate a greater 

variety of waste streams than the current system. Efforts 

to manage these wastes will benefit from an improved 

understanding of different combinations of geologic 

disposal environments, engineered barriers and waste forms.

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Finally, one area outside the DOE RD&D program where 

the Commission has identified a specific need for increased 

funding involves ongoing work by the NRC to develop a 

regulatory framework for novel components of advanced 

nuclear energy systems. This is a priority because a regulatory 

framework can help guide the design of new systems and 

lower barriers to commercial investment by providing greater 

confidence that new systems can be successfully licensed. 

In its draft report to the full Commission, the Reactor and 

Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee recommended that 

5 to 10 percent of total federal funding for reactor and fuel 

cycle technology RD&D be directed to the NRC to support 

its work in this area; the Commission agrees that adequate 

funding for this activity should be provided. We also support 

the NRC’s current risk-informed, performance-based 

approach to developing regulations for advanced nuclear 

energy systems. 

11.4 Workforce Development

The effective conduct of the U.S. nuclear enterprise (whether 

that enterprise is expanded, maintained at the current level, 

or diminished in the future) will require a properly trained 

workforce, including scientists and engineers in many 

disciplines as well as skilled workers for site evaluation, 

construction, operation, decommissioning and closing 

nuclear facilities—including facilities in the nuclear waste 

management program. At the professional level there has 

been healthy growth in the number of students pursuing 

a nuclear engineering career over the last decade. Several 

factors account for this, including the availability of federal 

funding and a recent increase in the number of new plants 

proposed or under construction in the United States and 

around the world. In addition, there has been noteworthy 

progress in developing programs to prepare skilled labor 

from many different building trades and crafts for the entire 

spectrum of work at nuclear facilities. Finally, the training 

available to first responders in other sectors has resulted 

in improved capabilities for responding to transportation 

accidents as well as incidents at fixed facilities involving 

hazardous materials, including radioactive wastes.

Nevertheless, workforce needs in the nuclear industry 

and in other high-tech sectors of the U.S. economy are 

expected to grow in the coming years. According to a 

2008 report prepared by the Directors of the National 

Laboratories: “A recent industry study pointed out that 

over the next five years, half of the nation’s nuclear utility 

workforce will need to be replaced.” The Directors called 

for both government and industry actions to support the 

development of the future nuclear workforce.283 Based on 

testimony presented to the BRC Subcommittee on Reactor 

and Fuel Cycle Technology, the Commission concurs with 

this general finding. We recommend expanded federal, 

joint labor-management, and university-based support for 

advanced science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 

training to develop the skilled workforce needed to support 

an effective waste management program as well as a viable 

domestic nuclear industry.

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12. INTERNATIONAL

Throughout its deliberations the Commission has been

acutely aware of the international implications of future

U.S. actions with respect to innovation in nuclear

technologies and the management of the back end of the

nuclear fuel cycle. In our view, international collaborations

and considerations are especially important in three areas:

safety, non-proliferation, and nuclear security (counterterrorism). This chapter highlights our main conclusions and

recommendations in each of these areas.

Unfortunately, our failure to develop a broadly-accepted

domestic spent fuel storage and disposal strategy has limited

our non-proliferation policy choices in the context of nuclear

fuel cycles. In addition to supporting non-proliferation

objectives, our international nuclear safety goals will also

be served by establishing and implementing effective waste

management strategies.

Overall, we believe the United States must continue to

strengthen its leadership role on the world stage to assure

the safe, secure, and responsible application of nuclear

technology, particularly if rising resource demands coupled

with climate change concerns prompt a significant global

expansion of nuclear capacity in coming decades.

12.1 International Nuclear

ety

Recent events in Japan have reinforced the importance of a

focus on nuclear safety. Although the radiological releases

in Japan will have no direct impacts of significance on

the United States, the events at Fukushima are certain to

affect attitudes toward nuclear technology here and abroad.

Even if the health consequences of the Fukushima accident

prove to be small compared to the direct impacts of the

The United States has long been a global leader in the

development of nuclear technologies and policies and

in international efforts to address issues of nuclear

security and safety.

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earthquake and tsunami, economic ramifications—including 

the permanent loss of contaminated land and six costly 

reactors—and the potential danger of a nuclear accident 

remain abiding public concerns. These concerns must be 

directly and forthrightly addressed.

At a minimum, events in Japan will have to be carefully 

scrutinized to see what can be learned from them and to 

identify any needed changes in the U.S. regulatory system. 

Insights gained from Fukushima should also have an 

influence on the direction of research and development 

efforts and on the design of advanced nuclear energy systems.

Events in Japan also reinforce the need for expanded 

international efforts to promote the safe operation of existing 

and planned nuclear installations, including facilities for 

spent fuel storage and disposal. A significant expansion of 

nuclear power is planned in the years ahead in countries such 

as China, Russia, India, and Korea. Over 60 countries that 

do not currently have nuclear power plants have approached 

the IAEA to explore the possibility of acquiring one and the 

IAEA anticipates that about 15 of these emerging nuclear 

nations will proceed over the next decade or two. Several of 

these “new-entrant” countries have already committed to 

construction. All will have to provide for safe storage and 

disposal of their nuclear fuel as part of a larger commitment 

to ensure the safety of all nuclear facility operations.

Safety is an inescapable, continuing, expensive, and 

technologically sophisticated demand that all new entrants to 

commercial nuclear power will have to confront over the full 

lifecycle of these systems—from preparing for construction 

through decommissioning. The nature and scope of the 

safety challenges involved might not be fully apparent to 

new entrants. Managing these challenges requires that robust 

institutional, organizational and technical arrangements be 

in place at the very early stages of a nuclear program. Also 

needed are sufficient technical knowledge and experience, 

strong management, continued peer-review and training, 

and an enduring commitment to excellence and a robust 

safety culture. Many countries will not initially be able to 

obtain the needed level of expertise and experience on their 

own. Thus, relevant international organizations and industry 

groups should expand the assistance available to such 

countries as they tackle the planning, design, construction, 

operation and regulation of nuclear energy systems.

All nations that have or plan to construct nuclear 

reactor facilities will, of course, also face the paramount 

task of providing for the safe storage and ultimate 

disposition of spent fuel. Here again, international efforts 

are needed to help new-entrant countries successfully 

manage these challenges.

The capacity to pursue nuclear technology in the United 

States will depend to a large extent on other countries’ success 

in achieving a high level of safety performance. Many of 

these countries have not yet demonstrated that they have 

the infrastructure or the commitment to a safety culture that 

provides confidence they will succeed. Moreover, as the events 

at Fukushima have shown, even a nation that has successfully 

operated nuclear reactors can have difficulties preparing for 

and responding to major accidents. Since Fukushima, the 

international community has worked to strengthen global 

nuclear safety, particularly through the work of the IAEA 

and its focus on enhanced international safety standards and 

expanded safety services. 

However, the Commission does not believe the task 

of enhancing global reactor safety should fall to the IAEA 

alone. In that spirit, we strongly support recent actions 

undertaken by the World Association of Nuclear Operators 

(WANO), which shortly after the Fukushima accident asked 

every nuclear power plant operator in the world to take 

“specific actions to verify their ability to deal with a station 

blackout or a beyond-design-basis event like fire or flood.”284

In addition, the WANO Governing Board established a 

high level commission tasked with recommending changes 

to WANO programs and organization as a result of lessons 

learned from Fukushima. That commission has recommended 

that WANO better define its roles and responsibilities in an 

emergency situation and develop a worldwide integrated event 

response strategy. It has also urged WANO to add emergency 

preparedness as a core review area to each and every WANO 

peer review, to conduct peer reviews for all initial reactor start 

ups, and to look more closely at fuel storage—including fuel 

pools and dry cask storage.285

In addition to the work being done by the operators of 

nuclear power plants, efforts by international nuclear vendors 

to embrace additional and voluntary self-governance regimes 

have also gained traction. Several “principles of conduct”286

recently adopted by a number of the world’s leading civilian 

nuclear technology vendors describe a commitment to 

undertake good faith efforts in several areas: safety, security, 

environmental protection, compensation for nuclear damage, 

nonproliferation, and ethics. Participating vendors express 

their intention to follow these principles in designing and 

exporting nuclear power plant technologies. These principles 

are based upon practices derived from the experience of 

power plant vendors and operators and IAEA standards.287

The Commission supports these efforts and encourages industry 

to continue pushing forward with the implementation of global 

best practices across a range of issues related to the safe and secure 

operation of nuclear energy facilities. 

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In sum, the United States should work with the 

IAEA and other interested nations to launch a major 

international effort, encompassing international 

organizations, regulators, vendors, operators, and technical 

support organizations, to enable the safe application of 

nuclear energy systems and the safe management of nuclear 

wastes in all countries that pursue this technology. The 

United States should also participate in other new and ongoing 

IAEA initiatives to address safety challenges. Finally, we believe 

DOE and NRC should be explicitly directed and funded to 

offer nuclear safety assistance and guidance to new-entrant 

countries who request it.

12.2 Non-proliferation 

Considerations

Because enrichment, reprocessing and recycled fuel 

fabrication facilities typically produce or utilize large 

amounts of separated materials (including enriched 

uranium and plutonium) as part of their operations, 

they present higher proliferation risks and are therefore 

considered particularly sensitive elements of the fuel cycle. 

The technologies used in these facilities can not only serve 

nuclear power needs, but can give countries the technical 

and physical capacity to obtain the direct-use nuclear 

materials required for a weapons program. Proliferation 

risks are varied: they may include the potential for countries 

to secretly divert materials from civilian nuclear facilities 

that they have declared to the IAEA under the NPT, or the 

potential for countries to apply know-how and equipment 

from declared programs to the construction of clandestine 

production facilities (e.g., clandestine enrichment plants). 

Finally, there is the risk that under some circumstances 

countries might withdraw from the NPT and then overtly 

misuse materials and facilities.

A number of institutional and technical approaches 

exist under the NPT and other international and bilateral 

agreements to address these risks. These include the 

application of IAEA safeguards to detect the diversion of 

nuclear materials in a timely manner and to verify peaceful 

uses of declared civil nuclear energy infrastructure; the 

IAEA’s ability to verify the absence of clandestine production 

facilities in countries that have ratified the IAEA Additional 

Protocol; international agreements by nuclear supplier 

nations to apply export controls to detect and prevent 

transfers of dual-use equipment to clandestine production 

facilities; the use of national technical means and human 

intelligence to detect clandestine production efforts; and 

initiatives aimed at developing international fuel cycle 

facilities as a way to provide emerging nuclear energy nations 

with reliable and affordable access to fuel enrichment and 

reprocessing services without the need to develop indigenous 

capacity; and the international system of bilateral and 

multilateral security and mutual defense agreements that 

reduce regional security concerns that could otherwise lead 

some countries to seek nuclear weapons capability.

None of these measures offers a perfect solution to the 

problem of nuclear proliferation, but together they can help 

reduce proliferation risks to a manageable level. The ability 

to identify and isolate non-compliant programs by itself can 

help ensure that problem countries do not come to be viewed 

as role models by other emerging nuclear energy nations. 

In the sections that follow we review the main elements of 

the current international non-proliferation regime and offer 

recommendations for improving and strengthening these 

elements through further U.S. investments and policy leadership.

12.2.1 The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT)

The NPT provides the foundation of the international 

nuclear non-proliferation regime. Opened for signature in 

1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. It currently has 

189 signatories,288 divided between nuclear weapon states 

(NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Virtually 

all states in the international system have signed and ratified 

the treaty: only Israel, India, and Pakistan have declined to 

sign, and North Korea is the only state that has joined the 

treaty but later exercised its right to withdraw.

The NPT is designed to promote three main objectives: 

to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, to encourage eventual 

nuclear disarmament, and to provide a framework and 

enable widespread access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

The key provisions of the NPT therefore outline rights and 

responsibilities for state parties in the area of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear energy, and disarmament.289 Article 

I states that no NWS may “transfer, assist, encourage or 

induce” any NNWS to “manufacture or otherwise acquire 

nuclear weapons.” Article II requires NNWS parties not to 

“receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire” nuclear weapons 

and “not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture 

of nuclear weapons.” Article IV protects the right of all states 

to peaceful nuclear energy, conditional on their being in 

compliance with their Article II commitment: “Nothing in 

this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable 

right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, 

production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 

without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and 

II of this Treaty.” Article VI of the NPT calls for all parties 

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to work towards nuclear disarmament: “Each of the Parties 

to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 

on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 

race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” As noted 

above, Article VI is often treated as exclusively applicable to 

NWS, though it clearly states that each of the parties to the 

treaty must pursue “negotiations in good faith”290 in pursuit 

of nuclear disarmament.

Although the NPT provides a legal framework for the global 

non-proliferation regime, the workhorse of the regime has been 

the IAEA safeguards system. This system is used to verify NPT 

compliance and to affirm that governments are not using civil 

nuclear energy programs for nuclear-weapons purposes.

All signatories to the NPT are required to have a 

comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in place. 

These CSAs cover “all source or special fissionable material 

in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of 

a State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its 

control anywhere.”291 Because IAEA safeguards depend 

on correct and complete declarations of countries’ nuclear 

materials and activities, CSAs play an important role in 

verifying country reports. Typically, they rely heavily on 

nuclear material accounting measures, complemented by 

containment and surveillance techniques such as tamperproof seals and cameras that the IAEA installs at facilities. 

Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and 

ongoing monitoring.

Unfortunately, some events of the last several decades 

have challenged the efficacy and credibility of CSAs. In 

particular, Iraq’s engagement in a clandestine nuclear 

weapons program from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s 

violated its safeguards obligations under the NPT. In 

response, the IAEA broadened the scope of materials 

and facilities covered by the safeguards and strengthened 

safeguards techniques.292 In 1992, the IAEA Board of 

Governors reaffirmed the agency’s authority to conduct 

“special inspections” of suspected undeclared sites in NPT 

non-nuclear weapon states and in 1997 the IAEA Board 

of Governors adopted a new safeguards model. Known as 

the “Additional Protocol” or AP, the protocol gave IAEA 

inspectors increased access to all aspects of a non-nuclear 

weapon state’s nuclear program, even where nuclear material 

is not involved; required states to provide more detailed 

information on their nuclear program; allowed for the use 

of improved verification technologies (i.e., environmental 

sampling); and required more extensive inspections at 

declared nuclear sites.293 There are currently 104 countries 

with Additional Protocol agreements in force but some key 

countries, like Iran, have refused to ratify the AP.294

Even with the Additional Protocol in place, plans to 

expand global nuclear energy production and concerns 

over the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies are placing 

increased strain on international safeguards. To the extent 

that this expansion involves new reprocessing and enrichment 

facilities, one of the most vexing challenges for the safeguards 

system will be verifying physical materials at these facilities. In 

large bulk-handling facilities with high volume throughputs 

(hundreds to thousands of metric tons) and complicated 

equipment schematics, material unaccounted for or “MUF” 

can represent a substantial proliferation challenge. Even as 

a small percentage of facility throughput, the quantity of 

material unaccounted for can be significant. Over the last 

15 years, material accounting efforts have failed on multiple 

occasions to detect and resolve anomalies in a timely fashion. 

These lapses have involved large amounts of MUF that 

remained unresolved for months, years, or even decades.295

The Commission endorses R&D efforts on modern 

safeguards technologies and urges continued U.S. 

government support for IAEA’s work in this area. The 

National Nuclear Security Administration is the principal 

federal sponsor of nuclear non-proliferation-related research 

and development and is currently (in conjunction with 

the national laboratories) supporting work on safeguards 

systems analysis and enhancements, safeguards-by-design, 

nuclear material control and accountability (MC&A) 

improvements, modern inventory controls, software 

and hardware development, collaborative information 

technology tools, and real-time process monitoring and data 

integration systems. Support for the development of novel 

safeguards technologies is not only imperative because of 

the fundamentally important nature of the threat, but 

because of compounding issues related to the development 

of these technologies. The IAEA finds itself constrained 

financially, lacking the resources to perform research and 

development on the necessary technologies, while tasked 

with ever-increasing responsibilities.296 In addition, the size 

of the “safeguards market” simply doesn’t support the costeffective production of units or major R&D investments by 

commercial players. As a result, the IAEA remains reliant on 

the R&D efforts of national governments.

12.2.2 Multilateral/Multi-national 

Fuel Cycle Services Options

Proposals for “multi-nationalizing” certain fuel cycle facilities 

or operations as a way to provide access to sensitive parts of 

the nuclear fuel cycle are not new and have been discussed 

in multiple forms since the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal report 

and Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace speech.297 Striking a 

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balance between the reliable provision of fuel supply services on

the one hand and guaranteeing adherence to non-proliferation

norms on the other hand is difficult, to say the least. In concert

with the IAEA, several countries, including the United States,

have proposed an array of strategies to provide countries with

credible, cost-efficient options for an assured nuclear fuel

supply, including the development of backup supplies or “fuel

banks” of enriched uranium, multi-national fuel cycle centers,

and government-to-government agreements.

Today, as shown in figure 20, the majority of nuclear

energy programs worldwide are small, with less than 10

GWe of capacity (fewer than 10 reactors). Furthermore,

while some new uncertainty has been introduced by the

Fukushima accident, the number of countries with small

nuclear energy programs is still widely expected to grow

further. In 2011, Iran’s first power reactor reached criticality

at Bushehr, adding another country to the list shown in

figure 20. In addition, 65 more countries are currently

participating in IAEA technical cooperation projects related

to the introduction of nuclear power. Because most national

nuclear energy programs are small, the combined installed

nuclear capacity in these countries accounts for less than 15

percent of total global nuclear generation capacity. Given this

feature of the current global nuclear energy market, there

are compelling practical and economic reasons for countries

to make use of regional or multi-national fuel cycle facilities

and services, rather than developing their own nuclear fuel

cycle capabilities.

In 2004, the Director General of the IAEA appointed an

international expert group to consider options for possible

multilateral approaches to developing facilities on the

front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle. Their report,

Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, was released

in February of 2005;299 it categorized the options for offering

assured fuel supply into three major and distinct categories:

assurances of services not involving the ownership of fuel

cycle facilities, conversion of existing facilities to multinational facilities, and the construction of new jointly-owned

facilities.

Within the first option, it is generally assumed that a

functional market exists for whatever fuel service is required,

either through state-owned enterprises or commercial

enterprises. Of course, market options currently vary

across the fuel cycle (i.e., more commercial options exist

for enrichment than they do for reprocessing, and none

exist for spent fuel and HLW disposal). While a diversity of

supply options alone does not necessary reflect the health

of a market and its ability to answer demand, it can affect

IRAN

ARMENIA

NETHERLANDS

SLOVENIA

ARGENTINA

MEXICO

ROMANIA

SLOVAKIA

SOUTH AFRICA

BULGARIA

PAKISTAN

HUNGARY

BRAZIL

FINLAND

SWITZERLAND

CZECH REPUBLIC

TAIWAN

BELGIUM

SPAIN

SWEDEN

GERMANY

CHINA

UNITED KINGDOM

UKRAINE

CANADA

INDIA

KOREA – RO

RUSSIA

JAPAN

FRANCE

UNITED STATES

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

INSTALLED NUCLEAR CAPACITY - GIGAWATT ELECTRIC (GWe)

15%

Of Global Nuclear Capacity Is In

Nations With Under 10 GWe

85%

In Nations

Over 10 GWe

Figure 20. Worldwide Distribution of Civil

Nuclear Energy Generation Capacity in 2010298

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countries’ confidence that their ability to access supplies 

is really “assured.” In some cases, the ability to access 

fuel supplies via existing and perfectly healthy markets is 

not sufficient for a country to forgo developing its own 

indigenous fuel cycle development, ostensibly the case in 

Iran. Assurance of sufficient supply, beyond that available 

through the normal market, can be strengthened through 

additional agreements, including by supplier and government 

consortia and through the IAEA. 

As the 2005 IAEA report noted, the advantages and 

disadvantages of either converting a national facility 

to an international facility or to building a new multinationally managed facility will vary depending on the 

type of facility being discussed (enrichment, reprocessing, 

etc.). The advantages of converting an existing facility to 

multi-national ownership include lower capital investment 

required, no further dissemination of facility construction 

know-how, strengthened proliferation resistance due to 

multi-national management and operating teams, and 

pooled expertise and resources. Disadvantages include the 

potential need for additional facilities in politically diverse 

countries to provide adequate assurance that fuel supplies 

will not be withheld for ideological reasons, the need to 

balance existing property rights, potential proliferation 

risks due to an increased number of international partners, 

added international management demands, and the 

potential need to back-fit safeguards depending on the host 

nation’s prior approach.

The advantages to building a new fuel cycle facility under 

multi-national controls include the ability to incorporate 

safeguards during construction instead of back-fitting these 

controls, the ability to pool expertise and resources, the 

ability to size the facility economically, and the opportunity 

to strengthen proliferation safeguards. The disadvantages of 

building new facilities include potentially higher proliferation 

risks due to broader access to know-how (depending on 

the management model chosen), uncertain commercial 

competitiveness, and potential for breakout and retention of 

fissile materials.

Regardless of the advantages and disadvantages of each 

of these options, it is clear that cross-cutting technical, legal, 

cultural, political and financial factors will affect perceptions 

about their relative feasibility and desirability. These factors 

may be decisive in any future multilateral or unilateral efforts 

to develop multi-national fuel cycle facilities. 

Longer term, the United States should support the use 

of multi-national fuel-cycle facilities, under comprehensive 

IAEA safeguards, as a way to give more countries reliable 

access to the benefits of nuclear power while simultaneously 

reducing proliferation risks. We note that the term “multinational fuel cycle facility” is commonly understood to 

encompass facilities associated with all aspects of the nuclear 

fuel cycle. The Commission wishes to stress that our support 

for multi-national management of such facilities should not 

be interpreted as support for additional countries becoming 

involved in enrichment or reprocessing facilities, but rather 

reflects our view that if these capabilities were to spread it 

would be far preferable—from a security and non-proliferation 

standpoint—if they did so under multi-national ownership, 

management, safeguards, and controls.

The Urenco uranium enrichment facilities—which are 

owned by the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands—are a 

long-standing example of facilities under multi-national 

ownership. Other examples of multi-national approaches to 

providing fuel supply “assurance” include the IAEA’s $150 

million fund for uranium purchases,300 Russia’s creation of 

an International Uranium Enrichment Center,301 a 120 MT 

LEU Fuel Bank302 in Angarsk, and the UK’s Nuclear Fuel 

Assurance Plan.303 The latter is basically a bilateral agreement 

that is supposed to serve as a model for government-togovernment arrangements between supplier and recipient 

states, where the supply of low enriched uranium is not 

disrupted for non-commercial (political) reasons.

Although discussions of multi-national facilities and 

fuel services typically focus on securing enrichment and 

reprocessing facilities, the same concepts can be applied 

to the disposal of spent fuel and HLW. All countries with 

nuclear power will have to store SNF and HLW for some 

period of time and ultimately provide for disposal (internally 

or multi-nationally) of the spent fuel or of the high-level 

radioactive waste components that remain if the spent fuel 

is reprocessed. Spent fuel contains approximately 1 percent 

plutonium and the self-protecting nature of the radioactivity 

will diminish over time making the plutonium more 

accessible. Thus, it is in the best interests of the United States 

and the international community to have spent fuel under 

effective and transparent control and to assure that in the 

coming century no spent fuel becomes “orphaned” anywhere 

in the world with inadequate safeguards and security.

Fuel “take-away” arrangements304 would allow countries, 

particularly those with relatively small national programs, 

to avoid the very costly and politically difficult step of 

providing for waste disposal on their soil and to reduce 

associated safety and security risks. Fuel take-away could 

also provide a strong incentive for emerging nuclear nations 

to take key actions, such as ratifying the IAEA Additional 

Protocol, that can strengthen the non-proliferation regime 

and further isolate the currently small number of problem 

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states. The United States has implemented a relatively small 

but successful initiative to ship spent foreign research reactor 

fuel to U.S. facilities for storage and disposal. This program 

has demonstrated meaningful non-proliferation and security 

benefits. A similar capability to accept spent fuel from 

foreign commercial reactors, in cases where the President 

would choose to authorize such imports for reasons of 

U.S. national security, would be desirable within a larger 

policy framework that creates a clear path for the safe and 

permanent disposition of U.S. spent fuel. Unfortunately, 

the failure to develop broadly-accepted domestic spent fuel 

storage and disposal strategies thus far limits U.S. nonproliferation policy choices.

The Commission believes the availability of spent fuel 

take-away would provide substantially greater incentives 

for some emerging nuclear nations to forgo the indigenous 

development of sensitive fuel-cycle facilities in return for 

access to regional or international facilities. In that context, 

government support for limited fuel supply and take-away 

initiatives to advance U.S. national security interests can be 

part of a comprehensive strategy for maintaining the nuclear 

energy option while simultaneously addressing proliferation 

and security concerns.

12.3 Security and CounterTerrorism

As stated in a communiqué issued by the Washington 

Nuclear Summit on April 13, 2010, “Nuclear terrorism is 

one of the most challenging threats to international security, 

and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective 

means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized 

actors from acquiring nuclear materials...Success will require 

responsible national actions and effective international 

cooperation.”305 To date, the United States has worked to 

enhance global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to 

nuclear terrorism by conducting multilateral activities aimed 

at strengthening the operations, plans, policies, procedures, 

and interoperability of partner nations through a variety of 

activities. Most recently, these activities have included the 

2010 Nuclear Summit, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, 

and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Held in April 2010 and attended by 47 nations, the U.S.-

hosted 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was launched with 

the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide 

within four years. Other efforts since that time have included 

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signing a plutonium disposition protocol with Russia,306

returning Russian origin high-enriched uranium (HEU) back 

to Russia,307 converting the Kyoto University research reactor 

in Japan from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU), and 

pursuing ratification to an amendment of the Convention on 

Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials that would extend 

and strengthen the Convention’s coverage of peaceful nuclear 

material in storage or use at domestic nuclear facilities, rather 

than merely in international transit. In preparation for the next 

summit, some U.S. experts are proposing the development 

of an international “nuclear material security framework 

agreement [that] would identify the threats to humankind 

from vulnerable fissile and radiological materials...and list 

actions and commitments required to mitigate them.”308

The domestic division of regulatory responsibility 

for nuclear security and counter-terrorism is discussed 

in chapters 5 and 9 of this report; those chapters also 

describe security measures implemented at U.S. reactor 

sites following 9/11. As the United States continues to 

improve its ability to secure and protect nuclear facilities 

and materials, the Commission urges continued U.S. 

leadership to improve nuclear security and strengthen 

nuclear safety standards worldwide. Reviews conducted 

post-Fukushima will undoubtedly examine the safety and 

security benefits that could be achieved by improving 

instrumentation to measure key plant safety parameters 

including pool water levels under conditions of station 

blackout and severe damage, reviewing and strengthening 

procedures for connecting portable pumps and power 

supplies, and potentially accelerating the transfer of SNF 

out of reactor pools and into dry storage. The Commission 

urges that these reviews be completed expeditiously and 

that unclassified results be widely shared with regulators and 

other appropriate entities around the world.

Finally, the Commission finds that is important for the 

U.S. government to continue to support the IAEA’s physical 

protection programs as well as efforts by the WINS to promote 

global best practices regarding nuclear security. Overall, 

the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities to 

deter terrorist activity remains a very high priority in today’s 

security environment as the potential theft and sabotage of 

nuclear materials and facilities continues to be a real threat.309

Furthermore, the theft of weapons-usable material or any 

act of nuclear-related sabotage or terrorism anywhere in the 

world could create real consequences here in the United 

States, particularly if it leads to a detonation or large release 

of radioactivity. For this reason, the United States has a direct 

interest in encouraging and enabling all nations to uphold 

their national and international obligations for the security and 

safety of nuclear materials and facilities. 

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13. Near-Term Actions

Given uncertainty about how long that might take and the 

fact that under current law DOE remains responsible for the 

nuclear waste management activities of the federal government, 

it is important that those steps that do not require the new 

organization to be in place be initiated as soon as possible. 

Specifically, the Commission urges near-term action in the areas 

described below. To ensure continued progress, we also urge 

the Secretary of Energy to task a senior official with sufficient 

authority to coordinate all of the DOE elements involved in 

the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations.

Financing the Waste Program

• DOE should offer to enter into negotiations with 

contract holders to revise current contracts to provide a 

new fee payment option in which payments to the Waste 

Fund each year would be based on actual appropriations 

from the Waste Fund, with the remainder of the nuclear 

waste fee being placed in a third-party escrow account by 

the contract holder until needed. 

• The Administration should work with the appropriate 

congressional committees and the Congressional Budget 

Office to reclassify receipts from the nuclear waste fee as 

discretionary offsetting collections and allow them to be 

used to offset appropriations for the waste program.

• The Administration, DOE, and DOJ should also work 

with nuclear utilities and other stakeholders toward a fair 

resolution of outstanding litigation and damage claims. 

The Commission recognizes that it will take time, 

commitment to action, and new authorizing legislation 

to implement our most important recommendations, 

particularly the recommendation to establish a new waste 

management organization.

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Establishment of a New Organization

• The appropriate congressional committees should begin 

hearings on establishment of an independent waste 

management organization as soon as practicable. The 

Commission recognizes that there are many details that 

need to be worked out in creating a new institution, and 

believes that the sooner the process of obtaining the views 

of interested parties and developing a detailed legislative 

proposal can begin, the better.

Storage

• Using existing authority in the NWPA, DOE should 

begin laying the groundwork for implementing 

consolidated storage and for improving the overall 

integration of storage as a planned part of the waste 

management system without further delay. Specific steps 

that DOE could take in the near term include:

o Performing the systems analyses and design studies 

needed to develop a conceptual design for a highly 

flexible, initial federal spent fuel storage facility. 

o Preparing to respond to requests for information 

from communities, states, or tribes that might 

be interested in learning more about hosting a 

consolidated storage facility.

o Working with nuclear utilities, the nuclear industry, 

and other stakeholders to promote the better 

integration of storage into the waste management 

system, including standardization of dry cask storage 

systems. This effort should include development of 

the systems analyses needed to provide quantitative 

estimates of the system benefits of utility actions 

such as the use of standardized storage systems or 

agreements to deliver fuel outside the current OFF 

priority ranking. (These analyses would be needed 

to support the provision of incentives to utilities to 

undertake actions such as using standardized storage 

systems or renegotiating fuel acceptance contracts.)

• The Administration should request, and Congress should 

provide funding for, the National Academy of Sciences 

to conduct an independent investigation of the events at 

Fukushima and their implications for safety and security 

requirements at SNF and HLW storage sites in the 

United States.

• DOE, NRC and industry should continue a vigorous 

research and regulatory oversight effort in areas such as 

spent fuel and storage system degradation phenomena, 

vulnerability to sabotage and terrorism, and others. 

Transportation

• DOE should complete the development of procedures 

and regulations for providing technical assistance and 

funds (pursuant to section 180 (c) of the NWPA), and 

begin providing funding, for working with states and 

regional state-government groups and training local and 

tribal officials in areas likely to be traversed by spent fuel 

shipments, in preparation for movement of spent fuel 

from shutdown reactor sites to consolidated storage.

• DOE and other federal agencies should reexamine and 

address those recommendations from the 2006 NAS Going 

the Distance study that have not yet been implemented. As 

a part of this reexamination, the NRC should reassess its 

plans for the Package Performance Study without regard to 

the status of the Yucca Mountain project, and if it is found 

to have independent value, funding should be provided 

from the Nuclear Waste Fund so that the NRC can update 

these plans and proceed with those tests.

Disposal

• DOE should keep a repository program moving 

forward through valuable, non-site specific activities, 

including R&D on geological media, work to design 

improved engineered barriers, and work on the disposal 

requirements for advanced fuel cycles. The work 

of the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign of DOE’s 

Office of Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition Research and 

Development in this area should be continued.

• DOE should develop an RD&D plan and roadmap for 

taking the borehole disposal concept to the point of a 

licensed demonstration.

Facility Siting

• To ensure that future siting efforts are informed by past 

experience, DOE should build a data base of the experience 

that has been gained and relevant documentation produced 

in efforts to site nuclear waste facilities, in the United 

States and abroad. This would include storage facility and 

repository siting efforts under the NWPA by both DOE 

and the Nuclear Waste Negotiator. 

Regulatory Actions

• EPA and the NRC should work together to define an 

appropriate process (with opportunity for public input) 

for developing a generic safety standard for geologic 

disposal sites. The implementation of this standardsetting process should be coordinated with the aim of 

developing draft regulations for mined repositories and 

deep borehole facilities.

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• The NRC should continue efforts to review and 

potentially revise the existing waste classification system.

• A portion of federal nuclear energy RD&D resources 

should be directed to the NRC to accelerate the 

development of a regulatory framework and to support 

anticipatory research for novel components of advanced 

nuclear energy systems. An increased degree of confidence 

that new systems can be successfully licensed is important 

for lowering barriers to commercial investment.

Occupational Safety and Health for 

the Nuclear Workforce

• The jurisdictions of safety and health agencies should be 

clarified and aligned. New site-independent safety standards 

should be developed by the safety and health agencies 

responsible for protecting nuclear workers through a 

coordinated joint process that actively engages and solicits 

input from all relevant constituencies. Efforts to support 

uniform levels of safety and health in the nuclear industry 

should be undertaken with federal, industry, and joint 

labor–management leadership. Safety and health practices 

in the nuclear construction industry should provide a model 

for other activities in the nuclear industry.

Nuclear Workforce Development

• DOE, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of 

Labor and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, should lead a 

public–private initiative to develop ongoing labor demand 

projections and forecast capacity for the nuclear workforce, 

in areas including science, technology, engineering and 

mathematics; crafts; and emergency response and hazardous 

material (HAZMAT). This capacity will help inform 

expanded federal, joint labor–management, and universitybased support for critical high-skill, high-performance 

nuclear workforce development needs, including special 

attention to the expansion of the emergency response and 

HAZMAT-trained workforce.

International

• DOE should identify any legislative changes needed to 

authorize and direct the U.S. waste management program 

to support countries that pursue nuclear technologies 

in developing capacity for the safe management of the 

associated radioactive wastes and to encourage broad 

adherence to strengthened international norms for 

safety, security, and non-proliferation for all nuclear 

infrastructure and materials.

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The members of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future are:

Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chair - Director of The Center on 

Congress at Indiana University; former Member, U.S. House 

of Representatives (D-IN).

Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chair - President of the Scowcroft 

Group; former National Security Advisor to Presidents 

Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush. 

Mark H. Ayers, President, Building and Construction Trades 

Department, AFL-CIO. 

Vicky A. Bailey, Former Commissioner, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission; former Indiana PUC 

Commissioner; former DOE Assistant Secretary for Policy 

and International Affairs. 

Albert Carnesale, Chancellor Emeritus and Professor, 

University of California, Los Angeles. 

Pete V. Domenici, Senior Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center; 

former U.S. Senator (R-NM). 

Susan Eisenhower, President, Eisenhower Group, Inc. 

Chuck Hagel, Distinguished Professor at Georgetown 

University and the University of Nebraska at Omaha; former 

U.S. Senator (R-NE). 

Jonathan Lash, President, Hampshire College; former 

President, World Resources Institute. 

Allison M. Macfarlane, Associate Professor of Environmental 

Science and Policy, George Mason University.

Richard A. Meserve, President, Carnegie Institution for 

Science and Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP; 

former Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Ernest J. Moniz, Professor of Physics and Cecil & Ida Green 

Distinguished Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Per Peterson, Professor and Chair, Dept. of Nuclear 

Engineering, Univ. of California – Berkeley. 

John Rowe, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Exelon 

Corporation. 

Phil Sharp, President, Resources for the Future; former 

Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-IN).

BRC Staff

John Kotek – Staff Director

Matthew Milazzo – Deputy Director, Staff Liaison to the 

Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee

Tom Isaacs – Lead Advisor

Alex Thrower – Counsel, Staff Liaison to the Transportation 

and Storage Subcommittee

Natalia Saraeva – Research Associate, Staff Liaison to the 

Disposal Subcommittee

Marika Tatsutani – Lead Writer and Editor

Mary Woollen – Government and Community Liaison

Irie Harris – Office Manager

BRC Senior Consultants

Dr. Tom Cotton – Senior Technical Advisor 

Allen Croff – Senior Technical Advisor

Dr. Glenn Paulson – Senior Technical Advisor

APPENDIX A

BRC Commissioners, Staff, Senior Consultants and Charter

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Blue Ribbo n Commission on Ameri ca’ s N u c l ear Futu re

Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future

U.S. Department of Energy

Advisory Committee Charter

1. Committee’s Official Designation. Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s

Nuclear Future (the Commission).

2. Authority. The Commission is being established in accordance with the

provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), as amended, 5

U.S.C. App. 2, and as directed by the President’s Memorandum for the Secretary

of Energy dated January 20, 2010: Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s

Nuclear Future. This charter establishes the Commission under the authority of

the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).

3. Objectives and Scope of Activities. The Secretary of Energy, acting at the

direction of the President, is establishing the Commission to conduct a

comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel

cycle, including all alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of

civilian and defense used nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and materials derived

from nuclear activities. Specifically, the Commission will provide advice,

evaluate alternatives, and make recommendations for a new plan to address these

issues, including:

a) Evaluation of existing fuel cycle technologies and R&D programs. Criteria for

evaluation should include cost, safety, resource utilization and sustainability,

and the promotion of nuclear nonproliferation and counter-terrorism goals.

b) Options for safe storage of used nuclear fuel while final disposition pathways

are selected and deployed;

c) Options for permanent disposal of used fuel and/or high-level nuclear waste,

including deep geological disposal;

d) Options to make legal and commercial arrangements for the management of

used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste in a manner that takes the current and

potential full fuel cycles into account;

e) Options for decision-making processes for management and disposal that are

flexible, adaptive, and responsive;

f) Options to ensure that decisions on management of used nuclear fuel and

nuclear waste are open and transparent, with broad participation;

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g) The possible need for additional legislation or amendments to existing laws, 

including the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended; and 

h) Any such additional matters as the Secretary determines to be appropriate for 

consideration. 

The Commission will produce a draft report to the Secretary and a final report 

within the time frames contained in paragraph 4. 

4. Description of Duties. The duties of the Commission are solely advisory and are 

as stated in Paragraph 3 above.

A draft report shall be submitted within 18 months of the date of the Presidential 

memorandum directing establishment of this Commission; a final report shall be 

submitted within 24 months of the date of that memorandum. The reports shall 

include: 

a) Consideration of a wide range of technological and policy alternatives, and 

should analyze the scientific, environmental, budgetary, financial, and 

management issues, among others, surrounding each alternative it considers. 

The reports will also include a set of recommendations regarding policy and 

management, and any advisable changes in law. 

b) Recommendations on the fees currently being charged to nuclear energy 

ratepayers and the recommended disposition of the available balances 

consistent with the recommendations of the Commission regarding the 

management of used nuclear fuel; and 

c) Such other matters as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. 

5. Official to Whom the Committee Reports. The Commission reports to the 

Secretary of Energy. 

6. Agency Responsible for Providing the Necessary Support. DOE will be 

responsible for financial and administrative support. Within DOE, this support 

will be provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy or 

other Departmental element as required. The Commission will draw on the 

expertise of other federal agencies as appropriate. 

7. Estimated Annual Operating Cost and Staff Years. The estimated annual 

operating cost of direct support to, including travel of, the Commission and its 

subcommittees is $5,000,000 and requires approximately 8.0 full-time employees. 

8. Designated Federal Officer. A full-time DOE employee, appointed in 

accordance with agency procedures, will serve as the Designated Federal Officer 

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Blue Ribbon Commission on Ameri ca’s N u c l ear Futu re

(DFO). The DFO will approve or call all of the Commission and subcommittee 

meetings, approve all meeting agendas, attend all Commission and subcommittee 

meetings, adjourn any meeting when the DFO determines adjournment to be in 

the public interest. Subcommittee directors who are full-time Department of 

Energy employees, as appointed by the DFO, may serve as DFOs for 

subcommittee meetings. 

9. Estimated Number and Frequency of Meetings. The Commission is expected 

to meet as frequently as needed and approved by the DFO, but not less than twice 

a year. 

The Commission will hold open meetings unless the Secretary of Energy, or his 

designee, determines that a meeting or a portion of a meeting may be closed to the 

public as permitted by law. Interested persons may attend meetings of, and file 

comments with, the Commission, and, within time constraints and Commission 

procedures, may appear before the Commission. 

Members of the Commission serve without compensation. However, each 

appointed non-Federal member may be reimbursed for per diem and travel 

expenses incurred while attending Commission meetings in accordance with the 

Federal Travel Regulations. 

10. Duration and Termination. The Commission is subject to biennial review and 

will terminate 24 months from the date of the Presidential memorandum 

discussed above, unless, prior to that time, the charter is renewed in accordance 

with Section 14 of the FACA.

11. Membership and Designation. Commission members shall be experts in their 

respective fields and appointed as special Government employees based on their 

knowledge and expertise of the topics expected to be addressed by the 

Commission, or representatives of entities including, among others, research 

facilities, academic and policy-centered institutions, industry, labor organizations, 

environmental organizations, and others, should the Commission’s task require 

such representation. Members shall be appointed by the Secretary of Energy. 

The approximate number of Commission members will be 15 persons. The Chair 

or Co-Chairs shall be appointed by the Secretary of Energy. 

12. Subcommittees. 

a) To facilitate functioning of the Commission, both standing and ad hoc 

subcommittees may be formed. 

b) The objectives of the subcommittees are to undertake fact-finding and analysis 

on specific topics and to provide appropriate information and 

recommendations to the Commission. 

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c) The Secretary or his designee, in consultation with the Chair or Co-Chairs, 

will appoint members of subcommittees. Members from outside the 

Commission may be appointed to any subcommittee to assure the expertise 

necessary to conduct subcommittee business. 

d) The Secretary or his designee, in consultation with the Chair or co-Chairs will 

appoint Subcommittees. 

e) The DOE Committee Management Officer (CMO) will be notified upon 

establishment of each subcommittee. 

13. Recordkeeping. The records of the Commission and any subcommittee shall be 

handled in accordance with General Records Schedule 26, Item 2 and approved 

agency records disposition schedule. These records shall be available for public 

inspection and copying, subject to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. 

14. Filing Date. 

Date filed with Congress: _____March 1, 2010__________ 

 Signed 

 _________________________ 

 Carol A. Matthews 

 Committee Management Officer 

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March 25 & 26, 2010 – Washington DC – Full Commission Meeting

May 25 & 26, 2010 – Washington, DC – Full Commission Meeting

July 7, 2010 – Washington, DC – Disposal Subcommittee Meeting

July 12 & 13, 2010 – Idaho Falls, ID – Reactor & Fuel Cycle Technologies Subcommittee Meeting

July 14 & 15, 2010 – Hanford Site/Kennewick, WA – Full Commission Meeting

August 10, 2010 – Maine Yankee Site/Wiscasset, ME – Transportation & Storage Subcommittee Meeting

August 19, 2010 – Washington, DC – Transportation & Storage Subcommittee Meeting

August 30 & 31, 2010 – Washington, DC – Reactor & Fuel Cycle Technologies Subcommittee Meeting

September 1, 2010 – Washington, DC – Disposal Subcommittee Meeting

September 21 & 22, 2010 – Washington, DC – Full Commission Meeting

September 23, 2010 – Washington, DC – Transportation & Storage Subcommittee Meeting

October 12, 2010 – Washington, DC – Reactor & Fuel Cycle Technologies Subcommittee Meeting

October 21 & 22, 2010 – Finland – Disposal Subcommittee Site Visits and Meetings

October 23-26, 2010 – Sweden – Disposal Subcommittee Site Visits and Meetings

November 2, 2010 – Chicago, IL – Transportation & Storage Subcommittee Meeting

November 4, 2010 – Washington, DC – Disposal Subcommittee Meeting

November 15 & 16, 2010 – Washington, DC – Full Commission Meeting

January 6 & 7, 2011 – Aiken, SC and Augusta, GA – Savannah River Site Visit and Meeting

January 26, 27 & 28, 2011 – Carlsbad and Albuquerque, NM – Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Visit and Meetings

February 1 & 2, 2011 – Washington, DC – Full Commission Meeting

February 3, 2011 – Washington, DC – Classified (Closed) Meeting

February 8-11, 2011 – Japan – Site Visits and Meetings

February 17 & 18, 2011 – Russia – Meetings

February 20, 21 & 22, 2011 – France – Site Visits and Meetings

May 13, 2011 – Washington, DC – Full Commission Meeting

June 21-28, 2011 – United Kingdom and France – Site Visits and Meetings

September 12, 2011 – Denver, CO – Regional Public Meeting

October 12, 2012 – Boston, MA – Regional Public Meeting

October 18, 2011 – Atlanta, GA – Regional Public Meeting

October 20, 2011 – Washington, DC – Regional Public Meeting

October 28, 2011 – Minneapolis, MN – Regional Public Meeting

December 2, 2011 – Washington, DC – Full Commission Meeting

APPENDIX B

Full Commission, Subcommittee 

and Regional Comment Meetings

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[NOTE: Much of the information herein was derived from 

a 2009 report of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review 

Board (NWTRB) on the status of international repository 

programs. This appendix may therefore not reflect more 

recent developments, although we have attempted to update 

the information below based on information provided to the 

Commission. For nations covered herein but not covered in the 

NWTRB report, the information was gathered by BRC staff].

Canada: Canada currently has 18 operating nuclear 

power plants, which together account for nearly 15% of 

the country’s total electricity production. Responsibility 

for managing nuclear waste rests with the Nuclear Waste 

Management Organization (NWMO), a private corporation 

formed by nuclear plant owners. The Organization’s key 

policies and decisions must be approved by the government, 

which regulates nuclear waste management activities through 

the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. Similar to the 

approach taken in the United States, owners of nuclear 

power plants pay into a Nuclear Fuel Waste Act Trust Fund. 

Canada does not reprocess commercial used nuclear fuel. The 

Organization’s “Adaptive Phased Management” (APM) plan 

is guided by five fundamental values: Integrity, Excellence, 

Engagement, Accountability, and Transparency. It consists of 

a technical method and a management system. The technical 

method envisions disposal in an appropriate geologic 

formation with the option of shallow underground storage 

at the disposal site. It includes the potential for retrievability, 

continuous monitoring, flexible design, and an ongoing 

technical and social research program. The management 

system calls for collaborative and phased decision making; 

continuous learning; open, inclusive and transparent 

engagement; and pursuit of a willing and informed host 

community in one of the four nuclear provinces. Currently 

NWMO is in the early stages of the siting phase and a 

number of communities have expressed interest in learning 

more about the program in order to inform a decision about 

their interest in volunteering to host such a facility. The 

proposed process for selecting a deep geologic repository site 

does not contain a firm schedule for completing this process 

or an anticipated start date for repository operations.Canada 

does not have an independent, centralized interim-storage 

facility for used nuclear fuel.

Finland: Finland currently has four operating nuclear 

power plants, which together account for nearly 30% of 

the country’s total electricity production. Responsibility for 

waste management rests with Posiva Oy, a joint company 

created by Finland’s two nuclear utilities in 1995. The 

government’s Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority serves 

as independent regulator. Nuclear power generators pay into 

a nuclear waste management fund; their annual obligation 

depends on the gap between estimated waste disposal and 

plant decommissioning costs and the level of the fund at that 

point in time. Finland does not reprocess commercial used 

nuclear fuel. In 2000, the government approved Olkiluoto, 

a migmatite site in the municipality of Eurajoki, for a 

deep geologic repository. (Two of Finland’s four existing 

nuclear reactors and a new reactor that is currently under 

construction are also located at Olkiluoto.) The site was 

subsequently approved by Finland’s Parliament (in 2001) 

and is currently being characterized at depth using an 

underground research tunnel known as Onkalo (construction 

of the tunnel began in 2004). Selection of the Olkiluoto 

site has the support of the host community, which could 

have exercised veto power over the government’s decision 

(instead, the Eurajoki Municipal Council approved a positive 

statement about the site). The community had negotiated 

a benefits package with Posiva Oy in 1999. Key decisions 

concerning long-term health and safety requirements, the 

design of engineered barrier systems, and the methodology 

to be used for demonstrating compliance with post-closure 

standards have been taken; details are available from the 

NWTRB report and other sources. Earlier regulations 

stipulated that waste emplaced at the site be retrievable in 

the future; this requirement was lifted in 2008 but Posiva 

is still obliged to present a plan and cost estimate for waste 

retrieval when it applies for a license to construct the 

Olkiluoto repository. The anticipated start date for repository 

operations is 2020. Finland does not have an independent, 

centralized interim-storage facility.

France: France has 58 operating nuclear plants, which 

together account for 76% of the country’s total electricity 

production. A new 1.6 GW plant is currently under 

construction. Responsibility for managing and disposing of 

nuclear waste falls to the National Agency for Radioactive 

Waste Management, a government-owned public service 

agency which reports to the government’s Ministries of 

Environment, Industry, and Research. France’s Nuclear 

Safety Authority is the independent regulator. In France, 

APPENDIX c

Status of Nuclear Waste Management Programs 

in Other Countries

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all owners of a nuclear license are responsible individually 

for assessing costs of decommissioning their plants and for 

the long-term management of the waste and spent fuel—

which is not considered “waste” in France. They are also 

responsible for establishing the necessary financial provisions 

and for ear-marking the necessary assets for the exclusive 

coverage of those costs. They are individually responsible 

for managing those assets, which will be disbursed when 

the relevant decommissioning and long-term management 

activities start on an industrial basis. The necessary R&D 

for long-term waste management is financed through an 

additional tax on nuclear installations, which is transferred 

to a fund that goes to the National Waste Agency. France 

requires reprocessing in the fuel cycle; accordingly, only 

high-level waste and long-lived intermediate-level waste 

are authorized for disposal in a deep geologic repository. 

In 1999, construction began on an underground research 

facility in argillite rock at a location near the village of Bure 

in the Meuse area located at the boundary of the HauteMarne region; the area was subsequently approved for a 

long-term repository site in 2006. The National Agency 

has recently identified a 30 square kilometer area to locate 

the repository. The selection of this area was carried out in 

consultation with the mayors and authorities from both the 

Meuse and Haute Marne region. Consultations continue 

on where to locate surface facilities and the lay-out of the 

underground facility and its access. Local government in 

the Meuse and Haute-Marne area have been associated with 

the site-characterization program in various ways, and both 

can expect to benefit from a series of measures designed to 

support their development, funded through a dedicated tax 

on basic nuclear installations. France has established health 

and safety requirements for a deep repository site, identified 

a methodology for demonstrating compliance with postclosure standards, and decided on the design of engineered 

barrier systems at the site (the plan is to place vitrified waste 

in stainless steel packages). Current policy stipulates that the 

repository must be designed to be “reversible” for at least 100 

years, a concept that implies technical retrievability. Specific 

conditions for meeting this requirement will be prescribed 

by the French Parliament after a license application has been 

submitted. France currently expects its repository to become 

operational in 2025. All commercial high level waste is slated 

for disposal and is stored in a special facility within the spent 

fuel reprocessing complex at La Hague.

Japan: Japan has 53 nuclear power plants, which prior 

to the disaster at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power 

station together account for nearly 25% of the country’s 

total electricity production. In addition, three new nuclear 

power plants (totaling 3.7 GW) are under construction. 

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization, a private, 

non-profit entity formed by nuclear power plant owners, 

is responsible for waste management. The Nuclear and 

Industrial Safety Agency, a unit within Japan’s Ministry of 

Economy, Trade, and Industry, is the independent regulator. 

The Ministry maintains two funds to cover costs associated 

with radioactive waste management: nuclear power plant 

owners pay into a High-Level Waste Fund; owners of 

reprocessing plants and mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants 

pay into a TRU Waste Fund. Commercial spent nuclear fuel 

from Japan has been reprocessed in France and the United 

Kingdom; in addition, reprocessing takes place in Japan at 

a small facility in Tokai. A large new reprocessing facility at 

Rokkasho Village is expected to open in the next few years 

pending the results of pre-service testing. Two underground 

research laboratories to investigate deep geologic disposal (in 

granite and sedimentary rock) are under construction, but 

no decision has been reached in terms of selecting a site for 

a long-term repository. Requirements for such a repository 

(with regard to health and safety, retrievability, design of 

engineered barriers, etc.) have also not been established. 

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization has adopted 

a transparent, voluntary approach to identifying potential 

sites—thus, both the mayor of the host community and 

the governor of the prefecture must agree to participate. 

Localities that agree to be included in an initial survey 

can receive up to $18 million; if they subsequently agree 

to participate in surface-based site investigations they can 

receive up to $65 million. One town (Toyo-cho) initially 

agreed to participate but later withdrew. The national 

government has since indicated that it may play a more 

proactive role in the site selection process going forward. 

Japan had been constructing an independent, centralized 

interim-storage facility at Mutsu in Aomori Prefecture 

but those plans have been put on hold in the aftermath of 

the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami. Japan has not 

projected a date for opening a permanent repository.

Russia: Russia currently has 33 nuclear reactors in operation 

(including a 600 MWe fast breeder reactor) which together 

account for nearly 16% of the country’s total electricity 

production. Another 9 reactors are under construction 

(including a 800 MWe fast breeder reactor). Radioactive 

waste management and spent fuel waste management are 

divided into two different programs. Radioactive waste 

management is the responsibility of the newly created 

federal state enterprise “RosRAO” within the structure of 

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the federal corporation Rosatom (which runs the country’s 

nuclear power complex) and Rosatom itself. The new Federal 

Law on Radioactive Waste Management (came into force 

in 2011) establishes a legal framework for radioactive waste 

management in Russia and requires creation of a unified 

state system for radioactive waste management. Among other 

provisions, the law authorizes a single-purpose organization 

(so-called “national operator” – currently Rosatom) to 

conduct main activities related to waste management 

activities (e.g. receiving, storing, securing and disposing 

of radioactive waste); decision-making regarding siting, 

construction, commissioning etc. of waste-management 

facilities remains the responsibility of the Federal 

Government. The law also establishes a framework for a new 

funding mechanism (analogous to the Nuclear Waste Fund 

in the United States). Some federal budget resources have 

also been allocated for the program (the total for 2016 to 

2020 is $13 billion in U.S. dollars). Meanwhile, a system for 

managing spent nuclear fuel is being developed by Rosatom. 

It is not clear whether implementing this system will be 

the responsibility of Rosatom or one of its subsidiaries. The 

pending Federal Law on Spent Nuclear Fuel Management 

will provide the legal framework for the national program. 

As work continues on drafting this legislation, Rosatom 

has gone ahead with developing plans for the construction 

and commissioning of an underground rock laboratory 

by 2015 and a final repository by 2021. Several sites have 

been proposed as candidates for such a facility, including a 

granite site on the Kola Peninsula (in the Murmansk region), 

Krasnokamenks in Chita (4,300 miles east of Moscow), and 

the Nignekamensk Rock Mass in the Krasnoyarsk Territory 

of Siberia. Site selection efforts are currently underway on the 

Kola Peninsula. Russia plans to close its fuel cycle as much 

as possible and use plutonium in MOX fuel in fast breeder 

reactors. However, current reprocessing capacities are limited 

to about 100 metric tons per year. A new reprocessing plant 

in the city of Zheleznogorsk (in the Krasnoyarsk Territory) is 

being redesigned from a previous version and is expected to 

commence operations in the 2025–2030 timeframe.

Although most of Russia’s spent nuclear fuel is being 

stored at reactor sties, there is a centralized interim wet (pool) 

storage facility located in Zheleznogorsk. Its storage capacity 

of 7,200 metric tons was recently expanded to 8,600 metric 

tons, allowing it to safely store/accept spent VVER-1000 

(PWR-1000) fuel through 2025. In addition, a dry storage 

facility for spent RBMK (BWR) fuel with a total capacity of 

8,600 metric tons was commissioned in late 2011, also in 

Zheleznogorsk, with the first SNF is scheduled to arrive in 

early 2012.

Low-level radioactive wastes and some intermediate-level 

wastes are processed and stored at 16 sites in Russia (within 

the structure of the federal state enterprise RosRAO). 

Russia currently has a program to “take-back” spent fuel 

of Russian origin for reprocessing from commercial and 

research reactors abroad. However, due to limits on available 

reprocessing capabilities, the spent fuel that has been accepted 

under this program is being held in wet (pool) storage.

Spain: Spain has eight operating nuclear power plants, 

which together account for 18% of the country’s total 

electricity production. Management of nuclear waste is 

the responsibility of the Spanish National Company for 

Radioactive Waste, a government-owned corporation. 

The Nuclear Safety Council is the independent regulator, 

although the Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and Trade is 

required by law to make a final decision concerning the 

disposition of used nuclear fuel. Operators of nuclear power 

plants pay into a nuclear decommissioning fund that was 

established to cover the costs of both decommissioning 

plants and managing radioactive waste. Some used 

nuclear fuel from Spanish reactors has been reprocessed 

in the past at the La Hague and Sellafield facilities, but 

current national policy does not contemplate any further 

reprocessing. No decision has been made regarding a 

deep geologic repository for high-level waste and used 

nuclear fuel, but in 2006 Spain initiated a process to site 

a centralized temporary facility. That process required 

voluntary participation by potential host communities 

and resulted in recent selection of a site for a consolidated 

storage facility in the town of Villar de Cañas, located in 

the “autonomous community” (the level of government in 

Spain roughly equivalent to a state) of Castilla la Mancha. 

Sweden: Sweden currently has 10 operating nuclear 

power plants, which together account for 42% of the 

country’s total electricity production. The Swedish 

Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, a private 

corporation formed by nuclear power plant owners, is 

responsible for waste management. The Radiation Safety 

Authority within Sweden’s Ministry of the Environment 

is the independent regulator. Owners of nuclear power 

plants pay fees into a nuclear waste fund. The fees vary 

from year to year and from plant to plant, depending on 

the estimated costs of disposing of used nuclear fuel and 

the level of the fund. Small amounts of used nuclear fuel 

from Swedish reactors have been reprocessed in the past 

at facilities in France and England (none of the resulting 

high-level waste was returned to Sweden), but Sweden’s 

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current plans do not include reprocessing. In 2001, the 

government approved a proposal by the Swedish Nuclear 

Fuel and Waste Management Company to investigate three 

potential sites for a long-term geologic repository—at 

Östhammer, Oskarshamn (Oskarshamn was also the site 

of an underground research laboratory constructed in 

the early 1990s) and area in the northern part of Tierp. 

Later, municipal councils in Östhammer and Oskarshamn 

consented to further investigation, while Tierp opted-out. 

The site at Östhammer was selected for a repository in 

2009. The value of benefits for communities was estimated 

as $300 million. The local community at Östhammer, 

which could have vetoed its selection as a geologic 

repository site, will receive 25% of the benefits. In addition, 

the community at Oskarshamn, which was not selected, 

will receive about 75% of the benefits for participating in 

the siting process. A license application for the Östhammer 

repository was submitted to the Radiation Safety Authority 

for review in March 2011. Concurrently, Sweden’s 

Environmental Court will rule on the application. Based 

on the findings of the Safety Authority and the Court, the 

Swedish government will decide whether to approve the 

license application. Regular operation of the repository 

is expected to begin after several years of trial operation. 

Current plans call for transporting waste to the site using a 

specially designed ship and for placing used nuclear fuel in 

a copper canister that has a cast-iron insert for support and 

is surrounded by bentonite clay. Details concerning safety 

standards, post-closure compliance demonstration, and 

other requirements applicable to the Östhammer repository 

are available from the NWTRB report and other sources. 

Sweden currently expects to start repository operations in 

2023. Sweden also has an independent, centralized interimstorage facility for used nuclear fuel: the CLAB facility, also 

located in Oskarshamn, was commissioned in 1985. 

United Kingdom: The United Kingdom currently has 

19 nuclear reactors that together account for one-sixth 

of the country’s electricity generation. In October 2010, 

the UK government approved the construction of up to 

eight new nuclear power stations. All nuclear installations 

in the UK are subject to regulation by the Office for 

Nuclear Regulation and by environmental authorities. 

Responsibility for designing and developing a geological 

disposal facility for higher activity wastes rests with the 

Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). The NDA 

has a baseline disposal plan that envisions first emplacement 

of legacy intermediate level waste in 2040, emplacement of 

legacy high level waste and spent fuels in 2075, emplacement 

of spent fuel from new reactors in 2130, and commencement 

of facility closure in 2175.

The UK has accumulated a substantial legacy of radioactive 

waste from a variety of different nuclear programs, both civil 

and defense-related. For decades, the UK struggled to find 

a solution to the problem of long-term radioactive waste 

management. The nearest the UK came was a planning 

application for a “Rock Characterisation Facility” as the first 

step towards geological disposal in Cumbria in 1994. The 

application went to a public inquiry and was rejected in 1997, 

largely on the basis of the site selection process used and 

scientific and technical uncertainties at the time. 

Recognizing that the existing approach was unworkable, 

the government undertook a more fundamental review of 

options for managing radioactive wastes in the long term. 

In 2001, the UK government initiated the “Managing 

Radioactive Waste Safely” (MRWS) program, which 

provided for public consultation on the waste management 

issue with the goal of finding a practicable solution for the 

UK’s higher activity wastes. The process was designed to 

work in an open and transparent way that inspired public 

confidence, was based on sound science, and ensured the 

effective use of public monies. Having collected feedback 

from a public consultation process, an independent body, the 

Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) 

was set up to recommend specific program options. In 

July 2006, CoRWM announced an integrated package of 

recommendations for pursuing geological disposal, coupled 

with safe and secure interim storage and a program of 

ongoing research and development. Following publication 

of a white paper in 2008, the UK government launched 

a search for an engineered, underground site to serve as a 

permanent disposal facility for high-level radioactive wastes. 

The government invited communities across the country 

to learn more about what it would mean to potentially 

host this facility. To date, only a group of communities in 

West Cumbria, near the Sellafield nuclear site in northwest 

England, have sought to examine the possibility further. 

They formed a West Cumbria MRWS Partnership, including 

a range of local stakeholders, to examine the proposal and 

make recommendations to the local decision-making bodies 

on whether to proceed further. A comprehensive local 

consultation is currently underway to gauge public view 

prior to submission of the final recommendation whether to 

proceed or not.

The U.K. has taken a noteworthy approach to providing 

benefits to potential host communities. One element is an 

“Engagement Package” which Government agrees upon each 

year to support the running costs of the MWRS partnership, 

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including all the research, project management, consultants, 

travel expenses, staff time and public engagement work. In 

2011 the support costs were approximately 1.2 million pounds. 

This kind of Engagement Package is anticipated to continue 

throughout the whole siting process, and be extended to 

individual host communities as they enter the process actively, 

to cover their own costs. Note, however, that the definition 

of Engagement Package does not cover any ‘incentive’ type 

payments - only reimbursing actual costs incurred.

A “Community Benefits Package” will only be paid 

when a host community has passed the time at which it 

can withdraw from the process (i.e. when a final planning 

application is submitted for the actual facility to be built). 

The Community Benefits Package would, however, be agreed 

upon well before that point. 

A site has not yet been selected so there are no specific 

agreements to date regarding what amount of money or 

investment any community would receive for hosting the 

facility, only a promise in the Government’s policy that these 

kinds of benefits be available to the community that finally 

agrees to host a repository. Recognizing this, but wanting 

reassurance at the same time, the current partnership has 

developed a number of principles for community benefit 

that have been agreed to by the Government, so that the 

community’s understanding of the type and scale of benefits 

meets their expectation. These principles will form the basis 

for any future negotiation.

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1. Joe T. Carter et al., U.S. Radioactive Waste Inventory and Characteristics Related to Potential Future Nuclear Energy Systems, 

Rev. 2, May 2011 

2. Peter C. Chestnut et al., The Role of Indian Tribes in America’s Nuclear Future, April 29, 2011

3. Rodney C. Ewing, Standards & Regulations for the Geologic Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste, March 4, 2011

4. Cliff W. Hamal et al., Spent Nuclear Fuel Management: How Centralized Interim Storage Can Expand Options and Reduce 

Costs, May 16, 2011

5. Elizabeth Helvey, Overview of the Section 180(c) Program: History, Lessons Learned and Potential Next Steps, April 18, 2011.

6. Joseph S. Hezir, Budget and Financial Management Improvements to the Nuclear Waste Fund, May 2011

7. Judith A. Holm, Innovative Stakeholder Involvement Processes in Department of Energy Programs: A Selective Accounting, April 2011

8. Hank Jenkins-Smith, Public Beliefs, Concerns and Preferences Regarding the Management of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 

Radioactive Waste, February 2011

9. Andrew C. Klein, Nuclear Energy R&D Infrastructure Report for The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, 

March 16, 2011

10.Jim Lieberman et al., Overview of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Its Regulatory Process for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle for 

Light Water Reactors, February 25, 2011

11. Richard C. Moore, Enhancing the Role of State and Local Governments in America’s Nuclear Future: An Idea Whose Time Has 

Come, May 2011

12. Michael O’Hare et al., Nuclear Waste Facility Siting and Local Opposition, January 2011

13. Scott D. Sagan, The International Security Implications of U.S. Domestic Nuclear Power Decisions, April 18, 2011

14. Stoneturn Consultants, From Three Mile Island to the Future: Improving Worker Safety and Health In the U.S. Nuclear Power 

Industry, March 14, 2011

15. Eileen M. Supko and Michael H. Schwartz, Overview of High-Level Nuclear Waste Materials Transportation: Processes, 

Regulations, Experience and Outlook in the U.S., January 2011.

16. Seth P. Tuler and Roger E. Kasperson, Social Distrust: Implications and Recommendation for Spent Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste Management, January 29, 2011

17. Van Ness Feldman, P.C., Legal Memorandum, Co-Mingled and Defense-Only Repositories, updated Dec. 9, 2011

18. Van Ness Feldman, P.C., Federal Commitments Regarding Used Fuel and High-Level Wastes, August 13, 2010 (revised 

November 12, 2010) 

19. Gary Vine, Abridged History of Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technologies Development, March 15, 2011

20.Thomas Webler et al., Options for Developing Public and Stakeholder Engagement for the Storage and Management of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and High Level Waste (HLW) in the United States (Updated), June 6, 2011

21.Chris Whipple, Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, September 10, 2010

22. Paul P.H. Wilson, Comparing Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options: Observations and Challenges, June 25, 2011

23. R.G. Wymer and A.G. Croff, Current U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Energy RD&D Programs and Plans, January 2011

24. Van Ness Feldman, P.C., Legal Analysis of Commission Recommendations for Near-Term Actions, July 29, 2011 (revised

 October 11, 2011). 

25. Van Ness Feldman, P.C., Legal Background and Questions Concerning the Federal Government’s Contractual Obligations

 Under the “Standard Contracts” with “Utilities,” December 20, 2010

APPENDIX d

BRC Commissioned Papers

These papers are available at www.brc.gov

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1. The resulting crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant 

was by no means the most tragic aspect of the disaster that 

occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011: on the contrary, more 

than 23,000 people were lost and immense damage was caused 

by the immediate impacts of the earthquake and tsunami. 

2. “Spent fuel” is sometimes also referred to as “used 

fuel.” The difference in terminology in fact reflects a 

profound policy issue as to whether the material should be 

seen as a waste or a resource. We use the term “spent fuel” in 

this report, but, as discussed in chapter 11, we believe it is 

premature to resolve that policy debate.

3. The Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ “Principles of 

Conduct” are available at http://nuclearprinciples.org/theprinciples/.

4. The inter-temporal, inter-generational dimensions 

of this ethical obligation have long been recognized in the 

U.S. context and internationally. The 1996 IAEA “Joint 

Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel and Radioactive 

Waste Management,” for example, speaks of the need to 

avoid “compromising the ability of future generations to 

meet their needs and aspirations.” (See http://www.iaea.org/

Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointconv.html.) Put 

another way, plans for geologic disposal must not impose 

reasonably predictable impacts on future generations that are 

greater than those permitted for the current generation. 

5. The “Open Government Directive” was sent by Peter 

Orszag to the heads of executive departments and agencies 

on December 8, 2009. See: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/

default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf. 

6. Atoms of a given element, such as uranium, can exist 

in different forms or “isotopes,” depending on the number 

of neutrons present in the nucleus of the atom. Different 

elements are distinguished by their unique atomic number, 

which reflects the number of protons in the atomic nucleus. 

Uranium has an atomic number of 92, which means that 

all uranium atoms have 92 protons. A U-235 atom differs 

from a U-238 atom in that its nucleus holds three fewer 

neutrons—143 neutrons instead of 146—in combination 

with 92 protons. 

7. Some reactors – such as the CANDU reactors 

employed in Canada and elsewhere – can use natural 

uranium as fuel.

8. There have been around 3,300 truck and rail shipments 

of spent nuclear fuel in the United States since the mid-1960s 

(firm numbers before that are not available). There have been 

a very few barge shipments--most notably from Brookhaven 

National Laboratory and the Shoreham plant, both on Long 

Island--but they were multimodal shipments that used truck 

or rail for most of the distance. Information on shipments 

to date is taken from National Research Council, Going the 

Distance? The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste in the United States, Washington, DC: 

The National Academies Press, 2006. See Table 3.2 on p. 188. 

9. The amount of fission products is roughly proportional 

to the amount of electricity generated, no matter what fuel 

cycle is used. As a result, any nuclear energy system produces 

wastes that will require disposal.

10. The figure shows the composition of a standard PWR 

fuel assembly which achieved a burnup of 33 gigawatts per 

ton after ten years of cooling. Adapted from “Fuel Cycles 

for Sustainable Development and Waste Minimization,” 

presentation by M. Salvatories, CAE/DEN Cadarache, 

France at World Nuclear University Summer Institute 

2007(available at: http://www.world-nuclear-university.

org/html/summer_institute/2007/2007SI-lecture%20

Materials/0725/0725_Massimo%20SALVATORES_1/0725-

1-Massimo%20Salvatores.pdf).

11. People are routinely exposed to low levels of radiation 

in everyday life. These low-level exposures can come from 

natural sources (e.g., cosmic rays, certain minerals) and 

from man-made sources (e.g., building materials, medical 

procedures such as x-rays, certain cancer treatments, etc.). 

12. Riley E. Dunlap, Michael E. Kraft and Eugene A. 

Rosa, eds., Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste: Citizens’ Views of 

Repository Siting, Duke University Press, 1993.

13. Half-life is the time required for half of the initial 

atoms of a given amount of a radionuclide to decay.

14. Weight (e.g., metric tons) is not the best measure of 

the nuclear waste challenge. However, it is commonly used, 

including in federal law, so we adopt the same practice for 

purposes of this report. 

15. Sources for the information shown in the figure 

include the following: U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, “Radiation Health Effects,” available at http://www.

epa.gov/radiation/understand/health_effects.html and World 

Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Radiation and Health Effects,” 

available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf05.html. 

See also http://www.naturalnews.com/032136_radiation_

exposure_chart.html and http://www.informationisbeautiful.

net/visualizations/radiation-dosage-chart/.  

ENDNOTES

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16. U.S. Department of Energy, “Supplemental Analysis 

for the U.S. Disposition of Gap Material – Spent Nuclear 

Fuel,” (DOE/EIS-0218-SA-4), January 2009.

17. U.S. Department of Energy, “Draft Environmental 

Impact Statement (EIS) for the Disposal of Greater-ThanClass C (GTCC) Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) 

and GTCC-like Waste” (DOE/EIA-0375D), 2011. More 

information available at http://www.gtcceis.anl.gov/.

18. John McKenzie, Presentation to the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, March 25, 

2010, available at http://www.brc.gov/pdfFiles/NR_

Briefing_100325.pdf.

19. The Navy has also designed and built large shipping 

casks that each hold one loaded spent fuel canister and are 

designed for shipment by rail. The canisters were intended to 

be transferred at Yucca Mountain into disposal overpacks and 

then be directly disposed in the repository.

20. More details on the 1995 Agreement and the 2008 

modifications to it can be found in a white paper prepared for 

the BRC by Van Ness Feldman, P.C.: “Federal Commitments 

Regarding Used Fuel And High-Level Wastes,” August 31, 

2010 (Revised November 12, 2010). Available at www.brc.gov.

21. There is a similar agreement with the State of 

Colorado under which Navy SNF has to be moved out 

of that state by January 1, 2035. The penalty for noncompliance amounts to $15,000 for each day of delay 

beyond the deadline.

22. United States Government Accountability Office, 

DOE NUCLEAR WASTE: Better Information Needed on 

Waste Storage at DOE Sites as a Result of Yucca Mountain 

Shutdown, GAO-11-230, March 2011.

23. See presentation of Susan Burke, Idaho National 

Laboratory Oversight Coordinator for the State of Idaho, 

“Idaho’s Perspective on the Blue Ribbon Commission Report,” 

available at http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/

presentations/brc_comments_idahos_perspective.pdfIdaho

24. http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/comments/

attachments/brc_nrcomentletter.pdf

25. The Atomic Energy Commission was the nation’s first 

overarching nuclear regulatory authority. It was established 

by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

26. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was 

established by an Act of Congress in 1863 to provide 

independent advice to the U.S. government on matters related 

to science and technology. The National Research Council, 

which was created in 1916 to extend the scope of the NAS in 

its advisory role, conducts much of the research and technical 

analysis, and issues many of the reports released under NAS 

auspices. Today, the National Research Council is operated 

collaboratively by the NAS and by the National Academy of 

Engineering as the working arm of both organizations. (The 

NAS, the National Academy of Engineering, and the National 

Research Council—along with the Institutes of Medicine—

together comprise the “National Academies.”) For simplicity 

in this report, we use the acronym “NAS” to encompass work 

that may be undertaken by, or studies that have been issued by, 

the National Research Council.

27. In 1957, the NAS published The Disposal of 

Radioactive Waste on Land (Washington, DC: The National 

Academies Press). This report recommended geological 

disposal and specifically recommended disposal in cavities 

mined in salt beds or domes.

28. ERDA, along with the newly formed NRC, took the 

place of the AEC in 1975. Soon after, in 1977, the functions 

and responsibilities of ERDA were assumed by the newly 

formed DOE.

29. A statement by Representative Morris Udall of 

Arizona, on the floor of the House of Representatives in 

1987, summed up the general mood of dismay. Referring 

to the site selection process in the original NWPA, 

Representative Udall said, “We created a principled process 

for finding the safest, most sensible place to bury these 

dangerous wastes. Today, just 5 years later, this great program 

is in ruins. Potential host states no longer trust the technical 

integrity of the Department of Energy’s siting decisions.” 

30. By 1989, DOE was relying on the Negotiator to 

find an MRS site, with linkages to the repository removed. 

According to a DOE report to Congress in 1989 concerning 

the schedule for an MRS facility: “[T]he reference schedule 

for the MRS facility assumes that (1) a site will be obtained 

through the efforts of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator and 

(2) the statutory linkages specified in the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Amendments Act between the MRS facility and the 

repository (see Section 4) are modified” (U.S. Department 

of Energy, Reassessment of the Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management Program: Report to the Congress by the Secretary of 

Energy, November 29, 1989, DOE-RW-0247). 

31. Keith Schneider, “Grants Open Doors for Nuclear 

Wastes,” New York Times, January 9, 1992, available at http://

www.nytimes.com/1992/01/09/us/grants-open-doors-fornuclear-waste.html?scp=2&sq=Office+of+the+nuclear+waste

+negotiator&st=cse&pagewanted=print.

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32. Several organizations that commented on the BRC 

Disposal Subcommittee’s draft report have pointed out that the 

Yucca Mountain site was ranked first among candidate sites in 

the DOE assessments that led up to the 1987 Amendments. 

33. See MSNBC, “Store Nuclear Waste on Reservation? 

Tribe Split,” June 26, 2006, accessible at http://www.msnbc.

msn.com/id/13458867/.

34. Governor Gary R. Herbert, State of Utah, letter to 

the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, 

September 13, 2011. Available at www.brc.gov.

35. Richard B. Stewart, “Solving the US Nuclear 

Waste Dilemma,” Environmental Law and Policy Review

(forthcoming, 2011). See http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/

files/meetings/attachments/stewart_elpar_article.pdf.

36. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future 

of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, 

Cambridge, MA, 2011, p. 4.

37. See description in Luther J. Carter, Nuclear Imperatives 

and Public Trust: Dealing with Radioactive Waste, Washington, 

D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1987, pp. 84-89.

38. E. Michael Blake, “Where new reactors can (and 

can’t) be built,” Nuclear News, November 2006, pp. 23-25. 

Other states, such as Minnesota, have adopted moratoria on 

new nuclear reactors, but these moratoria are not necessarily 

tied to the waste issue.

39. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 42 FR 34391, 

July 5, 1977.

40. “Waste Confidence and Waste Challenges: Managing 

Radioactive Materials,” Remarks Prepared for NRC 

Chairman Dale E. Klein, Waste Management Symposium, 

Phoenix, Arizona, February 25, 2008.

41. At an August 22, 2007 briefing to the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission on new reactor issues ( (the briefing 

was attended by all four NRC commissioners), Marvin Fertel 

of NEI called for the NRC to reaffirm the waste confidence 

decision: 

 

“[W]e believe that it would be prudent and reasonable 

for NRC to consider reaffirming their waste confidence 

position that they currently have in rulemaking...The 

thing that we think would be harmful to decision-making 

at the companies and then to the licensing process 

themselves is to have this [uncertainty about when and 

whether Yucca Mountain would be licensed] become 

an issue in individual proceedings. We think it would 

delay proceedings. We think the potential for that could 

actually impact decision-making by corporate boards...

So our recommendation would be for the Commission 

to look at going forward to update the rulemaking and to 

have that behind us as soon as possible as this licensing 

process begins and particularly as the companies make 

decisions. [F]irm decisions [about moving ahead with 

new reactors] are still being discussed and evaluated 

at the Board level. So anything we can do from our 

standpoint to relieve what people perceive as risks, we 

think is important and that’s one that we do perceive as 

a risk.” In a September 7, 2007 follow-up memo (SRM 

M070822) on the meeting to the Executive Director for 

Operations and the General Counsel, the secretary of 

the Commission reported that the Commission agreed: 

“ The Commission agreed with the nuclear industry 

view that it was appropriate to update the NRC’s waste 

confidence findings in the near term. Accordingly, the 

staff should include waste confidence in its proposal 

to the Commission regarding potential rulemaking to 

resolve issues that are generic to COL applications, as 

required by the Staff Requirements Memorandum to 

COMDEK-07-0001/COMJSM-07-0001.” See http://

pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0724/ML072400432.pdf,

42. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission news release 

No. 10-162, September 15, 2010.

43. Testimony of Jack Spencer, The Heritage Foundation, 

before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, United States House of 

Representatives, June 3, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/

research/testimony/2011/06/the-american-energy-initiative. 

44. The NWTRB report presents all of its countryspecific information in tables, using alphabetical groupings of 

three countries at a time.

45. Most ratepayers are, of course, also taxpayers (and 

vice versa). For clarity, we refer to taxpayers and ratepayers as 

distinct groups here and in the main body of the report.

46. Spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive 

waste often also contains toxic or hazardous chemicals, but 

these are not primary drivers of the disposal concerns and issues 

that are the subject of the Blue Ribbon Commission’s work.

47. In the past, a number of concepts have been 

advanced periodically in hopes of eliminating the need 

for long-term nuclear waste disposal options (including 

permanent repositories). One program at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory, for example, focused on acceleratordriven systems for transmuting waste; it eventually evolved 

into a more comprehensive effort known as the Advanced 

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Fuel Cycle Initiative. Advanced fuel cycle technologies are 

discussed in chapter 11 of this report. 

48. An international review of options for disposal of 

high-level waste and spent fuel conducted by the National 

Academy of Sciences specifically examined technologies for 

separating out and transmuting long-lived radionuclides to 

produce wastes that have shorter half-lives and that therefore 

pose less of a challenge for long term disposal. The NAS 

study concluded that “this option should be considered a 

supplement to, but not a substitute for, continued surface 

storage or geological disposition.” It also concluded that 

“Geological disposition followed by closing the repository 

(geological disposal) is nevertheless the only permanent and 

final solution to the waste problem.” National Research 

Council, Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear 

Fuel: The Continuing Societal and Technical Challenges, 

Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2001, 

Chapter 7.

49. For example, see endnotes 52, 53 and 56

50. According to a report issued by the OECD’s Nuclear 

Energy Agency (NEA) in 2008 and titled Moving Forward 

with Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste:  

“The overwhelming scientific consensus world-wide is 

that geological disposal is technically feasible. This is 

supported by the extensive experimental data accumulated 

for different geological formations and engineered 

materials from surface investigations, underground 

research facilities and demonstration equipment and 

facilities; by the current state-of-the-art in modeling 

techniques; by the experience in operating underground 

repositories for other classes of waste; and by the advances 

in best practice for performing safety assessments of 

potential disposal systems.” See p. 7 of report available at: 

http://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/reports/2008/nea6433-

statement.pdf and http://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/

documents/FSC_moving_flyer_A4.pdf.

51. On July 19, 2011 the European Commission 

adopted the “radioactive waste and spent fuel management 

directive” that had been proposed by the Commission for 

the European Union on November 3, 2010. That directive 

supports disposal as the necessary long-term end point for 

radioactive waste: 

 

“Temporary storage is an important stage in the overall 

management of radioactive waste, in particular for spent 

fuel and HLW, allowing effective cooling and radiation 

levels to decrease thereby making handling safer. 

However, there is also a broad consensus that storage of 

spent fuel and radioactive waste, including long-term 

storage, is only an interim solution requiring active and 

permanent institutional controls. In the longer term, only 

disposal with its inherent passive safety characteristics can 

guarantee protection against all potential hazards.”

See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?u

ri=CELEX:52010PC0618:EN:HTML:NOT.

52. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future 

of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, 

Cambridge, MA, 2011, p. 59.

53. The description in this paragraph is adapted 

from U.S. Department of Energy, Final Environmental 

Impact Statement: Management of Commercially Generated 

Radioactive Waste, Volume 1, October 1980, DOE/EIS0046F Volume 1 of 3 UC-70.

54. International Atomic Energy Agency, Scientific and 

Technical Basis for Geological Disposal of Radioactive Wastes, 

Vienna, 2003.

55. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Survey of 

National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste 

and Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Report to Congress and the Secretary 

of Energy, Washington DC, October 2009, available at 

http://www.nwtrb.gov/reports/reports.html. 

56. A similar conclusion is reached in several submissions 

made to the BRC (e.g. Hansen, et. al, Geologic Disposal 

Options in the USA, SAND2010-7975C).

57. For a description of different borehole disposal 

concepts, see Fergus Gibb, “Deep borehole disposal 

(DBD) methods,” Nuclear Engineering International, 

March 25, 2010, at http://www.neimagazine.com/story.

asp?storyCode=2055862. See also: Patrick V. Brady, Bill 

W. Arnold, Geoff A. Freeze, Peter N. Swift, Stephen J. 

Bauer, Joseph L. Kanney, Robert P. Rechard, Joshua S. 

Stein, Deep Borehole Disposal of High-Level Radioactive 

Waste, SAND2009-4401, August 2009, at http://www.

mkg.se/uploads/Bil_2_Deep_Borehole_Disposal_HighLevel_Radioactive_Waste_-_Sandia_Report_2009-4401_

August_2009.pdf. In addition, the Commission received a 

number of public comments about deep boreholes.

58. Chris Whipple, “Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and 

High-level Radioactive Waste,” ENVIRON International 

Corporation, September 10, 2010, at http://www.brc.gov/

sites/default/files/documents/disposal_of_spent_nuclear_

fuel_and_high_level_radioactive_waste_rev4.pdf.

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59. EPA’s existing disposal standards (40 CFR Part 191) 

apply to any disposal method for SNF and HLW.

60. It is important to recognize that retrievability is not 

an absolute or binary characteristic—rather it is a relative 

one. The question is how easy (or difficult) would it be to 

retrieve materials from a geologic disposal facility and over 

what time frame. Wastes that were disposed of geologically 

could always, if absolutely necessary, be recovered 

somehow—although different methods of disposal could 

make it more or less expensive to do so. 

61. The OECD/NEA’s International Project on 

Reversibility and Retrievability defines retrievability as “the 

possibility to reverse the step of waste emplacement” and 

reversibility as a term that “implies a disposal programme 

that is implemented in stages and that keeps options open 

at each stage, and provides the capability to manage the 

repository with flexibility over time.” See: International 

Understanding of Reversibility of Decisions and Retrievability 

of Waste in Geological Disposal at http://www.oecd-nea.org/

rwm/rr/documents/RR_Leaflet.pdf.

62. Specifically, current regulations stipulate that the 

option of waste retrieval must be preserved throughout 

the period of waste emplacement and thereafter until the 

completion of a performance confirmation program and 

subsequent NRC review.

63. Bill W. Arnold, Peter N. Swift, et al, “Into the Deep,” 

Nuclear Engineering International, March 25, 2010. http://

www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2055856.

64. U.S. Department of Energy, “Analysis of the Total 

System Life Cycle Cost of the Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management Program, Fiscal Year 2007,” (DOE/RW0591),Washington DC, July 2008.

65. U.S. Department of Energy, “Fiscal Year 2007 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Fee Adequacy 

Assessment Report,” (DOE/RW-0593), Washington DC, 

July 2008.

66. Electric Power Research Institute, Industry Spent Fuel 

Storage Handbook, July 2010, available at http://my.epri.com/

portal/server.pt?Abstract_id=000000000001021048.

67. The figure is from a presentation to the Blue 

Ribbon Commission by Dr. John Kessler of EPRI. In 

his presentation, Dr. Kessler predicted that utilities “will 

continue with on-site storage on a plant-by-plant basis—

barring clear, compelling national guidance.” 

68. It is worth noting that the NRC’s 2010 Waste 

Confidence finding is being challenged in court by three 

states; it is also worth noting that the NRC took care to 

reaffirm as part of this finding its view that final disposal in a 

mined repository will still be necessary. 

69. See study conducted for the BRC by Cliff W. 

Hamal, Julie M. Carey and Christopher L. Ring and 

titled “Spent Nuclear Fuel Management: How centralized 

interim storage can expand options and reduce costs,” 

May 16, 2011, available at http://brc.gov/sites/default/

files/documents/centralized_interim_storage_of_snf.pdf. 

See also Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future 

of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, 

Cambridge, MA, 2011, p. 50.

70. Derived from U.S. Department of Energy, Report to 

Congress on the Demonstration of the Interim Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel from Decommissioned Nuclear Power Reactor 

Sites (DOE/RW-0596), December 2008. This table contains 

updated information from reactor site managers as of January 

2012.

71. Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force, “Comments on 

the: Transportation and Storage Subcommittee Draft Report 

to the Full Commission,” June 9, 2011.

72. “Because the NWPA required DOE to enter into 

contracts with the owners and generators of SNF, rather than 

merely create a statutory program, changes in the program, 

even if directed by a statutory change, can potentially cause 

further breaches of contract, which then can create additional 

monetary liability.” Statement of Michael F. Hertz, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General Civil Division, before the Blue 

Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, February 

2, 2011, pp. 10-11.

73. Van Ness Feldman P.C., “Legal Background 

and Questions Concerning the Federal Government’s 

Contractual Obligations Under the ‘Standard Contracts’ 

with ‘Utilities,’” Memorandum prepared for the BRC, 

revised Dec. 20, 2010, at pp. 22-23. 

74. In March, 2011, the Department of Justice offered 

all remaining SNF litigants a New Framework settlement 

agreement that would be applicable to the 78 nuclear 

power reactors covered by a Standard Contract that had 

not previously entered into a settlement agreement. Under 

this framework, which uses a higher acceptance rate for 

determining the government’s performance liability than 

has been used in previous settlements, there is no “crossover 

point” at which the government will have caught up with 

its acceptance obligations. Rather, the government’s liability 

for spent nuclear fuel storage costs will continue until 

the spent fuel is removed from reactor sites covered by a 

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New Framework settlement agreement. As of October 6, 

2011, eight utilities have accepted the New Framework 

settlement agreement. See memorandum provided 

by David K. Zabransky, Director, Office of Standard 

Contract Management Office of General Counsel, to 

Steve Isakowitz, Chief Financial Officer, DOE on October 

26, 2011 and available at http://www.brc.gov/index.

php?q=generalcomment/response-brc-request-information.

75. NWPA, Sections 144-149.

76. The regulations cover multiple types of dry cask 

technologies as well as dry vaults. While no ISFSIs using 

pools have been proposed, there is little doubt that pools – 

the storage technology for which there is most experience – 

would not raise any new technical issues. 

77. This would be consistent with common practice 

in Sweden and France, where fuel is removed from reactor 

pools within a year after discharge and moved to central pool 

storage pending later disposition. (In Sweden, the fuel is 

stored for disposal; in France it is stored for reprocessing.)

78. It is worth noting that nearly 60 percent of the fuel 

discharged from the six reactors at Fukushima prior to the 

earthquake and tsunami had already been transferred into a 

shared pool, leaving relatively small inventories of spent fuel 

(compared to U.S. practice) in the reactor pools. This shared 

pool appears to have survived the disaster relatively unscathed.

79. The MRS Review Commission concluded that 

“in view of the continuing delay in the building of a 

repository... it would be in the national interest to have 

available a safety net of storage capacity for emergency 

purposes, such as an accident at a nuclear power plant, 

which would make it advantageous to have the plant’s spent 

fuel pool available for decontamination of affected parts of 

reactors and for storage of debris.” The Review Commission 

recommended construction of a Federal Emergency Storage 

(FES) facility with a capacity limit of 2,000 metric tons. See 

U.S. Monitored Retrievable Storage Review Commission, Is 

there a need for federal interim storage? Report of the Monitored 

Retrievable Storage Commission, University of Michigan 

Library, 1989. Accessible at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/

files/documents/is_there_a_need_for_interim_storage_s.pdf 

80. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management, 1987 OCRWM Mission 

Plan Amendment (DOE/RW-0128), June 1987, p. 116.

81. It is worth noting that the opportunity to host 

an R&D facility of this type might itself be among the 

inducements for a community interested in being considered 

for a consolidated storage facility. A national center for 

ongoing research on all aspects of the storage of spent fuel 

could be a significant ancillary benefit for a community 

willing to host a storage facility.

82. “If standardization is not mandated by the Federal 

government, then an MRS facility that accepts waste early 

could promote standardization by reducing the variety of 

spent fuel forms and packages to be handled and limiting 

the number of reactors providing storage for other than 

intact, unpackaged spent fuel.” U.S. Monitored Retrievable 

Storage Review Commission, Is there a need for federal 

interim storage? Report of the Monitored Retrievable Storage 

Commission, University of Michigan Library, 1989, p. 97. 

More generally, actions that could be taken now or in the 

near term to specify standardized requirements for SNF 

package designs could be of substantial value to the waste 

management program, and to utilities and cask vendors, 

in the future. Standardization would help ensure that SNF 

and HLW would not need to be re-packaged before being 

shipped and emplaced at a storage or disposal facility. 

See for example, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 

Technical Advancements and Issues Associated with the 

Permanent Disposal of High-Activity Wastes: Lessons Learned 

from Yucca Mountain and Other Programs, Washington DC, 

June 2011, p. 44.

83. The MRS Review Commission evaluated 

occupational doses to workers in the no-MRS, linked MRS, 

and unlinked MRS systems and concluded that the unlinked 

MRS system would result in the lowest doses because of 

“greater reliance on remote operations and remote handling 

facilities” at the MRS. U.S. Monitored Retrievable Storage 

Review Commission, Is there a need for federal interim storage? 

Report of the Monitored Retrievable Storage Commission, 

University of Michigan Library, 1989, p. 13.

84. The MRS Review Commission explicitly evaluated 

the argument that a system using dual-purpose storage/

transportation casks for storage at reactors would provide 

as much flexibility as a system including a centralized 

MRS facility and concluded that it would not because they 

could not be certain “that a dual-purpose cask could be 

developed that could be used for prolonged storage and then 

transported without having to be returned to a spent fuel 

pool or opened.” Ibid., p. 95.

85. The recent MIT fuel cycle study (titled The Future of 

the Nuclear Fuel Cycle; full cite given in previous endnotes 

and available at http://web.mit.edu/mitei/docs/spotlights/

nuclear-fuel-cycle.pdf) refers to storage on the order of a 

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century. The NRC is evaluating the implications of storage 

for a period of up to 300 years. As noted in the main text, 

the fact that storage periods of this length are being evaluated 

should not be taken as an indication that storage over multicentury timeframes would be desirable or even defensible 

from either a cost or risk management standpoint.

86. A.C. Kadak and K. Yost, Key Issues Associated with 

Interim Storage of Used Nuclear Fuel, MIT, 2010, pp. 27-28.

87. Staged development of a centralized storage facility 

is discussed in a paper developed for the BRC by Cliff W. 

Hamal, Julie M. Carey and Christopher L. Ring and titled 

“Spent Nuclear Fuel Management: How centralized interim 

storage can expand options and reduce costs,” May 16, 2011, 

pp. 48-50. Available at http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/centralized_interim_storage_of_snf.pdf. 

88. American Physical Society, Consolidated Interim 

Storage of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Technical and 

Programmatic Assessment, American Physical Society Panel on 

Public Affairs, February 2007

89. It is possible that the contractual obligation for waste 

acceptance would remain with DOE for some time and 

perhaps indefinitely—even after a new waste management 

organization is established.

90. Eileen M. Supko and Michael H. Schwartz, Overview 

of High-Level Nuclear Waste Materials Transportation: 

Processes, Regulations, Experience and Outlook in the U.S., 

Energy Resources International, Inc., ERI-2030-1101, 

January 2011, p. 74.

91. While the Standard Contract allows DOE to 

give priority to fuel at shutdown sites, the Department 

has declined to consider this option in the past because 

of concerns about equity impacts on contract holders. 

U.S. Department of Energy, Report to Congress on the 

Demonstration of the Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

from Decommissioned Nuclear Power Reactor Sites (DOE/RW0596), Dec. 2008, p. 3.

92. This chart uses GAO’s estimate of $4.5 million/year 

M&O costs for stranded fuel at a shutdown site. While the 

figure indicates a repository, the estimates would apply to any 

facility capable of accepting spent fuel in 2030.

93. Some of the data used in preparing this chart 

were derived from the following report: Government 

Accountability Office, Nuclear Waste Management; Key 

Attributes, Challenges, and Costs for the Yucca Mountain 

Repository and Two Potential Alternatives, GAO-10-48, 

November 2010.

94. This cost analysis is based on capacity for either 

interim storage or disposal being available for spent fuel.

95. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission SECY-11-0137, 

“Prioritization of Recommended Actions To Be Taken in 

Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” Oct. 3, 2011 

(available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/

commission/secys/2011/2011-0137scy.pdf). 

96. In the course of the BRC’s deliberations, Commission 

members with appropriate clearances were briefed by officials 

from DOE, NRC, and other agencies regarding issues of fuel 

storage and transportation safety and security. These briefings 

also covered related research efforts and the additional 

security measures that have been implemented at some 

sites. We are confident that the NRC’s current analytical 

and regulatory processes are adequate to make needed 

assessments, and to adapt as appropriate.

97. Over time, spent fuel “cools” thermally and 

radioactively and requires less shielding to be handled directly. 

In this way it loses some of the characteristics that would make 

it difficult to remove and transport for unauthorized purposes. 

Depending on burnup, spent fuel may no longer be selfprotecting after a century or so of storage. 

98. Material for this section was developed from 

presentations to the BRC Transportation and Storage 

Subcommittee by Mr. Philip Brochman, NRC Office of 

Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Sept.23, 2010 

(available at http://www.brc.gov/index.php?q=meeting/openmeeting-4.). 

99. Electronic mail from Dr. Brittain Hill, NRC, to Alex 

Thrower, BRC staff, Feb. 23, 2011 (available at http://www.

brc.gov/sites/default/files/comments/attachments/post_9-

11steps_b_hill.pdf).

100. Additional background about NRC’s security 

programs is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/security-enhancements.pdf). 

101. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff 

Requirements Memorandum dated Aug. 26, 2010 (SECY10-0014 Enclosure 1, found at http://wba.nrc.gov:8080/ves/

view_contents.jsp). 

102. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission paper 

dated Aug. 26, 2010 (SECY-10-0114, Enclosure 1), found 

at  https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/WorkplaceXT/getContent

?id=release&vsId=%7B1214CFFE-E9C0-4742-B109-

74DCD84A1B84%7D&objectStoreName=Main.__.

Library&objectType=document. 

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103. Robert Alvarez et al., “Reducing the Hazards from 

Stored Spent Fuel Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States,” 

Science and Global Security 11: 1-51, 2003. 

104. Allan S. Benjamin et al., Spent Fuel Heatup 

Following Loss of Water During Storage, Sandia National 

Laboratory (NUREG/CR-0649, SAND77-1371), 1979. 

105. Robert Alvarez et al., “Reducing the Hazards from 

Stored Spent Fuel Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States,” 

Science and Global Security 11: 1-51, 2003, p. 21.

106. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Reducing 

the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the 

United States,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 11, pp. 

203–211.

107. National Research Council, Committee on the 

Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel in 

Storage, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear 

Fuel Storage, Washington DC: The National Academies 

Press, 2006, p. 5 (accessible at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.

php?record_id=11263).

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid at p. 3

110. The term “hardened on-site storage” is not 

currently defined in regulations, and is not commonly used 

by the industry.

111. Michelle Boyd, “Principles for Safeguarding Nuclear 

Waste at Reactors,” submission to the BRC, May 11, 2010 

(the principles may be found at http://www.citizen.org/

documents/PrinciplesSafeguarding2009.pdf).

112. Charles W. Pennington, “Storage and Transportation 

of Spent Fuel: Does Storage/Transport System Hardening 

Enhance Safety and Security,” submission to the BRC 

Transportation and Storage Subcommittee, Sept. 2010 

(accessible at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/

presentations/c_pennington_presentation_final.pdf). Mr. 

Pennington subsequently submitted a detailed critique of 

the HOSS proposal as presented by Mr. David Kraft at the 

subcommittee meeting in Chicago, IL on Nov. 2, 2010. Mr. 

Kraft’s submittal can be found at http://www.brc.gov/sites/

default/files/meetings/presentations/panel_present_to_brc_11-

2-10.pdf. Mr. Pennington’s critique was submitted to the 

BRC on January 20, 2011 and is available at http://brc.gov/

sites/default/files/comments/attachments/recapitulating_and_

expanding_upon_safety_of_dry_storage_-_final.pdf. 

113. Nuclear Energy Institute [NEI 06-12, Revision 2), 

“B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal Guideline.” This document 

was initially designated for Official Use Only – Security 

Related Information, and so is unavailable to the public. 

However, it was made publicly available on May 9, 2011 

and can be found on NRC’s ADAMS system at http://www.

nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html with accession number 

ML070090060. 

114. See remarks in the comments of Bill Borchardt, 

Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, and Anthony Pietrangelo, Senior Vice 

President and Chief Nuclear Officer of the Nuclear Energy 

Institute, in the transcript of the March 29, 2011 meeting 

of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

on the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi reactor complex, 

accessible at http://dpwsa.powergenworldwide.com/index/

display/wire-news-display/1389933775.html. 

115. Michelle Boyd, “Principles for Safeguarding Nuclear 

Waste at Reactors,” submission to the BRC, May 11, 2010 

(the principles may be found at http://www.citizen.org/

documents/PrinciplesSafeguarding2009.pdf).

116. Another country that has grappled with the siting 

issue is Germany, which in the late 1990s commissioned 

an expert committee (not unlike the BRC) to look at 

the problem of nuclear waste. The German committee 

developed a relatively straightforward plan in which the 

siting organization was to do an initial screening of the 

entire country for geologically suitable sites, based on a short 

set of criteria. From the subset of potentially suitable sites, 

weighted criteria were to be used to reduce the number of 

potential locations to five. At that point, the five affected 

municipalities were to be asked whether they wished to go 

forward with a more detailed evaluation. The hope was that 

at least two sites would survive this next cut, and assuming 

approval could be obtained from the local communities, 

the plan was to build two underground facilities for further 

technical analysis in preparation for a final decision. 

However, because of a change of government, the German 

plan was never implemented.

117. According to a March 2010 document issued by the 

NEA’s Forum on Stakeholder Confidence: “History shows 

that the search for sites for radioactive waste management 

facilities has been marred by conflicts and delays. Affected 

communities have often objected that their concerns and 

interests were not addressed. In response, institutions have 

progressively turned away from the traditional “decide, 

announce and defend” model, and are learning to “engage, 

interact and co-operate.” This shift has fostered the 

emergence of partnerships between the proponent of the 

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facility and the potential host community, as shown in a 

recent NEA study. Working in partnership with potential 

host communities enables pertinent issues and concerns 

to be raised and addressed, and creates an opportunity for 

developing a relationship of mutual understanding and 

mutual learning, as well as for developing solutions that will 

add value to the host community and region. Key elements 

of the partnership approach are being incorporated into 

waste management strategies, leading increasingly to positive 

outcomes.” See: http://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/fsc/docs/

FSC_partnership_flyer_US_letter.pdf.

118. Under Finland’s Nuclear Energy Act of 1987, 

the consent of the host municipality is required for any 

major nuclear installation (including reactors as well 

as repositories). Thus, local acceptance was a necessary 

prerequisite for any decision in principle to approve the 

Olkiluoto repository. Interestingly, when a proposal for the 

Olkiluoto repository first came up for a vote by the local 

town council, it was vetoed. See http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/

kaannokset/1987/en19870990.pdf. 

119. Like the U.S. program, the Finnish program 

included a siting schedule. However, that schedule allowed 

considerably more time than in the U.S. case. The schedule 

set by Finnish government in 1983 called for repository 

construction to begin in 2010, and targeted 2020 as the 

date when spent fuel would begin to be accepted for final 

disposal. See http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/

p000915.pdf.

120. The Swedish Act on the Management of Natural 

Resources gives municipalities a veto over siting permits. 

While the government has the right, under certain 

circumstances, to disregard such vetoes, neither SKB nor 

the Swedish Parliament favored siting a repository without 

the consent of the selected municipality. The government’s 

choice not to exercise its override authority, in other words, 

represents a discretionary policy decision. See SKB RD&D 

Programme 1998, p. 30 (accessible at http://www.skb.se/

upload/publications/pdf/RD&D98webb.pdf) and Rolf 

Lidskog & AnnCatrin Andersson, “The management of 

radioactive waste: A description of ten countries” (accessible 

at http://www.edram.info/en/edram-home/joint-activities/

status-report-skb-report/index.php), p. 71.

121. Claes Thegerström (CEO of the SKB), “Comment 

on Disposal Subcommittee Draft,” submission to the full 

Commission on June 29, 2011 (available at: http://www.brc.

gov/sites/default/files/comments/attachments/brb-text_5_

sweden.pdf). 

122. See “Next phase for French geological disposal,” 

January 5, 2012, at http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/WRNext_phase_for_French_geological_disposal-0501127.html.

123. In a presentation before the Commission, Liz 

Dowdeswell, former President of the NWMO, summarized 

the organization’s perspective this way: “We believed that 

fundamentally the selection of an approach for long-term 

management was really about developing a contract between 

science and society, a contract that would allow all of us 

to continue to benefit from technology, but also would 

mitigate risk and, most importantly, would respect the 

values of our citizens.”

124. This siting process was described to the Blue Ribbon 

Commission at its September 20, 2010 meeting. See http://

www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/presentations/

alvaro_rodriguez_usa_21-09-10.pdf and

http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/attachments/

alvaro_atc_articulo_para_la_ens.pdf

125. National Research Council, Disposition of HighLevel Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal 

and Technical Challenges, Summary, Washington DC: The 

National Academies Press, 2001. An even earlier National 

Academies study, issued in 1990 and titled Rethinking 

High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal, likewise called for 

an adaptive approach. According to the abstract: “This 

alternative approach emphasized flexibility; time to assess 

performance and a willingness to respond to problems as 

they are found, remediation if things do not turn out as 

planned, and revision of the design and regulations if they 

are found to impede progress toward the health goal already 

defined as save disposal. To succeed, however, this alternative 

approach will require significant changes in laws and 

regulations, as well as in program management.”

126. In follow-on study sponsored by DOE, the 

National Academies elaborated on this central conclusion by 

describing two approaches to staging: (1) “Linear staging, 

involving a single, predetermined path to a well-defined 

end point, with stages viewed as milestones at which cost 

and schedules are reviewed and modified as needed” (this 

is the approach that in the Academies’ view characterized 

the current U.S. program); and (2) “adaptive staging, which 

emphasizes deliberate continued learning and improvement 

and in which the ultimate path to success and the end 

points themselves are determined by knowledge and 

experience gathered along the way.” The report, which was 

issued in 2003, concluded by recommending that adaptive 

staging should be the approach used in geologic repository 

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development. See: National Research Council, One Step at 

a Time: The Staged Development of Geologic Repositories for 

High-Level Radioactive Waste, Washington DC: The National 

Academies Press, 2003.

127. The One Step at a Time report argues strongly 

for the use of a periodically-revised safety case as a central 

feature of adaptive staging: “Two primary roles of the safety 

case are: (1) to guide the work of the implementer while 

adapting the program at each stage, and (2) to provide the 

implementer with a vehicle for making the safety arguments 

understandable by a wide audience.” 

128. The concept of a broad “safety case” that integrates 

all available lines of evidence supporting the safety of a 

repository, including institutional as well as technical factors, 

has become increasingly prominent internationally over the 

last decade. See International Atomic Energy Agency And 

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Geological Disposal 

Of Radioactive Waste: Safety Requirements, No. Ws-R4, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2006, 

sections 3.40-3.53 (available at www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/

publications/PDF/Pub1231_web.pdf).

129. The Commission recognizes that many arguments 

for the safety of the repository are distributed throughout 

the regulatory process in the regulations and the justification 

documents supporting them, in requirements for reporting, 

and elsewhere. See EPRI comments on the BRC Disposal 

Subcommittee’s Draft Report to the Full Commission, 

July 1, 2011 available at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/

files/comments/attachments/epri_comments_on_the_brc_

disposal_subcommittee_draft_report_-_final_0.pdf.

130. “Complex performance assessments may be 

necessary for licensing, but the public and policy-makers 

may not find them easy to understand. The probabilistic 

performance assessment methods and results developed 

for Yucca Mountain are a state-of-the-art achievement 

and very valuable. They verge on being incomprehensible 

because of their complexity, however, except perhaps to 

organizations able to afford a large cadre of experts. Future 

repository programs still may have to produce complex 

performance assessments for compliance purposes, but they 

also must produce more-realistic, less-complex performance 

assessments for non-regulators. As experience with the Yucca 

Mountain program clearly shows, not only the regulators 

decide the fate of a repository program. The audience for the 

safety case is much broader.” See Nuclear Waste Technical 

Review Board, Technical Advancements And Issues Associated 

With The Permanent Disposal Of High-Activity Wastes: 

Lessons Learned from Yucca Mountain and Other Programs, 

Washington DC, June 2011.

131. “If adopted, Adaptive Staging would lead DOE to 

...Focus more strongly on achieving the degree of technical 

and societal consensus needed to begin waste emplacement, 

rather than on the emplacement of all waste.” 

National Research Council, One Step at a Time: The Staged 

Development of Geologic Repositories for High-Level Radioactive 

Waste, Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 

2003, pp. 7-8.

132. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

133. Unless the provisions of an agreement would require 

additional legislative authorizations not already provided in 

the law establishing the waste management organization.

134. This is very well demonstrated in Sweden’s 

repository program which began by establishing an 

underground rock laboratory. 

135. A similar approach has just been adopted in a recent 

directive of the European Commission requiring members 

of the European Community to develop programs and 

schedules for developing disposal facilities: “Member States 

will have to draw up national programmes and notify them 

to the Commission by 2015 at the latest. The Commission 

will examine them and can require changes. National 

programmes have to include plans with a concrete timetable 

for the construction of disposal facilities, as well as a 

description of the activities needed for the implementation of 

disposal solutions, costs assessments and a description of the 

financing schemes. They will have to be updated regularly.” 

Source: “Nuclear waste: Commission welcomes adoption of 

radioactive waste directive,” Brussels, 19 July 2011, accessible 

at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/waste_management/

waste_management_en.htm. 

136. This contention is supported by a 2008 report 

of the National Academy of Sciences, which concluded: 

“When done well, public participation improves the 

quality and legitimacy of a decision and builds the capacity 

of all involved to engage in the policy process. It can 

lead to better results in terms of environmental quality 

and other social objectives. It also can enhance trust and 

understanding among parties. Achieving these results 

depends on using practices that address difficulties that 

specific aspects of the context can present.” See National 

Research Council, Public Participation in Environmental 

Assessment and Decision Making, Washington, DC: The 

National Academies Press, 2008.

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137. For this reason, the BRC provided funding for 

key NGO and community stakeholders to travel to its 

deliberative meetings. 

138. For example, the waste management organization 

could provide funding for independent monitoring and 

testing on a candidate repository site, provided that these 

activities do not interfere with other site development 

activities or compromise the site’s integrity. In fact, Section 

116 of the NWPA provides for grants to states and affected 

units of local governments for a number of purposes, 

including “any monitoring, testing, or evaluation activities 

with respect to site characterization programs with regard to 

such site,” while Section 117 adds the proviso “except that 

such monitoring and testing shall not unreasonably interfere 

with or delay onsite activities.” Funding for monitoring, 

testing, or evaluation activities is also provided for affected 

tribes. Under these provisions, over $4 million was provided 

to Inyo County, CA for the Inyo Regional Ground Water 

Monitoring Program, and over $31 million was provided to 

Nye County, NV for a Science & Verification Program that 

included the Nye County Early Warning Drilling Program, 

which provided data used in the Yucca Mountain project 

(Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Office of 

Business Management, “Summary of Program Financial & 

Budget Information as of January 31, 2010”).

139. For example, a report from 1980 on the subject 

pointed out that states have a “constitutional responsibility 

to ensure the health and safety of their citizens,” as well 

as “jurisdiction over local authorities and land use,” and 

that states therefore believed “it is both undesirable and 

impartial for disposal procedures to be wholly federally 

determined.” See Pat Choate and John Bowman, Radioactive 

Waste Management: State Concerns, A Report to the Office of 

Technology Assessment from the Academy for Contemporary 

Problems, 1980, p. 3. 

140. Ibid p. 11.

141. An absolute state veto had been opposed by the 

State Planning Council established by President Carter to 

provide advice on intergovernmental relations, as well as by 

others. See U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 

Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive 

Waste, (OTA-O-171), March, 1985, p. 180. 

142. The state of Nevada’s strong opposition to the 

proposed Yucca Mountain repository is well known, but 

other examples abound. In Utah, efforts to site a private 

centralized storage facility were blocked when the Utah 

delegation successfully pushed for congressional designation 

of a wilderness area that prevented access to the proposed 

site. Utah took this action despite its tradition of hostility 

toward past federal efforts to designate wilderness lands and 

national monuments within the state.

143. The Commission recognizes that more than one 

community, state, or tribe might be affected by a proposed 

repository. The waste management organization should 

therefore be directed to consult with any state, affected 

unit of local government, or Indian tribe that it determines 

may be so affected and to include any reasonable and 

appropriate provisions relating to their interests in negotiated 

agreements, as the Nuclear Waste Negotiator was directed 

and empowered to do under Section 403(b) of the NWPA.

144. In one notable instance—the NRC Agreement 

States program—regulatory authorities of the federal 

government under the Atomic Energy Act have been 

delegated to states. Although the current Agreement States 

program does not cover licensing of a repository, it does 

suggest a similar enforcement model might give a host state 

or tribe sufficient regulatory oversight to assure a meaningful 

public safety role. Alternative approaches through 

memoranda of understanding or other binding agreements 

may also be acceptable and should be explored as part of the 

negotiating process.

145. For instance, the Western Governors’ Association 

(WGA) adopted a definition of consent-based siting for 

spent fuel storage facilities as part of its Resolution 11-3. The 

resolution requires the written consent of the governor of 

the hosting state. Members of the WGA’s WIEB High-Level 

Waste Committee also believe that written consent should 

be required for all future disposal and storage decisions. For 

details see WGA’s comments, dated September 13, 2011, on 

the BRC draft report.

146. Mixed waste is waste that contains, in addition to 

radioactive materials, materials that are defined as hazardous 

under RCRA (e.g., a chemical such as toluene). 

147. Current federal law—including aspects of the 

Atomic Energy Act, the Commerce Clause, and the doctrine 

of intergovernmental immunity on federal reservations—has 

the effect of preempting almost all forms of state regulation 

over a high-level waste facility.

148. Elements that were essential to the success of the 

Environmental Evaluation Group have been summarized by 

the two scientists who served as director of the organization. 

See R.H. Neill and M.K. Silva, “EEG’s Independent Technical 

Oversight on WIPP, a TRU Waste Geologic Repository” in the 

conference proceedings of the 9th International High Level 

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Radioactive Waste Management Conference, Session T-1, Las 

Vegas, NV, April 29–May 3, 2001.

149. The article quotes Sullivan as stating that “the same 

problems that existed 20 years ago still exist today. Among 

them is the lack of trust that western states have of the federal 

government to either follow through on a long-term policy or 

to actually work in a state’s own interest.” See: http://wyofile.

com/2011/02/sullivan-i-was-right-to-veto-nuclear-waste/. 

150. Peter C. Chestnut et al., The Role Of Indian Tribes 

In America’s Nuclear Future, BRC Commissioned paper April 

29, 2011, available at: http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/the_role_of_indian_tribes_in_americas_nuclear_

future-2011-04-29_final.pdf

151. See, for example, Executive Order 13175 

“Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal 

Governments” available at: http://www.epa.gov/fedreg/eo/

eo13175.htm.

152. Peter C. Chestnut et al., The Role of Indian Tribes 

in America’s Nuclear Future, BRC commissioned paper April 

29, 2011, accessible at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/the_role_of_indian_tribes_in_americas_nuclear_

future-2011-04-29_final.pdf. According to this paper, “It is 

critical to remember that any entity created by the federal 

government...must have a formal working relationship 

directly with all potentially affected Indian Tribes. An 

example of a formal working relationship with Indian tribes 

is the Memorandum of Agreement between the Tennessee 

Valley Authority (TVA) and the Tennessee State Historic 

Preservation Officer of Knox County, TN. This Agreement 

calls for consultation with federally recognized Indian tribes 

that are participants or invited signatories to the Agreement.”

153. In France, direct financial benefits for the region 

surrounding the proposed repository are spelled out in 

law.  In addition, a range of other programs to promote 

development are being provided.  While the particular 

government—utility mechanism that is used for this purpose 

may be unique to the French situation, the concept of 

promoting regional development through activities that go 

beyond financial benefits and waste-management-related 

employment is worthy of careful examination.

154. For example, the authorization of federal funds 

to build a new road so that shipments of transuranic waste 

could bypass Santa Fe (known as the Santa Fe bypass) was 

important in the WIPP context.

155. In the past, DOE often did not make the most of 

these opportunities. For example, WIPP was managed for 

years by DOE personnel located in Albuquerque rather than 

at an office in Carlsbad near the facility. It was only late in 

the process that DOE relocated its top WIPP management 

to Carlsbad. Likewise, the TRANSCOM tracking system 

used in the transportation program was originally based 

out of Oak Ridge, Tennessee. It was later relocated to 

Albuquerque and finally moved to Carlsbad in 2005.

156. Benefits provided by the current NWPA include 

cash payments of up to $20 million per year (Section 171) 

and special consideration for selection for DOE research 

projects (Section 174).

157. Provisions for evaluating and providing 

compensation are contained in Sections 116 and 118 of the 

NWPA.

158. Throughout this report we use the term 

“management” to refer to these three activities (i.e., 

transportation, storage, and disposal). 

159. Outside of the United States and Germany, the 

implementing organizations are all dedicated public or 

private entities rather than a ministry or department of the 

national government.

160. In 2010, Senator Voinovich introduced the ‘‘United 

States Nuclear Fuel Management Corporation Establishment 

Act of 2010’’ (S. 3322), co-sponsored by Senators Alexander 

and Murkowski, and Representative Upton introduced a 

companion bill (H.R. 5979) in the House. There was no 

legislative activity on these bills in the 111th Congress.

161. Report of the Advisory Panel on Alternative Means 

of Financing and Managing Radioactive Waste Management 

Facilities (AMFM Panel): A Report to the Secretary of Energy, 

December 1984 (transmitted to Congress in April 1985), 

in the BRC library at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/amfm_1984_s.pdf. 

162. Belgium, France, Japan, Spain, and United 

Kingdom have established public companies to implement 

high level waste management programs. In Canada, 

Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, waste producers have 

set up implementing bodies to undertake these tasks. 

Only the United States and Germany have assigned 

the job to a government department. See International 

Association for Environmentally Safe Disposal of 

Radioactive Materials (EDRAM), Report on Radioactive 

Waste Ownership and Management of Long-Term 

Liabilities in EDRAM Member Countries, June 2005, 

available at http://www.edram.info/fileadmin/edram/pdf/

EDRAMWGonWOwnershipFinal_271005.pdf. 

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163. The TVA board provides an example of how 

the need for expertise and stakeholder representation 

might be balanced. It has nine members appointed by the 

President and confirmed by the Senate. Key qualifications 

specified in law include “management expertise relative to 

a large for-profit or nonprofit corporate, government, or 

academic structure” and “support for the objectives and 

missions, of the Corporation, including being a national 

leader in technological innovation, low-cost power, and 

environmental stewardship.” That is, Board members 

must be both capable of and invested in ensuring that 

the Corporation achieves its mission. In appointing 

members of the Board, the President must consider 

recommendations from governors of states in the service 

area; individual citizens; business, industrial, labor, electric 

power distribution, environmental, civic, and service 

organizations; and the congressional delegations of the 

states in the service area. Furthermore, the President must 

“seek qualified members from among persons who reflect 

the diversity, including the geographical diversity, and 

needs of the service area of the Corporation.”

164. Section 302(d) of the NWPA limits use of the 

Waste Fund to “non-generic research, development, and 

demonstration activities under this Act.” An example of such 

non-generic research is the OCRWM Science and Technology 

program initiated by OCRWM in 2002 to improve existing 

technologies and develop new technologies so as to achieve 

efficiencies and life-cycle cost savings in the waste management 

system (transportation, waste handling, and disposal) and 

to increase confidence in repository performance. Robert J. 

Budnitz, “Status of OCRWM’s New Science and Technology 

Program,” presentation to the National Research Council’s 

Board on Radioactive Waste Management, December 12, 2002.

165. This could include addressing the need for complex 

adjustments to the nuclear waste fee schedule if spent nuclear 

fuel becomes a feedstock.

166. In our proposal, responsibility for the treatment and 

storage of defense waste would remain with DOE.

167. Based on an evaluation conducted by DOE pursuant 

to the NWPA and titled An Evaluation of Commercial 

Repository Capacity for the Disposal of Defense High-Level 

Waste, (DOE/DP/0020/1), Washington DC, 1985.

168. This general approach, in which government 

and not the implementing organization defines the policy 

framework that will guide future waste management 

activities is common to most countries with a significant 

waste management program. A review of 11 countries 

that are members of the International Association for 

Environmentally Safe Disposal of Radioactive Materials 

(EDRAM) shows that in all cases general waste management 

policy is set by government, rather than the implementing 

organization. International Association for Environmentally 

Safe Disposal of Radioactive Materials, Report on Radioactive 

Waste Ownership and Management of Long-Term Liabilities in 

EDRAM Member Countries, June 2005.

169. For example, “the economic and social well-being of 

the people living in [the Tennessee] river basin” is one of the 

general purposes identified in the legislation that established 

TVA [48 Stat. 69, 16 U.S.C. sec. 831v]; consequently, TVA 

sees economic development of the region as a key part of 

its mission and has an economic development program for 

that purpose (http://www.tva.com/econdev/index.htm). 

Similarly, ENRESA, which is Spain’s national corporation for 

radioactive waste management, has established the ENRESA 

Foundation to promote social welfare and socio-economic 

development, the environment, education, and culture in 

areas that host ENRESA facilities.

170. The NWPA already requires annual audits of the 

activities of OCRWM by GAO, a comprehensive annual 

report by OCRWM on its activities and expenditures, and an 

annual report to Congress from the Secretary of the Treasury 

(after consultation with the Secretary of Energy) on the 

financial condition and operations of the Waste Fund.

171. Spain, for example, may offer a useful model: 

the government provides policy direction to the waste 

management organization, ENRESA, through ministerial 

review and approval of a General Radioactive Waste Plan that 

is revised and resubmitted every four years. 

172. The CRA requires federal agencies that promulgate 

rules to submit certain information to each House of 

Congress and the General Comptroller about the rule. 

Generally, major rules may not become effective until 60 days 

after submission to Congress. During those 60 days, Congress 

could pass a joint resolution to disapprove the major rule. 

The President could veto a congressional joint resolution of 

disapproval. In that case Congress would have 30 days to 

override the President’s veto. If Congress does not override 

the veto, the rule becomes effective. In legislation establishing 

the waste management organization and setting nuclear waste 

policy direction, Congress could provide itself CRA-like 

authority to review the organization’s Mission Plan update. 

173. These ten countries are Belgium, Canada, France, 

Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and 

the United Kingdom.

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174. The AMFM Panel recommended that a “Waste 

Fund Oversight Commission” be established for the specific 

purpose of ensuring that NWF fees are being used costeffectively and to approve or disapprove proposed changes 

to the level of the fee. In its 2001 update of the AMFM 

study, DOE instead recommended that the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC) serve this purpose.

175. The National Academies’ One Step at a Time report 

also recommended a stakeholder advisory board. 

176. Waste management facilities include disposal and 

interim storage facilities as well as any new transportation 

infrastructure required to construct, operate or decommission 

a geologic repository or interim storage facility. 

177. The NWPA does provide (in a separate section) 

for local government representation on a review panel that 

would advise DOE in the context of a negotiated “benefits 

agreement” between the federal government and a state or 

tribe hosting a repository or MRS facility. However, local 

interests account for only a small part of the representation 

on this panel.

178. Clinch River MRS Task Force, “Position on the 

Proposed Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility,” October 

10, 1985. 

179. The Voinovich/Upton bill deals with this issue by 

providing that contracts and settlements remain the liability 

of DOE until 10 years after termination of the license of the 

reactor involved. The new federal corporation would take 

liability under the existing contracts no later than 10 years 

after license termination; it would also be liable for all new 

contracts and for any negotiated transfer of liability between 

DOE and the corporation. 

180. For more details see “R&D Activities for Used 

Nuclear Fuel Disposition Storage, Transportation & 

Disposal,” by William Boyle, Director, Office of Used 

Nuclear Fuel Disposition Research & Development, DOE 

Office of Nuclear Energy, presented to the NWTRB winter 

meeting, February 16, 2011 and accessible at http://www.

nwtrb.gov/meetings/2011/feb/boyle.pdf.

181. The “polluter pays” principle for high-level waste 

disposal was first established by the AEC in 1970 when 

it established rules for the solidification and disposal of 

high-level wastes from reprocessing. However, the waste 

generators were going to pay when they actually delivered 

the waste for disposal, leaving the federal government to 

come up with the funds needed to develop a disposal system 

before the government could be reimbursed for this expense 

by the waste generators. In the NWPA, Congress departed 

from this approach and opted for an up-front fee to generate 

the revenues to build the system without having to rely on 

taxpayer funds, to ensure that adequate funds were available 

as needed.

182. U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 

Managing the Nation’s Commercial High-Level Radioactive 

Waste, OTA-O-171, March, 1985, p. 93, pp. 106-107.

183. Opening Statement of Senator J. Bennett Johnston, 

Chairman, at a hearing before the Senate Committee on 

Energy and Natural Resources, March 1, 1994.

184. Data Source: U.S. DOE Office of Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management, Office of Business 

Management “Summary of the Program Financial & Budget 

Information,” as of January 31, 2010. 

185. Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, 

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and United States.

186. International Association for Environmentally Safe 

Disposal of Radioactive Materials (EDRAM), Report on 

Radioactive Waste Ownership and Management of Long-Term 

Liabilities in EDRAM Member Countries, June 2005, Tables 

7.4 and 7.5, accessible at http://www.edram.info/fileadmin/

edram/pdf/EDRAMWGonWOwnershipFinal_271005.pdf. 

187. See extended discussion in Joseph S. Hezir, “Budget 

and Financial Management Improvements to the Nuclear 

Waste Fund (NWF): Background Report to the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future,” May 2011. 

Accessible at http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

brc_hezir_nwfbudget_051511.pdf. 

188. This specific combination of measures was identified 

as one of four feasible interim steps for dealing with the 

funding problem in DOE’s 2001 update of the AMFM 

report. See U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Means 

of Financing and Managing the Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management Program (DOE/RW-0546), August 2001.

189. Data source: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Office of Business 

Management, “Summary of Program Financial & Budget 

Information” as of January 31, 2010.

190. U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Means 

of Financing and Managing the Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management Program (DOE/RW-0546), August 2001, Fig. 

3. The proposal was not accepted by the utilities because the 

quid pro quo was their agreement not to seek damages for 

delay in waste acceptance.

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191. Legal analysis performed for the BRC concluded 

that it may be possible to amend the Standard Contract in 

this way without a rulemaking proceeding to amend the rule 

that established the contract in the first place  (10 C.F.R. 

§ 961). See Van Ness Feldman, P.C., “Legal Analysis of 

Commission Recommendations for Near-Term Actions,” 

October 11, 2011, http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/vnf_legal_authorities_memo_legal_authorities_

memo_revised_20111011_final_clean_1.pdf.

192. In proposing this approach, Secretary of Energy 

Peña stated that this “can be accomplished promptly within 

[DOE’s] current authority.” (See letter from Secretary 

of Energy Federico Peña to Alfred William Dahlberg, 

Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer, Southern 

Company, May 18, 1998.) Under the NWPA, the Secretary 

of Energy has existing authority to establish procedures for 

the collection and payment of the fees. In addition, the 

principle that fee payments can be deferred until wastes 

are accepted has an existing precedent in the form of the 

one-time fee payment imposed on utilities for spent fuel 

generated before the Act was passed. See Van Ness Feldman, 

P.C., “Legal Analysis of Commission Recommendations for 

Near-Term Actions,” October 11, 2011, accessible at http://

www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20111011_legal_

authorities_memo_revised_final_clean_1.pdf.

193. The original PAYGO requirements in the Budget 

Enforcement Act of 1990 have since been modified in the 

Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010. The requirements 

apply to proposed legislation (and not administrative actions) 

and require that OMB maintain a “PAYGO Scorecard” 

of the average annual cost over a 5-year period and the 

annual average cost over a 10-year period of newly enacted 

legislation. If, at the end of the Congressional session, 

there is a net increase in budget costs, an across-the-board 

sequestration of an equal offsetting amount is triggered. 

Legislation that increases direct spending also is subject to 

points of order under the Congressional Budget Act and 

the rules of the House and Senate. For example, the 112th 

Congress adopted a Cut-As-You-Go (CUTGO) rule (part 

of H. Res. 5) that establishes a point of order against any 

legislation that increases net mandatory spending for the 

period of the current fiscal year, the budget year, the four 

fiscal years following the budget year or the nine fiscal years 

following the budget year. There also is a point of order 

against any legislation that increases mandatory budget costs 

in excess of $5 billion in any of the first four consecutive 

10-year fiscal-year periods following the period covered by an 

applicable budget resolution. It should be emphasized that 

PAYGO and CUTGO rules apply to legislative and not 

administrative actions.

194. Joseph S. Hezir, “Discussion of Timing of Payment 

of NWF Fees,” presentation to the BRC Subcommittee on 

Transportation and Storage, January 3, 2011, Washington, 

D.C. If this change were a DOE-initiated proposal, rather 

than implementation by DOE of policy direction from the 

Administration, it might be subject to review under the 

administrative PAYGO requirements for agency proposals 

affecting mandatory spending established by the Bush 

Administration in 2005 through OMB Memorandum 

M-05-13 and supported by the Obama Administration in 

the FY 2011 budget. (The extent of its use in practice is 

unclear – a report by the Congressional Research Service, 

“OMB Controls on Agency Mandatory Spending Programs: 

‘Administrative PAYGO’ and Related Issues for Congress,” 

documented only a single instance where administrative 

PAYGO was applied.) However, the proposed renegotiation of 

contracts might not fall within the scope of the administrative 

PAYGO guidelines in any event, and even if it did, it should 

be subject to the  provision for exceptions “...in light of 

extraordinary need or other compelling circumstances.” In 

this case, the need for assured funding for the used/spent 

nuclear fuel management program to mitigate the magnitude 

of further federal budget liability to the Judgment Fund, 

plus the fact that reduced receipts in the near term would 

be offset by higher-than-projected receipts in the long term 

when the escrow accounts are drawn down to meet the costs 

of constructing and operating waste management facilities, 

would provide a compelling argument.

195. Ibid.

196. The original classification of the fee receipts as 

mandatory and program expenditures as discretionary was a 

judgment made by OMB based on general budget principles 

rather than on clear legislative requirements. See Hezir, op. cit.

197. See U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Means 

of Financing and Managing the Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management Program, (DOE/RW-0546), August 2001.

198. The Financial Report shows $19.1 billion of unpaid 

damages and $30 billion of unspent fees and interest that 

are categorized as “unearned revenue” (money received in 

advance of providing goods or services).

199. The Bush Administration addressed precisely 

this issue in a statement by DOE to Congress explaining 

the Administration’s proposed legislation to reclassify the 

revenues from the nuclear utility fees as offsetting collections 

“so they can be used in the way that was intended when 

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the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was passed: to develop a 

repository for disposal of high-level radioactive waste and 

spent nuclear fuel.” The specific stated objective was the 

same as that of our non-legislative proposal: “to ensure that 

Congress can focus its appropriations decisions on ensuring 

that the funds are used effectively and efficiently to meet 

the objectives of the Act, without having to worry about the 

impact on the funding of other programs within the Energy 

and Water Development appropriation.” In that testimony, 

DOE noted: “[T]the principle supported by the proposal 

is specific to the highly unusual contractual arrangement 

required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and is unlikely to 

be relevant to many other federal activities. Simply stated, 

whenever the Federal government, pursuant to an explicit 

statutory requirement, makes a legally binding contractual 

commitment specified by that statutory requirement to 

perform a well-defined service in exchange for payments that 

cover the costs of that service, it should treat those payments 

in a way that ensures that they are used for the statutorilyspecified contracted purpose. It is hard to see how anyone 

could disagree with that principle. Likewise, it is hard to 

see how such distinctive-if not unique-statutory obligations 

could threaten the ability of Congress to weigh competing 

demands for appropriations in other, unrelated areas.” 

Testimony by Robert G. Card, Under Secretary of Energy, 

before the hearing on “A Review of the Department of 

Energy’s Yucca Mountain Project, and Proposed Legislation 

to Alter the Nuclear Waste Trust Fund (H.R. 3429 and 

H.R. 3981),” held by the Subcommittee on Energy and Air 

Quality of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

March 25, 2004.

200. For a summary of proposals to change the 

Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) funding structure from 1994 

through 1999, see Figure 3 in U.S. Department of Energy, 

Alternative Means of Financing and Managing the Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management Program, (DOE/RW-0546), 

August 2001. More recently, Senator Hagel introduced a 

bill in 2007 with provisions specifying that “funds from 

the Nuclear Waste Fund will not be subject to allocations 

for discretionary spending under Section 302(a) of the 

Congressional Budget Act or suballocations of appropriations 

committees under Section 302(b).” To address the issue of 

budget neutrality, the Hagel bill would have further required 

that adjustments be made “In the allocation of new budget 

authority to appropriate committees in amounts equal to 

the fees reclassified as discretionary as a result of the above 

provision.” Legislation introduced by Senator Domenici 

in 2008 under the title “Strengthening Management of 

Advanced Recycling Technologies Act” (or SMART Act) 

would have established a revolving fund using $1 billion of 

the current NWF, as well as the annual interest on the Fund. 

The remaining 95 percent of the current waste Fund, as well 

as all future fees, would be placed in a legacy fund for the 

purposes of constructing a geologic repository. Expenditures 

from the revolving fund for the provisions of the Act could 

be made without further appropriations but would be 

subject to limitations in appropriations acts. In this way, the 

revolving fund could be put to use without being subject to 

the uncertainty of the annual appropriations process while 

still retaining the authority of Congress to oversee the NWF. 

The recent Voinovich/Upton legislation would establish two 

funds—an operating fund and a reserve fund—for the new 

waste management organization. The unexpended balance 

of already appropriated funds, plus accounts receivable and 

future revenues from NWF fees and appropriations would 

go to the operating fund. The corpus of the NWF would be 

transferred as an unfunded asset to the reserve fund (accruing 

interest from the NWF would go to the operating fund). 

201. This would need to take account of the current 

Cut-As-You-Go (CUTGO) rules that establish a point of 

order against (1) any legislation that increases net mandatory 

spending for the period of the current fiscal year, the budget 

year, the four fiscal years following the budget year or the nine 

fiscal years following the budget year, and (2) any legislation 

that increases mandatory budget costs in excess of $5 

billion in any of the first four consecutive 10-year fiscal-year 

periods following the period covered by an applicable budget 

resolution.

202. Testimony by Robert H. Card, Under Secretary of 

Energy, before the hearing on “A Review of the Department 

of Energy’s Yucca Mountain Project, and Proposed 

Legislation to Alter the Nuclear Waste Trust Fund (H.R. 

3429 and H.R. 3981),” held by the Subcommittee on Energy 

and Air Quality of the House Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, March 25, 2004. 

203. Section 302(b)(4) stipulates that “No high-level 

radioactive waste or SNF generated or owned by any 

department of the United States .... may be disposed of by 

the Secretary in any repository constructed under this Act...

unless such department transfers to the Secretary, for deposit 

in the NWF, amounts equivalent to the fees that would be 

paid to the Secretary under the contracts referred to in this 

section if such waste or spent fuel were generated by any 

other person.” In practice, funds for the defense wastes have 

been appropriated directly to the program for use each year, 

with no surplus to be deposited in the Fund. 

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204. 52 FR 31508.

205. U.S. Department of Energy, “Fiscal Year 2007 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Fee Adequacy 

Assessment Report,” DOE/RW-0593, July 2008.

206. Mark Gaffigan, Managing Directorof Natural 

Resources and Environment, “NUCLEAR WASTE: Disposal 

Challenges and Lessons Learned from Yucca Mountain,” 

statement before the Subcommittee on Environment and the 

Economy, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of 

Representatives, June 1, 2011.

207. Information provided by DOE to the BRC. See 

http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/correspondence/blue_

ribbon_request_1-6-2010_final.pdf. 

208. Just as the fees paid by utilities to date are credited 

in determining whether they are fully “paid up” for purposes 

of being able to begin delivering waste for disposal, so should 

the defense waste appropriations to date be credited in 

determining when the defense share has been fully paid. 

209. Recent court decisions upholding the government’s 

obligation to accept spent fuel are backed by a long history 

of case law regarding the contractual obligations of the 

federal government, even in times of severe economic and 

budget crisis. In one Depression-era case involving an effort 

to stop payment on government-issued insurance policies, 

the Supreme Court concluded: “No doubt there was in 

March, 1933, great need of economy. In the administration 

of all government business economy had become urgent 

because of lessened revenues and the heavy obligations 

to be issued in the hope of relieving widespread distress. 

Congress was free to reduce gratuities deemed excessive. 

But Congress was without power to reduce expenditures 

by abrogating contractual obligations of the United States. 

To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen government 

expenditure, would not be the practice of economy, but an 

act of repudiation.” Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 

580 (1934).

210. The courts have ruled that “acceptance” includes 

the obligation to remove spent fuel from reactors. We use 

“accept” and “acceptance” in this broader sense.

211. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States, 536 

F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 

United States, 536 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Sacramento 

Municipal Utility District v. United States, Nos. 2007-5052, 

-5097, 2008 WL 3539880 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2008).

212. Department of Justice, “Response to Request 

for Information from the Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America’s Nuclear Future”, December 20, 2011. Available 

at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/comments/

attachments/doj_response.12.20.11_0.pdf.

213. “Because the claims of a substantial number of 

utilities are not substantially affected by issues that require 

resolution at the appellate level, it may be possible to 

implement an administrative claims process with these 

utilities that is less expensive and more efficient than 

litigation and that achieves largely the same results.” 

Testimony of Michael F. Hertz, Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Civil Division, on “Budget Implications of Closing 

Yucca Mountain, before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. 

House of Representatives, July 27, 2010.

214. Department of Justice, “Response to Request 

for Information from the Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America’s Nuclear Future”, December 20, 2011. Available 

at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/comments/

attachments/doj_response.12.20.11_0.pdf.

215. National Research Council, Going the Distance: The 

Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste in 

the United States, Washington DC: The National Academies 

Press, Aug. 2006.

216. Presentation of Earl Easton, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission Office of Spent Fuel Storage and 

Transportation, to the BRC Subcommittee on Transportation 

and Storage, Nov. 2, 2010. 

217. Examples of recommendations from the 2006 

NAS report that have not been implemented include fullscale cask testing, more systematic examination of social or 

societal risk and risk perception, making planned shipment 

routes publicly available, shipping stranded spent fuel 

from shutdown reactor sites first, and executing technical 

assistance and funding under NWPA, Section 180(c).

218. Including the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration, and the Federal Railroad Administration.

219. Burnups greater than 45 gigawatt-days per metric 

ton (45GWd/MTU) are now common.

220. In addition, the Departments of Homeland 

Security and Transportation adopted regulations in 2008 

to enhance the safety and security of rail shipments of 

hazardous materials, including spent nuclear fuel (49 

CFR 172, 179, 209, 1520, 1580). The rules designated 

46 High Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs) that require a 

chain of custody and control procedures. They also require 

rail route evaluations using 27 risk factors, including 

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proximity to densely populated areas, iconic targets, and 

places of congregation. These rules have not been applied 

to large-scale spent nuclear fuel shipping campaigns; in 

fact, a number of observers have noted that doing so on a 

nationwide basis could be problematic. See presentation of 

Robert Halstead to the BRC Transportation and Storage 

Subcommittee, Sept. 23, 2010 (available at http://www.brc.

gov/sites/default/files/meetings/presentations/d_halstead_

final_sep23.pdf).

221. Ibid at p. 8.

222. BRC staff met with NRC/NSIR staff on January 

11, 2011, and reviewed the classified versions of the NAS 

reports, as well as NRC summaries of the actions it has taken 

to address the issues identified. NRC staff also briefed cleared 

staff and Commissioners on Feb. 3, 2011.

223. Presentation of Lisa Janairo, Midwest Council of 

State Governments, to the BRC Transportation and Storage 

Subcommittee, Nov. 2, 2010 (accessible at http://www.brc.

gov/index.php?q=meeting/open-meeting-3). 

224. Ibid.

225. Presentation of Gary Lanthrum, Principal Engineer, 

RAMTASC to the Blue Ribbon Commission, Oct. 20, 

2011 (available at http://brc.gov/index.php?q=meeting/

public-meeting-solicit-feedback-draft-commission-reportwashington-dc ).

226. Western Governors’ Association, “Policy Resolution 

11-5, Transportation of Radioactive Waste, Radioactive 

Materials, and Spent Nuclear Fuel,” 2011 (available at http://

www.westgov.org/policies). 

227. Ken Niles and Rick Moore, The WIPP 

Transportation Program at 10 Years: Making the Case for 

Above-Regulatory Procedures, Waste Management Symposium, 

March 2009, at p. 4 (available at http://www.brc.gov/sites/

default/files/comments/attachments/above-regulatory_

transport.pdf).

228. Elizabeth Helvey, Complex Systems Group, 

“Overview of the Section 180(c) Program: History, Lessons 

Learned and Potential Next Steps,” April 2011 (available 

at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nwpa_

section_180c_paper_final.pdf).

229. EPA also has sole responsibility for regulating nonradiological environmental impacts.

230. 10 CFR 51.23(a). The Waste Confidence decision 

is important because it avoids the need to resolve the issue 

of long-term disposition of spent fuel in each individual 

licensing action. See, for example, Nuclear Energy Institute 

press release, “Industry Applauds NRC Approval of revision 

of Waste Confidence Rule,” Sept.15, 2010 (found at http://

www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/industry-applaudsnrc-approval-of-revision-of-waste-confidence-rule). 

231. Matthew L. Wald, “3 States Challenge Policy 

on Storing Nuclear Waste,” New York Times, Feb.15, 

2011 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/

nyregion/16nuke.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Nuclear&st=cse). 

232. The NRC has been careful to note that despite 

these actions, it is not endorsing indefinite storage at reactor 

sites and continues to believe a mined geologic repository is 

necessary; in addition, the NRC has expressed “reasonable 

assurance” that such a repository “will be available in the 

foreseeable future.” See Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

“Staff Requirements Memorandum”, Sept. 15, 2010 

(found at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/

commission/srm/meet/2010/m20100915.pdf). 

233. Notably, the IAEA goes on to state that “The 

aim of geological disposal is not to provide a guarantee of 

absolute and complete containment and isolation of the 

waste for all time.”

234. The NEA is an agency of the Organisation for 

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which 

includes the world’s major industrialized economies.

235. EPA’s general standard also applies to WIPP and is 

currently in use there.

236. The change came in response to a legal challenge 

charging that EPA was required by law to follow the 

recommendation issued by the NAS in 1995 that compliance 

should be measured at the time of peak dose within the 

period of geologic stability for Yucca Mountain, which the 

NAS found to be on the order of 1 million years.

237. 40 CFR § 197.20 (Yucca Mountain standards): 

“What standard must DOE meet? (a) The DOE must 

demonstrate, using performance assessment, that there 

is a reasonable expectation that the reasonably maximally 

exposed individual receives no more than the following 

annual committed effective dose equivalent from releases 

from the undisturbed Yucca Mountain disposal system: (1) 

150 microsieverts (15 millirems) for 10,000 years following 

disposal; and (2) 1 millisievert (100 millirems) after 10,000 

years, but within the period of geologic stability. (b) The 

DOE’s performance assessment must include all potential 

pathways of radionuclide transport and exposure.”

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238. “We have recognized the strong consensus in 

the international radioactive waste community that dose 

projections extending many tens to hundreds of thousands of 

years into the future can best be viewed as qualitative indicators 

of disposal system performance, rather than as firm predictions 

that can be compared against strict numerical compliance 

criteria. In fact, international organizations have treated such 

numerical criteria in a more flexible way and supported their 

application in conjunction with other qualitative considerations 

in applying them to regulatory determinations over very long 

time frames. Further, we agree that confidence in the way 

the projections were performed, and the consideration of 

supporting qualitative information, may be more important 

to an overall judgment of safety at longer times.” U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Preamble to 40 CFR 

Part 197, Public Health And Environmental Radiation Protection 

Standards For Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Final Rule, 73 FR 

61266, October 15, 2008. 

239. Canada’s regulations, for example, call for 

developing a long term safety case that combines a safety 

assessment with complementary arguments based on 

(1) appropriate selection and application of assessment 

strategies, (2) demonstration of system robustness, (3) the 

use of complementary indicators of safety, and (3) any 

other evidence available to provide confidence in the long 

term safety of the proposed system. Similarly, Finnish 

regulations call for a safety analysis that includes (1) a 

description of the disposal system and definition of barriers, 

(2) an analysis of the future evolution of the system, (3) 

definition of performance targets for individual barriers, 

(4) functional description of the disposal system by means 

of conceptual and mathematical modeling, (5) analysis of 

activity releases and resulting doses from radionuclides that 

penetrate the barriers and enter the biosphere, (6) estimates 

of the probabilities of activity releases and radiation doses 

arising from unlikely disruptive events, (7) uncertainty and 

sensitivity analyses, and (8) comparison of the outcome of 

the safety analysis with safety requirements.

240. See endnote 238.

241. See, for example, Rodney C. Ewing, “Standards & 

Regulations for the Geological Disposal of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel and High Level Waste,” prepared for the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, March 4th, 2011 

and available at http://www.brc.gov/library/commissioned_

papers/EWING%20BRC%20white%20paper%20FINAL.pdf.

242. Jukka Laaksonen (Director General, Radiation and 

Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finland), “Regulatory 

Aspects of Radioactive Waste Disposal – the Finnish 

Approach,” presented at the Conference on Geological 

Repositories: A Common Objective, a Variety of Paths, 

October 15 – 17, 2007, Berne, Switzerland.

243. Rodney C. Ewing, “Performance Assessments: Are 

They Necessary or Sufficient?” in Uncertainty Underground: 

Dealing with the Nation’s High-Level Nuclear Waste Policy 

and Scientific Issues, R. Ewing and A. Macfarlane, eds., MIT 

Press, 2006, p. 76.

244. U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 

Technical Advancements and Issues Associated with the 

Permanent Disposal of High-Activity Wastes: Lessons Learned 

from Yucca Mountain and Other Programs, Washington DC, 

June 2011. Available at http://www.nwtrb.gov/reports/

technical%20lessons.pdf.

245. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission “Comments 

on the Blue Ribbon Commission July 2011 Draft Report to 

the Secretary of Energy.” Available at http://www.brc.gov/

sites/default/files/comments/attachments/nrc_comments_

on_draft_brc_report.pdf.

246. 66 Federal Register 55746, November 2, 2001.

247. Organisation for Economic Development, Joint 

NEA-IAEA International Peer Review of the Yucca Mountain 

Site Characterisation Project’s Total System Performance 

Assessment Supporting the Site Recommendation Process, Final 

Report, December 2001.

248. Rodney C. Ewing, “Standards & Regulations for 

the Geological Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High 

Level Waste,” prepared for the Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America’s Nuclear Future, March 4th, 2011 and available 

at http://www.brc.gov/library/commissioned_papers/

EWING%20BRC%20white%20paper%20FINAL.pdf. 

249. Nuclear Energy Institute v. Environmental 

Protection Agency, 373 F. 3d 1251 (D.C. Cir 2004).

250. Notably, the statements of secondary performance 

standards – groundwater protection in parts 191 and 197, 

and human intrusion in 197 – do not include performance 

assessment as part of the standard, and use of performance 

assessment to demonstrate compliance with those standards 

is not absolutely required. E.g. 40 CFR § 197.30 “What 

standards must DOE meet? The DOE must demonstrate 

that there is a reasonable expectation that, for 10,000 

years of undisturbed performance after disposal, releases of 

radionuclides from waste in the Yucca Mountain disposal 

system into the accessible environment will not cause 

the level of radioactivity in the representative volume of 

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ground water to exceed the limits in the following Table 

1:” Another example of a more flexible approach is found 

in EPA’s regulations for uranium mill tailings, which allow 

the 1000-year quantitative standards to “be implemented 

through analysis of the physical properties of the site 

and the natural processes over time....... Computational 

models, theories, and prevalent expert judgment may be 

used to decide that a control system design will satisfy the 

standard.” 40 CFR § 192.20. 

251. In issuing its initial repository standards, EPA stated 

that “unequivocal proof of compliance is neither expected 

nor required because of the substantial uncertainties inherent 

in such long-term projections.”

252. International Atomic Energy Agency and the 

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Geological Disposal of 

Radioactive Waste: Safety Requirements, WS-R-4, Vienna, 

2006 (available at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/

publications/PDF/Pub1231_web.pdf).

253. EPA’s position on reasonable expectation was 

challenged as being arbitrary and capricious in the lawsuit 

that led to the remand of parts of 40 CFR 191 in 1987. 

Nevertheless, EPA’s position was upheld by the Court: “Given 

that absolute proof of compliance is impossible to predict 

because of the inherent uncertainties, we find that the Agency’s 

decision to require “reasonable expectation” of compliance is 

a rational one. It would be irrational for the Agency to require 

proof which is scientifically impossible to obtain. Any such 

purported absolute proof would be of questionable veracity, 

and thus of little value to the implementing agencies. Nor can 

we say that this provision is arbitrary and capricious because it 

will afford the implementing agencies a degree of discretion, 

since such imprecision is unavoidable given the current state of 

scientific knowledge” (Natural Resources Defense Council v. 

U.S.E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1258).

254. “As a historic matter, differences in the NRC and 

EPA standards are rooted in the two agencies’ philosophical 

approach to setting limits. EPA has tended to set very 

aggressive goals (often based on best technology) but has 

been very forgiving when best efforts at compliance with the 

goals are made (thus: “Reasonable Expectation”). The NRC, 

on the other hand, has set more achievable, science-based, 

standards and has been very strict in enforcing the standards 

once set (thus: “Reasonable Assurance”).” Report of the 

American Nuclear Society on the EPA proposed standard for 

the Yucca Mountain High Level Waste Repository, November 

1999, http://www.ans.org/pi/news/sd/944200800-report.

html. 

255. National Research Council, One Step at a Time: The 

Staged Development of Geologic Repositories for High-Level 

Radioactive Waste, Washington DC: National Academies 

Press, 2003, available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10611.

html, pp. 130-131.

256. Ibid, p. 92.

257. Ibid, p. 91.

258. In Appendix E of its recent “Plan for Integrating 

Spent Nuclear Fuel Regulatory Activities,” the NRC 

identifies “Development of an assessment tool (“Flexible 

Performance Assessment”–FPA) that allows a scoping-level 

evaluation of the regulatory and technical aspects of various 

spent fuel and HLW disposition scenarios that may be 

identified by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s 

Nuclear Future,” as one of several activities to be completed 

by the end of FY 2010. 

259. In 1990, in the midst of ongoing debates about the 

EPA and NRC repository regulations, the National Research 

Council warned against the risks of establishing excessively 

rigid regulatory requirements before data on actual sites were 

available. National Research Council, Rethinking HighLevel Radioactive Waste Disposal, Washington DC: National 

Academies Press, 1990.

260. According to a statement submitted by Steve 

Frishman: “The regulatory arena associated with deep 

geologic disposal of highlevel radioactive waste and used 

nuclear fuel has been subject to an array of policy changes, 

changes in philosophy, and internal struggles within and 

between the two affected regulatory agencies – the NRC 

and the EPA. The interested and affected public often has 

been confused about the roles of the respective agencies, 

and the motivation, scope and meaning of the regulations 

proposed, while being confined in their responses to the 

review and comment provisions of the Administrative 

Procedures Act (APA), and ultimately the federal courts. 

Having been a participant in this process, at the affected state 

government level, for its entire nearly 30-year history, has 

been frustrating, to say the least.” Summary of Statement by 

Steve Frishman, Consultant, Agency for Nuclear Projects, 

State of Nevada, presented at the public meeting focused 

on the issues to be addressed in development of new 

generic regulations for radioactive waste disposal in deep 

geological repositories,” held by the Disposal Subcommittee 

of the BRC, September 1, 2010, in Washington D.C. 

(accessible at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/

attachments/summary_of_steve_frishamn_to_the_disposal_

subcommittee.pdf). 

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261. At a hearing in Maine concerning spent fuel stored 

at the shutdown Maine Yankee reactor site, an elected official 

described open disagreement between EPA and NRC about 

whether the final cleanup standard for decommissioning of 

the site should be 15 mrem or 25 mrem. According to this 

official, her constituents did not understand the technical 

basis for the disagreement, but the simple fact that there 

was a dispute between the regulatory agencies undermined 

public confidence in the regulatory system and the ability to 

safely store spent fuel at the Maine Yankee site. This ongoing 

dispute between the EPA and NRC was also mentioned in 

a paper prepared for the Commission by Dr. Rodney Ewing 

and described in a GAO report in 2000 (see U.S. General 

Accounting Office, RADIATION STANDARDS: Scientific 

Basis Inconclusive, and EPA and NRC Disagreement 

Continues, GAO/RCED-00-152, June 2000).

262. Presentation to the BRC Subcommittee on Disposal 

by Robert Neill, September 1, 2010. Available at http://www.

brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/attachments/summary_of_

bob_neill__statement_to_the_disposal_subcommittee.pdf.

263. For example, the BRC’s Subcommittee on Disposal 

has also heard a proposal that would involve forming a 

panel of experts from each agency and from academia 

or the private sector to conduct a process in accord with 

the Administrative Procedures Act. The aim would be to 

produce a report that could be used as the basis for an 

integrated set of disposal safety regulations to be adopted by 

both EPA and NRC, as was proposed by Steven Frishman 

at the Disposal Subcommittee meeting on September 1, 

2010 (see: http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/

attachments/summary_of_steve_frishamn_to_the_disposal_

subcommittee.pdf). Other options such as regulatory 

negotiations might be possible. 

264. Current NRC regulations for geologic disposal provide 

requirements for physical protection (10 CFR 60.21(b)(3) and 

63.21(b)(3), Part 73) and material control and accounting (10 

CFR 60.78 and 63.78). The NRC is currently conducting a 

rulemaking to enhance these requirements.

265. The “President’s Offer” first put forward by 

President Lyndon Johnson, offered to place all U.S. nuclear 

facilities under IAEA safeguards except those of direct 

national security significance. This is intended to assure nonnuclear weapons states that they will not be discriminated 

against in having to supply information and undergo IAEA 

inspections and reports. For more details see Scott D. Sagan, 

“The International Security Implications of U.S. Domestic 

Nuclear Power Decisions,” paper prepared for the Blue 

Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, April 

18, 2011. Available at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/sagan_brc_paper_final.pdf.

266. Stoneturn Consultants: “From Three Mile Island 

to the Future: Improving Worker Safety and Health in 

the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry,” March 14, 2011. In 

concluding that the record of occupational health and safety 

performance for the civilian nuclear power industry is very 

good (and indeed comparable to that of non-energy sectors 

like insurance and finance), the Stoneturn report relied on 

performance indicators in nuclear power plants, occupation 

radiation dose, and occupational injury and illness rates 

compared to workers in other industries.

267. During the construction of WIPP, one construction 

worker was fatally injured in 1984 when he fell 1000 feet 

down a 6-foot diameter borehole. See: “Safety Violations 

Led to WIPP Worker’s Death,” Albuquerque Journal, July 4, 

1984, p. D-2. Overall this was the one traumatic fatality in an 

estimated 17,000 person-working years needed to construct 

the facility. SInce WIPP opened in 2000, there have been no 

significant accidents involving workers. In the case of Yucca 

Mountain, concerns were raised about the adequacy of the 

industrial hygiene procedures in place to protect workers 

from silica exposure. A study of some 413 individuals (out of 

almost 3000) who worked at Yucca Mountain between 1993 

and 2002 found three individuals with silicosis, however all of 

these individuals had previously worked in mines and two of 

them had been diagnosed before working at Yucca Mountain, 

so it was difficult to determine whether and to what extent 

exposures at Yucca Mountain might have contributed to 

their condition. The other case was a new diagnosis, but 

that worker also reported previous mining experience so it 

was not possible to attribute his disease solely to exposure at 

Yucca Mountain. The study was performed between 2003 

and 2005 out of almost 3000 individuals who had been 

known to have worked in some capacity at Yucca Mountain 

in during the study. (See An Investigation into the Silica 

Exposure of Yucca Mountain Project Workers. Special Hearing 

before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

US Senate, Las Vegas, March 15. 2004. Available at http://

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg94749/pdf/CHRG108shrg94749.pdf.) In contrast to Yucca Mountain, the 

WIPP facility is mined out of halite (salt) deposits. There 

has not been any study of whether mining halite has had 

any adverse health impact on workers at WIPP, even though 

there are significant salt dust exposures in the facility and even 

though exposure to salt dust is considered a risk factor for 

cardiovascular, gastric and kidney diseases.

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268. Note that these are not the precise legal 

definitions. Links or citations to the legal definitions may 

be found in the supplementary materials posted on the 

BRC website (www.brc.gov).

269. R. H. Jones Jr., Engineering Alternative Studies for 

Separations: NEPA Data Input Report, EAS-Q-NEP-G-00001 

Revision 4, June 2008, p. 3.

270. Kennedy, J.E. 2010. “Potential Changes to the U.S. 

LLW Regulatory Framework,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission Regulatory Information Conference 2010, 

March 11, 2010, Washington D.C. http://www.nrc.gov/

public-involve/conference-symposia/ric/past/2010/slides/

th31kennedyjpv.pdf.

271. As Secretary Chu pointed out at the March 2010 

Commission meeting, the once-through fuel cycle, as currently 

practiced in the United States with reactor technology that 

dates back to the 1970s and 1980s, uses only about 1 percent 

of the energy content of mined uranium. Noting the impact of 

future nuclear technology advances Secretary Chu said, “Your 

committee should be looking at these possibilities because if 

you can reduce the lifetime of the waste by factors of hundreds 

to thousands, if you can reduce the amount of the waste by 

factors of tens to hundreds, that also can change things. And 

what you do in the interim is then an open question.” See 

transcript of March 25, 2010 meeting at http://www.brc.gov/

sites/default/files/meetings/transcripts/0325scur.pdf.

272. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future 

of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, 

Cambridge, MA, 2011.

273. For example, see (1) Bunn, et al., The Economics 

of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

(Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard 

University, 2003). http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/files.

php/faculty/fetter/2003-Bunn-repro.pdf, (2) Dixon, et al. 

Dynamic Systems Analysis Report for Nuclear Fuel Recycle, 

December 2008, INL/EXT-08-15201 Rev., http://www.

inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/4310613.pdf, (3) 

U.S. DOE, Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative Comparison Report, 

FY 2003,(Updated 2004, 2006), http://www.ne.doe.gov/

pdfFiles/AFCICompRpt2003.pdf, (4) EPRI, Nuclear Fuel 

Cycle Cost Comparison Between Once-Through and Plutonium 

Single-Recycling in Pressurized Water Reactors, #1018585, 2009, 

http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?, (5) EPRI, Advanced 

Nuclear Fuel Cycles – Main Challenges and Strategic Choices, 

#1020307, 2010, http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?, (6) 

MIT, The Future of Nuclear Power, 2003 (Updated 2009), 

http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/, (7) MIT, The Future 

of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 2011, http://web.mit.edu/mitei/

research/studies/nuclear-fuel-cycle.shtml, (8) Shropshire, 

Advanced Fuel Cycle Economic Tools, Algorithms, and 

Methodologies, 2009, INL/EXT-09-15483, http://www.inl.gov/

technicalpublications/Documents/4247163.pdf, (9) Wigeland, 

AFCI Options Study, 2009, INL/EXT-10-17639, http://www.

inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/4480296.pdf, (10) 

Wilson, Comparing Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options: Observations 

and Challenges, 2011, http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/wilson.fuel_.cycle_.comparisons_final.pdf, (11) 

U.S. NWTRB, Nuclear Waste Assessment System for Technical 

Evaluation (NUWASTE): Status and Initial Results, 2011.

274. Mixed oxide fuel (MOX) consists of a mix of 

recycled plutonium and uranium.

275. DOE is currently planning to build a demonstration 

plant of this type, called the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, 

at the Idaho National Laboratory. The reactor would be 

cooled with helium gas, moderated with graphite, and use 

low-enriched uranium fuel. It would be capable of generating 

electricity as well as supplying process heat.

276. This endnote summarizes key assumptions 

underlying table 4. As noted in the first paragraph in section 

11.2, many of the comparisons are qualitative because the 

available technical literature is not comparable or consistent 

due to different assumptions and the current status of the 

technologies differs widely (LWR systems are deployed, fast 

reactors require more development and demonstration, and 

gas-cooled reactors even more).

Table 4 compares four nuclear energy systems: (1) a oncethrough LWR system using high-burnup uranium dioxide 

system [at least 45 GWd/metric ton] representative of 

near-term technology, (2) a modified-open cycle (MOC) in 

which eight high-burnup uranium dioxide fuel assemblies are 

reprocessed to make one high-burnup MOX fuel assembly 

which is irradiated for one cycle and then managed as waste, 

(3) a high-temperature [~600 C] helium-cooled reactor 

(HTGR) operated on a once-through basis using veryhigh-burnup uranium dioxide fuel in a graphite matrix to 

produce electricity or process heat, and (4) a closed sodiumcooled fast reactor system involving sustained reprocessing 

and recycle of MOX fuel. The comparisons in the table 

are based on a hypothetical system in which all nuclear 

power is produced by each system, i.e., transition effects are 

ignored. Each of the systems is assumed to produce the same 

amount of electric power. The once-through LWR system is 

considered to be the baseline against which the other systems 

are compared.

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Noteworthy assumptions for some of the criteria that are not 

already stated in the table are as follows:

 

- Uranium utilization: uranium recovered in the MOC 

system is assumed to be recovered and re-enriched to 

make fresh uranium dioxide (UOX) fuel and the MOX 

fuel replaces uranium dioxide fuel. In the closed cycle 

uranium is recovered and recycled but with ~1% losses 

during each recycle.

- Global climate and energy security: HTGR is planned 

to achieve temperatures that make it possible to displace 

fossil fuel use in energy-intensive non-electric sectors.

- Non-proliferation and counter-terrorism: Once-through 

systems would be sending plutonium in SNF to a repository 

after relatively short cooling times. MOX and closed cycle 

systems keep much more plutonium in reprocessing plant, 

MOX fabrication plant, and reactor storage.

- Disposal safety: Once-through systems about the 

same given uncertainties in HTGR burnup and fuel 

composition. Reduction of TRU in MOC based on 

ORIGEN2 calculation. Reduction of TRU in closed 

cycle based on literature and staff calculations with caveats 

concerning duration stated. The MOC system includes 

disposal of intact MOX fuel after one irradiation cycle. 

Reduction in fuel cycle risk from MOC and closed cycles 

based on scaling results given in G. E. Michaels, Impact 

of Actinide Recycle on Nuclear Fuel Cycle Heath Risks, 

ORNL/M-1947 (June 1992) and OECD Nuclear Energy 

Agency, Radiological Impacts of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Management Options: A Comparative Study, (2000).

- Waste volume: Volume requiring repository disposal 

and volume acceptable for near-surface disposal (A-B-C 

LLW plus uranium mill tailings plus depleted uranium) 

are addressed separately. Unit waste volumes are based on 

staff estimates using literature data. 

- Repository space: Assume 40%+ thermal efficiency for 

HTGR. Space requirements for MOC wastes (UOX 

HLW plus intact MOX fuel) based on integrated decay 

heat using ORIGEN2 results.

277. Although the safety evaluation of the once-through 

fuel cycle is marked as the baseline, this does not presuppose 

that safety is perfect. Even given consistent and approved 

safety design standards across fuel cycles, there is still room 

for improvement in this system.

278. “No existing deterministic cost study of full 

recycling is credible, because there has been no engineering 

demonstration of full recycling.” Testimony received from 

Geoffrey Rothwell at the meeting of the Subcommittee on 

Reactor & Fuel Cycle Technology on August 30, 2010.

279. The table compares nuclear energy systems in the 

long-term which means the R&D has been successfully 

completed, the fuel cycle in question has been adopted, and 

the transition phase is over so that the US is relying on just 

that system. 

280. Assumption: Depleted uranium is deemed acceptable 

for near-surface disposal. If repository disposal is required 

the volume of repository waste increases ranging from 3 to 

30 times for all but the closed fuel cycle, although decay heat 

and toxicity are not affected for 100,000 years. Note also that 

volume is less important for mined repositories than for other 

potential disposal options, notably boreholes.

281. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 

Technology (PCAST). Report to the President on Accelerating 

the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies Through an 

Integrated Federal Energy Policy. November 2010. Available 

at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/

ostp/pcast-energy-tech-report.pdf.

282. The ESBWR (or Economic Simplified Boiling Water 

Reactor) is a reactor design marketed by GE Hitachi Nuclear 

Energy. It is considered a generation III+, passively safety design.

283. M. Anastasio et al., A Sustainable Energy Future: the 

Essential Role of Nuclear Energy, August 2008, page 4, http://

www.ne.doe.gov/pdffiles/rpt_sustainableenergyfuture_

aug2008.pdf. 

284. World Association of Nuclear Operators 

(WANO), “A Post-Fukushima WANO – Applying Lessons 

Learned,”available at http://www.wano.info/press-release/

wano-press-release-3/.

285. World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), 

“WANO after Fukushima– Strengthening Global Nuclear 

Safety: A Question and Answer Document,” available at 

http://www.wano.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Q-ADocument-for-Press-Pack.pdf.

286. See http://nuclearprinciples.org/the-principles/

287. Ibid.

288. Scott D. Sagan, The International Security Implications 

of U.S. Domestic Nuclear Power Decisions, 2011. Commissioned 

paper for the BRC, available at http://www.brc.gov/sites/

default/files/documents/sagan_brc_paper_final.pdf. 

289. “The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons,” United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/

disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/NPTEnglish_Text.pdf. 

290. Scott D. Sagan, “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear 

Disarmament,” Daedalus 138:4 (Fall 2009):157-68.

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291. International Atomic Energy Agency, “The 

Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency,” see http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/.

292. See http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/

chapter02_02.html. 

293. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Model 

Protocol Additional to the Agreements Between States and 

the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards,” INFCIRC/540, 

available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/

Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf. 

294. From http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/

Safeguards/sg_protocol.html, accessed May 5, 2011.

295. Testimony before the BRC by Edwin Lyman on 

October 12, 2010.

296. The IAEA currently has 151 member states; 

its budget in 2011 was $447 million. The United States 

provided approximately 25% of that figure.

297. Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers study (1975-

1977), International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation study 

(1977-1980), Expert Group on International Plutonium 

Storage (1978-1982), IAEA Committee on Assurances of 

Supply (1980-1987), United Nations Conference for the 

Promotion of International Cooperation in The Peaceful 

Uses of Nuclear energy (1987).

298. World Nuclear Association - http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/reactors.html, update for Dec 1, 2011.

299. International Atomic Energy Agency, Multilateral 

Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report 

submitted to the Director General of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/640, 22 February, 2005. 

Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/

Infcircs/2005/infcirc640.pdf. 

300. The Fund was seeded by NTI and supplemented 

by voluntary donations from the European Union, Kuwait, 

Norway, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, 

according to a December 2, 2010 statement made to IAEA 

Board of Governors by Glyn Davies, U.S. Ambassador to the 

IAEA (see http://vienna.usmission.gov/101203nfs.html). 

301. Incorporated as a joint venture between Russia’s 

Tekhsnabeksport and Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom.

302. The fuel bank consists of two 1,000 megawattreactor loads of LEU.

303. Seen as a “virtual assurance mechanism that would 

facilitate access to nuclear energy to avoid the huge cost 

and technical challenge involved in establishing a nuclear 

fuel cycle.” Statement made at the 2010 IAEA General 

Conference by Charles Hendy, Minister of State for Energy 

and Climate Change of the United Kingdom; see http://

www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/Statements/uk.pdf. 

304. Spent fuel take-away arrangements are broadly defined 

as negotiated agreements for governments with fuel cycle 

capabilities to assume liability for supplied or obligated fuel and 

develop permanent disposition solutions for managing used 

fuel in concert with countries seeking nuclear energy.

305. U.S. Department of State – website, Principles of 

the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, http://

www.state.gov/t/isn/c37071.htm. 

306. Official U.S. Department of State blog - Secretary 

Clinton, Foreign Minister Lavrov Sign Plutonium 

Disposition Protocol, posted April 13, 2010 http://blogs.

state.gov/index.php/site/entry/clinton_lavrov_plutonium_

disposition_protocol. 

307. In 2010, The U.S. returned Russian-origin HEU 

from Poland, Czech Republic, Serbia, and the Ukraine. 

GTRI Fact Sheet, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/

factsheets/reducingthreats. 

308. Kenneth N. Luongo, “The Urgent Need for a Seoul 

Declaration: A Roadmap for the 2012 Nuclear Security 

Summit and Beyond,” Arms Control Today, Washington, 

D.C., April 2012.

309. According to the IAEA, 1,773 confirmed incidents 

of illegal possession, movement or attempts to illegally trade 

in or use nuclear material or radioactive sources occurred 

between January 1993 and December 2009. Information 

taken from the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database at http://

www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp.

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NOTES

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