U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

70–783 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–67] 

ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 

AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD READINESS, 

TRAINING AND OPERATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CATHY GARMAN, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, September 21, 2011, Army Reserve, Army National Guard and 

Air National Guard Readiness, Training and Operations ................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, September 21, 2011 ............................................................................ 39 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 

ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL 

GUARD READINESS, TRAINING AND OPERATIONS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 3 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Carpenter, MG Raymond W., USA, Acting Director, Army National Guard ..... 10 

Stultz, LTG Jack C., USA, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve .......................................... 5 

Wyatt, Lt Gen Harry M., III, USAF, Director, Air National Guard ................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z. ............................................................................ 46 

Carpenter, MG Raymond W. ........................................................................... 92 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 43 

Stultz, LTG Jack C. .......................................................................................... 49 

Wyatt, Lt Gen Harry M. .................................................................................. 82 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Charts submitted by LTG Jack C. Stultz ....................................................... 123 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Reyes .......................................................................................................... 127 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 131 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 136 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 134 

(1) 

ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD READINESS, TRAINING AND OPERATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 21, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. Well, good afternoon. And I would like to welcome 

all of our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on the training and operations tempo 

for our Army Reserve and our Guard and Air Guard Components. 

Just 10 days ago, we marked the 10th Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on our homeland. That day, as 

we all know, literally changed our world, and led us into a longterm global war on terrorism, a fight where our reservists and our 

National Guard members are full partners. In the intervening 10 

years, our Reserve Components have been stretched thin as they 

have been called upon to provide many of the enabling capabilities 

for the Active Duty Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn 

and Operation Enduring Freedom. 

They provide support, such as intelligence gathering, airlift, close 

air support and security forces. At the same time, the National 

Guard still must fulfill their traditional mission of supporting the 

states during emergencies such as the recent flooding and fires. 

There is no walking away from either mission. 

Their significant combat support role in Iraq and Afghanistan 

makes it clear that we cannot go to the fight without our Reserve 

Components. According to the Department of Defense’s recent 

study, the ‘‘Future Role of the Reserve Component,’’ the Reserve 

Component is an irreplaceable and cost-effective element of overall 

Department of Defense capability. 

The report specifically stated, ‘‘Unless we had chosen to dramatically increase the size of the active components, our domestic security and global operations since September 11, 2001 could not have 

been executed without the activation of hundreds of thousands of 

trained reserve component personnel.’’ 

Juxtapose this reliance on our Reserve Components against the backdrop of large U.S. force structure reductions in the $400 billion 
2 

to $900 billion in defense cuts proposed over the past several 

months, and you can see how current challenges can grow to become significant problems. For the Army Reserves and Guard and 

the Air Guard, their ability to take on additional missions that require significant military support will be severely strained if the 

force structure in budget era reductions of the magnitude being discussed take effect. Even fulfilling their steady-state missions could 

be severely impacted. 

For example, let us look at just the Army for a minute. As was 

noted in our July hearing, general readiness indicators have gradually improved across the Army Active and Reserve Components 

over the past year. However, significant equipment challenges remain. While deployed units report high levels of equipment readiness, many home station and Reserve units report significant 

shortages of key items needed to fulfill their assigned missions and 

to conduct full-spectrum training. 

Anticipated budgetary reductions will further challenge this 

trend and the Army’s ability to simultaneously provide trained and 

ready forces for ongoing operations and other possible future commitments and contingencies. This will be particularly true as the 

Army has changed its role. 

During the Cold War, the Army Reserve Components were considered strategic Reserves, which meant that only very limited 

training was done during their one weekend a month, two weeks 

a year, duty time. Units were not funded for significant training 

and had limited equipment sets. 

In theory, these units would have significant time after mobilization to get up-to-date equipment and conduct extensive training. 

They would then deploy for the duration of the conflict, rotate back 

home afterwards and return to their strategic Reserve status. However, in the past 10 years, the Reserve Components have become 

more operational, which requires more training before mobilization 

and involves a reset training period upon a units return from theatre. It also requires substantial additional resources to enable 

more training prior to a unit’s formal mobilization. 

But is this model sustainable? I hope our witnesses will answer 

that question, especially as we are facing significant budgetary 

challenges. Since 1999, the overall Army Reserve O&M [Operations 

and Maintenance] funding almost tripled, but I worry whether we 

will be able to support such growth. 

With regard to the Air National Guard, one of their important 

missions is protecting the homeland through the Air Sovereignty 

Alert [ASA]. This mission has not been without its challenges, primarily because it was not adequately resourced, programmed or 

budgeted for by the Active Air Force. 

Also, unlike the cold war era when Air Force units were assigned 

to dedicated air defense units, the units that perform ASA operations today are part of the Air Force’s total force and deploy overseas to support military operations. This can cause significant challenges for those Air Guard ASA units that must train for their primary contingency operations support missions, while simultaneously training and manning their ASA mission. 

When an ASA Guard unit is deployed overseas, there is tension 

in how it also will meet its ASA mission, which is often accom-
3 

plished by transferring personnel and equipment from non-deployed units to fill shortfalls. Here again, I hope our witnesses will 

help us understand the resources needed to maintain these domestic missions at a time when we face diminishing budgets. 

Joining us today to discuss the challenges for resources, training 

and budget are three distinguished individuals. They have served 

their country well. We are very privileged to have them here today 

to provide their expertise, knowledge and counsel to us. 

First, we have Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, the commanding general of the United States Army Reserve Command. 

General, thank you for being here. We also have Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III, the director of the Air National Guard. 

And General, we thank you. And Major General Raymond W. Carpenter, the acting director of the Army National Guard. General, 

thanks for all that you do and for your time this afternoon. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Ms. Bordallo, for any remarks she may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good 

afternoon, gentlemen. 

Today, we continue our discussion on the overall readiness of our 

Armed Forces. We will hear from the directors of the Army and the 

Air National Guard, as well as General Stultz from the Army Reserve. And we look forward to the testimony from our witnesses. 

As both Generals Wyatt and Carpenter know, I am indeed very 

proud that the Guam National Guard has the highest membership 

per capita of any National Guard in this country. And I think that 

is a real testament to the level of commitment and respect that our 

men and women on Guam have for our Nation and the National 

Guard. 

The last decade of war and conflict has required our National 

Guard and Reserves to transform from a strategic Reserve to an 

operational force. Beginning on September 11, 2001, and continuing through today, our Air National Guard began flying combat 

air patrol missions over our cities and our most important landmarks. Days later, we saw the Army National Guard mobilize to 

provide security at airports throughout the Nation. Mission requirements expanded with the beginning of rotations to Afghanistan and then Iraq and other areas. 

Our National Guard and our Reserves have answered every call 

to duty, and their support for our Nation has been invaluable. 

However, the roles and the missions fulfilled by the National 

Guard and Reserves have required greater resources to meet their 

increased training, equipment and manning costs. And the Nation’s 

budget challenges will only amplify the difficulty of maintaining an 

operational National Guard and Reserve. 

Over the past few years, this committee has taken significant 

steps to address critical shortfalls in dual-line equipment needs 

through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. 
4 

However, the Army National Guard’s goal is to maintain 80 percent of critical dual-use equipment on hand at any one time. How 

will this be achieved in austere budget times? 

Also, with the eventual drawdown of end strength in the Army, 

it is important for our witnesses to address what impact this may 

have on the rebalancing of missions and skill sets within the National Guard and the Reserves. What impact might this have on 

the readiness of these forces? This committee has also worked to 

ensure appropriate funding is authorized for increased training requirements due to continuing high operational tempo in Iraq, and 

especially Afghanistan. 

In the Army Reserve alone, operation and maintenance costs 

have increased from $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1999 to a requested 

$3.1 billion in fiscal year 2012. Additional investments in the operation and maintenance accounts will be needed to support a home 

station training concept. 

Such efforts are important toward ensuring the continued accessibility of the National Guard and Reserves. But there will be challenges in fully implementing this concept. So I hope the witnesses 

can discuss these challenges in their testimony today, and what 

risks would be associated with reduced funding for these purposes. 

I also remain seriously concerned about aviation assets to our 

National Guard. Our House-passed Fiscal Year 2012 Defense Authorization bill contains a prohibition on retirement of C–23 Sherpa 

aircraft. What plan does the Army National Guard have to replace 

these aging aircraft? At one time, the C–27J joint cargo aircraft 

was the replacement. But former Defense Secretary Gates cut the 

buy to 38 planes, and shifted the program to the Air Force. 

How will we meet this equipment requirement in a difficult 

budget environment? Will homeland defense missions and airlift 

capability that is needed to support such missions be factored into 

replacing the C–23 Sherpas? I also remain concerned that the Department of Defense has not acknowledged the need to incorporate 

homeland defense mission requirements into certain planning assumptions. Further, I remain concerned that the National Guard 

Bureau has not taken a more prominent role in working with the 

various services and secretary-level agencies to better define these 

requirements. 

I hope that our witnesses, Mr. Chairman, can comment on when 

such requirements will be finalized and incorporated into the Department of Defense planning assumptions. If we do not have solid 

homeland defense requirements built into the planning process I 

fear we take significant risk in the readiness of our National Guard 

and Reserve to be appropriately trained and equipped to respond 

to these missions. 

And finally, this committee will closely examine future budgets 

to ensure that we do not hollow out our National Guard and our 

Reserves. To remain an operational force, we will need to see investment in the training and the equipment accounts in future 

years. We must always have a ready, a reliable and an accessible 

Reserve Component. And I look forward to the testimony of our 

witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
5 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bordallo can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine. And as we 

discussed prior to the hearing, I asked unanimous consent that we 

dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and depart from 

regular orders so that members may ask questions during the 

course of discussion. I think this will provide a roundtable type 

forum, and will enhance the dialogue on these very important 

issues. And without objection, so ordered. 

I also asked for unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members, if any, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all 

subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. 

Is there any objection? Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

Gentlemen, as we mentioned at the outset, we would like to, as 

a committee, first of all simply say thank you to each one of the 

three of you. Thank you for your service to our country, for the sacrifices that we know that each of the three of you have made. But 

also thank you to the men and women who serve under you, for 

the great job that they have done, for the sacrifices that we know 

they made for our country. 

Your written statements have been introduced. We will be introducing those to the record. You do not need to read those again, 

but we are welcome to hear them if you would like to. 

But what we would love to hear is just your opinions as to what 

you think this committee needs to know. The unfortunate thing is 

no good deed goes unpunished. And because you have done such a 

great job, the American people, many policymakers in Congress, 

will just assume you are going to continue to do that, regardless 

of the resources that we give you. 

Many of us fear that we have an enemy coming over the horizon 

that we have not seen in years and that is some deficit reduction 

cuts that perhaps could impact what you do for a long time to 

come. And so it is very important that we hear from you as to the 

impact you think these cuts could have on the men and women 

that you represent. 

So General Stultz, if it is okay with you we will start with you 

just because that is where you are seated in the great lineups. General. 

STATEMENT OF LTG JACK C. STULTZ, USA, CHIEF, U.S. ARMY 

RESERVE 

General STULTZ. Chairman Forbes, Ms. Bordallo, other members, 

on behalf of the over 205,000 Army Reserve soldiers that I command, first and foremost let me say thank you for your enduring 

support. Support in terms of financial, but also support in terms 

just of moral support that you give our soldiers and our families 

as they continue to perform, as you indicated in a magnificent way. 

And I was just down in Florida on Monday for a segment with 

Fox and Friends. And just a little snippet, you know, in-between 

their breaks, I had 140 soldiers with me there. And they cut to me 

and said, ‘‘What would you like to say?’’ And I just said, ‘‘You 

know, these people sitting around me in uniform are a national 
6 

treasure because it is a volunteer Army and they don’t have to be 

here.’’ 

‘‘And yet, for some reason they continue to raise their hand over 

and over.’’ And I said, ‘‘There is Sergeant Dasher sitting right here 

in front of me. I just met him. He is a big, strapping E–7 and he 

has been to Iraq three times, 2003, 2006 and 2010. And he said, 

‘Sir, when you need me, I will go back again.’ ’’ That is a national 

treasure. 

And so as you have indicated, it has cost more for us to become 

an operational force. But there is a reason for that, and there is 

a reason we have got to maintain that support. I brought along two 

charts just to illustrate why. The first chart here is, and I think 

you have a handout available to you, it demonstrates what we have 

done in terms of the force mix in our Army. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 

123.] 

General STULTZ. As we have grown the Army from a force of 

482,000 in the Active Army to 569,000 we really have not grown 

our Reserve Components very much. In the Army Reserve, we are 

still at 205,000. That is where we were pre 9/11. I think the National Guard was at 352,000. They are at 358,000 now in authorized end strength. 

So the growth has come in the Active Force, and that growth has 

come in greater combat capability with their great combat teams 

and greater aviation capability, with combat aviation, and other 

types of things. 

At the same time, we have shifted the combat service support 

more and more to the Reserve Components. And so between the 

National Guard and the Army Reserve, the chart illustrates that 

80 percent of the transportation capability for the Army is now in 

the Guard and Reserve. Seventy-five percent of the engineer capability is in the Guard and Reserve. 

In the medical community, 75 percent, roughly, is in the Guard 

and Reserve. Civil Affairs, 85 percent. And it goes on and on. That 

is why the Army has become dependent on the Reserve Components is because we are no longer the Reserve. We are the Army. 

We are what the Army depends on for these kinds of capabilities. 

And yes, it does cost us more to keep those forces ready because 

we are utilizing them and we have got to train them and maintain 

them. 

But we cannot afford as the Army has to come down in end 

strength to cut any support for our Reserve Components because 

they are going to be even more dependent on the Reserve Components if they have to come down in end strength on the Active side. 

More of this capability is probably going to shift our way. 

And what we have to do is, we have to be good stewards of the 

dollars you give us. We have to be efficient and effective. And we 

in the Army Reserve have developed the training strategy that 

says, you know, we are going to take soldiers and put them in a 

5-year rotational cycle. So in the fifth year, they deploy or they become available. And then they go back and reset and start training, 

and we gradually train them up so that we don’t spend a lot of dollars until we are sure we are going to use them. 
7 

But in that third and fourth year prior to deployment, we need 

some extra training days and we need to make sure we have got 

the right equipment to train on so they are prepared to go to war. 

Because the Army depends on them. 

And so my concern is just as you said, Mr. Chairman. As we are 

looking at some of these dramatic cuts that someone assumes we 

can just take the Reserve back to where it used to be prior to 9/ 

11/2001. We can’t. Because the Army is different today than it was 

9/11/2001 in terms of the way they are structured and in terms of 

their dependence on the Army Reserve and the National Guard. 

Now the next chart, if I could, will illustrate my concern. I call 

this the ‘‘dip chart,’’ if you want to call it. But this indicates the 

end strength of the Army Reserve and how it has changed. But 

more importantly, it indicates how the Army Reserve has changed 

in terms of the composition of the force. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 

124.] 

General STULTZ. If you go back to 2002–2003 timeframe, we were 

at almost 215,000 of a 205,000 authorization, almost 10,000 over 

strength. And then we went to war. And what we realized is we 

had a strategic force. We did not have a force that was prepared 

for war. We had soldiers in our force that were not competent to 

go to war, physically, mentally, and other means. 

We had soldiers in our force that said, ‘‘This is not what I signed 

up for. It is time for me to leave.’’ And a lot of times we gave them 

a medal, and said, ‘‘Thanks for your service.’’ 

And that structure, or that end strength, went all the down to 

almost 185,000 by 2006, when I came aboard as chief of the Reserve. That didn’t mean we just lost 30,000. Every year we were 

recruiting an additional 30,000 into the force. So you multiply several years of 30,000, plus the 30,000 reduction, and it is well over 

100,000 soldiers we lost out of our force—over 50 percent of our 

force. 

And then we started building back. And we built back with soldiers like Sergeant Dasher that I mentioned earlier, with soldiers 

who said, ‘‘This is what I am signed up for. I want to go do something. I want to be something. I want something that is fulfilling.’’ 

And that is the heroes that we have today that is a national 

treasure. Those are those soldiers that stand there on Christmas 

Day with me in Baghdad with their hands raised, taking an oath 

of reenlistment to stay in the uniform, knowing that they are risking their lives every day they go into battle. 

We can’t afford to lose that. The Army is dependent upon that. 

That is a national treasure. And my fear, if we start cutting the 

force, if we start cutting resources, that dip will occur. It will occur 

again as those soldiers who are in our force today say, ‘‘I am not 

going back to a strategic 1-weekend-in-a-month, 2 weeks in the 

summertime force. I want to be part of something.’’ 

What we owe our Nation is to maintain that investment that we 

have got because we know our Reserve Components are a tremendous return on investment in terms of what it actually costs for a 

soldier in the Reserve versus a soldier in the Active Army. 

We know that is a huge savings in terms of capability as long 

as you are confident it will be there when you need it and it will 
8 

be ready when you need it. And we have got that today. We have 

got to maintain it because if we are going to have to cut spending 

in the total defense budget, I think the Reserve Components are 

going to become even more critical as a way of saving capability 

and spending less. 

And so my pledge to you is I will do everything I can to be as 

efficient, as cost-effective as I can. But I owe it to my soldiers to 

maintain their readiness, to give them the equipment they need to 

train on and the equipment they need to go to war, and to take 

care of their families while they are gone. 

So I will look forward to your questions, sir. But again, thank 

you for all of you for your support for us. 

[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in the 

Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. And we owe them the same 

thing and thank you for helping us provide that to them. 

General Wyatt. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF, 

DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

General WYATT. Let me just say that it is an honor and privilege 

to be here with you today, and on behalf of the 106,700 Air National Guardsmen that are representing our country so well. 

As we meet here today, there are over 6,289 Guard airmen deployed around the world in Iraq, Afghanistan, providing, for example, air logistic support to the National Science Foundation in Antarctica and Greenland, and helping to defend U.S. interests in 

every continent around the globe. 

In addition, 3,437 Air National Guard men and women are protecting our homeland, including protecting the sovereignty of American airspace. And then, Mr. Chairman, you and Ranking Member 

Bordallo both referenced the ASA mission. I learned just recently 

that the mission that I traditionally referred to as ASA is now referred to by NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] as ACA, Aerospace Control Alert. 

So if I lapse back into an old vocabulary, please forgive me. They 

are one in the same, sir. So ASA, in my mind equates, to ACA. But 

these 3,437 Air National Guard airmen that are defending the 

homeland right now include not only those ASA–ACA folks, but assisting several authorities in the protection of life and property in 

the United States, flood control as we have recently seen here on 

the East Coast, tornado recovery efforts in the Midwest, and fire 

support in the southwest part of the country. 

Air Guard members are helping U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 

on the border as we speak. And so far, in regard to that, the mobile 

air firefighting system, the Air National Guard, has delivered over 

360,000 gallons of fire retardant in support of the National Forest 

Service interagency help. 

When the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm began in January 1991—I am going to take you through just a really brief history of the percentage of support that the Air National Guard has 

given our United States Air Force—back in Operation Desert 

Storm, 1991, 11 percent of the U.S. Air Force aircraft that were 
9 

flown in that operation were maintained by Air National Guard 

airmen. 

Fast forward to April 1993, when the U.S. Air Force was called 

upon to support NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] in the 

campaign to protect civilians in Bosnia. Recall also that, as a byproduct of Operation Desert Storm, we were also doing Operation 

Northern Watch and Southern Watch over Iraq. 

Continuing to support national security requirements around the 

world at that point in time, the Air National Guard provided 45 

percent of the deployed United States Air Force aircraft for Bosnia, 

Kosovo, Northern Watch, and Southern Watch, in addition to providing countless support operations around the globe. 

As demands upon the U.S. Air Force expanded beyond flight operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air National Guard men and 

women were there providing medical assistance around the world. 

I had the privilege yesterday of attending the Air Force Association 

awards banquet. General Johns, representing Air Mobility Command, one of his units, his MAJCOM [Major Command] gained 

units, won an award for the medical assistance. 

And he summoned General Stenner and myself to the stand, to 

the awards stand, because he recognized that 94 percent of the 

United States Air Force medical capability resides in the Reserve 

Component. This is a dual-use capability, as Ranking Member 

Bordallo pointed out, that is also available to our governors. 

As you recall, Secretary Gates recently directed the National 

Guard to stand up 10 homeland response forces comprised of Army 

National Guard and Air National Guard members. They are about 

556 strong. And one of the large pieces of that, on behalf of the Air 

National Guard, is this medical assistance, where we are able to 

deploy those skills that we have to support the warfighter overseas 

in support of our citizens here at home when we have a natural 

disaster or terrorist attack. 

And in addition to medical assistance, some of the other capabilities that we provide, non-flying, our explosive disposal experts, security forces, battlefield airmen, and other combat and support 

task. Today, Guard airmen are serving alongside our Air Force 

Joint Force and coalition partners around the world. I provide some 

of these statistics to emphasize that the men and women of today’s 

Air National Guard are ready. And not only are they ready, but 

they are willing and, in fact, anxious to serve their Nation both 

here at home and abroad. 

As we look to the many challenges of this country ahead, my goal 

is to lay the foundations for an Air Force that has the capability 

and the capacity to meet tomorrow’s challenges, within the constraints that we can foresee. I believe that the Air National Guard, 

as well as the Air Force Reserve, are a part of the solution. We 

have proven time and again to be ready, willing and accessible. 

Operation Odyssey Dawn, Operator Unified Protector, the aerial 

tanking refueling was done by 22 aircraft, 16 of which were Air National Guard. There was no mobilization authority, but over 800 

Air National Guard’s airmen deployed in support of that operation, 

without any mobilization authority—100 percent volunteers. 

After the Vietnam War, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird created the Total Force Concept, realizing that by increasing reliance 
10 

on the Reserve Components through improved equipment and increased training the Nation could maintain defense capability at a 

lower cost. 

That concept is even more valid today than it was back in 1970. 

And your investment in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account has been a critical component to the Air National 

Guard as we increased our readiness through the last 20 years. For 

example, without that investment our Block 30 F–16s, which are 

the backbone of protecting America’s skies, would have been irrelevant by now. 

The Air National Guard is a cost-effective, professional, ready 

airspace and cyberspace force. Based upon its traditional part-time 

professional workforce, and because we operate primarily from civilian airports and small community bases, we provide the costeffectiveness that this country needs at this critical time. 

You have created the most the professional combat-ready force in 

the history of the Air National Guard. Today’s Guard airmen understand that the Nation needs more of them than one weekend a 

month and 2 weeks in the summer. And they are ready and willing 

to answer the call. All they ask is that we continue to provide them 

with the equipment, the training and the resources they need to accomplish the mission. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the 

Appendix on page 82.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

General Carpenter. 

STATEMENT OF MG RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, USA, ACTING 

DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 

General CARPENTER. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member 

Bordallo, it is an honor and a privilege to be here today to represent the 360,000-plus Army Guard soldiers. Currently there are 

39,485 soldiers mobilized, and more than half of our force has combat experience. The sacrifice of our soldiers, their families and employers has been tremendous, and they deserve our deepest gratitude. 

Looking back on the past decade, the Army National Guard has 

been there from the very beginning. The New York National Guard 

was among the first on the scene at the World Trade Center on 

9/11, as was Maryland and Virginia in the days after the Pentagon 

was attacked. 

Beginning with the 9/11 response, the Army National Guard has 

continued to shoulder our responsibilities in the overseas fight in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, while simultaneously responding to events 

in the homeland, the largest of which was Hurricane Katrina. 

And the service of our Army National Guard continues. For example, the weekend of August 26 through the 29th past, the National Guard had more than 63,000 National Guardsmen on duty 

protecting this country at home and abroad. Over 47,500 National 

Guardsmen were deployed in support of overseas contingency operations and partnership-building missions. 

Almost 10,000 members of the National Guard on that weekend, 

from 24 states, responded to Hurricane Irene. We staged three 
11 

ground task forces, three air task forces, and we pre-staged them 

in anticipation of landfall for Hurricane Irene. Another 1,000 National Guardsmen provided security on our Nation’s southwest borders. An additional 4,000 National Guardsmen responded to a 

range of domestic emergencies across this country. 

The experience of the past decade has transformed the Army National Guard to an operational force—‘‘our national treasure,’’ in 

the words of a recently-retired, four-star Active Duty general. As 

an operational force, the Army National Guard represents the best 

value for America. Force structure and military power can be sustained in the Army National Guard for a fraction of the regular 

cost. The Army National Guard is one-third of the total Army, but 

accounts for approximately 10 percent of the total Army budget. 

Supporting capability in the Army National Guard makes good 

business sense. The Army National Guard could not have evolved 

into the operational force without the support of this committee 

and Congress. Our Nation has invested over $37 billion in equipment for the Army National Guard in the past 6 years. The delivery of that equipment has increased Army National Guard equipment on-hand rates for critical dual-use equipment by 14 percent. 

Because the Army Guard is a full partner with the Active Component, it is vital for the Guard to continue modernizing equipment. Modernization and interoperability are essential for training 

during the Army National Guard pre-mobilization periods, and critical for deployments. 

It is no secret that the Department of Defense and the Army are 

facing reduced funding. We in the Army Guard understand that, 

and have already set about garnering efficiencies and developing 

new strategies that will allow us to continue to meet our dual-mission responsibilities with less funding. Those two missions have required an Army National Guard of 360,000 soldiers formed into 54 

joint force headquarters, 8 combat divisions, 28 brigade combat 

teams, 8 combat aviation brigades, and over 70 enabling brigades 

during the past 10 years. 

We are reminded regularly that we live in a very dangerous and 

unpredictable world. And it seems like the predicted 100-year natural disaster events are coming closer and closer together. We have 

built a capability to respond to the needs of our citizens at home 

and abroad. We ought to fully understand the risk associated with 

reducing that capability. Because, in the words of a combat commander in Afghanistan, ‘‘Sometimes all it takes is all you have.’’ 

The Army National Guard is a force forward-deployed in the area 

of operation, the homeland. We have built great capacity in the National Guard by establishing forces specifically designed to deal 

with emergencies, disasters and potential terrorist attacks. 

Those units include Guard civil support teams, of which there 

are 57, 17 chemical-biological emergency response forces, 10 homeland response forces. General Wyatt mentioned that we are in the 

process of building the last eight of those in this next fiscal year, 

and two domestic all-hazards response teams. 

By one estimate, 96 percent of the events that happen across our 

country are handled by local first responders, policemen, firemen 

and the National Guard. Only 4 percent require Federal support. 

It has taken years to build these organizations. We should not rush 
12 

to reduce the size, structure or capability of the Army National 

Guard without significant analysis and thorough deliberation. 

I would like to specifically address a separate issue. And that 

issue is access to the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve 

in non-named contingencies. The Department of Defense requested 

a change in the statute section 12304 which would allow the Reserve Components to be involuntary called with prior coordination 

at the service-chief level, as well as the necessary budgetary authority to support the deployment. 

The Army National Guard and the adjutant generals are staunch 

advocates of the change in statute. We think that it will allow for 

the continued critical contributions of our soldiers and units in the 

effective use of soft power—that is, theater security and cooperation—in the hope of reducing the possibility of mobilized military 

response in the future. 

We think our soldiers, equipped with their battlefield experience 

and civilian skills as well as their strong desire to be used, can 

make meaningful contributions to their state and nation, are the 

right force at the right time. Without the change in statute, they 

will be denied the opportunity. 

In the end, we have asked for the Army National Guard’s share 

of the budget reductions to be given to us, the Army Guard. Let 

us, the Army Guard, figure out where to pay the bill. Don’t direct 

reductions in Guard brigade combat teams or end strength. 

In closing, the Army National Guard is battle-tested, and wellequipped for both of our missions. And this committee has been 

critical in building and sustaining the best manned, trained and 

equipped National Guard I have seen in my career. Truly a best 

value for America. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found in 

the Appendix on page 92.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you gentlemen. And we have got some individuals on this subcommittee who have a great deal of expertise 

when it comes to the Reserves and Guard, so we want to get to 

their questions. I am going to defer most of my questions until the 

end, but I do have two that I would like to just set up for you at 

the beginning. 

General Stultz, the chart that you have does not reflect what I 

think is just a tremendous story for the Reserve and Guard that 

you gentlemen have played in it. And that is, how you have 

changed kind of the overall complexion of the Reserve and the 

Guard units. 

As you mentioned, if you go back 15 years ago, maybe 20 years 

ago, I know a lot of people you talked to as to why they served in 

the Reserve or the Guard it is because it was easy. I mean, you 

know, they would do their one weekend a month and their 2 weeks. 

And we heard that a lot. Even when we began the beginning of this 

last decade we heard that from some people. 

Something happened. You transformed that. And when most of 

us travel to Afghanistan and Iraq, we are trying to find those individuals now and we can’t. When you go to anybody and say, ‘‘You 

know, here everybody says that you want to be home. How tough 

is it?’’ They all look you in the eye and say, ‘‘This is what we want 

to do. This is what we have signed up to do.’’ 
13 

And so my question to all three of you, if you can help us with 

this is, why do men and women want to serve in the Reserve or 

the Guards today, you know, as opposed to the Active Duty? You 

have done just a wonderful job in recruiting top-flight people who 

are willing to pay those prices. What is it that draws them? And 

what risk do we have of losing that if we had these huge cuts? 

And one other thing. General Stultz, can you just clarify for me 

in the chart you gave me? As I look at this, when I look at the 

medical between the Reserve and the Guard, it looks like to me 

that 74 percent of all the medical for the Army is being provided 

by the Reserve and the Guard, and 79 percent of the transportation. I just want to make sure I am not misreading that, and 

when we state that, it is accurate. 

So, if all three of you would have at that. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. With the question you just asked, the 

chart that I showed is the number of units in the Active and the 

Guard and in Reserve. And out of the total units in the medical 

force, 74 percent of them are in the Guard and Reserve. Out of the 

total units in the transportation force, 79 percent are now in the 

Guard and Reserve. So, it is the total number of units. So, it is that 

capability. Because that is what we deploy. We deploy units on the 

battlefield. 

With regard to your first question, you know that is one of the 

things I said. And as I meet with soldiers in Iraq, Afghanistan, I 

ask myself and I ask them a lot of times—‘‘Why?’’ 

You know, when you are sitting there across the table having 

dinner with Lieutenant [inaudible] several years ago—he is from 

California—and I said, ‘‘So where did you go to school?’’ And he 

said, ‘‘Grad or undergrad?’’ So, I said, ‘‘Okay, grad school.’’ And he 

said, ‘‘So I got my Ph.D. from MIT.’’ 

And I said, ‘‘So what do you do? What did you major in?’’ And 

he gave me this look like ‘‘You are not going to understand this.’’ 

And he proceeded to prove himself because he talked about thought 

patterns turning into speech patterns and the processes and the 

neurons. And I said, ‘‘What do you do for a living?’’ And he said, 

‘‘Sir, I develop artificial intelligence.’’ And I said, ‘‘What are you 

doing here?’’ 

And he said, ‘‘Sir, I was in grad school at MIT when 9/11 occurred, and I just felt compelled to serve my country. But I don’t 

want to give up my civilian career and my education. I don’t want 

to be a full-time soldier all the time. And the Army Reserve lets 

me do that. It lets me pursue my civilian goals, and also be part 

of something special, this brotherhood and sisterhood of men and 

women in uniform.’’ 

And I think that is part of the answer. It is this generation that 

we have got today that they are living the American dream, in 

some cases with good education, good jobs. But they just want to 

give back. But they don’t want to give up what they have earned. 

And so the Reserve Component allows them to do that. 

And for our military, you put a Reserve soldier, Guard or Reserve, on the battlefield you put a force multiplier on the battlefield. Because they bring civilian education and skills, in a lot of 

cases, that the Active Army just can’t develop. 
14 

You know, when I am in Afghanistan, and I have a young sergeant come up to me and say, ‘‘Hey, sir. I want to get my picture 

taken with you because I work at Procter & Gamble, too.’’ And I 

said, ‘‘Well, I retired from P&G when I took this job.’’ And he said, 

‘‘I know, sir. But I want to get my picture taken with you.’’ And 

I said, ‘‘So what do you do at P&G?’’ And he said, ‘‘Sir, I am a scientist.’’ And he says, ‘‘What did you do?’’ And I said, ‘‘Don’t worry 

about it.’’ 

I mean, that is the quality of soldiers that we have got in our 

force today, and we can’t afford as a nation to lose them. That is 

that right side of that chart. That is those individuals that said, 

‘‘I just want to be part of something and give back to America, and 

still be a civilian career and education that I have got.’’ 

If we cut support to them it is not just going to be a blow to the 

Reserve, it is going to be a blow to this Nation. Because the talent 

and the quality we have in our force—and for one-third of the cost, 

in a lot of estimates of what it costs for a full-time soldier—what 

we get in return is remarkable. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

General Wyatt. 

General WYATT. Chairman Forbes, a lot of the things that General Stultz indicated are true in the Air Guard, too. I think, broadly, patriotism. And I will link that to some of my other comments 

here. But patriotism, the ability and the privilege to serve alongside Americans that are of like ilk. 

I think the good feeling of joining an organization, a professional 

organization, that is trained to the same standards as our Active 

Duty brothers and sisters, an effective force, an opportunity to continue that service to country, the ability to live where they want 

to live and pursue the dreams that they want to pursue, both militarily and in their civilian lives. 

I am no different than any other Guardsman. But I served my 

first 6 years on active duty. I had always wanted to go to law 

school, but back in the Vietnam days I decided to join the Air 

Force, and I wanted to be a fighter pilot. 

And after I was a fighter pilot for about 6 years, that desire to 

get into law school came back, and I started checking out some programs. And the Air Force would send me to law school, but then 

I couldn’t be a pilot anymore. I had to be a JAG [Judge Advocate 

General], and I wanted to be both. And the Air Guard offered me 

the opportunity to pursue both of my dreams. 

I continued being a fighter pilot. I continued to go to law school. 

I graduated, practiced law. One point in time, when I was the wing 

commander at Tulsa in the F–16 unit, I was also a state court trial 

judge. And I tell people that, and they say, ‘‘How do you do that?’’ 

I say, ‘‘The same way that all the other Air National Guardsmen 

do it. Because we want to, because we can, and that is what we 

want to do. We want to serve this country, but pursue our individual dreams, too.’’ 

And I think when you can join an organization that has 

transitioned from being a strategic Reserve, like the Air Guard was 

when I first joined, into an operational force where you can’t tell 

the difference, you go into combat and everyone, Guard, Reserve 

and Active Component are trained at the same standard. 
15 

You know, when you take a look at the contributions of that 

flight of four that took down al-Zarqawi in Iraq, it was Active Duty, 

Guard and Reserve. It was an Air National Guard targeting pod 

provided by Engria that spotted the guy and got him. That is how 

the total force works, and the Air National Guard gives our individuals that opportunity to make their contributions to the national 

defense in the way that they want. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

General Carpenter. 

General CARPENTER. Chairman Forbes, we have a chart not unlike what General Stultz has in the Army Reserve in terms of our 

history with regard to end strength. And it is similar in terms of 

the dip that you see in 2005–2006. And what we saw in 2005–2006 

was the change in the Reserve Component from the strategic Reserve to this operational Reserve that we have today. 

And what happened in 2005–2006 is, we had a cohort that had 

joined back before 9/11. And we had talked and we had sold college 

benefits and those kinds of things in terms of service to country. 

And to their credit, they went down-range and they did a terrific 

job. 

But when they came back and they were reunited with their 

families and their employers, there was an influence there that 

said, ‘‘You know what? I am not sure we are willing to do this 

again.’’ And we saw a lot of those soldiers make a decision, for the 

right reasons, to leave our formations. 

At that point, we began changing the way we recruited people, 

the way we recruited soldiers. And what we did was, we recruited 

them for patriotism, for service to country. And we had soldiers 

who wanted to be part of something, who wanted to be part of a 

team, who wanted to go do something for their country, and yet 

were not interested in residing on Fort Hood or Fort Bliss or in the 

Active Component. And that Army National Guard team, that 

Army National Guard family, you find throughout our organization. 

I was at the Gulf oil spill a year ago. I met a father-and-son 

team. They had both come into the National Guard since 9/11, and 

they were very proud of their service. They were not only doing 

work on the oil spill in Louisiana, they were getting ready to deploy into Afghanistan. And they have been mobilized, and they are 

down-range together. The son, by the way, has graduated from 

OCS [Officer Candidate School] and he is a second lieutenant. His 

father is an E–5 sergeant, about to be a staff sergeant. 

I ran into a mother-daughter team at the southwest border in 

Texas 6 months ago when I was down there. Same story. They had 

joined since 9/11. The mother was so proud of her service, and she 

wanted her daughter to be part of something. And she invited her 

daughter into the organization, and invited her to be part of the 

Texas National Guard. 

People don’t do that if they don’t feel good about their service, 

if they don’t like what they are doing. As a matter of fact, their 

tendency would be to serve and leave as opposed to invite their 

friends and, in this case family members, to be part of this organization. 
16 

So, we think we have got a great team in this Army National 

Guard. We think we have a treasure across this country, not unlike 

the other Reserve Components. And so it is my pleasure to represent them here today. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you, gentlemen. Thank all three of you 

for the great job you have done. 

Ms. Bordallo is now recognized for any questions she may have. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I decided 

I am going to go ahead with my first question, on behalf of Congresswoman Gabby Giffords. General Wyatt, I believe this question 

might be for you. 

As you know, Congresswoman Giffords is very proud of the brave 

men and women of Tucson’s 162nd Fighter Wing. And she feels 

strongly their primary mission of building international partnerships via training tactical skill sets is a strategic imperative during 

these fiscally austere times. 

So, as the Joint Strike Fighter comes online, how do you envision 

the Wing’s mission evolving? And can you discuss strategic significance of the Barry Goldwater training range? 

General WYATT. Ms. Bordallo, thank you very much for the question. I had the honor and privilege of being in Tucson last Thursday. We were at part of the 162nd Fighter Wing. An attendant unit 

there is the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Test Center. 

And I was getting some out-briefs on our weapons and tactics conferences. This is where our warfighters come in across all of the 

core functions of the United States Air Force and tell us the equipment and the training that is critical to them in order to be a frontline military force. 

It is a great treasure that we have in Tucson at the 162nd Fighter Wing. The Wing’s main mission, as Ms. Giffords knows, is to 

train foreign military students in the F–16 and the skills that are 

necessary to do that. Not only do you have to have the skills of 

being a fighter pilot, but you have to be able to teach the skills. 

And there is a big difference in being able to do it, and being able 

to do it and teach it. 

And you throw in the additional challenge of having students 

who may not be quite as proficient in the English language as we 

would like them to be, it takes a special talent, special skill, that 

exists nowhere else in the United States Air Force except Tucson, 

Arizona. So it is a national treasure. 

As we are seeing in the paper, and we are following the development of the F–35, we know that in addition to the coalition partners that have signed on as part of the Joint Strike Fighter F–35 

program there are a lot of other countries now who are recognizing 

the capability that this aircraft offers, and they are approaching 

the United States for opportunities to buy that aircraft. 

I see a need, a continuing need, for the 162nd to continue doing 

not only the F–16 foreign military training mission, but to gradually transition into the F–35 as more and more of the F–35 become 

available to our coalition partners and allies that desire to get into 

that airplane. So I do see them transitioning into the F–35. 

In fact, they were one of the training bases that was identified 

a year ago this last July by the Secretary and the chief of staff as 

one of the potential bed-down bases for F–35 training. They were 
17 

not selected as the primary location—I think Luke was and Eglin— 

but they were certainly on the list. And I would think, as this aircraft comes into the inventory, they will get closer and closer to realizing that mission. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General. And I know that 

Congresswoman Giffords will appreciate what each of you do for 

our country, and we look forward to having her back with us again 

soon. 

My question then for, I guess, each of the witnesses; what would 

be the impact on the National Guard and Reserves if you had to 

go back to the strategic Reserve model of training and deployments? 

If you can just quickly answer that, beginning with you, General? 

General STULTZ. Yes, ma’am. As I indicated, the chart here I 

think is indicative. I think we will lose a lot of soldiers. Just what 

Chairman Forbes asked, ‘‘Why are they here?’’ They are here because they want to serve and they want to do something, will say, 

‘‘If I am not going to have the opportunity, if I am going to go back 

to a strategic one-weekend-a-month service, I don’t want to stay 

in.’’ 

So we will lose that investment, and we will lose that talent. But 

additionally, this Nation will lose their ability to respond because 

of the capabilities that we have. We are the ones that open the theatre. We are the trucks, we are the boats, we are the logistics, we 

are the people who push that force into the theatre to respond to 

a contingency. 

And if we don’t invest and if we don’t maintain this support we 

will lose that ability also. And the next time we have to respond 

to a contingency somewhere else in the world it will take us longer 

as a nation to respond and get the forces in, in the magnitude that 

we need. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

General. 

General WYATT. Congresswoman, I think the answer is very 

similar. If we were relegated back to strategic Reserve, a` la the Air 

National Guard that I joined back in 1977, I think we would have 

a mass exodus of people. Because they are joining our organizations now because they know they train to the same standards, 

they know they are as good as, they know they provide the top line 

combat capability, and they want to continue doing that. 

We offer them the opportunity to do that at a significantly reduced cost to the country. And they recognize that they are the 

best bang for the buck as far as providing that military capability. 

If we put them back on the burner as a strategic Reserve they will 

still cost the country money, but they won’t be able to provide that 

front-line—respond at the same speed of light—that the Active 

service responds. They won’t be able to provide that capability. 

The other thing we do is, we take away the abilities of the governors and the adjutants general to respond to the domestic demands of their offices as those guardsmen are in Title 32 status. 

We train to such high standards in the military, and we use the 

level of that training in response to our state missions, too. 

So if we do that, we would actually be taking a double hit. We 

would lose military combat capability, besides losing our people. 
18 

And we would lose the ability to respond on a moment’s notice on 

behalf of the governors and the adjutants general. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I think that what comes to my mind is the experience they bring. I mean, that is just invaluable. It is—— 

General WYATT. Well, if I may—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

General WYATT [continuing]. Along those lines, one of the reasons that we are cost-effective—and I will talk about fighter pilots 

because that is what I am most familiar with—is because of the experience level that we have in the combat air forces inside of the 

Air National Guard, our experience level is—this is based on the 

number of hours and sorties and numbers of deployments and 

other things, skill levels—we have a 90 percent skill level in the 

Air National Guard. The Active Component is 40 percent. 

This allows us to maintain that high level of proficiency while we 

fly our people two less sorties per month than the Active Component gets. When you talk about an aircraft that costs $10,000 to 

$20,000 an hour to fly, we save perhaps a half million dollars per 

pilot a year just because of our experience level. And we can do 

that because of that experience level. 

Ms. BORDALLO. General Carpenter. 

General CARPENTER. Ma’am, I would echo everything that General Stultz and General Wyatt had to say. I would add this. With 

regard to returning to a strategic Reserve, there is no funding in 

the Army’s base budget to support the mandates and the additional 

requirements that go along with this operational Reserve. 

We have built this operational force on OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations funding], and when OCO goes away we in the 

Guard and the Reserve are going to be back to 48 drills and 15 

days of AT [annual training]. So there will be no requirement for 

anybody to do anything except watch as this force is put back in 

the box, back to 48 drills and 15 days of annual training. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. And one other 

quick question I have. This is in regard to the future of the C–27J. 

Can you talk about the future viability of the fleet, and the intended platform mission sets, given the growing concern that the 

reduced inventory will not be able to adequately support crew proficiency, operational readiness, and infrastructure investments? 

As you know, this committee remains concerned that the Department plans to retire the C–23 Sherpas without accounting for how 

the tactical airlift will be accomplished. The C–27J was the replacement aircraft, but the program was significantly cut and shifted to 

the Air Force. So what are the plans to support domestic emergency operations and other contingencies? 

General, begin with you. 

General WYATT. Congresswoman, that is an excellent question, 

and one that I think is hard-pressed to answer right now. Let me 

just review a couple of things that have happened in recent years, 

talking about the C–27. I will let General Carpenter talk about the 

C–23. 

But if you go back to 2005, BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure], the Air National Guard lost over 20 percent of its C–130s as 

a result of BRAC. We were able to respond to Katrina with over 

220 aircraft because the effects of BRAC had not begun to be im-
19 

plemented. Now our numbers are well below that 200 level, coupled 

at a time when the Army has put the C–23, perhaps, on the chopping block. And I will let General Carpenter address that. 

As has previously been referenced, the program of record right 

now for the C–27J is 38. And so, we are marching to that tune. As 

we speak, the C–27 is deployed in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The 

Mansfield Air National Guard is flying that aircraft in combat 

today. 

The anticipation of the need of this aircraft being flown in direct 

support to the Army in the theatre, and the reduced numbers, 

drives the Air National Guard then to consider ways to meet those 

mission requirements overseas with all the airplanes that will 

eventually be deployed overseas, at the same time as continuing 

our training here at home to keep our pilots and air crew proficient 

and also bring on new pilots and air crew. 

This has required us to up the crew ratio per airplane—traditionally somewhere around two crews per airplane for an airlifter—to 

five, to allow enough air crews to do the deployment mission overseas and continue training here. So that is how that has affected 

us. 

We continue to look forward to continue feeling of the C–27J. 

The demands for the domestic operation are where I have great 

concern. Because while the Air Force will tell you that there is sufficient airlift to handle the demands of the country around the 

world, the question I ask is, ‘‘Okay, but how long does it take us 

as an Air Force to do that?’’ 

We look at the requirement for domestic operations, 72 hours is 

a lifetime. It is an unacceptable time-response frame. When the 

governors call upon airlift, they need the airlift right now. It 

speaks for a need of what I would call ‘‘organic airlift,’’ airlift that 

is in the Air National Guard at the behest of the governors so that 

they can respond to national emergencies. 

The Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study 2016 that came out 

addressed support to the homeland, but it referenced the access to 

the Active Duty airplanes which will be available. But most of 

them are deployed, and I would submit to you it takes about 3 days 

to get a C–130 from Japan home. That is 72 hours. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Oh, I agree with that, sir. 

General WYATT. You know the time and distance. The response 

to the civilian fleet is the same thing. It takes about 96 hours to 

get a civilian aircraft on contract to do a domestic mission. All 

those are too late for the response to the homeland. So I am working with the Air Force, and I am getting a lot of support to go back 

and look at the domestic requirements for airlift. Especially in view 

of the fact that, subsequent to the Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study, Secretary Gates said, ‘‘Stand up these 10 homeland response forces, 556 soldiers and airmen, to be able to respond.’’ 

Sometimes needing airlift, most probably needing airlift, as the 

National Level Exercise 11 in May showed us when we practiced 

for the fault line earthquakes—Mississippi, Ohio, et cetera. There 

is a need. 

I think we need to determine what the requirements are for the 

homeland. I have asked for the help of NORTHCOM [Northern 

Command], and NORTHCOM is helping us develop those require-
20 

ments in conjunction with Air Mobility Command, Transportation 

Command, so that we can get a true handle on the requirements 

for the domestic airlift, in addition to the warfight airlift requirements. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you General. 

And quickly, General Carpenter. I know I have overstayed my 

time, I guess. 

General CARPENTER. Yes, Congresswoman. A couple of key 

points. All the C–23s are in the Army National Guard. Because of 

a budget decision, we have been directed to divest ourselves of all 

of those C–23s by FY [fiscal year] 2015. We currently have four 

that are parked on the ramp in Texas. They are no longer available 

for us to use and we will progressively park the rest of them over 

the next 4 or 5 years. 

We think that the gap that General Wyatt alluded to right now 

in terms of homeland defense and support, that is coming and is 

being accomplished by the C–23s. But for the C–23s, we wouldn’t 

be filling that gap in terms of short takeoff and landing and tactical air kind of things that are being provided by the C–23s. We 

think that it is a pretty valuable aircraft. 

I was in Balad 6 months ago, in Iraq. There were 10 aircraft on 

the ground there, 9 present for duty because 1 was in transit. All 

nine of those aircraft flew that evening. And they supported everything from Special Ops [Special Operations] to normal flights back 

and forth. And so this aircraft provides that kind of capability. It 

also provides observer support during the oil spill, for domestic operations. 

We have two of them in the MFO [Multinational Force] Sinai 

mission that provide observer support in that venue to support the 

MFO Sinai mission there. So we think they are a great aircraft. 

Unfortunately, we are going to be divesting ourselves of those particular aircraft over the next 4 years. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. Thank you, General. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Nevada, Dr. Heck is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all three of you 

for your lifetime of selfless service to our Nation. And in the interest of full disclosure, I will say that I am one of the over 205,000 

Army Reservists that General Stultz commands. 

Just a quick comment at first. I won’t take away from the idea 

that those that join now do so out of patriotism, but I think it is 

also important to know it is a two-way street. Folks join the Reserves so they get to do some pretty neat things that they don’t get 

to do—that that scientist at P&G [Procter and Gamble] or the MIT 

Ph.D. is not going to get an opportunity to jump out of airplanes, 

fast rope out of helicopters, and not to mention the incredible leadership training opportunities that will set them up for success in 

their civilian careers. So it is a two-way street. 

General Stultz, as you know my area of concern mostly is military medical readiness, and we have had several discussions on 

that. First, I want to start off by congratulating Major General 

Stone and Colonel Kiernan for the things that they have done to 

help clean up some of the issues that we have seen with overdue 

profiles. 
21 

My question is, has there been an audit done of the LHI [Logistics Health, Inc.] contract and the costs associated with those mass 

events per unit soldier, the cost and the impact of no-shows on 

vouchers, and ways to look at cost containment by pushing more 

of what LHI does back to our military force? 

I know we are doing ORWs [Operation Ready Warrior] for dental, which have been successful, rolling perhaps those out to include vision and immunizations, having our medical personnel perform the physical examinations for those that are being jammed up 

by temporary profiles. 

So one, has there been an audit? If not, are there plans to have 

an audit? And what are the plans to move forward to push some 

of those activities being contracted out back to our TPU [Troop Program Unit] soldiers? 

General STULTZ. To answer the first question, as a formal audit 

I can’t say that we have done a formal—if you want to call it an 

audit—to run the traps on it. We have looked at how much we are 

spending and what it is costing us and is it cost effective. 

As you well know, we have gone back to LHI to renegotiate some 

of the provisions of the contract to limit what they actually do for 

us. And I think the big question I have asked, to be perfectly 

straight with you, in the process of what LHI does for us when a 

soldier fills out the personal health assessment, a doctor from LHI 

who has no access to that soldier’s records makes a determination 

of what care or what profile he needs. 

But it still has to go to our Regional Support Commands to get 

further looked at by a doctor. And in a lot of cases further on, I 

am not sure what the value is there exactly. And what we have to 

do, I think, as we are going to be forced to draw down in our budgets, is do what we have already started, as you allude to. 

We are going to have to do a lot of this stuff ourselves, and use 

our own resources. Now in the past, we have gotten away from that 

because of the demand and the op tempo [operations tempo] and 

the training needs and everything else we have had on our medical 

force. 

But as that demand comes down, as we draw down out of Iraq 

and as we gradually draw down out of Afghanistan, those medical 

resources that we have got within our Reserve are going to become 

more available to us. We have got to take advantage of them. We 

have got to get back to the traditional, where we use our own resources to perform those medical examinations, those medical determinations, because we can do that on our time. 

You know, when we try to send a soldier to get a medical exam, 

we have to do that based on when the doctor is available. And 

quite often we take that soldier away from his civilian job. When 

we use our own resources, we have a little bit more control over 

saying, ‘‘You are going to go here on this weekend, where the soldier is already there, and you are going to give him that examination and all.’’ 

So yes, sir. I am all for, and have our staff looking at, shifting 

more and more of that, as we started in American Samoa, as we 

have started in Alaska, as we have started in other areas where 

we are providing medical and dental support to our soldiers on ex-
22 

ercises. Now, how do we get to them on the drill weekends and continue that support? 

Dr. HECK. I appreciate that, and it is very encouraging. And I 

would encourage at some point that there is a full audit done of 

LHI to see whether or not what they are providing has been costeffective. And as we start to move some of those activities back to 

our TPU or ARS [Army Reserve Soldiers] soldiers, that we can see 

whether or not it is truly cost-effective. 

So thank you and thank you for your forthrightfulness. 

General STULTZ. Roger, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you Dr. Heck. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, thank 

you for being here. Thank you for your service. 

General Wyatt, you know my sympathies were focused on the 

177th and I classify them—I don’t know if all of my colleagues 

would agree—as the premier homeland security base, primarily because of their strategic location and what they can bring to the 

fight in so many ways. 

But could you give us some insight on where you see—and I am 

going to go with the old name too, ASA, because it is going to take 

me a while to get switched over—the ASA mission going and its 

construct in the future, in light of the Air Force budget cuts which 

may have an effect on critical Air National Guard missions? 

And additionally, I am wondering if you have been speaking with 

the Air Force brass, their leadership, to ensure that the ASA units 

receive the upgrades necessary. I have been talking about this, and 

Mr. Chairman you have been helpful with this and this committee 

has been helpful. But some of these Air Guard units are running 

with iron that is just—their wings are going to fall off. 

And if they can’t fly they don’t have a mission. So I would hope 

you could talk to us a little bit about this. 

General WYATT. Mr. LoBiondo, first of all 177th, great organization. You are right. Their strategic location, along with probably 

the 113th here in DC to protect the National Capital Region, is 

strategically probably the two most important locations that we 

have. They are all important because they protect the American 

citizens. 

But I see the ASA–ACA mission as one imperative for the safety 

of this country. It is mission number one. There has been a recent 

study done by a former commander of NORTHCOM, Admiral 

Sandy Winnefeld, who is now the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

Some of that is classified, and I won’t get into that. 

But I think that a review of that report shows the importance 

of that mission for homeland security. So I see a continuing reliance upon the Air Sovereignty Alert mission for the safety of this 

country. 

On September 11, 2001, we were up at seven locations. Today, 

in the continental United States, we have 16 locations. All of those 

are flown by the Air National Guard. The United States Air Force 

flies one in Alaska with F–22s. 

We get into this discussion about whether you need fifth-generation fighters to do the Air Sovereignty Alert, not necessarily for the 
23 

stealth, but for all the other capabilities that fifth generation 

brings—ESR [electronically scanning radar] radar, integrated sensor fusion among not only the sensors on the aircraft itself, but all 

of the other sensors available—land-based radar, radio reports, 

chats, a lot of different sources for some information to help us in 

the intercept of these targets. 

And then Hawaii Air National Guard location, who will be flying 

the ASA–ACA mission in F–22s. The airplanes, most of the airplanes, that we do the ASA–ACA mission with are the oldest F– 

16s in the inventory. And you are very familiar with that because 

the 177th flies a Block 30 F–16. 

The Air Force has put in some weapons system sustainment 

money that will keep the airframes themselves viable, we think, for 

a couple of more years. We thought 2017–2018 would be the structural limitations. We think there are sufficient monies to keep 

them flying until 2019, maybe 2020. But the structural part is just 

a part of the issue. 

The other part, and probably for the mission equally as important, is the ability to detect, meaning these aircraft need state of 

the art radars. The ones that they are flying with now are extremely expensive and difficult to maintain. A lot of the parts are 

no longer manufactured. 

Only because we have the best maintenance people in the world 

in the Air National Guard are we able to keep some of these support systems onboard the aircraft working. They lack beyond line 

of sight radio communications that are necessary for this mission. 

They lack the ability to integrate and infuse all of the sensor data 

that is available for intercepts. 

And so we are kind of operating with our hands behind our back 

here as we go forward. We can still accomplish the mission in the 

short term. My concern is the long term. And if we don’t put money 

either into these aircraft to give them the capabilities that they 

need to continue, or if we don’t replace them with the F–35 aircraft, we face a continuing rising expense, perhaps cost prohibitive, 

if there is such a thing for the Department’s number one mission. 

Or we are going to see mission failure because we simply cannot 

stretch the life of these airplanes out any longer. 

Right now, the only Air National Guard unit that performs Air 

Sovereignty Alert that has been named to receive the F–35 is Burlington, Vermont. No other Air National Guard unit has been 

named. And you have got to remember that the units that do ASA 

and ACA, that is not their only mission. They also rotate and do 

the AEF [Air Expeditionary Force] mission OCONUS [outside of 

contiguous United States] overseas, Iraq and Afghanistan, and 

other possible locations in the world where stealth is a requirement 

to be able to get into access-denied areas. 

So I think a healthy investment in the F–35 and the Air National Guard is great, is required not only for the foreign fight overseas, but more importantly for the defense of this country with the 

ASA–ACA missions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Chairman I had a couple of more questions, but maybe I can 

submit them for the record. 

Mr. FORBES. We would be glad to take those into the record. 
24 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentleman from Texas recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank 

you for being here this morning. I apologize for having to leave, but 

we have got some conflicts in some of our committees. 

As I fly home almost every weekend through Dallas, I get a 

chance to interact quite a bit with not just regular duty soldiers 

and airmen and sailors going through Dallas, but also recently a 

bunch of National Guard and Reserve individuals as well. 

And one of the things I asked them, you know—particularly since 

9/11—we have asked a lot of our Reserves and National Guardsmen. And one issue that keeps coming up is the predictability of 

military service. And it may be a contradiction in terms because it 

doesn’t make sense. Because they tell me prior to 9/11 they had a 

good idea of whenever they might be called up because of floods, 

hurricanes, those kinds of weather-related issues. 

Post 9/11, however, it is a completely different situation. We are 

asking a lot of them. We are asking them to leave their jobs for 

extended periods. 

So my question is, how do you plan—or maybe it should be can 

you plan—to somewhere, at some point, normalize again the activation and mobilization of our Reserves and National Guardsmen. Is 

that viable now, post 9/11? Are we, at some point, going to be able 

to give them that predictability for activation? 

Because retention is the big issue. You know, so many of them 

say, as my colleague was saying, ‘‘We get to do some pretty neat 

stuff.’’ And in the old days it was under more of a normal environment. So I kind of would like to get each of your comments on that 

aspect of it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

General STULTZ. Yes sir. From the perspective of the Army Reserve, yes sir, I think we can. When I talk to soldiers and I ask 

them, ‘‘What do you want?’’ They really give me three specifics usually, the first one being predictability. ‘‘Because I have got another 

job, I have got another life, and I need to be able to predict when 

the Army is going to use me and when I am going to be able to 

focus on my other career.’’ 

Then their second thing is, ‘‘Don’t waste my time. If you are 

going to train me make it effective, make it worthwhile. Don’t just 

waste my time.’’ And the third one is, ‘‘Use me. I have signed up 

to do something, I want to do something, so use me.’’ 

And what we have adopted is, you have heard of the 

ARFORGEN, the Army Force Generation model, which is a 5-year 

model for the Army Reserve. For every 1 year, or whatever you are 

called up, you get 4 years back home of stability and progressive 

training readiness to get back to that fifth year. 

Soldiers have said, and employers have said, ‘‘If you can give me 

that predictability, I can live with that. Because 4 years in a 20- 

year career, that means I would be used about three, four times at 

most. It gives me about 4 years back home.’’ Which for most of our 

kids—and I call them kids—they change jobs about every 4 or 5 
25 

years. So they start a different career anyway in a lot of cases. So 

they are used to kind of starting over. 

That is the key. And the key to getting that ARFORGEN model 

is, one, we have got to be able to get the Army to say this is what 

we need from you each year. And then we have got to slice it into 

five slices, and build our force structure so we can give the Army 

what they require every year in a predictable manner. 

And then we have got to build that training and equipping 

model, which requires the resources to be able to give that soldier 

what he wants, meaningful training. ‘‘Don’t waste my time.’’ It is 

going to be meaningful whether it is simulations, or whether it is 

in-the-dirt training with the modern equipment. And if we can do 

that the soldiers will say, ‘‘I will be here with you,’’ and employers 

say, ‘‘We will be here with you also.’’ 

General CARPENTER. Sir, not unlike the situation that General 

Stultz just described for the Army Reserve, it is essentially the 

same for the Army National Guard. The Army Force Generation 

model has provided that level of predictability that we didn’t have 

before. 

On January 19, 2007, then Secretary of Defense Gates made the 

announcement the Reserves, the National Guard, would be mobilized for 1 year and 1 year only. And that provided the predictability in terms of how long you were going to be away from your 

job and be away from your family. A huge step forward for us in 

the Army National Guard. 

Separate from that, when we started into this we did very shortterm notification and mobilizations. And it was painful. Some of 

our units were notified, and at the MOB [mobilization] station and 

going down-range inside of 30 days at the start of what we saw in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, and that was certainly a shock to the system. 

What we have derived to is a notification of sourcing. That is, notifying the unit at least 2 years in advance that they are going to 

be used, alerting them at 1 year out, and then providing the mobilization order 180 days out. And the 180 days out is very key because that allows for the soldier to have the TRICARE benefits 

that they didn’t have before. 

So if they do not get the mobilization order they don’t get that 

TRICARE benefit. And we are seeing, as we come down now out 

of Afghanistan and Iraq, the off-ramps, first of all, delays in issuing 

the mobilization order for good reasons. Because we want to ensure 

that these soldiers are, in fact, going to go. And so they are being 

disadvantaged because they don’t have the TRICARE eligibility. 

And then beyond that, we are seeing some units off-ramped, in 

other words not going to the mobilization station. We recently had 

a Utah unit of about 400 soldiers that were planning on being mobilized and going down-range here on the 15th of September, and 

their mobilization was canceled because there was no requirement 

for the unit. 

We have worked with the Army, and identified soldiers who have 

hardship cases and ones who left their jobs and don’t have employment, those kinds of things. And we have found ways to do tours 

of duty separate for those particular soldiers. In the case of the 

Utah unit, TAG [The Adjutant General] Utah made arrangements 
26 

with the schools. And they have got 25 percent of those soldiers 

now back in school doing college instead of missing a semester. 

So it is a painful process, but the predictability is absolutely key. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Wyatt, first of all I represent Robins Air Force Base in 

the 116th. I would like to invite you to visit us, see our J–STARs 

[Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System], and talk with 

you about the future of that program. Do you think we have 

enough J–STARs, just offhand? 

General WYATT. I think we need more of the capability. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

General WYATT. Whether it is in that particular platform or another one is, I guess, up for debate and something that we could 

talk about. 

It has been several years since I have been to the 116th, but I 

have been down. And I know that with the GMTI, the Ground 

Moving Target Indicator, that that particular platform provides, it 

is in demand all over the world. The 116th is one of those high operations tempo Air National Guard units because there is, in my 

opinion, not enough for the GMTI capability. 

The Air Force is trying to robust that capability through not only 

enhancement of the J–STARs, but other platforms that can provide 

similar capabilities. Not the same kind, because in the J–STARs 

you have the sensor operators and the folks in the back that can 

give you real-time analysis of what they are seeing through the 

sensor systems. 

The sensor systems themselves are getting old and worn out. 

And, again, Air National Guard Maintenance keeps those things 

flying. But it is a great unit. To answer your question, we need 

more of the capability, and we can talk about how that might be 

provided. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well they do an excellent job for this country and our 

allies. And if you get the opportunity, we would love to host you 

down there and do a tour of the planes. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service and the men and women 

that you represent. General Carpenter, I want you to know that I 

heard what you said—don’t micromanage my command. Give me 

my budget number and let me handle it. And I hope that is the 

way we do it. 

And one last question, if I could, General Carpenter. How many 

different budget numbers do you get in a year? How often, with 

continuing resolutions and other things, is your budget changing 

and how much difficulty creating for you and your command? 

General CARPENTER. I think what we saw last year with the continuing resolutions and the stutter starts and stops were concerns 

by our soldiers about whether or not they were going to get paid 

or whether they weren’t going to get paid. 

I know that Congress, and I know the President have gone the 

extra mile to try and ensure that that worry goes away. But frankly last April when I was in Iraq and when we had the issue with 

the continuing resolution, it spread like wildfire across that com-
27 

munity about the situation with regard to pay and allowances and 

benefits. 

The goal here is for those soldiers down-range to concentrate on 

their mission. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

General CARPENTER. To do what they need to do, to not be distracted. And our goal, and I am sure yours is the same, I think the 

extent that we are successful in that then we are going to see soldiers that are going to be successful in their mission. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman for his questions. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. Hanabusa, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Carpenter, you have said certain things that have 

piqued my interest. First of all, you mentioned an amendment to 

a statute, I think it was Section 12304. Or did I hear you correctly? 

You want a change in the statute. Was that the right section? 

General CARPENTER. Yes, ma’am, it is Title 10, Section 12304. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And what exactly is the change that you are 

looking for? 

General CARPENTER. The situation inside of the Army National 

Guard and the Army Reserve, and the Air National Guard and Air 

Reserve, right now is that we have no authority to involuntarily 

call our soldiers to duty unless it is a named operation like Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. 

If we want to continue to use this operational Reserve and not 

use it for those kinds of contingencies—use it for theatre engagement, theatre cooperation, in our case, State Partnership Program 

initiatives, those kinds of things—we have got to be able to involuntarily call our soldiers to active duty as a team, as a unit, to be 

able to do that. 

This modification of 12304 allows that. Initially, the proposal was 

that inside of the defense budget, the President’s budget, was going 

to be the authority for 60,000 reservists to be called to duty during 

that budget year. And that those 60,000 soldiers or reservists 

would have a funding line associated with them. 

So it was going to provide the authority, provide the funding. 

And that by way of it being inside of the President’s budget de 

facto, it was the President’s consent—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. Call. 

General CARPENTER [continuing]. To be able to call those reservists to active duty. 

I think that the Senate version, as I understand it, reduced that 

60,000 to 10,000. And even at 10,000, at least it provides the opportunity for us to do the involuntary call-up. 

Ms. HANABUSA. The reason it piqued my interest is because one 

of the issues that I raise with almost everyone who comes before 

us that is National Guard and/or Active is, that issue arises is really the conflict between Title 10 and Title 32 status, which, of 

course, involves the two of you there. 

And something else that you said is also, I think, critical in understanding another issue. I think you also said that as the end 
28 

strength comes down you are concerned about OCO funding because a lot of the operational status of the Guard is tied to, basically, OCO, our overseas operation. 

Pending, I think an issue that is dear to both of your hearts, is 

whether or not there will be, quote/unquote—a ‘‘fourth seat,’’ or the 

seat for the Guard on the Joint Chiefs. And it would seem that unless there is some understanding of all of us as to what exactly this 

change to Section 12304 would be one step, is that as we cut the 

end strength, or as maybe OCO starts to cut, which is anticipated 

by everyone’s budget, and if you go back to a strategic kind of command for the National Guard Reserves is always Title 10, does that 

not call into question this whole debate that they are now having 

about whether or not the Guard should then have a, quote/unquote—‘‘seat’’ with the Joints. Because of the fact that if you go 

back to the pre 2005–2006 timeframe, the question will be how 

would that then be justified, because most of your rank and file 

would technically be under state control because they would be 

Title 32 status. 

General CARPENTER. Ma’am, actually, unless called by the President we are in a Title 32 status. And the only exception for that, 

for the most part, are people who are mobilized and deployed downrange in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the response to Hurricane 

Irene, for instance, was totally done in a Title 32 state Active Duty 

status. 

I think the great news story for us in the National Guard is that 

we do now have a four-star general to represent our interests. And 

his responsibility by the Guard Empowerment Act is to provide 

counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and to the Secretary 

of Defense on homeland matters and capabilities and requirements 

inside the National Guard. 

So I think that is a very positive step forward. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But the purpose of him being on equal status on 

the Joint Chiefs is for, I would assume, equal status in terms of 

military decision-making as well. 

General CARPENTER. He does not have a seat on the Joint Chiefs. 

Ms. HANABUSA. No, but there is an issue of whether he will have 

a seat. That is something that I think every one of your adjutants, 

your TAGs, have written in every local newspaper about why we 

should have it. 

General CARPENTER. Yes, ma’am, they have. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the generals being here today. 

The first question has to do with current readiness. And then if 

time, I will talk about future readiness. But with regard to current 

readiness, given the drawdown in Afghanistan and how the command over there is dealing with that and adjusting, in your view, 

to the panel, are you getting adequate preparation and adequate 

timing of the specific missions for your units so that they can go 

through man, equip, and train to prepare? 
29 

And particularly, now I am concerned about smaller units and 

how much lead time they are getting in terms of where they are 

going and what specific mission they are getting. 

General STULTZ. Well, I think from the Army Reserves perspective, one of the metrics I can give you. If you went back 3, 4 years 

ago, when we mobilized a unit it was taking somewhere upwards 

to 60 days to 90 days post-mobilization to get them ready before 

we were confident they could go into a combat. 

Today, the average unit in the Army Reserves spends less than 

30 days. One, because you do have a lot of experience, previous 

deployers in those formations. Two, because we have a training 

strategy that trains them, prior to getting mobilized, on a lot of the 

skills that they need. 

The concern I have got is not the forces deploying to Iraq and 

Afghanistan. That is kind of the easy one because I know where 

they are going, I know when they are going, and I know what their 

mission’s going to be. My concern is the contingency forces of the 

future. 

Those are the forces that we are going to train and have standing ready if this Nation needs them. And for those forces, I don’t 

know when they are going to need to go, I don’t know where they 

are going to need to go, and I am not going to have much time. 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. 

General STULTZ. And so that is why we have got to focus on it 

is easy to fall in on existing equipment, it is already modernized, 

and existing systems that are already there and set in place. What 

we have got to focus on is, how do we train a force for the future, 

the Army depending on us, that is trained and ready and equipped 

prior to being needed, not afterwards. 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. 

General STULTZ. And if you run the contingency plans we have 

for our op [operations] plans in other parts of the world, most of 

my forces are needed within the first 30 days. That is when they 

are most needed. 

General WYATT. Sir, I would, on behalf of the Air National 

Guard, a little bit different model that the Air Force uses than the 

Army instead of mobilize, train, and deploy. Because we provide 34 

percent of the combat capability of the United States Air Force, the 

Air National Guard does, at 7 percent of the budget. 

We have to be trained, and then mobilized or volunteered, and 

deployed. So a little bit different structure. This requires an investment by the Air Force into the Air National Guard. And I am 

proud to say the Air Force has made that investment. They provide 

the Air National Guard, which is an organize, train, and equipped 

organization, with sufficient funds to train to the same level as 

they train to. 

Our DOC statements, our description of capability statements, 

require Air National Guard units to be able to answer the call, 

muster, deploy within 72 hours, and generate combat sorties intheater within 72 hours. Same requirement as the Active Component. 

My concern as we go forward is, will there be sufficient funds to 

continue that level of training. I think there has to be for this coun-
30 

try to have a viable Air Force. We are probably the leanest component, when you look at the Air Force, as far as combat capability. 

Ninety-eight point five percent of our 106,700 people belong to 

UTC [Unit Task Code]-task units. They are the warfighters. We 

are a wing-centric organization. Most of our people are in wings 

and below. So that is our warfighting construct. Only 1.5 percent 

is what I would call what I do. You know, administration, policy 

and that sort of thing. 

I think it is a key for the Air Force not only to continue organize, 

train, and equip funding to the Air National Guard to at least the 

level that it has this year, but continuing in the future. But also 

plan sufficient MPA [Military Personnel Appropriation] days so 

that once we are up on the step if we do have some sort of requirement nationwide we can respond and send our airmen in harm’s 

way to bid the Nation’s call. 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. And I will tell you that the 109th is not in my 

district, but it is very close. And I share that with Paul Tonko. I 

have had visits there, and I was really struck by the fact that for 

a very small portion of the budget they do an enormous number of 

requirements and do them very well. 

And General Carpenter. 

General CARPENTER. Congressman, I know you have got some 

background in this, based upon your service in the Army. We have 

come a long way since Desert Storm, when it took 180 days for the 

48th Brigade out of Georgia to meet at least the standard set, at 

that point, for mobilization and deployment. 

I know that you know that the 27th Brigade is in the queue to 

go down-range into Afghanistan. They are in the process right now 

of going to the National Training Center for an NTC rotation out 

there in anticipation of that mobilization. Because of that planning—the notification, the sourcing, the alert and that whole process—they have been able to plan for that mobilization, they have 

been able to prepare, and they have been able to increase their 

readiness. 

When they get to the mobilization station, we anticipate they will 

spend a little bit more than 60 days before they deploy down-range 

on that mission. That is a long ways from where we started in this 

business, and I think it is a tribute to the New York unit and it 

is a tribute to the Army and it is a tribute to where we have come 

in this operational force. 

Mr. GIBSON. No question on that. Good. Totally concur. 

Did spend some time with them at their pre-mobilization family 

fair day. It was fantastic. I have got to tell you, it rivaled anything 

that we did on active duty the way they laid the whole community’s resources out so families could come in and have access to 

health care questions, education questions, deployment type questions. It was quite extraordinary. 

The genesis of the question actually was, I do hear periodically— 

not with the 27th, but with the dynamic, the changing in Afghanistan—that as the command comes to grips with that, given the 

changing scenarios, that is giving less time for Guard and Reserve 

units to know explicitly what their specific mission is going to be. 

And that is having cascading impacts on man, equip, and train 

going forward. 
31 

I know that you are monitoring that and doing everything that 

you can on that. I am short on time. I will tell you that I am working with Peter Welch from Vermont on the Yellow Ribbon Program. 

This is something of great interest to me. 

I think it is a good program, but I think it can be even better. 

As we look to the mark next year, you know, certainly welcoming 

all your feedback on that so we can perfect that program. 

General CARPENTER. Sir, one of the biggest problems that we are 

facing right now is behavioral health issues, and the Yellow Ribbon 

Program has been key in that. I think you know the Army has a 

suicide problem. We have been fortunate to trend ours down a little 

bit in the Army Guard. But, you know, one data point does not a 

trend make. Yellow Ribbon is key in that, and the funding for that 

program is essential. 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. 

And gentlemen, I am out of time, regrettably. But I just want to 

thank you for your service, your tremendous leadership you provide, and I look forward to working with you going forward. 

I yield back, Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schilling, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Very good. Thank you, Chairman. 

Chris had touched on a few of the things I was going to talk 

about or ask questions about. Anyway, first I want to thank you 

for your service to our country. 

One of the concerns that I have for our country is with the debt 

problem that we have because I think we all understand that it is 

going to be a huge problem. I guess my concern is the warfighter 

because, basically, what is going on in the Middle East is definitely 

not going to go away anytime soon. And basically, what I would 

like to know is what you gentlemen are seeing with the cuts that 

are coming, how that is going to adversely affect us. And then, you 

know, basically anything that we can do to try to help out. 

And General Carpenter, you know, I want to say one of the 

things that I think is totally wrong is when we have these CRs 

[continuing resolutions] and our warfighters are over there risking 

their lives. Literally, the worst thing that we can do here in the 

United States Congress is having them on the table whatsoever for 

any type of negotiating. 

I think that they should be completely taken off the table, you 

know, because they have got enough on their mind. To have to 

worry about the paycheck for just one split second is all it takes, 

when they are out there trying to do their job and protect this 

great Nation. 

So basically, just maybe some information on your thoughts on 

how this is going to affect us in the future warfighters. 

General CARPENTER. You know, I think first of all I mentioned 

that we are looking at funding strategies and developing efficiencies inside of the Army and the Army National Guard. And it 

is a team effort between the Army National Guard, the Army, and 

the Army Reserve. 

For instance, family programs are essential to us. And I mentioned the Yellow Ribbon Program. Family programs are just as 
32 

key. But we have hundreds of family programs out there. Many of 

them are duplicative. Some of them are redundant. Some are not 

even used. And so with the Army in the lead, we are looking across 

all those programs to try and determine which ones we can consolidate. 

And we are not trying to reduce the service provided to the family by any means. But we think we can deliver it in a lot more efficient, effective manner. Those kinds of things are areas of opportunity for us across the Army to harvest those funds and redirect 

them into priorities and into essential areas. 

But frankly, the Defense Department didn’t get us into the budget problems we got right now, and the Defense Department is not 

going to get us out. But we are going to pay our fair share, at least 

from my perspective. So we are up for that. But again, before we 

default to reducing capability and deciding to hollow out the force 

or shallow the force, make it a lot smaller, we ought to look at 

those aspects first. 

General STULTZ. I would just echo what Ray has said. And I 

think, as has been stated here by many of the members of the committee, one of the things that has been proven is the Reserve Component is a great return on investment for this Nation. And so as 

we look at trying to reduce defense cost, I think you have got to 

look at the Reserve Components and say what more can you give 

us. Are there other capabilities that we can invest in to save 

money, but also that confidence that they are going to be trained 

and ready when we need them and that we have got access to 

them. 

And then just as Ray had said, we have got to look internally 

within our organizations and say, okay, where can we get more efficient and more effective? One of the things we are looking at in 

the Army Reserve is, as we get new modernized equipment I have 

said to my commanders, ‘‘You are not going to get a full set sent 

to your home station because at home-station training, you are 

probably going to train at platoon level. And so what I want to do 

is give you a set of modernized equipment to train on at that level.’’ 

Then I am going to take a set and put it at Fort Hunter Liggett, 

California, or Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, so that when you go for your 

3 weeks of training the equipment’s waiting there for you that is 

modernized, and we don’t pay to transport your equipment up 

there. I mean, there is a lot of those kinds of things we can say 

to save money ourselves internally to help fund the bill. 

General WYATT. Just briefly, we learned in Desert Storm One 

that when so-called hostilities supposedly ceased there is still a 

need for some air presence. And we anticipate that there will be 

continued need, if those countries desire, for continued air presence. 

With the budget threats, you know, in my mind we have an option of either just shrinking the entire United States Air Force to 

meet those budgets which sacrifices not only capability but capacity, or we can take a look at force structure and recognize the cost 

efficiencies offered by the Air National Guard and the Air Force 

Reserve. And maybe take a look at, instead of sending airplanes 

and capability to the boneyard, maybe placing those in the Reserve 

Component, which can operate them less expensively. 
33 

It provides that capability, it provides that capacity. Because I 

think there is probably going to be another event one of these days, 

and we are going to need that capability and capacity. Just a 

thought. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Very good. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman for his question. 

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Am I the last one to go? 

Can I have more than 5 minutes? 

Mr. FORBES. You are next to the last, and you can have 4 minutes and 50 seconds. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Oh, great, great. No. 

Thank you all for being here today, definitely to testify. But more 

importantly, thank you for your service to our country. We greatly 

appreciate that. 

Today I had the awesome honor of receiving 86 World War II 

veterans as a part of Mississippi’s Honor Flight program. We have, 

in the past, had to depend on Alabama’s Honor Flight program. So 

we decided to start our own, and we actually had some Alabama 

participants on the Mississippi Honor Flight. 

Two of my major questions have pretty much been addressed, 

but I think it is worth asking again. And one is the CR. The multiple CRs that we had last year was just unnerving at so many levels. Lucedale’s National Guard Unit is the 287th Engineering Company sapper platoon. They had the most dangerous mission, and 

they did an excellent job and came back 100 percent thanks to 

MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles] funded 

through prior Congresses and others and the support from the 

Guard. 

But they had the most dangerous mission, the roadside clearance 

and IED [improvised explosive device] detection and stuff like that. 

The last thing these soldiers needed was to be worried about 

whether their spouses and their children were receiving their check 

so they could put gas in the car, food on the table, pay the rent. 

Because you know, we have to focus on our mission. It is dangerous 

enough, and then if you are distracted not only are you a danger 

to yourself, you are a danger to your teammates. 

So again, could you just elaborate—because I think we just need 

to constantly reiterate this to my colleagues throughout the House 

and both parties—the dangers that we face doing multiple CRs. 

General STULTZ. Well, I think it is—and I will make it real quick 

so that Ray and Bud can talk too—morale, obviously, as you have 

already alluded to. But also in terms of us being able to train our 

force professionally and productively when we don’t know how 

much money we are going to have. 

And I have got a 3-week training event for this soldier to go to 

that is going to be a good experience for him, and I have also got 

a school that he wants to go to improve himself professionally or 

technically, and I say, ‘‘But I can’t afford to send you to both because I am not sure I am going to have enough money.’’ 

Then come the summertime or whatever, and we have got the 

money, but the soldier says, ‘‘You know, I can’t go now because I 

have already committed my time and everything.’’ We have lost an 
34 

opportunity to improve a soldier, improve his capability. And we 

end up giving that money back. 

General WYATT. We see the same concerns about pay. But in addition to that, what we see is our wing commanders who are responsible for handling the budgets at the wing level become very 

conservative. They begin, as General Stultz said, taking a look at 

the training cost. And because some of this is lead time required 

for planning to set up training events and exercises, out of an 

abundance of caution they will begin canceling. And we lose training opportunities that you can’t make up after. 

In the acquisition world, a lot of our contracts have lead times. 

And if there is no assurances that the money is going to be there 

in subsequent years we will cancel contracts. And then if the 

money does flow at a later date, the cost of reinstating that contract goes up and we get less value for the dollar. So those are just 

some of the things that we face. 

General CARPENTER. Sir, I already made part of my comments. 

And far be it from me to tell anybody how to do their business. But 

somebody mentioned earlier the exclusion of at least soldiers that 

are mobilized and deployed from that process would be helpful and 

would alleviate maybe that issue in terms of the angst associated 

with not getting paid. 

The other issue that General Wyatt alluded to is, last year, when 

we finally got our budget for NGREA [National Guard and Reserve 

Equipment Appropriation] and when we got our military construction budget it was midyear. And so we essentially had 6 months 

to execute that budget. We, at least my team I think, has done a 

terrific job in execution of NGREA for 2011, and we are going to 

hit the threshold of 80 percent. But I am telling you, we have had 

to do a lot to make that happen. So it causes some problems. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I am kind of running short on time so I will just 

make some comments. First of all, I think it is extremely important 

that the National Guard has a seat at the table for the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. I don’t see our Guard and Reserves ever going back to a 

strategic Reserve. It is just the world we live in, it is the reality 

we have to face, and you all are part of our operational forces. 

As a citizen soldier that was a part of this strategic Reserve and 

a part of the operational Reserve, our force, that is just not going 

to happen. There is some discussion in the National Defense Authorization bill to do just that. And hopefully the Senate and the 

House can agree on that. 

And the Yellow Ribbon Program is a wonderful program. I have 

participated in that, and I thank them for their service. This is not 

only returning, but also deploying soldiers. So we were taking advantage of both of them on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. And I offered all of them and their families that my office is open to assist 

you in any way possible. Just be sure to use your chain of command, and they will help you. 

So thank you all for your service. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman. 

And as you just pointed out, one of the things I think this committee is going to work very, very hard on, as Mr. Schilling raised, 

was to make sure that we try to get the pay and benefit for our 

men and women in uniform out of these discussions. 
35 

But the second thing we just want to alert you to and everyone 

who cares about defense. Everything is kind of relative, and it used 

to be we worried about the timing issues for our supplementals and 

the contingency questions there. Now we are worried about whether the money is ever going to come, not just the timing issue. So 

we have a different fear that we are looking at. 

Mr. Conaway from Texas was very patient. He stayed from gavel 

all the way until he had to go to another committee. But General 

Wyatt, he had a question for you regarding missions on the border. 

And the question was this. What interaction do you have with the 

FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], and are there problems 

with flying remotely piloted aircraft along the southern border? 

General WYATT. The answer is yes to both of those. There is an 

issue with getting remotely piloted aircraft into the national airspace. FAA does have that authority. We work very closely with 

them with the support of NORTHCOM and the United States Air 

Force, not only just for mission effects, but also for training. 

To launch and recover some of these aircraft, move them from 

their base to a training area, sometimes you have to transit Federal Aviation-controlled airspace. It is not dedicated military airspace. We are not necessarily interested in changing the shape and 

the structure of the training airspace, but these aircraft are very 

sophisticated. 

And while the FAA operates on principally a see-and-avoid—very 

conservative, and rightly so—safety measure, some of these RPA 

[remotely piloted aircraft], even though you don’t have the pilot actually in the vehicle, with the sensing and the video and everything 

else that is in the airplane really can see better than a pilot can. 

And we have got to prove that to the FAA, to their satisfaction 

that we can operate remotely piloted aircraft in the national airspace. We are making great process in doing that, and I think that 

day will come, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And General, if you don’t mind, if you would have 

somebody maybe from your staff contact Mr. Conaway’s office to 

see. I think you have a great ally there. He wants to help you with 

that in any way he can. 

I have one follow-up question. I think Ms. Bordallo has one question. Because I know we are about ready for votes. 

But can you tell us how important it is for you to have additional 

access to equipment for training, especially simulators? Because I 

know you don’t always have the access to some of the types of simulators and all, maybe, that the Active forces have. And what can 

we do to help you guys with that? 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. I have, in the last 2 years, been particularly focused on simulators. What is available, what is out 

there, what is over the horizon. I have made a number of trips 

down to the Orlando, Florida, area to visit simulation training command and some of the corporations that are down there. 

Because as I said earlier, what my soldiers say is, ‘‘Don’t waste 

my time.’’ So if they are going to come in on a weekend drill period, 

they want to come in and do something meaningful and put them 

back in that same environment they have come from. And that is 

where simulations come in. 
36 

But additionally, what was asked earlier about can we save 

money. One of the ideal examples for me is weapons training. In 

the Army Reserve, as you probably already know, we don’t live 

close to an installation. So we look and say, ‘‘Where can we go do 

effective range fire?’’ Because we are required twice a year to do 

live fire. 

In some cases, like in Florida where I have commanded a unit, 

we have to go all the way up to Camp Blanding, which means we 

got to put them on a bus. We got to take time, get them up there, 

feed them, house them, bring them back for our training. Or we default to go into the local sheriffs range, which is really not an effective training. 

Meanwhile, we have got these Engagement Skills Trainers, EST 

2000s, that can stimulate an M16, and M4, a 9-millimeter, whatever you want. And it can be more effective, really, in terms of 

training a soldier on breathing and aiming and everything else 

than ever putting him on a range. 

And so I have said that is what we ought to be doing. Those 

types of training simulators where we can put them in that environment in their Reserve center and get just as effective and save 

a lot of money because we are not using ammunition, we are not 

paying travel, we are not doing any of that. And the soldier walks 

away that weekend saying, ‘‘This was a good experience. What are 

we going to do next month when I come back?’’ 

General WYATT. Simulation in the United States Air Force has 

taken quantum leaps in the last few years. Used to, you could not 

get very realistic training unless you actually accomplished the 

mission in the airplane. 

But with the high-fidelity simulators that we have now, the ability to link simulators and to fuse some of the sensors, and virtually 

create situations in the simulator, it is an excellent opportunity to 

train. Saves gasoline, saves petrol, saves wear and tear on our airplanes, and it is the wave of the future, I think, in a lot of our 

training. You cannot do all of it in the simulator, but we can do 

an increasing amount. 

The problem is that just about all of the simulators are located 

on Active-Duty fields. We have only two F–16 units that have a 

simulator, only two C–130 units, three KC–135 units. That leaves 

10 F–16 units, 5 F–15 units, 17 KC–135 units, and 15 C–130 units 

that to get access to a simulator they have got to travel now to an 

Active-Duty base to access the simulator. 

The Active Component works with us to provide, in our budget, 

money to do that. But it is time-consuming, it is expensive, it burns 

fuel—not military fuel, but civilian fuel—to get there. And I think 

for us to really leverage the technologies that we have, save 

money—this is another cost efficiencies thing that we can do in the 

Air Force—we need to invest money in the simulators and get 

those out to the people that are going to use them. 

General CARPENTER. Sir, with regard to the Army Guard, simulations is a big deal in the aviation world for us, the Army aviation 

world, because of the op tempo associated with Army aviation. We 

need to make sure that we do the advance scheduling so we do 

have access to those simulators. If we do that, it seems to work out. 

We do not have a simulator that I know of right now for the LUH 
37 

[Light Utility Helicopter] Program, although we are getting sufficient flight hours to work those. 

And then beyond that, to get to General Stultz’s point, you know, 

with the huge leaps and bounds that we are making in technology 

we see all kinds of computer simulation that can run everything 

from battle drills for Humvee evacuation to squad-on-patrol. So 

those kinds of simulations are going to save us in the long term 

as opposed to spending 4 or 5 hours to get to a training area and 

then 4 or 5 hours back. So it is a huge facet to our program in the 

future. 

Mr. FORBES. If you will just have your staffs work with our staffs 

we will see what we can do to help get you those simulators that 

you need. 

Ms. Bordallo is recognized for the last question. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Generals Wyatt and Carpenter, as I indicated in my opening 

statement I am concerned that the Department of Defense does not 

accurately account for homeland defense requirements. This hampers the ability of the Department to equip the National Guard or 

Reserve for such missions. What role is the Guard taking to work 

with the Department to make these requirements clear? 

General Carpenter first. 

General CARPENTER. Yes, a couple of things. The critical dual-use 

equipment discussion that we had earlier with regard to equipment 

that we have inside of our formations in the Army Guard that can 

be used both for deployment down-range and use in the homeland 

mission has been very, very important. We started out 5 years ago 

with Katrina and we had M35s. We did not have the right vehicles. 

We did not have high-water vehicles. 

Fast-forward to what we saw with Hurricane Irene in North 

Carolina and New Jersey across the eastern border, we had modern equipment that provided capability out there to make sure that 

we could meet our responsibilities. 

We are concerned about what is the future of funding for homeland defense, homeland security. We have, as I mentioned, civil 

support teams, homeland response forces. In order for them to 

maintain their proficiency they will have to be funded, and we 

would not like to see them be a casualty in the budget process. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So you are working with the Department, would 

you say? 

General CARPENTER. Yes, Congresswoman. We are. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. General Wyatt. 

General WYATT. Inside the United States Air Force, I see a continuing increasing focus on the homeland, homeland defense, homeland security. But we are not quite there yet. We have 12 core 

functions in the United States Air Force, and all of those do support the homeland, homeland defense, homeland security. But I 

think we need a core function that is domestic operations. 

And so we are working with the Air Force to try to gain acceptance, recognizing domestic operations as a core function of the 

United States Air Force. If we are able to do that, there would 

come with that budget funding for training for domestic operations. 

There is not now. Even though we have authority from the Na-
38 

tional Guard Bureau and regulation to conduct training, there is no 

funding line for that. 

The important thing to recognize is that a lot of the training that 

we do for the warfight overseas, with the dual-use equipment and 

the dual capabilities, mirrors for the homeland. So we get, as kind 

of a byproduct of our training line for the Air Force, to train for 

domestic operations in some of those core functions. 

But there are some differences, and I talked about our air medical evacuation folks. Ninety-four percent of that capability in the 

Guard and the Reserve. And we are very good at getting soldiers, 

sailors, airmen and marines out of tight spots, taking care of them 

in that golden hour, getting them the health care they need, transporting to Landstuhl and back here for treatment. 

But when we get into a Katrina or an Irene, where we are transporting elderly geriatric patients or we might be transporting, you 

know, birth incubator-type youngsters out of harm’s way, it takes 

a special type of training. That is just one example. We don’t have 

a funding line for that. 

So we are working with the Air Force. I see an increasing recognition of the importance of that, but we are not quite there yet. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. General, just one last question. Commentary recently, from General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, 

seemed to indicate that core mission sets for the Active, the Reserve and the Guard Components will be transferred in the future 

because of budget limitations, when they are addressed. 

Can we expect to see the Air Guard have a future role in ISR 

[intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] and long-range strike 

missions? 

General WYATT. I think it makes perfect sense, Madam Congressman, for that to happen. When you talk about the cost of 

being able to provide those capabilities, my answer to that would 

be yes in both arenas. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. 

And I just want to close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that you have 

my full support—the Air Guard, the Army Guard and the Reserves. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. We thank the ranking member for her questions. 

Once again, thank all of you gentlemen. I think you can tell by 

the participation of this committee how much they care about what 

you are doing and want to be a part of it. We just want to once 

again thank you, and the men and women who serve under you, 

for the great job they do in defending our country. 

And with that, we are dismissed. 

[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 

(43) 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 

(123) 
124 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 

(127) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES 

General WYATT. The Air National Guard (ANG) is currently deploying Airmen in 

several duty statuses, which affords our Airmen different levels of predictability for 

future deployments. In the mobilization (non-volunteers) process, the units identified to be activated are notified in a two-year planning document. This gives the 

units two years of predictability, enabling them to discuss with unit members the 

possibility of future mobilization deployments. The individual members which are 

specifically identified for mobilization are notified of their pending activation at approximately 330 days out from the mobilization start date. This gives the member 

approximately 330 days to initially notify their employers of the pending activation. 

The member will receive orders in hand 180 days from the mobilization start date, 

giving the member and their employer an official document indicating the member 

will be placed on non-voluntary mobilization orders. ANG members that are placed 

on mobilization orders are also given a means of future predictability by means of 

AF Mobilization Business Rules. These rules guarantee a member a minimum of 

one year dwell, time before they can be mobilized again, after being placed on mobilization orders. These rules also guarantee the member a minimum dwell period 

based off the total mobilization time period. A typical 179-day deployment will give 

the member the predictability that they will not be mobilized again for another 1105 

days. 

Not all ANG Airmen are receiving the early notification as outlined above. The 

predictability afforded our Airmen is hindered when the planning objectives of a deployment are changed or cancelled. Examples would be when an Aviation KC–135 

mobilization plan is altered due to the changing number of requirements, or the 

start dates of the deployments changing. If the requirements are reduced, ANG Airmen that were planning on deploying, some of whom may have already notified 

their employer, no longer are required to be activated. As activation dates change, 

the member must repeatedly coordinate with their employer their expected date of 

departure from their job. 

Other ANG members are not receiving the early notification mentioned above because of ‘‘Emergent’’ requirements needing to be filled in a relatively short period 

of time. These ANG Airmen are receiving notification of their deployment 30–90 

days before the deployment start date. There is no way of giving ANG Airmen predictability in this case, because of the nature of ‘‘emergent’’ needs. 

ANG members that are deploying on a volunteer duty status are also afforded approximately 330 days of predictability. The process established for volunteerism outlines a Projected Participation Plan which accounts for the members to volunteer 

for activation 11 months before the deployment date. These members are receiving 

orders for their employers 210 days before the activation start date. 

The majority of ANG Airmen who are volunteering to be activated are filling 

‘‘help-wanted’’ requirements. These ANG Airmen are volunteering to fill Active 

Component shortfalls, sometimes with as little as two weeks’ notice before the activation start date. On the average, the notification time for these volunteers is approximately 90 days before the activation start date. [See page 24.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 

(131) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. What are some examples of the impact to training of O&M funding 

reductions? 

General STULTZ. The Army Reserve is presently not funded to train for full-spectrum combat and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations—two of the most likely requirements posed by the threats in the next decade. The O&M funding level currently supports training proficiency at the platoon level. The following are examples 

of the impacts of O&M funding reductions: 

1. Maintenance on vehicles and equipment will be deferred. This could significantly impact the readiness of older equipment that already requires intensive 

levels of maintenance. 

2. Supply purchases will be scaled back. 

3. Repair part purchases will be reduced allowing only the highest priority items 

to be ordered. 

4. Shipment of equipment and travel of Soldiers to training events will be curtailed. 

5. Building renovations will be delayed or cancelled. 

6. Base operations service levels will be reduced at the four Army Reserve installations. For example, trash may be picked up less frequently and grass cutting 

could be reduced. 

7. Soldiers will only be trained to proficiency below the platoon level. This will 

affect unit performance on deployments and other operational missions. 

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to the $73 million reduction in FY 2011? What 

challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you? 

General STULTZ. The reduction in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding in 

FY11 impacted training and base operations. Reduced Operations Tempo 

(OPTEMPO) funding forced the Army Reserve to curtail year-end maintenance operations, supply purchases, and travel. The decrement to base operations funding resulted in postponement of two major building renovations and reduction of service 

levels provided at Army Reserve installations. If additional cuts to O&M are levied, 

the Army Reserve will be challenged to adequately train its Soldiers and to fund 

the installations that support the Army Reserve training base. More maintenance 

of equipment will have to be deferred, supply purchases will be cut back, and travel 

and shipment of personnel and equipment to training exercises and other key events 

will be reduced. 

Mr. FORBES. What barriers continue to slow or prevent the transition from a strategic force to an operational force? And what would be the impact on the Army Reserve if you had to go back to the ‘‘strategic reserve’’ model of training and deployments? 

General STULTZ. The prevailing barriers that continue to impede our transition 

from a strategic force to an operational force are funding and access to reserve personnel. 

While fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 10 years, the operational reserve has been funded through the use of OCO dollars. With the reduction of OCO 

funds, dollars must be programmed into the base budget in order to maintain an 

operational reserve. 

If costs to sustain readiness of the RC are not migrated into the base budget, 

what will remain post-OCO are the statutory 15 days of annual training and 48 unit 

training assemblies—resourcing levels we know will reduce the Army’s operational 

depth—and RC readiness in particular. This strategic Reserve level of funding will 

prevent us from building a level of readiness in ARFORGEN to adequately meet the 

Army’s contingency needs. Extended post-mobilization, pre-deployment training periods will again be required to prepare RC units for deployment. 

For the Army Reserve to continue as an Operational Force the Army needs to 

have access to us. Currently, authority to use Army Reserve forces falls within two 

areas: Annual Training and mobilization and revisions to existing mobilization. 

However, ‘‘Assured Access’’ to the Army Reserve for ‘‘Non-Emergency’’, and ‘‘SteadyState Security Cooperation Missions’’ requires changes to current legislation and the 

language in the current Senate Bill is a big step in the right direction. By giving 
132 

the Service Secretary Authority, we can take full advantage of the hard-won operational experience of our Army Reserve Soldiers and sustain that experience 

through predictable regular use. The Army is dependent on the Army Reserve as 

mission ‘‘enablers’’ that are critical when generating and sustaining theater forces. 

This is a fully integrated total Army. USAR enablers provide a best value capability 

to the nation. Changes to legislation are critical to the national defense of our nation as we leave Iraq and Afghanistan and shift our focus to preventing conflict in 

the future. Combatant Commands are asking the Army for engineer, medical and 

logistics capability for theater security cooperation missions—all capabilities that 

exist primarily in the Reserve Component. This isn’t a matter of back filling the 

Army. We are uniquely capable of responding to immediate global requirements 

across the full spectrum of operations. Security Cooperation and Capacity-Building 

Partnerships present opportunities to draw from the unparalleled experience and 

training levels of an operational force. The Army Reserve must remain an enduring 

operational force within the Total Army. If the Army Reserve had to go back to a 

strategic reserve, it would be very detrimental to the Army. The Army Reserve is 

a crucial element of the Army’s overall deployable strength and war fighting team. 

We provide support units and specific functions integral to the operational force. 

Army Reserve enablers provide cyclical capability across the Army Force Generation 

(ARFORGEN) model, including the flexibility to surge forces. This contribution is 

particularly important if the Army encounters security demands and global commitments that exceed the steady-state capacity of supply-based ARFORGEN. 

Today and in the future the Army will require recurrent, assured and predictable 

access to the RC to meet operational requirements as requirements increase for 

Army forces to conduct overseas engagement activities. This can best be accomplished through leveraging an Operational Reserve. 

It is essential that the Army sustain the increased levels of RC readiness and 

availability achieved since 2001. America’s enemies have demonstrated both resiliency and adaptability. Against such an enemy, America’s Army must be able to 

sustain steady state engagement and be prepared to surge a sustained response to 

the unexpected. Operational depth and fiscal advantages make an operational reserve force essential to meeting this challenge. Our Soldiers are a national treasure 

that must continue to be used in a meaningful way or we will lose them, and we 

simply cannot afford that as a nation. 

Mr. FORBES. What are some examples of the impact to training of O&M funding 

reductions? 

General WYATT. The overall impact of O&M funding reductions has been minimal 

on the Air National Guard’s (ANG) Non-Prior Service Training, Formal Training, & 

Flying Training Programs because 99 percent of our formal schools training dollars 

are resourced through Military Personnel Appropriations funding. Only one of these 

three programs, the ANG Formal Training Program, has O&M funding attached to 

it ($1.135M in FY12 O&M), which funds civilian instructor personnel at the ANG’s 

Training Education Center and Academy of Military Science, and provides administrative supplies/equipment for these two training sites. 

However, O&M reductions can impact day-to-day training at the unit level by reducing flying hours, Dual Status Military Technician pay, supplies and equipment, 

travel, and facilities. The impact of these unit level reductions could result in pilots 

not retaining currency, inability to maintain mission capable aircraft, and the inability to provide training for our maintenance and a host of support personnel. 

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to the $73 million reduction in FY 2011? What 

challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you? 

General WYATT. While the ANG did not take a reduction in FY2011, additional 

cuts beyond those scheduled through the President’s Budget submission for FY12, 

depending on the depth, could seriously impact our ability to organize, train, and 

equip our troops in preparing for domestic and federal operations. As the ANG is 

already a lean organization, further reductions could impact our ability to induct 

our aircraft for depot maintenance, create shortfalls in funds utilized by the unit 

commanders to effect training, and/or reduce our flying hour and civilian pay programs. 

Mr. FORBES. NORAD’s ASA and Operation Noble Eagle report stated that the National Guard Bureau traditionally runs a deficit in execution-year funding for the 

ASA mission. To what extent is the Guard experiencing cost overruns while conducting ASA operations? What are the underlying causes for these overruns? What, 

if any, impact do these cost overruns have on the Guard’s other missions? What impact do continuing resolutions have on your execution of funding? 

General WYATT. The ANG coordinated response to the NORAD ASA (now referred 

to as Aerospace Control Alert, or ACA) and ONE report indicated the ANG continually runs a deficit in execution-year funding. This deficit, while not always the 
133 

same amount, was approximately $4.0M dollars per year over the past two to three 

years. This is caused by unforeseen changes in requirements that the COCOM must 

react to in mission. A recent example is the hurricane, which prompted significant 

movement in locations due to evacuation, which in turn prompted airborne coverage 

over certain areas. Also, runway repairs and closures, inspection failures, backfills, 

and facility upgrades that drive re-locations, all incur additional costs. Air Combat 

Command contributes Military Personal Appropriations day funds when they are 

available. However often these funds are not available and the ANG is ultimately 

responsible. 

This impacts the ANG’s ability to fund their training requirements. The Active 

Duty Operations Support (ADOS) coding of the funds utilized for the ACA mission 

is the same as our Special Training (ST) Days fund. Therefore, the ANG ‘‘assumes 

financial risk’’ in their ST Day accounts to pay for these deviations from the program. The ANG must limit exercise or individual unit training funding from this 

account to provide the funds to the ACA mission. Additionally, even if the funding 

is repaid at the end of the fiscal year, the opportunity to attend the exercise or specific event has often already passed. Hence, there is a financial cost when the funds 

are not repaid and an opportunity cost involved even if the funds are repaid. 

The continuing resolution also impacts the ANG’s ability to provide training 

funds. Approximately 4 of every 70 personnel at an ACA unit are funded through 

the ADOS funding line. During a continuing resolution, the ANG is permitted to 

commit a percentage of their funds that equates to a portion of the fiscal year that 

the budget is approved. A first quarter continuing resolution allows the ANG to 

spend 25% of the previous years’ funding. However, for the ACA mission, it is not 

practical to do such time limited funding. Therefore, the ANG will maximize the 

timeframe the ACA mission personnel are funded, which in turn decreases the 

amount of funds available for the other items. Since the number of pilots doing the 

mission on ADOS funding is small, the ANG can place these limited individual on 

365 day orders and use the remaining money to fund all the other items for a smaller amount of time (possibly 70 days). The total amount utilized is within the continuing resolution amount (25% of the year) but the money spending is now unevenly spread to ensure the ACA mission does not suffer from the ‘‘stop and go’’ 

funding. 

Mr. FORBES. Both the Army and Air National Guard are divesting fixed-wing airframes. What impact will the loss of airframes have on the National Guard’s capability to conduct routine domestic operations and catastrophic incidents today and 

in the future? 

General WYATT. Since 2005, and with current programmed reductions in FY11 

and FY12, the Air National Guard will have lost 22% of its C–130 fleet, from 226 

aircraft down to 175. Programmed changes to domestic airlift could impact successful completion of current and future domestic operations missions. In addition, mission requirements and demands routinely levied on the NG are difficult to codify 

as to which missions are requirements and which are demands. The NG has requirements that are federally recognized, defined by joint and service doctrine and 

demands only defined by National Guard Regulation. A New Madrid Earthquake 

scenario could create an estimated need of 1000 C–130 sorties for aero-medical evacuation alone. This is in addition to moving our CBRN Enterprises, supplies and 

equipment. National Guard Aviation assets currently available to supply major military support to civilian authorities are stressed to meet all emergency response requirements and scenarios. 

Concerns that these programmatic decisions may have degraded NG aviation capabilities to adequately support Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions prompted the Chief, National Guard Bureau to request a Capabilities Based Assessment to analyze the National Guard aviation capability and its 

support for Domestic Operations. Once the Capabilities Based Assessment is complete, the National Guard should be able to provide a clearer picture of the National 

Guard’s capability to support Domestic Operations. 

Mr. FORBES. What are some examples of the impact to training of O&M funding 

reductions? 

General CARPENTER. Reductions to base training funds will impact the ARNGs 

ability to sustain Individual/Crew/Squad levels of readiness by reducing training 

events such as Combat Training Centers, inactive duty training (drill) and Annual 

Training opportunities. Current O&M funding level provides Individual/Crew/Squad 

levels of readiness. Units preparing for mobilization must report to their mobilization station at or above platoon level readiness. 

Additional resources provided through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) 

funding enables the ARNG to meet readiness requirements of deploying units. 

These additional OCO funds typically prepare deploying ARNG units to achieve Pla-
134 

toon level of proficiency. Upon full mobilization, ARNG units conduct additional 

training in order to achieve Company level of proficiency. Training conducted under 

post-mobilization and prior to and during deployment is funded through Army Active Component OCO funds. 

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to the $73 million reduction in FY 2011? What 

challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you? 

General CARPENTER. Army National Guard (ARNG) absorbed $73 million in Congressional reductions from Operations and Maintenance Appropriations ($42 million 

spread across multiple Operating Forces funding accounts) and Administrative Support ($31 million). The Operating force programs most impacted were Sustainment 

Restoration and Modernization (SRM). Due to this reduction, the ARNG pushed a 

number of SRM projects into future fiscal years. Our force was able to absorb much 

of the Administrative Support budget reduction from efficiencies gained in recruiting and retention advertising. 

Continued annual funding cuts force the ARNG to regularly postpone SRM 

projects into fiscal out-years. The shift to an Operational Force structure/Army 

Force Generation Model has shown the ARNG to be more than capable of successfully accomplishing our Constitutionally-mandated missions both here and abroad. 

However, the increased usage levels our facilities must now meet to ensure our future mission success equates with increased funding for proper maintenance. Large 

reductions in budget out years will directly—and negatively—impact Air and 

Ground operations tempo and training for the ARNG. 

Mr. FORBES. Both the Army and Air National Guard are divesting fixed-wing airframes. What impact will the loss of airframes have on the National Guard’s capability to conduct routine domestic operations and catastrophic incidents today and 

in the future? 

General CARPENTER. The current Army plan reduces the number of Army National Guard (ARNG) Fixed Wing (FW) aircraft available for domestic operations 

from 114 aircraft down to 64, or, potentially as low as 48 aircraft. This decrement 

includes the divestiture of 42 C–23 Sherpa aircraft. The current Army approach to 

domestic FW requirements is a derivative approach: the ARNG utilizes ARNG FW 

assets not deployed in federal service. With the Air National Guard (ANG) fielding 

C–27J aircraft that replace ARNG C–23s, ANG C–27J deployments and extensive 

new equipment training requirements will likely limit the availability of these assets for routine ARNG logistical support requirements and Army Service-specific 

missions. Loss of airframes—coupled with reduced access to fixed wing capabilities—increases the concern that the ARNG will fall short of needed fixed wing capabilities for future domestic operations and catastrophic incidents. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. Given the high ops tempo of your Joint STARS Wing, how well is the 

system doing in supporting increased COCOM requirements, and what stresses are 

you seeing on the system? 

General WYATT. JSTARS is providing exceptional support to increased global requirements. To date, JSTARS has flown over 77K combat hours and has been continuously deployed for more than 3.6K days. In FY11, JSTARS supported five 

COCOMs, the highest level of support in the history of the weapons system. The 

Active Component is maintaining an average 1:2 dwell rate; ANG personnel are 

maintaining an average equivalent dwell rate of 1:4 through volunteerism. 

Increased Operational Tempo continues to stress JSTARS personnel and the E– 

8C fleet. The E–8C fleet remains postured to meet COCOM requirements, but does 

so at a cost to home station operations. Surge operations in support of increased 

COCOM requirements directly affect the availability of resources for the co-located 

JSTARS FTU. In FY11, high levels of support for deployed operations caused 

JSTARS to fall short of the Air Combat Command standard for Mission Capable 

rate of 78% by 0.4%. There were also numerous shortfalls in key maintenance 

metrics, driven by engines (top contributor to Non-Mission Capable Rate) and the 

Oil Pressure Indicating System (number one cause of air aborts in theater). 

Mr. SCOTT. Given the small size and increasing demands on Joint STARS fleet, 

is the USAF doing all it can to ensure sufficient Joint STARS are operationally 

ready and available to meet the demands? 

General WYATT. COCOM requirements significantly exceed JSTARS’ sourcing capacity. The 116 Air Control Wing and 461 Air Control Wing deploy forces at the 

maximum sustained level and have dynamically conducted surge operations in support of increased COCOM requirements. Improvements to operational readiness and 
135 

availability can be made by addressing personnel and fleet availability issues including: 

• Personnel 

• Taskings in support of the MC–12 program and Task Force Torch directly increase the dwell rates of JSTARS Airborne Mission System Specialists and 

Airborne Battle Management Specialists enlisted aircrew positions to almost 

1:1. These requirements negatively impact the OPTEMPO for both Active 

Component and ANG aircrew members. Reducing or removing these additional taskings would improve OPTEMPO and raise overall aircrew readiness 

levels. • Fleet availability 

• Disposition of Aircraft -0597: This aircraft has been in non-flyable condition 

at the CENTCOM Forward Operating Location since 13 Mar 2009 following 

a fuel system related Class A Mishap. The repair of aircraft -0597 would preserve a critical fleet asset and the associated manpower and ensure JSTARS 

support to COCOM requirements is not degraded by 17%. However, repair of 

this aircraft is not currently funded. • Aircraft -0416 (flight deck proficiency trainer): This aircraft has significant 

structural and corrosion issues and the ability to return the aircraft to service 

is currently being assessed. It is utilized at maximum capacity and handles 

61% of JSTARS annual flight deck proficiency training requirements. Loss of 

this aircraft increases the homestation requirement, thereby reducing resources available for OCO support. • E–8C engines are the single highest contributor to fleet-wide non-mission capable rates. The re-engining program is not funded past the development 

stage. 

Mr. SCOTT. What upgrades are being considered to improve Joint STARS performance and readiness to better support the Joint STARS crews, maintainers, and users 

of the Joint STARS information? 

General WYATT. Air Combat Command (ACC) is the lead command responsible for 

planning and budgeting for JSTARS modernization. The National Guard Bureau is 

responsible for JSTARS sustainment. 

ACC’s currently planned modernization upgrades include: 

1. Enhanced Land Maritime Mode: provides JSTARS the capability to accurately 

track, target, and engage moving land and maritime targets using GPS-guided 

weapons from other aircraft. 

2. Multi-Functional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio System–Joint Tactical Information Distribution System: datalink replacement for 

diminishing manufacturing sources. 

3. Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below ‘‘Blue Force Tracker’’. A scheduled upgrade of the system will render JSTARS’ version obsolete. This upgrade 

ensures continued access to US Army and US Marine Corps tactical datalink. 

Phase 1 is funded. Phases 2 and 3, which enable access to new secure system, 

are currently unfunded. 

4. Prime Mission Equipment/Diminishing Manufacturing Source: replaces current 

onboard mission equipment, such as the Radar Airborne Signal Processor and 

Clipper Operating Work Stations computers, that have become obsolete from 

the manufacturing sources. 

5. JSTARS Radar Modernization: radar improvement demonstration to improve 

radar area rate coverage; provides the ability to detect, track and identify both 

stationary and moving ground vehicles. Funded through a Congressional mark 

in FY08/09. Demo will continue through FY12. 

The following upgrades to JSTARS are being considered by ACC but are not currently funded: 

1. Organic Combat Identification: provides the ability to independently identify 

ground targets, removing reliance upon other traditional and non-traditional 

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance sensors. 

2. Diminishing Manufacturing Source Replacement of Avionics for Global Operations and Navigation: system upgrade is required to maintain access to global 

navigation. 

3. Intelligence Broadcast Service: would provide access to beyond line of sight 

self-defense information; current system is obsolete. 

4. Maintenance and sustainment upgrades: include updates to the oil pressure indicator system, fuel flow transmitter, aft thrust reverser and E–8C radio system evaluation and adjustment tool. 

5. JSTARS Network Enabled Weapons Program: allows JSTARS to acquire and 

engage targets using weapons, such as Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile- 
136 

Air Surface Warfare-Anti-Surface Warfare, from other aircraft via a Link 16 

communications network. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you see an opportunity to provide additional support to 

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM as a result of deblending the Joint STARS wing into 

separate Guard and Active wings? 

General WYATT. The Active Associate organizational structure of Team JSTARS 

between the Air National Guard 116 Air Control Wing and the Active Component 

461 Air Control Wing does not affect the overall level of COCOM support that 

JSTARS can provide. Organizational changes have aligned how the two wings organize, train and equip forces with respect to Title 32 and Title 10 authorities. Under 

the current COCOM taskings, JSTARS is able to provide support to NORTHCOM 

and SOUTHCOM through utilization of homestation sorties on a non-interference 

basis. Additional support to these two COCOMs would require a reduction in the 

current CENTCOM and AFRICOM taskings. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the Guard Bureau were 

to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on maintenance of training systems? 

General STULTZ. From the perspective of the Army Reserve, ‘‘maintenance of 

training systems’’ is a potential requirement most likely appropriate for Operations 

and Maintenance (O&M) funding. Traditionally, National Guard and Reserve Equipment (NGRE) funds provided to the AR have been for procurement purposes. Should 

the Congress choose to supplement the President’s budget request for the purpose 

of ensuring adequate maintenance of Reserve Component training systems, it is our 

view that this is best done by adding resources to the appropriate areas of the O&M 

appropriation. 

Mr. PALAZZO. We are currently looking at passing a CR to continue funding the 

government until the end of the year. When I first came into office last January, 

we passed multiple CRs to keep our government functioning because of the failure 

of the previous Congress to pass the annual appropriations bills. Now we are looking at another CR, likely followed by an omnibus, that will carry us through. While 

we were working on the CRs we received a great deal of testimony from the DOD 

officials about the problems that CRs cause in their planning process. Could you 

elaborate on the issues you will have to deal with if Congress ends up producing 

another series of CRs? What is the overall effect on the readiness of the Guard and 

Reserve Components? 

General STULTZ. There are numerous issues caused by a series of CRs. The Army 

Reserve is reliant on contracts for much of its daily operations. Under a CR, many 

contracts must be incrementally funded instead of being fully funded when approved. This creates a significant additional workload for the organization that has 

the contract requirement and for the contracting office that is processing the action. 

Additionally, the incremental funding of contracts creates uncertainty for all of the 

vendors that are providing products and services to us. Contract bids are valid for 

90 days in many cases—when the bids cannot be exercised due to funding restrictions under a CR, the process must be restarted. MILCON projects are also significantly disrupted due to the lack of authority to start new projects. 

A CR also causes problems for the Army Reserve offices that manage and that 

execute funds. Each additional CR period requires calculation of spending authority 

to be distributed and distribution of the approved amounts to all organizations falling under each office that manages funds. This is a tremendous administrative burden that would not be necessary if appropriations were received at the beginning 

of a fiscal year. Also, trying to get be good fiscal stewards in an environment of uncertainty, absent total funding, commands may not take advantage of all training 

opportunities available. 

The overall effect on the readiness of the Army Reserve is limited, but could become more significant as CRs become the norm year after year. We are able to fund 

and complete training under a CR even though there is a dramatic increase in administrative workload. The most significant impact is likely the uncertainty generated by a series of CRs year after year. Soldiers that are deployed and already 

under stress are burdened by the thought that a government shutdown or delay in 

funding could impact their pay and their families back at home. The Army Reserve 

financial workforce is forced to set aside the normal analysis that could lead to more 

efficient operations to complete the repeated distribution of funds required under a 

CR or series of CRs. 
137 

Mr. PALAZZO. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the Guard Bureau were 

to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on maintenance of training systems? 

General WYATT. No. The ANG does not feel that expanding the uses of NGREA 

to include maintenance of training systems would be advantageous to increasing 

operational readiness capabilities. 

While NGREA is used to purchase equipment, fielding of this equipment drives 

a sustainment bill that includes daily maintenance, training, and support. The 

NGREA process includes identification of these issues, funding requirements and 

submissions into the ANG POM. 

Changing the purposes for which NGREA can be used would be counter to the 

current laws and regulations governing the uses of the money and would divert 

funds away from critical equipping and modernizing efforts. 

NGREA is a procurement appropriation, while maintenance on existing systems 

of any kind, to include trainers, is currently funded with Operations and Maintenance funds, one year funding. Expanding uses of NGREA across ‘‘purposes’’ is a 

violation of current law. Granting an exception would legally complicate what heretofore has been a clearly defined set of laws and policies. 

More importantly, allowing NGREA to be used for O&M would detract from the 

intended purpose of NGREA: to equip and modernize the ANG in areas where ANG 

equipment lags the active component or in mission areas such as domestic operations where the active component does not provide funding. 

Mr. PALAZZO. General Wyatt, as you know, the Air Force announced that it would 

beddown four operational C–27J aircraft and two additional training aircraft at Key 

Field Air Guard Station in Meridian, MS. Unfortunately, the documented permanent manning positions required to stand up this operational mission has yet to be 

provided and the base has had to rely on temporary manning slots for the past two 

fiscal years. Do you foresee NGB providing Key Field with the needed permanent 

positions later this year? If not, when do you expect these positions to be provided? 

Also, this unit has been asked to lean forward in preparation for the training piece 

of this mission. Can you tell me if that manning will be provided on time? 

General WYATT. NGB understands the resourcing challenges for Mississippi this 

fiscal year. Despite our desire to provide the state clarity on permanent funding, 

due to the lack of an FY12 approved appropriations bill and the current H.J. Res 

79, Continuing Resolution to fund the government through 18 November 11, NGB 

is unable to provide further information on the timeline of receipt of permanent 

funding. Every effort is being made by the NGB staff to communicate the current 

status of the budget and how it affects the individual units. NGB is standing ready 

to update the Manpower Resource Vouchers to reflect programmatic funding as soon 

as the budget is passed or the Continuing Resolution allows. Currently the Manpower Resource Vouchers indicate that the fulltime positions will remain capped at 

FY11 levels and show projected funding until 1 April 12. To alleviate personnel impacts, Key Field Air Guard Station currently has FY11 resourcing extended through 

FY12 with execution year funds. 

Mr. PALAZZO. General Wyatt, as a Congressman representing a district that is especially prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes, I anticipate the capabilities 

of the C–27J will be very important to my district and others like it across the country. Do you foresee budget cuts affecting this program? 

General WYATT. The C–27J was designed by the Army to deliver Time Sensitive/ 

Mission Critical personnel and equipment to strategic points across the battlefield. 

It is currently serving and meeting that expectation overseas at this time. The C– 

27J can provide that same time critical airlift for states and first responders during 

national or state emergencies. The aircraft is right-sized to deliver tailored or specialized response and support assets to those areas impacted by an emergency. The 

C–27J program is now completing its Low-Rate Initial Production, and delivering 

the first 21 aircraft to the first four of the seven designated Wings. The Systems 

Program Office is presently awaiting its Full Rate Production decision from the AF 

and Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, the decision has been delayed due 

in part to present state of the budget. This will likely impact delivery of final 17 

aircraft to final three Wings, but will not deter the NGB from supporting this mission. Given the lack of an FY12 approved appropriations bill and the current H.J. 

Res 79, Continuing Resolution to fund the government through 18 November 11, 

NGB is unable to provide further information on any foreseeable budget cuts and 

what impacts, if any, would be forced upon this program. NGB staff is committed 

to this program and continues to aggressively train, equip, and field the C–27J in 

order to provide its defined capability not only to the warfighter but also to our 

states for domestic operations. 
138 

Mr. PALAZZO. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the Guard Bureau were 

to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on maintenance of training systems? 

General WYATT. The ANG does not feel that expanding the uses of NGREA to include maintenance of training systems would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities. 

While NGREA is used to purchase equipment, which drives a sustainment bill to 

include daily maintenance, training, and support. The NGREA process allows the 

ANG to identify these funding requirements and plan for future budget submissions. 

Changing the purposes for which NGREA can be used would be counter to the 

current laws and regulations governing the uses of the money and would divert 

funds away from critical equipping and modernizing efforts. 

NGREA is a procurement appropriation similar in purpose to the three year AF 

3010 or 3080 funding. Maintenance on existing systems of any kind, to include 

trainers, is currently funded with Operations and Maintenance funds, one year 

funding. Expanding uses of NGREA across ‘‘purposes’’ is a violation of current law. 

Granting an exception would legally complicate what heretofore has been a clearly 

defined set of laws and policies. 

More importantly, allowing NGREA to be used for O&M would detract from the 

intended purpose of NGREA: to equip and modernize the ANG in areas where ANG 

equipment lags the active component or in mission areas such as domestic operations where the active component does not provide funding. 

Mr. PALAZZO. We are currently looking at passing a CR to continue funding the 

government until the end of the year. When I first came into office last January, 

we passed multiple CRs to keep our government functioning because of the failure 

of the previous Congress to pass the annual appropriations bills. Now we are looking at another CR, likely followed by an omnibus, that will carry us through. While 

we were working on the CRs we received a great deal of testimony from the DOD 

officials about the problems that CRs cause in their planning process. Could you 

elaborate on the issues you will have to deal with if Congress ends up producing 

another series of CRs? What is the overall effect on the readiness of the Guard and 

Reserve Components? 

General WYATT. Overall, the productivity and economic costs associated with CRs 

are not in our best interest, however the effects of the CR depends on the level of 

funding, and length of the authorities. A CR that keeps funding at current or expected levels for greater periods of time tends to reduce negative impacts. Inversely, 

we have begun operating in FY12 under a reduced authority for a short period, 

which is causing all units across the ANG to inefficiently manage their daily obligation rates. There are inherent costs associated with short term funding cycles, such 

as the loss of training opportunities and increased expenses associated with the inability to negotiate longer term contracts for services and supplies. Additional reductions beyond those scheduled through the President’s Budget submission for FY12, 

depending on the depth, could seriously impact our readiness. Specifically, further 

reductions could impact our ability to induct our aircraft for depot maintenance, create shortfalls in funds utilized by the unit commanders to accomplish training, and/ 

or reduce our flying hour and civilian pay programs. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Many of my colleagues are familiar with these efforts and I assume 

you are too but I would like to know your thoughts on the matter. Earlier this year, 

in the House Defense Authorization Bill a provision was included that would include 

a seat of the Joint Chiefs for the National Guard. It is my understanding that a 

similar provision is being worked on for the Senate version of the bill. Could you 

give me your thoughts on the necessity of a National Guard Representative on the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff? We have seen a largely increased role for the National Guard 

during this past decade, but do you believe that another 10 years down the road 

a seat with the Joint Chiefs will be necessary or warranted? 

General WYATT. During the 10 Nov Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, 

General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau stated: 

It is now in the best interest of the American people for the Chief of the National Guard to be made a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . Only full 

Joint Chiefs of Staff membership for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau 

will ensure that the responsibilities and capabilities of the non-federalized National Guard are considered in a planned and deliberate manner that is not 

based upon ad hoc or personal relationships, but is, instead, firmly rooted in 

the law and the national strategy. 

The domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into account when 

making military contingency plans, when allocating scarce readiness resources, 

and when advising the President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Secu-
139 

rity Council, and the Homeland Security Council on strategies and contingency 

response options. . . . 

Adding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the JCS, in my opinion, 

would ensure that in the post-9/11 security environment the National Guard’s 

non-federalized role in homeland defense and civil support missions will be fully 

represented in all JCS deliberations. This would not detract, in my opinion, in 

any way from its other critical JCS functions. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the Guard Bureau were 

to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on maintenance of training systems? 

General CARPENTER. As defined in Department of Defense Financial Management 

Regulation, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account procurement funds 

should not be used for sustainment and maintenance expenses. These funds are not 

programmed—they are annually appropriated—and are for procurement appropriations. An increase in National Guard Operations and Maintenance funding would 

directly and positively impact the maintenance and sustainment of ARNG training 

systems, as well as provide the flexibility of National Guard Bureau to focus those 

funds where most needed. 

Mr. PALAZZO. We are currently looking at passing a CR to continue funding the 

government until the end of the year. When I first came into office last January, 

we passed multiple CRs to keep our government functioning because of the failure 

of the previous Congress to pass the annual appropriations bills. Now we are looking at another CR, likely followed by an omnibus, that will carry us through. While 

we were working on the CRs we received a great deal of testimony from the DOD 

officials about the problems that CRs cause in their planning process. Could you 

elaborate on the issues you will have to deal with if Congress ends up producing 

another series of CRs? What is the overall effect on the readiness of the Guard and 

Reserve Components? 

General CARPENTER. When operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR), a portion of the budget is withheld from the Army National Guard (ARNG) in anticipation of Congressional downward adjustments. This process creates uncertainty at 

the execution level for the ARNG, because the States lack a clear picture on their 

programmatic funding for the year. Unplanned requirements directed by the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense or the Executive Branch to the ARNG place additional 

risk to funding. The longer the CR, the greater the level of uncertainty, and the 

greater the number of negative impacts observed at the local level to funding obligations and execution. 

Once the Department of Defense (DoD) appropriations bill was passed, it took 

roughly three weeks for Office of Management and Budget, DoD, and Department 

of the Army to complete all the fiscal transactions necessary to provide funding to 

the ARNG. The ARNG appropriations were balanced in May, seven months into Fiscal Year 2011. Due to the severely curtailed budget window, the ARNG was unable 

to execute an 80% obligation rate for its Operations and Maintenance appropriation. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Many of my colleagues are familiar with these efforts and I assume 

you are too but I would like to know your thoughts on the matter. Earlier this year, 

in the House Defense Authorization Bill a provision was included that would include 

a seat of the Joint Chiefs for the National Guard. It is my understanding that a 

similar provision is being worked on for the Senate version of the bill. Could you 

give me your thoughts on the necessity of a National Guard Representative on the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff? We have seen a largely increased role for the National Guard 

during this past decade, but do you believe that another 10 years down the road 

a seat with the Joint Chiefs will be necessary or warranted? 

General CARPENTER. During the 10 Nov Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau stated: 

It is now in the best interest of the American people for the Chief of the National Guard to be made a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . . Only 

full Joint Chiefs of Staff membership for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will ensure that the responsibilities and capabilities of the non-federalized 

National Guard are considered in a planned and deliberate manner that is not 

based upon ad hoc or personal relationships, but is, instead, firmly rooted in 

the law and the national strategy. 

The domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into account when 

making military contingency plans, when allocating scarce readiness resources, 

and when advising the President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council on strategies and contingency 

response options. . . . 
140 

Adding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the JCS, in my opinion, 

would ensure that in the post-9/11 security environment the National Guard’s 

non-federalized role in homeland defense and civil support missions will be fully 

represented in all JCS deliberations. This would not detract, in my opinion, in 

any way from its other critical JCS functions. 

Æ