IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

July 9, 2002 Session

DEBRA DENECE BOLIN v. CARL DEAN BOLIN

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Montgomery County

No. 99-08-0035 Carol Catalano, Chancellor

No. M2001-02168-COA-R3-CV - Filed August 13, 2002

Wife filed for divorce soon after Husband was sentenced to four years in prison for causing the death

of Son. The trial court granted Wife the divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct.

The court also determined that section 31-1-106 of the Tennessee Code prohibited Husband from

collecting his portion of Son’s life insurance policy. We affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; and

Remanded

DAVID R.FARMER,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W.FRANK CRAWFORD,P.J.,W.S.,

and HOLLY K. LILLARD, J., joined.

Carrie Kersh-Gasaway, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Carl Dean Bolin.

Gregory D. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Debra Denece Bolin.

OPINION

Carl and Debra Bolin were married on October 20, 1973. Ms. Bolin worked throughout the

marriage. Mr. Bolin worked irregularly until 1989, when he began to draw disability. Mr. Bolin also

supplemented his income by gambling on pool tournaments. During the course of their marriage,

the couple had two children, Chad and Cameron. At the time of the parties’ separation, Cameron

was twenty-two years old, Chad was deceased. This divorce, and the corresponding issues, stem

from Chad’s death. 

In January 1998, Mr. Bolin and Chad returned home after playing in a pool tournament at a

local bar. Chad had recently been discharged from the military and lived with Mr. and Ms. Bolin.

Chad’s girlfriend, Heather, and her two children also lived with the Bolins. 
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Soon after Mr. Bolin and Chad arrived at their house, Chad attacked Mr. Bolin. The reasons

behind this attack are unclear. Ms. Bolin and Heather attempted to stop the fight. Due in part to

their intervention, Chad ended his assault of Mr. Bolin. 

When Mr. Bolin got off the floor, he retreated into the couple’s bedroom. Mr. Bolin

retrieved a loaded double barrel shotgun that he stored above the bed. Mr. Bolin testified that he told

Ms. Bolin that he “was going [to] wrap it around [Chad’s] head to keep him off of me . . . .” Mr.

Bolin knew the gun was loaded, but maintained that he could not unload it because of an injury he

sustained during the fight with Chad. 

Mr. Bolin then followed Chad out of the house and into the back yard. The father and son

had a brief discussion, and Mr. Bolin fired a shot into the ground. Mr. Bolin testified that he thought

he emptied the gun by firing it. Chad then walked around the house to the front yard. 

While still in possession of the shotgun, Mr. Bolin went back through the house and out the

front door. When Mr. Bolin arrived on the front porch, he witnessed Chad exiting a truck. The truck

belonged to Mr. Bolin, and Mr. Bolin usually kept a small gun in the vehicle. Chad walked to the

street. Mr. Bolin followed on the sidewalk, beside a block wall adjacent to the driveway. At this

point, Mr. Bolin testified that he told Chad to “do whatever you got to do” and “I’m going to put the

gun [down].” Then, according to Mr. Bolin, “[i]n the process of putting [the gun] on the wall it

discharged.” The shotgun blast killed Chad. 

In July of 1999, a jury found Mr. Bolin guilty of reckless homicide. The court sentenced Mr.

Bolin to four years in the Department of Correction. This case is reported as State v. Bolin, No.

M1999-00849-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. January 28,

2002). 

Shortly after Mr. Bolin’s conviction, Ms. Bolin filed for divorce. Ms. Bolin’s complaint

alleged that Mr. Bolin was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct and that irreconcilable differences

existed between the parties. The trial court granted Ms. Bolin the divorce. In addition to awarding

the divorce to Ms. Bolin, the court ruled that Mr. Bolin could not benefit from Chad’s life insurance

policy. Mr. Bolin appeals the court’s decision. The issues, as stated by Mr. Bolin, are as follows:

I. The trial court erred by granting the plaintiff a divorce based upon

inappropriate marital conduct.

II. The trial court erred in finding that the defendant is precluded from receiving

life insurance proceeds from the death of the parties’ adult son.

III. The trial court erred by dividing the marital property inequitably.

IV. The trial court erred by denying the defendant’s request for attorney’s fees.
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To the extent these issues involve questions of fact, our review of the trial court’s ruling is

de novo with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); e.g., Berryhill v. Rhodes,

21S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tenn. 2000). We may not reverse the trial court’s factual findings unless they

are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Id. With respect to the court’s legal conclusions,

our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916

(Tenn. 2000).

Mr. Bolin’s first issue concerns the court’s decision to award Ms. Bolin the divorce. Mr.

Bolin contends that the evidence failed to establish that he was guilty of inappropriate marital

conduct. Mr. Bolin argues that behavior toward the parties’ adult child fails to justify a divorce on

the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. Mr. Bolin maintains that a divorce on those statutory

grounds must involve treatment toward the spouse. 

Grounds for divorce are governed by statute in Tennessee. Chastain v. Chastain, 559

S.W.2d 933, 934 (Tenn. 1977). One particular ground for divorce is where “[t]he husband or wife

is guilty of such cruel and inhuman treatment or conduct towards the spouse as renders cohabitation

unsafe and improper which may also be referred to in [the] pleadings as inappropriate marital

conduct . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-101(11) (2001). Essentially, inappropriate marital conduct

is where “either or both of the parties [have] engaged in a course of conduct which (1) caused pain,

anguish or distress to the other party and (2) rendered continued cohabitation ‘improper,’

‘unendurable,’ ‘intolerable,’ or ‘unacceptable.’” Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877, 892 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2000) (Cottrell, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the record supports the trial court’s decision to grant the divorce to Ms. Bolin

on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. Mr. Bolin’s actions in pursuing Chad with a

firearm that ultimately caused Chad’s death certainly caused Ms. Bolin pain, anguish, and distress.

The court was also justified in concluding that Mr. Bolin’s actions rendered cohabitation unsafe and

improper. Although Mr. Bolin’s actions were directed primarily at Chad, the trial court did not err

in determining that his actions constituted cruel and inhuman treatment toward Ms. Bolin. One of

the most cruel acts toward a parent would be the killing of his or her child. Accordingly, this issue

is without merit. 

In Mr. Bolin’s next issue, he contends that the court erred when it determined that section

31-1-106 of the Tennessee Code prohibited him from receiving any portion of Chad’s life insurance

benefits. In arriving at its ruling, the court found that Mr. Bolin’s actions were not consistent with

one who acts in self-defense. The court also found that Chad’s death was not an accident. The court

concluded that Mr. Bolin “intentionally shot and killed Chad Bolin and is barred from receiving any

life insurance funds or proceeds pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 31-1-106.”

Section 31-1-106 of the Tennessee Code states:

Any person who shall kill, or conspire with another to kill, or procure to be killed,

any other person from which the first named person would inherit the property, either
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real or personal, or any part thereof, belonging to such deceased person at the time

of the deceased person’s death, or who would take the property, or any part thereof,

by will, deed or otherwise, at the death of the deceased, shall forfeit all right therein,

and the same shall go as it would have gone under the provisions of § 31-2-104, or

by will, deed or other conveyance, as the case may be, provided, that this section

shall not apply to any such killing as may be done by accident or in self-defense.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-106 (2001).

The Tennessee Supreme Court interpreted this statute in Moore v. State Farm Life

Insurance Co., 878 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1994). In Moore, Mr. Jordan was the driver of a vehicle in

which Ms. Jordan was a passenger. Id. Mr. Jordan lost control of the vehicle, causing the death of

Ms. Jordan. Id. Mr. Jordan was the primary beneficiary of her insurance policy; her two children

by a prior marriage were the secondary beneficiaries. Id. State Farm paid the proceeds of the

policies to Mr. Jordan. Id. at 946-47. 

Mr. Jordan pled guilty to vehicular homicide. Id. at 947. Subsequently, the guardian of the

minor children sued State Farm and Mr. Jordan. Id. The guardian argued that Mr. Jordan forfeited

his right to the insurance proceeds pursuant to section 31-1-106 of the Tennessee Code and that the

children, as secondary beneficiaries, were entitled to the proceeds instead. Id. 

After analyzing the statute and several cases, the court determined that “a beneficiary must

have intended to kill the insured before the beneficiary is barred from taking the proceeds of the

policy.” Id. at 947-48. The court stated that this interpretation supported the purpose of the statute,

which is to eliminate the temptation to kill for financial gain. Id. at 948. The court also provided

an example of the proof necessary to accomplish a forfeiture in the automobile context. Id. at 948-

49. The court stated that “one who drives a speeding car directly against a pedestrian or onto a

crowded sidewalk will be found to have intended to kill if death in fact results.” Id. 

In this case, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mr.

Bolin intentionally killed Chad. The court found that Mr. Bolin liked to portray a “tough-guy image

that showed he was not beyond acts of violence.” The court also found that although Chad instigated

the fight, Mr. Bolin was the first to get a weapon. Further, the court found it important that Mr.

Bolin pursued Chad with the gun, and the record establishes that Mr. Bolin was in possession of the

gun when it discharged. Finally, the court found that Mr. Bolin was aware of the danger of firearms.

This finding is also supported by the record. 

The court determined that Chad’s death was not accidental, due in part to Mr. Bolin’s actions

after he shot Chad. Mr. Bolin did not seek help or try to render first aid to Chad. The court

concluded that “[n]ormally, any person who accidentally injured another would try to help that

injured person, especially their own child.” Finally, the court determined that Mr. Bolin’s story was

not credible, and stated that Mr. Bolin knew that he was carrying a loaded shotgun when he pursued

Chad to the front of the house. 
1Mr. Bolin does not argue that the proceeds from Chad’s life insurance policy are marital property.

Accordingly, we have not addressed that matter.

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The evidence also fails to preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mr. Bolin did not

act in self-defense. Chad was unarmed at the time of his death and was standing at least twenty feet

from Mr. Bolin. Although Chad broke into Mr. Bolin’s truck and stated “I’m going to make it even,”

there is no evidence that Chad knew Mr. Bolin carried a gun in the truck. Finally, the court found

that Chad was leaving the Bolin’s property, and the evidence supports this conclusion. 

Finally, Mr. Bolin made several statements that support the trial court’s conclusion. When

he shot Chad, Mr. Bolin told Ms. Bolin, “now you can call the law. I’ve shot him.” Also, after the

911 operator called the Bolin’s home, Mr. Bolin answered the phone. The operator asked if Chad

was dead, and Mr. Bolin replied, “I don’t know. I left him laying in the street.” 

The evidence supports the trial court’s finding of intent as required by Moore. Additionally,

the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the shooting was not in self-defense and was not

an accident. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Mr. Bolin is not entitled to any

portion of the insurance proceeds that resulted from Chad’s death. 

Mr. Bolin’s next issue concerns the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital property. In

dividing the Bolin’s marital property, the court awarded Mr. Bolin nine vehicles, two motorcycles,

and a trailer. The court also awarded Mr. Bolin a living room suite, the parties’ bedroom suite, a

pool table, a riding lawn mower, and an air compressor. 

The court awarded Ms. Bolin three vehicles, a motorcycle, a camper and a trailer. Ms. Bolin

also received the remaining household items. The court awarded the house to Ms. Bolin, in addition

to the $4,000 of equity therein. The court further determined that Ms. Bolin was responsible for the

remaining mortgage on the house. Finally, the court held Ms. Bolin responsible for the credit card

debts and for Chad’s funeral expenses. 

Mr. Bolin argues that the trial court erred in refusing to order Ms. Bolin to sell the marital

home. In the alternative, Mr. Bolin argues that the court should have ordered Ms. Bolin to pay him

one half of the equity in the residence. Further, Mr. Bolin contends that Ms. Bolin should have been

required to refinance the house in her name only.1 

Tennessee statutes only allow for the division of marital property upon the dissolution of a

marriage; therefore, it is of primary importance for the trial court to classify property as separate or

marital. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(2001); Brock v. Brock, 941 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1996). After the court determines the extent of the parties’ marital property, the court must

divide the marital property equitably. Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

The trial court’s division of the marital estate need not be equal to be equitable. Watters v. Watters,

959 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Generally, the fairness of the property division is

judged upon its final results. Id. 
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The trial court’s equitable division of the parties’ marital property is guided by the statutory

factors set out in section 36-4-121(c) of the Tennessee Code. Manis, 49 S.W.3d at 306. The trial

court’s equitable division of the marital property carries great weight before this Court. Id.

Accordingly, we will typically defer to the trial court’s decision unless it is contrary to the

preponderance of the evidence or is inconsistent with the statutory factors. Id.

After a thorough review of the record in light of the statutory factors listed in section 36-4-

121(c) of the Tennessee Code, we do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s

distribution of the parties’ marital property. In reviewing Ms. Bolin’s listing of the parties’ assets,

it is evident that the parties did not have a great deal of marital property. However, Mr. Bolin

received a sizeable portion of the parties’ property. Further, the court ordered Ms. Bolin to pay the

parties’ debt, as well as Chad’s funeral expenses. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s equitable

distribution of the parties’ marital property. 

In Mr. Bolin’s final issue, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for

attorney’s fees. Although Mr. Bolin asked for attorney’s fees in his counterclaim, his testimony does

not support his request. Mr. Bolin’s testimony on direct examination provides the following

exchange:

Q. And are you asking that your wife pay your attorney’s fees?

A. Well, no.

. . . . 

Q. If your wife has the funds to pay your attorney’s fees, you don’t want her to pay

them?

. . . .

A. Where would she have the funds?

Q. I’m just saying if she did have the funds.

A. Would I want her to pay for it?

Q. Right.

A. No, It’s my debt.

From this testimony, it is evident that Mr. Bolin did not want Ms. Bolin to pay his attorney’s

fees. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it failed to award Mr. Bolin his attorney’s fees.
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We affirm the decision of the trial court. The costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant,

Mr. Carl Bolin, for which execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________ 

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE