COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

January 26, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP144-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF93

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

HAKEEM RAHEEM TUCKER,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee

County: JOSEPH R. WALL, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Dugan, Graham and Donald, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2020AP144-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Hakeem Raheem Tucker appeals a conviction, 

following a jury trial, of first-degree reckless homicide, first-degree reckless 

injury, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. Tucker argues that 

the circuit court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by 

compelling him to answer a question during a pretrial competency hearing about 

whether his memory was sufficient to assist in his defense.1 Tucker objected to 

the court’s questioning on Fifth Amendment grounds, however he did not take any 

subsequent steps to obtain a ruling regarding the admissibility of his answer during 

the subsequent trial.

¶2 On appeal, Tucker argues that he is entitled to a new trial because 

his ultimate decision to waive his right to testify was “very likely” influenced by a 

concern that the State would impeach him with his compelled answer. We 

conclude that Tucker forfeited the issue he raises on appeal by failing to seek a 

ruling from the circuit court about the admissibility of his answer at trial. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 The State charged Tucker with multiple crimes based on events that 

occurred on January 3, 2017, after he confronted his child’s mother at her home in 

Milwaukee. Prior to the preliminary hearing, Tucker’s trial counsel raised the 

issue of whether he was competent to stand trial.2

 

1

 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen presided over the pretrial competency proceedings. 

The case was later transferred to the Honorable Joseph R. Wall, who presided over the trial and 

sentencing and entered the judgment of conviction.

2

 See WIS. STAT. § 971.13(1) (“No person who lacks substantial mental capacity to 

understand the proceedings or assist in his or her own defense may be tried, convicted or 

(continued)
No. 2020AP144-CR

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¶4 The circuit court ordered a competency evaluation, which was 

conducted by a board-certified psychiatrist. The psychiatrist noted that Tucker 

claimed to have no recollection of the events on the night in question, or most 

other points during his life. Among other things, he claimed not to recall his 

childhood, his family of origin, the reason he was in custody, or his interrogation 

by the police. The psychiatrist opined that Tucker was “simply claiming amnesia 

to avoid prosecution” and “feigning incapacity.” In the psychiatrist’s view, 

Tucker had the capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense.

¶5 During the competency hearing that followed, Tucker declined to 

challenge the psychiatrist’s report and attempted to withdraw his assertion that he 

was not competent to proceed. The circuit court explained that it was still required

to make a legal determination of whether Tucker was competent to stand trial. It

attempted to ask Tucker about his memory, but Tucker’s counsel objected to the 

line of questioning on Fifth Amendment grounds. The court described its intended 

questioning as follows:

Do I want to know what he remembers? No, I don’t want 

him to tell me any of that. All I want him to talk to me 

about is whether he still claims amnesia and whether he 

remembers anything, not what he remembers. I have a 

right to do that. There is no Fifth Amendment right in a 

competency hearing with regard to those issues.

Trial counsel continued to object,3and the court ultimately ordered the parties to 

brief the issue.

 

sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures.”); WIS. STAT. 

§ 971.14 (providing the procedure for competency proceedings). All references to the Wisconsin 

Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.

3

 The exchange became tense at points. At one point, the circuit court told trial counsel, 

“We are not going to continue to go round and round and round on this thing. I will have you 

(continued)
No. 2020AP144-CR

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¶6 The circuit court held a second competency hearing on the issue, and 

it overruled trial counsel’s continuing Fifth Amendment objection. According to 

the court, Tucker’s answer to questions about whether he had sufficient memory to 

assist in his defense would not be material to Tucker’s guilt or innocence. The 

court proceeded to question Tucker as follows:

THE COURT: So, Mr. Tucker, do you have 

enough recollection -- and I want a “yes” or “no” answer 

only, no explanation -- do you have enough recollection 

that you believe that you could tell your lawyer things to be 

able to assist you in your defense? Yes or no?

....

THE DEFENDANT: Can you explain what you’re 

saying?

THE COURT: Okay. Do you remember enough 

that you can tell your lawyer certain things to be able to 

help you in your defense?

THE DEFENDANT: Somewhat.

THE COURT: You think you can do that?

THE DEFENDANT: I think I can do that.

For ease of reference, we refer to Tucker’s response to this questioning as his 

“somewhat” answer.

 

removed and have somebody else come in on this case then.” Counsel implied that the court was 

threatening to remove him from the case because he disagreed with the court as to whether 

Tucker should answer questions regarding his recollection, and the court said, “No, [it’s] because 

I don’t believe that you’re properly representing your client at this point.” The court later 

exclaimed, “I am not going to have this case come back sometime four years from now and have 

your client claim I didn’t know what was going on because my lawyer just told me to say this, 

that, and the other thing.” At yet another point, the court threatened to find trial counsel in 

contempt of court for instructing Tucker to not answer a question about his memory.
No. 2020AP144-CR

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¶7 The circuit court did not say anything about whether Tucker’s

“somewhat” answer could be used at trial, and trial counsel did not ask for 

clarification on this point. Based on Tucker’s answer and the psychiatrist’s report, 

the court found that Tucker was competent to proceed.

¶8 The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Tucker’s trial counsel filed a 

pre-trial motion seeking to suppress the statements that he made to the police after

his arrest on the ground that they were not admissible because they were taken in 

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. However, Tucker did not file any similar 

motion seeking to exclude the “somewhat” answer he gave during the competency 

proceeding.

¶9 Tucker elected not to testify in his defense during trial. His trial 

counsel represented that they had been over the pros and cons of testifying and had 

come to “a joint conclusion, my recommendation, his decision, that he will not 

testify.” Trial counsel opined that Tucker’s decision to waive his right to testify 

was knowing and voluntary. The circuit court then conducted a colloquy with 

Tucker and confirmed that his decision was freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and 

understandably made.

¶10 The jury found Tucker guilty of first-degree reckless homicide, firstdegree reckless injury, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. 

Tucker directly appealed his conviction without first filing a postconviction 

motion in the circuit court.

DISCUSSION

¶11 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 

“[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
No. 2020AP144-CR

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himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.4 This right is commonly referred to as the right 

to remain silent or the privilege against self-incrimination. Persons may assert 

their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in any proceeding, civil or 

criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory. Kastigar v. 

United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972). When a defendant has been 

compelled to give a statement that is both testimonial and incriminating, the 

compelled statement may properly be excluded in any subsequent criminal 

proceeding against the defendant. See State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, ¶2, 292 Wis. 2d 

1, 718 N.W.2d 90.

¶12 With this framework in mind, we now turn to the parties’ arguments.

Tucker asserts that the circuit court unconstitutionally compelled him to make an 

incriminating statement over his trial counsel’s strenuous objections. He contends 

that a defendant cannot be compelled to answer a question “[e]xcept by a grant of 

immunity,” and that here, the court “never informed” him that “his statements 

could not be used against him, even on cross-examination, at trial.” Tucker argues 

that “the court’s improper ruling compelling him to answer questions ... very 

likely played in [his] decision not to testify.”5 He cites New Jersey v. Portash, 

440 U.S. 450 (1979), for the proposition that the remedy for the court’s violation 

is to put him back “in the same position as if [his] right to remain silent had been 

honored.” Therefore, he asserts, he is entitled to a new trial “during which he can 

 

4

 Similarly, the Wisconsin Constitution provides that “[n]o person ... may be compelled 

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself.” WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8.

5

 Specifically, he contends that the State would have used his answer to impeach him on 

the ground that he could only “somewhat” remember the events of the night in question.
No. 2020AP144-CR

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make the decision whether to testify without worrying that the state may crossexamine him with regard to his compelled statements.”

¶13 The State counters by arguing that the circuit court had the inherent 

right to ask Tucker questions so that it could rule on his competency as required 

by WIS. STAT. § 971.14(4)(b). It further argues that Tucker’s “somewhat” answer 

was neither compelled nor incriminating and that, even if the court’s questioning 

violated the Fifth Amendment, any error would be harmless because the State 

never used his answer against him at trial.

¶14 We need not resolve these disputes between the parties because, we

conclude, Tucker forfeited the issues that he raises on appeal by failing to seek a 

court order prohibiting the State from introducing his “somewhat” answer at trial. 

See Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶45 & n.21, 327 Wis. 2d 

572, 786 N.W.2d 177; State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 

N.W.2d 612. Tucker argues that, “[a]lthough the circuit court never affirmatively 

ruled that Tucker’s statements could be used against him, the court also never 

informed Tucker that his statement[s] could not be used against him.” (Emphasis 

added.) However, Tucker ignores the fact that he could have asked for this ruling 

himself by filing a motion in limine seeking the exclusion of his statement—and 

that he was required to seek such a ruling to preserve the issue for appeal.6

¶15 As a general rule, when a party fails to raise an issue before the 

circuit court, the party forfeits that issue on appeal. See Schill, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 

 

6

 Our supreme court has held that evidentiary motions should be made before trial, but

may also be made during trial at the court’s discretion. State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 548, 205 

N.W.2d 1 (1973).
No. 2020AP144-CR

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¶45 & n.21. Although forfeiture “is a rule of judicial administration” and we have 

discretion to overlook a party’s failure to raise an issue in the circuit court, State v. 

Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117, ¶7, 320 Wis. 2d 811, 772 N.W.2d 702, there are 

good reasons to apply the rule in many cases. The forfeiture rule “enable[s] the 

circuit court to avoid or correct any error with minimal disruption of the judicial 

process, eliminating the need for appeal.” Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶30. It also 

“gives both parties and the circuit court notice of the issue and a fair opportunity 

to address the objection,” “encourages attorneys to diligently prepare for and 

conduct trials,” and “prevents attorneys from ‘sandbagging’ opposing counsel by 

failing to object to an error for strategic reasons and later claiming that the error is 

grounds for reversal.” Id.

¶16 The policies underlying the forfeiture rule favor its application in 

this case. Had Tucker sought a ruling from the circuit court that his “somewhat” 

answer was inadmissible and prevailed, Tucker would have been given the relief 

he now requests, eliminating the need for this appeal. That is, in his original trial, 

Tucker would have been able to decide whether to testify without allegedly 

“worrying that the coerced statements he made to the judge would be used to 

impeach him on cross-examination.” Alternatively, if he did not prevail on his 

motion, Tucker would have preserved his right to appeal the court’s ruling, and on 

appeal, we would benefit from a fully developed record of the court’s decision for 

denying his motion.

¶17 Tucker relies heavily on New Jersey v. Portash, but that case helps 

illustrate why it is appropriate to apply the forfeiture rule in this case. In Portash, 

440 U.S. 450, the defendant had previously been compelled to testify in a grand 

jury proceeding, and everyone agreed that his testimony could not be used against 

him in any subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. at 451-52. Portash was later 
No. 2020AP144-CR

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indicted, and prior to his trial, his attorney “sought to obtain a ruling from the trial 

judge that no use of the immunized grand jury testimony would be permitted”

during the trial. Id. at 452. The judge denied the pre-trial motion. Id. Then, after 

the completion of the prosecution’s case, Portash’s attorney renewed his request 

for a ruling that the grand jury testimony would be inadmissible, and that motion 

was also denied. Id. At that point, the attorney stated that he would advise 

Portash not to take the stand because of the court’s ruling. Id. Portash does not 

stand for the proposition that a defendant can forego a motion to exclude an 

allegedly compelled response from use during the trial, and then obtain a new trial 

on the ground that the response may have influenced the defendant’s decision not 

to testify.

¶18 Finally, we note that Tucker had an additional opportunity to raise 

this issue. He could have filed a postconviction motion alleging that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to file a motion seeking a ruling regarding the 

admissibility of the “somewhat” answer. Tucker did not file any postconviction 

motions in the circuit court; therefore, he forfeited yet another opportunity to 

preserve his right to raise this issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶19 Accordingly, we conclude that Tucker has forfeited any entitlement 

to a new trial because he did not seek a ruling from the circuit court regarding the 

admissibility of his “somewhat” answer at trial. Therefore, we affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.
No. 2020AP144-CR

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