IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMANDA L. GESSNER, )

Plaintiff, ) C.A. No. 13-22 Erie

)

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Baxter

LT. NIXON, et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER1

United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Relevant Procedural History

On January 22, 2013, Plaintiff Amanda L. Gessner, a prisoner formerly incarcerated at the 

State Correctional Institution at Cambridge Springs, Pennsylvania (“SCI Cambridge Springs”),

2

filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Named as Defendants are SCICambridge Springs corrections officers Lt. Nixon (“Nixon”); Sgt. Gage (“Gage”); C.O. Yost

(“Yost”); C.O. Diehl (“Diehl”); and C.O. Jeffrey Vittorio (“Vittorio”).

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated her First, Seventh, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by using excessive force against her. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that, on 

November 17, 2012, Defendant Nixon ordered the other four Defendants to extract Plaintiff from 

her cell after she refused to leave the cell because she was trying to assist her cellmate with a 

 

1

The parties have consented to having a United States Magistrate Judge exercise jurisdiction over this matter. [ECF 

Nos. 7, 49].

2

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Muncy, Pennsylvania.

Case 1:13-cv-00022-SPB Document 61 Filed 03/24/15 Page 1 of 9
“medical issue” (ECF No. 3, Complaint, at Section IV.C). During the cell extraction, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants “put handcuffs on [her] wrist so tight it cut the blood circulation off to 

[her] hands,” “broke open flesh to [her] skin,” and “sprained [her] left wrist causing [her] to go 

on an emergency trip to Meadville Medical Center on November 18, 2012.” (Id). 

Defendants’ have filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, that the 

record evidence does not establish excessive use of force as a matter of law. [ECF No. 51].

3

Plaintiff has since filed a response to Defendants’ motion. [ECF No. 59]. This matter is now ripe 

for consideration.

B. Relevant Factual History4

On November 17, 2012, while Plaintiff was housed in the Restricted Housing Unit 

(“RHU”) at SCI-Cambridge Springs, she appeared at her cell door holding a spork. (ECF No. 53, 

Defendants’ concise statement of undisputed material facts, at ¶¶ 1-2). Defendant Vittorio went 

to Plaintiff’s cell, opened the wicket, and ordered Plaintiff to give him the spork, which is 

contraband in the RHU; however, Plaintiff refused. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4). After Plaintiff informed him 

that she had the spork for about a week, Defendant Vittorio again ordered Plaintiff it to hand 

him, but she again refused. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6). After refusing a third order to hand over the spork, 

Plaintiff covered her cell camera with toilet paper. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9). 

 

3

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; however, Defendants have 

failed to support this assertion with a declaration from an officer of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ 

Central Office verifying that Plaintiff has, indeed, failed to exhaust the administrative process as to her claims in this 

case. As a result, the Court will disregard this unsubstantiated assertion.

4

The facts recited herein have been gleaned from Defendants’ Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [ECF 

No. 53], which is unopposed by Plaintiff, but only to the extent said facts are fully supported by the record.

Case 1:13-cv-00022-SPB Document 61 Filed 03/24/15 Page 2 of 9
The Shift Commander was then notified of the situation and Defendant Vittorio was 

ordered to keep the light on in Plaintiff’s cell. (Id. at ¶ 10). Defendant Vittorio then gave Plaintiff 

a direct order to remove the toilet paper from her camera, which she refused, but she did slide the 

spork under the door. (Id. at ¶ 12). After this encounter, Plaintiff flooded her cell by stuffing 

items in her toilet and flushing it, causing it to overflow. (Id. at ¶ 13). Shortly thereafter, 

Defendant Vittorio called for a medical emergency for Plaintiff’s cellmate, who was having a 

seizure. (Id. at ¶ 14). Defendants Nixon, Gage, Yost, and Diehl were among the officers who 

responded to the RHU. (Id. at ¶ 15). Defendant Nixon ordered Plaintiff to come to the wicket to 

be cuffed so that the officers could remove her from the cell in order to provide medical 

assistance to her cellmate; however, Plaintiff refused. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 18). Defendant Diehl then 

knocked on the cell door and repeated the order to come to the wicket to be cuffed, but Plaintiff

refused this order as well. (Id. at ¶ 21). Defendant Nixon then ordered the officers to enter the 

cell and extract Plaintiff so that medical assistance could be provided to her cellmate. (Id. at 

¶ 24). 

Defendant Yost entered the cell first and removed Plaintiff from between the wall and the 

bunk beds. (Id. at ¶ 26). Plaintiff began kicking at the officers and twisting her body in an attempt 

to avoid being handcuffed. (Id. at ¶ 28). Defendant Gage assisted Defendant Yost in bringing 

Plaintiff to the floor to gain control of her as she continued to ignore orders to comply. (Id. at 

¶ 29). Defendant Yost then placed youth handcuffs and a tether on Plaintiff, as Plaintiff had 

slipped out of adult handcuffs in the past. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32). A spit hood was placed on Plaintiff to 

protect the officers, as she kept turning her head in an apparent attempt to spit on them. (Id. at 

¶¶ 37-38). Plaintiff continued to fight the officers by kicking and refusing to stand and walk. (Id. 

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at ¶ 40). As a result, Defendant Nixon ordered the officers to carry Plaintiff into the intake cell, 

which they proceeded to do while Plaintiff continued to struggle. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-44). 

Defendant Nixon turned on the camera in the intake cell to document Plaintiff’s behavior. 

(Id. at ¶ 45). As a precautionary measure, he then asked the medical staff to assess Plaintiff 

following the cell extraction, but Plaintiff refused to comply. (Id. at ¶¶ 51-52). While in the 

intake cell, Plaintiff repeatedly twisted her wrists in the cuffs, pulled away from the tether using 

the full weight of her body on her wrists, and tried to remove the spit shield by bending the top of 

her torso down to meet her outstretched cuffed hands. (Id. at ¶ 54). After Plaintiff’s cellmate was 

removed and the officers performed a safety check, Plaintiff was moved back into her cell. (Id. at 

¶¶ 48, 55).

After complaining of pain in her left wrist, Plaintiff was examined by a nurse, who

initially observed that Plaintiff’s left wrist was slightly reddened with no open flesh wound or 

swelling, and ultimately assessed a 3 cm. ecchymosis, or small bruise, on the left distal area of 

the left wrist. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-61). The nurse noted that Plaintiff was able to move her fingers and 

raise her left arm without difficulty, was able to turn her left wrist with slight difficulty, and was 

in no acute distress. (Id. at ¶¶ 62-63, 65, 67). The nurse took pictures of Plaintiff’s left wrist, 

applied ice to the wrist, administered Motrin, and referred Plaintiff to the physician’s assistant for 

further assessment. (Id. at ¶¶ 64, 66, 68). The next day, Plaintiff was taken to Meadville Medical 

Center for x-rays of her left wrist, which revealed no fracture. (Id. at ¶¶ 69-70, 73). Plaintiff was 

diagnosed with a contusion to her left wrist and was instructed to apply ice intermittently, four to 

six times daily, and to take Advil for pain (Id. at ¶¶ 71-72). 

Case 1:13-cv-00022-SPB Document 61 Filed 03/24/15 Page 4 of 9
C. Standards of Review

1. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) provides that summary judgment shall be 

granted if the “pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Rule 56(e)(2) further provides that when a motion for summary judgment is 

made and supported, “an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own 

pleading; rather, its response must – by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule – set out 

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, 

summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.”

A district court may grant summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff has 

failed to present any genuine issues of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has 

the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Andreoli v. Gates, 

482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007); UPMC Health System v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 

497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004). 

The burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts showing a 

genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 

458, 460-461 (3d Cir. 1989)(the non-movant must present affirmative evidence - more than a 

scintilla but less than a preponderance - which supports each element of his claim to defeat a 

properly presented motion for summary judgment). The non-moving party must go beyond the 

pleadings and show specific facts by affidavit or by information contained in the filed documents 

Case 1:13-cv-00022-SPB Document 61 Filed 03/24/15 Page 5 of 9
(i.e., depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions) to meet his burden of proving 

elements essential to his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 

F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). The non-moving party “must present more than just bare 

assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Garcia 

v. Kimmell, 2010 WL 2089639, at * 1 (3d Cir. 2010) quoting Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 

F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not permitted to weigh 

the evidence or to make credibility determinations, but is limited to deciding whether there are 

any disputed issues and, if there are, whether they are both genuine and material. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The court must consider the evidence, and all 

reasonable inferences which may be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). See also El 

v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007). 

A material fact is a fact whose resolution will affect the outcome of the case under 

applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Summary judgment is only precluded if the dispute 

about a material fact is “genuine,” i.e., if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 247-249.

“Where the party opposing a motion for summary judgment bears the ultimate burden of 

proof, the moving party may discharge its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue 

of material fact ‘by showing – that is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence 

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Player v. Motiva Enterprises, LLC, 240 

Fed.Appx 513, 522 n4 (3d Cir. 2007) quoting UPMC Health Sys. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 391 

Case 1:13-cv-00022-SPB Document 61 Filed 03/24/15 Page 6 of 9
F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004). If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving 

party must, in their opposition to the motion, identify evidence of record that creates a genuine 

issue of material fact. Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1988).

2. Pro Se Pleadings

Pro se pleadings, Ahowever inartfully pleaded,@ must be held to Aless stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers@ Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the 

court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it 

should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax 

and sentence construction, or litigant=s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. 

MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 

555 (3d Cir. 1969)(Apetition prepared by a prisoner... may be inartfully drawn and should be read 

>with a measure of tolerance=@); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 

1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a 

complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir.1997)(overruled on 

other grounds). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)(discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 

12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 

1990)(same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and make 

inferences where it is appropriate.

II. DISCUSSION

AIn determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of

the Eighth Amendment, courts look to several factors including: (1) >the need for the application 

of force;= (2) >the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used;= (3) >the 

Case 1:13-cv-00022-SPB Document 61 Filed 03/24/15 Page 7 of 9
extent of injury inflicted;= (4) >the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as 

reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them;= and (5) 

>any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.=@ Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 

106 (3d Cir. 2000), quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. The central question is Awhether force was 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm.@ Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Moreover, Aa showing of >significant=

or >serious= injury is not necessary to make an Eighth Amendment claim.@ Brooks, 204 F.3d at 

107, quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8.

Here, the overwhelming evidence of record favors Defendants’ assertion that the force 

applied to Plaintiff during her cell extraction was done in a good-faith attempt to maintain or 

restore discipline so that medical assistance could be provided to her cellmate, who was having a 

medical emergency. There is no evidence demonstrating that any force was applied sadistically or 

maliciously to cause Plaintiff harm. To the contrary, Defendants exercised remarkable restraint in 

the face of Plaintiff’s repeated refusal to obey orders and her incessant barrage of insults and 

obscenities, which are clearly audible on the video footage of Plaintiff’s stay in the intake cell.

(ECF No. 55, Exhibit 2). This footage also evidences Plaintiff’s violent struggle to free herself 

from her restraints, which more likely contributed to the bruising of her left wrist than anything 

the Defendants may have done during the cell extraction. Thus, no rational factfinder could 

conclude that Defendants used excessive force against Plaintiff in this case, and summary 

judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants accordingly.

An appropriate Order follows.

Case 1:13-cv-00022-SPB Document 61 Filed 03/24/15 Page 8 of 9
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMANDA L. GESSNER, )

Plaintiff, ) C.A. No. 13-22 Erie

)

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Baxter

LT. NIXON, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2015,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 

51] is GRANTED and judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on all 

claims.

The Clerk is directed to mark this case closed.

/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:13-cv-00022-SPB Document 61 Filed 03/24/15 Page 9 of 9