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72–743 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–307 

NOMINATION OF GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS 

TO BE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

KENT CONRAD, North Dakota 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

JUNE 23, 2011 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia .............. 3 

Lieberman, Hon. Joe, a U.S. Senator from Connecticut ....................................... 5 

WITNESS 

Petraeus, David H., Director-Designate, Central Intelligence Agency ................ 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Prepared statement of Senator Roy Blunt ............................................................. 32 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 54 

Prehearing Questions and Responses .................................................................... 80 

Additional Responses to Questions for the Record ............................................... 87 

Letter from Don W. Fox, Office of Government Ethics, Dated June 9, 2011, 

Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report ............................................. 123 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF GENERAL DAVID H. 

PETRAEUS TO BE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller, 

Wyden, Mikulski, Nelson of Florida, Conrad, Udall of Colorado, 

Levin, Chambliss, Snowe, Burr, Risch, Blunt, Rubio, and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order. 

I’ve just been told the Vice Chairman will be five or ten minutes 

late. But it’s going to be a long afternoon and I think we should 

begin. 

The Committee meets today to consider the President’s nomination of General David Petraeus to be the Director of the CIA. General, welcome and congratulations on your nomination. 

The way we will proceed—and I trust it’s agreeable—I’ll make a 

statement, the Vice Chairman will make a statement. 

Senator Lieberman, it’s my understanding you’re going to introduce General Petraeus. 

And then the general will speak and then we’ll do our Q&A. 

So, General, I’d like to recognize your wife, Holly Petraeus, who 

in addition to being the key behind your success, of course, is also 

serving the nation herself, recently becoming the Assistant Director 

of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, where she’s in 

charge of protecting and assisting the service members. 

Mrs. Petraeus, we’re delighted to have you here this afternoon. 

This nomination comes in the midst of a summer of significant 

change in the national security challenges and posture of the 

United States. Military and intelligence gains in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan have for the first time in years shifted the momentum 

from the Taliban and associated forces to the United States and coalition partners. 

But these gains are still reversible. President Obama’s announcement last night of a withdrawal this year of 10,000 of the surge 

troops will have an impact on operations after this summer’s fightVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072743 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72743.TXT DPROCT
2 

ing season, and I’m sure Members will want to hear your views, 

General, on that, as well as on the overall situation. 

The death of Usama bin Laden in a CIA Intelligence operation 

carried out by United States special forces marks a strategic shift 

in our decade-long efforts against al-Qa’ida and transnational terrorist groups. But the near-term threat from retaliatory strikes has 

gone up. 

There is unrest and revolution across the Middle East and northern Africa, affecting key allies and countries of concern alike. 

At home, the nation’s economic and financial struggles are requiring a new level of fiscal discipline, which means that the major 

increases of intelligence resources since 2001—and the CIA budget 

has virtually doubled in that time—will likely end and the intelligence community will have to do more with less. 

In Washington, the President’s national security team is changing, with Secretary Gates retiring at the end of next week, Director 

Panetta moving across to the Pentagon, and Ambassador Ryan 

Crocker likely to be confirmed soon for his posting to Afghanistan. 

The CIA has been involved in or affected by all of these changes. 

If confirmed, General Petraeus will have the opportunity to shape 

the Agency’s response to the new realities we now face, and our 

purpose today is to understand how he intends to carry out that 

charge. 

General Petraeus is a long-time consumer of intelligence, as the 

top general in both Afghanistan and Iraq. He has been the combatant commander for a portion of the world where intelligence operations play a key role, and he is especially aware of the coordination between military special ops and intelligence covert actions. So 

he comes to this nomination with a deep familiarity of the intelligence community and of the CIA in particular. 

Still, the Committee is always mindful that the CIA is by far the 

biggest of the civilian intelligence agencies. While the majority of 

our intelligence dollars are spent in the Department of Defense, the 

CIA is tasked to provide independent strategic assessments to the 

President. It is by design outside of the military chain of command 

and supposed to balance the need to provide intelligence to 

warfighters with the need to operate and make assessments globally. 

To be sure, CIA directors have in the past come from a military 

background. I believe there are seven of them. And General 

Petraeus and I have discussed this privately, and he has assured 

me that he understands and appreciates the need for independence. And so we look forward to continuing that conversation today. 

I’ve also asked General Petraeus to explain his vision of the CIA 

and will do so again today so that the Committee has some insight 

into his thinking. 

Members of the Committee don’t need an introduction to General 

Petraeus, but let me just give you a couple of brief highlights. He 

is without question one of the finest officers and military minds of 

his generation. He has presided over the shifting of momentum to 

our favor in Afghanistan and he has engineered, with other important contributing factors, a victory in Iraq when defeat often 

seemed inevitable. 

3 

He has demonstrated outstanding loyalty and service to this 

country, agreeing to step down from being the commander of 

CENTCOM to replace General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan 

last year. 

At that time, the Senate moved in near record speed, with the 

Armed Services Committee holding a hearing and reporting out the 

General’s nomination on the same day, and the Senate confirming 

him one day later with a 99–0 vote. 

I’d note as well, and I know Senator Lieberman will do this in 

more detail, he’s also earned a Ph.D. as well as a master’s from 

Princeton, which I believe will serve him well. 

Following the Abu Ghurayb scandal and the ensuing debate over 

detention and interrogation policy, General Petraeus wrote an open 

letter to all soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marine and Coast Guardsmen 

sharing under his command in Iraq. Here’s what he wrote: ‘‘Our 

values and the laws governing warfare teach us to respect human 

dignity, maintain our integrity and do what is right. Adherence to 

our values distinguishes us from our enemy.’’ 

I fully agree. It’s enormously important to have a Director of the 

CIA who is guided by these values and has a sense of right and 

wrong and not only what may or may not be possible. 

Let me just say one more thing. The Senate confirmed Director 

Panetta to be Secretary of Defense by a vote of 100–0 on Tuesday. 

Even if and when confirmed, General Petraeus will not resign his 

commission and come to the CIA until he’s able to transition the 

mission in Afghanistan to General Allen. So, for much of the summer the CIA will be under the acting directorship of Mike Morell, 

the current Deputy Director and lifelong CIA officer. 

I want to state for the record that the CIA and the government 

is very lucky to have such a fine and capable officer at the helm 

during this difficult time. And I know that he will be a valuable 

deputy when you take office, General Petraeus. 

Let me now turn to the distinguished Vice Chairman for his 

opening remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General Petraeus, I congratulate you on an exemplary military 

career as we consider your nomination to be the 22nd Director of 

the Central Intelligence Agency. 

I’d like to welcome your wife, Holly, as well, who has not only 

supported you and the military throughout your career, but has 

also worked to protect military families from predatory lending 

practices. We appreciate her being here to support you again as 

your nation calls on you for another challenging assignment. 

Your nomination comes at a pivotal moment in our history as we 

face threats from across the globe. As a warfighter, you bring a 

unique perspective to the table, having seen firsthand the tactical 

value of accurate and timely intelligence. 

While a key part of CIA’S tactical mission is to support the 

warfighter, it serves primarily as a civilian strategic collection and 

analytic agency. Whatever the topic, from terrorism and nuclear capabilities to the future of Afghanistan and Iraq, policymakers must 

4 

have unvarnished analytic judgments. Your job will be to make 

sure that the CIA delivers these. 

There’s growing demand for intelligence on nation-states, threats 

like terrorism, proliferation and cyber attacks, and for keeping a 

finger on the pulse of the world in as many places as possible. 

While often overlooked and under-resourced, this last point proved 

critical this year as events in the Middle East unfolded. 

While all of these challenges and ones we don’t yet anticipate 

will have your attention, the threat from terrorism will be your 

main focus at the CIA. The successful strike on bin Laden removed 

al-Qa’ida’s leader, but not the threat from terrorism. In my view, 

AQAP in Yemen presents the biggest threat to the homeland and 

I urge you to make your primary focus the dismantling of that 

group before they are able to strike us successfully. 

I would also urge you to look closely at the intelligence on the 

detainees held at Guantanamo. Numerous former detainees have 

joined AQAP and other terrorist groups. You have commented publicly that you believe it is appropriate to close Guantanamo ‘‘in a 

responsible manner.’’ With a recidivism rate now over 25 percent, 

I’d be interested to know whether you still think that is possible 

and, if so, how you think it can be done responsibly. 

In addition to my concerns about the transfer of dangerous detainees, it seems the focus on closing detention facilities has left us 

with few realistic options for detaining terrorists captured outside 

of Afghanistan. You and I, in fact, have had a conversation about 

that. 

As we draw down in Afghanistan, we will have nowhere to detain 

terrorists. In many press stories you read that the U.S. is not trying very hard to capture terrorists. Instead, we are killing them. 

But we know that capturing terrorists is one of the best ways to 

get actionable real-time intelligence to prevent future threats. 

We clearly need better-defined detention and interrogation policies. And I’ll be interested in your views on this and the appropriate role for the CIA to play in these areas in the future. 

You will face many other challenges in this new assignment, and 

I urge you to speak with Director Panetta about his experiences, 

practices and priorities while leading the CIA. He set some very 

good precedents for dealing with this Committee in an open and cooperative manner, and I hope you will continue this relationship in 

much the same way, and I know you will. 

Director Panetta has also been a fierce advocate for the men and 

women of the CIA. This was evident early on when he criticized a 

decision by the Department of Justice to reopen the investigation 

of CIA employees involved in the interrogation of high-value detainees. Unfortunately, that investigation remains ongoing. I feel 

very strongly that years of investigating these counterterrorism 

professionals hurts the mission and it is, frankly, unfair and unnecessary when the career professionals in the Department of Justice 

in the previous administration found no reason to prosecute anyone. 

I know you will stand by your employees on this issue, just as 

I know you stand by our military men and women under your 

charge today. 

5 

General, I’ve had the privilege of engaging you in-theater and 

out-of-theater on many occasions. You’re the epitome, in my opinion, of what a leader should be all about, as you’ve done a great 

job of leading our men and women in uniform. I’m asked quite 

often, as are all of us, what do you think should happen in Afghanistan? And my first response is, ‘‘Well, whatever General Petraeus 

says, that’s the direction in which we ought to go.’’ 

That’s the kind of respect I have for you, and I look forward to 

a continued very close relationship as you assume the duties at the 

CIA. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

It is now my privilege to recognize the Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, the distinguished Senator from the state 

of Connecticut, Joe Lieberman. We’re delighted to have you here, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. If you’d like to make your 

remarks? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOE LIEBERMAN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Chairman Feinstein, 

Senator Chambliss, members of the Committee, colleagues and 

friends. 

I am truly honored to have been asked to appear before you this 

afternoon to introduce President Obama’s nominee to be the next 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General David 

Petraeus. 

Madam Chair, as you indicated earlier, in a literal sense, General Petraeus needs no introduction. So I want to take just a few 

moments to describe what I believe Dave Petraeus has meant to 

our country and why I am confident he will be a superb Director 

of the CIA. 

General David Petraeus is the most distinguished general officer 

of the United States armed forces of his generation. And his generation contains a number of very impressive general officers. He 

is a true American hero who has twice been called upon by our 

commander-in-chief to assume leadership of a faltering war effort, 

and twice he not only answered that call, but led our forces out of 

the jaws of defeat onto the path to victory. To my knowledge, no 

one else in American history shares that record with Dave 

Petraeus. 

At a moment when cynicism too often infuses our national politics and partisanship too often affects national security, General 

Petraeus has won the confidence, gratitude and respect of the 

American people—Democrats, Republicans and, yes, independents—yes, especially independents. 

While commanding our extraordinary troops in wars that have 

divided our country, General Petraeus has inspired and united our 

American family. At a moment when too many of our fellow citizens fear that America’s best days are behind us, Dave Petraeus’ 

life and leadership have been a reminder that America is still a 

land of heroes and that individually and as a nation, we are still 

capable of greatness. 

6 

Our debt of national gratitude to the Petraeus family extends beyond Dave, beginning with his wife, remarkable wife Holly. As 

you’ve indicated, Madam Chairman and Senator Chambliss, Holly 

Petraeus shares her husband’s strength of character, intelligence 

and devotion to the cause of public service. As you know, she is 

currently leading a noble mission of her own, protecting our military families from exploitive and manipulative lending practices. 

By my rough calculations, General Petraeus has spent more than 

twice as many months deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan over the 

last eight years as he has back home in the United States. 

Throughout all that time, Holly has remained steadfastly supportive of her husband’s service to our country, and I might add, 

supportive and protective of their gifted children. 

So today, I know we all want to say thank you, Holly Petraeus. 

General Petraeus’ background and accomplishments would make 

him a superb candidate for any of the top national security positions in the United States government. But there are special set of 

reasons why I believe he will make a truly superb Director of the 

CIA, particularly at this time of war. 

First, General Petraeus is someone whose very name inspires the 

trust and confidence of America’s friends and the fear and anxiety 

of America’s enemies. As our commander-in-chief in Iraq, then at 

CENTCOM and now in Afghanistan, he has stood at the epicenter 

of some of our toughest, most intensive and most effective counterterrorism operations. General Petraeus knows our enemies. 

At the same time, he has also built very close personal relationships with our partners and allies in the Middle East, South Asia, 

the Euro-Atlantic community and around the world. 

Dave has proven himself to be a capable leader of organizations 

that are even larger than the CIA. And because, as you said, 

Madam Chair, he is not just a soldier, but a scholar as well, having 

earned a Ph.D. at Princeton, he is very well suited to oversee and 

demand the highest standards in the critically important analysis 

done by so many who work at the CIA. 

After all he has done, General Petraeus certainly would have 

been well justified at this point in his career to seek a quiet personal retirement. But, fortunately for the rest of us, service to a 

cause larger than himself is General David Petraeus’ creed and his 

personal destiny. 

The brave and skillful men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency will be in very good hands when he is given the opportunity to be their leader, and all Americans will be fortunate, 

indeed, and safer when General Petraeus is at the helm there. And 

that is why I feel so personally honored now to present to this 

Committee General David Petraeus. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We 

very much appreciate your being here. We would welcome you to 

stay, if you’d like, or I know you have other things as well, so it’s 

very much your choice. But thank you very much. 

General Petraeus, we’re delighted to hear from you, if you’d like 

to proceed. 

7 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS, DIRECTORDESIGNATE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General PETRAEUS. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear 

before you this afternoon. 

I’d like to thank Senator Lieberman for his very kind introduction. I have, of course, had considerable contact over the past 10 

years with Senator Lieberman in his capacity as a senior member 

of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and I might add, also as 

one of the so-called three amigos. 

Throughout that time, his support of and abiding concern for our 

troopers and their families have been extraordinary. Senator 

Lieberman is a true patriot and statesman who has served our 

country magnificently, and I know that he will be sorely missed by 

his colleagues and his constituents when he hangs up his Senate 

cleats in January 2013 after 24 years of service on Capitol Hill. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Thanks also for your kind words about my wife, Holly, here with 

me today. As you’ve noted, Holly is no stranger to public service. 

Indeed, she is an Army daughter, an Army wife, an Army mother, 

and an advocate for military families. 

As was noted, earlier this year she left the office she established 

some six years ago at the Better Business Bureau to become an Assistant Director of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 

responsible for the Office of Servicemember Affairs. 

Holly was recently described as being bright, nice, small and a 

pit bull, someone you want in your corner. I’ve been blessed to have 

had her in my corner for some 37 years and 23 moves, and I appreciate the opportunity this afternoon to recognize her publicly. 

While it is, needless to say, a tremendous honor to have been 

nominated by the President to serve as the next Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency, I’ve worked very closely with members 

of the Agency over the last decade in particular, and I have the 

highest regard for them and for the Agency as an institution. If 

confirmed, it will be a true privilege to serve with them and to continue to contribute to the important endeavors to which so many 

Americans and our coalition partners have given so much in recent 

years. 

Up front this afternoon I thought it might be useful to address 

a few of the concerns that various pundits have offered about an 

individual with my background becoming CIA Director. Some observers have, for example, questioned whether I will be able to 

grade my own work—that is, to ensure that my involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq or other endeavors will not color the Agency’s analysis of those efforts. 

Let me reassure you on this issue. Clearly, I have views on the 

efforts in which I’ve been engaged. I’ve shared them in the past 

with the Agency’s analysts and I’ll do so in the future. However, 

if confirmed, when I am in the Situation Room with the President, 

I will strive to present the Agency position. 

I will also remain keenly aware that I am the leader of an intelligence agency, not a policymaker. In truth, my goal in uniform has 

always been to convey the most forthright and accurate picture 

possible. 

8 

I have, to be sure, offered more positive assessments than the intelligence community did on two important occasions: in September 

2007 on Iraq and in December 2010 on Afghanistan. In each case, 

my team and I felt that the situation had changed significantly following the intelligence community assessment cutoff date, typically 

some six to eight weeks prior to the date of the assessment being 

reviewed by policymakers. In view of that, we sought to provide our 

assessment and more up-to-date analysis. 

In two other cases, those of the assessments on Iraq in April 

2008 and March 2009, I provided less positive assessments than 

those put forward by the intelligence community, which, again, 

stopped the clock for analysis purposes a good bit prior to the date 

that we provided our assessment. My view in those two cases was 

that the assessment should have been more cautious and more 

qualified, and that is what I offered. 

In short, I have sought to provide the most accurate view possible. My goal has been to speak truth to power, and I will strive 

to do that as Director of the CIA, if confirmed. 

There have also been concerns voiced over militarization of the 

intelligence community in general and the CIA in particular. One 

reason I will retire before assuming the directorship, if confirmed, 

is to allay such concerns. 

Beyond that, I have no plans to bring my military brain trust 

with me to the Agency. There is no shortage of impressive individuals at the Agency, and I look forward to interacting with them 

and populating my office with them. If confirmed, I will, in short, 

get out of my vehicle alone on the day that I report to Langley. 

Finally, some observers have suggested that someone who has 

had six commands in a row as a general officer might find the relative flatness of the Agency’s organization unsettling. I would remind such individuals that I was, as was earlier noted, privileged 

to have an academic period in my background and that I have long 

enjoyed vigorous debate and discussion. 

Moreover, I have repeatedly used red teams, outside advisers, directed telescopes and back-channel contacts with individuals well 

down in the organizations I’ve been privileged to command. 

A practice I used in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, was 

meeting with groups of company commanders while on battlefield 

circulations, and I have also corresponded by e-mail with innumerable young commissioned and noncommissioned officers as well. 

In short, I will not only be comfortable with the lack of rigid hierarchy at the Agency, I will promote appropriate flatness of the 

Agency’s organization, while recognizing that there does have to be 

some hierarchy and that at a certain point decisions have to be 

made, analyses have to be finalized and judgments have to be rendered. 

I would also like to offer a few observations about how I see the 

Agency, observations that benefit from discussions with the Agency’s current leadership team, former members of the Agency, including virtually all former Directors and a number of senior leaders, and of course with Director Panetta. 

And here, if I could, I would like to salute Director Panetta’s 

principled, forthright leadership of the Agency over the past two 

and a half years. Indeed, Leon Panetta did an absolutely magnifiVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072743 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72743.TXT DPROCT
9 

cent job at the helm of the Agency and it was a pleasure to work 

with him while I served as commander of U.S. Central Command 

and as the commander in Afghanistan. 

In assessing the organization, it is important that I recognize 

that the Agency is its people. Indeed, it is blessed with thousands 

of individuals who truly are national assets, quiet professionals and 

unsung heroes who go about their work silently and without public 

recognition. They are the ultimate selfless servants of our nation, 

individuals with extraordinary expertise, initiative, integrity and 

courage in the face of adversity and physical danger. 

Needless to say, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to help attract 

the very best people to the Agency, to ensure that those hired provide the diversity needed for the areas in which we need to perform 

missions, to ensure that we strive to develop them and invest in 

them to the maximum extent possible, and to work to retain them 

for as long as is possible. 

The Agency is, of course, but one of 16 elements that comprise 

the intelligence community. And while it may be the most prominent and well known, it is nonetheless part of a team, and collectively it has to be a team player. 

Moreover, it is critical not only that the leaders of Agency elements work well with their partners in the other organizations, it 

is also critical that the Director work closely and effectively with 

the DNI. 

I have known DNI Jim Clapper for a number of years and 

worked with him in his current capacity and when he was the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as well. We have 

worked well together in the past, and we have discussed the imperative of continuing to do likewise if I am confirmed as the next Director of the CIA. 

I believe I understand his role as the leader of the intelligence 

community, and I understand the relationship the D/CIA should 

have with the DNI. 

If confirmed, I also look forward to working closely together with 

the leaders of the other agencies of the intelligence community. I 

have, in fact, soldiered with many of them over the past decade 

while deployed for a year in the Balkans, during some four years 

in Iraq, as the commander of U.S. Central Command, and of 

course, over the past year in my present position in Afghanistan. 

I am also keenly aware of the need to maintain close ties with 

Congress. By all reports, the Agency has done an admirable job 

under Director Panetta in this regard, and I know that keeping the 

Committee fully and currently informed is imperative. 

If confirmed, I will keep the Agency on the trajectory it has been 

following in this regard under Director Panetta. Indeed, I look forward to furthering the relationship, indeed the partnership, that 

was built with Congress on his watch. 

With respect to additional organizational issues, many I’ve consulted since my nomination have emphasized the need to continue 

to improve the development of agency information systems that enable efficient sharing of information, and also to continue the development of tools and applications that help with analysis. I’ll focus 

on such areas, if confirmed, and seek congressional assistance, if 

required. 

10 

Related to that, I understand that the effort to reduce internal 

Agency stovepipes needs to continue. There reportedly has been 

considerable improvement in this area in recent years. However, 

additional attention is reportedly warranted to work the tensions 

between the need to protect information and the need to share it. 

On a related note, I will also strongly support efforts to integrate 

analysts, all disciplines of intelligence, and operators. In fact, the 

various centers of the Agency, such as the ones devoted to counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and crime and narcotics, among 

others, are good examples of such integration. If confirmed, I will 

support and reinforce such approaches. 

Other issues in the organizational arena deserving attention are 

the need to maintain sensitivity to the counterintelligence threat, 

improve cyber security, upgrade leadership training for supervisors, continue the expansion of language skills, and strengthen 

the lessons-learned process, among others. I will examine each of 

these areas closely, if confirmed, and support appropriate initiatives in them. 

The Committee knows well the regional and functional issues on 

which the Agency needs to focus. Obviously, the Agency is heavily 

engaged in the front lines in the global fight against violent extremists. There has, needless to say, been important progress 

against al-Qa’ida in recent months in particular, and I will ensure 

that we maintain the relentless pressure that has enabled such 

progress. 

Indeed, I have worked closely with various Agency elements in 

recent years in this campaign and, if confirmed, I will support continuation of the superb cooperation between Agency assets and 

other intelligence community elements, with the Joint Special Operations Command and other military commands and with relevant 

elements of the interagency. 

Needless to say, support for the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, as well as for missions in other locations, such as 

Yemen, Iraq, and parts of Africa, will remain critical. 

The Agency is, of course, specifically charged with the conduct of 

covert operations. These operations are of enormous importance to 

our country. And, if confirmed, I will devote considerable attention 

to ensuring that such activities are properly conducted, resourced 

and coordinated. 

It is also important that the Agency, while staying focused on 

supporting our ongoing wars, not be totally captured by these efforts. While contributing to such efforts to the utmost, the Agency 

nonetheless also has to maintain a broad global perspective, one 

that is constantly searching for new threats and opportunities—the 

next developments in the Arab spring, the evolution in capabilities 

of various state and nonstate actors, the development of China and 

other emerging global powers, and the possible proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction. 

Of particular note as well are cyber threats that have emerged 

in recent years. I share the concerns that many hold about cyber 

security and, if confirmed, I will ensure that the Agency continues 

to work closely with intelligence community partners to identify 

and counter risks, threats and adversaries from issues within our 

networks to threats from outside attackers. 

11 

Related to this, and in view of the Agency’s responsibility for conducting and coordinating human intelligence collection, I will also, 

if confirmed, examine progress and collection on the so-called hard 

targets and inventory the status of initiatives against them, aligning our efforts as required. 

Finally, I also recognize that it will be critical to ensure adequate 

resources for appropriate investment in Agency infrastructure, 

science and technology, and other assets, while also striving to be 

good stewards of our nation’s tax dollars and doing our share to 

help our country deal with challenging fiscal realities. 

If confirmed, I will focus intently on those imperatives, as well, 

noting that I will also not hesitate to seek additional resources that 

may be needed as emerging missions and tasks require. 

The Central Intelligence Agency is at the forefront of the efforts 

to identify and counter the threats to our nation’s securities and interests. It plays a central role in many of our country’s most important endeavors. 

If confirmed as the Agency’s next Director, I will do all that is 

humanly possible to ensure that the Agency is relentless in pursuit 

of intelligence needed by our country’s leaders, our military, our 

diplomats, and, indeed, our own covert operators. 

It would, in short, be an enormous privilege to be the Agency’s 

Director and to serve with, represent, lead and be an advocate for 

Agency members, individuals with world-class knowledge of other 

countries and cultures, with cutting edge technical expertise, with 

extraordinary courage, initiative and commitment, and with no 

quest for acclaim or public recognition. 

The professionals of the Agency are our country’s best and 

brightest, men and women who voluntarily undertake some of the 

most difficult tasks for our nation, men and women for whom integrity and analysis is the watch word. 

I have served closely with many of them since 9/11, and I cannot 

say enough about them and the sacrifices they and their families 

make for our country. Serving as their Director would be a tremendous honor, and again, a tremendous privilege. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:] 

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Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, General Petraeus. 

Now come the pro forma five questions, if you just answer yes or 

no, please. 

Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other 

venues when invited? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, I do. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to send officials from the CIA 

and designated staff when invited? 

General PETRAEUS. I do. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents or any 

other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibility? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, I do. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that the CIA and its officials provide such material to the Committee when requested? 

General PETRAEUS. I will. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to 

the fullest extent possible all members of this Committee of intelligence activities and covert actions, rather than only the Chairman 

and Vice Chairman? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, I do. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, General. 

I know this is not the subject, but because of President Obama’s 

announcement last night, I’d like to put that behind us and then 

go on to other things. 

When we talked, you mentioned that you had presented to the 

President certain options, and we didn’t discuss what they were. 

I would just like to ask this question: How do you view the President’s decision with respect to bringing home certain troops and 

maintaining others for the rest of the time prior to 2014? 

General PETRAEUS. If I could, Madam Chairman, perhaps I could 

just walk through the process, because it was quite a substantial 

one, although in a brief period of time, included three meetings. 

After the first meeting, I was given a homework assignment, 

which I answered by the second meeting, and then the third meeting was the one in which the President ultimately reached a decision. 

The responsibility of a combat commander in that kind of situation is to provide options to the President to implement his stated 

policy, and that’s what I did. 

Associated with each of those options was an assessment of risk, 

the risk being assessed in this case from my perspective, the risk 

having to do with the ability to achieve objectives of the military 

campaign plan, acknowledging that at every level of the chain of 

command above me there are additional considerations and that 

each person above me, all the way up to and including the President, has a broader purview and has broader considerations that 

are brought to bear, with the President alone in the position of 

evaluating all of those different considerations, including, certainly, 

those of the commander on the ground, but also many others as 

well, in reaching his decision. 

I provided such options. I provided assessments of risk. I provided recommendations. We discussed all of this, again at considerable length. 

18 

The President then made a decision. The commander in chief has 

decided. And it is then the responsibility, needless to say, of those 

in uniform to salute smartly and to do everything humanly possible 

to execute it. 

Now, as Chairman Mullen, Admiral Mullen, stated today before 

the House Armed Services Committee, the ultimate decision was a 

more aggressive formulation, if you will, in terms of the time line, 

than what we had recommended. Again, that is understandable in 

the sense that there are broader considerations beyond just those 

of a military commander. 

The fact is that there’s never been a military commander in history who has had all the forces that he would like to have, for all 

the time, with all the money, all the authorities, and nowadays 

with all the bandwidth as well. 

So there is always a process of assessing risk, and it’s typically, 

in a case like this, as the Chairman put it today, risk at the margin. We’re talking about small differences here, albeit significant 

from a military commander point of view. 

And so, that’s how I would lay out, again, the process that took 

place, the very good discussion. This was, indeed, vigorous. All 

voices were heard in the Situation Room. And ultimately, the decision has been made. 

And with a decision made, obviously I support that and will do 

all that I can during my remaining time as the commander of ISAF 

to implement it, to set up General Allen to do likewise so that we 

can achieve the objectives of the campaign plan. And then also, if 

confirmed as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to do the 

same from that position as well. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I have one minute left. 

I have been concerned by many of President Karzai’s statements. 

We all know what this country has done in the last ten years, and 

it seemed to me to be the development of an adversarial relationship. 

How do you view his recent statements? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, let me just say that there 

have been times when—first of all, we have not always seen issues 

the same way, and we have worked very hard to resolve such situations. 

Secondly, there have been times where we think that perhaps 

communication to domestic audiences led to some of the kinds of 

statements that we have heard, which I think have caused legitimate concern among some who have heard those, and that is very 

understandable. 

I should note that I have sat down with President Karzai on innumerable occasions. People ask what’s the relationship like, and 

I say that it is a productive, it is a forthright relationship, it is one 

in which, again, we do not always see issues from the same perspective initially, but typically, when we have batted these around, 

we have come to mutually acceptable solutions. 

Secretary Gates has observed, I think rightly, that there have 

been times that we have not listened closely enough to President 

Karzai. I think this is an important element of the relationship, 

that at times we need to think about walking a mile or a kilometer 

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19 

spective and the need to maintain, again, this political foundation 

that is so challenging there, but without which he cannot operate. 

So I have a degree of understanding in this case for President 

Karzai, with whom I have partnered over the past year, and during 

which time we have made significant gains on the security front in 

the greater Kabul security area, in Helmand province, in Kandahar 

and in other areas in the face of a resilient insurgency. 

We have resolved some of the very important issues that have 

been problematic in the past. The private security contractor issue 

is now on course. We have reduced civilian casualties each year. 

We did it in 2010. They’re down. The losses due to ISAF or Afghan 

operations this year are down by over 10 percent. 

But that’s not good enough, we understand, and we have to continue the efforts to do that. We have worked through mechanisms 

where now Afghan forces lead. They don’t just accompany us, partner us, they lead in nearly 25 percent of the night raids, which are 

very, very important to the overall effort, although not the be all 

and end all, because this requires a comprehensive approach that 

also has to include a variety of other elements in this civil-military 

campaign plan that we are executing. 

So, indeed, I think we have to continue the dialogue and the 

partnership. There are times, understandably, I think, where there 

are stresses on that relationship. Addressing those is not optional. 

And that is, indeed, the way that we approach that relationship. 

And I work to help the individual who is the elected leader of a 

sovereign country and is trying to reach the same kinds of goals 

that we have for his land there in the Hindu Kush. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

General Petraeus, in listening to the President last night I was 

somewhat disappointed with the scale of the drawdown, particularly in the short term. And the reason that I was disappointed is 

because I have visited with you on any number of occasions where 

you’ve been very attentive to making sure that we understood what 

your goals were in Afghanistan, particularly with the now halfwaycomplete surge from a time line standpoint. And you often talked 

about needing to make gains in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, 

as you just talked about, and ultimately making gains in the eastern part of Afghanistan. 

As I look back at your testimony in June of 2010, just after the 

President had made his West Point speech, you talked about him 

giving two messages in that speech, one of commitment and one of 

urgency. And I want to quote you. You said, ‘‘The urgency was the 

July 2011 piece—noting that—what happens in July 2011 is a beginning of a process for transition, that it’s condition-based and the 

beginning of a process of responsible drawdown of U.S. forces.’’ 

You also said in that testimony that, ‘‘As we embark on the process of transition, we should keep in mind the imperative of ensuring that the transition actions we take will be irreversible. We’ll 

get one shot at transition and we need to get it right.’’ 

Now, the reason that I’m concerned about what the President 

said last night is that I know you’ve made gains in the south, I 

20 

know you’ve made some gains in the east, and I know that you 

have some additional plans for moving more aggressively in the 

east. 

And I’m concerned because if we are now talking about pulling 

down 10,000, or a third of the troops by the end of this year that 

are part of the surge and the balance of them by the end of next 

summer, before even the fighting season ends next year, what is 

the risk of losing those gains that you talked about are reversible 

but need to be irreversible in your testimony back in June of last 

year? 

General PETRAEUS. Let me just, Mr. Vice Chairman, mention 

that, first of all, transition will begin this summer. It begins next 

month, in fact, as you know. It will be conducted in seven different 

locations, three provinces, one of which is Kabul, less one district, 

and then four different municipal districts. 

As I said, it will begin this summer and it will include a substantial number of Afghan citizens. It’s nearly 25 percent of the population. 

Now, the fact is that in each of these locations transition essentially already has taken place. This has been ongoing over a period 

of time. 

Strikingly, Lashkar Gah in Helmand province, the capital, the 

municipal district, is going to transition, and this is made possible 

because over the course of time, indeed, ISAF forces have thinned 

out and Afghan forces have very much stood up to the point that 

there are virtually no ISAF forces policing the streets there, nor 

are they in Kabul, I might add. 

Now, we believe very strongly this is certainly the right course 

to take. It was what we recommended. There will be another 

tranche in the fall of transition, another in the spring, and another 

in the fall of next year. And we have an eye on that schedule. 

Now, the fact is that we will have our surge forces again, certainly 10,000 will come down by the end of this year. We have 

flexibility in determining obviously which forces and when they 

come. There are already some that are coming home without replacement, decisions that were already made, and others identified. 

And then we’ll shape this and scope it, again based on conditions, 

based on assessments of the mission. And we’re constantly refining 

and updating our campaign plan and we’ll do another round of 

that, needless to say, with the decision having been made. 

But basically, we’re taking out 33,000 U.S. forces over the course 

of a 15-month period. It will run to really to I think somewhere in 

that summer, perhaps as late as mid-September or so, something 

like that. During that time, I might add, there will be some 70,000 

additional Afghan forces added, based on our projections. 

So there will be about 50,000 additional Afghan national army 

and Afghan national police. There will also be probably some 

20,000 or so what are called ‘‘Afghan public protection force,’’ which 

are the private security contractors coming underneath the control 

of the Ministry of Interior, a very important action that is just beginning now. And then there will be some other non-standard elements that are supported by various agencies and international 

elements such as counterterrorist pursuit teams under the intelligence service and so forth. 

21 

It will be critical that we obviously accelerate this as much as 

we can, something we’ve always been about doing, so that we can 

indeed do that hand-off as our forces come out of locations, as we 

really thin out, because we’re not just going to come out and hand 

off. We’ll thin out and indeed hand off to Afghan forces. 

Again, throughout this process, we’ll be constantly examining, assessing conditions. We will provide forthright advice. People have 

always asked me, ‘‘General, if something happens that’s unexpected 

or that increases the level of risk beyond what you originally provided, will you provide your forthright advice?’’ In my remaining 

time, I can assure you that will be the case. And, knowing General 

Allen, who, of course, was my deputy at Central Command during 

my time there, I can assure you that he will do the same as well. 

Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

We’ll go regular order, five-minute rounds. 

Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General Petraeus, when we talked, we talked more about the nature of the CIA, the evolution of the CIA. And it’s interesting to 

me, and you know, you made the statement, ‘‘I’m going to get out 

of the car all by myself.’’ You won’t have a uniform on. You will 

be, in a sense, a new person to them. 

I say this because I care tremendously about the morale at the 

CIA, about the personnel. I think it’s in pretty good shape right 

now because I think Leon Panetta was really good and worked at 

it. He brought two people with him, but no more. 

Other CIA Directors since I’ve been on this Committee, much 

less in the Senate, I think have been less effective. Some have demoralized the CIA. Some have developed sort of a very close band 

of advisers around them to whom they’d turn, but they haven’t 

been very good at reaching down to an unexpected analyst who 

gets a phone call all of a sudden, reaching outside the usual chain 

of command. 

It’s my impression that, first of all, that you want to be a champion for the CIA. That’s very important to you. It’s also my impression that you want to focus on your duties there, and you used the 

phrase in your testimony that you understand that you will be 

commanding a very large agency and you’ll be involved with public 

policy, but not necessarily the nation’s leading discusser of policy 

on Meet the Press, so to speak. 

In other words, I think the CIA will look at you first, and they 

will be very, very impressed, as obviously everybody is, by what 

you’ve done. But by the very, very excellence of your performance, 

they will also be nervous because they will be receiving as their 

leader somebody who comes in alone and somebody who is kind of 

a super-star on the military and intellectual force side, but who 

they don’t know. 

So my questions to you are the following. One, it is hard to walk 

into a building—you’re still General Petraeus—and to simply develop a sense of confidence. I believe so strongly in the CIA, I think 

they need the most immediate kind of trust in their leader. I would 

go so far as to say I think that the entire operation—it’s a very 

22 

large agency—will turn to a better day’s work or a less good day’s 

work based upon how they see you. 

So my questions are the following. You will take nobody in with 

you, but you will have a strategy as to how you’re going to make 

yourself close to the CIA without, in a sense, forcing yourself on 

them, but you will draw them to you. And we discussed that in my 

office, and you had some very interesting thoughts and ideas and 

I wish you would talk about them. 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks very much, Senator. 

First of all, I agree with you absolutely in your assessment of the 

Agency. As I told you behind closed doors, and I’ll say here, I wanted this job. This is something that was not, you know, a month or 

two or three in the making. Secretary Gates and I discussed this 

all the way back last year. 

I’m taking off the uniform that I’ve worn proudly for 37 years to 

do this job, I think in the right way. I think the world of the Agency and its people, having worked very closely with them for the 

past 10 years in particular. And I do, again, just feel enormously 

privileged just to have been nominated to lead them. 

You should know on day one after being sworn in, wherever that 

is, I will indeed get out of the vehicle alone. I will go to the auditorium. We’ll do an all-hands. We’ll have folks piped in as well. And 

I will tell them up front right there that you all should know that 

I’m here to recruit you and I know that you’re here to recruit me. 

I also know that the Director of the National Clandestine Service 

is my case officer. I will seek to reassure them. I’ll use a lot of the 

same techniques applied obviously to a different organization that 

I tried to use in the military—reaching out, reaching down. We 

talked, for example, about a dissent channel. There is a dissent 

channel. It’s called ‘‘ask the Director,’’ and there are an awful lot 

of great questions that come in for the Director, apparently. 

And I’ll stress that they should know that. And beyond that, I’ll 

even give them my personal e-mail address, which should be readily available, I’m sure, on the system anyway. And if it’s like the 

military, there won’t be any hesitation in the junior ranks in providing unsolicited input to their boss. In fact, actually mothers and 

fathers of American soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast 

Guardsmen occasionally take advantage of that as well, and I’m delighted to answer them. 

I did discuss today, in fact this morning, with the Deputy Director and the Associate Deputy Director—and I appreciate your recognition of Mike Morell as a truly superb officer in whose hands 

the Agency will be very well taken care of in the interim—both of 

them long-time veterans of the Agency, and we talked about, again, 

the kinds of strategies that can be pursued indeed to embrace the 

Agency and to show how much I believe in them, in the missions 

that they perform, in their enormous contributions to our country’s 

security and interests. 

And there’s a whole variety of these. I mean, it even starts out 

by going to the cafeteria a few days a week, and some other days 

inviting groups to your office—the equivalent, if you will, of company commander lunches; certainly going out to work spaces and 

visiting them there, rather than summoning them to the seventh 

23 

floor. But indeed, summoning someone to the seventh floor because, 

again, that’s an important incentive as well. 

So lots and lots of these tactics, techniques and procedures, if you 

will. And I’ve been given a number of good ideas like that and I 

will certainly seek to implement them. But again, I appreciate very 

much your feeling for the Agency because it is one that I share 

very deeply. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. And just finally, General Petraeus, the 

idea of redlining, of having people come at you, systematically challenging decisions that you are about to arrive at or perhaps you 

have arrived at, as well as just picking up the phone and calling 

some analyst or police officer somewhere, either in the building or 

somewhere else in the world, and saying, ‘‘What do you think about 

this? What do you think about that?’’ That kind of thing spreads 

wildly fast. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, thanks. 

First of all, I think red-teaming is a very important and literally 

formal red-teaming is an important part, I think, of any such organization, something I’ve sought to do. Also, as I mentioned, the 

idea of directed telescopes, people that are actually eyes and ears 

for you, as well, reaching down into the organization to individuals 

and, indeed, welcoming and saying, look, you know, this is not a 

military chain of command here. This is an organization that 

prides itself on its flatness and in the vigor of its discussions and 

debates. 

And there should not be a case where someone walks out of my 

office and goes down the hall and says, ‘‘Man, I wish I had said 

this or that.’’ That should not be the case. And I’ve got to try to 

create conditions to where people are willing, again not only for the 

Agency to speak truth to power in the interagency, but for there 

to be truth spoken to power on the seventh floor of the headquarters, as well. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator Snowe. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Madam Chair. And welcome, General Petraeus. 

I, too, want to join everyone in congratulating you and to express 

my profound gratitude to you for your more than three decades of 

extraordinary service to this country. 

You’re more than simply filling a position at the helm of the CIA. 

You’re certainly the man of our times, during this pivotal moment 

in this country and the multifaceted challenges that are confronting the Agency as well as this country and the fact that you 

bring a real-world operational experience in the backdrop of being 

an operational commander in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well 

as command of the U.S. Central Command. 

So I want to congratulate you, and also to say thank you to your 

family, your magnificent wife, Holly, for your extraordinary service 

to this country. Americans owe you a tremendous debt of gratitude. 

And so I think that this nomination is an expansion on your illustrious career that is well deserved. 

General, I would like to go back to the question of Afghanistan, 

because, obviously, people in this country, rightfully—and all the 

24 

sacrifices that the military families and those who have made the 

ultimate sacrifice, those who have been injured during the course 

of this decade-long war, are concerned about, you know, where the 

future is with respect to the ultimate end game strategy, and particularly in light of the President’s proposed redeployment and 

surge drawdown. 

In your March testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, you said that, obviously, we must be ensured that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for al-Qa’ida. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator SNOWE. You said today in your testimony that we have 

made important advances in recent months against al-Qa’ida. 

But you also said in your testimony back in March that our efforts are fragile and reversible. I’m presuming that that is on the 

basis that you need a certain level of troops. 

The President indicated in his speech last night, in reference to 

Pakistan, that they will have to expand their capabilities to root 

out cancer in the violent extremists. 

Irrespective of troop levels and irrespective of capabilities ultimately of the Afghan National Army, is it possible to end this insurgency without the Pakistanis’ cooperation, their willingness to 

take durable, unambiguous steps toward eliminating terrorist safe 

havens? 

I know your predecessor—now Secretary Panetta—said that it is 

one of the most frustrating and complicated relationships with 

Pakistan. So the real key to all of this is that if Pakistan doesn’t 

cooperate in eliminating those sanctuaries along the porous borders, then will we ever get to a point that the situation will not 

be fragile and reversible? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, first of all, thanks for your 

kind words. 

Second, I think it is very important to note what Pakistan has 

done over the course of more than two years now. 

If you remember back around, oh, say 30 months or so ago, virtually all of the then-Northwest Frontier Province—now KhyberPakhtunkhwa, Swat Valley—were controlled by the Pakistani 

Taliban, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani. Other agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Area were controlled by the Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistani. And it was very clear to all in Pakistan—to the 

political leaders, the citizens, the religious leaders and the military 

leaders—that this posed the most pressing existential threat to the 

very existence of the Pakistani state as it existed at that time. 

To their credit, they have conducted very impressive counterinsurgency operations in very extreme terrain, again, in the former 

Northwest Frontier Province, to clear Swat Valley and associated 

areas, to clear a number of the agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas—not all. And certainly, they’re in a tough fight 

in Mohmand Agency right now. And we’re working hard to coordinate on the other side of the border, where they at times are the 

anvil for our operations in Kunar Province and then we are the 

anvil for their operations in Mohmand or in Bajaur Agencies. 

So I think it’s very important that we give them credit for what 

they have done and for the enormous number of casualties. ThouVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072743 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72743.TXT DPROCT
25 

sands of soldiers, thousands of police, and, indeed, thousands of civilian have lost their lives to these extremists inside Pakistan. 

Now, having said that, there is also very clear recognition that 

more needs to be done, not only against those extremist elements 

that are threatening the security of Pakistan, but also against 

those that are causing problems for neighboring countries—Afghanistan foremost among them—and, indeed, posing a threat to the entire world with the fact that al-Qa’ida, of course, senior leadership 

is known to be in various locations, again in the rugged tribal border areas. 

So there is more that needs to be done. 

In some of these areas, we have been able to coordinate to share 

intelligence and so forth, but in some others, as Director Panetta 

has forthrightly noted, that has not been the case, and that is difficult. 

And there’s no question that the order of difficulty, the magnitude of the difficulty for the effort in Afghanistan is greater as 

a result of the inability to deal with some of those very significant 

threats that reside in places like North Waziristan, down in certain 

areas of Baluchistan and so forth. 

Now, we have got to work this relationship. There are hugely important mutual objectives that we need to work together to achieve. 

Clearly, this has been a time when that relationship has been 

fraught for a whole variety of different reasons, and we’ve got to 

redouble our efforts there, indeed, to move forward constructively. 

Now, can we achieve our objectives in Afghanistan? Certainly 

much more difficult if there’s not assistance there. And in those 

cases what we have done, actually, is to establish layered defenses 

back from the borders of the agencies in which these groups reside 

most heavily. 

So, for example, in Khowst Province down to the southeast of 

Kabul, which borders North Waziristan, there is quite a substantial Afghan defensive element established there. 

Then where you hit the mountains, there’s another line of defense, then there’s another line of defense just at the southern end 

of the two provinces just south of Kabul, the Greater Kabul Province area. 

And then within Kabul, Afghan security forces are in the lead 

conducting all operations as the lead elements, including some absolutely superb special operations forces which, indeed, we do seek 

to support and enable with certain intelligence tools and assets, but 

which conduct the operations on their own pursuant to arrest warrants issued by Afghan authorities. 

So, again, more difficult? Without question. I’m not sure, though, 

that I would say not doable. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And, General, let me join my colleagues in expressing my gratitude for your service. 

I also think that what is especially important in the Director position is that Senators get the real story, they get somebody who’s 

26 

going to be a straight shooter. And I’m convinced you’re going to 

do that, and I appreciate that. 

I brought with me a new issue of the Foreign Affairs magazine. 

And they talk about the era of revolt. And they have a section with 

a big caption, ‘‘Why No One Saw It Coming.’’ 

So what I’d like to do is begin by asking you what you believe 

is reasonable for policymakers to expect the intelligence community 

to be able to anticipate in terms of major geopolitical events. I 

would like to take Arab spring really as something of a case study, 

General. 

Certainly, over the last few months, the reporting that we’ve gotten from the intelligence community has been quite good. But in 

December and January, when the revolutions were getting started, 

the intelligence agencies appeared to be about as surprised as everybody else. 

In fact, the Director, Jim Clapper, told the Committee a few 

months ago that the intelligence community first realized that the 

Mubarak regime was going to have trouble hanging on in Egypt 

when the leader of Tunisia stepped down in mid-January. 

Now, obviously, not every surprise or instability can be predicted, 

but I’d like to hear your thoughts about whether it’s reasonable for 

policymakers to expect the CIA and other intelligence agencies to 

see events like the Arab revolutions coming. 

So my question is, what should policymakers expect you to know 

and when should we expect you to know it? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think, Senator, that it is reasonable 

to expect the intelligence community and the CIA in particular to 

do everything humanly possible to identify new developments, 

emerging developments, like the Arab spring. 

And, as you noted, I think the reporting on that has gotten better 

over time. I don’t know whether it is reasonable to expect the intelligence community to be able to anticipate that the self-immolation 

of a street vendor would bring down a longstanding leader of a 

country, the dictator of Tunisia. So, I have, you know, some degree 

of understanding there, frankly. 

I think over time that the intelligence, because I have followed 

it—some of it is of countries from my former Central Command 

days in which I retain interest—has improved. 

But the truth is that this really comes to the point that I made 

in my opening statement, and that is that the Agency has to, on 

the one hand, absolutely maintain its focus on prosecuting the global war on terror and going after the violent extremists who pose 

such an important threat to our country and to our allies and to 

our troops in a number of locations, but we also can’t turn that into 

a game of magnet ball, to use the kids’ soccer analogy, that everybody can’t focus on the ball, flock to it, and thereby lose sight of 

the rest of the field. 

Now, I can tell you, having discussed this with Agency leaders, 

that they are keenly aware of the tension, again, between this 

focus that has to be maintained on this very important fight, a 

focus that resulted, of course, in the death of Usama bin Laden, but 

also ensure that the global coverage mission continues, so that, indeed, new developments don’t end up being new surprises to policymakers. 

27 

Senator WYDEN. What concerns me, General, and obviously, we’ll 

talk more about this, is there is no question that the intelligence 

community saw that ordinary Arab citizens generally had a lot of 

grievances against their respective governments, but we understand you don’t have to be a CIA analyst to figure that out. 

So the question is going to be, and we’ll be talking a lot about 

it, since we are spending billions and billions of dollars on intelligence, what can we get for that investment so that we really get 

an improved early warning system with respect to how serious 

these matters are? 

And suffice it to say, we’ll continue this. I look forward to supporting you both in the Committee and on the floor of the Senate. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Burr. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General, many thanks to you and your family for your service. 

A number of us have had the opportunity to see you in action in 

Iraq, in Afghanistan. I think we’ve seen firsthand you don’t say 

things you don’t mean. 

Given that you’ve made a statement numerous times that on the 

day you’re sworn in, you’re going to get out of your car by yourself, 

given that you were the only named person in bin Laden’s documents, I hope you will change your mind and take somebody with 

you. 

[Laughter.] 

General PETRAEUS. There’ll be some security. I’m sorry. There 

will be agency-provided security. 

Senator BURR. General, most, if not all, of the finished intelligence that our Committee is provided is finished analysis, and 

that’s derived from source reports and other raw intelligence materials that we don’t see and, I might say, we don’t always need to 

see. 

In order to assure that our tax dollars are put to good use in the 

intelligence community, would you agree that part of the Committee’s duty is to conduct successful quality oversight of that analysis? 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. And, as I stated, I think this is 

not just about keeping the Committee informed, I think it’s about 

a partnership. I know that’s the trajectory on which Leon Panetta 

has the Agency, and that’s what we want to continue to do. 

Senator BURR. Well, I hope as we go forward that you will agree 

that, on a case-by-case basis, that there are times that the Committee needs that raw intelligence to make the successful judgment 

on the accuracy of the analytic product that we are provided. 

You just alluded to this. I think on 9/11, the relationship between 

our intelligence community, and specifically the House and Senate 

Intelligence Committees, changed. I think it became much more 

transparent, a much more open line of communication and we had 

a common goal. And I believe that this Committee should and has 

been notified as fully as possible on a very quick basis on anything 

that was significant, especially as it related to changes in threats. 

28 

Do you agree that this Committee should have that information 

in a very timely fashion and that you would provide it? 

General PETRAEUS. I do. 

Senator BURR. Well, I thank you for that. 

Last thing. We continue to be plagued with a process of leaks. 

Some of that may deal with changes that we need to make in clearances, I’m not sure. 

But staff and contractors of the CIA must pass a polygraph in 

order to have access to classified information. Congressional staff 

on the Senate and House oversight committees do have access to 

some of the most sensitive intelligence information from the CIA 

and the IC community. 

Given this access, what’s your personal opinion on whether oversight Committee staff should be required to meet the same minimum polygraph standards of all contractors and staff at CIA? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, with respect, that’s not something 

that I have discussed with the leadership of the Agency. And before 

making a judgment on that before the Committee, what I’d like to 

do really is to discuss it and then to come back to you for the 

record, if I could on that. 

Senator BURR. I appreciate that, and I think I speak for the entirety of the Committee. We would like to try to begin to make sure 

that we don’t read about the things that we discuss in the Intelligence Committee. 

I know the Chairman has a deep interest in that. And any suggestions that you might have that help us to plug those holes, we 

would greatly appreciate. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BURR. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Burr. 

Senator Mikulski. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Well, General Petraeus, it’s a pleasure to welcome you and Mrs. 

Petraeus here. I want to just echo my thanks for your desire for 

continued service, as my colleagues have said, and really, as someone who has a substantial number of military, particularly enlisted 

military, in her state, special kudos to Mrs. Petraeus for the way 

she’s protecting them from financial predatory behavior. 

I so enjoyed our conversation in my office and listening to the 

testimony here, because as you know, in our conversation, I wanted 

to know not about General Petraeus, who I tremendously respect 

and admire, but who was going to be Mr. Petraeus? Who was going 

to be Dr. Petraeus? And who in the heck was going to be Director 

Petraeus? 

Now, you answered a lot of those questions, both with me and 

Senator Rockefeller’s question on being the CEO of CIA, and I 

know we, hopefully, would have time to elaborate on that. 

But we also talked about you as a reformer at CIA, because 

you’ve certainly been a reformer in the military. So just let me get 

to a reformer question. 

So much of the work of the CIA over the last 10 years has been 

contracted out. There has been just a trend of a tremendous use 

of contractors, many of which to do work of dubious quality, and 

some pretty dirty. 

29 

I wonder if you’ve had the chance, as you’ve gone through your 

transition documents, to take a look at the contractor issue and do 

you see the need for reform there, both in terms of expenditures 

of money, functions performed, and also the so-called dirty work 

that we didn’t want to know too much about? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I have. In fact, that is a topic I’ve discussed with the leadership of the Agency. In fact, by the way, it 

came up when I was briefed on the Agency budget. 

And if I might just for the Committee very briefly, I know that 

that budget is classified. I won’t get into the numbers. But I will 

tell you that, coming from the military, I kept asking, surely 

there’s got to be something more you’re not telling me about. Because if our country gets the great CIA for that amount of budget, 

it’s the best bargain we have as a nation. 

Now, having said that, there is no question but that quite a substantial component goes for contractors. There is, as you know, 

Senator, an effort already ongoing to reduce the number of contractors. And I can tell you that that effort will continue, that indeed 

that thrust is present for a variety of different reasons, some of 

them, if you will, substantive reasons, that it should be done, but 

then also because of the fiscal constraints that all elements of government are going to have to deal with in the years that lie ahead. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, can I have your word that, as the CEO 

of the CIA, that you will thoroughly scrub this issue of the use of 

contractors? And we need them. I don’t dispute the need. I’m talking about the appropriate need, value for the dollar, and then this 

whole way, I found, if it was tough interrogation, and even questionable tactics, we used that through contractors. 

General PETRAEUS. You have my word. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Let me go, in my last time here—the job of 

the CIA is both to recruit and deploy spies, but also to advise the 

senior policymakers from the President to the Congress on potential threats and emerging threats. That takes me to cyber security. 

You mentioned this in page five. I’d like to hear your comments 

on that from the perspective of the CIA. My own view is that this 

is our new enduring war, that coming out of the White House the 

policy has been thin—a lack of urgency, cohesiveness and muscle. 

And I wonder, from your perspective, as we work on a more muscular, focused, urgent policy, how you see the CIA—and without revealing your tactics, your plans—I know it’s a complicated question 

in a public forum. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, actually, I appreciate—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. Could you share with us? 

General PETRAEUS. I would be happy to, because in particular as 

commander of U.S. Central Command I was one of the more vocal 

proponents of the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command. 

Senator MIKULSKI. General Alexander. 

General PETRAEUS. Who happens to be, by the way, a West Point 

classmate of mine, a longtime friend, and in my personal pantheon 

of heroes for the extraordinary expertise that he has developed in 

this area over the years and his leadership of the community that 

carries out a very substantial portion of activities in this arena. 

Clearly, the Agency has to focus very intently on the defenses 

against cyber threats, intrusions, and so forth. This is where you 

30 

do have this tension between need to share and need to protect. 

And that is something that indeed I look forward to working with 

the leadership of the Agency. 

But we should also remember that the Agency has a unique role 

to play, as the human intelligence collection agency, if you will, 

first and foremost—that is a charter of the CIA—in terms of helping other agencies get into networks. And so I indeed look forward 

to working that role very hard, and in a number of different ways, 

partnering with General Alexander and the heroes at NSA and 

Cyber Command, and the other elements of the interagency to assist as is appropriate in that regard, as well. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, thank you, General, Mister, Doctor, Director Petraeus. And we look forward to working with you. I believe 

we do protect dot-mil. I have really great anxiety about protecting 

dot-gov and dot-com, and look forward to working with you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much Senator Mikulski. 

Senator Blunt, you’re next. 

Senator BLUNT. I thank you, Chairman. And, General, thank you 

for being here. I want to join all of my colleagues in thanking you 

and your family for your service. 

You mentioned your West Point colleague, General Alexander. I 

know there are a couple of cadets here today, Doug McFarland 

from Missouri and Travis Griffin from Maine. And whether they’re 

here or not, I think your leadership and your example are a great 

role model for those who serve us. 

I think the questions of my colleagues have been good and don’t 

need to be repeated. There are a couple of things I would like to 

pursue a little bit. 

One, I just want to mention in my prepared remarks for the 

statement which I’ll submit, I made the comment you made about 

how it’s critically important—as a matter of fact, I’m going to read 

three sentences from that. 

Congressional oversight is fundamental to who we are and to our 

system of government. By necessity, most of the CIA’s activities 

happen out of public view and under cover. That cover shouldn’t be 

used by elected officials, however, to hide from accountability. Protecting our national security must be a partnership. And I think, 

as Senator Burr said and you mentioned, it’s been a greater partnership since 9/11 than it was before. 

I want to talk a little bit about drones for a minute and the use 

of drones. As I told you in my office a couple of days ago, I’m very 

supportive of the decisions the President made regarding 

Abbottabad. And one of the results of that decision was the—well, 

I—I think we can talk about what I want to talk about here. 

General PETRAEUS. I think generically. 

Senator BLUNT. The only thing I was going to say about that 

was, we were able to leave with information in addition to the principal goal, which was justice for Usama bin Laden. And what I was 

going to ask you in a general context was, what kind of evaluation 

should go into that decision of how much information might be 

there, whether you use a drone or not, or whether you make the 

decision to try to capture the information, as well as eliminate the 

individual? 

31 

General PETRAEUS. Well, thanks, Senator. As we discussed, in 

fact, our preference in many of our targeted operations—again, 

speaking now for the military, but it has applications more broadly—is to capture individuals so that you can indeed interrogate 

them, so that you can develop knowledge about the organizations 

they’re a part of, so that you can build, if you will, the link diagrams, the architectural chart of these organizations, understand 

the hierarchy, and generally continue to pull the string in, as you 

develop an ever more granular and nuanced understanding of these 

organizations that we are seeking to combat. 

There are, however, occasions where we cannot, for a variety of 

different reasons, carry out that kind of operation. And in such 

cases, then, obviously, kinetic activity is a course of action, whether 

by drones or other platforms, for that matter, or other kinetic elements. And so that does provide an option to us, other than, again, 

where you cannot carry out a capture operation. 

I would note that the experience of the military with unmanned 

aerial vehicles is that the precision is quite impressive, that there 

is a very low incidence of civilian casualties in the course of such 

operations. The warheads, actually, tend—in many cases, they’re 

as small as a Hellfire, of course, so these are not large munitions. 

And as a result, I think, again, the precision is really quite impressive. And it is constantly growing with the proliferation of various platforms that enable us to have the kind of observation and 

understanding of the targets before they’re attacked. 

Senator BLUNT. Well, I appreciate that. And I do think a sense 

of what might be available, who else might be there, all of those 

things are things that, as the Director, you need to be intimately 

involved in. And look forward to that leadership and other leadership. And like others on this Committee, I respect your service, I 

respect your capacity as an individual and look forward to being 

supportive both during this process and if, as I expect will happen, 

you’re Director, to be supportive of your actions and to help move 

forward with that partnership that you mentioned, that’s such a 

critical part of this part of our security right now. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Blunt. 

Senator Nelson, you’ve returned. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Blunt follows:] 

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Insert offset folio 7 here 72743.007
34 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General, I enjoyed talking to you. Amplifying on Senator Rockefeller’s comments to you, you and I discussed before that having 

come out of a military command structure where so often it is of 

necessity a top-down command structure, that when you get into 

the intelligence community the collaboration structure is so much 

more essential to the effective achieving of the mission. And you 

shared some very interesting thoughts on that with me. Would you 

repeat them for the folks here? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, thanks, Senator. 

Indeed, this ability to foster collaboration in an organization like 

this—and of course it’s not strictly unique to the Agency; there are 

huge elements within the military and among those various intelligence elements in which we seek to shape that same kind of collaboration and sharing. 

But critical to the Agency, in particular, is the sharing of all disciplines of intelligence, the fusion of the products of all disciplines, 

the interaction of operators and analysts, and then the collaboration of all members of the intelligence community as well. I think 

that’s critical. 

As we discussed, there certainly have been breakthroughs in 

every discipline of intelligence since 9/11, whether it’s signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, indeed with the proliferation of various platforms and unmanned aerial vehicles, the ability to digitize 

human intelligence, indeed, even measurement intelligence, because of some of the sophisticated packages, balls, optics and so 

forth that are now on some of our platforms. 

So in every discipline there have been breakthroughs. But the 

fact is, the biggest breakthrough is occasionally overlooked, and 

that is the fusion of the products of all of these disciplines, and 

bringing that all together. And that fusion is carried out by people. 

Yes, you can have the great applications, computer databases, massive databases that you can throw lots of data into, but at the end 

of the day, the digitization of this, the use of it, the employment 

of it is by people. 

And it’s by people who work together, who are encouraged to do 

that, who are in centers like the Counterterrorist Center and so 

forth, and with leaders who indeed bring them together and ensure 

that all know that teamwork is not optional. 

Now, again, I think the tone for this, the culture of this obviously 

has to start at the top, as is the case with any organization. Every 

team does, at the end of the day, have a coach. And if I’m privileged to be the coach of team CIA, indeed I will try to foster that 

kind of approach. I will try to indeed encourage that by my own 

actions and initiatives, including some of those that we discussed 

with Senator Rockefeller earlier—reaching down, reaching out, 

making contact with individuals well down in the organization, allowing dissent channels, welcoming red team contributions and so 

forth. 

Senator NELSON. Describe what you think to be the state of the 

fight now with al-Qa’ida, and what do we need to do to make sure 

that al-Qa’ida no longer poses a meaningful threat? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, we have to maintain that effort, again 

that relentless pressure that has resulted in al-Qa’ida being a conVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072743 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72743.TXT DPROCT
35 

siderably diminished organization, but noting that it still has considerable capability. 

Obviously the loss of the only leader al-Qa’ida had ever known, 

an iconic figure, is a tremendous blow to the organization, and to 

the organization in the franchise, if you will, as well. 

And indeed, I think even some of the images that came out of 

that subsequently diminished the perception of Usama bin Laden, 

and the way in which he was living, and so forth, I think was contrary to what I would assume many of his followers would have expected of him. 

Also, of course, over the course of recent years, the number three 

position in al-Qa’ida was the most hazardous job in the world. 

But having said all that, there still is al-Qa’ida senior leadership. 

There is a new leader of al-Qa’ida, reportedly. And indeed, there 

will be efforts to regenerate, to resurrect and to continue the efforts 

to carry out attacks on our homeland and on the homelands of 

some of our allies. 

And as you know, these franchises elsewhere, al-Qa’ida in the 

Arabian Peninsula was a concern of mine even before I left Iraq, 

before even going to Central Command, and indeed over the course 

of years there, there has been increased pressure on that, as is reasonably well reported. 

Al-Qa’ida in East Africa sustained a very substantial loss very 

recently here. Every now and then, you actually get a break, and 

that appears to have been the case there with a significant leader 

being killed at a checkpoint. 

Al-Qa’ida in the Maghreb and other parts of Africa also bears 

very careful watching. Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, enormously diminished, 

but still capable of carrying out sensational attacks and warrants 

additional attention. 

Now, the fact here is that we cannot ever get into a game of 

whack a mole. What we have to do is whack all the moles simultaneously. We have to pressure that network with our own network. 

And one of the major developments since 9/11 has been the establishment of this network, in many cases led by the Joint Special 

Operations Command of the military, but with very, very good 

partnering, again with elements of the Central Intelligence Agency, 

other elements of the intelligence community, and in fact with conventional military forces, the white SOF as well as the special mission units, and certainly with our diplomats and the members of 

other interagency elements, such as the Treasury Department, 

State Department, Department of Homeland Security, who also 

play very important roles in the fight against extremism. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS [presiding]. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus was very good with his time with me, and I appreciate you taking time to come to see me and answering my 

questions. So thank you very much. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Senator Risch is a tough act to follow. 

[Laughter.] 

36 

Senator RISCH. You never said that before, Senator, but I’ll take 

note. 

Senator UDALL. One Rocky Mountain westerner to another. 

General, thank you as well for your service, for taking time to 

come and sit down with me. We could have, I know, visited for 

quite a bit longer. But thank you for the thoughtful way in which 

you approach everything you’ve done for our country. 

I know you’re a keen observer of institutions and people, and in 

that spirit I know you’ve also acknowledged in many settings that 

the men and women in uniform that fight for us not only have to 

be warriors in this day and age, but they have to be educators, diplomats, small ‘‘d’’ democrats, even human rights advocates. 

And I know you mentioned that the CIA isn’t in the business of 

setting policy per se, but there are a set of values and beliefs and 

principles that you’re defending that we all should defend. 

So in that context I wanted to talk a little bit about torture, and 

the very important debate we’ve had in our country. One of the 

things that you’ve said that’s been most quoted is, ‘‘Some may 

argue that we would be more effective if we sanctioned torture or 

other expedient methods to obtain information from the enemy. 

They would be wrong. Beyond the basic fact that such actions are 

illegal, history shows that they are also frequently neither useful 

nor necessary.’’ 

And then you went on to say,’’Whenever we’ve perhaps taken expedient measures, they’re turned around and bitten us in the backside.’’ 

Now, there are some who have argued that by not taking expedient measures we’re deprived of valuable information. Do you anticipate your basic views on this issue changing at all as you take 

the helm with the CIA? In other words, do you see torture any differently in a CIA context than in a military context? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, thanks very much. First of all, 

I might add that it was not just the counterinsurgency field manual that we oversaw the drafting of when I was a three-star commander at the Combined Arms Center headquartered at Fort Leavenworth. It was also the Army field manual sometimes identified 

on interrogations. It’s actually called the ‘‘Human Intelligence Collector Operations.’’ 

And that field manual, I might add, thanks to Senator McCain, 

who knows something on this subject also, has the force of law. 

Your body gave it the force of law. No one has more experience, I 

don’t believe, overseeing the application of that field manual and 

those techniques than I do, having commanded in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, when we had some 27,000 detainees at the 

highest point, and then in Afghanistan where we had far, far 

fewer, some 2,000 or so. 

My experience is that those interrogation techniques, which are 

judged to be humane, and by the way, we have had the International Committee of the Red Cross in all of our detainee facilities 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. We opened up some during my time in 

each of those commands that were conducted by some of our special 

operations forces. And they have been judged as the gold standard 

by that international organization. 

37 

Those techniques, again, do work. We do gain very important information. And as I mentioned, that’s why in many cases we prefer 

to capture extremists, rather than to kill them. And it is a very 

rare case, in fact, where those techniques do not elicit the information that we actually are after in these cases. 

So I strongly support the continued exercise of that, noting, by 

the way, that the CIA does not do interrogations and does not hold 

detainees, but again as a general statement. But also, I would submit to this body and really to policymakers that there may be consideration of a special case. And I have talked about this on the 

record before. I do think there is a need at the very least to address 

the possibility of the so-called, you know, you have the individual 

in your hands who you know has placed a nuclear device under the 

Empire State Building. It goes off in 30 minutes, he has the codes 

to turn it off. 

I think that is a special case. I think there should be discussion 

of that by policymakers and by Congress. I think that it should be 

thought out ahead of time. There should be a process if indeed 

there is going to be something more than, again, the normal techniques employed in such a case. And again, I would certainly submit that that would be very helpful if that kind of debate could be 

held and if some resolution could be made as to what should be 

done in a case like that so that it is worked out ahead of time, 

rather than under an extraordinary sense of pressure in such a situation. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that thoughtful answer. I look forward in perhaps a more secure classified setting having that discussion. And in the meantime, I’ll note the ways in which you and 

the military have performed humane interrogations that have generated enormous amounts of information, while keeping faith with 

the values that make America and Americans special. 

Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Senator. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General, first of all, I want to echo all the comments that were 

made here by everyone thanking you for your service to our country and looking forward to supporting you both in Committee and 

on the floor in your nomination, and hoping you’ll come visit Florida like you did from time to time, when you spent some significant 

amount of time there and the mutual friends that miss you in the 

Tampa area. 

I do want to revisit for a moment the President’s decision on Afghanistan because I think it’s relevant to the role that you will 

play in terms of managing our relationship with Pakistan. You earlier, in response to a question from the chairwoman, said that you 

had provided the President options and that each option had a list 

of risks. And I guess my question was, did you also provide recommendations to the President? 

General PETRAEUS. I did. And I said that earlier, indeed. And as 

I mentioned earlier, as Chairman Mullen noted today as well, the 

decision made by the President was a more aggressive formulation, 

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38 

ommended. And I also noted that, again, there are broader considerations that guided that, in my view, but I don’t think it’s my 

place to try to explain in detail what all those broad considerations 

are. 

I don’t think it’s appropriate for me to go into the positions of 

other people in that room either. And I think that you have certainly the right to ask us I think it’s termed the ‘‘personal view’’ 

as we pledge to provide, and I have provided that here this afternoon. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, my question was really more toward the— 

and I understand the President has a number of factors he has to 

take into account when making this decision. I would think your 

recommendation would be based on military factors. You wouldn’t 

be able to happen to share that recommendation with us today on 

exactly what it is you recommended the course of action would be 

from a military perspective? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Chairman Mullen has already done 

that today. He talked about having two full fighting seasons, rather 

than, again—— 

Senator RUBIO. At the surge level. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Well into it. Yes, in other words, 

the 33K coming down at the end of the second fighting season, 

roughly in that timeframe there. Now, we do have, as I said, 15 

months to do this. And again, there was a good discussion of this 

and healthy debate. 

Senator RUBIO. I just wanted to kind of add to that by asking, 

the September 2012 date, is there any specific significance to that 

date from a military or practical perspective in terms of why that 

date was chosen, September 2012? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, I’m not going to try to provide the rationale that individuals used in making the decision. My discussion, my input focused on, again, the duration of a fighting season, 

and that’s what guided that. 

Senator RUBIO. Yes, right, and that’s what I’m trying to get at, 

is if the September 2012 a date that had some military significance 

or fighting season significance? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, it does in that it is a reasonable time 

through the fighting season, to be sure. Right. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. The other question I had is, in light of this 

decision, one of the things we’ve heard repeatedly is that, and obviously it’s not the only reason, but one of the things that complicates our relationship with Pakistan, and in particular managing 

our relationship with ISI, is this thought that from the Pakistani 

side, so they say, they have doubts about America’s willingness to 

stay there and that, in fact, they feel like in the past perhaps we’ve 

not stuck to our commitments in the region and have left them 

holding the bag, and in essence, we encourage them to hedge their 

bets. Obviously, I don’t think that explains all the problems here, 

but it’s one of the things we keep hearing come up in conversations 

and in media accounts. 

I wanted to get your perspective on how not just the President’s 

decision yesterday but in general any decisions that we make about 

transition in Afghanistan, you know, how that should be handled 

and how those numbers, dates, decisions that are made, how that 

39 

impacts that issue and that role and that view. And in fact, the 

question would also apply to elements within Afghanistan that 

have also expressed, you know, some of the same ‘‘we need to 

hedge our bets’’ attitude because they have questions about America’s commitment to the region and to the conflicts, but specifically 

about Pakistan and managing that relationship. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, sure. First of all, I think it’s very important to recall that the most significant development of the past 

year in a strategic sense with respect to the campaign in Afghanistan is the commitment that was made at Lisbon this past November for the alliance to remain committed to Afghanistan through 

the end of 2014, by the end of which time Afghan forces will be in 

the lead in security terms throughout the country. That was an 

enormously important moment for the effort in Afghanistan. 

Now, implied in that, explicit in that actually, is the idea that 

obviously during that time there’s going to be a steady drawdown 

of coalition forces, of ISAF forces, as indeed there is a steady increase of Afghan forces. As I noted earlier, for example, during the 

15-month period that we will draw down some 33,000 troops, and 

at the end of which we’ll still have 68,000 U.S. troops on the 

ground, and probably another at least 30,000 to 40,000 other nonU.S. ISAF forces, during that time that we draw down 33,000, I 

think there will be an increase of some 70,000 Afghan forces. 

Again, this is not just the army and the police that are authorized. It is also the Afghan public protection force being stood up. 

It is additional Afghan local police elements that will be established and are very, very important because they’re local defense 

forces and no one defends his village better than the villager. 

So all of that will take place. 

And, indeed, I think the commitment to 2014 remains very 

sound. There will be those, in fact, who will argue that this decision solidifies support for that all the way through, provides the rationale, and so on. 

Pakistan sees this. I think they saw 2014, and at that time I 

think they realized that the United States and the rest of the international community was indeed committed for another, you know, 

still from here now three and a half years. 

And then there is now the discussion of the U.S.-Afghanistan 

strategic partnership agreement, or declaration. And indeed, there 

is also discussion of a NATO–Afghanistan partnership agreement 

that would go beyond 2014. 

Countries like Australia, the prime minister has been very clear 

and explicit in her commitment to continuing beyond 2014 already, 

as have other countries. 

So I don’t think that we face a ‘‘Charlie Wilson’s War’’ kind of 

scenario here. I don’t see us feeling that, okay, you know, we got 

rid of the Soviets, we accomplished this mission and now we’re out 

of here. 

I think there is every intention that there be an enduring commitment, albeit one that is much less costly over time, that is more 

sustainable in that sense, given the fiscal constraints that all of the 

contributing nations face in Afghanistan, and one that increasingly 

is characterized by Afghans being in the lead, and Afghans shouldering more and more of the burden. 

40 

And I have an obligation here, by the way, for our Afghan partners, to note to this Committee that Afghan forces right now are 

dying, are being killed in action at a rate that is three times the 

rate of ISAF forces. 

So for anyone to say when will the Afghans start fighting and 

dying for their country, I can tell you that they are doing that right 

now, and indeed we should give them enormous credit for being out 

there, and increasingly shouldering the burdens in their country. 

Thanks, Senator. And I will get back to Florida. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio. 

General, we have two ex officio members who are very potent 

members in their own right of a very significant Committee, namely the Chairman and Ranking Member of Armed Services. 

And I want you to note their humility. They have sat at the end 

of this row now for approximately two hours. And I think it’s 

time—— 

Senator MCCAIN. And hated every minute of it. 

General PETRAEUS. I have been staying hydrated for this very 

minute. I want you to know, when I saw Senator McCain, I started 

drinking water immediately. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So I’d like to recognize the Chairman of 

the Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, General, for your fabulous service. You’ve been 

a great commander of our troops. You’re a deep thinker in terms 

of strategy and how to deal with challenges we face, including 

these kind of insurgencies. We’re all very much in your debt, and 

the country is very much in your debt and that of your family as 

well. 

And, by the way, we’re going to have a hearing on General Allen 

next Tuesday, you’ll be happy to hear. We hope to get his confirmation completed next week. 

I want to pick up the question of Afghanistan, the decision the 

President made last night. You gave a number of reasons here 

today for why you—as I read you, that you are comfortable implementing the decision that the President made, whether or not it 

was precisely following your recommendation or not, that you do 

feel comfortable implementing it and supporting it. Is that an accurate reading? 

General PETRAEUS. I would be a bit more qualified, Mr. Chairman. And, actually, first, if I could—— 

Senator LEVIN. Yes, put it any way you want. 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks. 

And, first, look, in turn, I’d like to thank you for your great support for our troopers over the years. We’ve actually been through 

a lot of hearings over those years. And I have appreciated those opportunities. And more importantly, I’ve appreciated all that you’ve 

done for our men and women in uniform, and indeed for their families. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, what I have said, again, is the same, 

frankly, as what Admiral Mullen said this morning to the House 

Armed Services Committee, that this is a more aggressive timeline. 

41 

Now, what that means, in, of course, soldier shorthand, commander shorthand, is that that means that we assess that there is 

a greater risk to the accomplishment of the various objectives of 

the campaign plan. It doesn’t mean they can’t be achieved. 

That just means from our perspective, which again is admittedly 

one that does not have some of the broader concerns that those 

above us in the chain of command, and indeed the President, has 

to address, that from our perspective, again, that would have been, 

therefore, preferable. 

Now, what I need to do, frankly, is get back—in fact, I’m headed 

back to Afghanistan first thing tomorrow morning—sit down with 

the staff, work our way through this. We had done preliminary 

planning. This was an option that was indeed evaluated. 

But now that you have the final answer, we will go to work on 

how indeed best to implement the policy, how to ensure that Afghan forces are positioned to accept the transition, as we thin out 

in certain areas, and they are thickened in certain areas. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you also agree with Admiral Mullen, as he 

put it to the Committee, that the truth is that we would have run 

other kinds of risks by keeping more forces in Afghanistan longer— 

that’s his exact words—and we would have made it easier for the 

Karzai administration to increase their dependency on us. Those 

were his words today as well. 

We would have denied the Afghan security forces who’ve grown 

in capability opportunities to further exercise that capability and to 

lead. And that, in terms of risks, we would have signaled to the 

enemy and to our regional partners that the Taliban still possessed 

strength enough to warrant the full measure of our presence. They 

do not. 

Would you agree with Admiral Mullen on that? 

General PETRAEUS. I’m not sure I buy every bit of that characterization, Chairman. Again, you can certainly say that staying longer 

would reinforce the Taliban narrative that, you know, we’re not 

going to go home, except I think, you know, we are pulling the 

forces down, gradually reducing those forces. 

So, again, I would come back, if I could, Chairman, to my point, 

which has to do strictly with the military commander on the 

ground, strictly evaluating, again, the military campaign plan, and 

the awareness of the strategic context and these other factors that 

are out there, and explicit recognition that others have to evaluate 

those factors. 

I cannot do that. Only the President of the United States can assess all of the different considerations. And, again, I should note 

that I stated this in the Situation Room, to acknowledge that indeed in this process there are broader concerns than those of the 

military commander. 

And as a result, I obviously support the ultimate decision of the 

commander in chief. That is, we take an oath to obey the orders 

of the President of the United States, and we indeed do that. 

Senator LEVIN. And if you couldn’t do that consistent with that 

oath, you would resign? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I’m not a quitter, Chairman. 

I think that—I’ve actually had people e-mail me and say that. 

And I actually—this is something that I have thought a bit about. 

42 

Senator LEVIN. I’m sure you have. 

General PETRAEUS. And I don’t think that it is the place for a 

commander actually to consider that kind of step unless you are in 

a very, very dire situation. 

Senator LEVIN. You don’t think—— 

General PETRAEUS. This is an important decision. It is, again, a 

more aggressive approach than the Chairman, General Mattis and 

I would have indeed certainly put forward. But this is not something I think where one hangs up the uniform in protest or something like that. 

Senator LEVIN. Just a final part of this—— 

General PETRAEUS. You know, if I could continue, though, Chairman, I feel actually quite strongly about this. Our troopers don’t 

get to quit. And I don’t think that commanders should contemplate 

that, again, as any kind of idle kind of action. That would be an 

extraordinary action, in my view. 

And at the end of the day, this is not about me, it’s not about 

an individual commander, it’s not about a reputation. This is about 

our country. 

And the best step for our country, with the commander in chief 

having made the decision, is to execute that decision to the very 

best of our ability, to do everything I can during the remainder of 

my time as commander of ISAF to enable General Allen then to 

take the effort forward, and then, if confirmed, to be the Director 

of the Central Intelligence Agency, to do everything I can from that 

position with that great organization to support the effort as well. 

Senator LEVIN. I think that’s well put and it’s very reflective of 

your character. You are a man of extraordinary honor. And we all 

are in your debt. 

If I could just add one quick additional reason for why the conditions on the ground have improved, you mentioned that there 

would be 70,000, approximately, additional Afghan security forces 

you expect in the next 15 months. You’ve indicated that they are 

capable, and people who don’t believe that Afghan army is capable 

of fighting I think will run right into your very strong, powerful 

comment about how many of them have died fighting. 

I also want to add that in the last 15 months or so—last 18 

months—there’s been over 100,000 additional Afghan forces that 

have been trained, and that that has also changed the situation on 

the ground in a significant way, because now the Taliban has to 

face those additional troops. 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. 

Senator LEVIN. I thank you. 

And I thank you, Madam Chairman, as well. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you again, Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for being here. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General, let me add my voice to the chorus of congratulations 

and appreciation of you and your family for their incredible and 

wonderful service to our country. I guess you do have a certain 

sense of relief not having, again, to put up with Colonel Graham’s 

presence with you. 

43 

General PETRAEUS. It’s a very, very heavy burden that we have 

had in theater in Iraq, and now in Afghanistan. I thought we’d gotten—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Your reward will be in heaven for putting up 

with him, and we’re indeed proud of his continued presence and 

contributions. 

I guess my question, sir, and I think you’ve been very candid 

with the Committee, particularly in your previous responses to 

Chairman Levin’s comments, I guess one of my questions is this. 

Is it more difficult or less difficult now for General Allen to be able 

to achieve the success of his mission in Afghanistan? Does the 

President’s decision make it more or less difficult for General Allen 

to achieve his goal—the goal or the success of his mission? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, first of all, let me also in turn 

thank you for all that you have done for our country over the years, 

including a particularly long tour that you served in uniform, and 

the way that you then used that experience I think to help guide 

us as we sought to learn lessons from some experiences early on 

in the post-9/11 period. 

And as I mentioned earlier, the manual to which you gave force 

of law does prescribe techniques that work. And I remember that 

debate very well. I was, as I said, the commander of the Combined 

Arms Center when that manual was produced, and I thought that 

the way that you guided that debate was truly admirable because 

it was in the face of some degree of criticism, as you well know, 

from some quarters, including some of those on your side of the 

aisle, which made it all the more admirable. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, with respect to the question that you 

posed, again I would like to use this in terms of risk. But again 

you have to keep in mind that there are risks not just at the military campaign level, not just in achieving the objectives of that 

campaign. There are risks that involve other considerations. 

And in my view—and again, I don’t want to get too much into 

the reasoning employed by others—but in my view, it is an assessment of those risks, risks having to do with other considerations 

that led to the decision, that are important as well. 

And so I actually can’t give a direct answer in that regard because as a commander on the ground you are aware of these other 

considerations. You are aware of the context in which your options, 

your recommendations are evaluated. And it is, again, only those 

at the very top, only the commander in chief, who ultimately, I 

think, can actually assess those full risks. 

Senator MCCAIN. I appreciate that. I appreciate that. And that’s 

the whole structure of our system of government. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. And I fully acknowledge that. 

From a pure military standpoint, conditions on the ground as 

they are, the troops coming out before the end of the fighting season next summer in order to comply with the September pullout, 

does it make it more difficult for General Allen to carry out the 

pure military aspects of his mission? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again this is a more aggressive time 

line than that which the Chairman, General Mattis and I put forVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072743 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72743.TXT DPROCT
44 

ward. It means that there are, again, further challenges by not getting all the way through the fighting season. 

But when you then elevate and consider other factors and other 

considerations, I think at the end of the day that this is why the 

Chairman, I think, gave the assessment that he gave earlier today. 

Senator MCCAIN. It doesn’t surprise me, but it’s interesting to 

note that, according to an article today in the New York Times, 

only hours after Mr. Obama spoke, President Nicolas Sarkozy of 

France said on Thursday he would begin drawing down some of the 

4,000 French soldiers. The German foreign minister, Guido 

Westerwelle, his country’s goal was to be able to reduce the number of German troops for the first time. 

We’re going to see a domino effect here of this announcement. No 

elected leader of our alliance is going to tell his people they’re staying when the Americans are going. Is that of concern to you, sir? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think this is expected, with respect. 

Actually, I talked to the French leadership before, I talked to the 

German leadership, I’ve talked to other countries. Indeed, really 

it’s only one country that had already announced; the others were 

waiting for the announcement. But there was no question that 

those announcements were coming. 

Now, the question is, of course, what is the size of their reductions, does it come as in the case of the U.K. forces; in fact, some 

of those reductions were support troops who were still at Kandahar 

Airfield, no longer needed and so on. 

But, again, this is an area in which we’ll have to look at all of 

that. We will conduct yet another review of the campaign plan, 

something that we do on a fairly regular basis, and examine how 

we may or may not have to relook the battlefield geometry, assess 

the focus of our campaign over time, over the course of the 15 

months of this drawdown effort, and determine the establishment, 

the increase of Afghan forces that can take over in the transition 

of our forces. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, we’ll be able to discuss it, I’m sure, in the 

future. But I predict to you now that our allies will accelerate their 

reductions and presence in Afghanistan. It’s only logical for them 

to do so, which I think exaggerates to some degree the difficulties 

of the challenge of achieving our goals. 

Finally, I’d just like to say I would look forward to working with 

you on this ticking time bomb scenario. And I’m not sure what the 

answer is, because I think the person who would have to be responsible would be the President of the United States, who would then 

be able to go to the American people and say, ‘‘I did it because of 

the imminent threat to security of the country.’’ And I’m not exactly sure how we do it, but I do agree with you. 

But I would also agree with you and thank you for your battlefield experience. And that is, that at no time in the Afghan or Iraq 

conflict has there been a need to torture and violate the Geneva 

Conventions and the things that we as Americans stand for and believe in. 

Comment? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I couldn’t agree with you more, sir. As 

you know, we have been partners in this. There have been 

quotations from this letter that I sent out to our troopers when I 

45 

had a concern at one point in time. It was titled ‘‘Live Our Values.’’ 

These are values we have fought for, that Americans have died for 

over the course of decades and centuries. 

And, as was noted, there are two good reasons to live our values. 

One is, it’s the right thing to do. If someone doesn’t accept that, 

it’s the expedient thing to do, because it bites you in the backside 

over time if you don’t. And, again, I thank you for championing 

that in this body. 

With respect to the ticking time bomb scenario, indeed, I actually 

think—I mean, this could literally be sort of, you know, the nuclear 

football kind of procedure where it is all thought through—that 

there is an authorization, but it has to come from the top because 

something extraordinary is going to be done—and this can’t be 

something where we are forcing low-level individuals to have to 

make a choice under enormous duress. 

I think there has to be a very streamlined process, but I think 

that’s something worth discussing and I appreciate your willingness to take that on, because that is an issue that has to be dealt 

with, I think, by folks on the Hill and also certainly policymakers. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

I have a couple of odds and ends I want to clear up, and then 

we’ll do a quick second round. 

We’re going to try—and I spoke with the Vice Chairman—try 

and get this nomination confirmed by the Fourth of July, so we will 

have to be very speedy with the questions and the markup. And 

I hope you’ll be able to do that. 

General PETRAEUS. We will do it. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay. Good. 

The second thing is, you know, listening to Senator McCain on 

the Army field manual, it’s easy for us—I’ve never known torture. 

It’s a different thing for someone that has to really come out I 

think where Senator McCain has come out. And I, too, and I think 

every Member appreciates that. 

I just wanted the record to be complete on what has happened. 

The Army field manual does not have the force of law. It has the 

force of executive order. 

General PETRAEUS. I’m sorry. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. Correct. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I put it in the 2008 intelligence authorization bill. That bill was vetoed by the President. 

General PETRAEUS. Correct. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So right now it has the force of executive 

order. 

You know, as I listened to you and the questioners here, the 

thought that occurred to me was you are bringing direct street 

smarts from the theater of war to the intelligence community. I 

think we believe that if we win against terrorists, it’s going to be 

because we have good intelligence. 

You are a different nominee than Leon Panetta was. Leon 

brought street smarts with respect to the administration, with respect to the House, with respect to how government works. This is 

really a unique situation, I think, where your experiences can hopefully improve the gathering of intelligence. 

46 

Do you agree with this? And if so, how do you think this can be 

realized? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I would certainly hope that that will be 

the case. As was noted earlier, I don’t think there have been any 

more avid consumers of intelligence in battlefield commands than 

I have been. We have worked very, very closely together to integrate all elements of military forces and intelligence elements for 

common objectives. 

Clearly, I’ve got an enormous amount to learn about the Agency 

as an institution and an organization and its processes and so 

forth. But again, I’d like to think that the experiences that I have 

had will prove of value at the helm of this organization, if confirmed. And I can assure you I’ll also have the sense to listen to 

people like Mike Morell and the others who lead the various elements of the Agency. In fact, I’ve spent a fair amount of time with 

them over the course of the last week or week-and-a-half already. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

The Staff Director gave me a note so that I can clarify this Army 

field manual further. The Army field manual is by executive order 

for the intelligence community. The Detainee Treatment Act makes 

it law for the military service. So there is that slight differential 

there. I think it’s good for all of us to know that as we go forward. 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. And again, I mean, to us it is 

what we follow, as you know. 

You know, if I could, I also perhaps want to get on the record 

the fact that I mentioned earlier that I not only would feel privileged to lead the organization, to be its champion, but also to be 

its advocate. And in that regard, I think that it is time to take the 

rearview mirrors off the bus with respect to certain actions out 

there. 

I don’t want to comment on specific Justice cases, but I think 

that at a certain moment in time, especially a moment when we 

do not any longer truly, I think, appreciate the context of the post9/11 period and some actions that were taking place under direction. And I, for one, again, as the potential leader of the Agency, 

would like to see us focus forward and indeed put some of these 

actions behind us once and for all, and put our workforce at rest 

with respect to that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. That’s very helpful. 

My own view is that you’re going to be a terrific asset to the intelligence community and this Committee really looks forward to 

working with you. I think the closer the relationship in terms of 

the sharing of material and thinking, the better we all are, the better our authorization bills are, the better the performance of both 

sectors—the Congress as well as the Agency. 

And so this will be, I think for all of us, a very special and very 

unique experience. And we’re lucky to have one of our very best 

leading it. I have no doubt that you will be. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Chambliss. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

General, I just want to go back to the issue of detention and interrogation because I’m extremely concerned about where we are 

right now with issues like Bagram. What’s going to happen to all 

47 

of the detainees at Bagram when we turn Bagram over to the Afghans? I am really, really concerned about that. I think I know 

where you stand on that, too. 

Secondly, with respect to the interrogation of detainees, irrespective of what techniques we use, we’ve got to have detainees to interrogate. And we’ve got to make sure that we’ve got facilities in 

which to hold those detainees. I’m concerned about going forward, 

that if we are still thinking in terms of closing Guantanamo, it’s 

been very clear that the American people do not want those detainees at Guantanamo transferred to U.S. soil. And now, that’s the 

law of the land, they won’t be. 

And if we’re going to try to house these prisoners somewhere 

other than Guantanamo, I don’t know where it’s going to be. And 

I don’t expect you to be able to give me an answer right now on 

the issue of interrogation of future detainees, but it’s something 

that I hope you’ll give some thought to immediately, because while 

you’re kind of on the board of the HIG, the CIA is not a part of 

the interrogation team. I think that’s a mistake. And I hope that 

that policy will be changed under your leadership. 

With respect to housing detainees, I would like your comment 

there, particularly at Bagram or Guantanamo. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, actually I’m very glad you raised that 

because it’s literally in a sense the last issue I really was eager to 

get out on the table, having had the opportunity to talk about this 

other one earlier. 

I am on the record, as you know obviously, Vice Chairman, as 

saying that Gitmo should be closed responsibly. This was some— 

back at least two-and-a-half years ago. I think it was shortly after 

taking over Central Command. And it was based on the fact that 

in the Central Command region, the existence of Gitmo indeed had 

considerable antibodies attached to it. There was a certain degree 

of radioactivity. 

Now, to be fair, some of that was because of an association with 

Abu Ghurayb that shouldn’t have been drawn, but nonetheless 

these were the kinds of issues that were reality for those of us 

working in the Central Command area at that time. 

By the way, I did that before President Obama made that statement, so this was not something that was trying to be politically 

correct. This was something that I felt and answered on the record. 

Now, the challenge has been, of course, that we have not been 

able to do this in that responsible manner. There certainly haven’t 

been any state governors that I’m aware of who have raised their 

hand and said, ‘‘Yes, sure, send all the detainees out here.’’ And yet 

there has to be a location for these detainees. I agree with you absolutely in that regard. 

And I think we are in a real conundrum right now. I can tell you 

that Afghanistan cannot and should not be a location to which detainees taken outside Afghanistan end up being located. 

So we are in a very difficult position. And this is, together with 

the issue of the ticking time bomb scenario, I think this is the 

other major issue that needs to be addressed by a combination of 

policymakers and those in Congress, because our nation does have 

to have a place to hold individuals. There is a very legitimate conVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072743 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72743.TXT DPROCT
48 

cern about the recidivism rate of those that have been released to 

various locations. 

In fact, you’ll have seen that there was a jail break in Yemen in 

the last 36 hours or so. I don’t yet have the details on whether or 

not there were any Gitmo detainees as part of that, but I do have 

confirmation that some of them were al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula figures. 

So, again, this is a very, very serious issue, I think, for our country, and it is one I really believe that policymakers and Congress 

need to address on an expeditious basis. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Well, we’ll look forward to working 

with you, because I, too, agree that that is at the top of our priority 

list moving forward. And Yemen is a pretty good example of why 

that recidivism rate is at 25 percent and maybe even higher than 

that, I don’t know, because there is virtually no supervision of 

those former Gitmo detainees in Yemen. 

Well, thank you very much, General, and we look forward to seeing your confirmation process move quickly. 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Mr. Vice Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I appreciate the chance to get into just one other area with you, 

General. I think you’re aware that we sent you the question I’m 

going to ask you. We sent it to your staff and your staff had it. It 

deals with the fact that I feel very strongly that intelligence agencies have to be able to conduct secret operations to protect the 

American people, sources and method, but I also feel strongly that 

our laws, and particularly how they’re interpreted, the official interpretation of how our laws are interpreted, that that has to be 

public. 

So the question that I sent you, and with that essentially as my 

concern, involves the official interpretation of the CIA’S authorities. 

And the State Department’s top lawyer, Harold Koh, gave a speech 

last year in March where he laid out the administration’s official 

views regarding counterterrorism and the use of force, but there 

seems to be some question about whether the speech applies to the 

entire government or whether there is an exception, really an 

unspoken exception, for the intelligence agencies. 

So the question that I sent and I ask now is, did all the statements made in that speech regarding the use of force against terrorists apply to the CIA? 

General PETRAEUS. My apologies, Senator, with respect. I don’t 

know on that. I know that it was sent over. But this is one that 

I’d like to take for the record, and obviously I’ll get you the answer, 

needless to say, before the confirmation process is complete, touch 

wood. So I’ll get that to you for the record, if I could. 

Senator WYDEN. That’s very helpful. That was the answer I’ve 

been hoping for. And, of course, what’s key here is that it be an 

unclassified answer, because this is, as I say, a question of how the 

law is being interpreted. I want to make sure, and we had discussions about this before, that nothing is done in any way that 

threatens sources and methods and collections. And this is about 

the official interpretation. And to have that in an unclassified fashVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072743 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72743.TXT DPROCT
49 

ion, that would be very helpful by the end of the confirmation process, and I thank you. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

The New York Times reported this morning that, according to 

military officials, the withdrawal plan outlined by the President 

will result in the curtailment or cancellation of plans to shift U.S. 

troops coming out of southern and southwestern Afghanistan to 

eastern Afghanistan, where Afghan, U.S. and coalition forces are 

fighting insurgents, including the Haqqani group. Is that accurate? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, I don’t have a clue who those 

military sources are, and if they know something I don’t know. But 

I’m just the commander of the theater. 

Again, we have not yet done—— 

Senator LEVIN. As far as you know, is that accurate? 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t think so. Again, literally just gave 

guidance to the deputy chief of staff for operations of ISAF, who’s 

also dual-hatted as the J3 for the U.S. forces, this evening on secure Internet as to how to move forward on this. And this is— 

they’re a little bit of the planning process if I could, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. So, if this were true, would you know it? 

General PETRAEUS. I would certainly hope so. Again, as I said, 

I don’t know how to comment on, quote, ‘‘military sources.’’ 

I actually saw that and I was a little bit surprised. This is a little 

bit similar to the military sources, by the way, who are also trying 

to comment on what my options and recommendations were going 

to be, and that was curious because there was only one person who 

knew what those were going to be and that was a four-star action 

officer named Petraeus. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, if it turns out that is accurate, would you 

let us know? 

General PETRAEUS. I’ll be happy to. 

Actually, let me just clarify, because the plan for the east was 

never that we were going to move massive forces. It’s more that 

you’re going to move the main effort and enablers. And, again, 

there’s not a concept of moving brigades from the south to the east. 

There is a concept of moving the main effort, the focus, in other 

words other resources that enable those forces on the ground, and 

that’s how you weight the main effort in a campaign like this. This 

is not a maneuver campaign. Perhaps there could be some small 

elements moved. 

But, again, we have not yet done the latest iteration of the refinement of the campaign plan, and it would be premature for 

somebody to try to leak that to the New York Times. 

Senator LEVIN. Another article in the Times this morning, the reporter, quoting himself, I think, made a general assertion that the 

effort to transfer security responsibility to the Afghan security 

forces remains ‘‘elusive’’ because Afghan troops are ‘‘proving unprepared for the job.’’ Can you comment on that? 

General PETRAEUS. I’d be happy to. I mean, we’re going to transition, as I mentioned, in seven different locations. In those locations 

those Afghan forces, frankly, are already performing the bulk of the 

50 

security tasks, most significantly and prominently in Kabul, where, 

again, all night raids in Kabul are led and predominantly manned 

by Afghan forces. Not only do we not do unilateral operations, we 

don’t do even partnered operations there. They are all led by Afghan forces there, in some cases enabled by ISAF and/or other intelligence elements that support them, but we don’t do them. 

I might also add that 100 percent—actually, there’s a small subset we do an occasional kinetic strike—but every targeted special 

operation conducted in Afghanistan, every single one, is now 

partnered with Afghan forces. There are Afghan equivalents for our 

most highly qualified special mission units and then there are 

other elements. There are some 12,000 Afghan special operations 

forces now of all different categories, and I’m not including the civil 

order police among those. 

Senator LEVIN. In all those efforts and actions are they proving— 

not all, but are they generally proving prepared for the job? 

General PETRAEUS. They are indeed. 

Now, having said that, there is an unevenness to the police in 

particular that is characteristic of these kinds of endeavors. As 

you’ll recall, we faced the same in Iraq. We actually faced the same 

in the Balkans and Haiti and a variety of other contingency operations as well. 

But there’s a substantial number of good forces there, and indeed 

they have continued to grow and to develop and to prove themselves. It’s not to say they’re all going to step up to the plate and 

hit the ball on the first pitch, but the batting average has certainly 

gone up considerably. 

Senator LEVIN. And finally, on President Karzai’s comment, his 

speech about our being occupiers, I’ve got to tell you that while I 

agree with you that there are times when we have not listened adequately to President Karzai—I agree with that—on this occasion I 

was absolutely dismayed because I thought that comment of his, 

talking about us as occupiers, plays right into the hands of a common enemy, the Taliban. 

And I would hope that in your determination to speak truth to 

power, which is your commitment here as the new CIA Director, 

that you also will speak truth to the President of Afghanistan, 

President Karzai, that that comment and that speech of his, as 

Eikenberry said, was really totally unacceptable and dismaying 

and plays into the hands of our common enemy. 

General PETRAEUS. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I have 

always sought, albeit in private and, on many occasions, one-onone, to have very candid and forthright conversations with President Karzai. 

Senator LEVIN. Were you dismayed by that comment? 

General PETRAEUS. It did cause concern, without question. I 

mean, to have that—even though you understand it’s to a domestic 

audience, you can understand some of the pressures of some issues 

that are out there that are of enormous concern to our Afghan 

partners, but at the end of the day, it’s not just about the Afghan 

domestic public opinion. There’s some domestic opinion in the 49 

troop-contributing nations, not the least of which is right here in 

the United States. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

51 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

I would like to associate myself with your comments, and I just 

want to say to you, General, President Karzai’s comments had a 

big impact on me. You know, I come from a state where we have 

a lot of veterans and a lot of people that have lost limbs, as do 

other Senators. 

It’s very hard to sustain what has increasingly become an unpopular war—because we believe we need to do it if we’re ever 

going to stabilize that part of the world and prevent terrorism from 

growing—it’s very hard to do that in the face of comments like this, 

and I just had them all pulled and took a look at them. And if you 

look at all of them, they’re unbelievable—that we use chemical 

weapons, that we are occupiers, that we may use a nuclear bomb. 

I mean, it’s provocative, they’re insulting and they’re very misleading. 

So, you know, we have to appropriate the money for the war. I 

happen to be on the Defense Subcommittee. And if the person that 

we’re trying to help stabilize a government for him is saying these 

things about us, you have the automatic reaction, why the heck are 

we here then? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, look, I am entirely sympathetic to that, 

needless to say. And so I will certainly ensure that that sentiment 

is shared with our Afghan partners. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I appreciate that very much. 

And again, we will try to get this done just as soon as we can. 

The questions will go out to you tomorrow by 3:00. 

General PETRAEUS. Terrific. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The sooner you get back and get them 

back to us, we will have all Members receive them and schedule 

a markup, and the vote will go to the floor. And somehow I don’t 

think it will be controversial. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So thank you very much. 

Senator LEVIN. General Patraeus, I think it’s all of our hope that 

you’ll get some time to yourself and your family between these two 

awesome responsibilities. You’re entitled to that, and we hope you 

get it somehow. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes. In the meantime, take your wife out 

to dinner tonight. 

[Laughter.] 

General PETRAEUS. That’s a novel idea. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, all of you. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

(53) 

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