II 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 3395 

To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 5, 2023 

Mrs. SHAHEEN (for herself, Mr. WICKER, and Mr. DURBIN) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Belarus Democracy, 

5 Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2023’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 

8 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended 

9 to read as follows: 

10 ‘‘SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

11 ‘‘Congress finds the following: 

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1 ‘‘(1) Consistently, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the 

2 illegitimate leader of Belarus, engages in a pattern 

3 of clear and persistent violations of human rights, 

4 democratic governance, and fundamental freedoms. 

5 ‘‘(2) Alyaksandr Lukashenka has overseen and 

6 participated in multiple fundamentally flawed presi7 dential and parliamentary elections undermining the 

8 legitimacy of executive, judicial, and legislative au9 thority in Belarus. 

10 ‘‘(3) On August 9, 2020, the Government of 

11 Belarus conducted a presidential election that was 

12 fraudulent and did not meet international standards. 

13 There were serious irregularities with ballot counting 

14 and the reporting of election results. The Govern15 ment of Belarus also put in place restrictive meas16 ures that impeded the work of local independent ob17 servers and did not provide sufficient notice to the 

18 OSCE to allow for the OSCE to monitor the elec19 tions, as is customary. 

20 ‘‘(4) Independent election monitors recognized 

21 Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the legitimate winner 

22 of the August 9, 2020 election for president in 

23 Belarus following her candidacy after her husband, 

24 opposition leader Sergei Tikhanovsky, was imprisVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:51 Dec 12, 2023 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3395.IS S3395
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1 oned for challenging Lukashenka for president in 

2 2020. 

3 ‘‘(5) Following threats to her safety, Sviatlana 

4 Tsikhanouskaya was forced into exile in Lithuania 

5 after Mr. Lukashenka claimed victory in the fraudu6 lent 2020 elections, and since that time, the Govern7 ment of Lithuania has hosted the Office of Sviatlana 

8 Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian Democratic Leader, 

9 and the Government of Poland has hosted the 

10 Belarusian United Transitional Cabinet. 

11 ‘‘(6) Thousands of employees at Belarusian 

12 state-owned enterprises went on strike across the 

13 country to protest Mr. Lukashenka’s illegitimate 

14 election and the subsequent crackdowns on peaceful 

15 protestors to the contested results of the election, in16 cluding at some of Belarus’s largest factories such 

17 as the BelAZ truck plant, the Minsk Tractor Works, 

18 and the Minsk Automobile Plant. 

19 ‘‘(7) After the August 9, 2020, presidential 

20 election, the Government of Belarus restricted the 

21 free flow of information to silence the opposition and 

22 to conceal the regime’s violent crackdown on peace23 ful protestors, including by stripping the accredita24 tion of journalists from major foreign news outlets, 

25 disrupting internet access, limiting access to social 

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1 media and other digital communication platforms, 

2 and detaining and harassing countless journalists. 

3 ‘‘(8) The Government of Belarus, led by 

4 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to subject thou5 sands of pro-democracy political activists and peace6 ful protesters to harassment, beatings, enforced dis7 appearance, and imprisonment, particularly as a re8 sult of their attempts to peacefully exercise their 

9 right to freedom of assembly and association, includ10 ing following violent crackdowns on peaceful 

11 protestors and mass detentions of peaceful pro12 testers resisting the results of the contested 2020 

13 election. 

14 ‘‘(9) Women serve as the leading force in dem15 onstrations across the country, protesting police bru16 tality and mass detentions by wearing white, car17 rying flowers, forming ‘solidarity chains’, and un18 masking undercover police trying to arrest dem19 onstrators. 

20 ‘‘(10) The Government of Belarus, led by 

21 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, suppresses independent 

22 media and journalists and restricts access to the 

23 internet, including social media and other digital 

24 communication platforms, in violation of the right to 

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1 freedom of speech and expression of those dissenting 

2 from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. 

3 ‘‘(11) The Government of Belarus, led by 

4 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has criminalized access to 

5 independent media sources and media channels, in6 cluding foreign media, by designating such sources 

7 and channels as extremist and conducting arbitrary 

8 arrests and detainments of media workers, activists, 

9 and users. 

10 ‘‘(12) The Government of Belarus, led by 

11 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues a systematic 

12 campaign of harassment, repression, and closure of 

13 nongovernmental organizations, including inde14 pendent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating a 

15 climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil 

16 society and social solidarity. 

17 ‘‘(13) The Government of Belarus, led by 

18 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has pursued a policy un19 dermining the country’s sovereignty and independ20 ence by making Belarus political, economic, cultural, 

21 and societal interests subservient to those of Russia. 

22 ‘‘(14) Against the will of the majority of the 

23 Belarusian people, Russian President Vladimir Putin 

24 has propped up the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime, 

25 including by offering security assistance, providing 

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1 significant financial support, and sending Russian 

2 propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime and 

3 pro-Kremlin propaganda on Belarus state television. 

4 ‘‘(15) Efforts by the Government of the Rus5 sian Federation to subsume Belarus into its sphere 

6 of influence and consider Belarus as part of the 

7 Russian empire or as a ‘Union State’ include secu8 rity, political, economic, and ideological integration 

9 between Russia and Belarus, which intensified in 

10 2020 after President Putin supported Mr. 

11 Lukashenka’s illegitimate election and resulted in 

12 the Government of Belarus permitting Russian 

13 troops to use Belarusian territory to conduct mili14 tary exercises ahead of the February 2022 further 

15 invasion of Ukraine and staging part of the Feb16 ruary 2022 further invasion of Ukraine from 

17 Belarusian territory, including by providing Russia 

18 with the use of airbases which allowed Russia to 

19 shoot artillery and missiles from Belarusian territory 

20 into Ukraine. 

21 ‘‘(16) The United States Government and 

22 United States partners and allies have imposed sanc23 tions on Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the Govern24 ment of Belarus in response to anti-democratic ac25 tivities and human rights abuses for more than 20 

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1 years, including in response to the Government of 

2 Belarus’ support for Russia’s further invasion of 

3 Ukraine, which include property blocking and visa 

4 restrictions and export restrictions. 

5 ‘‘(17) The Kremlin has provided the Govern6 ment of Belarus with loans amounting to more than 

7 $1,500,000,000 dollars to prop up Lukashenka’s il8 legitimate regime and Russia continues to provide 

9 Belarus with access to an economic market to avoid 

10 the impacts of United States and allied countries’ 

11 sanctions on key Belarusian industries. 

12 ‘‘(18) The Government of Belarus is relied 

13 upon by the Government of the Russian Federation 

14 to increase production of ammunition and other mili15 tary equipment to facilitate the Kremlin’s crimes of 

16 aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 

17 during the illegal war in Ukraine. 

18 ‘‘(19) Since before the 2022 further invasion of 

19 Ukraine, the Government of Belarus has hosted 

20 Russian troops on Belarusian territory and enabled 

21 the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty by Russia in 

22 February 2022 and since the further invasion of 

23 Ukraine, the Government of Belarus has also hosted 

24 Russian mercenary fighters and reportedly hosted 

25 Russian nuclear warheads. 

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1 ‘‘(20) The international community has seen 

2 credible evidence that children forcibly removed from 

3 Ukraine by Russia during the further invasion of 

4 Ukraine have transited through the territory of 

5 Belarus or been illegally removed to the territory of 

6 Belarus with support from Alyaksandr Lukashenka 

7 and been subjected to Russian re-education pro8 grams. 

9 ‘‘(21) The Government of Belarus’ continued 

10 support of Russia, especially in the unprovoked fur11 ther invasion of Ukraine, and continued oppression 

12 of the Belarusian people may amount to crimes 

13 against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of ag14 gression. 

15 ‘‘(22) The Government of Belarus also threat16 ens the safety, security, and sovereignty of European 

17 countries, including NATO allies Latvia, Lithuania, 

18 and Poland, by facilitating illegal migration through 

19 the territory of Belarus, resulting in efforts by the 

20 United States to support a Customs and Border Pa21 trol Technical Assessment in Latvia to ensure Euro22 pean allies and partners can secure their borders. 

23 ‘‘(23) The Government of Lithuania and other 

24 United States partners and allies host independent 

25 Belarusian free media, including Radio Free Europe/ 

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1 Radio Liberty’s Minsk bureau, and facilitate infor2 mation and content in the Belarusian language, 

3 which the Lukashenka regime has dismissed and de4 facto outlawed as an inferior language to Russian 

5 for the purpose of facilitating Russification cam6 paigns in Belarus. 

7 ‘‘(24) The governments of Lithuania, Latvia, 

8 Poland, and other European partners host members 

9 of the Belarusian pro-democracy movement, includ10 ing political leaders, free and independent media, 

11 and exiled civil society groups and provide essential 

12 support to these individuals and groups that make 

13 up the Belarus democracy movement. 

14 ‘‘(25) The Government of Belarus has further 

15 attempted to suppress freedom of movement of 

16 Belarusian people and Belarusian diaspora and re17 taliate against those Belarusians living overseas and 

18 who have fled the Lukashenka regime by refusing to 

19 provide overseas passport services. 

20 ‘‘(26) The International Civil Aviation Organi21 zation found that the Government of Belarus com22 mitted an act of unlawful interference when it delib23 erately diverted Ryanair Flight 9478 in order to ar24 rest two Belarusian citizens, including an opposition 

25 activist and journalist. 

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1 ‘‘(27) The Belarus democracy movement has le2 gitimate aspirations for a transatlantic future for 

3 the people of Belarus and continue to seek justice 

4 for those imprisoned and oppressed by the 

5 Lukashenka regime and resist Russian encroach6 ment on Belarusian territory, culture, and identity.’’. 

7 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

8 Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 

9 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended 

10 to read as follows: 

11 ‘‘SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

12 ‘‘It is the policy of the United States— 

13 ‘‘(1) to condemn the conduct of the August 9, 

14 2020, presidential election and crackdown on opposi15 tion candidates, members of the Coordination Coun16 cil, peaceful protestors, employees from state-owned 

17 enterprises participating in strikes, independent elec18 tion observers, and independent journalists and 

19 bloggers; 

20 ‘‘(2) to recognize Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as 

21 the Democratic Leader of Belarus; 

22 ‘‘(3) to refuse to recognize Alyaksandr 

23 Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader of 

24 Belarus; 

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1 ‘‘(4) to seek to engage with the United Transi2 tional Cabinet as the executive body that represents 

3 the aspirations and beliefs of the Belarusian people 

4 and as a legitimate institution to participate in a 

5 dialogue on a peaceful transition of power and sup6 port its stated objectives of— 

7 ‘‘(A) defending the independence and sov8 ereignty of the Republic of Belarus; 

9 ‘‘(B) representing the national interests of 

10 Belarus; 

11 ‘‘(C) carrying out the de-facto de-occupa12 tion of Belarus; 

13 ‘‘(D) restoring constitutional legality and 

14 the rule of law; 

15 ‘‘(E) developing and implementing meas16 ures to thwart illegal retention of power; 

17 ‘‘(F) ensuring the transition of power from 

18 dictatorship to democracy; 

19 ‘‘(G) creating conditions for free and fair 

20 elections in Belarus; and 

21 ‘‘(H) developing and implementing solu22 tions needed to secure democratic changes in 

23 Belarus; 

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1 ‘‘(5) to continue to call for the immediate re2 lease without preconditions of all political prisoners 

3 in Belarus; 

4 ‘‘(6) to continue to support the aspirations of 

5 the people of Belarus for democracy, human rights, 

6 and the rule of law; 

7 ‘‘(7) to continue to support actively the aspira8 tions of the people of the Republic of Belarus to pre9 serve the independence and sovereignty of their 

10 country and to pursue a Euro-Atlantic future; 

11 ‘‘(8) not to recognize any incorporation of 

12 Belarus into a ‘Union State’ with Russia, as this so13 called ‘Union State’ would be both an attempt to ab14 sorb Belarus and a step to reconstituting the totali15 tarian Soviet Union; 

16 ‘‘(9) to condemn efforts by the Government of 

17 the Russian Federation to undermine the sov18 ereignty and independence of Belarus, and to con19 tinue to implement policies, including sanctions, that 

20 serve to punish Russia for its anti-democratic and il21 legal actions involving Belarus; 

22 ‘‘(10) to continue to reject the fraudulent vic23 tory of Mr. Lukashenka on August 9, 2020, and to 

24 support calls for new presidential and parliamentary 

25 elections, conducted in a manner that is free and 

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1 fair according to OSCE standards and under the su2 pervision of OSCE observers and independent do3 mestic observers; 

4 ‘‘(11) to continue to call for the fulfillment by 

5 the Government of Belarus of Belarus’s freely un6 dertaken obligations as an OSCE participating state 

7 and as a signatory of the Charter of the United Na8 tions; 

9 ‘‘(12) to support an OSCE role in mediating a 

10 dialogue within Belarus between the government and 

11 genuine representatives of Belarusian society; 

12 ‘‘(13) to support international efforts to launch 

13 investigations into the Government of Belarus and 

14 individuals associated with the Government of 

15 Belarus for war crimes and crimes against humanity 

16 against the people of Belarus and the people of 

17 Ukraine for their actions during the further invasion 

18 of Ukraine; 

19 ‘‘(14) to support a United States diplomatic 

20 presence to engage with the people of Belarus, in21 cluding the regular appointment of a United States 

22 Special Envoy to Belarus until such a time that the 

23 credentials of a United States Ambassador to 

24 Belarus are recognized by the Government of 

25 Belarus; 

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1 ‘‘(15) to continue to work closely with the Eu2 ropean Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and 

3 other countries and international organizations, to 

4 promote the principles of democracy, the rule of law, 

5 and human rights in Belarus; 

6 ‘‘(16) to remain open to reevaluating United 

7 States policy toward Belarus as warranted by de8 monstrable progress made by the Government of 

9 Belarus consistent with the aims of this Act, as stat10 ed in this section; 

11 ‘‘(17) to express concern in the event that social 

12 media or technology companies move to block inde13 pendent media content or participate in media black14 outs that prevent free and independent media serv15 ices from transmitting information into Belarus; 

16 ‘‘(18) to continue to support Belarusian lan17 guage and cultural programs, including by sup18 porting Belarusian language independent media pro19 grams, and Belarusian civil society, including efforts 

20 to restore democracy and the regular function of 

21 democratic institutions in Belarus; 

22 ‘‘(19) to work with the Belarusian democratic 

23 movement and European allies and partners to en24 sure Belarusian nationals living outside of Belarus 

25 have access to national identification documentation 

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1 following the Lukashenka regime’s decision to stop 

2 supplying overseas passport services to Belarusians; 

3 ‘‘(20) to provide technical support to the United 

4 Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and European allies 

5 and partners to develop and implement national 

6 identification documents (New Belarusian Passport) 

7 that will enable the more than 2,000,000 

8 Belarusians living abroad to access freedom of move9 ment and essential services while maintaining 

10 Belarusian national identity and unity; 

11 ‘‘(21) to include Belarusian nationals living in 

12 Ukraine as of February 24, 2022, in the Uniting 

13 For Ukraine program to provide a pathway for 

14 Belarusian nations and their immediate family mem15 bers outside of the United States to come to the 

16 United States and stay for a period of not more 

17 than two years of parole and subject those 

18 Belarusian nationals to the same qualifications for 

19 entry into the program as Ukrainian nationals; 

20 ‘‘(22) to engage in the United States-Belarus 

21 democratic movement strategic dialogue when nec22 essary to reaffirm commitments to promoting free23 dom and democracy in Belarus and promote efforts 

24 to restore free and open presidential and parliamen25 tary elections in Belarus that are conducted conVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:51 Dec 12, 2023 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3395.IS S3395
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1 sistent with OSCE standards and under the super2 vision of OSCE observers and independent domestic 

3 observers; 

4 ‘‘(23) to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of 

5 the Lukashenka regime to enter into any inter6 national agreements or treaties; 

7 ‘‘(24) to advocate for the inclusion of the 

8 Belarus democratic movement to participate in inter9 national institutions and be granted Permanent Ob10 server Status by the United Nations General Assem11 bly; 

12 ‘‘(25) to establish a Belarus service at Voice of 

13 America through the United States Agency for Glob14 al Media that broadcasts in the Belarusian language; 

15 ‘‘(26) to continue to support the Governments 

16 of Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland in providing crit17 ical support to the Belarusian government, civil soci18 ety, and media in exile; 

19 ‘‘(27) to transfer when applicable existing bilat20 eral funding for Belarus toward sustaining pro-de21 mocracy and civil society initiatives outside the terri22 tory of Belarus; 

23 ‘‘(28) to continue to ban ticket sales for air 

24 travel to Belarus until such a time that civilians do 

25 not face random arrests by the Government of 

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1 Belarus, a ban that was enacted following the un2 lawful actions of the Government of Belarus to de3 liberately divert Ryanair Flight 9478; and 

4 ‘‘(29) to continue to work with international al5 lies and partners to coordinate support for the peo6 ple of Belarus and their legitimate aspirations for a 

7 free, open, and democratic society and the regular 

8 conduct of free and fair elections.’’. 

9 SEC. 4. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR BELARUS. 

10 (a) SPECIAL ENVOY.—The President shall appoint a 

11 Special Envoy for Belarus within the Department of State 

12 (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Special Envoy’’). 

13 (b) QUALIFICATIONS.—The Special Envoy— 

14 (1) should be a person of recognized distinction 

15 in the field of European security, geopolitics, democ16 racy, and human rights; and 

17 (2) may be a career foreign service officer. 

18 (c) CENTRAL OBJECTIVE.—The central objective of 

19 the Special Envoy is to coordinate and promote efforts— 

20 (1) to improve respect for the fundamental 

21 human rights of the people of Belarus; 

22 (2) to sustain focus on the national security im23 plications, for the United States, of Belarus’s polit24 ical and military alignment; and 

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1 (3) to respond to the political, economic, and 

2 security impacts of events in Belarus on neighboring 

3 countries and the wider region. 

4 (d) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special 

5 Envoy shall— 

6 (1) engage in discussions with Belarusian offi7 cials regarding human rights and political, economic, 

8 and security issues in Belarus; 

9 (2) support international efforts to promote 

10 human rights and political freedoms in Belarus, in11 cluding coordination and dialogue between the 

12 United States and the United Nations, the Organi13 zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 

14 European Union, Belarus, and the other countries in 

15 Eastern Europe; 

16 (3) consult with nongovernmental organizations 

17 that have attempted to address human rights and 

18 political and economic instability in Belarus; 

19 (4) make recommendations regarding the fund20 ing of activities promoting human rights, democracy, 

21 the rule of law, and the development of a market 

22 economy in Belarus; 

23 (5) review strategies for improving protection of 

24 human rights in Belarus, including technical train25 ing and exchange programs; 

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1 (6) develop an action plan for holding to ac2 count the perpetrators of the human rights viola3 tions, documented in the United Nations High Com4 missioner for Human Rights report on the situation 

5 of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 

6 2020 presidential election and its aftermath (Human 

7 Rights Council Resolution 49/36); 

8 (7) engage with member countries of the North 

9 Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for 

10 Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Euro11 pean Union with respect to the implications of 

12 Belarus’s political and security alignment for trans13 atlantic security; and 

14 (8) work within the Department of State and 

15 among partnering countries to sustain focus on the 

16 political situation in Belarus. 

17 (e) ROLE.—The position of Special Envoy— 

18 (1) shall be a full-time position; 

19 (2) may not be combined with any other posi20 tion within the Department of State; 

21 (3) shall only exist for the period during which 

22 United States diplomatic operations in Belarus at 

23 the United States Embassy in Minsk have been sus24 pended; and 

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1 (4) shall oversee the operations and personnel 

2 of the Belarus Affairs Unit of the Department of 

3 State. 

4 (f) REPORT ON ACTIVITIES.—Not later than 180 

5 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annu6 ally thereafter for the following øfive¿ years, the Secretary 

7 of State, in consultation with the Special Envoy, shall sub8 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 

9 that describes the activities undertaken pursuant to sub10 section (d) during the reporting period. 

11 (g) TERMINATION.—The position of Special Envoy 

12 for Belarus Affairs and the authorities provided by this 

13 section shall terminate on the date that is øfive¿ years 

14 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

15 SEC. 5. STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH THE BELARUS DEMOC16 RACY MOVEMENT. 

17 (a) STRATEGIC DIALOGUE.—The President shall di18 rect the Secretary of State to host a strategic dialogue 

19 with the Belarus Democracy Movement not fewer than 

20 once every 12 months following the date of the enactment 

21 of this Act. 

22 (b) CENTRAL OBJECTIVE.—The central objective of 

23 the strategic dialogue required under subsection (a) is to 

24 coordinate and promote efforts— 

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1 (1) to consider the efforts needed to return to 

2 democratic rule in Belarus, including the efforts 

3 needed to support free and fair elections in Belarus; 

4 (2) to support the day-to-day functions of the 

5 Belarus Democracy Movement, which represents the 

6 legitimate aspirations of the Belarusian people, and 

7 ensure that Belarusians living outside the territory 

8 of Belarus have adequate access to essential services; 

9 and 

10 (3) to respond to the political, economic, and 

11 security impacts of events in Belarus and Russia on 

12 neighboring countries and the wider region. 

13 (c) TERMINATION.—The strategic dialogue with the 

14 Belarus Democracy Movement and the authorities pro15 vided by this section shall terminate on the date that is 

16 øfive¿ years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

17 SEC. 6. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SO18 CIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS. 

19 Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 

20 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend21 ed— 

22 (1) in subsection (c)— 

23 (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘, in24 cluding by establishing a Belarus service at 

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1 Voice of America to include broadcasts in the 

2 Belarusian language’’ after ‘‘within Belarus’’; 

3 (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ‘‘in the 

4 Belarusian language’’ after ‘‘and Internet 

5 media’’; 

6 (C) by striking paragraphs (11) and (14); 

7 (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) 

8 through (10) as paragraphs (4) through (11), 

9 respectively; 

10 (E) by inserting after paragraph (2) the 

11 following new paragraph: 

12 ‘‘(3) countering internet and media censorship 

13 and repressive surveillance technology that seeks to 

14 limit free association, control access to information, 

15 and prevent citizens from exercising their rights to 

16 free speech;’’; 

17 (F) in paragraph (11), as redesignated by 

18 subparagraph (C), by inserting ‘‘and the devel19 opment of Belarusian cultural programs’’ after 

20 ‘‘supporting the development of Belarusian lan21 guage education’’; 

22 (G) in paragraph (12), by inserting ‘‘, in23 cluding refugees from Belarus in Ukraine and 

24 refugees from Ukraine fleeing Russia’s 

25 unprovoked war following the February 2022 

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1 further invasion of Ukraine’’ after ‘‘supporting 

2 political refugees in neighboring European 

3 countries fleeing the crackdown in Belarus’’; 

4 (H) in paragraph (13)— 

5 (i) by inserting ‘‘and war crimes’’ 

6 after ‘‘human rights abuses’’; and 

7 (ii) by striking the semicolon and in8 serting ‘‘; and’’; and 

9 (I) by redesignating paragraph (15) as 

10 paragraph (14); 

11 (2) in subsection (f), by striking ‘‘2020’’ and 

12 inserting ‘‘2023’’; and 

13 (3) by striking subsection (g). 

14 SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREE15 DOM, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN 

16 BELARUS. 

17 Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, 

18 and Sovereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22 

19 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended— 

20 (1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting ‘‘and 

21 Voice of America’’ after ‘‘Radio Free Europe/Radio 

22 Liberty’’; and 

23 (2) in subsection (b)(1)— 

24 (A) by striking ‘‘2020’’ and inserting 

25 ‘‘2023’’; 

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1 (B) in subparagraph (A) by inserting ‘‘, in2 cluding through social media platforms,’’ after 

3 ‘‘communications in Belarus’’; and 

4 (C) in subparagraph (C) by inserting ‘‘, in5 cluding by ensuring private companies do not 

6 comply with media blackouts directed by or fa7 vored by the Government of Belarus’’ after ‘‘ac8 cess and block content online’’. 

9 SEC. 8. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF 

10 BELARUS. 

11 Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, 

12 and Sovereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22 

13 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended— 

14 (1) in subsection (b)— 

15 (A) by redesignating paragraphs (2) 

16 through (5) as paragraphs (3) through (6), re17 spectively; 

18 (B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the 

19 following new paragraph: 

20 ‘‘(2) The release of Ukrainian nationals illegally 

21 held in Belarus, including those illegally transferred 

22 to Belarus after the 2022 Russian further invasion 

23 of Ukraine.’’; 

24 (C) in paragraph (3), as redesignated by 

25 subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘, and people 

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1 who protested the support of the Government of 

2 Belarus for the further Russian invasion of 

3 Ukraine and cooperation of the Government of 

4 Belarus with Russia’’ after ‘‘August 9, 2020’’; 

5 and 

6 (D) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, 

7 by inserting ‘‘, or for providing support in con8 nection with the illegal further Russian invasion 

9 of Ukraine’’ after ‘‘August 9, 2020’’; and 

10 (2) in subsection (c)— 

11 (A) in the subsection heading, by inserting 

12 ‘‘AND THE FEBRUARY, 24, 2022, FURTHER IN13 VASION OF UKRAINE’’ after ‘‘ELECTION’’; 

14 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (5) 

15 through (9) as paragraphs (6) through (10), re16 spectively; 

17 (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the 

18 following new paragraph: 

19 ‘‘(5) assisted the Government of Belarus in— 

20 ‘‘(A) supporting security cooperation with 

21 the Government of Russia in advance of the 

22 February 24, 2022, further invasion of 

23 Ukraine; 

24 ‘‘(B) supporting the presence of Russian 

25 mercenaries in the territory of Belarus; or 

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1 ‘‘(C) supporting ongoing security coopera2 tion with the Government of Russia, including 

3 the Government of Belarus’ decision to host 

4 Russian tactical nuclear weapons;’’; and 

5 (D) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by 

6 subparagraph (B), by inserting ‘‘, or in connec7 tion with the 2022 Russian further invasion of 

8 Ukraine’’ after ‘‘August 9, 2020’’. 

9 SEC. 9. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION. 

10 Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, 

11 and Sovereignty Act of 2020 (Public Law 108–347; 22 

12 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended— 

13 (1) in paragraph (1); by striking ‘‘; and’’ and 

14 inserting a semicolon; 

15 (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at 

16 the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

17 (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the fol18 lowing new paragraphs: 

19 ‘‘(3) to condemn the continued collaboration be20 tween the Government of Belarus and the Govern21 ment of Russia, particularly as it relates to the fur22 ther invasion of Ukraine, and further the purposes 

23 of this Act, including, as appropriate, to levy sanc24 tions and additional measures against the Govern25 ment of Belarus for its complicity in war crimes and 

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1 crimes against humanity committed in the territory 

2 of Ukraine; and 

3 ‘‘(4) to provide technical assistance to the 

4 Belarus democracy movement on the creation and 

5 international recognition of national identity docu6 mentation following the Lukashenka regime’s deci7 sion to cease overseas passport services for 

8 Belarusian nationals, with the objective of maintain9 ing Belarusian national identity and unity but pro10 viding Belarusians living overseas with freedom of 

11 movement and the ability to access essential serv12 ices.’’. 

13 SEC. 10. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR 

14 UKRAINE. 

15 The Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sov16 ereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 

17 5811 note) is amended— 

18 (1) by redesignating sections 8 and 9 as sec19 tions 9 and 10, respectively; and 

20 (2) by inserting after section 7 the following 

21 new section: 

22 ‘‘SEC. 8. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR 

23 UKRAINE. 

24 ‘‘(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con25 gress that— 

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1 ‘‘(1) there are a significant number of 

2 Belarusian nationals residing in Ukraine and suf3 fering from Russian aggression during the further 

4 Russian invasion of Ukraine; and 

5 ‘‘(2) Belarusian nationals may experience 

6 threats to their physical security due to political per7 secution or retribution or human rights abuses if 

8 they return to Belarus. 

9 ‘‘(b) UNITING FOR UKRAINE PARTICIPATION.— 

10 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days 

11 after the date of the enactment of this section, the 

12 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland 

13 Security shall provide a pathway for Belarusian na14 tionals living in Ukraine following the February 24, 

15 2022, further invasion of Ukraine to participate in 

16 the Uniting for Ukraine program. 

17 ‘‘(2) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary of State and 

18 the Secretary of Homeland Security may delay im19 plementation of the pathway required under para20 graph (1) if they determine that it is counter to 

21 United States national security interests.’’. 

22 SEC. 11. REPORTS. 

23 Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, 

24 and Sovereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22 

29 

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1 U.S.C. 5811 note), as redesignated by section 8(1) of this 

2 Act, is amended— 

3 (1) in subsection (a)— 

4 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘2020’’ 

5 and inserting ‘‘2023’’; and 

6 (B) in paragraph (2)— 

7 (i) in subparagraph (G), by striking ‘‘; 

8 and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

9 (ii) in subparagraph (H), by striking 

10 the period at the end and inserting a semi11 colon; and 

12 (iii) by adding at the end the fol13 lowing new subparagraphs: 

14 ‘‘(I) an assessment of how the Government 

15 of Russia is working to achieve deeper security 

16 cooperation and interdependence or integration 

17 with Belarus; 

18 ‘‘(J) a description of the Government of 

19 Belarus actions to support the 2022 further 

20 Russian invasion of Ukraine and ongoing Rus21 sian aggression in Ukraine; 

22 ‘‘(K) a description of how the Government 

23 of Belarus supports, adopts, and deploys Rus24 sian disinformation campaigns or Belarusian 

25 disinformation campaigns; and 

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1 ‘‘(L) an identification of Belarusian offi2 cials involved in continued support to Russia 

3 and the further invasion of Ukraine and an 

4 identification of Russian officials involved in 

5 continued support to Belarus and the further 

6 invasion of Ukraine.’’; 

7 (2) in subsection (b)(1)— 

8 (A) by striking ‘‘2020’’ and inserting 

9 ‘‘2023’’; 

10 (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘; 

11 and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

12 (C) in subparagraph (B), by striking the 

13 period at the end and inserting a semicolon; 

14 and 

15 (D) by adding at the end the following new 

16 subparagraphs: 

17 ‘‘(C) an identification of efforts by the 

18 Government of Belarus and the Government of 

19 Russia to circumvent sanctions, including those 

20 imposed by the United States in response to the 

21 further invasion of Ukraine; 

22 ‘‘(D) an assessment of the shared assets 

23 and business interests of Vladimir Putin and 

24 Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the Government of 

25 Belarus and the Government of Russia; and 

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1 ‘‘(E) a determination on the possibility for 

2 Belarus to host free and fair elections during 

3 the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2024 

4 and the presidential election scheduled for 

5 2025, including a proposal of how the United 

6 States may support a return to democracy in 

7 the anticipated elections in Belarus.’’; and 

8 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub9 section: 

10 ‘‘(c) REPORT ON EFFORTS TO ENABLE

11 BELARUSIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF

12 BELARUS TO TRAVEL FREELY.— 

13 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days 

14 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De15 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 

16 2023, the Secretary of State, in coordination with 

17 the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to 

18 the appropriate congressional committees a report 

19 describing efforts to provide Belarusians living out20 side the territory of Belarus with national identifica21 tion documents. 

22 ‘‘(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 

23 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: 

24 ‘‘(A) An assessment of the European 

25 Union’s efforts to provide Belarusians living 

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1 overseas with national identification documents 

2 that maintain Belarusian nationality but enable 

3 Belarusians living overseas to travel freely and 

4 access essential services. 

5 ‘‘(B) A description of efforts to provide 

6 technical assistance to the Belarus democratic 

7 movement on the creation of national identifica8 tion documents that fulfill the needs described 

9 in subparagraph (A). 

10 ‘‘(3) FORM.—The report required by this sub11 section shall be transmitted in unclassified form but 

12 may contain a classified annex.’’. 

13 SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS. 

14 Section 10(1)(B) of the Belarus Democracy Act of 

15 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note), as re16 designated by section 10(1) of this Act, is amended by 

17 striking ‘‘Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af18 fairs’’ and inserting ‘‘the Committee on Homeland Secu19 rity and Governmental Affairs’’. 

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