NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

HAMZAH IBRAHIM, Petitioner Employee,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

MKTS LLC, Respondent Employer,

SPECIAL FUND DIVISION/NO INSURANCE SECTION, 

Respondent Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-IC 24-0004 

Special Action - Industrial Commission

ICA Claim No. 20213340180

The Honorable Rachel C. Morgan, Administrative Law Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC, Phoenix

By Kelley M. Jancaitis, Brian A. Weekley

Counsel for Petitioner Employee

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix

By Afshan Peimani

Counsel for Respondent

FILED 10-08-2024
2

James F. Mahoney PLC, Scottsdale 

By James F. Mahoney

Counsel for Respondent Employer 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Sophia Cox

Counsel for Respondent Party in Interest

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 This case turns on whether Hamzah Ibrahim was an 

employee of MKTS, LLC., when he was injured. Following an evidentiary 

hearing, an Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ) determined that Ibrahim was an independent contractor, not 

an employee, and on that basis denied his claim. Because Ibrahim has 

shown no error, the award is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Ibrahim was seriously injured when a semi-tractor trailer 

truck he was driving rolled over while on a haul for MKTS, a general freight 

carrier. It was Ibrahim’s first trip working as a driver for MKTS. He filed a 

claim with the ICA, but MKTS denied responsibility arguing Ibrahim was 

not an employee. MKTS based its denial on a “Company Truck Driver

Independent Contractor Agreement” that set forth terms of Ibrahim’s status 

as a truck driver for MKTS.

¶3 At an evidentiary hearing, both Ibrahim and MKTS’ owner 

Mazin Jardak testified about the relationship. The ALJ did not find

Ibrahim’s testimony to be credible and found Jardak’s testimony was 

credible. This court defers to those determinations, viewing the facts in a

light most favorable to upholding the award. See Lovitch v. Indus. Comm’n, 

202 Ariz. 102, 105 ¶ 16 (App. 2002). Application of the law to those facts, 

however, is reviewed de novo. See Young v. Indus. Comm’n, 204 Ariz. 267, 

270 ¶ 14 (App. 2003).
IBRAHIM v. MKTS LLC/SPECIAL FUND

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 The evidence received at the hearing shows that MKTS is a 

long-distance trucking company. In September 2020, Ibrahim and MKTS 

entered into the Agreement to provide services described as “Truck 

Driver.” Although Ibrahim would be paid weekly, the Agreement included 

no rate of payment. The Agreement allowed MKTS to keep the final week’s 

pay if sufficient notice was not provided. Ibrahim had to provide a vehicle 

and any equipment, tools and materials needed to perform the work. He 

was required to “follow the stated speed limits” and keep a paper log “on 

hand.” He was also required to maintain a log “through truck tablets” and 

was prohibited from using a cell phone for that purpose. The Agreement

also states that Ibrahim and those who work with him will comply with

licensing and permitting requirements, that MKTS will not provide 

unemployment or workers’ compensation insurance and that MKTS will 

not withhold payroll taxes.

¶5 Ibrahim could terminate the Agreement at any time with 14 

days’ written notice. MKTS could terminate the Agreement immediately 

without notice for any “act exposing [MKTS] to liability to others for 

personal injury or property damage, causing delay in delivery, being not 

on time for work schedule.” Jardak testified that he explained the 

Agreement to Ibrahim before he signed it. Although the Agreement states 

that it was to take effect on the signatures of both parties only Ibrahim 

signed the Agreement.

¶6 MKTS retained Ibrahim after he passed drug screening and 

driving tests. At that time, Ibrahim had a commercial driver’s license and a 

required medical certificate but did not own a truck. Two months after 

signing the Agreement, Ibrahim contacted Jardak and said he was ready to 

work. MKTS then leased a truck from Penske (a company Ibrahim selected)

and subleased that truck to Ibrahim, which Ibrahim intended to use to make 

runs between Phoenix and Salt Lake City. MKTS installed electronic 

equipment in the truck that tracked and logged mileage as required by 

federal law.

¶7 Jardak testified that drivers typically are paid 85 percent of 

the price MKTS charges its customers per trip, with MKTS keeping the 

remainder. Ibrahim was required to make truck lease payments and

reimburse MKTS for the electronic log equipment rental. Ibrahim 

purchased fuel using an MKTS card and reimbursed MKTS. Those are

considered “expenses” of driving. Ibrahim also reimbursed MKTS for cargo 

liability insurance it supplied. Jardak testified that MKTS held the last 

payment for two weeks after a driver stops working in case the driver 

receives a traffic ticket. 
IBRAHIM v. MKTS LLC/SPECIAL FUND

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 Jardak emphasized that drivers can decline trips and need not

drive exclusively for MKTS. Ibrahim was injured during a one-way 

delivery to Utah. Had Ibrahim wanted to haul freight on the return trip, he 

would have to get another load from MKTS or another carrier.

¶9 MKTS argued that Ibrahim was an independent contractor 

because MKTS had no right to control how Ibrahim accomplished the task 

for which he was hired – the transfer and delivery of goods. MKTS

contended that any requirements imposed on Ibrahim were mandated by 

federal regulations regarding motor carriers hauling freight. MKTS 

emphasized that Ibrahim could “grow [his] fleet” of trucks and hire drivers 

who drove for him, like other independent contractors. Ibrahim countered 

that MKTS was not entitled to the statutory presumption in favor of an 

independent contractor relationship because the written Agreement did not 

comply with A.R.S. § 23-902(D). He also argued he was an employee 

because the services he was providing were “integral” to MKTS’ business

and because MKTS “cannot contract [] out the very heart of [its] business.”

The Special Fund also argued Ibrahim was an employee based on factors it 

contended showed MKTS had the right to control Ibrahim’s work.

¶10 The ALJ concluded that Ibrahim was not MKTS’ employee.

The ALJ cited multiple factors showing Ibrahim’s independence, including:

(1) entering the Agreement but not reporting for work until two months 

later; (2) providing his own truck subleased from MKTS; (3) choosing the 

truck rental company; (4) expenses being deducted from payment and (5) 

MKTS did not require certain routes or hours. The ALJ also noted that

Ibrahim agreed to obtain his own workers’ compensation coverage.

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that a statutory rebuttable presumption of 

independent contractor status applied, see A.R.S. § 23-902(D), and ruled in 

MKTS’ favor.

¶11 In requesting reconsideration, Ibrahim again argued that the 

Agreement did not meet statutory requirements and could not support the

presumption of independent contractor status. Most notably, both parties 

did not sign the Agreement. He then re-urged his argument that the 

relationship between MKTS and himself had the earmarks of an employeremployee relationship. After MKTS responded, the ALJ summarily 

affirmed. This statutory special action followed.1

1 The Special Fund Division/No Insurance Section of the ICA did not 

submit argument to this court.
IBRAHIM v. MKTS LLC/SPECIAL FUND

Decision of the Court

5

DISCUSSION

¶12 This court defers to the factual findings of the ALJ but reviews

questions of law de novo. See Young, 204 Ariz. at 270 ¶ 14. The court may 

independently assess whether an injured worker is an employee or an 

independent contractor based on the totality of facts and circumstances. 

Cent. Mgmt. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 162 Ariz. 187, 189 (App. 1989) (citing

cases). The language of a contract between a company and an injured 

individual is not determinative, but it is one factor to consider. Santiago v. 

Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505, 508 (1990) (citing cases). To further

the remedial purposes of workers’ compensation law, courts interpret the 

term “employee” broadly and liberally. See Schaeffer Trucking v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 141 Ariz. 408, 410 (1984). A court, however, should not “impose

burdens and liabilities which are not within the terms or spirit of the 

[workers’ compensation statutes].” Meno’s Constr., L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm’n, 

246 Ariz. 521, 526 ¶16 (App. 2019) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 

omitted).

¶13 “An independent contractor is not an employee [under]

workers’ compensation law.” Danial v. Indus. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 81, 83 ¶ 12

(App. 2019). Arizona’s workers’ compensation law defines an employee as 

a worker whose work “is a part or process in the trade or business of the 

employer” and over whose work the hirer retains supervision or control.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 23-902(B)(2024).

2 An independent contractor, by 

contrast, is a worker who is “not subject to the rule or control” of the hirer 

and is “engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work.”

A.R.S. § 23-902(C). “The distinction between an employee and independent 

contractor . . . rests on the extent of control the employer may exercise over 

the details of the work.” Cent. Mgmt. Co., 162 Ariz. at 189. This requires

consideration of the “totality of the facts and circumstances of each case, 

examining various indicia of control.” Anton v. Indus. Comm’n, 141 Ariz. 566, 

571 (App. 1984) (quoting Home Ins. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 123 Ariz. 348, 

350 (1979)).

¶14 When an independent contractor relationship is desired, the 

parties may enter into a written agreement that complies with A.R.S. § 23-

902(D). Among other things, A.R.S. § 23-902(D) requires that both parties 

sign the independent contractor written agreement. The Agreement here is 

signed by Ibrahim but not MKTS. Thus, it does not comply with subsection 

(D). Nor does the statute allow for “substantial” compliance; to fully benefit 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
IBRAHIM v. MKTS LLC/SPECIAL FUND

Decision of the Court

6

from the statutory presumption, subsection (D) requires “a fully completed 

written agreement that satisfies the requirements” of that statute. A.R.S. § 

23-902(D). The ALJ, therefore, erred by applying the statutory presumption. 

¶15 Because this court makes a de novo decision on the legal 

question of the parties’ relationship, that error is not dispositive here. This 

court will analyze the relationship under A.R.S. § 23-902(B) and (C), which 

focuses on the right to control the worker. Thus, we consider the evidence 

without applying the subsection (D) presumption.

¶16 In Home Insurance, the Arizona Supreme Court identified 

factors indicating the right to control, noting that none are conclusive:

duration of employment; the method of 

payment; who furnishes necessary equipment; 

the right to hire and fire; who bears 

responsibility for workmen’s compensation 

insurance; the extent to which the employer 

may exercise control over the details of the 

work; and whether the work was performed in 

the usual and regular course of the employer’s 

business.

123 Ariz. at 350. In addition, 

any supervision or control exercised by an 

employing unit to comply with any statute, rule 

or code adopted by the federal government, this 

state or a political subdivision of this state or 

any requirement of licensing, professional or 

ethical standards may not be considered for the 

purposes of determining the independent 

contractor or employment status of any 

relationship or individual for the purposes of 

this title.

A.R.S. § 23-1602. Therefore, compliance with federal law (including federal 

motor carrier requirements) is not an indication of control by MKTS.

¶17 The most significant factor favoring an employer-employee 

relationship here is the nature of Ibrahim’s work. Ibrahim’s work as a driver

for MKTS was in the usual and regular course of MKTS’ long-haul trucking 

business, not incidental or ancillary to it. That said, very little indicia of 

control are present here. Ibrahim was responsible for supplying a vehicle 
IBRAHIM v. MKTS LLC/SPECIAL FUND

Decision of the Court

7

and all tools necessary to complete the work. The fact that he leased a truck 

and other equipment from MKTS, and borrowed funds from MKTS for fuel 

purchases, does not favor an employee relationship, as Ibrahim remained 

legally responsible for those necessities. Neither do the delivery time and 

place requirements indicate MKTS control, as those details are dictated by 

the nature of the work. MKTS did not mandate specific routes or driving 

hours. Any requirements by MKTS were those mandated by motor carrier 

regulations.

¶18 Ibrahim argues that the misapplication of the presumption 

affected the ALJ’s credibility findings. The record, however, does not 

support that argument. The record also fails to support Ibrahim’s argument 

that MKTS exercised any more control than was necessary to comply with

motor carrier regulations. Furthermore, several facts that Ibrahim contends 

are evidence of an employer-employee relationship are not, such as MKTS’ 

transportation of Ibrahim from Las Vegas to Phoenix to fill out employment 

paperwork, assisting Ibrahim with English translation of documents,

procuring his preferred route to provide full-time work, or Ibrahim’s move 

from Las Vegas to Arizona to start work for MKTS.

¶19 Citing Anton and Central Management, Ibrahim contends that 

because he was hired to provide services that are the “very heart” of MKTS’ 

business—long haul trucking—that single factor by itself outweighs the 

other factors tending to show an independent contractor relationship. The 

law, however, is to the contrary. The nature of the work is one of several 

factors to weigh and balance, even if it might weigh heavily at times. The 

fundamental test is the right to control how the work is performed: “The

right to control or supervise the method of reaching a specific result

determines whether an individual is an employee or an independent 

contractor.” Home Ins., 123 Ariz. at 350. “In deciding whether a worker is an 

employee we look to the totality of the circumstances and the indicia of 

control.” Santiago, 164 Ariz. at 510.

¶20 In Anton, a woodcutting business hired a woodcutter and, 

after the woodcutter was injured, the woodcutting business claimed the 

woodcutter was an independent contractor. See 141 Ariz. at 568. The court 

recognized the woodcutter was hired to perform an integral part of the 

hirer’s regular business. Id. at 573. In that circumstance, the court noted “the 

relative nature of the [woodcutter]’s work bears heavily on the question of 

whether the [woodcutter] is an employee or an independent contractor.” Id. 

at 572. The court noted the substantial control the business exercised over 

the woodcutter, even requiring the woodcutter to use a saw and not an axe. 

Id. at 570-71. The court concluded the woodcutter’s job was “an ongoing 
IBRAHIM v. MKTS LLC/SPECIAL FUND

Decision of the Court

8

basic employment activity of the business owner as opposed to an 

incidental part of the owner’s normal operation,” id. at 573, to find the 

woodcutter was an employee and not an independent contractor, id. at 574.

¶21 In Central Management, a taxi service operated, maintained, 

controlled and presented to the public vehicles that were leased as the usual 

and regular course of its business. 162 Ariz. at 190-91. Drivers who leased 

vehicles from the taxi service were thus engaged in the regular course of 

the taxi service’s business and not simply leasing the vehicles. Id. That 

factor, along with “additional indicia of control,” justified affirming the 

ALJ’s determination that the drivers were employees rather than 

independent contractors. Id. at 191-92.

¶22 Outside the core function of Ibrahim’s work, there are no

significant indicia of control by MKTS. Setting aside federal regulation 

mandates, as Arizona law requires, and the requirements integral to the 

task itself (such as specific times for pickup and delivery and destinations), 

MKTS had minimal rights to control Ibrahim and how he accomplished his 

work. He was not limited to a particular route or specific times to drive. He 

was free to deliver the cargo in any way that ended in a timely, undamaged

arrival at the destination. He was not required to lease a truck from MKTS

and was free to use some other vehicle, either borrowed, bought or leased.

And while MKTS allowed him to use its fuel card, Ibrahim was responsible 

for reimbursing that cost. MKTS did not supply any of Ibrahim’s costs of 

doing business.

¶23 Under Arizona worker’s compensation law, the evidence here 

does not show that MKTS had a right to control Ibrahim’s work to the extent 

that an employer-employee relationship was created rather than the 

independent contractor relationship urged by MKTS.

CONCLUSION

¶24 The award is affirmed.