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DOE’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX: CHALLENGES TO SAFETY, SECURITY, AND TAXPAYER 

STEWARDSHIP 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 12, 2012 

Serial No. 112–175 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Chairman Emeritus 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO MACK, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

Vice Chairman 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

Ranking Member 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Chairman Emeritus 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

Chairman 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Ranking Member 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California (ex officio) 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Cliff Stearns, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4 

Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State of Colorado, opening statement ...................................................................................... 6 

Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Hon. Lee Terry, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nebraska, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 9 

Hon. Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Tennessee, opening statement ............................................................................ 9 

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California, opening statement ............................................................................. 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 89 

WITNESSES

Daniel B. Poneman, Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy .......................... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 90 

Thomas P. D’Agostino, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy 1

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 115 

Glenn S. Podonsky, Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer, Department 

of Energy 1

Mark E. Gaffigan, Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment, 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 129 

Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, Department of Energy ...................... 47 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 137 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Subcommittee exhibit binder .................................................................................. 139 

1Mr. D’Agostino and Mr. Podonsky did not present statements for the record. 

(1) 

DOE’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX: CHALLENGES TO SAFETY, SECURITY, AND TAXPAYER STEWARDSHIP 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cliff Stearns 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Stearns, Terry, Burgess, 

Blackburn, Scalise, Gardner, Griffith, Barton, DeGette, 

Schakowsky, Castor, Markey, Green, Christensen, and Waxman (ex 

officio). 

Staff present: Nick Abraham, Legislative Clerk; Carl Anderson, 

Counsel, Oversight; Charlotte Baker, Press Secretary; Sean 

Bonyun, Communications Director; Matt Bravo, Professional Staff 

Member; Karen Christian, Deputy Chief Counsel, Oversight; Andy 

Duberstein, Deputy Press Secretary; Heidi King, Chief Economist; 

Krista Rosenthall, Counsel to Chairman Emeritus; Alan Slobodin, 

Deputy Chief Counsel, Oversight; Peter Spencer, Professional Staff 

Member, Oversight; Alvin Banks, Democratic Investigator; and Tiffany Benjamin, Democratic Investigative Counsel. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CLIFF STEARNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

Mr. STEARNS. Good morning, everybody, and I welcome our witnesses to the Oversight and Investigation Committee. Today’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation will review challenges to 

safety, security, and taxpayer stewardship in the Department of 

Energy’s nuclear weapon complex. 

DOE is responsible for securing and maintaining the most dangerous materials on the planet, including nuclear warheads. This 

is one area that must have effective oversight. 

This committee, principally through the work of this subcommittee, has a long history of bipartisan scrutiny of the Department of Energy’s oversight and management of the contractors that 

are charged with running DOE’s nuclear weapons programs and 

operations. And the lessons from our committee’s past investigations and related GAO, Inspector General, DOE’s oversight reports 

should guide our bipartisan review of the current situation. 

2 

My colleagues, chief among these lessons is that independent and 

effective oversight is simply essential and necessary. The safety 

and security risks involved in overseeing the Nation’s nuclear facilities are enormous, and this committee must be vigilant about 

maintaining the exhaustive oversight that the committee has traditionally had in this area. 

DOE, through its National Nuclear Security Administration or 

NNSA, manages programs that involve high-hazard nuclear facilities and materials, the most sensitive national security information, and complex construction and environmental cleanup operations that pose substantial safety, public health, and environmental risks. Interestingly, all of these programs are carried out by 

contractors, both at the national labs and at DOE’s weapon production facilities. 

These contractors and their Federal managers, spending billions 

of taxpayers’ dollars on dangerous nuclear projects, require rigorous oversight. Today we will review what DOE has done in recent years to reform its oversight and program management. I welcome our witnesses from DOE, the DOE Inspector General, and the 

GAO, who will help us in examining this important issue. 

When government vigilance is not sufficiently rigorous, problems 

obviously occur. The case in point is a recent security failure at the 

Y–12 National Security Site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, this past 

July. By all accounts contractors and site managers’ failures at Y– 

12 allowed one of the most serious security breakdowns in the history of the weapons complex. 

But Y–12 is but the latest in a string of failures. Over the past 

decade we have seen security breaches and management failures at 

Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. GAO testimony 

will remind us all of one, 5-year period after 9/11 in which 57 security incidents occurred, more than half of which involved a confirmed or suspected release of data that posed the most serious rating of threat to the United States security interest. 

In another example investigated by this subcommittee in 2008, 

the Lawrence Livermore National Lab gave itself passing marks on 

its own physical security, and the NNSA Federal onsite managers 

gave it a passing mark, too. Only when DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight actually tested the security independently was 

it evident that the lab deserved the lowest possible rating for protective force performance and for physical protection of classified 

materials. 

On the safety front, the experience has been no better. From 

2007 to 2010, the Lawrence Livermore Lab has multiple events involving uncontrolled worker exposure to beryllium, which can cause 

a debilitating and sometimes fatal lung condition. During this period the lab determined it was compliant with DOE’s safety regulations. It took an independent department oversight review to determine that the contractors’ program violated the regulations. 

Now, this past May the DOE Inspector General reported that 

Sandia National Laboratories had not held its line managers accountable for implementing an important system for preventing 

and reducing injuries. Neither the contractor nor the Federal site 

manager had addressed problems that had been identified in this 

program for more than a decade. 

3 

For more than 20 years GAO has designated DOE contract management oversight relating to the weapons complex as high risk for 

fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement. We have seen examples 

of this multi-billion dollar cost increases and schedule delays in important NNSA construction projects. 

In the meantime, directors of the national laboratory and others 

claim that Federal oversight is too burdensome and intrusive and 

that DOE should back off and let the contractors operate as they 

see fit. Our friends at the Armed Services Committee have moved 

legislation through the House that would dramatically limit DOE’s 

ability to conduct independent, internal oversight over its program 

management and the contractors. 

I recognize that NNSA has not been delivering all that is expected of it, but this committee, given its jurisdictional and longtime policy interest in effective DOE management has to diagnose 

the problems for itself independently. We need to examine the 

facts, follow the evidence, identify what works and what doesn’t 

work, and identify a clear path to ensuring safe, secure operations, 

in the interests of taxpayers, and of course, our national security. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stearns follows:] 

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85180.002
6 

Mr. STEARNS. With that I recognize the ranking member, Ms. 

DeGette. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DEGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to echo the chairman’s remarks about this subcommittee 

having a long bipartisan history of asking tough questions about 

the safety and security of our Nation’s nuclear facilities. I am really pleased we are continuing this work today. 

I am glad that members of this subcommittee have the chance 

to develop a greater understanding of how NNSA is doing securing 

our nuclear facilities and to learn what can be done to improve the 

safety and security of those who live or work near those facilities. 

I have been on this committee for almost 16 years now, and since 

that time we have had almost 20 or over 20 hearings on nuclear 

issues at our national labs. In fact, many of the witnesses here 

today are regulars in front of this committee. I know the importance of safe and secure nuclear facilities, and I know what is at 

stake when something falls through the cracks or when the contractors at the sites aren’t being carefully watched. 

About 10 years ago this subcommittee began the first of a series 

of hearings on shocking security issues at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory in New Mexico. Chairman Barton will remember the 

trip that we took there to look at that facility and to see the shocking lapses that we saw. 

What we covered were serious pervasive issues with the management, culture, and the security and safety of the site. We attacked 

those problems head on, demanding answers and forcing NNSA 

and DOE to work harder to secure their facilities, and as a result 

the agency implemented new security procedures and increased 

oversight of the labs. 

But obviously NNSA has more work to do and frankly, this committee has more oversight work to do. In recent weeks we have 

seen new safety and security issues arise at two locations in the 

Nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Late last month the Los Alamos 

Lab informed the public that they were investigating an inadvertent spread of a radioactive material, Technetium-99, by employees and contractors at Los Alamos. While DOE indicated that 

there was no danger of public contamination, approximately a 

dozen people were exposed, with some tracking of the radioactive 

material offsite. 

This safety lapse comes on the heels of a bizarre but very serious 

security breach at the Y–12 uranium facility, where an 82-year-old 

nun—an 82-year-old nun—and two others were able to breach the 

secure perimeter and vandalize a supposedly secure building containing dangerous nuclear material. 

These safety and security incidents show very clearly the need 

for strong and robust oversight from this committee and others of 

security issues at our nuclear facilities. 

In 2004 and 2005, our willingness to bring serious nuclear safety 

issues into the public view and to demand that DOE and its labs 

be held accountable for their actions made a significant difference. 

7 

DOE is better than it used to be. There is an entire office dedicated 

to the health, safety, and security of all DOE facilities, but recent 

events tell us there is more serious work left to be done. 

So, Chairman, that is why it is absolutely necessary for DOE and 

others to remain a strong oversight role over NNSA facilities. From 

this committee to the DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security, 

to the Inspector General, to GAO, to the Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board, to other outside organizations, strong, independent 

oversight from agencies and groups forces NNSA to take better 

care of our nuclear facilities. Without good oversight, serious 

issues, won’t be identified and fixed, and the results could be disastrous. I can’t think of any reason we would want to decrease our 

oversight of these facilities, inhibit the ability of oversight to review 

site actions, or reduce accountability for those responsible for keeping nuclear sites safe. 

At a time when terrorists and hostile nations have an ever-increasing pool of physical and cyber weapons in their arsenals, we 

need to constantly adapt and focus our efforts to protect nuclear facilities. I hope that this hearing will provide us with the information that our colleagues on both sides of the aisle need so we can 

come together to improve the safety and security of these nuclear 

facilities. There have just been too many close calls to ignore. Constant vigilance is required. When it comes to our Nation’s nuclear 

facilities, there can never be enough oversight, and that, Mr. Chairman, is why I appreciate you holding this hearing today, and I 

yield back. 

Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleague, and I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Barton, for 2 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When an 82-year-old 

pacifist nun gets to the inner sanctum of our weapons complex, you 

cannot say, ‘‘Job well done.’’ She is in the audience. Would you 

please stand up, ma’am? We want to thank you for pointing out 

some of the problems in our security. While I don’t totally agree 

with your platform that you were espousing, I do thank you for 

bringing up the inadequacies of our security system, and thank you 

for being here today. 

Mr. Chairman, that young lady there brought a Holy Bible. If 

she had been a terrorist, the Lord only knows what could have 

happened. We have had numerous hearings in this subcommittee 

and full committee on security at our national laboratories and especially our weapons complexes. Apparently that message has still 

not gone forward about what needs to be done. 

What doesn’t need to be done, though, is just give the contractors 

an ‘‘atta boy’’ and a pat on the back. If there is ever a time for more 

aggressive oversight, this is it, and I applaud you and the ranking 

subcommittee member, Ms. DeGette, for doing that today, and with 

that I yield to Mr. Terry the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:] 

8 


85180.003
9 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LEE TERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 

Mr. TERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady can sit down if she likes. 

Mr. TERRY. Well, it is—I have to congratulate the contractors of 

NNSA for accomplishing something based upon their mind-boggling 

incompetence that hasn’t happened here in a while, and that is 

uniting Republicans and Democrats in our desire for change and 

reform and more oversight. 

The security of U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile cannot be overstated. NNSA was created to keep the DOE from being overstretched, yet it appears that all of their duties were left with contractors where little oversight could or would be done. The last 5 

years has seen a significant deterioration in security at the complexes as a result of a decrease in how contractors interact with 

Federal officials. There must be an understanding that the taxpayer owns these complexes, and they have not gotten their monies’ worth. 

Failures in both the safety of the laboratories and protection of 

the weapons themselves has been repeated across the complex, and 

I believe there is bipartisan support for more oversight. The unprecedented breakdown at Y–12 acted as a test of our security system, and it appears to be an all-out failure. I struggle to understand how the gentlelady that was introduced, an 82-year-old nun, 

can get through the Fort Knox of nuclear weapons facilities, and 

what does that say for the complex as a whole? 

A major concern of the Y–12 breakdown is the disunity between 

maintenance and operation contractor and the security personnel. 

When cameras had been inoperable for 6 months, this tells me that 

even the most basic level there is no communication within the facility, no oversight, and I understand there is a point where too 

much oversight can become inefficient and hinder progress in a nuclear—progress in nuclear testing. I believe that we are ultimately 

here today to do—is find a balance where citizens can be certain 

that the nuclear materials are pure and scientists continue to work 

in their most efficient manner. 

That is what we are here to do today. Hopefully we can find that 

balance, and I will yield to the gentlelady from Tennessee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I thank the gentleman, and I thank the Chairman for the hearing, again. Indeed, there has been a lot of emphasis and a lot of focus on the July 28, 2012, incident that occurred 

at the Y–12 facility and the security complex there, and the nun 

who has stood and been recognized and two other anti-nuclear activists cut through that fence, got into, through the perimeter. They 

did this seeming to not be noticed. Despite setting off multiple 

alarms, a delayed response to WSI security personnel gave these 

protestors time to hang banners, splash blood and paint messages 

on the facility that contains over 100 tons of weapons-grade, highly 

enriched uranium. We are appalled. We are appalled. 

10 

WSI’s slow response, lack of regard for security protocols, along 

with their check-the-box mentality is completely unacceptable, especially when you take into account the sensitive material they are 

paid to protect against potential terrorists and nations, states capable of using deadly force during a security breach. 

While I understand that security changes have now been made 

at the Y–12 facility since the incident to ensure that it never happens again, we need to seriously review classified DOE reports 

from 2010, that the Washington Post reported on this morning, 

where investigators found, and I am quoting, ‘‘Security cameras 

were inoperable, equipment maintenance was sloppy, and guards 

were poorly trained.’’ And you knew this 2 years ago? Two years 

ago. 

These criticisms are the very same ones that may have led to the 

July 28 security breach. Mr. Chairman, the incident demonstrates 

the great importance of the hearing today. I fully believe it is important for the committee to review the entire working relationship 

between the NNSA, DOE, and the security contractors across the 

country at all of our nuclear weapons complexes. 

I yield back. 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Waxman, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is one of those 

hearings that we occasionally have in Congress where we say together, Democrats and Republicans, we are shocked. We are 

shocked that something like this could happen, but we then blame 

others and don’t accept responsibility for ourselves. We have oversight jurisdiction in this committee to be sure this sort of thing 

doesn’t happen, and we know DOE has oversight responsibility, 

and we expect them to do their job, and you would think that reasonable people would understand that this is a high priority for 

this country. This is a wake-up call if there ever was one with— 

this is a quote from the New York Times. ‘‘With flashlights and 

bolt cutters the three pacifists defied barbed wire as well as armed 

guards, video cameras, and motion sensors.’’ 

Well, this security lapse is incredible. We have to do everything 

in our power to ensure that no one else breaches our security and 

particularly that none of our enemies view this as an opening, that 

this will show that this is a weakness that they could exploit. 

Well, given this wake-up call you would think members of Congress or any reasonable person would suggest that rolling back security and safety requirements at the nuclear safety—NNSA facilities or promoting reducing oversight of these facility would be outrageous. They wouldn’t think of such of thing, yet that is what the 

Republican Congress did. We have a National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4310, that passed the House in May, and that bill 

weakens protection for our nuclear laboratories and facilities. The 

bill lowered standards at NNSA sites, and they limited the ability 

of the Department of Energy and the Defense Nuclear Facilities 

11 

Safety Board to address concerns and propose solutions to these 

problems. 

Well, we went along with that, our committee leadership, and 

the Authorization Bill to lower our oversight for these kinds of 

breaches. This effort to weaken oversight of nuclear facilities 

makes absolutely no sense, and this issue most recently of our 

guest today, an 82-year-old nun, breaching the security at the sensitive Oak Ridge Nuclear Facility and splashing blood on a building 

that holds enriched uranium before she was arrested, illustrates 

why we need more oversight and more activity to stop it, not less. 

Sometimes I think that people are so anxious to save money that 

they cut off their nose to save their face. We need oversight. 

We need to spend the money to do this, and all those people who 

have been telling us we can’t afford this and we can’t afford that 

because we got to give more tax breaks to the upper income ought 

to think through whether that point of view makes sense. We need 

multiple layers of strong oversight at our nuclear facilities. We 

can’t simply assume that NNSA and its contractors are making appropriate security and safety decisions. 

That reminds me of Hurricane Katrina. Good job. Great job, 

Brownie, as President Bush said to his appointee who knew nothing about emergency preparedness. He was put in his job because 

he was a crony of the President at that time. The ability of DOE, 

this committee, and other oversight experts to ask the tough questions is absolutely vital to holding labs and facilities accountable. 

We cannot leave nuclear facilities exposed to national disasters or 

threats from hostile enemies. We have to make sure that those who 

manage nuclear materials are putting safety and security first. 

Now, we are lucky that it was just this very nice nun and others 

who came to express their point of view that gained access to a secure area next to highly enriched uranium facilities. It could have 

been much worse. We can all view this as a warning call. We have 

to look closely at our nuclear facilities. Make sure they are strong, 

that there are strong, effective oversight mechanisms in place to 

protect them from danger. We cannot remove or repeal the protections that already are in place. 

Mr. Chairman, there is some things we don’t agree on, but I 

think we can all agree that strong oversight of our nuclear arsenal 

and our nuclear facilities and laboratories is an absolute necessity, 

and it is time for Congress not just to hold hearings and say, oh, 

my gosh, what happened, but to realize that when we make cuts 

to this exact kind of surveillance, we are going to end up paying 

the consequences for it. Happily the consequences were not as severe as they might have been, but let this be a warning call to all 

of us. 

Yield back my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Waxman follows:] 

12 


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85180.005
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Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back. I would just say to the 

gentleman this full committee always puts safety and security first 

when we are dealing with this very important issue, and it has always been bipartisan. 

With that let me welcome our witnesses here this morning, and 

we have the Honorable Daniel B. Poneman, Deputy Secretary, U.S. 

Department of Energy, the Honorable Thomas P. D’Agostino, 

Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, Nuclear—National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department 

of Energy, Mr. Glenn S. Podonsky, Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer, Department of Energy, the Honorable Gregory H. 

Friedman, Inspector General, Department of Energy, and Mark E. 

Gaffigan, Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environmental Team, Government Accountability Office. 

As you know, folks, the testimony you are about to give is subject 

to Title XVIII, Section 1001, of the United States Codes. When 

holding an investigative hearing like this, this committee has a 

practice of taking testimony under oath. Do any of you object to 

testifying under oath? No? OK. 

The chair then advises you that under the rules of the House and 

rules of the committee you are entitled to be advised by counsel. 

Do you desire to be advised by counsel during your testimony 

today? No? 

In that case, would you please rise and raise your right hand? 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. STEARNS. All right, and with that we welcome you, again, 

and you will give your 5-minute summary of your—Mr. Poneman, 

we are going to start with you. Go ahead. 

STATEMENTS OF DANIEL B. PONEMAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY, 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS P. 

D’AGOSTINO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY 

AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND GLENN S. 

PODONSKY, CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND SECURITY OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; MARK E. GAFFIGAN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND 

GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL B. PONEMAN 

Mr. PONEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and in the interest of 

time I would request that my full statement be submitted—— 

Mr. STEARNS. By unanimous consent, so ordered. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Thank you, sir. Chairman Stearns, Ranking Member DeGette, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss 

the Department of Energy’s oversight of the nuclear weapons complex and the recent security incident at the Y–12 National Security 

Complex. We appreciate the interest and engagement of this committee and recognize the important oversight role that you fulfill. 

We also share the committee’s commitment to ensure that all of 

15 

our offices and operations are delivering on our mission safely, securely, and in a fiscally responsible manner. 

Since its creation in 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration has served as a separately organized entity within the 

U.S. Department of Energy, entrusted with the execution of our 

nuclear security missions. Living up to the challenging demands of 

executing our mission safely, securely, and in a fiscally responsible 

manner requires daily management through strong, effective, and 

efficient relationships with our management and operating contractors. Congressional oversight, in conjunction with oversight by the 

DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security, our internal independent oversight body, as well as that of the DOE Inspector General, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and the Government Accountability Office contribute to the safety and security of 

DOE facilities. 

As the recent incident at Y–12 demonstrates, the Department 

has at times fallen short of our own expectations and faces continuing challenges in our goal of continuous improvement. This recent incident, as the Secretary has made abundantly clear, is unacceptable, and we have taken and will continue to take steps not 

only to identify and correct issues at Y–12 but across the DOE complex. 

In response to this incident, we acted swiftly to identify and address the problems that it revealed. These actions either directly or 

through the contract for the site included the following immediate 

steps to improve security. In the realm of physical protection, cameras have been repaired and tested, guard patrols increased, security policies have been strengthened, and all personnel have been 

retrained on security procedures. The number of false and nuisance 

alarms have been greatly reduced to provide more confidence in the 

intrusion detection system. 

In terms of the professional force onsite, nuclear operations at 

the site were suspended until retraining and other modifications 

mentioned above were completed. The entire site workforce was required to undergo additional security training. The former head of 

security from our Pantex facility moved to Y–12 to lead the effort 

to reform the security culture at the site. 

The Department’s Chief of Health, Safety, and Security was directed to deploy a team to Y–12 for an independent inspection. Site 

managers at all DOE facilities with nuclear material were directed 

to provide their written assurance that all nuclear facilities are in 

full compliance with Department security policies and directives as 

well as internal policies established at the site level. Security functions at the Y–12 site itself had been brought into the management 

and operations contract to ensure continuity of operations and moving toward an integrated model moving forward. 

In the area of leadership changes, the plant manager and chief 

operating officer at the site retired 12 days after the incident. Six 

of the top contract executives responsible for security at the Y–12 

site had been removed. The leadership of the guard force has been 

removed, and the guards involved in this incident have been removed or reassigned. The Chief of Defense Nuclear Security for the 

National Nuclear Security Administration has been reassigned 

pending the outcome of our internal reviews, and a formal show 

16 

cause letter was issued to the contractor that covered the entire 

scope of operations at Y–12, including security. This is the first 

step towards potentially terminating the contracts for both the site 

contractor and its security subcontractor. Past performance including deficiencies and terminations would be considered in the 

awarding of any future contracts. 

In the area of reviews, the HSS Organization that Ms. Podonsky 

leads was directed to lead near-term assessments of all Category 

1 nuclear material sites to identify any systemic issues, enhancing 

independent oversight performance testing program to incorporate 

no notice or short notice security testing and conducting comprehensive, independent oversight security inspections at all Category 1 four sites over the next 12 months using the enhanced program of performance testing. An assessment was initiated led by 

Brigadier General Sandra Finan to review the oversight model 

itself and the security organizational structure at NNSA headquarters that some of the members have already commented in 

their opening remarks. 

The series of personnel and management changes that I have 

just briefly outlined were made to provide the highest level of security at the site and across the DOE complex. To manage this transition we have brought some of the best security experts from our 

enterprise to Y–12 to act quickly to address the security shortcomings at that site. 

We are also working to make the structural and cultural changes 

required to appropriately secure this facility. The Secretary and I 

intend to send a clear message. Lapses in security will not be tolerated. We will leave no stone unturned to find out what went wrong, 

and we will take the steps necessary to provide effective security 

at this site and across our enterprise. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, 

safety and security are integral to the Department’s mission. DOE 

embraces its obligation to protect the public, the workers, and the 

environment. We continuously strive to improve upon our safety 

and security standards and the policies that guide our operations, 

and we hold line management and ourselves accountable. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this vital mission. I look 

forward to answering your questions both here and in a classified 

setting as appropriate. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Poneman follows:] 

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Mr. STEARNS. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Gaffigan, your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MARK E. GAFFIGAN 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member DeGette, members of the subcommittee, good morning. I am pleased to be here 

to discuss safety, security, and project management oversight of the 

nuclear security enterprise. In summary, in each of these areas I 

would like to briefly discuss some of the challenges, the current 

status and progress in these areas, and some potential paths forward. 

Regarding safety, let me start by noting that thankfully through 

the efforts of DOE, NNSA, and its contractors, the stockpile has remained safe and reliable. However, safety problems do occur, and 

we have identified them in the past. We have attempted to find the 

contributing factors to these problems and note that they fall into 

three key areas; lax attitudes towards safety procedures, inconsistent and unsustained corrective actions, and inadequate oversight. 

Currently, DOE has instituted a safety reform effort to review 

opportunities to streamline requirements and eliminate directives 

that do not add value to safety. While we applaud DOE’s efforts to 

improve safety requirements, going forward we believe that DOE 

can make a stronger case in safety reform by ensuring that 

changes are based on sound analysis of the benefits and costs with 

good measures of their success. 

In addition, future efforts should strive to address areas of concern in quality assurance, safety culture, and independent Federal 

oversight. 

Regarding security, our work in the past has sought to understand past failures that have led to security incidents that have 

posed the most serious threat to national security and led to shutdowns of facilities like Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore. 

Both GAO and the DOE IG have identified common themes that 

led to these problems, including an over-reliance on contractor assurance and corrective actions that are not sustained. 

As with safety, DOE has instituted a security reform effort to ensure effective, streamlined, and efficient security without excess 

Federal oversight. While there may be opportunities for more efficient security policy and oversight, our past work has shown that 

excessive Federal oversight is not the problem. 

As demonstrated by the July incident at Y–12, the recent IG report cites and all-to-familiar finding that contractor governance and 

Federal oversight failed to identify and correct early indicators of 

multiple system breakdowns that allowed the security breach. 

While DOE and NNSA are undertaking many actions in response 

to this incident, the real challenge going forward is to sustain the 

security improvements that will invariably be made at NNSA sites. 

This will require leadership, improved contractor assurance systems, and strong, independent Federal oversight. 

Lastly, regarding project management, NNSA continues to experience significant costs and schedule overruns on its major construction projects. To name a few, the National Emission Facility 

at Lawrence Livermore, a $2.1 billion original estimate grew to 

26 

$3.5 billion and was 7 years behind schedule. CMMR, Chemistry 

and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos originally projected to cost less than $1 billion. The last estimate before this project was put on hold was $3.7 to $5.8 billion, 

a six-fold increase with a scheduled delay of 8 to 12 years. 

This is why NNSA project management is on GAO’s high-risk 

list. We believe that NNSA has made some progress. We believe 

they have a strong commitment and top leadership support and 

have developed and implemented corrective action plans to address 

these concerns. Going forward we believe NNSA needs to demonstrate its commitment to sufficient people and resources and 

demonstrate on a sustained basis the ability to complete major construction projects on time and on budget. 

However, not to be forgotten, 80 percent of NNSA’s budget is devoted to operations and maintenance activities and is not construction related. We recently raised concerns with NNSA’s process for 

planning and prioritizing its work, including the need to more thoroughly review program estimates. We have recommended going forward that they update the requirements for review and cost estimates and reestablish independent analytic capability. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening remarks. I would be 

happy to address any questions you or the members may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gaffigan follows:] 

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Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentleman, and Mr. Friedman, welcome, again, for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Chairman Stearns and Ranking Member DeGette 

and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here at your 

request to testify on matters relating to the oversight of the nuclear weapons complex by the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. With an annual budget of nearly $12 billion, NNSA—— 

Mr. STEARNS. I am just going to ask you to move your mic a little 

closer if you don’t mind. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Certainly. NNSA is charged with critically important missions relating to nuclear weapons refurbishment and storage, nuclear non-proliferation, and science and technology. The directors of NNSA’s contractor operate at national security laboratories Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia, as well as 

other independent review groups have expressed concern with the 

Department and NNSA oversight of contractors is overly burdensome. They recommended changes in the model, with the most radial being to take NNSA outside of the Department’s purview entirely. 

We recognize and I think everybody should that it is difficult to 

strike precisely the right balance between the contractors’ desire to 

operate without undue oversight and the government’s need to ensure the taxpayers’ interests and the operation of the laboratories 

and the other facilities is protected. We agree that oversight should 

not be overly burdensome. It should be targeted, cost effective, risk 

based, and it should encourage intelligence risk tolerance. 

However, at the end of the day responsible Federal officials have 

an obligation to a higher authority, the U.S. taxpayers, to ensure 

that the terms and conditions of the various NNSA contracts are 

satisfied, the national security mission goals are met, and that the 

weapons complex is operated in an effective, efficient, and safe and 

secure manner. Our reviews have identified numerous opportunities to advance various aspects of NNSA’s functions, including its 

management of the national security laboratories and other weapons complex facilities. 

Most prominently, we recently issues a special inquiry report on 

the security breaches, security breach, excuse me, at the Y–12 national security complex at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. You heard about 

that previously from prior speakers. In the Y–12 report we cited 

delayed and inept response, inoperable security equipment, excessive use of compensatory measures, resource constraints, and most 

importantly as it pertains to the purpose of this hearing, contract 

administration issues. 

We have no evidence, empirical or otherwise, to suggest that unreasonable Department and NNSA oversight has had a causal relationship to the problems we identified in our reviews. In fact, in 

many cases, the Y–12 matter being a prime example, we found the 

Department and NNSA had not been as thorough as we felt necessary in exercising the contract administration responsibilities. 

Further, NNSA is currently dealing with a number of cost, schedule, and mission issues concerning major projects, including over 

48 

$13 billion in capital investments in the projects that Mr. Gaffigan 

just referred to. With projects of such magnitude and complexity, 

Federal officials have a special responsibility to ensure that taxpayer dollars are well spent and the national security is protected. 

Further, the unique contractor indemnification provision of 

NNSA’s Management Operating Contracts place special burdens on 

the Federal management team. In short, the Department bears ultimate financial responsibility for essentially all contractor activities which are nuclear related. In my judgment this argues for a 

robust contractor oversight. 

There are a number of threshold questions regarding oversight, 

the oversight model which have yet to have been answered from 

my perspective. For example, to what extent does current oversight 

hinder mission accomplishment? How would a new model lead to 

tangible improvements in scientific and technological outcomes? 

And how would a new model improve accountability and transparency? 

In our view any decision to modify the NNSA Weapons Complex 

Governance Model should ensure that first, historic safety and security concerns regarding weapons complex management are treated as a priority. Second, the synergies that result from numerous 

collaborations between the national security laboratories and the 

Department’s other laboratories and energy functions are not impeded. Third, expectations of the contractors are as clear and precise as possible. Fourth, that metrics are in place to provide a 

sound basis for evaluating contractor and program performance. 

Fifth, that any new operating formulation is lean and mean, reflecting current budget realities, and finally, that contractors have 

in place an effective internal governance system. 

We support continuous improvement, but a scalpel rather than 

a cleaver approach ought to guide efforts to find better NNSA contractor oversight mechanisms. The problems with the status quo 

need to be well-defined, all remedies cost effective, and the core 

mission maintained. The work of the NNSA and its weapons complex is too important to do anything less. 

This concludes my testimony, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman follows:] 

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Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, and I will start with my questions. 

Just as an overview I think everyone should understand Y–12 is 

a connotation given to this site because of the Cold War, and they 

didn’t want to have people mention geographically what they were 

talking about, where it was, so Y–12 became the code name. 

But if you go on Google maps and look at the site, you see that 

it is a brand-new site, and if you go onto Microsoft site, you see 

it is under construction. So this really is a site that has brand-new 

construction. 

And so, Mr. Friedman, the first question I have for you is as I 

understand it, these people cut and got their way through three 

fences. Is that correct? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is my understanding, Mr. Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK, and so is it three or four fences? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, my understanding is it is three. There are 

people on the panel who may have more intimate knowledge than 

I do. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. We appreciate your hand being up, but we are 

limiting ourselves to the panel, if you don’t mind. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, people on the panel. 

Mr. STEARNS. Yes. Is there anyone else who—yes, sir. Mr. 

Poneman. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Sir, there is an outer perimeter fence—— 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. 

Mr. PONEMAN [continuing]. At the ridgeline. They call it the 229 

fence. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. 

Mr. PONEMAN. That is not sensored. Then there were the three 

PIDAS—— 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. So they actually went through four fences. 

Mr. PONEMAN. They would have had to come through the perimeter, yes, and then there were the three—— 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. 

Mr. PONEMAN [continuing]. PIDAS fences—— 

Mr. STEARNS. So once they go through these four fences, it is assuming that all these fences there is some type of sensor device 

which would indicate—and there would be cameras. Is that true, 

Mr. Friedman? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. STEARNS. So there are cameras set up to monitor this? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. STEARNS. And how highly rated was Y–12 security prior to 

this incident? I mean, what was the record they were saying it was 

rated? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The contractor self-assurance indicated that it 

was highly rated, and that was carried through—— 

Mr. STEARNS. I was told it was rated by the contractor and—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The Federal personnel endorsed that rating. 

Mr. STEARNS [continuing]. At 96 percent. Is that what—I was 

told that was what they rated it. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don’t have a percentage for you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STEARNS. Would you consider it a Fort Knox type of security? 

I mean, that was the perception is, it had to be Fort Knox type of 

security? 

61 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Stearns, this is my nearly 40 years in the Department of Energy. Y–12 was the Fort Knox of the Department. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. So they, these folks in the audience here, the 

three of them, they got through four fences that were sensored, and 

the cameras were all set up, and this was a new facility. Were the 

cameras new or old? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There were actually—some of the equipment was 

fairly new, some of the equipment was old, but the, I think the salient point is that many of the cameras or some of the cameras 

were not operable and not operable—— 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. So the cameras were not—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN [continuing]. For some period of time. 

Mr. STEARNS [continuing]. Operable. Now, when you generally 

have a Fort Knox facility like this, wouldn’t there be large maintenance records for these cameras that people would check them? 

Were there backlogs relating to these cameras? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There were significant, we found significant backlogs and maintenance of—— 

Mr. STEARNS. Were there large maintenance entries into these 

backlogs to show that they were, the cameras were looked at? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am not sure I understand your question, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. STEARNS. Well, if you went into these backlogs that show the 

maintenance on these cameras—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Right. 

Mr. STEARNS [continuing]. Did you see maintenance on these 

cameras? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well—— 

Mr. STEARNS. You are saying they are inoperable. Wouldn’t at 

some point somebody—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Maintenance had not taken place. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The cameras had not been fixed—— 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN [continuing]. If that is your question. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. Well, how long were these cameras, these critical cameras not operable? Could you tell that? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, we—there were elements of the security apparatus that were inoperable for at least 6 months and probably— 

and possibly beyond that. At least 6 months. 

Mr. STEARNS. Now, who would you blame that for? The contractor or the site government operators? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is—that sounds like a 

very simple question, but it is a complex, the answer is somewhat 

complex. 

Mr. STEARNS. Well, let me phrase it for you. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There is enough—let me put it this way. 

Mr. STEARNS. Do you think the responsibility—we pay contractors to do this. Is that correct? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Correct. 

Mr. STEARNS. And the contractors were responsible? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Correct. 

62 

Mr. STEARNS. And we pay them significant fees? We do this, and 

they were not operable, and the maintenance backlogs show that 

no one was doing anything, so wouldn’t you say the contractors—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would say they have a major share of responsibility. Yes. 

Mr. STEARNS. And then the onsite government employees who 

are overseeing the contractors also have responsibility because they 

failed to catch this. Is that correct? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They do. There was widespread knowledge and 

acknowledgement of the fact that these cameras, including 

amongst the Federal officials, that these cameras in other facilities 

were inoperable. I think their reaction to that was much too passive, much too lethargic. 

Mr. STEARNS. Well, I think we have got them through four 

fences, we have got them through the sensing devices. We are not 

keying the personnel. The cameras were inoperable, so they got 

through, and as I understand there was a period of time where 

these three people were right at the facility and nothing still happened. Is that true? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, there was a delay in the response and—— 

Mr. STEARNS. How long was the delay in response? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I can’t go into timeline. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. You may be able to get that information at the 

later classified briefing. 

Mr. STEARNS. All right. So at this point we have obviously a 

dereliction of duty. Is there anyone on the committee that would 

like to add any questions, any response to some of my questions 

that I had? 

Mr. PONEMAN. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Sir, just for the record, it is my understanding, we 

will confirm this, you talked about all four senses being—fences 

being sensored. It is my understanding that there are no trespassing signs on the outer perimeter fence at the ridge line, but the 

sensors only come into play once you penetrate the first of the 

three fences that surround the actual facility. So I believe it would 

be fair to say that—and the sensor bed is inside those three fences, 

not out at the perimeter fence. But we will confirm that and come 

back to you. 

Mr. STEARNS. Were the guards who were supposed to be there 

and take care and stop this, were they blind in any way? Was there 

any obstruction for them to see this? I mean, forget the cameras 

for a moment. Wouldn’t you start to at some point say, gosh, what 

is happening? I am starting to see three people in my facilities 

wandering around. I mean, where were the guards? Were they— 

Mr. Friedman, what is your interpretation? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. As has been either implied or stated directly earlier, there were a huge number of false alarms ongoing on a regular basis. They are due to critters and squirrels and other things, 

so they were somewhat from my point of view numb to the number 

of false alarms. There was a delay in the response. The response 

of the first responder was less than adequate, so there was a—certainly shortcomings on the part of the—— 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. My time has expired. 

63 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think your questions 

really set up a factual foundation for what I want to talk about. 

The first thing I want to do is I want to thank Sister Rice and 

the other people for coming today. I apologize. You won’t be allowed 

to testify. I think it would be interesting to hear your perspective 

on how you were able to breach these four fences at the Fort Knox 

type of facility and perhaps we can talk afterwards. 

But what I want to ask you gentlemen about is from my perspective this bill that we passed earlier this year, the National Defense 

Authorization Act, which is H.R. 4310, because what that does, as 

you know, it makes considerable changes to NNSA’s structure and 

its oversight relationship with DOE. And a lot of us on both sides 

of the aisle are really concerned that the changes will have a significant impact on safety and security at NNSA. 

So, Mr. Poneman, I wanted to start with you, and I wanted to 

ask you how H.R. 4310 changes the NNSA Administrator’s authority to change nuclear safety and security requirements. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. It is 

our understanding that that legislation makes significant changes 

in the reporting structure and the authorities within the Department, that it significantly curtails the authority of the Secretary to 

direct the Administrator of the NNSA and that it provides for a 

number of things that would tend to delegate activities, for example, to a national lab director’s counsel and so forth, that would 

then come in directly to the Administrator, and the Administrator 

under that legislation as we understand it would be granted much 

widened autonomy. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. 

Mr. PONEMAN. In addition, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board would be reduced in some of its authorities. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And that would really undermine the DOE’s authority for oversight. Correct? 

Mr. PONEMAN. In our judgment, Congresswoman, as reflected in 

the statement of—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes or no will work. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. Now, as the current language is written, I think you mentioned this, somewhere down the line an 

NNSA Administrator could come in and actually reduce the safety 

and security requirements. Correct? 

Mr. PONEMAN. It would curtail the Secretary’s authority to—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. But they could actually reduce the requirements. 

Correct? Under the legislation. 

Mr. PONEMAN. I think that became law. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Yes. Now, H.R. 4310 also changes NNSA’s relationship with oversight bodies, including DOE’s Office of Health, 

Safety, and Security and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board. 

So, Mr. Poneman, maybe Mr. Podonsky can help you here. Can 

you talk to me about what changes it makes to NNSA’s relationship with the DOE and independent oversight bodies? 

Mr. PONEMAN. What changes the legislation—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Correct. 

64 

Mr. PONEMAN. It would grant a much larger measure of autonomy to NNSA within the DOE system. The DOE system includes 

the HSS organization that Mr. Podonsky leads. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Now, do you think that is a good idea to reduce NNSA oversight? Yes or no will work. 

Mr. PONEMAN. We have serious concerns—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. 

Mr. PONEMAN [continuing]. With the legislation. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Do you think that if the bill is passed as is, it 

could have an impact on the security and safety of workers at 

NNSA sites? 

Mr. PONEMAN. If the authorities of the Secretary are curtailed in 

that way, it could have an adverse effect. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Now, Mr. Gaffigan, I am not asking you to 

comment on the NDAA, but your testimony said, your written testimony said in 2007, the GAO concluded that the drastic change of 

moving NNSA away from DOE was, ‘‘unnecessary.’’ Is that correct? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. That is correct. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And so from your perspective is a significant overhaul of the agency structure necessary to solve the problems we are 

seeing today? Yes or no will work? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Not necessarily. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. We have to focus on—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. So you don’t think we necessarily need a significant overhaul. Right? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. We have not seen the problem of being excessive 

oversight. We have seen the problem being ineffective oversight. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Ineffective. Yes. Less oversight is not the solution 

here. Right? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. We have not seen excessive oversight as the problem. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Mr. Friedman, what do you think? Would reorganizing the NNSA so that contractors have more autonomy and 

less oversight solve the problems of the agency? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, Ms. DeGette, I would characterize it as the 

tail wagging the dog frankly. I think that it would be a mistake 

to dramatically lessen the quality of the oversight. 

Now, there are, as I have indicated in my testimony, there are 

improvements, and intelligent oversight is extremely important. So 

there are improvements that can occur—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN [continuing]. But I think the legislation that you 

are referring to goes too far. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So I just have kind of one last question, and I am 

going to ask you, Mr. Friedman, and you, Mr. Gaffigan. Do you 

think that really burdensome oversight caused Sister Rice and her 

colleagues to be able to gain access to a secure area at a nuclear 

facility? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, as—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes or no. Do you think the reason she got in 

there was because there was too much oversight? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Clearly not. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. 

65 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Gaffigan? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. No. No. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Barton, the former chairman of the full committee, is recognized. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you. The—I had to go do a little press interview while the chairman was doing his questions, but my understanding is he established that there were four fences that were 

breached. Is that correct? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. Were they all chain-linked fences? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. All chain-linked fences. Is it classified how long 

that took? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. It is classified? Were there any cameras that were 

operable? We know that there are some that weren’t. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. Were there some that were? 

Mr. PONEMAN. There were cameras at the site that were operable. 

Mr. BARTON. They just weren’t where these people were doing 

their thing. Let us assume that we actually had good security. 

What would have happened had it been discovered that these three 

individuals were trying to get in the facility? 

Mr. PONEMAN. The sensored part of the fences are the three 

fences that are relatively close to the facility, Congressman. If the 

system had worked properly, as soon as they penetrated the first 

link, the sensor would have gone off, and when they saw as would 

be the case when people were coming through, that there were 

multiple sensors going off, there would have been an immediate response within 1 or 2 minutes of guards on the site. 

Mr. BARTON. So even if it had been working and the guards had 

been alert and everything that was supposed to have been done 

would have been done, they would have been able to get through 

the first fence before anything was done. Is that correct? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. The theory is one of layered defenses, 

and we could go into classified session. There are many, many layers between that outer-most security fence and the sensitive material but—— 

Mr. BARTON. Well, I am—— 

Mr. PONEMAN [continuing]. That would be what triggered the response. 

Mr. BARTON [continuing]. Not a security expert, but I would assume that we would have a security system at a weapons complex 

or an enrichment facility that if anybody got within 10 feet of the 

first fence, alarms would start going off and dogs would start barking and loud speakers would say, get away, get away or something 

like that instead of letting them actually walk up to fence, use a 

pair of wire cutters, and cut the fence before anybody even assumes 

that there is something wrong. I mean, that seems to me to be a 

66 

little bit lax. Am I just not with it to think that we shouldn’t even 

let them get near the first fence? 

Mr. PONEMAN. When you walk into the facility, Congressman, 

you have to establish the perimeter in some specific place, and you 

have to put the first sensor in some specific place. That sensor is 

placed in such a manner as if it had been responded to appropriately before they were able to do anything at the wall, there 

would have been security forces on site. So you have to put the first 

sensor somewhere. 

Mr. BARTON. But my point is you don’t let them get close enough 

to take out the wire cutters without somebody noticing you. If I 

were to go to the facility today with a pair of wire cutters, hat on 

that says I am a fake terrorist, I would hope somebody would notice that before I started cutting on the fence. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Well, I assure you, Congressman, we are taking 

a full review of the full profile. You could see if doing something 

at the outer perimeter fence up at the ridge line would be better, 

but then you are talking about acres and acres of security, which 

is challenging. 

Mr. BARTON. You—is the deputy secretary at the Department of 

Energy the number two official? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. So you—the Secretary is number one, and you are 

number two? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. Could you rank this issue in a priority of issues at 

the Department of Energy for management attention of you and 

the Secretary? Is this a top five issue, a top ten issue, top 100 

issue? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, there is no issue that we are dealing with more forcefully and with greater concentration than this 

issue. This is protecting our nuclear material. It has top priority. 

Mr. BARTON. So this has got the personal serious attention of you 

and the Secretary? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Hours and hours. 

Mr. BARTON. OK, and the gentleman to your right, Mr. 

D’Agostino. Is that close? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Barton, D’Agostino. 

Mr. BARTON. D’Agostino. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. I would assume that on a day-to-day basis you are 

the person in—ultimately responsible for this at the Department, 

at the—I know you are at the Nuclear Security Administration, but 

I would assume that you are the number one person in terms of 

just thinking about this. Is that correct? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Every day since—every day I think about this 

issue and specifically but every day I also think about security in 

general. This is the number one priority for me. Bar none. 

Mr. BARTON. Do you believe since it is your number one priority 

that we can fix this problem? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I believe we can fix it. We have work to do. It 

is inexcusable. It is appalling. The language the committee has 

used here I would agree with. We have to work aggressively. We 

have taken unprecedented steps to address this particular problem. 

67 

It is important to hold organizations accountable. It is important 

to hold people accountable for this, and we are working through 

that particular process. 

In addition to the steps we have taken, we believe there are more 

steps to take, and we are working very closely with Glenn 

Podonsky and the HSS organization to make sure we actually have 

that right. 

Mr. BARTON. My time has expired, but I want to ask one more. 

Is it possible under current policy at the Department of Energy to 

terminate the contractor who allowed this to happen? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Sir, we—because of this incident issued what we 

call a show-cause notice to the contractor, which gives them a set 

period to respond. Given the facts that are inconsistent with our 

contractual responsibility to provide security, to show cause why 

the contract should not be terminated. 

Mr. BARTON. So the answer is yes, they can be terminated. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STEARNS. The chairman emeritus was really asking the question, I will ask it for him, has anyone been fired because of this 

incident? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Sir, there have been a number of personnel 

changes. The way the structure—— 

Mr. STEARNS. No one has been fired, though? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Oh, no, no, no. There have been a number of 

changes. The two top contractor officials at the site retired within 

12 days. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. 

Mr. PONEMAN. A number of other people have been moved out 

of their positions, from the guard force to the contractor as well. 

Mr. STEARNS. It doesn’t sound like anybody has been fired. 

Ms. Christensen, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to direct my questions at Mr. Poneman, but I would believe that Mr. 

Podonsky might be able to assist in answering. 

The DOE’s office of Health, Safety, and Security has been able 

to identify major security flaws within several DOE nuclear facility 

sites through the various security and safety oversight inspections 

that it conducts. 

So, Mr. Poneman, can you talk briefly about the inspections the 

Office of Health, Safety, and Security is currently doing across the 

DOE complex? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, Congresswoman. We highly value their role 

as our internal independent oversight organization, and therefore, 

the Secretary directed Mr. Podonsky to, A, dispatch a team immediately to Y–12; B, to assemble a team that draws from other parts 

of the Department to make sure all of the sites in the complex that 

have Category 1 nuclear materials are looked at quickly to see if 

there are any urgent changes that we need to make in other sites; 

and then the third thing we have asked Mr. Podonsky to do is an 

in-depth, what we call a comprehensive inspection by his oversight 

organization, which will take 3 weeks at each of the 12 sites and 

over the course of 12 months do a deep drive, force-on-force testing 

68 

and make sure if there are deeper problems that need to be addressed that we can do that. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. OK, and Mr. Chairman, these assessments 

will certainly be helpful to the committee and perhaps we could 

have DOE come back to us once they have finished those assessments. 

So what kind of inspections did HSS do at Y–12 facility before, 

and what did they find? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I think I would let Mr. Podonsky address that. 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, ma’am. In 2008, we did what we call a comprehensive security inspection. By definition comprehensive means 

that we do force-on-force, limited scope performance testing, we 

look at personnel security, protection program management, physical security systems, material control accountability. We look at 

the entire kaleidoscope of security subjects to make sure that we 

know how effective the requirements are being implemented. It is 

not just an inspection to make sure that people are complying, but 

we also take a look to see how they are performing, and it was in 

that inspection that we identified a number of serious problems 

that resulted in findings that the NNSA, according to DOE orders, 

would then be responsible for fixing and putting a corrective action 

plan in place, which they did. Many of those findings, we believe, 

if they were completely fixed and maintained, then perhaps the 

events that occurred in July of 2012 would not have occurred. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. So when did that take place? 

Mr. PODONSKY. That was in 2008, and the report was issued in 

2009. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. So you don’t believe that all of the 

vulnerabilities were addressed, or they were addressed but not 

maintained? 

Mr. PODONSKY. In all fairness they were addressed in 2009, they 

put together the corrective actions, but then as 2010, 2011, we believe they deteriorated. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Is there any reason that we should be worried about other facilities that may be susceptible to similar 

breaches? 

Mr. PODONSKY. We should always be looking for improvements, 

Congresswoman, and that is why the Deputy and the Secretary directed us to go out and do immediate comprehensive inspections of 

all of our Category 1 facilities. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. The August IG report revealed 

that several of the security mechanisms in place at the Y–12 facility, if functioning properly, would have allowed personnel to quickly identify and locate the intruders. Mr. Friedman, can you tell us 

what those mechanisms were? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, the cameras are a perfect example. They 

have been discussed already during the hearing. They should all 

have been fully functioning, and the maintenance process should 

have been such that high priority maintenance, high priority security components would have been repaired within a very short period of time, if, in fact, they were—they broke down for any—or became inoperable for any reason. 

Also, we found another was compensatory measures. The compensatory measures are implemented when there is a mechanical 

69 

failure. They were in place for much too long, and therefore, they 

lost their character as a short-term measure to address a problem 

in the immediate term but not the long term as it was intended. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And who is responsible for that, for maintaining the cameras? Was it the contractor, was it—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, the contractor had primary responsibility, 

but there certainly was responsibility on the part of the site officials, the Federal site officials as well. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Well, you know, the incident, as has been 

said, makes it clear that independent DOE oversight of NNSA and 

its contractors is very important, and I look forward to seeing the 

outcome of DOE’s inspections throughout the nuclear complex and 

the actions taken in response to these inspections. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. STEARNS. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Terry from Nebraska is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and first I just want to 

say that I appreciate the gentlelady, Diane DeGette’s questions 

about some legislative language, and I happen to agree with her 

position, and I think most of us do, that we need more oversight, 

efficient oversight, force-on-force. I mean, we can’t do enough here 

to make sure that they are secure. So we have to change a culture. 

But I want to go back to the cameras, because as I understand 

security, it isn’t that sensors are number one and then cameras are 

number two, and there is kind of list that you go down. Sensors 

and cameras are part of the same. They are yin, and they are yang. 

Sensors go off, you view the cameras to see what is occurring. So 

I think that would be critical, but yet it was deemed not to be critical. Is that correct, Mr. Poneman? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. On both points. It is critical, and it was 

not deemed to be critical. 

Mr. TERRY. Yes, and so how long were—I don’t know if we established how long the cameras were not operating, how many weeks, 

days, months. 

Mr. PONEMAN. In at least one instance the IG report noted the 

camera was broken on the order of 6 months. 

Mr. TERRY. Six months. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TERRY. Six months for something that universally at this 

table you would deem cameras as critical. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir, and indeed—— 

Mr. TERRY. Someone there made a decision that they weren’t 

critical. Who was that, or what entity makes that decision? 

Mr. PONEMAN. That was something that would have been in the 

hands of the M&O contractor to propose what—— 

Mr. TERRY. It would be a guess. 

Mr. PONEMAN [continuing]. And what is not and then it would 

be up to the Federal oversight to be cognizant of that and to be allowing it to continue. 

Mr. TERRY. I appreciate it. Did you want to say something? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. No, just—I was making sure my microphone 

was off because I thought I saw the light on. I wanted—I agree 

with—the Deputy Secretary said it absolutely right. We have a contract with our M&O contractor down in Y–12 to take care of this 

70 

equipment, put it on a high priority. The camera maintenance was 

not prioritized to be fixed. Our Federal oversight should have 

caught that. That information as it is floated in reports and oversight from the program side in Washington should have been able 

to pick that data out. As the Inspector General said, there were indicators in our reports, but when there are too many indicators, the 

real indicator gets lost in the noise, and so the important thing 

here is on oversight, in my opinion, and I do greatly—— 

Mr. TERRY. That is what we want. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. That we have to make sure our oversight is done not only in the quantity but in the quality that allows 

us to—— 

Mr. TERRY. Absolutely. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. Pick out these flags and not have 

the important indicators buried in reports. That is an important 

thing from my standpoint. 

Mr. TERRY. Very good. I am just curious, Mr. Poneman. How— 

these were down, cameras were down for 6 months. Once they were 

fixed, evidently they were fixed within a couple days after the incident. Is that correct? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. They have all been fixed, sir. 

Mr. TERRY. What was wrong with the cameras? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I don’t know what was wrong the cameras, but I 

think Mr. D’Agostino put it very well. 

Mr. TERRY. Mr. D’Agostino, do you know what was wrong with 

the cameras? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Not in a specific way. We can get—take that 

question for the record and get back to the committee. 

Mr. TERRY. Mr. Podonsky, do you know? 

Mr. PODONSKY. I have an inspection team on the site right now, 

and what I understand were those two particular cameras that 

were out. One was an inner workings of the camera. It took 24 

hours to fix that. The other one was a trip switch that had to be 

just flipped on. 

Mr. TERRY. A trip switch. What does that mean? 

Mr. PODONSKY. I am not a systems engineer, but that—— 

Mr. TERRY. Is that a circuit breaker? 

Mr. PODONSKY. A circuit breaker was flipped. 

Mr. TERRY. So all they had to do was look at it and go like that, 

and that camera would have worked again? 

Mr. PODONSKY. That is what my inspectors are telling me. 

Mr. TERRY. But it was down for 6 months. So I guess to conclude 

in the last 40 seconds, Mr. Friedman, you made a comment regarding we need a scalpel, not a cleaver. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did. 

Mr. TERRY. I may disagree. When you have that level of incompetence, to keep the same people and organization in place probably isn’t a good decision. There we probably need a cleaver. 

I yield back. 

Mr. STEARNS. Ms. Schakowsky is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to focus on 

a more fundamental question involved in all of this. That is the use 

of a private contractors altogether. You know, we made a decision 

in—as a country in 1828, that we would be protected here at the 

71 

Congress, members of Congress and the public, by people who wear 

the badge, and I am looking at the recruiting Web site, and it says, 

‘‘Wear the badge, feel the honor, the moment of transformation 

when you slip into the uniform. Put on the badge and join our elite 

ranks. What does it take to join this prestigious team? A deep 

sense of patriotism, unyielding dedication to protecting the public, 

and a passion for the American way of life are just the beginning.’’ 

DOE is the largest non-defense department contractor and agency in the Federal Government, and this is probably one of the most 

sensitive missions; stewardship of the Nation’s nuclear weapon 

stockpile. And when you look at who the contractor—the company 

that holds the security contractor is WSI Oak Ridge. It is my understanding that this is a local branch of G4S Global Solutions, formerly known as Wackenhut, the same company that recently 

apologized to the British Parliament for failing to provide enough 

security guards for the London Olympics, and that they also own 

the company, Armor Group, which was involved in serious abuses, 

including sexual hazing and disgusting photos we were all privy to 

at the U.S. Embassy in Cabo in 2009. 

Now, I don’t understand, one, why this company has any role to 

play. I would like to know if you have any concerns about the performance of this particular company. If the government has taken 

any steps to hold both B&W Y–12 and WSI Oak Ridge accountable 

for the security breach and any other misconduct. I have seen reports that the current contracts for B&W expire September 30, and 

WSI’s contract ends November 30 and wondered if we are going to 

get rid of them, and perhaps even more fundamentally, I wonder 

if anybody has really looked at, done a cost analysis of what it 

would be to have someone with pride wear the badge of the United 

States of America, be in the line of command, and guard something 

as sensitive as this rather than hiring these private outside contractors. 

That is a lot of questions, but I would like to at least begin—— 

Mr. PONEMAN. These are profound questions, Congresswoman, 

and they come in two sections. I am going to address each of our 

concerns. 

The question you raised about whether the protective force 

should be Federal employees or contractor employees is a longstanding question that has been looked at back to the late 1940s 

when it first went in the direction that it did for security contractors being hired. What you said about that sense of mission and patriotism, that is what we believe should be held by all of us, including contractors. We say that we all work for the President. 

Now, there have been a number of reports, including GAO reports, that have weighed the pros and cons, of which there are 

many, but it comes down to something that I think Mr. Gaffigan 

said well in his testimony. There is no substitute for management, 

and you have to stay—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, talk to me about this particular company. Haven’t they done enough to preclude them from being 

hired? I mean, how many apologies have to be issued? 

Mr. PONEMAN. That is the segue to the second part of your question. Now, in this particular case the first thing we did was we 

found that since the contract structure had an independent conVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:44 Nov 04, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\PROGRA~1\WS_FTP\85180.TXT WAYNE
72 

tract for the protective force, this aggregated from some of the systems that your colleague mentioned, we put Wackenhut under the 

M&O contractor so we had a single command. Point one. Point two, 

we then issued the show-cause notice that said given these security 

breaches that were experienced at Y–12, the contractors which 

would include both the M&O contractor and Wackenhut or WSI at 

the site, show cause why the contract should not be terminated. 

And the third point is on your point about the contracts soon to expire, any subsequent competition would be informed by the record 

of the contractors in their last term of service under contract. So 

that would very much influence any decision, and there would, 

therefore, be consequences. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Let me just say, if this were part of the normal chain of command of people who wore the badge of the United 

States of America, these people were out, they would be sanctioned, 

there would be some consequence immediately for that. It seems to 

me a company who has been engaged in the kind of practices that 

they have, first of all, should be off the list of contractors, and I 

think we ought to reconsider this issue of whether or not private 

contractors are appropriate for this level of sensitive mission. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. May I just point out, if I might, that in November 

of 2011 we in our management challenge report for the Department 

of Energy, we recommended that we take a close look at how the 

structure and the provision of protective forces at the DOE facilities around the country, including, by the way, Argon and Fermi, 

and one of the options that we put on the table was, in fact, federalizing the workforce. It is a very complicated issue. It goes back 

a long time as the Deputy Secretary indicated, but we think it is 

time to relook at that issue, and we agree with you there. 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Dr. Burgess is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURGESS. So if I just heard you correctly, Mr. Inspector General, you said it is now, you feel it is now time to relook at the 

issue. You know, there was a situation in 2007, six cruise missiles, 

each loaded with a nuclear warhead, mistakenly loaded on a B–52 

bomber at Minot Air Force Base and transported to Barksdale, 

North Dakota, to Louisiana. The warheads were supposed to be removed before the missiles were taken from storage. The missiles 

with the nuclear warheads were not reported missing and remained mounted to the aircraft at both Minot and Barksdale for 

36 hours. The warheads were not protected by various security precautions required for nuclear weapons. They never left the base, no 

one sprayed paint on them, no one protested, but Secretary Gates 

demanded the resignation of the Air Force Secretary and Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force. 

Where is the sense of urgency here? I haven’t heard it this morning. Mr. Terry said scalpel and cleaver, he prefers a cleaver. I don’t 

understand why these individuals are free to be here in the hearing room today. Why are they not incarcerated? My understanding 

is they have been charged with both criminal trespass, which is a 

misdemeanor, and destruction of Federal property, which is a felony. My understanding is one of the individuals is a repeat offender. Do they pose a flight risk? I don’t know. They don’t seem 

73 

like reliable individuals. It is hard to be against a nun and a house 

painter and an electrician, whatever their professions are, but at 

the same time why are they even here in this hearing room? Why 

are they not being held in detention somewhere? What is to prevent them from doing the very same thing tomorrow night or the 

night after? 

Mr. Barton posed a very good question. Carrying a Bible to a secured nuclear facility is one thing, but it could have been anything. 

It could have been anything. Where is the sense of urgency to stop 

this problem? The POGO folks, the oversight guys that are always 

posting stuff said the Boy Scouts would have done a better job. So 

where is the sense of urgency? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, there is, if that is directed to me, 

there is no greater urgency that we face in the complex. We are 

working this every day, all day, and we have from the day of the 

incident, and we immediately took the actions to remove the 

guards who were responsible, we immediately fixed the cameras, 

we immediately dispatched teams, we immediately took the general 

from our Pantex facility who is an expert at security and sent him 

up to make sure that the best practices that are enforced in 

Pantex, and we have done this from day one, and we continue to 

do it, and we are going to keep working at it until we feel confident 

that it—the job has been well done. 

Mr. BURGESS. Have those guards been fired? I think the answer 

to that question is, no, they have been reassigned. Are they going 

to be barred from working on any sort of similar security arrangement in the future? I don’t think we have gotten an answer to that. 

Who in the agency is taking responsibility? Secretary Gates asked 

for the resignation of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. 

Where is that accountability in this situation, which I would submit is no less serious than what occurred in Minot, North Dakota. 

Mr. PONEMAN. We agree with the seriousness, Congressman. 

That is precisely why we have got General Finan doing the internal 

reviews. We have taken the people who were on the line in terms 

of our own Federal oversight and reassigned them to permit that 

review to be unimpeded, and we will follow every fact trail to the 

end of the earth and find out what happened. We will, as Secretary 

Gates did, hold people responsible. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, I think the response was much more immediate in Secretary Gates’ situation. 

Mr. Friedman, Inspector General Friedman, on the issue of compensatory measures, one of the Federal officials according to your 

report, this is—I am referencing here the special report in the inquiry of the security breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Y–12 national complex under compensatory measures on page 4. You say one of these Federal officials also indicated 

that they had been instructed not to evaluate and report on how 

the contractors were conducting business. Is that an accurate statement? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is an accurate statement. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, if that is the case, as long as they were doing 

an adequate job was the other part of that statement. In this case 

were they doing an adequate job in deciding how to accomplish 

their security mission for the Department of Energy? 

74 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. As the very essence of our report is we think not. 

Mr. BURGESS. So I guess my question to you is, I mean, you are 

the law enforcement person here. You are the Inspector General. 

Where is the accountability that you are going to extract because 

they clearly failed at their mission? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, you are right in your characterization of 

what my job is and included, by the way, effectuating the arrest 

of the three trespassers, and we are proceeding on that case, and 

your earlier point, Doctor, is—Dr. Burgess, is exactly correct. The 

judicial system is now the timing mechanism. It is not the Department of Energy or the Office of Inspector General. 

With regard to your second point is we generally do not identify 

particular individuals, there are cases where this does occur, who 

ought to be fired. That is the responsibility of management to take 

our report and the other information they have available to them 

and make whatever judgments they see to make with regard to firing individuals, personnel actions, or disassociating the Department from certain contractors who have not acted well. 

Mr. BURGESS. These are individuals who walked through the socalled fatal force zone. At Los Alamos several years ago I saw a 

force-on-force exercise out there. It was pretty impressive, all of the 

tools that they had at their disposal. Why was none of that used? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Dr. Burgess, I am sorry. I really—could you repeat the question? I am sorry. 

Mr. BURGESS. At Los Alamos in 2005—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Right. 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. I was given a demonstration of the 

force-on-force exercise that would be instituted were there a serious 

security breach. I would submit that this was serious. Got through 

four fences. They had something the size of a Bible. Where was— 

what would it have taken to institute that force-on-force—— 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. You go ahead. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The answer—well, my answer to your question, 

Dr. Burgess, is really the following. One of the—and I—the fact 

that the nun, one of the trespassers is here today makes this even 

more meaningful, I suppose, is we have testimony from sharp 

shooters who were on the protected force at the site, that if the 

trespassers, if they had clear sight of the trespassers, they might 

have taken them out or attempted to take them out at that time. 

So the aggressive force that you witnessed on the force-on-force exercises at Los Alamos exists, at least theoretically, at Y–12 as well. 

Mr. STEARNS. To confirm them, you had snipers at Y–12? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I don’t want to characterize their abilities. 

They are highly trained, very professional, paramilitary, former 

Seals, very competent individuals in terms of their physical abilities and the training generally. Clearly there was a breakdown in 

this case, but you should not believe that these are people who are 

not equipped to do the job when they have to do the job. 

Mr. STEARNS. I understand. The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. 

Castor, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me start by expressing my dismay over this security breach. It is appalling on all 

levels for the government and for the private contractors that had 

responsibility here. 

75 

Last night the Washington Post published a story noting that the 

security lapses that allowed three protesters, including an 82-yearold nun, to gain access to the secure Y–12 area at Oak Ridge National Lab, that those security lapses had been identified by government investigators 2 years before the break in. According to the 

Post a 2010, classified report by DOE inspectors found that, ‘‘security cameras were inoperable, equipment maintenance was sloppy, 

and guards were poorly trained.’’ 

Mr. Poneman, are you aware of this report? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. CASTOR. Is what is being reported accurate? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Obviously it is a classified report. We would be 

very happy to go into it in closed session, and I would suggest we 

defer. 

Ms. CASTOR. What can you tell us now? 

Mr. PONEMAN. What I can tell you is what we have been very 

clear about, which is the characterization that you have used and 

your colleagues have used. ‘‘Appalling’’ is apt, that as Mr. Gaffigan 

has testified it is not just a matter of finding the thing that is 

wrong and fixing it but sustaining that level of effort and that we, 

therefore, had a breakdown up and down the chain, including a 

sense of complacency that something like this could not happen, 

and we are vigorously doing everything we can to root that out and 

to put in place more effective security. 

Ms. CASTOR. Can you tell us that after that 2010, report came 

out that it was reviewed with Babcock and Wilcox, your contractors, Wackenhut, WSI Oak Ridge? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I can tell you that that is what is supposed to 

happen with those kind of reports. In terms of what happened with 

that particular report, we would have to come back to you. I don’t 

know exactly—— 

Ms. CASTOR. And Mr. D’Agostino, did I see you nod that it was 

reviewed with the contractors? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, ma’am. As part of standard practice all 

independent inspection reports by the Health, Safety, and Security 

organization are briefed to both the Federal officials and the contractor officials at each site. Given the consistency of Mr. 

Podonsky’s organization doing these inspections, which he could 

confirm, but there is no doubt in my mind that there is, that these 

reports are in their hands, they get copies, they are copied on the 

reports, they have the reports. 

I do as well. I get, typically get the report, I read the executive 

summaries, I am briefed by Mr. Podonsky’s organization to give me 

the overall sense of the conditions. That is standard practice. The 

key, though, for me in this particular case is it is not enough just 

to read an executive summary and take a high-level look at the 

findings and get a brief by the organization. I actually have to read 

every page of that report. 

Ms. CASTOR. Who is responsibility is it then to sit down with the 

contractors, with Babcock and Wilcox, Wackenhut, WSI Oak Ridge 

to go through that? Did you do that, Mr. Podonsky? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Ma’am, what we do and we have been doing for 

2 decades, is we independently assess the performance of the contractor and the feds on the site, and then we issue a report that 

76 

is validated, and I won’t bother to explain all the details, but it is 

a very rigorous process. So we spend—— 

Ms. CASTOR. I wonder if anyone here at the table read that report in 2010, and actively discussed it personally with the contractors. 

Mr. PODONSKY. I will tell you that when the team is on site as 

they are right now at other sites, including Y–12, they actively 

validate daily—— 

Ms. CASTOR. I am just wondering if any of you here had that report and had that discussion with the contractors. 

Mr. PODONSKY. I read my reports. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. CASTOR. And then did you—— 

Mr. PODONSKY. And then it is up to the line to discuss with 

them, with their contractors and with their own staff how they are 

going to correct it. We don’t—— 

Ms. CASTOR. So you didn’t have any personal conversations on 

the phone or in person with the contractors? I am just wondering 

if anyone, if it was anyone’s responsibility to do that or if anyone 

did that here. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Ma’am, it is my responsibility to make sure my 

organization and my security organization does exactly that, go 

over the details of the report. As I mentioned earlier, I get the executive summaries, I get a brief by the independent inspection organizations on these reports, which I did in this particular case, 

and the key is—and so I count on my security organization to go 

through the details page by page—— 

Ms. CASTOR. OK. Thank you, and Mr. Friedman, I have—your 

recent Y–12 report suggests that there may have been systemic 

failures to address maintenance issues at Y–12. I would like to 

know in a broader perspective were the problems you saw at Y– 

12 symptomatic of larger issues here at this agency or the DOE? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, symptomatic in the sense that we have concerns about the whole notion of contract administration and contractor oversight and how that is effectuated throughout the Department, yes. In terms of security, you know, to be totally candid 

with you we have—we issued a report on a compromise of a forceon-force exercise in 2004. So we have had some continuing—at Y– 

12 but that—— 

Ms. CASTOR. And then back on the accountability for the contractors, are there any penalties built into these contracts? I understand that you have now taken action, began proceedings to fire 

the management contractor, the subsidiary of Babcock and Wilcox, 

but are there any penalties built into these type of contracts so 

that if a breach like this occurs, not only do personnel lose their 

jobs but there is some payment back to the DOE or the government? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The government always has the ability to reach 

back and look at past performance and make adjustments consistent with the contract, and our plans are to do just that in this 

case, ma’am. 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady from Tennessee is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you all 

for your patience. I hope that it is not lost on you that this is someVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:44 Nov 04, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\PROGRA~1\WS_FTP\85180.TXT WAYNE
77 

thing that concerns us tremendously, and having served in the 

State Senate in Tennessee, knowing how proud individuals in that 

part of the State are of that facility, having visited the facility 

many times myself, I think not only did you have a security breach, 

but you have now what you are seeing is a breach of the public 

trust in that area. You are charged with keeping that facility safe. 

You are charged in keeping the employees at that facility safe, and 

it is such—the ineptness and the negligence is mindboggling as we 

look at this. 

Now, I want to go back to this 2010, report. A report comes out 

in 2010, and you review this report. Now, you have to review it 

with the contractors. Am I right there, Mr. Podonsky? I think—— 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes. We validate the content—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. 

Mr. PODONSKY [continuing]. To the contractors and the site—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. Now, with the site, who is the buck stops 

here? Who is—do you have a guy who makes the decision at that 

facility that says, these are serious issues? 

Mr. PODONSKY. That would be the site manager, the Federal site 

manager. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. The Federal site manager. Did that individual make that decision that this was serious, and did they hold 

Babcock and Wilcox and WSI responsible and say, we are going to 

tie your money up until you straighten this out? 

Mr. PODONSKY. I would tell you from the independent oversight 

perspective that is what is supposed to happen, and then we as an 

organization brief it up as Administrator D’Agostino said, we did 

brief him and his security staff back in Washington. So it is up to 

Administrator D’Agostino to then make sure that the corrective actions through the site manager are—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. D’Agostino, did you follow up with the site 

manager? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Did the site manager say we have taken action 

to fix these security lapses? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, ma’am. In the 2009, report that was referenced—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. When did he show proof that he had taken 

that? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The—I will have to get you the exact month 

that he showed proof, but we had validated the closure of all of the 

findings, including the cameras—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. Then who is responsible that it didn’t get 

done? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The problem—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Let me ask you this. Have any of you been on 

the ground at the Y–12 facility? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, ma’am. 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. All of you have been there? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, ma’am. 

78 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. So all of you went, and all of you looked at this 

physical facility, and all, each of you reviewed the items that were 

pointed out and made sure boxes were checked that they had been 

repaired and signed off on this. Am I right on this? 

Mr. PONEMAN. No, ma’am. I visited this site—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. Mr. Poneman. 

Mr. PONEMAN [continuing]. On earlier occasions, and as you 

know having visited the site, it is an impressive site. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Yes, it is. 

Mr. PONEMAN. And the problem—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. And it deserves to be protected. 

Mr. PONEMAN. And it deserves for the site, for the people of the 

Nation, absolutely correct. One of the problems here is you have an 

evidence that looks like invincibility, but we had specific shortcomings that were not adequately identified or if they were fixed, 

the system was not fixed to the point that it was sustained. These 

are the things that we are trying to get our arms around right now. 

You are absolutely right. It has to have that kind of top level—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. See, it just seems incomprehensible that you 

could have said we have this report, we are doing this review, we 

have these problems, the problems are not fixed, are not fixed to 

completion. How could you continue the contract if they are not 

completed, and I have to tell you, listening to you all this morning, 

I got to tell you something. This is classic bureaucratic pass the 

buck. It is not my problem. It is somebody else’s problem. Well, it 

is your problem. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congresswoman—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. You are charged with the responsibility of protecting these facilities, and we are charged with conducting the appropriate oversight for this, and to say, well, I reviewed it and so 

and so said—somebody somewhere has to say are the cameras 

working, are the fences complete. If you have got, what is it, 200 

false alarms, you should know that there is a problem with something causing the false alarms. You know it is wildlife in this area. 

Is that not correct? So you fix it, but you don’t allow it to continue 

and continue to pay the contract and then have something like this 

occur where you have individuals inside this facility. The security 

culture and the safety culture demands a better product from you 

all. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congresswoman, in terms of the priority that it 

deserves and in terms of the cultural requirement to be ever vigilant, you are absolutely correct. That is why within days of actually 

knowing about the problems, the problems that had been identified 

had been fixed, and we are now about the business of making sure, 

A, that we don’t have problems like that anywhere else in the system, and B, that we take permanent, sustained, and sustainable 

measures to make sure that it is—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Sir, my time has expired, but I would offer 

that you fixed them after you were embarrassed, and you fixed 

them 2 years too late. 

I yield back. 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

79 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A question for everyone 

on the panel. The National Defense Authorization Act was passed 

by this chamber earlier this year, allows the National Nuclear Security Administration sites to adopt OSHA workplace standards in 

lieu of the NNSA present standards. 

Can anyone on the panel tell me the differences between what 

NNSA’s present standards and the standards the House NDAA 

would allow? In addition, the OSHA standards provide more protection. Would OSHA standards provide more protection for the 

workers at those nuclear sites, and would OSHA standards be easier to enforce? 

Is OSHA stronger than what was original standards? 

Mr. PONEMAN. We have very strong standards, Congressman, in 

the Department of Energy. There are some similarities between 

OSHA standards and DOE standards, but there are some unique 

DOE requirements because of our unique nuclear responsibilities 

for such materials as Beryllium and so forth. So we are informed 

by those standards, but the standards that the DOE employs are 

specific to the DOE complex and are unique requirements. 

Mr. GREEN. You can apply both, whichever is the toughest. Obviously your standards or OSHA standards, I guess, for safety. Is 

there any—is national, nuclear security standards stronger than 

OSHA? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Well, the OSHA standards, Congressman, and my 

colleagues may wish to join me in explaining this, apply to general 

industrial safety. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. PONEMAN. And where we can apply globally recognized 

standards that apply to industrial safety, we do that. That is an 

efficient thing to do to use validated peer review standards such as 

OSHA. However, when there are those unique requirements that 

pertain to the use of Beryllium and other things that are unique 

to our complex, we need special DOE-tailored standards. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. And if I could just agree with everything the 

Deputy Secretary said. We have, we follow DOE directives on safety. Safety is critically important, and we are inspected by independent inspection, Mr. Podonsky’s organization, as well as we 

have our own safety inspection standards. We don’t believe that 

OSHA broadly applied is the way to go. We believe after years of 

analysis and work in developing DOE directives on safety that we 

have the right set. It is something that requires constant vigilance, 

constant attention to detail as this security situation has pointed 

out. We really do have to continue to keep eyes on the ball here, 

sir. 

Mr. PODONSKY. May I amplify on that, Congressman? 

Mr. GREEN. Sure. 

Mr. PODONSKY. The Administration made it clear that the legislation that was proposed would hinder the Secretary’s ability to 

manage safety and security at—within the NNSA, and specifically 

to your question on OSHA versus the standards that we have, our 

standards are much stronger. In fact, the Administrator for OSHA 

would like to move OSHA more towards the DOE standards, but 

because their hazards are of not the same magnitude as ours, it is 

rather difficult. 

80 

Mr. GREEN. Well, and obviously I have trouble with OSHA standards. I represent an area of maybe not as—but refineries and 

chemical plants, and our standards, sometimes the company standards are tougher than OSHA, and I can understand that. 

The testimony by the Inspector General and the GAO submitted 

today indicate that have been persistent safety problems at NNSA 

sites for the past decade. The GAO reported between 2000, and 

2007, there were 60 serious accidents or near misses, including 

worker exposure to radiation, inhalation of toxic vapors, electrical 

shocks, and again, I am interested in learning what DOE and 

NNSA are doing to protect the workers. Is 60 violations in 7 years, 

particularly dealing with the type of substances that you have to 

do, it seems like that would be an awful lot. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, when it comes to anything nuclear, 

even one incident is one too many. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. PONEMAN. And I can assure you that we take gravely seriously our commitment and our responsibilities for the safety of our 

workers, of the neighbors of the facilities, and of the general public. 

We have addressed issues up, down, and sideways relating to improving our safety culture. The Secretary and I have both spent 

days and weeks going out to the sites, telling people they should 

feel free to come forward to express—— 

Mr. GREEN. I have one more question. Let me get—Mr. Gaffigan, 

your testimony states that the problem of NNSA oversight is not 

a matter of being excessive or overbearing but ineffective. What 

recommendations would you provide for the oversight to be less ineffective, and what steps can be—you report to the DOE in taking 

to make sure that oversight of the labs is as effective as possible? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. And I this applies to both safety and security. We 

have not found the problems to be the standards themselves. I 

think the standards are good. They are out there. They do find the 

problems, they do come up with good corrective action plans, and 

the thing that we think they fall short on over and over again, this 

is kind of deja vu all over again with both the safety and the security side, and we have reports going back to the early 2000s and 

beyond. The same issue of they identified the problem and then 

they come out with corrective action, and it is not sustained, and 

I think you found in the testimony today talking about 2008, when 

the first report came out, 2009, 2010, whatever these issues were 

floated, yes, it looks like some action was taken, but it wasn’t sustained. And that seems to be the problem over and over again. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STEARNS. Thank the gentleman. 

I recognize Mr. Gardner, the gentleman from Colorado, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have heard 

members of the committee as well as panelists before this committee describe what happened as inexcusable and as appalling, 

but I would also say that it has become a little bit of a theme. If 

you look at some of the background material that we have been 

given before this committee hearing and the memorandum, it talks 

about committee hearings that were held, a series of Energy and 

Commerce Committee hearings held in 1999, that talks about 15 

81 

hearings held and numerous GAO investigations requested in 2004, 

and 2005, and 2008, and 2009. We have heard about reports in 

March of 2010. 

I have in my district 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles, Minutemen III, located in my district, and recently I went to F. E. 

Warren Air Force Base, where I viewed the preparations that they 

go under to monitor the sites, the missile alert facilities, and the 

material that they are protecting. And certainly I don’t think at 

any point was I concerned that they were becoming numb to an 

alarm that was going off, because as I sat in the facility there were 

alarms going off because a tumbleweed blew up against an electronic surveillance barrier, and they knew where to look for that, 

and they certainly checked it out and verified it. And it happened 

multiple times a day as you can imagine on the eastern plains of 

Colorado, where you have wildlife, where you have tumbleweeds, 

where you have high wind, where you have snow that builds drifts 

that may cause an alert. Watching the shadows on the video monitor of the drifts to make sure that nothing was changing. 

And yet we continue to see this theme that it sounds like you 

know what is wrong, it sounds like you have identified the problem, but I don’t know that we have had the government picture in 

place that actually accomplishes the protections that we need of 

what obviously is a critical matter of national security. 

And some of this, some of these questions have been asked before. Some of them have been talked about here, but I do want to 

follow up and do a little bit of repeating of what has happened. 

And so, Mr. Friedman, Mr. Friedman, in your report, in your IG 

report you say that one official in NNSA was talking about how, 

talking about how—excuse me. Had been instructed not to evaluate 

and report on how the contractors were conducting business, and 

we talked a little bit about the contractors, whether or not they 

have done an adequate job deciding how to accomplish the mission. 

We have talked about effective management. 

And so I guess the question is actually not for you, Mr. Friedman, but to Mr. D’Agostino. How do we make sure that we have 

the management that we need to—for a contractor to make decisions if the Federal side officials are not able to evaluate how the 

contractor is doing their job? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Gardner, that is the question is to make 

sure, it is my responsibility to make sure that my Federal overseers in the program understand that my expectation is that they 

do oversee the contractor in this high hazard, highly important, 

critical missions of nuclear safety and nuclear security and that we 

have an independent oversight structure in place to check that we 

are actually doing that particular thing. 

In this particular case you referenced a quote I think from Mr. 

Friedman’s report. We had clearly a situation that was unacceptable, was inexcusable, and this is why we are conducting reviews 

because we want to understand what happened in the translation 

of oversight that we have people at our site offices thinking that 

they cannot and should not and are not allowed to oversee the contractor in that way. So we want to track this down, we want to get 

this review done and General Finan’s review as the Deputy Secretary had mentioned, clearly is a step towards digging beyond just 

82 

what we have been—and some of the pieces we have been talking 

about on specific numbers of cameras, which is important, but we 

want to get to that underlying thing that allows us to sustain oversight, effective oversight in the right way, and as Mr. Friedman’s 

report said, so it in a risk-based way where our attention is based 

on the most, the highest, most important activities. 

Mr. GARDNER. Do you carry out perimeter checks? I mean, do 

you carry out perhaps drills or tests that may breach a perimeter 

just to check for response? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, but we clearly need to do more of these 

and do what—— 

Mr. GARDNER. How many—how often do you carry those out? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Those checks, right now those checks are now 

being ascribed every time we conduct a visit from headquarters 

that we are going to do that check. We are going to have federalized—— 

Mr. GARDNER. How often were they carried out before the incident at Y–12? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. They were carried out on a regular basis. 

Mr. GARDNER. What is a regular basis? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Regular basis is on a weekly basis by their protective force. We expect our contractor have a performance assurance system. They have to prove to the Federal Government, we 

have a contract with them, that they are checking themselves, and 

so they—— 

Mr. GARDNER. And are you reviewing those checks? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. Those checks get reviewed. The challenge is to make, is to have these checks done in such a way that 

they actually could test conditions on the ground, not the fact that 

we have a contractor knowing that something is going to happen 

so they are ready to go. 

Mr. GARDNER. Yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and thank 

you, Sister, Meghan Rice, for being here. Thank you for your actions. Thank you for your willingness to focus attention on this nuclear weapons buildup that still exists in our world and how much 

we need to do something to reduce it. We don’t need more nuclear 

weapons. We need fewer nuclear weapons. We don’t need more hostility with Russia. We need less hostility with Russia. We thank 

you. We thank you for your courage. 

I went to Immaculate Conception Grammar School, Malden 

Catholic, Boston College, and Boston College Law School. So I went 

to catholic school every day for 20 years, and I am very influenced, 

of course, by everything that the nuns taught me. It is important 

that was nuns on the bus, not under the bus, which a lot of people 

would like for you, Sister. They think you should be punished and 

not praised, but what you have done is you have shown the 

lackness, the laxness of the security at our nuclear weapons facilities, and but you have also pointed out that we still have an outof-control nuclear arms race with an out-of-control budget building 

more nuclear weapons in our own country, and for that you should 

83 

be praised, because that is ultimately what the Sermon on the 

Mount is all about. 

And I think along Sister Simone Campbell, speaking at the 

Democratic Convention about the Ryan budget, that you can’t build 

more nuclear weapons and cut Medicaid and cut Pell Grants and 

cut Medicare at the same time. It is not just the arithmetic doesn’t 

add up if you say you are balancing the budget, but the morality 

end of it. It is just wrong, and so what you did, Sister, was just 

so memorable to me in pulling up all of those classrooms that I was 

in all those years, just hearing that message. And so I thank you 

for that, and I hope that the members of this committee can learn 

from what you are saying and what Sister Campbell is saying and 

perhaps just reflect that in the incredible commitment that too 

many members have to building more nuclear weapons when we 

don’t have any targets anymore for those nuclear weapons. 

And some people just think of the Defense budget as a jobs bill. 

No. It should just be what enhances our security, and if you can’t 

justify it on that basis, you just can’t maintain it because it adds 

to the instability on the planet. 

So, Mr. Poneman, let me just go to you. The United States Enrichment Corporation is possibly the most troubled company that 

has a pending loan guarantee application at the Department. It is 

rated at below junk bond status. It has been warned that it is at 

risk of being delisted from the stock exchange, which prompted the 

USEC to warn its shareholders could be put into default on all of 

its debts. It lost more money last year than the entire Solyndra 

Loan Guarantee was worth, and despite repeated DOE bailouts totaling almost $1 billion and free uranium and other subsidies in 

just the past 8 months the total value of the company is only about 

$62 million. And despite the clear signs of impending bankruptcy, 

the Department requested another $100 million from Congress for 

USEC for fiscal year 2013. 

Mr. Poneman, will the Department actually provide these funds 

to USEC even if USEC continues to be at risk of being delisted 

from the stock exchange and defaulting on all of its debts? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, let me be very clear. The thing that 

the United States Department of Energy is focused on is maintaining a domestic source of enriched uranium so that while we still 

have the deterrent that we need to defend America, we can get the 

tritium and so forth we need—— 

Mr. MARKEY. I understand that, but USEC’s American centrifuge 

project in Ohio plans to use foreign-made technology for everything 

from pumps to cooling systems. They have even asked from Congress to pass legislation to get favorable tariff treatment on these 

imports, and USEC’s Kentucky facility relies on French pumps to 

move the enriched uranium and waste through the machines. 

If DOE really believes it needs American technology to meet its 

tritium needs, why does it allow USEC to rely so heavily on foreign 

technology? 

Mr. PONEMAN. To be very clear, Congressman, that is, whether 

there are some parts that are foreign, the technology and the intellectual property is owned by the United States of America, and the 

United States Department of Energy has taken every step to ensure that in the event that USEC is not able to carry of its responVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:44 Nov 04, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\PROGRA~1\WS_FTP\85180.TXT WAYNE
84 

sibilities, that we have access both to the machines and to the intellectual property to assure that our trading requirements can still 

be met. 

Mr. MARKEY. But are you going to give them money even if they 

are going bankrupt? 

Mr. PONEMAN. To me, to us, Congressman, the question is not a 

specific company and its status. The question is the capability for 

the Nation. We will do what we need to to make sure that we still 

have the deterrent that we need to defend America. 

Mr. MARKEY. Well, I just disagree with that 100 percent. I just 

think if we are going to have a loan guarantee program and 

Solyndra is going to be criticized, then we have to criticize the 

United States Enrichment Corporation as well, and we should find 

a way indigenously of doing it but not subsidizing companies that 

are going bankrupt. It is just wrong. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, to be very clear, precisely because 

the underwriting criteria of the loan program guarantee could not 

be met by USEC, the Department entered into a far different arrangement, a much more modest arrangement for research demonstration and development program, which would vouchsafe the 

technology stayed safe in American hands, even if the loan guarantee could not be qualified as under the underwriting criteria it 

could not. The program that we have in place will reduce the technical risks and reduce the financial risks if it works out, and we 

have very strong safeties to make sure that the U.S. taxpayer interest is well protected. 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. MARKEY. That is junk bond status. 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Back to the subject of this hearing, I got a couple of questions. 

I have heard that everybody is processing reports and going over 

all of this. Can I assume that you all will bring a report to us as 

well highlighting what went wrong, what is being done to rectify 

that? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, we not only recognize it. We embrace the oversight responsibilities of this subcommittee, and we 

will surely bring that to your attention. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. And Mr. Chairman, I think probably the 4 years 

in we might want to have a revisit on this subject even if brief, 

even if only a brief hearing on that matter. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Also, there has been talk of and I don’t care who responds because several people have mentioned that there was—the debate 

over federalization had been going on for years, and it was being 

looked at again, and I am sitting here, and there may be some 

great reason for it, but I am new, and I am just trying to solve 

problems, but have we ever thought about attaching at least for the 

protection of the perimeter an installation of the United States 

Army? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, the first thing that we have done 

in this particular instance is make sure with the force that we have 

and the arrangements that we have that we are safe and the mateVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:44 Nov 04, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\PROGRA~1\WS_FTP\85180.TXT WAYNE
85 

rial is secure. We have already said we need to look at exactly the 

kinds of questions you are asking to see if it can be done better. 

It has been looked at many times. I do think that Mr. Gaffigan put 

his finger on something very important when he said whatever the 

organizational arrangements, and I think this is what the past 

GAO reports indicated, there was no substitute for strong management oversight. So whether it is a federalized force or whether it 

is a contracted force, there is no substitute for getting that strong 

direction and leadership. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Historically the United States Army seems to have 

done a pretty good of that. 

Mr. PONEMAN. We are very proud of the U.S. Army. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. That being said, Mr. Friedman, I am new to this, 

but my understanding is is that this has been going on for some 

time with various problems, and what else should we be doing as 

a committee to make sure that we don’t have another problem 6 

months, 2 years, 5 years from now, and as a part of that, you 

know, should we be making more site visits to see whether or not 

the cameras are switched on ourselves? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I will respond to your question, Mr. Griffith, but it is a little presumptuous on my part to tell the subcommittee how to conduct its oversight. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, I am looking—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. So I would tell you this. I think periodic hearings 

on these specific matters would be worthwhile. I think more site 

visits, boots on the ground from the subcommittee’s point of view 

to see what is going on, comparing and contrasting from your perspective what goes on at the various Department of Energy sites 

and seeing if there are anomalies that you might point out, and finally, sort of the $64 question, which I don’t know has been asked, 

is the question of resources, and there are resource issues, and perhaps, I know you are an oversight committee, but obviously you 

have appropriations responsibilities as well, and that might be an 

area in which you could focus your attention. In other words, do 

they have the resources to do that job, are they properly positioned 

to do that. 

Mr. PONEMAN. I would just add, Congressman, we would welcome any and all members of the subcommittee to the site. We 

think that would be a very, very useful exercise and helpful. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. All right. Mr. Chairman, I see no need to pile on. 

Everybody has said what happened was bad and we want to fix it, 

but I am happy to yield my time to any member who might with 

to have that time. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. I will take a little bit and then the gentlelady 

from Tennessee. 

Mr. Friedman, you indicate more resources but wasn’t it a case 

where they just didn’t check the circuit breakers on one of the cameras? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I am not suggesting that the Congressional 

appropriation was inadequate. What I am suggesting is that in 

terms of maintenance, which is one of the key issues here, we were 

told that there were not enough maintenance individuals to take 

care of the backlog of existing equipment while they implemented 

and installed a new system. So the pie simply was not large 

86 

enough to take care of both. That is the sort of resource issue that 

I was referring to, and I apologize if I didn’t make that clear. 

Mr. STEARNS. But you would admit that checking circuit breakers doesn’t require more resources, and one of the key cameras 

didn’t—no one checked the circuit breaker. It wasn’t working. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I would suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that 

when somebody takes a closer look at it, it was more than a mere 

circuit breaker, but I am not in a position to affirm that positively 

but—— 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. The gentleman from Virginia reclaims his 

time. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would say 

that the other question that I have is is that there must have been 

more than just one or two cameras out. Either that or these folks 

had some inside information. My guess is is that your entire perimeter was exposed or else they wouldn’t have been able to just waltz 

in the way they did. Either that or they knew which cameras 

weren’t working. It sounds like to me the whole thing was down. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Scalise is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCALISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding 

this hearing, and I have a number of questions, but I first want 

to respond to some of those comments made by the gentleman from 

Massachusetts. You know, first of all, to try to equate in some way 

building nuclear weapons to protect this country and reforming 

Medicaid, which is an incredibly broken system that is depriving 

many people of good healthcare and equating that as a moral, I 

have no idea what place that has in this debate. You know, maybe 

some people haven’t been paying attention what has been going on 

in the world. 

I mean, we just saw yesterday on the 11th anniversary of September 11 that there is turmoil in this world and especially in the 

Middle East. You know, not only what happened in Libya and 

Egypt yesterday but also you look at what is happening in Iran, 

you know, while some people here might want to eliminate our nuclear force and our capabilities to defend this country, Iran is currently developing and may have nuclear capabilities at this time, 

and there is a bipartisan group in Congress that recognized that 

threat, and while President Obama might not have time to meet 

with Benjamin Netanyahu to talk about the threat to Israel, one 

of our greatest allies in the world, there is a bipartisan group in 

Congress who do recognize that treat and support the efforts, not 

only of Israel to defend themselves, but of this country and the actions that we ought to be taking that we are not to address the 

threat of Iran, as well as the nuclear threats all around the world 

and the fact that we can’t do it by disarming ourselves. I mean, 

America is the beacon of the world in large part because of our 

strength, and peace through strength has worked over time. It is 

what ended the Cold War, and yet there are some people that want 

to think that now that the Cold War is over, they just want to ignore history. 

And so, you know, I think that history repeated itself yesterday, 

and those who ignore it are doomed to have it repeat itself, and we 

87 

can’t let that happen, and that is why the Department of Energy 

has a responsibility to protect the arsenal that we have, and you 

know, I think what our hearing is really focusing on is what kind 

of job is being done. You know, I looked at the Inspector General 

report, and I have some questions about that. 

First, I want to just open it up to the whole panel. In February 

the National Research Council issued a report which concluded in 

part, I quote, ‘‘The study committee recommends that the NNSA, 

Congress, and top management of the laboratories recognize that 

safety and security systems at the laboratories have been strengthened to the point where they no longer need special attention.’’ 

This was written in February. 

I want to ask if any of you all want to comment on that, and first 

of all, do you agree with it? I strongly disagree with that conclusion 

by the National Research Council, and I think what happened with 

this breach just 2 months ago shows that, in fact, they haven’t been 

strengthened, but this conclusion says they are strengthened. Mr. 

Poneman, do you want to comment? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, very important points and just 

briefly on your first point, that is exactly why President Obama has 

made clear that in our nuclear posture review that non-proliferation is the top objective, and we have been to every effort to stop 

Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. 

Mr. SCALISE. I would disagree. I would think if you look at the 

actions that this administration has taken, it has been inadequate 

to stop Iran from developing the capabilities that everybody that 

honestly looks at it, especially Israel, which is faced with the evisceration, says that they are carrying forward with. So, I mean, to 

say that this administration has taken actions to stop Iran from 

advancing their nuclear capability is just wrong. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Sir, with all due respect, we have negotiated to 

curtail and to pull out highly enriched uranium, natural uranium 

that had been enriched in a facility. We are sparing no effort to 

stop that, but I want to go back to your NRC question about the 

report. 

We strongly, strongly believe that continued and, in fact, enhanced vigilance in oversight is required. The job of—— 

Mr. SCALISE. Well, did you agree with that conclusion that security has been strengthened to the point where it no longer needs 

special attention? Do you agree with that conclusion or do you not? 

Mr. PONEMAN. No. Security always, always needs to be—— 

Mr. SCALISE. OK. So you disagree. 

Mr. PONEMAN. It will never be done. 

Mr. SCALISE. Mr. Friedman, you did the Inspector General, you 

are part of the Inspector General report. What is your response to 

the conclusion that they had just in February? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I disagree with that aspect of the conclusion 

based on our work. We treat these matters as—on our management 

challenge list as components of the management challenge list. 

While there have been some improvements and some setbacks in 

certain areas, we don’t think their position is—— 

Mr. SCALISE. Thank you, and I hope that the Department looks 

closely at your report and some of the reports of those who were 

on the ground, those people that were tasked with maintaining seVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:44 Nov 04, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\PROGRA~1\WS_FTP\85180.TXT WAYNE
88 

curity at this facility. I mean, it looked like a Keystone Cop operation where the officer there wasn’t even paying attention to what 

was going on, wasn’t even really securing the facility after the people who broke in came and in essence surrendered to them. They 

just kind of looked around, and it took a second supervisor to come 

before they finally took some action. 

But I think it shows—and it wasn’t, he wasn’t the only one. I 

mean, there was reports that people on the—at the facility for 

months didn’t know even how many cameras weren’t even working. 

They had no idea what was working, what wasn’t working, and 

some of this had been problematic for months. And so I think there 

was a culture there, and I don’t know if that permeated at the 

other facilities, too, because this wasn’t—Y–12 wasn’t the only facility. So I don’t know if this is a culture of neglect and lax security, but clearly there is a difference because as I pointed out, you 

know, you look at what National Research Council said. They said 

the security is fine, and it is not. 

And so I hope that there will be real accountability and not just 

people reassigned, but people ought to be removed, and a new culture needs to be installed. 

And with that I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. STEARNS. Thank the gentleman. I believe we have had a very 

good attendance by the subcommittee. I want to thank the witnesses for their patience and participation. 

I ask unanimous consent that the contents of the document binder be introduced into the record and to authorize staff to make any 

appropriate redactions. 

Without objection, so ordered. The documents will be entered into 

the record with any redactions that staff determines are appropriate, and I remind all members that at 12:30 we are going to 

have a meeting and a briefing, and all members on the subcommittee are invited. It is over in the visitor’s center, and you can 

talk to staff if you want the actual room number. 

And, again, we want to thank our witnesses, and the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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