PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TAMMY STEELMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 06-1007

MICHELLE HIRSCH, d/b/a Hair of the

Dog,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.

Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.

(CA-04-204-1)

Argued: October 27, 2006

Decided: January 10, 2007

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Duncan joined. Judge Gregory wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Linda Vespereny, LAW OFFICES OF GLEN C.

SHULTS, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Earl Thomison

Holman, ADAMS, HENDON, CARSON, CROW & SAENGER,

P.A., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Glen

Coile Shults, Jr., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. 
OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: 

The parties in this case were romantic partners who exchanged

vows, lived together, and worked side by side in a dog-grooming

business known as "Hair of the Dog" in Asheville, North Carolina.

The defendant, Michelle Hirsch, and the plaintiff, Tammy Steelman,

supported themselves from the business’ proceeds. They anticipated

spending their lives together, but when the romantic relationship

ended, the professional relationship collapsed as well. In this lawsuit,

Steelman seeks an ownership share in Hair of the Dog and compensation for work that she alleges was performed in reliance on Hirsch’s

promises of additional compensation, in addition to or in lieu of damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on

the sole federal cause of action — the FLSA claim — and dismissed

the state law claims without prejudice after it declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction. We affirm, because the FLSA covers only

"employees" and cannot be stretched to reach the particular arrangement at issue here. Although the plaintiff may well have a basis for

recovery in state law, the FLSA cannot be transformed into a blunt

instrument to resolve all manner of financial disputes.

I.

Plaintiff Tammy Steelman and defendant Michelle Hirsch met and

became romantically involved in the fall of 1999. The relationship

quickly became a serious one and Steelman moved in with Hirsch in

December of that year. The couple initially agreed to split rent, utilities, and food costs. The next month, however, the couple revised

their arrangement when Steelman left her job at a local residential

cleaning company to work at Hair of the Dog, a dog-grooming business that Hirsch had founded as a sole proprietorship in June of 1999.

Steelman saw the job as a way to build on a committed domestic

partnership. "We discussed the fact that we planned on being

2 STEELMAN v. HIRSCH
together," Steelman said in her deposition. "My working for her was

us working for our future." Steelman also believed she would be better off financially, because her new position "wasn’t a job. It was

[Hirsch] and I committed to a business, and we did everything we

could to make it succeed." She added, "There was never any question

that we weren’t going to be together forever and that we weren’t

going to work side by side in that business." At the time Steelman

started work, she and Hirsch were the only people working at Hair of

the Dog. 

Steelman worked full-time at Hair of the Dog for the next four

years, performing tasks such as bathing and grooming dogs and ordering, receiving, and selling merchandise. After Hirsch instructed her in

dog-grooming technique, Steelman said, "[a]nything she did, I did,

and anything I did, she did. We worked side-by-side." Steelman said

that when the company hired additional workers, she acted as supervisor and had the authority to hire and fire. 

The couple did not sign a compensation agreement, but according

to Steelman, they had conversations in which Hirsch communicated

that "[w]hat was mine was hers and what was hers was mine." They

also agreed that instead of splitting the cost of their lives together as

initially planned, they would pay their expenses from Hair of the

Dog’s revenue. The couple took the company’s successes and failures

into account when they made spending decisions, but throughout their

relationship, they used business proceeds to pay their rent and their

bills for electricity, water, cable service, and Internet access. The

funds also covered Steelman’s cell phone, auto insurance, and doctor’s visits, as well as the cost of food, gas, and cigarettes. In addition,

the couple took trips to places including Charleston, Las Vegas, New

Orleans, Phoenix, California, Florida, and Georgia using company

funds. When Steelman needed a car in 2002, she purchased a Jeep

from Hirsch’s father for $1. 

Steelman said she was uncomfortable with the amount of the company’s proceeds spent to maintain the couple’s lifestyle. She said

Hirsch "spent all the money on extravagant gifts," and that the couple

was "continuously eating out." As she put it in her deposition, "We

were blowing every penny we made as fast as we could make it. Had

STEELMAN v. HIRSCH 3
to have the best of everything. I didn’t believe in that. I believed we

should be saving money and saving for our future." 

Both Steelman and Hirsch were issued American Express cards

whose bills were paid from Hair of the Dog proceeds, and both used

the cards for personal expenses like gas and cigarettes. The couple

also had a joint checking account and ATM cards. Before making

large expenditures, however, Steelman would generally have to ask

Hirsch to transfer money from Hair of the Dog to the couple’s personal account, because the personal account usually contained little

cash and Steelman herself could not make withdrawals from the business account. Steelman kept a separate savings account of her own,

to which she would make occasional deposits, but not withdrawals for

day-to-day expenses. She received health insurance through Hair of

the Dog for most of her time at the company, and received sporadic

paychecks to substantiate the company’s claim that she was on its

payroll for insurance eligibility purposes. 

Hirsch said in an affidavit that during the couple’s relationship, the

parties spent "substantially more" than the business earned. Hirsch

borrowed from her parents to pay costs such as start-up expenses and

taxes, and after this lawsuit was filed Hirsch said in an affidavit that

she owed more than $100,000 to her parents for these debts, most of

which she said were incurred while Steelman worked at the company.

The parties bitterly dispute whether their private agreements

included guarantees of further compensation for Steelman. Steelman

alleges that on several occasions, beginning in early 2000, the couple

agreed that she would have a 26 percent stake in Hair of the Dog.

Hirsch said that she discussed making Steelman a partner in the business, but had serious reservations and never promised her a stake. In

denying that she treated Steelman as a partner in the business, Hirsch

said that she considered Steelman an employee and operated the business as a sole proprietorship. 

Steelman said that Hirsch promised other compensation as well.

She said Hirsch agreed to give her money to deposit in a savings

account, promised that if she left the business she would be taken care

of financially, and offered severance payments, either in lieu of or in

addition to the ownership stake. She said that when Hair of the Dog

4 STEELMAN v. HIRSCH
stopped issuing sporadic salary checks, Hirsch told her the business

would institute "profit sharing." Finally, Steelman said the couple discussed paying her commissions, but that while she received one or

two such checks, they did not become commonplace. Steelman said

that she tried to get promises of an ownership stake and of severance

payments reduced to writing between 2000 and 2003, but that these

efforts were unsuccessful. 

Although Steelman said that the parties at one point exchanged

vows and considered themselves married, they drifted apart. They

went into couples counseling, and considered living together but not

working together and working together but not living together. During

her last six months at the business, Steelman said that Hirsch began

to accuse her of taking more from the business than she was giving.

Their conflict came to a head in January of 2004. Hirsch asked

Steelman to return her American Express card. Steelman said she did

not know what prompted the action, but acknowledged that Hirsch’s

mother had been saying month after month that the couple was spending too much money. Steelman quit and moved out of the home the

couple shared. She and Hirsch agreed to continue couples counseling,

Steelman said, because "we still loved each other and were wanting

to try to work things out" and "being together 24/7 was the problem."

Steelman said she asked for severance that month, but that Hirsch

told her she was not entitled to severance because she quit without

notice. The couple nevertheless remained friendly until late February

or early March, when Hirsch became romantically involved with

someone else. Steelman said she was "devastated," and felt unwelcome for the first time in the home that the couple had shared. She

started a competing dog-grooming business, and filed this lawsuit. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on

the FLSA claims. The court wrote that the plaintiff could only recover

under the FLSA if she had been an employee. It held that the plaintiff’s testimony undercut any claim under the FLSA, because the

plaintiff claimed to be a partner in Hair of the Dog and partnership

would be inconsistent with employee status. The court declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, which

were all based in state law. It therefore dismissed without prejudice

STEELMAN v. HIRSCH 5
the claim under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, as well as

the claims for fraud and breach of contract or, in the alternative,

recovery quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. Plaintiff Steelman

now appeals.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, taking the

facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and drawing all permissible inferences in the light most favorable to her. See, e.g., Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., 370 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 2004); A

Fisherman’s Best, Inc. v. Recreational Fishing Alliance, 310 F.3d

183, 190 (4th Cir. 2002).

II.

We must determine here whether federal law prohibited the longterm couple in this case from arranging their finances as they did, and

permits the plaintiff to avoid or supplement the personal and professional bargain she made with the defendant on the grounds that the

FLSA required a different arrangement. The FLSA imposes minimum

wage, overtime, and record-keeping requirements, but the requirements apply only to "employees." See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2000)

(minimum wage); id. § 207 (overtime); id. § 211(c) (record-keeping);

see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S.

290, 295 (1985). 

The plaintiff claimed a partnership stake in Hair of the Dog and

does not dispute that such an interest would preclude her being an

"employee" under the FLSA, but she notes that her FLSA count was

one of several claims made in the alternative. While some evidence

in the record supported her claim to an ownership stake, a court might

nevertheless find that she was not a part-owner. If a court so found,

the plaintiff argues, she should be permitted to recover back wages as

an employee under the FLSA. 

We agree that a party may make claims of ownership and

employee status in the alternative. But federal law does not divide the

world exclusively into owners and employees, and we reject the

plaintiff’s contentions because the relationship that she describes does

not make her an employee regardless of her ownership status under

state law.

6 STEELMAN v. HIRSCH
A.

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that she is an employee

under the FLSA. Benshoff v. City of Virginia Beach, 180 F.3d 136,

140 (4th Cir. 1999). The Act itself provides little guidance on the

term’s meaning. It defines an employee as "any individual employed

by an employer," 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2000), subject to enumerated

exceptions, but this is "completely circular and explains nothing,"

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (discussing same language in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6)). The FLSA does not

add much when it defines "employ" to include "to suffer or permit to

work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2000). Consequently, "there is in the Fair

Labor Standards Act no definition that solves problems as to the limits of the employer-employee relationship under the Act." Rutherford

Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947).

The case law provides more direction. The Supreme Court has said

that the term "employee" is to be broadly construed, but "it does have

its limits," Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S at 295, and those

limits must be defined in accordance with "economic reality," id. at

301 (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28,

33 (1961) (internal quotations omitted)). The cases make clear that

the "economic reality" standard calls for pragmatic construction of a

concept — employment — that may have seemed at once too commonplace and too nuanced to define. Thus, courts have been exhorted

to examine "the circumstances of the whole activity," rather than "isolated factors," Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, or "technical concepts,"

Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33 (internal quotations omitted), and they have

noted that in the absence of a statutory definition, it is permissible to

draw upon "common linguistic intuitions," Vanskike v. Peters, 974

F.2d 806, 807 (7th Cir. 1992). In short, "[W]e cannot assume that

Congress here was referring to work or employment other than as

those words are commonly used" when it enacted the language of the

FLSA. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321

U.S. 590, 598 (1944).

Prior decisions make use of this contextual, common-sense

approach. The Supreme Court has applied the FLSA without regard

to deviations from traditional employment paradigms that are largely

technical. See, e.g., Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32-33 (holding "formal difSTEELMAN v. HIRSCH 7
ferences" between cooperative members and traditional employees to

be irrelevant); Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301 (holding

workers who received in-kind benefits to be employees in part

because benefits were "wages in another form"); United States v.

Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361-64 (1945) (holding workers to be

covered even if their employer chose to pay them by piece-rate rather

than hourly wage). 

However, when relationships have deviated from the traditional

understanding of employment in fundamental ways, the Supreme

Court has refused to shoehorn them into the Act. For example, the

Court has written that the FLSA would not apply to volunteers who

"without promise or expectation of compensation, but solely for

[their] personal purpose or pleasure, worked in activities carried on

by other persons either for their pleasure or profit." Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947). And it has written that

the FLSA does not cover independent contractors who "without any

express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their

own advantage on the premises of another."1Id. We have joined other

circuits in using this approach to conclude that prisoners in an inmate

labor program should not be treated as employees under the FLSA,

because their work "differs substantially from the traditional employment paradigm covered by the Act" and is not the "arms’ length" bar1The plaintiff makes reference to the independent-contractor cases

when she states the test for employee status is the degree to which the

worker depends upon a defendant — a primary consideration in the

independent-contractor context. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835

F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff is undisputedly not an

independent contractor, however, and tests designed to ferret out such

relationships have little relevance. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257,

272 (10th Cir. 1987) (describing independent-contractor test as "useless

for drawing lines between people who are part of the same enterprise"

and declining to apply its factors to determine whether partners were

"employees" under FLSA); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 986 (1st

Cir. 1997) ("We do not, however, hitch our wagon to cases deciding

whether a particular individual is an employee as opposed to an independent contractor. That distinction is between those who are part of an

employer’s business and those who are running their own businesses,

and the factors central to that inquiry are inapposite here."). 

8 STEELMAN v. HIRSCH
gain for labor "that occurs in a true employer-employee relationship."

Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993). 

The plaintiff does not quarrel with the Tenth Circuit’s application

of these principles to hold that general partners in a business are not

covered by the FLSA. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 277

(10th Cir. 1987). The Tenth Circuit wrote that "[t]he word

‘employee,’ however broadly defined, is still ‘employee,’ and circumscribed by meanings reasonably related to that word." Id. at 276. It

concluded, pertinently for this case, that attributes of partnership such

as exposure to risk, managerial control, and the ability to share in

profits, id. at 274, "introduce complexities and economic realities

which are not consonant with employee status," id. at 275; see also

Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444,

449-51 (2003) (declining to hold that shareholders and directors of

professional corporation must be employees under Americans with

Disabilities Act definition of "individual employed by an employer").

B.

Taking the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to her,

the plaintiff cannot be adjudged an "employee" for purposes of the

FLSA under these precedents, or under any analysis based in "economic reality." The intended lifetime partnership she described was

not "the bargained-for exchange of labor for mutual economic gain

that occurs in a true employer-employee relationship." Harker, 990

F.2d at 133 (internal quotations omitted). According to the plaintiff,

the couple saw their work together as a way to improve an economic

future that they intended to share in perpetuity, rather than as a transfer of one individual’s assets to another in exchange for labor. The

plaintiff did not obtain a bargained-for portion of her supposed

employer’s assets — she took from those assets for her own purposes

with a discretion that is fundamentally alien to employer-employee

relationships. 

To be sure, the plaintiff would consult with the defendant prior to

significant expenditures, and she did not withdraw funds directly from

the company’s coffers. But her financial control was substantial even

if it was indirect: She funded her day-to-day expenditures using an

American Express card whose bills were paid by the business and by

STEELMAN v. HIRSCH 9
withdrawals from a joint checking account containing funds transferred from Hair of the Dog. Far from alleging that she had the benefit

of only a meager share of company resources as a result of her indirect control, the plaintiff said she would have preferred that the couple

spent less of the business’ money, took fewer trips, and ate out at restaurants less regularly. 

Such extensive access to company funds is not the kind of privilege

that employees enjoy with respect to their employers’ revenue.

Indeed, the plaintiff’s ability to draw compensation from the company

exceeded the financial control typical in the partnerships that the

plaintiff does not dispute fall outside the FLSA. When the plaintiff

lived comfortably and exclusively off the proceeds of the business

and exerted authority in disposing of its funds, we find it hard to see

the bargain exchanging labor for compensation that marks employment arrangements. 

The relationship between Hirsch and Steelman was significantly

entrepreneurial. Plaintiff and defendant shared the risks and rewards

of their joint venture in a fashion more characteristic of a partnership

than an employer-employee relationship. They adjusted their expenditures to the company’s successes and setbacks. Each would on occasion call the defendant’s mother, who handled the company’s

accounting, to ask whether the couple could afford a desired purchase,

given the company’s performance. "I remember one time us asking

[about] something and she said, You just can’t afford it," the plaintiff

said. "And I recall one time asking to go on a vacation and she said,

You all can afford that." We do not hold that compensation linked to

company performance is inherently incompatible with an employee

relationship, but we agree with the Tenth Circuit that "real opportunity to share in the profits of the business" is a consideration that

weighs against such status. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 275. 

The rest of the plaintiff’s account is consistent with this conclusion.

The plaintiff testified that she performed the same duties as the defendant, from dog grooming to customer relations, and that she had

supervisory authority, including hiring and firing, over other employees as the business grew and took on new personnel. In addition,

while we do not determine the effect under North Carolina law of the

defendant’s alleged promises to the plaintiff of a 26 percent owner10 STEELMAN v. HIRSCH
ship stake in the business, the promises do not themselves bespeak a

traditional employment relationship, to say the least. 

In sum, the parties’ financial and work arrangements cannot be categorized as mere "formal differences" from a classic framework of

employment, Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32, but instead render the parties’

relationship as distinct from an employer-employee relationship as the

independent contractor, volunteer, and trainee relationships that are

already regarded as outside the FLSA. See Walling, 330 U.S. at 152-

53. We find the parties’ business venture falls outside the FLSA

because it "differs substantially from the traditional employment paradigm" and goes beyond the "bargained-for exchange of labor for

mutual economic gain that occurs in a true employer-employee relationship." Harker, 990 F.2d at 133 (internal quotations omitted).

C.

The Supreme Court has written that the term "employee" should be

defined in light of the purposes of the FLSA, and an analysis of the

Act’s purposes bolsters our conclusion. The FLSA’s scope must be

determined by "recognizing that we are dealing with human beings

and with a statute that is intended to secure to them the fruits of their

toil and exertion." Muscoda, 321 U.S. at 592. In Rutherford, 331 U.S.

at 723-24, the Court instructed us to treat as "persuasive" under the

FLSA its related precedent in United States v. Silk, which defined

"employee" status "in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the

end to be attained" with "the primary consideration [being] whether

effectuation of the declared policy and purposes of the Act comprehend securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protection

afforded by the Act," 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947) (quoting National

Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124,

131-32 (1944) (internal quotations omitted)). 

As a result, the FLSA applies to workers regardless of their protestations that they are not employees because "the purposes of the Act

require that it be applied even to those who would decline its protections." Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 302. Otherwise,

"employers might be able to use superior bargaining power to coerce

employees to make such assertions, or to waive their protections

under the Act." Id. In contrast, the FLSA does not apply to prospecSTEELMAN v. HIRSCH 11
tive railroad workers during on-the-job training, because coverage

would not be necessary to prevent evasion of the Act when the workers in question benefitted from their training and the employer

received no immediate advantage. Walling, 330 U.S. at 151-53. 

Interpreting the FLSA in light of its purposes leads us to a similar

conclusion with respect to the parties’ relationship. We need not look

hard to find Congress’ purpose, as the Act’s enacted findings state

that it seeks to remedy "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)

(2000). It does so directly by imposing minimum wage and overtime

requirements on employers, as well as indirectly, by protecting businesses from the "unfair method of competition" that arises when competing enterprises save costs by providing substandard working

conditions. Id. Harker demonstrates how these objectives can illuminate the scope of the Act in specific cases. We held that a prison labor

program was not subject to the FLSA in part because coverage would

not serve the Act’s purposes: the Department of Corrections provided

for inmates’ material needs already and another law prevented prison

goods from being used in a manner that would threaten fair competition. Harker, 990 F.2d at 133-34. 

Similarly, the FLSA’s objectives would not be advanced by federal

interposition in the relationship in this case. Retroactively substituting

the uniform federal standard tailored to the traditional workplace for

the fluid and informal financial arrangement of the couple here would

bear no relation to the purposes of the Act. Such an extension would

not advance living conditions, given that the parties drew freely from

the company’s resources and lived well off them, but simply failed to

conform their dealings to the FLSA framework. Nor would such an

extension prevent the unfair competition that arises when businesses

cut their costs by paying exploitatively low wages, as the degree of

financial control the plaintiff possessed precluded such exploitation.

To the extent that the parties’ sharing of risk and reward created

incentives for hard work and good management, this advantage

amounts to fair competition, akin to the partnerships and other profitsharing arrangements that the Act evinces no intent to outlaw.

12 STEELMAN v. HIRSCH
III.

Our holding is limited, as befits an examination of an unorthodox

financial relationship in an area not governed by bright-line rules. We

certainly do not say that one member of a romantic couple can never

be an employee of another.2 But when long-term partners perform

many of the same duties in a small business and live off its proceeds,

with each free to incur substantial personal expenses paid by the business, we do not confront the employer-employee relationship that the

FLSA contemplates.

This does not leave the plaintiff without recourse. She may well

have an ownership interest in Hair of the Dog, an action for fraud or

breach of contract, or a basis for recovery under a theory of quantum

meruit or unjust enrichment, and we note that the plaintiff has brought

all these claims. State law has provided mechanisms for dealing with

the dissolution of domestic and business relationships for centuries,

and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act may supplement those

remedies. But broad as the FLSA’s coverage is, the statute was not

meant to be an omnibus financial relations act, imposing a one-sizefits-all federal solution upon all sorts of human relationships and

available as a weapon upon the dissolution of all domestic partnerships and other intimate arrangements involving shared funds and

shared labor. "Such an extension on our part would be no small excursion into the arena of public policy," Harker, 990 F.2d at 136, and

because we see no evidence that Congress intended the FLSA to so

restructure all manner of personal and financial dealings, we decline

the plaintiff’s invitation to push the Act to this new frontier. The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

2We therefore agree with our friend in concurrence that the inquiry

here is not into "interference with or interpretation of the parties’ domestic relationship." We simply hold that in light of all the circumstances,

the parties’ professional and financial arrangements cannot be described

as the employer-employee relationship contemplated by the FLSA. 

STEELMAN v. HIRSCH 13
GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I agree that this Court should affirm the judgment below because

Tammy Steelman has not proven that she is an employee for purposes

of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). I am not however of the

view that the inquiry here concerns interference with or interpretation

of the parties’ domestic relationship.

Simply stated, Steelman’s FLSA claim fails because there is no

evidence that she "work[ed] in contemplation of compensation"—

whether in the form of wages or benefits—for her labor. Tony &

Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 306 (1985).

Rather, as the facts recounted by the majority show, Steelman worked

to build a business with Michelle Hirsch, without regard to any precise compensation for the precise hours she labored at Hair of the

Dog. She worked for her and Hirsch’s shared advantage—"for their

future," as Steelman testified. Cf. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,

330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) (denying that such scenario constitutes

employment). Moreover, she described a financial arrangement that

became the best evidence that she and Hirsch had not made the

"arms’ length," "bargained-for exchange of labor for mutual economic gain" that typically occurs in employment relationships.

Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993)

(emphasis added). For this reason, I concur in the judgment.

14 STEELMAN v. HIRSCH