IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAY ARGENTINA, :

:

Petitioner :

: CIVIL NO. 4:09-CV-0382

:

v. : Hon. John E. Jones III

 :

:

WARDEN T.R. SNIEZEK, : 

:

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

 June 28, 2010

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS MEMORANDUM IS AS FOLLOWS:

Petitioner Ray Argentina (“Petitioner” or “Argentina”), an inmate presently

confined at the Federal Correctional Institution- Schuylkill (“FCI Schuylkill”) in

Minersville, Pennsylvania, initiated the above action pro se by filing a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc.

1.) 

On April 2, 2003, Argentina was sentenced in the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of New York to a term of imprisonment of 324

months. (Doc. 7-2 at 2-3, Pittello Decl., ¶ 4.) Argentina was sentenced after being

found guilty of one count of Racketeering Conspiracy; one count of Conspiracy to

Commit Mail Fraud, Wire Fraud, Bank Fraud, and Fraud Against HUD; one count of

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Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Narcotics; and one

count of Distribution and Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine. (Id.) The

sentencing court also imposed a $400.00 assessment against Argentina, and restitution

in the amount of $586,000, both due in full immediately. (Id.; Doc. 7-2 at 9-15,

4/9/03 Judgment.) 

In the instant Petition, Argentina alleges that the collection of payments from

him by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) through its Inmate Financial Responsibility

Plan (“IFRP”) violates the schedule ordered by the sentencing judge for his payment

of restitution. (See id. at 5-6.) He also disputes that the program is voluntary, and

asserts that it amounts to “extortion of one’s family” and that the BOP forces inmates

to participate by imposing harsh sanctions when they refuse to sign a contract. (See

id. at 8, 10-12.) He asks this Court to direct the BOP not to collect more than ten (10)

percent of his gross in-prison income, not to exceed $15.60 per annum; refund to him

all previously collected funds that exceed this amount; and adjust his IFRP contract

accordingly for the remainder of his 324 month term of imprisonment. (See id. at 13.) 

He also requests that sanctions be imposed against the BOP officials who

administered his IFRP contract. (See id.)

In a Response to the Petition, filed on April 21, 2009, Respondent asserted that

the Petition should be denied because the BOP has properly utilized the IFRP to

collect payments from Argentina in accordance with the intent of the sentencing court

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and because it is within the BOP’s discretion to impose consequences when an inmate

chooses not to participate in the IFRP. (See Doc. 7, Response, at 7-12.) In the

alternative, Respondent submitted that the Petition should be dismissed because

Argentina’s claims do not concern the fact or duration of his confinement in prison,

and therefore are not cognizable in a habeas petition. (See id. at 12-13.) 

In a Memorandum and Order dated May 21, 2010, we determined that

Argentina’s challenge to the BOP’s authority to set the terms of his court ordered

restitution payments is properly pursued under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

(See Doc. 9.) We acknowledged the holding in United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210

(3d Cir. 2007), that “ordering restitution is a judicial function that cannot be

delegated, in whole or in part” and that therefore, a sentencing court “impermissibly

delegate[s] its duty under the MVRA to schedule restitution payments to the Bureau

of Prisons” when it understands from the information before it at the time of

sentencing that the defendant cannot make immediate payment in full and fails to set a

different schedule of payments. (See id. at 5-6 (citing 500 F.3d at 225, 227-28.).) 

It was unclear from the record before us whether or not the sentencing court 

had information about Argentina’s finances at the time that indicated that he had the

means to make an immediate payment. Consequently, we directed Respondent to file

a supplemental brief along with materials relating to the sentencing court’s

consideration of Argentina’s finances at the time it directed him to make an

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immediate payment of restitution in the amount of $586,000. (See id. at 8-9.) 

Pursuant to our Order, on June 4, 2010, Respondent filed a supplemental brief

(Doc. 10). Respondent asserts that the instant action should be transferred to the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for the

convenience of the parties. (See id. at 4-8.) Although Argentina was given the

opportunity to file a reply to Respondent’s supplemental brief pursuant to our May 21,

2010 Order, he did not do so. For the reasons that follow, this action will be

transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

DISCUSSION

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) states as follows:

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of

justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other

district of division where it might have been brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court may apply “traditional venue considerations”,

including convenience to the parties, where material events took place, and where

records and witnesses pertinent to a petitioner’s claim may be found, to habeas cases. 

Braden v. 30 Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 493-94 (1973). As observed by th

Respondent, where another Member of this Court had a similar challenge presented

through a section 2241 petition, it was determined that “judicial efficiency and

economy would best be served by transferring the case.” Gardner v. Williamson,

Civil No. 3:07-CV-1788, Doc. 26, 2008 WL 1752229, at *4 (M.D. Pa. April 14, 2008)

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(Munley, J.) (citing Verissimo v. INS, 204 F. Supp. 2d 818, 820 (D.N.J. 2002) (finding

that “a habeas petition may be transferred tot he district court of the state I which the

petitioner was sentenced and convicted, even if the petitioner was transferred to

prison in a different state.”); Wilkins v. Erickson, 484 F.2d 969, 973 (8 Cir. 1973)

th

(allowing transfer of habeas corpus case from the District of South Dakota to the

District of Montana because “Montana, the state of conviction and sentencing, is the

most convenient forum because of the availability of witnesses and records.”).). 

We adopt the same reasoning in the instant case. The resolution of the instant 

Petition turns on the terms pursuant to which the sentencing court established a

restitution schedule. Argentina was sentenced in the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York. That Court has access to the evidence that led to

its sentencing and restitution determination, including evidence regarding Argentina’s

financial resources at the time of sentencing. Further, as pointed out by Respondent,

the probation department that likely prepared a pre-sentence report, the prosecuting

office and files, and any witnesses, all are located in the jurisdiction of the sentencing

court. (See Doc. 10 at 7.) Therefore, the interests of judicial efficiency and economy

would best be served by transferring this case to the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York. An appropriate Order will enter.

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