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Exhibit 10.24    
  


BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION

KEY EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE PLAN  


I.    2002 Payout Criteria  


PAYOUT AS A PERCENT OF SALARY  



	Financial Improvement
 
	 	CEO
	 	SVP—65%
	 	SVP—55%
	 	VP—50%
	 	VP—45%

	$	(200,000,000)	 	0.00%	 	0.00%	 	0.00%	 	0.00%	 	0.00%
	$	(150,000,000)	 	25.00%	 	16.25%	 	13.75%	 	12.50%	 	11.25%
	$	 150,000,000	 	158.33%	 	102.91%	 	87.08%	 	79.17%	 	71.25%
	$	 461,000,000	 	210.17%	 	136.61%	 	115.59%	 	105.09%	 	94.58%
	$	 461,000,001	 	227.00%	 	147.55%	 	124.85%	 	113.50%	 	102.15%
	$	 561,000,000	 	243.50%	 	158.28%	 	133.93%	 	121.75%	 	109.58%





	•
	For
Financial Improvement in excess of $561 million, the payout increases proportionally to the increase from $461 million to $561 million. 
	•
	The
payout is interpolated on a straight line for Financial Improvement not shown in the table. 
	•
	Financial
Improvement is measured by calculating the company's economic value added. 







	Economic Value Added	 	=	 	Net Operating Profit Before Tax – Capital Charge
	

Net Operating Profit

Before Tax (NOPBT)*	
 	

=	
 	

Income from operating assets

+  Imputed interest of capitalized lease obligations

+  Increase (decrease) in LIFO reserve

–  Amortization of restructuring losses




	*
	Unusual
nonrecurring and nonoperating income or expense items do not affect NOPBT 






	Capital Charge	 	=	 	Capital × 16%
	

Capital**	
 	

=	
 	

Operating Capital

+  Imputed capital value of lease obligations

+  Total LIFO reserve account

–  Gain from the sale of assets

+  Unamortized restructuring losses




	**
	Nonrecurring
and nonoperating losses do not affect Operating Capital. There may be adjustments to Operating Capital for strategic investments while they are under construction and up
to two additional years subject to approval by the Executive Compensation Committee of the Board. 


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II.    Alternative Payout  


An
Alternative Payout shall be calculated as follows: the actual percentage payouts earned for the 2002 plan year under the company's Paper Division Incentive Plan, Packaging Division Incentive Plan,
Timber and Wood Products Division Incentive Plan, BMDD Incentive Plan, BCOP Incentive Plan, and Trucking Division Incentive Plan shall be averaged (weighted according to the total capital of each
respective division). This average payout shall then be multiplied by the ratio each officer's target payout bears to the target payout of key executives in such plans (e.g., VP ratio = 45 or
50/24; SVP ratio = 55 or 65/24; CEO ratio = 100/24) to arrive at the Alternative Payout percentage. The Alternative Payout may be reduced by
the Executive Compensation Committee, in its sole discretion, to any percentage amount (including zero). 


Payout
under the Plan will be the greater of (1) payout determined under criteria based on economic value added or (2) the Alternative Payout. 


2





 
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION

KEY EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE PLAN  


I.    2003 Payout Criteria  


PAYOUT AS A PERCENT OF SALARY  



	Financial Improvement
 
	 	CEO
	 	SVP—65%
	 	SVP—55%
	 	VP—50%
	 	VP—45%

	$	  59,000,000	 	0.00%	 	0.00%	 	0.00%	 	0.00%	 	0.00%
	$	  94,000,000	 	50.00%	 	32.50%	 	27.51%	 	25.00%	 	22.50%
	$	129,000,000	 	100.00%	 	65.00%	 	55.00%	 	50.00%	 	45.00%
	$	429,000,000	 	280.00%	 	182.00%	 	154.00%	 	140.00%	 	126.00%
	$	429,000,001	 	297.00%	 	193.05%	 	163.35%	 	148.50%	 	133.65%
	$	529,000,000	 	346.00%	 	224.90%	 	190.30%	 	173.00%	 	155.70%





	•
	For
Financial Improvement in excess of $529 million, the payout increases proportionally to the increase from $429 million to $529 million. 
	•
	The
payout is interpolated on a straight line for Financial Improvement not shown in the table. 
	•
	Financial
Improvement is measured by calculating the company's economic value added. 







	Economic Value Added	 	=	 	Net Operating Profit Before Tax – Capital Charge
	

Net Operating Profit

Before Tax (NOPBT)*	
 	

=	
 	

Income from operating assets

+  Imputed interest of capitalized lease obligations

+  Increase (decrease) in LIFO reserve

–  Amortization of restructuring losses




	*
	Unusual
nonrecurring and nonoperating income or expense items do not affect NOPBT 






	Capital Charge	 	=	 	Capital × 14.5%
	

Capital**	
 	

=	
 	

Operating Capital

+  Imputed capital value of lease obligations

+  Total LIFO reserve account

–  Gain from the sale of assets

+  Unamortized restructuring losses




	**
	Nonrecurring
and nonoperating losses do not affect Operating Capital. There may be adjustments to Operating Capital for strategic investments while they are under construction and up
to two additional years subject to approval by the Executive Compensation Committee of the Board. 


3





 

II.    Alternative Payout  


An
Alternative Payout shall be calculated as follows: the actual percentage payouts earned for the 2003 plan year under the company's Paper Solutions Division Incentive Plan, Building Solutions
Manufacturing Division Incentive Plan, Building Solutions Distribution Division Incentive Plan, Office Solutions Incentive Plan, and Trucking Division Incentive Plan shall be averaged (weighted
according to the total capital of each respective division). This average payout shall then be multiplied by the ratio each officer's target payout bears to the target payout of key executives in such
plans (e.g., VP ratio = 45 or 50/24; SVP ratio = 55 or 65/24; CEO ratio = 100/24) to arrive at the Alternative Payout percentage. The
Alternative Payout may be reduced by the Executive Compensation Committee, in its sole discretion, to any percentage amount (including zero). 


Payout
under the Plan will be the greater of (1) payout determined under criteria based on economic value added or (2) the Alternative Payout. 


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Exhibit 10.24