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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

“The ongoing security 

transition (2011-2014) will be 

accompanied by greater 

risks to Afghanistan’s polity, 

security and economy from 

drugs—including through 

likely further increases in 

opium production. As aid 

flows diminish, power-holders 

will look to other sources 

of finance to maintain their 

patronage and political power. 

Many factions and groups 

(even within the Taliban, which 

is not monolithic) have a 

vested interest in maintaining 

the insecurity that allows the 

drugs trade to flourish.”

May 18, 2012

Drugs in Afghanistan—A Forgotten 

Issue? 

Implications and Risks for Transition

Summary

•	 Opium will continue to be an important part of the Afghan landscape—with political and

security as well as economic ramifications.

•	 The ongoing security transition (2011-2014) will be accompanied by greater risksto Afghanistan’s polity,security and economy from the illicit drug industry—including through likely

further increasesin opium production.

•	 The priority attached to drug issues by the international community appearsto be declining;

it would be perilous, however, to neglect the drugsissue.

•	 Poorly thought-out, knee-jerk reactionsto increasesin opium production—ranging from

aerialspraying or massive eradication at one extreme to licensing opium in the absence of

adequate governance and controlsto prevent leakagesinto the illicit market at the other

extreme—would be misplaced and naïve.

•	 Patience and modest expectations are called for—other countries have taken decadesto rid

themselves of much smaller illicit narcotics problems; moreover, differentiated approaches

based on regional and local characteristics will be required.

•	 Careful management will be needed to mitigate adverse political economy implications—

including use of drug money in election campaigns and involvement of local and regional

power-holders as well assome at the central government level in the drug industry.

•	 Bans on opium poppy cultivation are sustainable in localities where agricultural resources,

accessto markets, the security situation and government presence are reasonably good.

•	 Such bans are counterproductive and unsustainable in areas without viable licit economic

livelihoods, where government presence islimited and where temporarily strong but unsustainable military forces have provided backing to enforce bans.

•	 Only sustained, broad-based rural development will over time move rural areas away from

dependence on opium; agriculture and rural developmentshould be a priority for remaining

aid resourcesfor Afghanistan.

•	 Drug issues need to be“mainstreamed”—factored into broader political,security, economic

and developmentstrategies and programs during transition.

William Byrd

E-mail: wbyrd@usip.org

David Mansfield

E-mail: davidmfld@aol.com

PEACEBRIEF126
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

Drugs in Afghanistan—A Forgotten Issue?

page 2 • PB 126 • May 18, 2012

Background

Opium has been, and will continue to be, a major part of Afghanistan’s economy—currently

equivalent to one-sixth of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP)—with importantsecurity,

political and economic ramifications. Although total national cultivation and production have

fluctuated widely, they rebounded following the Taliban regime’s effective ban in 2000-01 and

remain at very high levelstoday, despite modest reductionssince 2007. Afghanistan produces

more than 90 percent of global illicit opium and heroin. 

Afghanistan’srural households vary in their dependence on opium poppy cultivation. Simplistic

models whereby households are assumed to base planting decisions only on opium prices are misleading.1 Such decisions depend on multiple factorslike accessto land and water, household assets,

number of able-bodied malesin the household, accessto urban marketsfor agricultural products

and labor, transport linkages, price and availability of wheat (Afghanistan’s main staple food), etc.

Over the past decade, partly reflecting distortions and abusesin implementation of counternarcotics policies, Afghanistan’s drug industry appearsto have become more consolidated at

upper levels,securing influence in some government and political circlesthrough its financial

resources, with widespread perceptionsthat government officials are involved in the trade.2Virtually all processing of Afghan opium into heroin hasshifted to Afghanistan during the past 10-15

years,sharply increasing the drug industry’sresources(although in recent yearsthey have been

eclipsed by the enormous volume of aid inflows and international military contracts). Drug money

also partly fundsthe Taliban, other anti-government elements and local power-holders—although

it isfar from essential for theirsurvival.

Numerous counter-narcotics measures have been attempted since 2001, varying in regional

focus and intensity. These include bans on opium poppy cultivation in some provinces; unevenly

implemented poppy eradication campaigns; interdiction against drug trading,shipments, precursors and processing facilities; many“alternative livelihoods”projects(but of limited size and impact

even in aggregate); and public awareness campaigns. Overall, these efforts cannot be deemed

a success given continuing high levels of opium production, a resurgence of cultivation in some

“poppy-free provinces”(some of which previously had effective bans), and adverse impacts on

governance and politics. However, there have been successesin moving some of the rural population away from opium on a sustained basisin areas with better agricultural resources and accessto

marketsfor agricultural products and for labor.

Implications of Transition

The ongoing security transition (2011-2014) will be accompanied by greaterrisksto Afghanistan’s

polity,security and economy from drugs—including through likely furtherincreasesin opium

production. First, production is already increasing in the eastern provinces ofNangarhar and Laghman—previously seen as counter-narcotics“successstories.” Government coercion to persuade

farmers notto plantin more marginal areas has also led to growing popularresentment, a breakdown

in the politicalsettlement with rural elites, and growing supportfor anti-government elements.Opium

poppy cultivation is also increasing in the northeastern province of Badakhshan and elsewhere.

Second, the dramatic reduction in opium poppy cultivation since 2008 in the central canal command area of Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, which wasinstrumental in the fall in total

national production, is unlikely to be sustainable. The presence of international military forces has

been a determining factor in reducing cultivation in this area,3 and it is unlikely that Afghan security

forces will maintain the same level of presence. Continuing to pressfor elimination of opium poppy

cultivation without viable alternative livelihoodsfor those involved will intensify the growing anger
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

Drugs in Afghanistan—A Forgotten Issue?

page 3 • PB 126 • May 18, 2012

felt toward the Afghan government and weaken its position in the canal command area of Helmand province. If the security situation deteriorates, widespread cultivation could resume. 

Third, the absence of viable alternativesisresulting in the relocation of both production and

land-poor households, who have been most disadvantaged by the ban, from central Helmand to

former desert land north of the Boghra canal.4 Furthermore, this vulnerable population has not

seen any direct benefitsfrom development assistance in the canal command area. High opium

pricesfurther increase incentivesto expand agricultural land in this area and cultivate it with

poppy. More generally, it is doubtful whether former desert land in the southern provinces of

Farah, Helmand, and Kandahar—now largely cultivated with opium poppy based on expensive

tubewell irrigation—willshift away from poppy. Any reduction in cultivation in the more accessible

canal command area can be more than offset by further increasesin these new areas, which would

also tend to offset the effect of the recent outbreak of disease on opium production. 

Based on these trends, Afghanistan easily could end up producing significantly more opium

post-2014 than it does currently or did in the 1990s prior to the international intervention. But even

if opium production does not increase, drug money will become relatively more important as other

inflows decline. The international military drawdown, and reductionsin associated funding, may

also mean lessscope for internationally-led actions and leverage on counter-narcoticslaw enforcement. Civilian aid to Afghanistan will decline,so the potentialscale of rural development initiatives

to reduce dependence on the opium economy will be less. Although international assistance was

not very effective in thisregard, it has generated employment opportunitiesin the service and security sectors(particularly in the Army and Police), providing incomesfor householdsthat abandoned

poppy cultivation.5 Declining assistance and loss ofsuch opportunities may lead to increasing

underemployment in rural areas, exacerbating pressuresfor return to opium poppy cultivation.

It is unclear what role the illicit drug industry will play in the continuing conflict in Afghanistan.

As aid flows diminish, power-holders will look to othersources of finance to maintain their

patronage and political power. Asin the late 1980s and early 1990s, it islikely that many will extract

rentsfrom trade in licit and illicit goods. Widespread opium production also raises questions about

the prospectsfor reconciliation. Many factions and groups(even within the Taliban, which is not

monolithic) have a vested interest in maintaining the insecurity that allowsthe drugstrade to

flourish. Moreover, the Taliban are not expected to repeat their 2000-01 opium poppy cultivation

ban which alienated the rural population.

Policy Issues

International attention to drugsin Afghanistan has waxed and waned, often reacting to short-term

metricssuch aslevel of cultivation rather than focusing on longer-term progress. Currently the

priority attached to drug issues by the international community appearsto be declining. Although

there is brief mention of counter-narcotics aspirationsin the recently signed Strategic Partnership

Agreement between the USA and Afghanistan, drug issues may not feature very prominently

at the upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago and the Tokyo conference on development in July.

It would be perilous, however, to neglect the drug industry, as demonstrated by Afghanistan’s

experience post-2001 (when opium production rebounded after the end of the Taliban ban).

Patience and modest expectations are called for. Other countries—facing much smaller illicit

narcotics cultivation than Afghanistan—have taken decadesto eliminate it. Moreover, it must be

recognized that the drug industry will respond to counter-narcotics actions, and thatsuch actions

may have unanticipated adverse side effects. This does not imply that any action would be futile

but rather underlinesthe need to think ahead.
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About This Brief

William Byrd is a development 

economist and has worked on 

Afghanistan in various capacities 

over the past decade. During 

2002-2006 he was stationed in 

Kabul, Afghanistan, where he 

served as the World Bank’s country 

manager for Afghanistan and then 

as economic adviser. He is currently 

a visiting senior expert at the U.S. 

Institute of Peace. David Mansfield 

is an independent consultant and 

visiting fellow at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University. 

He has conducted in-depth field 

research in rural Afghanistan for 

15 consecutive years, and has produced numerous publications on 

the opium economy in Afghanistan. 

This paper reflects both authors’ 

concern that neglect of the opium 

economy in coming years could 

be perilous, exacerbate problems, 

possibly lead to poorly thought-out 

knee-jerk reactions and/or simplistic 

responses which would only worsen 

the situation, and further damage 

the prospects for success of what 

will inevitably be a difficult and 

challenging process of transition in 

Afghanistan. The views expressed 

in this brief do not necessarily 

represent the views of the U.S. 

Institute of Peace, which does not 

take policy positions.

Avoiding major policy mistakes(e.g. massive eradication, aerialspraying, licensing in the

absence of preconditions) will be essential. Such knee-jerk reactions would be disastrous, although

they mightseem tempting asresponsesto increasesin opium production.

Differentiated approachestailored to regional and local characteristics will be needed—more

focus on law enforcement in areas where land and water resources, person/land ratio, accessto

markets, etc. are good; focus on rural development where there is potential; and less attention

to remote areas where there will not be viable alternatives even in the longer run, and outward

population movementsto better-off areas most likely will be the eventual developmentsolution.

In these areasit might be best for the Afghan government and international community to tolerate some opium production.

Opium bans will continue to work and be sustainable where the agriculturalresource picture,

accessto marketsfor agricultural products and labor, and the security situation and government presence are reasonably good. But asin the recent past,such bans will be counterproductive and unsustainable in areas without viable licitlivelihoodsforthe rural population, where government presence is

limited, and where temporarily strong but unsustainable military forcesfacilitate enforcement of bans.

Careful management will be required to mitigate adverse political economy implications—including use of drug money in election campaigns and involvement of local and regional powerholders as well assome at the central government level in the drug industry.

There is no alternative to sustained, broad-based rural development, with expanded markets and

livelihoods opportunitiesfor households, to achieve longer-term progress against poppy cultivation.

Agriculture and rural developmentshould therefore be a priority. A proposed program in thisregard

has been put forward by the UK Department for International Development and theWorld Bank.6

Finally, drug issues need to be“mainstreamed”—factored into broader political,security,

economic and developmentstrategies and programs.7 Declining resourcesfor Afghanistan during

transition mean that remaining funds must be well-utilized to promote development in drugaffected environments.

Notes

1.	 Mansfield, David,“The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality—

Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan,”Paper prepared for the International Conference on

Alternative Development in Drug Control and Cooperation, Feldafing (January 7-12, 2002).

2.	 Shaw, Mark,“DrugTrafficking and the Development ofOrganized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan,”in Buddenberg, Doris andWilliam Byrd (editors), Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy (UNODC andWorld Bank, 2006).

3.	 Mansfield, Alcis, and OSDR, Managing Concurrent and Repeated Risks: Explaining Reductions in 

Opium Production in Central Helmand Between 2008 and 2011 (AREU, 2011).

4.	 Land under cultivation north ofthe Boghra canal and south ofHighway 1 inHelmand increased

from approximately 900 ha in 1999 to 27,500 ha in 2010, and furtherto 33, 500 ha in 2011.

5.	 Mansfield, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Counter-narcotics efforts and their effects in 

Nangarhar and Helmand in the 2010-11 growing season (AREU, 2011).

6.	 Ward, Christopher, David Mansfield, Peter Oldham, and William Byrd, Afghanistan: Economic 

Incentives and Development Initiatives to Reduce Opium Production (DFID and World Bank, 2008).

7.	 Mainstreaming in development programsis discussed in Ward, Christopher and William Byrd,

“Afghanistan’s Opium Drug Economy”(World Bank South Asia PREM Working Paper, December

2004), Annex 8.

Drugs in Afghanistan—A Forgotten Issue?

page 4 • PB 126 • May 18, 2012