Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed October 18, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D20-0114

Lower Tribunal No. 08-22359

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Ramle International Corp.,

Appellant,

vs.

Miami-Dade County, Florida, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose M. 

Rodriguez, Judge.

Albert D. Rey, P.A., and Albert D. Rey, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Randi E. Dincher, Assistant 

Attorney General (Tallahassee), for appellee Florida Department of 

Revenue; Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and 

Jorge Martinez-Esteve and Daija Page Lifshitz, Assistant County Attorneys, 

for appellee Miami-Dade County.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ. 

LOBREE, J.
2

Ramle International Corporation (“Ramle”) appeals a final order

granting Miami-Dade County’s (“County”) motion for involuntary dismissal of 

its complaint. Because Ramle failed to provide sufficient evidence to support 

a prima facie case for any of its claims, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2004, Unit 2405 of the Club Atlantis Condominium in Miami Beach, 

Florida (“the property”), was sold via a tax deed sale. The sale resulted in 

surplus proceeds in the amount of $262,412.08. After receiving no claims to 

the surplus proceeds, the Miami-Dade County Clerk, Harvey Ruvin (“the 

Clerk”) transferred the funds to the County.

Four years later, Ramle filed a complaint against the County alleging 

the former property owners assigned their rights in the property to Ramle 

and it was therefore entitled to the surplus proceeds. Ramle later amended 

its complaint to assert new claims and add the Clerk, the State of Florida 

(“State”), and the Florida Department of Revenue (“DOR”) as parties.

In the 2015 operative second amended complaint, Ramle raised six 

claims: (1) damages resulting from failure to pay surplus proceeds to Ramle; 

(2) declaratory judgment finding section 197.473, Florida Statutes (2004),

1

1 As the statutes at issue were subsequently amended, this case pertains 

only to the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the tax deed sale.
3

unconstitutional per se; (3) declaratory judgment finding section 197.473

unconstitutional as applied; (4) declaratory judgment finding section 

197.582(2), Florida Statutes (2004), unconstitutional per se; (5) declaratory 

judgment finding section 197.582(2) unconstitutional as applied; and (6) 

money had and received. The County, DOR and the Clerk filed answers and 

affirmative defenses. In 2019, the Clerk was dismissed from the case after 

the trial court entered final summary judgment in its favor. Ramle did not 

appeal that judgment.

The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial on October 28, 2019. Ramle 

called one witness—Maher Ghafir, Ramle’s director—who testified that 

Ramle acquired an interest in the surplus proceeds by purchasing an 

assignment of rights from the alleged former owners of the property. Ramle 

introduced five exhibits at trial: (1) a final judgment in Ramle’s favor in the 

foreclosure case of another unit, 2407, of the Club Atlantis Condominium; 

(2) an order granting an ex parte motion to redeem unit 2407; (3) bank 

records and a statement by one of the former property owners related to an 

alleged payment from Ramle for the purchase of unit 2407; (4) the 

assignment documents from the prior owners of the property to Ramle; and 

(5) a copy of a warranty deed for unit 2407.
4

At the close of Ramle’s case, the County raised an ore tenus motion 

for involuntary dismissal asserting the evidence presented by Ramle failed 

to establish a prima facie case for relief on any claim. The trial court deferred 

ruling on the motion and allowed the parties to submit proposed orders and 

memoranda in support of their positions. The trial court subsequently 

granted the motion. Ramle then filed a motion for rehearing, which was 

denied by the trial court. This timely appeal ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision on a motion for 

involuntary dismissal is de novo. Bank of America, N.A. v. Arevalo, 306 So. 

3d 1008, 1011 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). Whether a challenged statute is 

constitutional is a question of law which this court also reviews de novo. See, 

e.g., Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation 

Comm’n, 838 So. 2d 492, 500 (Fla. 2003). There is, however, a strong 

presumption that statutes are constitutionally valid and will not be declared 

unconstitutional unless determined to be invalid beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Medina v. Gulf Coast Linen Servs., 825 So. 2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2002) (citing Todd v. State, 643 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).
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ANALYSIS

“An involuntary dismissal . . . is properly entered only when the 

evidence considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party fails 

to establish a prima facie case on the non-moving party’s claim.” Luciani v. 

Nealon, 181 So. 3d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quoting McCabe v. 

Hanley, 886 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). “[A] motion for 

involuntary dismissal is the proper method by which a defendant may obtain 

a judgment in his favor following the presentation of the plaintiff’s case in 

chief.” Valdes v. Ass’n I.N.E.D., H.M.O., Inc., 667 So. 2d 856, 856 n.1 (Fla. 

3d DCA 1996). “[W]here the evidence offered by the plaintiffs, considered 

in the light most favorable to them, does not establish a prima facie case, it 

is incumbent on the trial judge to grant the motion.” Day v. Amini, 550 So. 

2d 169, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).

Thus, we address each of the six counts raised in the complaint and 

the evidence offered by Ramle in support at trial.

2

 In counts one and six,

2 On appeal, Ramle also asserts the trial court erred in awarding costs to the 

County and DOR under section 194.192, Florida Statutes. In their briefs, 

however, both the County and DOR waived entitlement to recover costs in 

this action. This issue is therefore moot. A.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam.

Servs., 932 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“An issue is moot when the 

controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have 

no actual effect.” (quoting Merkle v. Guardianship of Jacoby, 912 So. 2d 595, 

600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))).
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Ramle raised claims against the County for damages resulting from failure 

to pay it the surplus proceeds and for money had and received, respectively. 

Section 197.582(2) provides the procedure for how surplus proceeds are 

distributed after a tax deed sale. Pursuant to the plain language of the 

section, “[i]f the property is purchased for an amount in excess of the 

statutory bid of the certificateholder, the excess shall be paid over and 

disbursed by the clerk.” § 197.582(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, Ramle could not establish a prima facie case for either claim

against the County as a matter of law because the Clerk is the sole party 

responsible for payment of surpluses. The trial court lacked the authority to 

impose a legal obligation to handle distribution of surplus proceeds on the 

County where the Florida Legislature declined to do so.

The trial court additionally found that count six was properly dismissed 

because Ramle failed to meet the elements of a claim for money had and 

received. “An action for money had and received, or the more modern action 

for unjust enrichment, is an equitable remedy requiring proof that money had 

been paid due to fraud, misrepresentation, imposition, duress, undue 

influence, mistake, or as a result of some other grounds appropriate for 

intervention by a court of equity.” Hall v. Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach, 

686 So. 2d 653, 656 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (citation omitted).
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Ramle contends the County is erroneously retaining the surplus 

proceeds because it is entitled to collect them based on the assignment from 

the former owners of the property. Ramle, however, failed to provide 

sufficient evidence that the former owners of the property who assigned their 

rights to Ramle were entitled to the surplus proceeds.

Contrary to Ramle’s apparent contention otherwise, prior ownership 

alone is insufficient to establish a right to surplus proceeds from a tax deed 

sale. Pursuant to section 197.582(2), to be entitled to surplus proceeds a 

party must first show that it is one of the persons listed in section 197.522(1), 

Florida Statutes (2004). Section 197.522(1)(a) refers to “the persons listed 

in the tax collector’s statement pursuant to section 197.502(4)[, Florida 

Statutes].” § 197.522(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also Rahimi v. Glob. Discoveries, 

Ltd., LLC, 252 So. 3d 804, 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“After the property tax 

bill and other government liens are paid off, the court clerk holds the 

‘balance’ (or surplus) of the tax deed sale ‘for the benefit of person described 

in [the tax collector’s statement].’” (quoting § 197.582(2), Fla. Stat.)). The 

persons listed in section 197.502(4) include “the titleholder to the property 

up for sale, ‘[a]ny lienholder of record who has recorded a lien against the 

property,’ and ‘[a]ny mortgagee of record.’” Id. (quoting § 197.502(4)(a)-(c)).
8

Accordingly, “[o]nly those titleholders, lienholders, and mortgagees 

that are of record before the tax deed sale are entitled to notice, and those 

for whom the clerk is holding the surplus.” Id. Review of the record 

demonstrates that Ramle failed to provide sufficient evidence at trial 

establishing the alleged former owners were titleholders, lienholders or 

mortgagees of record before the tax deed sale. Ramle did not provide a 

copy of the Tax Collector’s statement, any title records related to the 

property, or any records of the Clerk related to the tax deed sale of the 

property. Absent any proof that the alleged former owners were persons

entitled to the surplus proceeds pursuant to section 197.582(2), Ramle could 

not establish a prima facie case for money had and received.

In the remaining four counts of the operative complaint, Ramle

challenged the constitutionality of sections 197.473 and 197.582(2). This 

court, however, is precluded from considering Ramle’s constitutional 

challenges because Ramle did not provide any evidence demonstrating it 

complied with the procedural requirements to raise a constitutional challenge 

to a state statute.

Section 86.091, Florida Statutes, provides that “[i]f the statute, charter, 

ordinance, or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney 

General or the state attorney of the judicial circuit in which the action is 
9

pending shall be served with a copy of the complaint and be entitled to be 

heard.” § 86.091, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added); see also Martin Mem’l Med. 

Ctr., Inc. v. Tenet Healthsystem Hosps., Inc., 875 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2004) (“The purpose of [section 86.091] would appear from its 

language to be relatively clear—to ensure that the state (in the person of the 

Attorney General or appropriate state attorney) is aware of any litigation in 

which a plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that any of the enumerated 

forms of legislation is unconstitutional, and afforded an opportunity to present 

the state’s position.”).

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.071 similarly “requires a party that 

files a pleading, written motion, or other document drawing into question the 

constitutionality of a state statute or a county or municipal charter, ordinance, 

or franchise, to give notice to the Attorney General or the state attorney of 

the judicial circuit in which the action is pending.” Yanes v. OC Food & 

Beverage LLC., 300 So. 3d 798, 802 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020); see also Fla. R. 

Civ. P. 1.071(b) (“A party that files a pleading, written motion, or other 

document drawing into question the constitutionality of a state statute . . . 

must promptly . . . serve the notice and the pleading, written motion, or other 

document drawing into question the constitutionality of a state statute or a 

county or municipal charter, ordinance, or franchise on the Attorney General 
10

or the state attorney of the judicial circuit in which the action is pending, by 

either certified or registered mail.”); State v. Fla. Workers’ Advocs., 167 So. 

3d 500, 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (noting that Rule 1.071 requires “a mailing 

by certified or registered mail to the Attorney General when a pleading, 

motion, or other paper draws into question the constitutionality of a state 

statute”).

Pursuant to section 48.121, Florida Statutes, “process against the 

state shall be served on the state attorney or an assistant state attorney for 

the judicial circuit within which the action is brought and by sending two 

copies of the process by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General.” 

§ 48.121, Fla. Stat. When a party fails to provide proper notice to the 

Attorney General or state attorney, a court is precluded from considering the 

constitutional challenge raised in the complaint. See Lee Mem’l Health Sys. 

v. Progressive Select Ins. Co., 260 So. 3d 1038, 1042 (Fla. 2018) (“Failure 

to comply with rule 1.071 bars consideration of a claim that would result in 

the striking of a state statute as unconstitutional.”); Shelton v. Bank of New 

York Mellon, 203 So. 3d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (declining to 

consider a constitutional issue where the “objection to the notice of sale does 

not state that the Attorney General or state attorney was served”); Davis v. 

Karr, 264 So. 3d 279, 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (concluding a constitutional 
11

challenge to a statute was not properly preserved for review where the 

appellant failed to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.071).

Here, Ramle presented no evidence that it provided the State with the 

requisite service. On appeal, Ramle contends the State was properly served 

because DOR was served, answered and defended in this action. This 

argument is without merit as it improperly conflates DOR with the State. 

While both are State entities, service on DOR does not equate service on 

the State for purposes of raising a constitutional challenge to a state statute. 

Pursuant to the relevant rule and statute, Ramle had to serve a copy of its 

complaint on the Attorney General or state attorney of the eleventh judicial 

circuit. See § 86.091, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.071. Ramle failed to do 

so. The trial court therefore properly found it was barred from considering 

Ramle’s constitutional challenges.

CONCLUSION

As Ramle failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie 

case for any of its claims, we find the trial court properly granted the County’s 

motion for an involuntary dismissal. Sec. Abstract & Ins. Co. v. Fid. Nat. Title 

Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 668 So. 2d 658, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding 

“that the trial court properly granted an involuntary dismissal as to all these 
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counts at the close of plaintiff’s case, because [the plaintiff] failed to establish 

a prima facie case as to any of them”).

Affirmed.