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i 

71–448 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–77] 

UPDATE ON KC–46A AND LEGACY AERIAL 

REFUELING AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri, Chairman 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

MARY KATE CUNNINGHAM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, October 13, 2011, Update on KC–46A and Legacy Aerial Refueling 

Aircraft Programs ................................................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, October 13, 2011 .................................................................................... 17 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2011 

UPDATE ON KC–46A AND LEGACY AERIAL REFUELING AIRCRAFT 

PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Van Buren, David M., Air Force Service Acquisition Executive; Maj Gen 

Bruce Litchfield, USAF, Special Assistant to Commander, Air Force Materiel Command; Maj Gen (Select) Christopher C. Bogdan, USAF, Program 

Executive Officer, KC–46 Tanker Modernization Directorate; and Shay 

Assad, Director, Defense Procurement, Acquisition, Policy and Strategic 

Sourcing, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) ............................................................................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 21 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike ........................................................................................ 23 

Van Buren, David M., joint with Maj Gen Bruce Litchfield, Maj Gen 

(Select) Christopher C. Bogdan, and Shay Assad ...................................... 24 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 43 

Mr. Courtney ..................................................................................................... 43 

Mr. Critz ............................................................................................................ 44 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 49 

(1) 

UPDATE ON KC–46A AND LEGACY AERIAL REFUELING 

AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 13, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:03 p.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. W. Todd Akin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. AKIN. The hearing will come to order and if it is all right 

with people, I am going to start it with a prayer. 

Heavenly Father, we thank you for this day, for a free country. 

We ask your blessings on our deliberation, our leadership. Watch 

over our people who serve us overseas, the people in uniform. And 

I pray in Jesus’ name, amen. 

Okay. We have got the Air Force tanker hearing. I have got some 

fairly brief opening remarks. I believe the ranking member has 

some remarks. I hope they are brief. And we are talking about potentially a vote at like 1:30, or something like that. So we are going 

to try and roll the best we can and then pop back in. 

So we are going to be hearing testimony from the Department of 

Defense acquisition officials regarding the Air Force’s new tanker 

program, the KC–46, and to receive an update on current tanker 

aircraft, KC–135 and the KC–10. We intend to provide sufficient, 

but not overly burdensome oversight, of this program, and hope 

that this will go into the record books as an acquisition model of 

success. 

Today we have with us Mr. Shay Assad. He is the Director of Defense Acquisition Policy and Strategic Sourcing. We have Dave Van 

Buren, the Air Force’s Service Acquisition Executive. Major General Bruce Litchfield, Special Assistant to the Commander of the 

Air Force Materiel Command. And Major General (Select) Chris 

Bogdan, a Program Executive Officer for the KC–46 program. 

Thank you all, gentlemen. 

During the hearing, we hope to gain a better understanding of 

the KC–46 program, the program risks that have been identified, 

and the oversight mechanisms in place to keep the program on 

track. And we will appreciate the need for this new tanker as we 

hear testimony regarding our aging, but still capable, fleet of legacy 

tankers, and the dedicated airmen that keep them flying. 
2 

Finally, we would like to gain an understanding of the KC–46 

program impacts as budget deliberations for the future continue to 

take center stage and remain uncertain. 

With that, I turn to the ranking member of the subcommittee, 

Mr. McIntyre, for any comments that you would like to make, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 21.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to also thank the witnesses for appearing today. 

The Air Force has waited too long, unfortunately, for a replacement for the KC–135, when we think about it being an aircraft 

with an average age of nearly 50 years. 

In our current environment of constrained budgets, it is absolutely critical we get the KC–46 acquisition process on a stable 

track and on a schedule that is realistic and will not lead to costly 

delays. The Air Force recently completed an integrated baseline review, and I am interested in hearing from the witnesses about any 

risks that were identified in that process. 

Recent press reports have estimated the KC–46 program will experience cost overruns of more than $300 million. We need to clear 

that up. 

I would like us to better understand today how much of these 

overruns the Government would be liable for, and what measures 

are being taken to prevent any further cost overruns. If you will 

please address that. 

As we wait for the KC–46 to come online, I am concerned with 

the viability of our current legacy aerial refueling fleet. Their intheater demand, as you well know, remains high. It appears that 

trend will continue in the near term. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on the condition of 

our current legacy fleet, and if you would please discuss their ability and capacity to meet the increased theater demand. 

We all know and are very aware of the fiscal constraints that 

DOD [Department of Defense] is currently facing, and our full committee was hearing from the Secretary of Defense about that this 

morning in testimony. To the extent possible, it is important that 

we hear from you, our panel before us right now, what potential 

impacts you believe the Budget Control Act and possible concerns 

about it will have on the overall aerial refueling mission. 

Thank you for your service to our country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your prayer. Thank you for holding this important hearing 

today. 

I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

And I believe we are going to have just two opening statements; 

is that correct? I think David Van Buren, the Acquisition Executive, first; is that correct? And then also, then General Litchfield 
3 

is going to talk a little bit about where we are legacy-wise, and 

that sets up, of course, where we want to be going. 

So David, it is good for me to put kind of a face on a name. I 

understand, I think of you as the parallel to Mr. Stackley, who does 

a good job, and I am sure you do very well, as well. So we would 

like to hear your testimony, sir. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN, AIR FORCE SERVICE 

ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE; MAJ GEN BRUCE LITCHFIELD, 

USAF, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO COMMANDER, AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND; MAJ GEN (SELECT) CHRISTOPHER C. 

BOGDAN, USAF, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, KC–46 

TANKER MODERNIZATION DIRECTORATE; AND SHAY ASSAD, 

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, ACQUISITION, POLICY 

AND STRATEGIC SOURCING, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS 

(USD AT&L) 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN, AIR FORCE SERVICE 

ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address this committee with an update on the status of our KC–135 

and KC–10 fleets, and how the KC–46 program is progressing now 

almost 8 months after contract award. 

The capitalizing of the tanker fleet remains the Air Force’s acquisition priority. The Air Force awarded the Boeing Company an engineering, manufacturing and development contract for the KC–46 

on February 24, 2011. Since contract award, the KC–46 team has 

worked with Boeing, the Federal Aviation Administration and 

many Department of Defense stakeholders to complete a comprehensive review of the KC–46 program. 

We have baselined the cost schedule and technical performance 

and risks of the program. As we work toward the low rate initial 

production decision scheduled for late fiscal year 2015, we are confident that we can maintain the cost and schedule of this program, 

while mitigating the identified risks. 

The Air Force remains mindful of our Nation’s budgetary challenges and fiscal constraints. This environment requires that we 

balance our capabilities between current combat operations and the 

need to address emerging threats and future challenges. 

We seek cost-effective systems that leverage existing capabilities 

and maximize interoperability and integration of legacy and future 

systems. 

At this point in the development program, I am pleased both on 

the performance of the Air Force program office led by General 

Bogden, the PEO [Program Executive Officer], and by the program 

execution of the Boeing Company. I understand this subcommittee 

is looking for how potential sequestration will affect the tanker program. 

As Congress implements the Budget Control Act of 2011, impacts 

to Air Force capabilities must be considered. Any reductions im-
4 

posed by sequestration rules would deeply affect the Air Force’s 

ability to perform its missions. 

At this point, however, it is too early to determine the specific 

impacts to aerial refueling programs, because such cuts would require the Air Force to rebalance its entire portfolio programs. However, we do know that any mandated significant cuts to KC–46 program would have grave consequences for the program. Likewise 

fully funding the KC–46 program under sequestration would be at 

the expense of other programs. 

We are committed to fielding the KC–X—KC–46 on time and on 

budget so the warfighter is properly supported in the future. In the 

meantime, the Air Force will continue to address new capabilities 

and upgrades needed for the legacy KC–135 and KC–10 tanker 

fleets to meet future air space mandates and emerging technologies, resolve critical obsolescence and diminishing resource 

issues, and maintain operational relevancy. 

I appreciate the subcommittee’s continued support for our Air 

Force tanker programs and we look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Van Buren, General 

Litchfield, General Bogdan, and Mr. Assad can be found in the Appendix on page 24.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you for your testimony, David. 

And then, General Litchfield. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN BRUCE LITCHFIELD, USAF, SPECIAL 

ASSISTANT TO COMMANDER, AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND 

General LITCHFIELD. Thank you, Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 

am pleased to be here to cover the status of our KC–135 and KC– 

10 fleets. 

The Air Force tanker fleet remains the backbone of the Department of Defense’s global power projection and global reach capabilities. This venerable fleet consists of 414 KC–135s and 59 KC–10 

aircraft. 

Executing the Tanker Modernization Plan will require sustaining 

the KC–135s to an average age of over 80 years and KC–10s past 

an average age of 54. 

As such, both airframes will be in uncharted territory in terms 

of structural and systems issues attributed to age, obsolescence and 

diminishing manufacturing sources. We should expect keeping a 

fleet this long will result in greater demands on our airmen, higher 

sustainment costs and challenges to aircraft availability. 

The tanker fleet is in high demand as we execute operations 

across the globe and across the full spectrum of military operations. 

Because of this demand, the Air Force is executing a set of multistage initiatives to keep these aircraft viable and relevant through 

a combination of sustainment and modification efforts. 

KC–135 aircraft availability and mission capability rates have remained relatively steady over the last several years with aircraft 

availability near 65 percent and mission-capable rates near 80. For 
5 

the KC–10, the aircraft availability and mission-capable rates are 

65 percent and 79 percent, respectively. 

Our dedicated airmen around the world work hard every day to 

generate mission-ready aircraft. To sustain long-term fleet health, 

the tanker fleet receives routine depot maintenance and undergoes 

system modifications to address structural, systems and obsolescence concerns. 

We are currently executing several initiatives to keep our tankers in compliance with today’s Federal aviation standards. These 

include modernizing air traffic management and friend-or-foe identification systems, as well as remanufacturing obsolete parts. 

Even with all the maintenance activities, sustainment actions 

and planned modifications, the preponderance of our legacy tanker 

fleet remains—retains the inherent design concepts birthed in the 

1950s. With the planned service life of the KC–135s and the KC– 

10, the challenges of sustaining these aging weapon systems will 

rise until the KC–46 comes online. In the meantime, we will continue to execute our long-term sustainment plan for our legacy fleet 

to ensure we meet our Nation’s aerial refueling needs. 

I appreciate the subcommittee’s continued support for our Air 

Force tanker programs. Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss this critical Air Force mission, and I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much, General. 

I have a couple. First of all just on the—the intro, Mr. Van 

Buren. What are we looking at until we build the first aircraft? 

There is a series of steps. You are going to assemble an aircraft. 

We are going to be flying it, doing some testing on it. And then we 

expect maybe the first aircraft will be coming off of the line. What 

are the sort of dates timewise that you are looking at there? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Well, the contract that we currently have runs 

through 2016 for EMD [Engineering and Manufacturing Development]. We will have a preliminary design review in 2012, critical 

design review in 2013, build the aircraft, first flight of the 767–2C 

in 2014. And—— 

Mr. AKIN. So the first flight is 2014. Okay. And then? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Roughly 3 years from contract award. And then 

we will have the full-up KC–46 first flight at the end of 2014. 

And General Bogdan, any other details with regard to our contract that you may want to add? 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Congressman, the only thing I would add to that is one of the 

unique aspects of the way Boeing is actually designing and developing the airplane is to blend both their commercial best practices 

and our defense best practices to design the airplane. 

And one of the manifestations of that is the Boeing team is 50 

percent from their commercial side of their business, and 50 percent from their defense side. And as they walk through the design 

of the airplane, they are using both the review process from their 

commercial side, as well as the review process from the defense 

side. And what I am happy to say about that is that the Air Force 

is involved in both sets of those steps, watching them design and 

develop the airplane. 
6 

So, what you may see on the master schedule is actually two preliminary design reviews and two critical design reviews to go with 

those two first flights. The first flight of the commercial derivative 

airplane and the first flight of the actual KC–46. The Air Force is 

involved in both sets of those reviews, which gives us early insight 

into the commercial portion of the airplane to ensure that the military’s portion ends up correct. 

Mr. AKIN. Well, that is encouraging to hear you say that. It is 

sort of a double check and balance then with your team. Now, just 

want to make sure I understand one thing. 

You are in charge of this program; is that right? 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. That is kind of encouraging, because sometimes we 

have groups that come in and address us, and it is not really clear 

who is really in charge of building this. In other words, you have 

the authority, but also you also have the responsibility to make 

sure this comes in on time and under budget. 

General BOGDAN. Absolutely, sir. The buck stops with me and I 

report directly to Mr. Van Buren for the execution of this program. 

Mr. AKIN. Directly to—okay. That makes sense. And so that is 

directly connected to—— 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Currently, Mr. Kendall is the acting Under 

Secretary. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. That is good. One of the—I used to work for 

IBM. And one of the things we always said was if you have got an 

important program then you have to make sure there is somebody 

in charge. So I am glad to hear that there was no equivocation on 

that particular point. And of course the other thing is, is that if 

things slip at all, you will have the distinct honor of being able to 

fly in antique airplanes, you know? Maybe that is not what you 

really want to do. 

Just one other quick question from my memory. You have the 

KC—is it 35—is the large number 500d or some of them? 

General LITCHFIELD. KC–135s. 

Mr. AKIN. One thirty-five. And that is a smaller plane than the 

10 [KC–10], right? 

General LITCHFIELD. It is. 

Mr. AKIN. What is the difference in the number of gallons or capacity, or however you measure it? 

General LITCHFIELD. The KC–135 is roughly a 200,000-pound 

fuel capacity. I think the KC–10 is about 350 [350,000 pounds]. So 

about one-and-a-half times. 

Mr. AKIN. And how does the 46 [KC–46] fall in that mix? 

General BOGDAN. Sir, the KC–46 when fully loaded is going to 

be able to offload or carry 212,000 pounds of gas. It doesn’t appear 

like that is a whole lot more than a 135 [KC–135]. However, a far 

more efficient airplane than the 135, so it is offload capability and 

its range capability far exceed the 135. 

And we also have to remember that the KC–46 has also been 

built for a number of other missions, to include cargo-carrying capability. So it has a fully loaded cargo floor and it has built-in ability to carry air medical patients for air medical evacuation. 
7 

Mr. AKIN. So it is a little bit more a multipurpose aircraft. And 

there is a certain point of no return in carrying fuel, right? Because 

there are only a certain number of planes you are going to refill 

in a certain period of time, right? So you don’t want to carry a lot 

of extra fuel you don’t need? 

General BOGDAN. That is true, sir. We prefer to offload all of our 

fuel and land at minimum fuel than have to land with extra fuel. 

More wear and tear on the airplane. 

Mr. AKIN. Yes. Thank you very much. 

And let us see. The next question to the ranking member, Mr. 

McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like on the 

panel whoever feels most qualified to answer the question that I 

alluded to in my opening remark. What impacts will the Budget 

Control Act of 2011 enacted in July of this year have on the KC– 

46 program? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The exact impacts, sir, are not known yet. The 

issues of sequestration, as I mentioned in my opening comments, 

are not specifically identified by the Air Force, as of now. 

However, I should say that one of the features of this particular 

acquisition, which in my mind is a model, is the manner in which 

we contracted for not only the engineering, manufacturing and development, but also on a firm fixed-price basis for the two—first 

two production lots and a not-to-exceed cap for the remaining production lots out for a large number of years, to the good work of 

Mr. Assad here, and others. 

And so, that any perturbation to that business deal or the business transaction that has been set up would be, in my opinion, very 

negative for the taxpayer. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I also mentioned about the cost overruns, currently estimated at $300 million, roughly, above contract ceiling. 

Can you explain to us in simple terms whether or not the Government is exposed? And if it is not, then who is responsible for paying 

for those cost overruns above the ceiling? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes, sir. I think I can answer that. The Boeing company is completely responsible for all costs above the contract ceiling price. So the taxpayers will incur no further cost increase on 

this contract should the development program exceed the ceiling 

price of the contract. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you for clarifying that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am wondering, can you go back again and talk about the $300 

million cost overrun? And where, since we are under a fixed-price 

contract, what are the ramifications of that? 

Mr. ASSAD. Yes. The $300 million cost overrun that you are referring to, Congressman, was Boeing’s present projection of where 

they think their costs are going to end up on the contract. They are 

trying to manage to a much lower number, but that is their projection. Our ceiling price, the price that the maximum liability to the 

taxpayer, is $4.9 billion. 

So to the degree that Boeing executes this contract in any manner that causes them to exceed that cost number, it is on the com-
8 

plete shoulders of the Boeing Corporation and not the taxpayer. So 

it is very straightforward. Anything over that $4.9 billion is 

Boeing’s nickel, not ours. 

Mr. COFFMAN. As it should be. I believe that Boeing is also in 

development using essentially the same design or a similar design 

for what they are—to develop this same aircraft commercially as 

a cargo plane, if I am correct in that? 

Mr. ASSAD. They are, yes. They are using their first—as General 

Bogdan mentioned—they are developing the 767–C. They are using 

a lot of existing technology. So there is not a lot of risk in terms 

of understanding how to put that plane together. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Oh, absolutely. But I think what I am saying is, 

essentially, they will be able to recover their cost, this cost overrun 

that they will eat, and not the U.S. taxpayers. But the fact that 

they are going to be able to utilize a lot of technology that they are 

developing for the U.S. Government, that they will be able to utilize certainly some of that same technology for, or commercially— 

a commercial aircraft. Am I correct in that? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, actually, most of the technology, if not all of it, 

is being brought to the table by Boeing. There are very few—there 

is some military modification to this aircraft that we are going to 

use that some—I guess they could take advantage of. But the fundamental plane is being brought to the table—that the elements of 

that plane—is being brought to the table by Boeing. 

Mr. COFFMAN. But did—— 

Mr. ASSAD. There will be some benefit from the extra development that we are doing, but they are bringing a lot of that technology; for example, the 787 Dreamliner cockpit. That is already 

developed, designed and paid for by the Boeing Corporation. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I see. And so that is not part—that is not a part 

of the cost for this. But the—— 

Mr. ASSAD. That is correct. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay, okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Critz, where did—oh, okay. There you are. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Looking at some information on the IBR [Integrated Baseline Review], obviously the risk assessments, cost is low because of the 

cap. That is pretty straightforward. They listed the risk assessment 

for the schedule to be moderate. 

Could somebody explain why there is risk there? 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. 

Relative to the schedule on the contract, the requirement for Boeing is to deliver to the Air Force 18 fully ready to go to war on day 

one airplanes with all the support equipment, all the tech quarters, 

all of the training by August of 2017. That is the requirement in 

the contract. Boeing has set a baseline and attempting to deliver 

those 18 airplanes approximately 5 months earlier than that in 

March of 2017. That is their own internal timeline. 

When my team baselined the program, we took a look at that 

overall schedule and the likelihood of Boeing meeting the March 

date and the likelihood of Boeing meeting the August 2017 date. 

We came to the conclusion that it is likely that Boeing will meet 

the August 2017 date, but there are about four things that we 
9 

needed to keep our eye on to make sure that they didn’t go off the 

rails, which would definitely impact them meeting that scheduled 

date. 

And let me enumerate those for you. The first thing that Boeing 

is doing a little differently on this airplane in terms of building it 

is, instead of building a basic commercial airplane on their production line at Everett, and then flying it down to Wichita and then 

taking it apart to put the military modifications on it, what they 

are doing is called inline provisioning. And that means that, as 

they build the airplane in Everett, they are going to build it with 

the wiring and the bundling and the fuel lines as if the military 

pieces were going to be fit on the line right there. 

Let me give you an example. When Boeing builds the tail of a 

767 for a commercial customer, the tail of that airplane does not 

have a hole in it to fit a boom. But for our airplane, when the tail 

section of that KC–46 or 767–2C gets to Everett, it will already 

have the hole in it for Boeing to put the boom on it. 

So they are passing down through their sub-tier suppliers an additional requirement to build the airplane as if it were a military 

airplane, even though it is going to be put together on a commercial line. While Boeing does that quite often in their commercial 

airplanes, different variants, to do it on a military airplane with 

military requirements and specs, increases the level of risk for us 

in the Air Force of getting that done on time. 

So I have let Boeing know, and I have put them on notice, that 

I think that that inline provisioning is something that they are 

going to have to pay particular attention to, and we, the Air Force, 

are going to have to pay particular attention to, to ensure that 

their sub-tier suppliers can do the job right. It is less a problem 

with Boeing integrating, and more of an issue of making sure that 

we watch Boeing watch their sub-tier suppliers for this inline provisioning. 

So that is the first thing that worries me about the schedule, because if you don’t get that right, you are not going to build your 

four test airplanes on time, and then everything propagates from 

there. 

The second thing that worries me a little bit on the program relative to schedule is the fact that Boeing is going to deliver to us 

an airplane that is FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]-certified. There are two elements to that FAA certification. The first 

is what we call an amended type certification, and that certification 

goes with the 767–2C. The second part of the FAA certification is 

called a supplemental type certification, and that certification goes 

with the military modifications that they are going to put on the 

airplane. 

It is very typical in the commercial world to do an ATC [Amended Type Certificate] certification and an STC [Supplemental Type 

Certificate] certification in serial. You do the ATC first. You put 

the military modifications on the airplane, and then you do the 

supplemental type cert. In this instance here, as a result of some 

of that inline provisioning, Boeing is actually going to do part of 

the ATC and the STC simultaneously. There is some concurrency 

there. 
10 

The issue I have with that is, if a problem arises during the FAA 

certification on the ATC side, there is not a whole lot of time for 

them to recover before they get to the supplemental type cert, the 

STC side. And I have to have that STC certification before I can 

deem the airplane airworthy to fly. So that concurrency of the ATC 

and the STC worries me a little bit. 

We have been working with the FAA. The FAA has basically, in 

general, approved Boeing’s process for doing this. The FAA doesn’t 

have a problem with it. But we just have to make sure that the 

first time around, when they go to get that ATC certification there 

aren’t too many hiccups, because that is going to propagate with 

that concurrency into the second part of that certification. So that 

is the second thing that I am a little bit worried about that causes 

some increased risk into the program. 

Mr. CRITZ. Now, you said there were four. And I see we have already used up my 5 minutes. So if I could, if it is possible to get 

written response to that question, I would really appreciate it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 44.] 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. And I apologize for being a little bit 

long. 

Mr. CRITZ. Oh, that is quite all right. It is an important issue. 

Thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. AKIN. And Mr. Bartlett is next. 

Oh, and by the way, it may be if we move along in the questions, 

it may be we could catch some of the things offline, just depending 

on who has questions. 

Mr. BARTLETT. All right. Thank you very much. 

I noticed, both from your comparison chart and your spec sheet, 

that you are no longer waiving chemical and electromagnetic hardening, as we did during the Clinton years. Can you tell me to what 

level you are doing EMP [electromagnetic pulse] hardening? 

General BOGDAN. Sir, currently, the military standard for EMP 

hardening for the KC–135 airplane is at a certain level, and for the 

KC–10 is at a certain level. The Department of Defense has undergone a rewriting of the standard, and the standard for us now has 

been slightly increased, although it is not at the same level as, for 

example, a presidential airplane. And that is in general terms. 

So what I would like to do is, I will take that question for the 

record and get you the actual numbers, the decimals and all of 

that, engineering numbers, that go with that. But what I can tell 

you is, the airplane—we are not going to waive the EMP hardening. It has to meet the current mil [military] standard, and that 

will—that is going to provide us a more capable and more survivable airplane than we have in the current tanker fleet. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 43.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. The EMP Commission interviewed two Russian 

generals that told them that the Soviets had developed, and they 

had, an EMP-enhanced weapon that would produce 200 kilovolts 

per meter at the ground zero. And that would be, if it was detonated 300 miles high over Iowa or Nebraska, that would be about 

100 kilovolts per meter at the margins of our country. 
11 

To my knowledge, that number is at least twice, and maybe more 

than twice, as large as anything that we have ever designed or 

built or tested to. How do we verify the level that we ought to be 

protecting to? The Department—the Pentagon—has a number. 

They have—and I don’t know whether that number is classified or 

not—but it is substantially lower than the number that the Russian generals told the EMP Commission that they had enhanced 

the EMP weapons to produce. 

General BOGDAN. I will just make a few quick comments about 

that, sir. The standards by which the Department of Defense sets 

the EMP levels for the airplanes are based on, as I know—understand it—a very detailed assessment of the threats. 

Without getting into any classified information, we can provide 

you that process. And they look at the current and the future 

threats to determine that EMP level. Relative to our airplane, as 

again I said, one of the inherent capabilities of our airplane being 

a commercial derivative airplane is, every commercial airplane has 

to have a certain amount of hardening for lightening strikes. 

And the FAA requires that and tests that during their ATC and 

STC certifications, as I talked about. So an added enhancement to 

our airplane is not only for the normal threat of EMP, but on top 

of that the FAA certification for things like lightening strike will 

be incorporated in our airplane. And I will get you the information 

about how we determine those levels. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 43.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes. Lightening strikes are what is referred to as 

an E2. It is an E2 component of a nuclear detonation. The E1 has 

a rise time in nanoseconds. No lightning protection, as far as I 

know, provides any meaningful protection against E1. And airplanes probably are not so susceptible to E3, which is a really, really long wavelength that couples with railroad tracks and wires buried deeply under the ground, coupled with the E3. 

I am concerned, because when we really need these planes in a 

war with a peer, it is in all of their open literature, it is in all of 

their war games. One of the first things they do is a robust EMP 

lay-down to deny us the use of all of our equipment which is not 

EMP hardened, which is far too much of our equipment. And I am 

concerned that if we are going to harden, hadn’t we not ought to 

the level that we are told we should expect. 

I will look forward to your written response to this. And if the 

level to which you are hardening is not at the level that was designated by the Russian generals to the EMP Commission, then I 

would like your suggestions as to why it should not be. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Roscoe. 

Our next is Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Van Buren, you were asked earlier about the Budget Control 

Act in terms of impact on the program. How about the C.R. [Continuing Resolution] last year in terms of the, you know, fits and 

starts and where we are today with the C.R.? And, you know, has 

that—it is—I mean, we are right now at R&D [Research and Devel-
12 

opment] sort of level in terms of where the program is. And I am 

just sort of wondering if that had any sort of delay, interruption, 

cost? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The continuing resolution last year did not impact the program. 

General Bogden, what is your assessment of this year? 

General BOGDAN. Sir, we took a look at that. And if we were to 

go into a C.R. for the entire fiscal year 2012 year and maintain at 

the fiscal year 2011 levels, we would be $203 million short of what 

we would need to pay Boeing in their progress payments for work 

done on the EMD contract in fiscal year 2012. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. The numbers that we have here seems to 

suggest it was fairly level from 2011 to 2012. So there actually is 

a difference in terms of what you—the plan was for—— 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. When we originally put the budget in 

for 2012, it was long before we figured who was going to win this 

competition, because we hadn’t chosen the winner. So we had to 

budget for either possibility that the other competitor of Boeing 

would win. 

And if the other competitor would have won, we would have 

needed more money in 2012 than we would have for Boeing. And 

in this instance, because Boeing won, although 2012 and 2013 are 

leveled together, they are not equal, per se. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. Because the numbers that we have 

here—— 

General BOGDAN. And then, like I said, we went back, and based 

on Boeing’s projected progress payments, which I have to validate, 

I have to take a look and make sure that they are really earning 

the money they claim they are earning with the work being completed. We will be about $200 million short on the progress payments for them. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. 

General BOGDAN. If we are at the 2011 level. 

Mr. COURTNEY. That is helpful for us to know that. 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. One last question. 

General Litchfield, you talked about the operations that the 

tanker fleet has been involved in, in recent years. You know, looking at Libya where after the initial sort of salvo of ships and strike 

aircraft, I mean, our involvement tended to just sort of revert to 

refueling and recognizance. 

Is that because the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

allies don’t really have that capability? I mean, are we the only 

ones that really have refueling fleets of any size or significance? 

General LITCHFIELD. I think size and significance is a fair statement. There are other countries that have air refueling capability, 

but we are really the joint and coalition and allied supplier of air 

refueling across our partners. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So what percentage? I guess in terms of the operations of Libya, just an estimation? 

General LITCHFIELD. I would have to get some specifics on—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. 

General LITCHFIELD. I would have to take that one for the 

record. 
13 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 43.] 

Mr. COURTNEY. But it is significant, as you said? 

General LITCHFIELD. Well, I think what is the real important 

thing is that our tankers are involved globally. You could say 

Libya, but I could say the same thing about the humanitarian operations in Japan when they were, after the tsunami and the nuclear 

incident, we were there. 

I could talk to you about what we do on a daily basis for keeping 

the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] for drug 

interdictions and all that. I could talk to you about getting our 

wounded warriors home when they need to get MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] from the AOR [Area of Responsibility] all the way 

to the (?), because minutes matter in terms of saving a life. 

I think you could talk any operation you want any day, and our 

tankers are fully engaged in keeping—in support of their mission. 

We can get the answer on Libya. But what I would really like 

to leave you with is there isn’t a day go by that a 135 averages 

passing about 5 million pounds of fuel and supplying about 400- 

plus aircraft with refueling. And that is on a normal day. 

Mr. COURTNEY. You don’t have to, you know, spend your time, 

you know, chasing those numbers. But I guess the point is just that 

there really is no other ally that can sort of fill that hole if we don’t 

get this program, you know, hitting all cylinders on time. So—— 

General LITCHFIELD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY [continuing]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

And next is Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank the witnesses for being here today, and the service to— 

that you are providing to our country. Thank you. 

Like many people, especially those along the Gulf Coast, we were 

kind of surprised about the KC–X award, but after reviewing the 

selection documents it pretty much came up to our—ultimately our 

satisfaction that the decisionmaking process was okay. 

I do have a few questions that I would like to ask. I did have 

a question on the $300 million overrun, but that has already been 

asked and answered. 

So just General Bogden—but anybody who wants to jump in, feel 

free—is according to some press reports, the FAA is proposing 

heightened scrutiny of the wing skin after cracks as large as half 

an inch were found on commercial 767s. 

What impact will this have on the KC–46A program, and what 

measures has the Air Force taken to ensure that the tanker can 

meet the desired capabilities in the service line? 

General BOGDAN. Sir, I am not sure if you are referring to the 

most recent airworthiness directive from the FAA about cracks that 

were recently found on some 767s. If you are talking about that 

one, what I can tell you is 183 of the oldest 767s in the commercial 

fleet today have older wing pylons on their airplanes. And it is 

those wing pylons that the FAA has sent out an airworthiness directive on just a few weeks ago for increased rate of inspection. 

The reason why that won’t affect us is because in 2005 the FAA 

actually found those wing cracks and sent out the original air-
14 

worthiness directive. And that is why most of the 767 fleet today 

has the new pylons and was not affected by this most recent finding of cracks. 

The design of our airplane has the new wing pylons from the 

2005 airworthiness directive. So we are confident, relative to that 

particular incident, that our airplane will not meet the same fate. 

One of the requirements, in a broader sense, one of the requirements we have on this contract is that Boeing has to prove to us 

during the design, development and testing phase of the program 

that this airplane is going to last for 40 years. 

That includes a number of different engineering tests and analysis on the structures, the wings, the skin of the airplane. And the 

requirements to meet that 40-year lifecycle are not the commercial 

requirements. They are the military standard requirements, which 

go above and beyond in a number of instances from the commercial 

inventory. 

So I am fairly confident that Boeing understands this. I am also 

fairly confident that our overseeing of Boeing developing and designing the airplane to the military standard for a 40-year lifecycle 

on the airplane is going to mitigate any problems we may see. 

Mr. PALAZZO. And I have one more question, Mr. Chairman. 

What impacts would sequestration, as a result of the potential 

outcome of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, have 

on this program, the KC–46A? 

General BOGDAN. As Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Assad had already 

spoken, I will say it in very simple terms. The EMD contract on 

this program is a fixed price contract. All 175 production airplanes 

have already been priced. 

We know exactly how much we are going to pay for both EMD, 

and for every one of those airplanes. And we got a good deal. 

If we were to remove money from this program of a significant 

amount that we would have to alter the development program or 

alter our production target quantities, there is a chance that we 

would have to renegotiate both of those contracts. And that would 

put in jeopardy a significant savings to the taxpayers. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

And last is Mrs. Davis. We have—there is a 15-minute vote and 

we are probably, what do you think, about 13 minutes into it or 

so, possibly? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try and be quick. 

And thank you all for being here. 

I just have a quick question to your last response. Wouldn’t Boeing have assumed that they were building to military standards 

and not commercial; is that not a correct assumption? 

General BOGDAN. During the proposal phase and during the 

source selection when we laid out our requirements, Boeing was 

well aware that the airplane had to meet the military standards for 

the 40-year lifecycle. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. 

Is there anything else besides what you suggested to the committee—and I may have missed this—that you learned from this 

process that informs future decisions? Because I think sometimes 

we, you know, we demonstrate that we have cut something and 
15 

that is fine. And I think we are obviously looking at, you know, a 

tremendous number of cuts. But there doesn’t seem to be a real 

systemic change to the culture of doing that. 

What did you learn that informs future decisions? 

Mr. ASSAD. In this particular program, Congresswoman, what we 

learned was that we need to use the type of procurement practice 

that we used on KC–X on as many programs, frankly, as we can, 

but that requires firm requirements. 

In this particular case, we spent a significant amount of time understanding from the warfighter exactly what their requirement 

was, so that the plane that rolled off the production line, in fact, 

can go to war from day one. 

And so, in those instances where we can define our requirements 

in a firm way, we need to use this type of contract, you know? It 

is appropriate to use a fixed price contract when you have definitive requirement and that is where we want to be whenever we can 

be there. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is that—go ahead, sir. I am sorry. 

General BOGDAN. Go ahead, ma’am. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Would anyone be challenging you on that in the future? 

Mr. ASSAD. Well, you know, there are those who never think a 

fixed price contract is the right type of a contract to use. And our 

view is, if the shoe fits on Cinderella’s foot, she should wear it. And 

so, if a fixed price contract is appropriate, if the firm requirements 

are there and known and the risks are understood, it is an appropriate contract to use. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay, thank you. 

And I know that the—my understanding that the KC–46A will 

replace about 179 of the current 472 legacy tankers. So what about 

the others? What is the Air Force’s plan to replace the others? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The baseline, Congresswoman, has always been 

for the so-called KC–Y and a KC–Z that would go on after the acquisition of the KC–X program. And the whole set of requirements 

and acquisition approach will be more than a decade out during the 

period of our procurement of the KC–X tankers. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you for everybody helping on keeping the questions pretty short. Two more people have come in. 

Mr. Johnson, you are next. If you keep your questions to a couple 

minutes, that allows Mr. Larsen to ask one and we will still get 

to votes on time. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Assad, I just heard you say that the as far as the KC– 

X and KC–Y programs, they would—you didn’t say that they would 

replace the KC–135. You said they would go on after the KC–135. 

Which is the most accurate description? 

Mr. ASSAD. I am sorry, I might not have been as clear as I wanted to be. The whole replacement of the KC–135 fleet and the KC– 

10 fleet will be conducted by a series of procurements, KC–X being 

the first one, then KC–Y and then KC–Z. So there are three programs that will go incrementally through the years to replace the 

current tanker fleets. 
16 

Mr. JOHNSON. So we will have three models that are replacing 

the current tanker fleet? 

Mr. ASSAD. I would want to defer that until after the commander—mobility command—goes through and develops those requirements in the out-years. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But we are, as it stands now, planning for three 

replacements? 

Mr. ASSAD. Three procurements. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Three procurements, all of which would replace 

the program that is in place now with just the one aircraft? 

Mr. ASSAD. They would replace the current legacy fleet of KC– 

135 and KC–10. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Looking ahead at the mix of aircraft our Air Force 

would be using in 20 or 30 years, is it possible that we won’t need 

to spend billions of taxpayers’ money on a new heavy tanker if we 

could accomplish our objective with the KC–46? 

Mr. ASSAD. That is entirely possible. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I have no further questions. 

I will yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

And our last question goes to Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Most of the gentlemen I have heard from you at one time or the 

other about this program, so my only concern is, and the only comment—it is really more of a comment. Just given the news of the 

summer and the conversations that took place in the media about 

the development phase of this, that we would be sure that here you 

stick to your contract and you make sure that the contractor sticks 

to the contract. And that the taxpayers aren’t on the hook for anything but what is in the contract. That is the main point I want 

to make. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. That is our intent, sir. And that is the reason 

why we have very stringent controls with regard to constructive 

change to the contract, both at General Bogdan’s level and at my 

level. 

Mr. ASSAD. And in addition, Representative, that is why, frankly, 

we are, we have and we will continue OSD [Office of the Secretary 

of Defense] oversight to ensure that that happens. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, from OSD, not just from Air Force. 

Mr. ASSAD. That is correct, Congressman. 

Mr. LARSEN. And we will continue congressional oversight on you 

all. 

Thanks a lot. 

Mr. AKIN. Congressman Larsen, thank you. 

I just want to thank you all for being here. We just wanted a 

quick update on how the program was going. I think you did a 

great job and I wish you the very best on it. Make it the very best 

program ever. 

And so, we will stay tuned and thanks for taking the time with 

us. I am glad we got the questions done, so we do not have to wait 

and come back for anything. 

So, God bless you, have a great day. 

[Whereupon, at 1:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

(21) 

Statement of Hon. W. Todd Akin 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces 

Hearing on 

Update on KC–46A and Legacy Aerial Refueling Aircraft 

Programs 

October 13, 2011 

This afternoon the subcommittee meets to receive testimony from 

Department of Defense acquisition officials regarding the Air 

Force’s new tanker program, the KC–46, and to receive an update 

on current tanker aircraft, the KC–135 and the KC–10. Normally, 

we would hold this type of hearing at the beginning of the budget 

cycle, but as everyone knows, the Air Force was still in source selection and we felt that it was prudent to delay until sufficient information was available to the public. We also intend to provide 

sufficient, but not overly burdensome, oversight of this program 

and expect that this will go into the record books as a model of 

success. 

Today we have with us Mr. Shay Assad, Director of Defense Acquisition Policy and Strategic Sourcing; Mr. Dave Van Buren, the 

Air Force’s Service Acquisition Executive; Major General Bruce 

Litchfield, Special Assistant to the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command; and Major General (Select) Chris Bogdan, Program 

Executive Officer for the KC–46 program. 

I think it’s safe to say that many folks have looked forward to 

this day, and more importantly, the fact that the Air Force has finally begun to replace its 50-year-old, Eisenhower-era tankers. 

And, that the old adage known as ‘‘Third Time’s a Charm’’ has once 

again been reaffirmed by the Air Force’s acquisition professionals. 

As chairman of this subcommittee, I commend the acquisition 

corps of professionals who so diligently oversaw the process for this 

source selection and conducted what I felt to be a fair, open, transparent and fierce competition between two global competitors within the aircraft industry. I feel that the most affordable aircraft that 

met warfighter requirements for our Air Force was selected, and 

that the taxpayers’ investment will provide many worthwhile and 

valuable returns. 

Air-to-air refueling is a crucial capability within our military and 

is what enables our global reach, influence and projection of our 

joint and allied air forces. Whether it is providing fuel for fighter 

aircraft to remain orbiting overhead our soldiers and marines on 

the ground in Afghanistan, or fuel for allied aircraft operations 

over Libya, or fuel for the last leg of that C–17 mission bringing 

our wounded warriors home from battle, air-to-air refueling will 
22 

always, and should always, remain a mainstay of our core 

capabilities. 

During this hearing, we hope to gain a better understanding of 

various elements of the KC–46 program and how it will be carried 

out, as well as understand all program risks that have been identified and the oversight mechanisms in place to keep the program on 

track. And, we will all appreciate the need for this new tanker as 

we hear testimony regarding our aging, but still capable, fleet of 

legacy tankers and the dedicated airmen that keep them flying. Finally, we’d like to gain an understanding on KC–46 program impacts as budget deliberations for the future continue to take center 

stage and remain uncertain. 
23 

Statement of Hon. Mike McIntyre 

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces 

Hearing on 

Update on KC–46A and Legacy Aerial Refueling Aircraft 

Programs 

October 13, 2011 

I would like to thank all of the witnesses for appearing here 

today to talk about this very important topic. The Air Force has 

waited way too long for a replacement for the KC–135, an aircraft 

with an average age of nearly 50 years. 

In our current environment of constrained budgets, it is absolutely critical that we get the KC–46 acquisition process on a stable 

track and on a schedule that is realistic and will not lead to costly 

delays. I understand that the Air Force recently completed an Integrated Baseline Review, and I am interested in hearing from the 

witnesses about any risks that were identified in that process. 

Recent press reports have estimated that the KC–46 program 

will experience cost overruns of more than $300 million. I would 

like to better understand how much of these overruns the Government would be liable for and what measures are being taken to 

prevent any further cost overruns. 

As we wait for the KC–46 to come online, I am concerned with 

the viability of our current legacy aerial refueling fleet. Their intheater demand remains high and it appears that trend will continue in the near term. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on the condition of our current legacy fleet and discussing 

their ability and capacity to meet increased theater demand. 

We are well aware of the fiscal constraints that DOD is currently 

facing. To the extent possible, I would like to hear what potential 

impacts the Budget Control Act and possible sequestration will 

have on the overall aerial refueling mission. 

I would like to thank the witnesses for their service to our country, and I thank the chairman for holding this important hearing 

today. 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

(43) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

General BOGDAN. MIL–STD–2169 addresses all aspects of the current EMP threat 

and provides detailed descriptions of the components of high-altitude EMP (HEMP) 

threat waveforms, which include E1 (prompt gamma HEMP), E2 (scattered and 

neutron inelastic gamma HEMP), and E3 (magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) HEMP). 

An unclassified composite waveform of E1, E2, and E3 HEMP environment is shown 

below. 

Only the E1 waveform is applicable to KC–46 aircraft as it couples well to antennas, equipment (through apertures), conductive lines, and contains strong in-band 

signals to interfere with communication receivers. Due to low frequency content, the 

E2 and E3 components do not affect aircraft. The E2 component couples to overhead 

and buried long conductive lines, vertical antenna towers, and aircraft with trailing 

wire antennas. The E3 component couples to power and long communication lines 

including undersea cables. 

MIL–STD–2169 is based on all currently known EMP threats and is maintained 

and updated by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) (8725 John J. Kingman Road, Stop 6201, Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060). [See page 10.] 

General BOGDAN. The KC–46 System Specification includes a contractual requirement to withstand an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) at least two times (6 dB) the 

EMP threat environment defined in the classified MIL–STD–2169. KC–46 aircraft 

will be designed and tested to meet this requirement. [See page 11.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY 

General LITCHFIELD. Total # of Air Refueling (AR) Sorties: 6043 

Total # of USAF Air Refueling Sorties: 4256 

U.S. Percentage of Total Air Refueling Sorties: 70.42% 

[See page 12.] 
44 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ 

General BOGDAN. The contractual requirement is for Boeing to deliver 18 aircraft 

ready to go to war on day one with all the support equipment, all the tech orders 

and all of the training, to the Air Force by August of 2017. As part of the Integrated 

Baseline Review (IBR) process, Boeing established an internal baseline schedule to 

deliver those 18 aircraft in March of 2017, approximately five months earlier than 

contractually required. 

During the IBR process, the KC–46 Directorate assessed Boeing’s overall schedule, the likelihood of Boeing meeting their internal March 2017 baseline date, and 

the likelihood of Boeing meeting the contractually required August 2017 date. The 

KC–46 Directorate came to the conclusion that it is likely that Boeing will meet the 

contractually required August 2017 date, but that there are four risks to the supporting schedule to closely manage during contract execution. 

Risk #1: In-line provisioning. Instead of building a basic commercial aircraft on 

their production line at Everett and then flying it down to Wichita to take it apart 

and install the military modifications on it, what they’re doing is called in-line provisioning. In-line provisioning means that Boeing is going to build the wiring and 

the bundling and the fuel lines in the aircraft at Everett as if the military modifications were going to be fit on the line. 

For example, when Boeing builds the tail of a 767 for a commercial customer, the 

tail of that aircraft does not have a hole in it to fit a boom. But for the KC–46 aircraft, when the tail section of that 767–2C gets to Everett, it will already have the 

hole in it for Boeing to put the boom in place. Boeing is passing down to their subtier suppliers an additional requirement to build the aircraft as if it were in the 

military aircraft configuration even though it’s going to be put together on a commercial line. While Boeing does this quite often in different variants of their commercial aircraft, doing so on an aircraft with military requirements and specifications increases the level of risk for accomplishing that work on time. 

Risk #2: FAA Certification. Boeing is going to deliver an airplane to the Government that is FAA certified. There are two elements to FAA certification. The first 

is an Amended Type Certification (ATC) associated with the commercial 767–2C. 

The is a Supplemental Type Certification (STC) associated with the military modifications that Boeing is going to put on the aircraft. It is typical to accomplish the 

ATC and STC in a serial manner—ATC first, install the military modifications, and 

then the STC. In this case, as a result of that in-line provisioning, Boeing is actually 

going to accomplish a portion of the ATC and STC concurrently. If a problem arises 

during the FAA ATC process, there is not a lot of time for Boeing to recover before 

they get to the STC process, which must be done before the Government can deem 

the aircraft airworthy to fly. 

The KC–46 Directorate has been working with the FAA, and the FAA has basically approved Boeing’s process for accomplishing the ATC and STC effort. However, 

the Government and Boeing team must collectively work to ensure there are no 

major issues with obtaining the initial ATC because that will—given the concurrency— propagate into the STC process. 

Risk #3: Flight Test. The test program, particularly for the Aerial Refueling certifications, will require efficient use and synchronization of FAA, developmental, and 

operational test resources to avoid driving additional test events, and to finish the 

test program objectives on schedule. While the KC–46 Directorate determined that 

Boeing has adequately justified their capability to achieve the proposed flight hours/ 

month and effectiveness rate for FAA certification of the 767–2C with 65 hours/ 

month and 85% effectiveness (i.e., a 15% re-fly rate), the KC–46 Directorate has 

some concern with Boeing’s ability to achieve their proposed KC–46 sortie rate of 

50 hours/month and 85% effectiveness given the amount of coordination and synchronization with outside resources. The KC–46 Directorate is working with Boeing 

to identify resource requirements and constraints to mitigate this risk. 

Risk #4: Software. Boeing plans to reuse 70%–80% of existing software on the 

KC–46 program. Although a higher reuse rate might be expected on a commercial 

derivative aircraft program, historical experience on military programs would typically suggest a software reuse rate of 20%–30%. Because of this, the KC–46 Directorate is focusing on software early in the program to ensure Boeing puts the proper 

emphasis on this area, especially given the modifications to the commercial software 

required to accommodate classified/unclassified separation, information assurance 

and other military capabilities. The program will use simulation and hardware and 

software integration laboratories to provide early indication of software effectiveness. In addition, the Government is driving the requirement to capture leading 

software metrics to pinpoint areas of concern such that appropriate expertise and 
45 

resources can engage early enough to prevent significant impacts to the program 

schedule. [See page 10.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

(49) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. Given the experience with late deliveries of Boeing’s Italian tanker 

program largely due to problems with the aerial refueling systems and the fact that 

the Government has listed the KC–46 wing pods and the fly-by-wire boom systems 

as major risk items, what process did the Government use to evaluate the readiness 

level of those key aerial refueling systems to ensure they can be developed and 

qualified in time to meet the proposed delivery schedule? 

Mr. VAN BUREN, General LITCHFIELD, and General BOGDAN. The RFP required a 

technology readiness level (TRL) assessment as well as an assessment of the risk 

associated with the approach. The TRL was assessed in accordance with the governing TRL standard. The risk was assessed based on technical judgment and past 

experience of many highly experienced evaluators. Boeing’s design and approach 

was found to be TRL 6 or higher with an acceptable level of risk. With respect to 

the Italian tanker, Boeing’s past experience produced significant lessons learned for 

the KC–46 program. For example, the issue with the wing pods was discovered on 

the Italian program which allowed Boeing to start mitigating the risk before contract award. The Italian program also provided relevant experience with boom control laws. Additionally, the KC–46 boom is the same shape as the KC–10 boom 

which allows the use of extensive historical data (analysis, wind tunnel, and flight 

test) to mitigate the development risk. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The documents we have reviewed indicate Boeing had acceptable 

plans to meet 577 requirements. The KC–X RFP mandates 372 mandatory requirements and the post-contract award documents indicate Boeing bid less than 18 nonmandatory requirements (the number EADS [European Aeronautic Defence and 

Space Company N.V.] bid) for a maximum of 390 requirements. What are the other 

requirements? 

Mr. VAN BUREN, General LITCHFIELD, and General BOGDAN. There are no additional requirements. The difference in number of requirements is solely due to Boeing separating single Government requirements into different system specification 

paragraphs. Breaking down requirements is a standard systems engineering practice. For example, if the Government required a capability on the ground and inflight, Boeing may have two separate paragraphs—one for the capability in-flight 

and one for the capability on the ground. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The schedule appears highly concurrent and compressed. From the 

materials presented we understand first flight is scheduled for 3Q14, followed by 

the initiation of the development test program in 2Q15, and a Milestone C decision 

planned for 4Q15. Thus, simultaneously with the occurrence of the IOT&E phase 

(3Q16–1Q17), 14 aircraft production representative aircraft must be delivered in 33 

months (August 2017). What independent tool, process, or agency did the Government use to determine this was only a moderate risk schedule? 

Mr. VAN BUREN, General LITCHFIELD, and General BOGDAN. During both the KC– 

X source selection and the post-contract award Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) 

process, the Department used independent cross-functional teams of subject matter 

experts to assess Boeing’s schedule and test approach. 

The KC–X source selection evaluation team conducted a thorough evaluation of 

each offeror’s proposal (to include each offeror’s program schedules and test approaches), per Section M of the Request for Proposal, to ensure there was ‘‘an expectation of a low to moderate risk of unsuccessful contract performance.’’ The KC–X 

source selection evaluation team—specifically evaluated by subject matter experts 

from the KC–X program office, Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), Air Force 

Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), AMC/TE, US Navy NAVAIR, 

Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), AF SEEK EAGLE Office (AFSEO) and 

reviewed by Air Force and OSD experts—concluded that Boeing’s test schedule and 

test approach was acceptable, and therefore, represented a ‘‘low to moderate risk of 

unsuccessful contract performance.’’ These organizations and subject matter experts 

provided a cross-service, independent assessment of Boeing’s schedule and test approach informed by experience from previous, relevant EMD programs. 

During the post-contract award IBR process, Boeing reiterated their internal baseline schedule to deliver the 18 aircraft in March of 2017, approximately five months 
50 

earlier than contractually required. The KC–46 Directorate (supported by the FAA 

and Defense Contract Management Agency) again assessed Boeing’s overall schedule and test approach, the likelihood of Boeing meeting their internal March 2017 

baseline date, and the likelihood of Boeing meeting the contractually required August 2017 date. The KC–46 Directorate concluded that it is likely (moderate risk) 

that Boeing will meet the contractually required August 2017 date, but that there 

are four risks to the supporting schedule to closely manage during contract execution. 

Risk #1: In-line provisioning. Instead of building a basic commercial aircraft on 

their production line at Everett and then flying it down to Wichita to take it apart 

and install the military modifications on it, what they’re doing is called in-line provisioning. In-line provisioning means that as Boeing builds the aircraft in Everett, 

they are going to do so with the wiring and the bundling and the fuel lines as if 

the military modifications were going to be fit on the line right there. 

For example, when Boeing builds the tail of a 767 for a commercial customer, the 

tail of that aircraft does not have a hole in it to fit a boom. But for the KC–46 aircraft, when the tail section of that 767–2C gets to Everett, it will already have the 

hole in it for Boeing to put the boom in place. So Boeing is passing down to their 

sub-tier suppliers an additional requirement to build the aircraft as if it were a military aircraft even though it’s going to be put together on a commercial line. While 

Boeing does this quite often in different variants of their commercial aircraft, to do 

so on a military aircraft with military requirements and specifications increases the 

level of risk for accomplishing that work on time. 

Risk #2: FAA Certification. Boeing is going to deliver an airplane to the Government that is FAA certified. There are two elements to FAA certification. The first 

is an Amended Type Certification (ATC) associated with the commercial 767–2C. 

The second part of the FAA certification is called a Supplemental Type Certification 

(STC) associated with the military modifications that Boeing is going to put on the 

aircraft. It is typical in the commercial world to accomplish the ATC and STC in 

a serial manner. You accomplish the ATC first, install the military modifications, 

and then accomplish the STC. In this case, as a result of that in-line provisioning, 

Boeing is actually going to accomplish a portion of the ATC and STC concurrently. 

If a problem arises during the FAA certification on the ATC side, there is not a lot 

of time for Boeing to recover before they get to the STC side, which must be done 

before the Government can deem the aircraft airworthy to fly. 

The KC–46 Directorate has been working with the FAA, and the FAA has basically approved Boeing’s process for accomplishing the ATC and STC effort. However, 

the Government and Boeing team must collectively work to ensure there are no 

major missteps in the initial ATC part, because that will—given the concurrency— 

propagate into the STC part of the certification. 

Risk #3: Flight Test. The test program, particularly for the aerial refueling certifications, will require efficient use and synchronization of FAA, developmental, and 

operational test resources to avoid driving additional test events, and to finish the 

test program objectives on schedule. While the KC–46 Directorate determined that 

Boeing has adequately justified their capability to achieve the proposed flight hours/ 

month and effectiveness rate for FAA certification of the 767–2C with 65 hours/ 

month and 85% effectiveness (i.e., a 15% re-fly rate), the KC–46 Directorate has 

some concern with Boeing’s ability to achieve their proposed KC–46 sortie rate of 

50 hours/month and 85% effectiveness given the amount of coordination and synchronization with outside resources. The KC–46 Directorate is working with Boeing 

to identify resource requirements and constraints to mitigate this risk. 

Risk #4: Software. Boeing plans to reuse 70%–80% of existing software on the 

KC–46 program. Although a higher reuse rate might be expected on a commercial 

derivative aircraft program, historical experience on military programs would typically suggest a software reuse rate of 20%–30%. Because of this, the KC–46 Directorate is focusing on software early in the program to ensure Boeing puts the proper 

emphasis on this area, especially given the modifications to the commercial software 

required to accommodate classified/unclassified separation, information assurance 

and other military capabilities. The program will use simulation and hardware and 

software integration laboratories, solely dedicated to the KC–46 program, to provide 

early indication of software effectiveness. In addition, the Government is driving the 

requirement to capture leading software metrics to pinpoint areas of concern such 

that appropriate expertise and resources can engage early enough to prevent significant impacts to the program schedule. 

Mr. PALAZZO. We understand that all 4 EMD aircraft are planned to be instrumented for the test phase and the IOT&E period is not scheduled to end until 1Q17. 

Presumably those 4 EMD aircraft will be added to the 14 LRIP aircraft to fulfill 

the requirement to deliver 17 [18] aircraft within 78 months after contract award. 
51 

A. What mechanism did the Government use to ensure these aircraft can be deinstrumented and modified to production representative status and delivered by August 2017? 

B. How does this schedule risk assessment take advantage of lessons learned from 

previous concurrent EMD schedule programs? 

C. How does the Government intend to protect the warfighter’s interest if the contractual schedule mandate (17 [18] aircraft within 78 months after contract award) 

is not met (i.e., will the Government seek reimbursement from the contractor to offset sustainment costs required to maintain the legacy tanker fleet)? 

Mr. VAN BUREN, General LITCHFIELD, and General BOGDAN. A. Boeing’s schedule 

shows a 90-day period per EMD aircraft that occurs prior to IOT&E for de-instrumentation and to update to a production representative baseline configuration as required for IOT&E per Title 10. After completion of IOT&E, the contract calls for 

these aircraft to reset all inspection clock times to zero and have deficiencies identified through IOT&E corrected to meet the final product baseline prior to final delivery to the Air Force. 

B. During both the KC–X source selection and the post-contract award Integrated 

Baseline Review (IBR) process, the Department used independent cross-functional 

teams of subject matter experts (SME) to assess Boeing’s schedule and test approach. These SMEs were able to provide lessons learned from various concurrent 

EMD schedule programs and identify risk areas with Boeing’s approach. 

The KC–X source selection evaluation team conducted a thorough evaluation of 

each offeror’s proposal (to include each offeror’s program schedules and test approaches), per Section M of the Request for Proposal, to ensure there was ‘‘an expectation of a low to moderate risk of unsuccessful contract performance.’’ The KC–X 

source selection evaluation team—specifically evaluated by subject matter experts 

from the KC–X program office, Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), Air Force 

Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), AMC/TE, US Navy NAVAIR, 

Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), AF SEEK EAGLE Office (AFSEO) and 

reviewed by Air Force and OSD experts—concluded that Boeing’s test schedule and 

test approach was acceptable, and therefore, represented a ‘‘low to moderate risk of 

unsuccessful contract performance.’’ During source selection, these organizations 

and subject matter experts provided a cross-service, independent assessment of 

Boeing’s schedule and test approach informed by experience from previous, relevant 

EMD programs. 

During the post-contract award IBR process, Boeing reiterated their internal baseline schedule to deliver the 18 aircraft in March of 2017, approximately five months 

earlier than contractually required. The KC–46 Directorate (supported by the FAA 

and Defense Contract Management Agency) again assessed Boeing’s overall schedule and test approach, the likelihood of Boeing meeting their internal March 2017 

baseline date, and the likelihood of Boeing meeting the contractually required August 2017 date. The KC–46 Directorate concluded that it is likely (moderate risk) 

that Boeing will meet the contractually required August 2017 date, but that there 

are four risks to the supporting schedule to closely manage during contract execution. 

Risk #1: In-line provisioning. Instead of building a basic commercial aircraft on 

their production line at Everett and then flying it down to Wichita to take it apart 

and install the military modifications on it, what they’re doing is called in-line provisioning. In-line provisioning means that as Boeing builds the aircraft in Everett, 

they are going to do so with the wiring and the bundling and the fuel lines as if 

the military modifications were going to be fit on the line right there. 

For example, when Boeing builds the tail of a 767 for a commercial customer, the 

tail of that aircraft does not have a hole in it to fit a boom. But for the KC–46 aircraft, when the tail section of that 767–2C gets to Everett, it will already have the 

hole in it for Boeing to put the boom in place. So Boeing is passing down to their 

sub-tier suppliers an additional requirement to build the aircraft as if it were a military aircraft even though it’s going to be put together on a commercial line. While 

Boeing does this quite often in different variants of their commercial aircraft, to do 

so on a military aircraft with military requirements and specifications increases the 

level of risk for accomplishing that work on time. 

Risk #2: FAA Certification. Boeing is going to deliver an airplane to the Government that is FAA certified. There are two elements to FAA certification. The first 

is an Amended Type Certification (ATC) associated with the commercial 767–2C. 

The second part of the FAA certification is called a Supplemental Type Certification 

(STC) associated with the military modifications that Boeing is going to put on the 

aircraft. It is typical in the commercial world to accomplish the ATC and STC in 

a serial manner. You accomplish the ATC first, install the military modifications, 

and then accomplish the STC. In this case, as a result of that in-line provisioning, 
52 

Boeing is actually going to accomplish a portion of the ATC and STC concurrently. 

If a problem arises during the FAA certification on the ATC side, there is not a lot 

of time for Boeing to recover before they get to the STC side, which must be done 

before the Government can deem the aircraft airworthy to fly. 

The KC–46 Directorate has been working with the FAA, and the FAA has basically approved Boeing’s process for accomplishing the ATC and STC effort. However, 

the Government and Boeing team must collectively work to ensure there are no 

major missteps in the initial ATC part, because that will—given the concurrency— 

propagate into the STC part of the certification. 

Risk #3: Flight Test. The test program, particularly for the aerial refueling certifications, will require efficient use and synchronization of FAA, developmental, and 

operational test resources to avoid driving additional test events, and to finish the 

test program objectives on schedule. While the KC–46 Directorate determined that 

Boeing has adequately justified their capability to achieve the proposed flight hours/ 

month and effectiveness rate for FAA certification of the 767–2C with 65 hours/ 

month and 85% effectiveness (i.e., a 15% re-fly rate), the KC–46 Directorate has 

some concern with Boeing’s ability to achieve their proposed KC–46 sortie rate of 

50 hours/month and 85% effectiveness given the amount of coordination and synchronization with outside resources. The KC–46 Directorate is working with Boeing 

to identify resource requirements and constraints to mitigate this risk. 

Risk #4: Software. Boeing plans to reuse 70%–80% of existing software on the 

KC–46 program. Although a higher reuse rate might be expected on a commercial 

derivative aircraft program, historical experience on military programs would typically suggest a software reuse rate of 20%–30%. Because of this, the KC–46 Directorate is focusing on software early in the program to ensure Boeing puts the proper 

emphasis on this area, especially given the modifications to the commercial software 

required to accommodate classified/unclassified separation, information assurance 

and other military capabilities. The program will use simulation and hardware and 

software integration laboratories, solely dedicated to the KC–46 program, to provide 

early indication of software effectiveness. In addition, the Government is driving the 

requirement to capture leading software metrics to pinpoint areas of concern such 

that appropriate expertise and resources can engage early enough to prevent significant impacts to the program schedule. 

C. The Air Force will hold Boeing responsible for all contractual obligations. If 

Boeing does not meet its contractual obligations—for example, meeting the August 

2017 RAA date with 18 aircraft—due to a contract-caused delay, then the Government would negotiate an adjusted schedule with Boeing and seek appropriate consideration from Boeing for that change. FAR 49.402–4 provides the contracting officer with the ability to ‘‘permit the contractor, the surety, or the guarantor, to continue performance of the contract under a revised delivery schedule.’’ In conjunction 

with reaching an agreement on a revised delivery schedule, FAR 49.402–7 requires 

the contracting officer to promptly ‘‘assess and demand any liquidated damages to 

which the Government is entitled under the contract.’’ 

Æ