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© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

“In combination with 

the ways in which Pakistan 

seems to be moving further 

from its historical oscillations 

between civilian and military 

rule, current circumstances 

provide an opportunity for 

the PTI to develop into a 

political alternative capable 

of bolstering civilian effectiveness, particularly given the 

way in which the party has 

energized youth participation 

and required traditional actors 

to react to mass sentiment.”

May 24, 2012

The PTI and Pakistan’s Changing 

Political Landscape

Summary

•	 Asthe Pakistani electoral cycle gears up for an election, the country’straditional political

stakeholdersface a change in the tenor of political discourse and a more robust electoral field

due to the recent rise in popularsupport for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), or Pakistan

Movement for Justice, helmed by cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan.

•	 The PTI’s platform and rhetoric reflect current disaffection with Pakistan’s civilian leadership.

Encapsulated within the party’s populism is capitalization on a political opening in Pakistan

created by a tumultuous year and facilitated by perception of Khan as an‘anti-politician

politician.’

•	 The party possesses a security outlook in line with Pakistan’ssecurity establishment and differs

little from other political optionsin ways which should mitigate expectationsthat the PTI’s

political engagement will bring lasting changesto Pakistan’sstatus quo.

•	 Khan’s popularity with oft-politically marginalized groups and his emphasis on improving government accountability are forcing other political partiesto shift their responsivenessin ways

which reflect changing notions of the responsibilities of the state to its citizens. This change

indicates a continuing maturation in Pakistani democracy.

Background 

Pakistan is preparing for an election in early-2013. Within the context of thistimeline, the Pakistan

Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), a right-of-center political party,surprised observers when itsself-proclaimed

political‘tsunami’drew a crowd 100,000 strong to a rally in Lahore on October 30, 2011. Since

then, the PTI has enjoyed a sharp rise in popularsupport, drawing similarly large crowdsto rallies

around the country. Much has been made of this meteoric rise in popularsupport for the party,

currently the most popular political party at the national-level according to a recent IRI poll, and in

particular, PTI Chairman Imran Khan. June 2011 Pew Research Center polling data marked Khan as

Pakistan’s most favorably viewed political leader, with 68 percent of respondentsrating him positively, up from 52 percent in 2010. The public response has political observersspeculating about

the PTI’s electoral performance in the upcoming national elections. Equally interesting, however,

isthe impact of the PTI’sincreased appeal on public discourse regarding the nature of politics and

democracy in Pakistan, and what these conversations mean for the relationship between citizens

and elected leaders.

Stephanie Flamenbaum

E-mail: sflamenbaum@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3849

PEACEBRIEF127
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

The PTI and Pakistan’s Changing Political Landscape

page 2 • PB 127 • May 24, 2012

Khan formally entered Pakistani politicsin April 1996 asthe founding chairman of the PTI. A

national hero for captaining Pakistan’s 1992 one-day Cricket World Cup-winning team, Khan was

readymade for a cult of personality as he shifted his public persona toward social work and criticism of the rampant corruption in Pakistan’s politicalsystem. The PTI failed to win a single seat in

the 1997 national elections, but Khan has championed the PTI as a‘third force’between Pakistan’s

two most popular parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz

(PML-N). Eventually elected to Parliament in 2002, Khan became increasingly known for inconsistencies; an outspoken supporter of General Musharraf after he took power, he later called for

Musharraf’s execution. In short, few took Khan seriously, and in a country where voting behavior

is driven more by patronage and kinship than by potential and performance, the PTI continued to

lack genuine national influence.

Capitalizing on a Political Moment

Six months ago, just weeks before the Lahore rally, expectationsfor the PTI’s political future were

relatively low. What, then, has enabled the rapid transformation in the credibility enjoyed by the

PTI in recent months?

Overall, 2011 was a bad year for Pakistani politics. For months, there has been widespread

disillusionment with the PPP, from leadership absences at times of domestic crisis, namely President Zardari’sslow return from France at the onset of the devastating August 2010 floods, to the

country’s deepening economic crisis. Anger over corruption, inflation and frequent power outages

have coalesced in a populace fed up with the governance failures—perceived and real—of the

country’s major parties, from the PPP-Awami National Party (ANP)-Muttahid Quami Movement

(MQM) governing coalition to the PML-N in the Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province.

The unceasing parade of crisis moments compounded with a tumultuous year in Pakistan-U.S.

relations and the discontent embodied in the Arab Spring created a political opening for Khan and

the PTI. Asthe only major party not in power, the PTI was well positioned to become a mouthpiece

for popular grievances. In many ways, this political opening can be traced to the 2007 Lawyer’s

Movement, which, whether grassrootsin nature or institutional in itsfocus, brought about a

paradigm shift in state-citizen relations. Khan’s own emphasis on support to the resurgently independent judiciary and on improvementsin government transparency and accountability reinforce

the PTI’s position as a responsive and aware alternative in the current context, particularly given

perception of Khan as a clean politician. This ability to convey not just awareness of the grievances

of the average Pakistani, but empathy and a commitment to prioritize“legislation benefiting the

common man”1 helps explain much of the PTI’s popularsupport. This messaging rejects citizen

complicity in Pakistan’s currentstate of affairs and pairs effectively with anti-U.S. populism which,

while disconcerting to Western observers,should not be mistaken for the PTI’s primary missive. It

also speaksto the closeness of the PTI’sstance, particularly on issues of nationalsecurity, to Pakistan’s military. This affinity in views has prevented active pushback from the security establishment

to the PTI’srise, even as potential military backing of the party, often claimed by observers, remains

unclear. Khan’sregular interaction with traditional power brokerssuch asthe military, however,

bringsinto question whether the PTI’srise marks a new political moment, or more of the same.

The Same Pakistan or a “New Pakistan?”

Whether the PTI’s current role in Pakistani politicsis conceptualized as continuation of a democratic evolution, or a new phenomenon, it isimportant to consider the waysin which the PTI invokes

a politicalstatus quo which may hinder itsimpact even while enabling itssuccess. Foremost isthe
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The PTI and Pakistan’s Changing Political Landscape

page 3 • PB 127 • May 24, 2012

reality that, like the Bhutto’s PPP and Sharif’s PML-N, Khan embodies‘personalization of power’

wherein a leader, whether lauded or derided, issynonymous with the party or institution they

head.2 While effective for gaining popularity given the proclivity of Pakistanisto vote based on

personalities and subsequent patronage,such a personalization of power limits opportunity for

democratic culture to develop within partiesthemselves. The removal of the sub-clause requiring

intra-party electionsfrom Pakistan’s constitution during the passage of the 18th Amendment

removed the impetusfor partiesto develop a new generation of leaders by stifling internal dissent.

While the PTI has on multiple occasions declared intent to hold party elections despite the lack of

a legal obligation to do so, it remainsto be seen whether this would be a shallow exercise or one

fostering genuine internal debate. Nonetheless, that the PTIsharesthe structure of the country’s

other major partiesshould dampen expectations of the PTI as a divergence from currently weak

political party accountability to constituent needs, despite the party’srhetoric.

Within Khan’s cult of personality is a parallel to other crisis momentsin Pakistan’s history. In

Khan’srhetoric, one finds echoes of roti, kapra aur makaan (“food, clothing and shelter,”a central

PPP slogan during the PPP’srise) and the masssupport for the Islamic socialism of Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto in the 1970s. Khan’s own populism is most evident in his promise to eliminate corruption

within 90 days as part of his vision to make Pakistan an Islamic Welfare State.3 Asthe PTI welcomes

individualsfrom the political old guard,such historical parallelssuggest an extension ofsimilarities

beyond popularity to the endurance of Pakistan’s powerstructures, and subsequently a political

status quo. It remainsto be seen whether the PTI is welcoming these old handsin order to lend

viability to the rhetoric of hope and change yet unsubstantiated by concrete policy prescriptives.

But in Khan’s arguable electoral pandering—both with these old hands and in the PTI’s unclear

relationship with groupssuch asthe Difa-e-Pakistan Council, a coalition of 40-plusright wing religious parties—are questions about the true intent and capacity of the party should it be given the

chance to govern. By enveloping old names and maintaining a security outlook in conformity with

the security establishment, the PTI leavesscantspace to shift Pakistan’s overallstrategic outlook in

ways necessary for the state to transform its civil-military relationship, and in turn, alterstate priorities and resource allocation to addressissues of governance and socioeconomic advancement.

Contravening the waysin which the PTI and Khan are following a script of political ascendancy is

the party’ssupport among Pakistani youth, a key constituency given that an estimated 67 percent

of Pakistan’s population is under 30. During an April 20 PTI rally in Quetta, more than half of the top

trending topics across Pakistan on Twitter were PTI related,4 highlighting both the demographic

reach of the party’s appeal and the space the PTI occupiesin social media. This engagement with

politics by Pakistani youth marks a major divergence from recent years, during which high demand

by Pakistani youth for positive political change wasinversely met with high disapproval of active

political engagement. A 2009 British Councilsurvey found that“few young Pakistanisfeel able to

campaign for change,”with the result that half of those surveyed were not on the voter lists.5 While

youth interest in the PTI has been particularly evident, thisshift extends beyond the PTI into other

arenas of Pakistani political life. Voter registration drives have been undertaken on Facebook as

political discussion has broadened into non-traditional mediums. Asthe PTI phenomenon transforms Pakistan’s youth into an accessible and arguably vital voting bloc, the PPP and PML-N have

been forced to heighten their youth outreach. In March, Nawaz Sharif, PML-N Chief, visited Punjab

University and promised the distribution of 300,000 laptopsin the coming monthsin a clear attempt to win over young voters. PPP and PML-N campaigning acrossthe country show additional

signs of having adopted the PTI engagement model, particularly as both partiesreemphasize their

youth and women’s wings and visibly promote the next generation of each party’s personalization

of power in the form of Bilawal Bhutto Zardari (PPP) and Maryam Nawaz (PML-N).
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

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About This Brief

This brief examines changes in 

the Pakistani political landscape in 

advance of the country’s election, 

expected in early-2013. Stephanie 

Flamenbaum is a senior program 

assistant for the Afghanistan and 

Pakistan programs in USIP’s Center 

for Conflict Management.

In the same British Councilsurvey, respondentsindicated that Pakistani youth, not unlike other

demographic categories,see the government as widely corrupt. Imran Khan’s use of accountability

as a lynchpin of his political persona subsequently resonates deeply. Khan, who emphasizes his

requirement that members declare their financial assets before joining the PTI, boycotted the

February 2012 by-elections when the voter lists he had requested be reviewed by the Supreme

Court were not validated in advance of Election Day. Thisreview process uncovered 35 million

potentially invalid names among the 80 million registered. When complete, it will enhance the

ability of the Election Commission of Pakistan to guarantee clean elections, regardless of the party

or parties which come out on top. While Khan’s anti-corruption stance raises eyebrows among

those who question his ability to solve Pakistan’s corruption challenge, hisregular insertion of

corruption into public discourse has changed the anti-corruption narrative from lamentable reality

to actionable issue. The PTI’s opponents are being forced to addressincreasing allegationsraised

by media actors emboldened by the PTI’sstance on accountability. This narrative shift has even

impacted the PTI; Khan’s call for internal electionsreflects pressure on the PTI to maintain its high

level of transparency and appear responsive to public sentiment.

Progress in the Political Landscape

If the PTI’s current trend toward reliance on Pakistan’straditional powerstructures continuesrather

than affecting a lasting shift towardsthe grassroots mobilization the party’sreach among youth

impliesitseemslikely that history will repeat itself. But a potentialspace for political restructuring appearsto exist in the conversations happening about the PTI, its political viability, and its

political rivals within the country’straditional powerstructures. In combination with the waysin

which Pakistan seemsto be moving further from its historical oscillations between civilian and

military rule, current circumstances provide more opportunity for the PTI to develop into a political

alternative capable of bolstering civilian effectiveness, particularly given the way in which the

party has energized youth participation and required traditional actorsto react to masssentiment.

Regardless of the PTI’s electoral or legislative performance in the coming months, the need for

realistic expectationsfor the PTI’s ultimate political influence should not undermine the fact that

the party’simpact on conversations about Pakistan’s political future means a bad year for Pakistani

politicsistranslating into an opportunity for Pakistani democracy to become more responsive and

perhaps even more accountable to the people whose will it is meant to represent.

Notes

1.	 “An Agenda for Resurgence: The Manifesto of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.”

2.	 See Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: a political history (Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 1997).

3.	 For Khan, this predominantly relatesto income distribution in the context of anti-corruption.

In a February 1 interview, Khan defined such a welfare state as one where leaders“Use taxes for the

people, not against them. The State isresponsible and must provide the basic needs of the people.

All policies must be made for the bottom 50 percent of the population.”See Kiran Nazish,“Pakistan

is a rich, rich country: Imran Khan,”The Express Tribune, 1 Feb 2012.

4.	 The top 4 trending topics across Pakistan near the end of the rally were #PTI4Balochistan,

#Quetta, Imran Khan and Balochistan

5.	 The British Council,“Pakistan: the Next Generation,”November 2009, pg. 15-16.

The PTI and Pakistan’s Changing Political Landscape

page 4 • PB 127 • May 24, 2012