Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : NANCY A. McCASLIN GREGORY F. ZOELLER McCaslin & McCaslin Attorney General of Indiana Elkhart, Indiana AARON J. SPOLARICH Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


## IN THE COURT OF APPEAL S OF INDIANA

A. B. , ) ) Appellant

- Respondent , ) ) vs. ) No. 20A03

- 1112

- JV

- 540 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee

- Petitioner

. )

APP EAL FROM THE ELKHART CIRCUIT COURT The Ho n orable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge The Honorable Deborah A. Domine, Magistrate C ause No. 20C01

- 1108

- JD

- 312

May 17, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION
- NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFOR D, Judge2

Appellant

- Petitioner A.B. challenges the trial court’s finding him to be a delinquent child based upon the crime of Class A misdemeanor Battery if committed by
an adult. 1 Upon appeal, A.B. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his adjudication. We affirm

.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 3 0, 2011 Elkhart Community Schools bus driver Betty Denman was dropping children off ne ar the ar ea of Washington G ardens in Elkhart when she saw a group of people arguing. Apparently A.Be., who was the mother of one of Denman’s students, and a certain E.B. were in an argument regarding A.Be.’s testimony against
E.B. in an unrelated case. A s A.Be. approached Denman’s school bus, an individual described by Denman to be a young black male with braids in his hair, approach ed A.Be.
The male punched A.Be. three times with a closed fist , including on the bridge of her nose. This knocked A.Be.’s glasses off and scraped her nose. A.Be. did not personally
know her attacker but , after receiving tips from others, identified him from a photograph
on her Facebook account as the pe rson known by the community as “Pimp.” A.B.’s
Facebook account identifie s him both as A.B. and as “Pimp.” A.B.’s date of birth is November 27, 1994, and he was sixteen years old at the time of the incident. On August 1, 2011, the State alleged A.B. to be a delinquent child based upon the
offense of Class A misdemeanor batter y. At the November 4, 2011, fact

- finding hearing, A.Be. identified A.B. in court as her perpetrator

. A.B. testified in his defense, claiming on direct examination that he did not hit A.Be., that he did not have braids, and

1 Ind. Code § 35

- 42

- 2

- 1(a)(1)(A) (2011).3

that he had never seen or met E .B. A.B. conceded on cross - examination, however, that his nickname was “Pimp ,” that he had attended at least two court hearings with E.B. , and that he would be willing to fight on E.B.’s behalf. Following the fact

- finding hearing, the trial court enter ed a true finding against A.B. based in part on its assessment of his credibility as “zero.” Tr. p. 53. The trial court subsequently entered a dispositional order adjudicating A.B. to be a delinquent child and placing him in the Elkhart County Juvenile D etention Center. This appeal
follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION Upon appeal, A.B. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence identify ing him to
be the perpetrator. A.B. claims that he was not in the area on the day A.Be. was injured,
that he did not see t he fight between E.B. and A.Be., and that he did not have braids in
his hair. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support A.B.’s adjudication, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. D.W. v. State , 903 N.E .2d 966 , 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied

. We look only to probative evidence supporting the adjudication and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from that evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the juvenile was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the adjudication, it will not be set aside. Id. The uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain an adjudication of delinquency on appeal. Id.4

A.B.’s argument is based upon his version of the events in question. But the trial court did not believe A.B.’s testimony . In fact, it found A.B. totally lacked credibility. We will defer to its assessment on this poin t. Further, t he record contains ample evidence linking A.B. to A.Be.’s battery. Most significantly, A.Be. identified him to be the perpetrator, which is sufficient, by itself, to sustain A.B.’s adjudication. See i d. In addition, A.B. admitted that he w ould fight on E.B.’s behalf. At the time of the battery, E.B. was fighting with A.Be

. , creating a situation in which A.B. was ad mittedly prepared
to assist E.B

. A.B.’s challenge is merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we
decline to do.
Th e judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. VAIDIK, J., and CRONE, J., concur.