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STRENGTHENING THE BORDER—FINDING THE 

RIGHT MIX OF PERSONNEL, INFRASTRUCTURE, 

AND TECHNOLOGY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND 

MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 15, 2011 

Serial No. 112–10 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

VACANCY

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Chairwoman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona, Vice Chair 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

PAUL ANSTINE, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security ........................................................................................................ 1 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security ................................................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES

Mr. Michael J. Fisher, Chief of the Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Accompanied by Mark 

Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Technology Innovation and 

Acquisition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 

Security and Michael C. Kostelnik, Assistant Commissioner, Office of CBP 

Air & Marine, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 9 

Major General Hugo Salazar, Adjutant General, Arizona National Guard: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

Mr. Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Graph .................................................................................................................... 32 

(1) 

STRENGTHENING THE BORDER—FINDING 

THE RIGHT MIX OF PERSONNEL, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

Tuesday, March 15, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Miller, McCaul, Quayle, Duncan, 

Cuellar, Jackson Lee, Higgins, and Clarke. 

Also present: Representative Green. 

Mrs. MILLER [presiding]. If I can turn my mic on, we will get it 

going on here this morning. It is still early. I would like to call the 

committee to order. 

Certainly, first of all, let me just thank all of our witnesses sincerely, every one of you, for taking time today to provide the testimony that you are going to be providing to the committee and answering our questions very forthrightly. We are sincerely appreciative of that. 

I want to say that the men and women of Customs and Border 

Protection have our Nation’s gratitude so very, very much for all 

of the work that they do and they perform to keep our Nation safe. 

Certainly, Major General Salazar, we had a chance to chat before 

we opened the hearing. We appreciate so much all the work that 

the men and women in the National Guard all across our country, 

engaged in theater. I mentioned to you my husband spent many, 

many years in the Air National Guard, a blue suiter—but we are 

very appreciative of the work that they do everywhere and work 

that they are doing to work so closely with CBP in securing our 

Nation’s border today. We will be interested in hearing about that. 

Our first hearing, actually, examined the concept of operational 

control of the border. We tried to define what operational control 

is and the matrix that we are utilizing to determine what operational control is of both the Southern border and the Northern 

border and, I think, the difference between what the American people commonly think when they hear the term ‘‘operational control’’ 

and then what the Border Patrol means when they say ‘‘effective 

control.’’ 

This hearing determines and tries to build on that discussion by 

examining the three main pillars that allow Border Patrol agents 
2 

to be effective. That, of course, is a combination of personnel, infrastructure, and technology. I think we certainly need all three to be 

successful in securing our borders. 

Since the year 2004 we have invested literally billions of dollars 

in every one of these categories, all three of the categories. But we 

want to look at how they work in concert to enable our agents to 

be effective. Today we are going to look at the level of agents that 

we have in the field, the amount of fencing that we have, infrastructure, and perhaps certainly one of the most critical elements, 

and that is how we are utilizing technology as well along our borders. 

The Secure Border Initiative Net, SBInet, as everybody calls it, 

was designed to be one of the solutions, technology solutions to 

help secure the Southwest border. It has been used as well on the 

Northern border, but after a number of years of missteps and we 

didn’t get what we wanted to out of the SBInet, and as well we expended over $1 billion, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet 

Napolitano, decided to cancel this program after the completion of 

an analysis of alternatives, which determined that SBInet was just 

not economically feasible. 

So the logical question is, and one of the things that I hope we 

get to today, is what is the follow on? What is the follow on to 

SBInet? If not SBInet, then what is next if, you know, we can’t put 

enough agents on the border, we can’t put up enough fence to provide the level of security on the very vast Southwest border, and 

certainly the Northern border, that is required to protect our sovereignty and to meet the demands of the American people? So, 

technology has to become a force multiplier, a force multiplier to 

support the incredible efforts, again, of our brave border agents. 

In fact, I think that is what the Border Patrol envisions—utilizing technologies to reduce the workload, to make them more effective for the men and women in the field as well as to enhance 

their effectiveness in identifying, apprehending, whether it is drug 

smugglers or illegal immigrants, who might only seek economic opportunity, but as well potential terrorists and others, who would 

seek to cross the border illegally. 

The Department of Homeland Security’s Analysis of Alternatives, 

which formed a new technology plan for the State of Arizona, consists of a combination of Remote Video Surveillance Systems, Mobile Surveillance Systems, Unattended Ground Sensors and other 

types of technology. The backbone of the Arizona plan actually consists of Integrated Fixed Towers, which look very similar to the 

original design of SBInet. 

However, it now appears that the technology plan for the entire 

Southwest border currently being prepared will not be ready until 

July instead of March, as we had originally hoped. 

I am concerned about the lack of a comprehensive technology 

plan as well for the Northern border, which does not appear to be 

something that CBP is considering at this time. I just would once 

again, and I always say that I am totally cognizant and very sensitive to all of the challenges that are happening on the Southern 

border of our Nation, but I like to remind folks we actually have 

two borders, so the Northern border as well. Both of them need to 

be secured. 
3 

To fund this new technology plan, the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget included $242 million in the border security fencing 

infrastructure and technology account, which will be used to deploy 

the first three of five total, as I understand it, Integrated Fixed 

Tower System deployments to Border Patrol stations’ areas of responsibility in Arizona. 

Unmanned aerial systems are another critical tool employed by 

CBP Air and Marine, which gives the agents the ability to loiter 

over an area for long periods of time, making this platform ideal 

for the surveillance missions required by the Border Patrol. As 

well, I am a very strong supporter of using UAVs—I know my colleague, Mr. Cuellar, is as well—and, you know, which have proven 

to be so effective in theater in Iraq and Afghanistan to scale a vast 

expanse of the borders. 

Infrastructure is also critically important to our success in gaining control of the border. Like technology, it is not a solution by 

itself, but provides what the Border Patrol calls persistent impedance, which either pushes illegal crossers into more remote areas 

or gives Border Patrol agents more time to respond. 

I think we will be asking the question: Do we need more fencing, 

or is 350 miles of pedestrian fence and 299 miles of vehicle fence 

along the Southwest border adequate? Again, these are some of the 

questions that the committee is seeking to have answered today. 

Finally, the National Guard has been surged to the border several times since 2006, to perform a variety of missions. However, 

I am very concerned that the National Guardsmen and women are 

possibly constrained by DOD regulations. We don’t want it to be an 

exercise in good optics, obviously, to say that we are sending all 

these National Guard troops to the border, but then limiting their 

ability to actually do the job that they have been trained to do and 

are able to do so effectively and so well. 

So we just want to certainly make sure that the Congress is assisting and enabling the National Guard to be able to do the job 

that they need to do along the border. 

Of course, I would point out that each and every mile of border 

is different. I am certainly cognizant again of the fact that it will 

take a combination of technology, personnel, and infrastructure to 

secure the border. There is no one-size-fits-all solution for a border 

as vast and different, certainly, as ours. 

Again, I want to welcome all of the witnesses. I look forward to 

all of your testimony today. 

At this time the Chairwoman would recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Cuellar. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here with us. 

I think we both agree that we are at a very important stage in 

our Nation’s efforts to secure our borders. As border security 

threats are continuing to evolve and our country is facing new challenges that demand new resolutions, we must be at the forefront 

of all measures to secure and protect our homeland, including our 

many points of entry and exit on the Northern and Southern border. 

At our Northern and Southern borders, we have taken critical 

steps to interdict the flow of illegal weapons, people, drugs, and 
4 

cash, but more work needs to be done. Chairwoman Miller and I 

both represent districts along our Nation’s border, and I know we 

have several issues of mutual interest. 

Communities along our Nation’s border and coastal areas face a 

unique exposure to threats that concern all of us. In the 28th District of Texas, which I represent, we have first-hand knowledge of 

all the challenges along the Southern border and the importance of 

providing the tools necessary to enhance border security. 

I believe strongly that technology and personnel play vital roles 

in securing America’s borders. DHS has increased its efforts in recent years to enhance border security, and we, both Democrats and 

Republicans, have provided the resources necessary to help us just 

do that. 

Since 2007 Congress has continued to increase border security 

funding. As a result CBP now has over 20,000 Border Patrol 

agents, more than 20,000 CBP officers at ports of entry and preclearing stations, and over 1,000 air marine pilots and vessel operators. Throughout the work of this committee, Congress has also 

provided funding to enable DHS to deploy technology in their security effort. 

I am particularly interested in receiving an update on CBP’s use 

of unmanned aerial systems and how this technology will be utilized in the future in securing the borders. We must continue to 

mitigate border threats by deploying a combination of manpower, 

technology, and resources to enhance our strategy for securing our 

borders. I am interested in hearing from our witnesses about how 

they believe we can achieve this important goal. 

However, I do want to remind everyone here that our discussion 

about border security, we cannot continue to overlook the importance of our land ports of entry, which plays a vital role in combating the flow of illegal weapons, drugs, cash, human smuggling, 

while facilitating legitimate trade and travel. 

CBP reports that on a typical day officers at the ports of entry 

process 956,000-plus passengers and pedestrians and 64,000-plus 

trucks, rail, and sea containers. We cannot achieve effective control 

of our borders if we do not provide the needed resources to the 

ports of entry to enhance security and facilitate commerce. 

Madam Chairwoman, I look forward to continue to work with 

you on this issue. 

I also thank the witnesses for joining us today. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 15, 2011 

In January, after over 4 years and nearly a billion dollars spent, Secretary of 

Homeland Security Janet Napolitano canceled the SBInet program. 

Like the Department of Homeland Security’s previous attempts to deploy a ‘‘virtual fence’’ along the Southwest border, the program never lived up to its billing. 

Technology problems, integration challenges, and management deficiencies 

plagued the program from its inception. 
5 

With so little return on the taxpayers’ investment, I wholeheartedly agreed with 

Secretary Napolitano’s decision not to continue to deploy SBInet. 

However, I am concerned that there are some striking similarities between the 

Department’s new plan for border security technology and SBInet and its predecessors. 

It is my understanding that the new Arizona Technology Plan calls for an integrated system of towers mounted with cameras and radars, as well as Remote Video 

Surveillance Systems, Mobile Surveillance Systems, and Unattended Ground Sensors. 

Is my further understanding that the Arizona Technology Plan comes with a price 

tag of several hundred million dollars. 

All of this sounds very familiar. 

We have been told that this time, technology is being selected considering operational needs and cost-effectiveness. 

Again, that sounds familiar, since DHS made similar promises when SBInet was 

launched. 

Make no mistake—I do not oppose the use of technology to sure our America’s 

borders. 

To the contrary, I believe technology is an essential complement to Border Patrol 

agents, Customs and Border Protection officers, Air and Marine personnel, infrastructure, and other resources. 

But technology must be both proven and cost-effective if DHS is to avoid repeating past mistakes yet again. 

I am interested in hearing from our witnesses about how the new plan for border 

security differs from its predecessors, and how the Department will ensure this 

technology succeeds where others did not. 

DHS must do more than just put a new brand on the old way of doing things. 

It is my hope that under Secretary Napolitano’s leadership, they will get it right 

this time. 

With respect to personnel, Customs and Border Protection has some of the finest 

agents and officers not only within DHS, but across the Federal Government. 

They work along the front lines of our Nation’s borders, often under difficult and 

dangerous conditions, and we appreciate the work they do. 

As CBP has grown and the situation along the Southwest border has intensified, 

the men and women that comprise its ranks face new and more difficult challenges. 

Specifically, today I would like to hear from Chief Fisher about how the Border 

Patrol has been affected by its rapid expansion in recent years. 

I would also like to hear from General Kostelnik about what personnel challenges 

his agency is facing. 

Finally, I want to reiterate my support for a comprehensive border security strategy as a means for achieving border security. 

There is no single strategy setting forth how the relevant agencies are going to 

work together to secure America’s borders. 

Given the number of agencies that play a role in this effort, such a strategy is 

essential. 

Again, I urge the Department to work with its Federal counterparts and other 

border stakeholders to develop such a plan. 

I thank the witnesses for joining us today and I look forward to your testimony. 

Mrs. MILLER. We are again pleased to have a very distinguished 

panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. I think 

what I will do is read your bios, and then we can just go on to the 

questions. 

First of all, Chief Michael Fisher, who has been before this committee before and appreciate him coming back, was named chief of 

the U.S. Border Patrol in May of last year. Chief Fisher started his 

duty along the Southwest border in 1987 in Arizona. 

He successfully completed the selection process for the Border 

Patrol tactical unit in 1990 and was later selected as field operations supervisor for the tactical unit assigned to El Paso, Texas, 

for 4 years. Following this, he served as the deputy chief patrol 

agent in the Detroit sector and as an assistant chief patrol agent 

in Tucson, Arizona. 
6 

Mark Borkowski became the assistant commissioner for the Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition with U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection of the Department of Homeland Security in 

July 2012—excuse me, 2010. He is responsible for ensuring technology efforts are properly focused on mission and well integrated 

across CBP and for strengthening effectiveness in acquisition and 

program management. 

Prior to his appointment as assistant commissioner, Mr. 

Borkowski was the executive director of the Secure Border Initiative program executive office and was responsible for the implementation of SBI at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

Michael Kostelnik is the assistant commissioner, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Office of Air and Marine. Office of Air and 

Marine is the world’s largest aviation and maritime law enforcement organization. The Office of Air and Marine is also the most 

experienced operator of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle systems—unmanned aerial systems in the homeland security missions on the 

world stage. 

The mission of the Office of Air and Marine is to protect the 

American people and the Nation’s critical infrastructure through 

the coordinated use of integrated air and marine forces to detect, 

interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement 

of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband toward or across the 

borders of the United States. 

General Kostelnik spent more than 32 years on active military 

duty with the U.S. Air Force, serving as a fighter pilot flying 

F–4 and F–15 aircraft. 

Major General Salazar assumed the duties as the adjutant general, Arizona National Guard, in December 2008 and concurrently 

serves as the director of the Arizona Department of Emergency in 

Military Affairs. Major General Salazar has worked as a full-time 

member of the Arizona National Guard for the past 18 years, received his commission from the Officer Candidate School at Fort 

Benning, Georgia, in 1983. 

His military assignments include several command assignments, 

Arizona Joint Counter Narcotics Task Force, senior military advisor with the Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq, and 

deputy chief of staff operations for the Arizona Army National 

Guard. 

As the commanding general for the Arizona National Guard, his 

duties and responsibilities include managing the day-to-day activities of the Arizona Army National Guard, Air National Guard joint 

programs in the emergency management division. 

Richard Stana is the director of homeland security and justice 

issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. During his 

nearly 35-year career with GAO, he served in headquarters, field, 

overseas offices and has directed reviews on a wide variety of complex military and domestic issues. Most recently, he directed GAO’s 

work relating to immigration and border security issues. 

So again, gentlemen, the committee welcomes all of you this 

morning. 

At this point the Chairwoman will recognize Mr. Borkowski, who 

will testify on behalf of the Department’s witnesses. 
7 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FISHER, CHIEF OF THE BORDER 

PATROL, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ACCOMPANIED BY 

MARK BORKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF 

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ACQUISITION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, AND MICHAEL C. KOSTELNIK, ASSISTANT 

COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF CBP AIR & MARINE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished 

Members of the committee, on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security, thank you for this invitation to testify. I will be 

joined by my colleague, General Kostelnik, who was our assistant 

commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine, and Chief Fisher 

from the Border Patrol, but I will give one statement for all of us. 

We have submitted a detailed written statement, and I will summarize that on all of our behalf. 

First of all, I think as you characterize it, Madam Chairwoman, 

Ranking Member Cuellar, Customs and Border Protection is the 

agency responsible for security at our borders, or very close to the 

border. That is the mission that we perform. The men and women 

of Customs and Border Protection are very proud of that mission, 

are very dedicated to that mission. 

As you also noted, we have over the last several years significantly increased the resources applied to that mission. Ranking 

Member Cuellar, you mentioned the 20,700 Border Patrol agents, 

for example, which is more than twice what we had in 2004. 

Madam Chairwoman Miller mentioned the 649 miles of fence, combined pedestrian and vehicle. 

In addition to resources we have applied a lot of effort in doing 

things more smart—for example, collaboration. Many of you are 

probably familiar with the Coalition on Transnational Terrorism, 

which includes 60 stakeholders, including our Government, the 

Mexican government, Federal, State, local, Tribal stakeholders. 

We have created a joint force command in Arizona so that within 

the CBP we now have a field commander—not in Washington, but 

in the field—who can make decisions about the use of CBP resources. So we have applied resources. We have changed our ways 

of doing business. We believe that those have already shown effects. 

One of the ways we measure that is by apprehensions. I think 

most of you are aware that over the last 2 years, apprehensions on 

the Southwest border have decreased by a very significant 36 percent and in fact are only a third of what they used to be years ago 

at their peak. 

Apprehensions, we believe, are a measure of the activity on the 

border. They do measure the flow, so we are quite clear that that 

also indicates that the flow of traffic between the ports of entry has 

declined. 

Last year we seized $147 million of currency both between and 

at the ports of entry. That is a 34 percent increase from the pre-
8 

vious year. We seized 4.1 million pounds of narcotics. So we think 

we have been increasingly effective. 

Now, notice I said that carefully—‘‘increasingly effective.’’ That 

does not mean we are completely done with the mission. It does not 

mean we are where we would like to be. We recognize we have 

more work to do. 

One of the ways we think we get to that, as you have both alluded, is with the application of technology. You have suggested 

what the role of technology might be. I believe we are focused at 

this point between the ports of entry, but you have also noted, I 

think quite appropriately, that there is technology at the ports of 

entry, above and below the ports of entry, and the border. 

But for the purpose of this discussion, let us start with technology between the ports of entry. I think we are all familiar with 

the Secured Border Initiative Network program, the SBInet program, which was at one point intended to be the backbone of our 

technology. As you also suggested, we have had a series of problem 

with that. It is much behind schedule, much over cost, and we have 

lost confidence in the SBInet program. 

The Secretary conducted an assessment of that program and has 

concluded it does not make sense to continue it. In fact, the SBInet 

program, the whole concept of a backbone, seems inappropriate. 

What seems more appropriate is a tailored mix of technologies that 

are currently available to the border. 

The Secretary conducted the assessment with, among other 

things, an analysis of alternatives. You are going to hear a lot, I 

think, about analysis of alternatives. It is a certain term of art. 

One thing, I think, we need to be clear about is an analysis of 

alternatives is not in and of itself conclusive or determinative. It 

has uncertainties, but it is a very disciplined, structured process 

which frames decisions. The decisions themselves are not from the 

analysis of alternatives. They are from the decision-makers to receive the analysis of alternatives. In that case, this is the Border 

Patrol. 

So the Border Patrol decisions about technology and how it 

should be procured and used on the Southwest border were advised 

by this analysis of alternatives, but were actually made by that 

Border Patrol. I think it is important that we understand that as 

we go forward. 

I should note, and I think you are aware, that GAO has been 

with us for the past several months, reviewing this. That review 

is not complete, and I understand we will talk about the status of 

it, but the work continues. We still have some differences in what 

our understandings of this are, although we have philosophical 

agreement on what an AOA is and how it ought to be used. But 

there is more work to be done. 

I would just point out that we are in the process of making a bit 

of sausage, but in the end I am certain that it will be a sausage 

that is tasty and worthy, but we are not there yet, and I just think 

it is important to highlight that. 

A couple of other things—we should recognize the Northern border. I know in particular, Madam Chairwoman, you are very familiar with the activities on the Northern border, the deployment of 

agents, the beginning of the application of technology along the St. 
9 

Clair River, along the Niagara River, the deployment of mobile surveillance systems. We are very much looking forward to joining you 

next week for the formal opening of the new operational integration center. 

One thing I would point out about the Northern border is that 

we believe is a much different environment. I know that Chief 

Fisher is prepared to talk to you about that, but the way we look 

at the Northern border ought to be different from the way we look 

at the Southwest border. We look forward to pursuing that discussion as we go forward. 

With that, thank you. We look forward to your questions. 

[The joint statement of Mr. Fisher, Mr. Borkowski, and Mr. 

Kostelnik follows:] 

PREPARED JOINT STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FISHER, MICHAEL KOSTELNIK, AND

MARK S. BORKOWSKI

MARCH 15, 2011 

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection’s (CBP) efforts to secure our Nation’s borders. 

As America’s frontline border agency, CBP is responsible for securing America’s 

borders against threats, while facilitating legal travel and trade. To do this, CBP 

has deployed a multi-layered, risk-based approach to enhance the security of our 

borders while facilitating the flow of lawful people and goods entering the United 

States. This layered approach to security reduces our reliance on any single point 

or program that could be compromised. It also extends our zone of security outward, 

ensuring that our physical border is not the first or last line of defense, but one of 

many. 

I’d like to begin by recognizing those at the Department who have given their 

lives in service to our mission. The loss of these brave agents is a stark reminder 

of the sacrifices made by the men and women of DHS every day. It also strengthens 

our resolve to continue to do everything in our power to protect against, mitigate, 

and respond to threats and secure our border. 

OVERVIEW OF BORDER SECURITY EFFORTS

Over the past 2 years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has dedicated 

historic levels of personnel, technology, and resources to the Southwest border. In 

March 2009, DHS launched the Southwest Border Initiative to bring unprecedented 

focus and intensity to Southwest border security, coupled with a smart and effective 

approach to enforcing immigration laws in the interior of our country. We increased 

the size of the Border Patrol to more than 20,700 agents today, more than double 

the size it was in 2004. DHS also quintupled deployments of Border Liaison Officers 

to work with their Mexican counterparts; and began screening Southbound rail and 

vehicle traffic to look for illegal weapons and cash that, when smuggled across the 

border, help to fuel the cartel violence in Mexico. 

With the aid of the fiscal year 2010 Border Security Supplemental requested by 

the administration and passed by Congress, we are continuing to add technology, 

manpower, and infrastructure to the Southwest border, including 1,000 new Border 

Patrol agents; 250 new CBP officers at our ports of entry; improving our tactical 

communications systems; and adding two new forward operating bases to improve 

coordination of border security activities. The Supplemental also provided CBP two 

new Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), further strengthening our UAS operations, 

which now covers the Southwest border from the El Centro Sector in California to 

the Gulf of Mexico in Texas. 

We’ve also constructed 649 miles of fencing out of nearly 652 miles where Border 

Patrol field commanders determined it was operationally required, including 299 

miles of vehicle barriers and 350 miles of pedestrian fence. 

In addition, President Obama authorized the temporary use of up to 1,200 additional National Guard personnel to bridge to longer-term enhancements in border 

protection and law enforcement personnel from the Department of Homeland Security to target illicit networks’ trafficking in people, drugs, illegal weapons, money, 
10 

and the violence associated with these illegal activities. That support has allowed 

us to bridge the gap and hire the additional agents to support the Southwest Border, as well as field additional technology and communications capabilities that Congress so generously provided. Secretary Gates and Secretary Napolitano agreed to 

equally fund this National Guard support and submitted two reprogramming requests to Congress to that end. Congress did not approve the reprogramming requests; therefore, the Department of Defense has been funding the full cost of this 

National Guard support. 

Beyond these measures, in recent months we have taken additional steps to bring 

greater unity to our enforcement efforts, expand coordination with other agencies, 

and improve response times. In February, we announced the Arizona Joint Field 

Command (JFC)—an organizational realignment that brings together Border Patrol, 

Air and Marine, and Field Operations under a unified command structure to integrate CBP’s border security, commercial enforcement, and trade facilitation missions 

to more effectively meet the unique challenges faced in the Arizona area of operations. We also are improving coordination with military forces on the Southwest 

border. In partnership with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and with 

support from the Department of Defense, DHS is standing up the new Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS) in the El Paso Intelligence Center, which will integrate and synthesize all available Southwest border inteligence from Federal, State, 

local, and Tribal partners to create a common inteligence picture to support border 

enforcement activities on the Southwest border. By disseminating real-time operational inteligence to our law enforcement partners in the region, BFIS will streamline and enhance coordinated Federal, State, local, and Tribal operations along the 

border. Additionally, we are continuing to work with Mexico to develop an interoperable, cross-border communications network that will improve our ability to coordinate law enforcement and public safety issues. 

Moreover, CBP has increased partnerships with Federal, State, local, and Tribal 

law enforcement agencies, as well as with the public and private sectors, as coordination and cooperation among all entities that have a stake in our mission has been, 

and continues to be, paramount. CBP is working closely with Federal, State, local, 

Tribal, and international partners to increase inteligence and information sharing. 

A Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) cell has been established at 

the Air and Marine Operations Centers (AMOC) in Riverside, CA and Grand Forks, 

ND to enable essential information to be provided to law enforcement across the Nation—increasing understanding of evolving threats and providing the foundation for 

law enforcement entities to exercise targeted enforcement in the areas of greatest 

risk. This inteligence-driven approach prioritizes emerging threats, vulnerabilities, 

and risks—greatly enhancing our border security efforts. 

An example of our collaborative efforts along the Southwest border is the Alliance 

to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) in Arizona. ACTT is a collaborative enforcement effort, established in September 2009, that leverages the capabilities and 

resources of more than 60 Federal, State, local, and Tribal agencies in Arizona and 

the Government of Mexico to combat individuals and criminal organizations that 

pose a threat to communities on both sides of the border. Through ACTT, we work 

with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement partners to increase collaboration; enhance inteligence and information sharing; and develop coordinated 

operational plans that strategically leverage the unique missions, capabilities, and 

jurisdictions of each participating agency. Since its inception, ACTT has resulted in 

the seizure of more than 1.6 million pounds of marijuana, 3,800 pounds of cocaine, 

and 1,000 pounds of methamphetamine; the seizure of more than $13 million in 

undeclared U.S. currency and 268 weapons; nearly 14,000 aliens denied entry to the 

United States at Arizona ports of entry due to criminal background or other disqualifying factors; and approximately 270,000 apprehensions between ports of entry. 

While there is still work to be done, every key measure shows we are making significant progress along the Southwest border. Border Patrol apprehensions—an indicator of illegal immigration—have decreased 36 percent in the past 2 years, and are 

less than a third of what they were at their peak. We have matched these decreases 

in apprehensions with increases in seizures of cash, drugs, and weapons. Additionally, in fiscal year 2010, CBP seized $147 million in currency (inbound and outbound) at and between the ports of entry (POEs), a 34% increase from the previous 

fiscal year. CBP also seized 4.1 million pounds of narcotics, including 870,000 

pounds seized at POEs, 2.4 million pounds seized between POEs, and 831,000 

pounds seized by Air and Marine Interdiction Agents. These numbers demonstrate 

the effectiveness of our layered approach to security. Violent crime in border communities has remained flat or fallen in the past decade, and some of the safest communities in America are at the border. In fact, violent crimes in Southwest border 

counties overall have dropped by more than 30 percent and are currently among the 
11 

lowest in the Nation per capita, even as drug-related violence has significantly increased in Mexico. 

Nonetheless, CBP still faces significant challenges. We remain concerned about 

the drug-cartel violence taking place in Mexico and continue to guard against spillover effects into the United States. We will continue to assess and support the investments in the manpower, technology, and resources that have proven so effective 

over the past 2 years in order to keep our borders secure and the communities along 

it safe. 

TECHNOLOGY AND BORDER SECURITY

The Border Patrol utilizes technology for detection and surveillance between ports 

of entry, enabling CBP to maximize its effectiveness in responding to and disrupting 

illicit activity. In other words, technology enhances situational awareness of the 

amount and types of illegal activity at the border, enabling agents to spend more 

time responding to incursions and less time detecting them. 

Along the Southwest border, the primary technology system has been the Remote 

Video Surveillance System (RVSS), a tower with a pair of day and night cameras, 

which are monitored by personnel in a given area. There are currently 250 of these 

systems deployed along the Southwest border. More recently, CBP has added other 

systems, including Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSSs), which are truck-mounted 

infrared cameras and radars displaying sensor information on an integrated display 

within the cab of the truck, and are considered one of the most technologically advanced ground-based systems. There are currently 38 MSSs deployed along the 

Southwest border. In addition, there are more than 130 aircraft (planes and helicopters) and 4 UASs deployed to the Southwest border. Among the aircraft deployed 

to the border are specialized, twin engine surveillance aircraft outfitted with a variety of sensors. Two additional Multi-role Enforcement Aircraft are scheduled to be 

delivered in May. These aircraft will provide robust capabilities for surveillance and 

interdiction support over both the land border and the maritime approaches. To increase effectiveness and enhance situational awareness, these various aviation resources are tied together by information sharing tools. 

SBInet RE-ASSESSMENT

The Secure Border Initiative-network (SBInet) program, as conceived in 2005, was 

intended to cover the entire Southwest border with a highly integrated set of fixed 

sensor towers. Since its inception, however, SBInet experienced repeated technical 

problems, cost overruns and schedule delays which raised serious questions about 

the system’s ability to meet the needs for technology along the border. Given these 

issues, in 2009, Secretary Napolitano asked CBP for an analysis of the SBInet program. Based on this analysis, Secretary Napolitano froze funding for SBInet beyond 

the on-going, initial deployments of Block 1 and ordered a Department-wide reassessment of the SBInet program that incorporated an independent, quantitative, 

science-based Analysis of Alternatives to determine if SBInet was the most efficient, 

effective, and economical way to meet our Nation’s border security needs with respect to technology. The assessment focused on two fundamental questions: Whether 

or not the SBInet system was technically viable; and if SBInet was viable, whether 

it was cost-effective relative to other lower-cost technologies and systems which 

could provide needed surveillance capabilities. 

The issue of viability was evaluated within the context of the initial SBInet configuration, known as SBInet Block 1, which has been completed in two areas of the 

Arizona border—Tucson–1 (TUS–1) and AJO–1. Although it is too early to quantify 

the effectiveness of the SBInet Block 1 technology, the qualitative assessments from 

the Border Patrol suggest that select elements of the technology such as sensor towers, integrated together to observe localized areas, enhanced operational capabilities 

in some parts of the border. In the case of TUS–1, the Border Patrol experienced 

improved situational awareness and increased apprehensions of illegal entrants 

when they first started using the system despite no apparent increase in illegal traffic. Over time, the Border Patrol observed a decrease in activity, and consequently, 

realized a fewer number of apprehensions. It appears that the use of the TUS–1 system, combined with increased personnel and tactical infrastructure, contributed to 

decreasing the flow of illegal entrants and increasing the likelihood of apprehension. 

To assess the cost-effectiveness of SBInet, DHS conducted an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). In the AoA, DHS quantified relative effectiveness and relative costs 

of various technology solutions, and compared these measures for each option. The 

results of the AoA showed that the selection of technology for a given area of the 

border is highly dependent on the nature of that area (e.g., terrain, population density). Therefore, the SBInet concept of a ‘‘one size fits all’’ solution is not appropriate 
12 

across the entire border. In fact, the AoA suggested that the optimal technology deployment strategy would involve a mix of technologies tailored to each area of the 

border and based on the operational judgment of the experienced Border Patrol 

agents deployed in that area. 

NEW TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT PLAN

After completion of the AoA, CBP used the results to develop a detailed technology deployment plan for different border regions across Arizona based on current 

and anticipated operational activity. Accordingly, the new plan incorporates both the 

quantitative analysis of science and engineering experts and the real-world operational assessment of agents on the ground and in the air. 

The new border security technology plan will utilize existing, proven technology 

tailored to the distinct terrain and population density of each border region, including commercially available MSSs, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, thermal imaging devices, and tower-based RVSSs. Where appropriate, this technology plan will also include elements of the former SBInet program that have proven successful, such as 

stationary radar and infrared and optical sensor towers. 

This new technology plan will provide better coverage of the border, a more effective balance between cost and capability tailored to each area of the border, faster 

deployment of technology, more continuous and extensive surveillance of the Southwest border, and better linkage between operations and technology. Through investments in portable technology, the new plan provides flexible capabilities that will 

enable the Border Patrol to move and adapt to evolving threats. As part of the 

Southwest Border supplemental, CBP is developing new Mobile Response Teams to 

provide surge capabilities to send Border Patrol into a particular area of the border. 

The Department recognizes that, as we tighten the security of one area, our adversaries will attempt to find new routes in other areas. A more mobile and flexible 

response capability will allow us to move with the changes in illegal activity. 

Based on the Border Patrol’s assessment of priority needs and the Department’s 

2011 and 2012 budget requests, the Department intends to initiate procurements for 

the Remote Video Surveillance Systems and cameras, thermal imaging systems, 

Agent-Portable Surveillance Systems, imaging sensors, Unattended Ground Sensors, 

and Mobile Video Surveillance Systems in fiscal year 2011, with deliveries scheduled between 2011 and 2012. The integrated fixed towers will follow starting with 

procurements in early fiscal year 2012. 

The Department does not intend to use the existing Boeing contract for procurement of any of the technology systems included in the new Southwest border technology plan. Going forward, the Department will conduct full and open competition 

for all elements of the new technology plan. 

BUDGETING FOR THE NEW ARIZONA TECHNOLOGY PLAN

The budget for the Arizona technology investment plan will be managed by CBP 

as part of the existing Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology 

(BSFIT) account. The budget line item is called ‘‘alternative border technology,’’ and 

comprises the projects identified in the Arizona technology plan (e.g., Integrated 

Fixed Towers, Remote Video Surveillance Systems, Agent Portable Surveillance Systems). 

The original fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request for BSFIT technology was 

largely centered on the former SBInet plan. Recently, the Department provided to 

Congress a report outlining the results of the AoA, the resulting Arizona Technology 

Plan, and the termination of further SBInet investment. CBP recommended to Congress a revised fiscal year 2011 BSFIT spend plan that would re-allocate $185 million for procuring the proposed technology systems covering all of Arizona, except 

for the Integrated Fixed Towers. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget request 

will allow for the deployment of Integrated Fixed Towers to Nogales, Douglas, and 

Casa Grande Stations, and these new resources combined with the fiscal year 2011 

funding will allow CBP to fully complete three out of five border areas in Arizona. 

NEXT STEPS FOR TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT

The Department is in the process of conducting the same type of analysis along 

the entire Southwest border as was conducted on the Arizona border. The next three 

focus sectors are El Paso, San Diego, and Rio Grande Valley. The initial Analysis 

of Alternatives for these three sectors is complete, and the Border Patrol operational 

assessment is currently underway. 

Following these three high-priority sectors, the Department will complete the 

same process for the remaining sectors along the Southwest border. This will result 

in an optimum technology deployment plan for the entire Southwest border. 
13 

FUTURE NORTHERN BORDER TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENTS

Over the past 2 years, we have made critical security improvements along the 

Northern border—investing in additional law enforcement, technology, and infrastructure. Currently, we have more than 2,200 Border Patrol agents on the Northern border—a 700 percent increase since 9/11—and nearly 3,800 CBP Officers managing the flow of people and goods across ports of entry and crossings. With Recovery Act funds, we are in the process of modernizing more than 35 land ports of entry 

along the Northern border to meet our security and operational needs. We have also 

deployed new technology along the Northern border, including thermal camera systems, Mobile Surveillance Systems, and Remote Video Surveillance System and recently completed the first long-range CBP Predator–B unmanned aircraft patrol 

that extends the range of our approved airspace along the Northern border by nearly 900 miles. 

We have also expanded our strong partnerships with Federal, State, local, and 

Tribal agencies, as well as the Canadian government, in protecting our communities, borders and critical infrastructure from terrorism and transnational crime. 

CBP is working closely with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the 

Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to enhance coordination on port operations, 

conduct joint operations between POEs, and jointly deploy new technology. In conjunction with CBSA and RCMP, CBP recently announced the release of a joint border threat assessment, which provides U.S. and Canadian policymakers, resource 

planners, and other law enforcement officials with a strategic overview of significant 

threats—to include drug trafficking, illegal immigration, illicit movement of prohibited or controlled goods, agricultural hazards, and the spread of infectious disease— 

along the U.S.-Canadian border. To enhance cross-border security and increase the 

legitimate flow of people, goods, and services between the United States and Canada, last month President Obama and Prime Minister Harper of Canada jointly announced a new bi-lateral initiative, ‘‘Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness.’’ By increasing collaboration with Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, and by working in concert 

with the Government of Canada, we can streamline our operations and utilize our 

resources in the most effective and efficient manner possible. 

To continue to bolster our Northern border security efforts, our fiscal year 2012 

budget request includes $55 million to support investments in technology systems 

that address security needs for the Northern border maritime and cold weather environment, as well as innovative technology pilots. It will also deploy proven, standalone technology that provides immediate operational benefits. These demonstrations and deployments explore how best to integrate various border security organizations and mission operations in order to enhance border security in this challenging environment. 

In the coming year, CBP plans to continue to expand joint operations by forming 

a joint command with the U.S. Coast Guard in the Great Lakes Region. The Air 

and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), which includes representatives from the 

U.S. Coast Guard, as well as other agencies, provides a comprehensive picture of 

the air environment in the United States. The AMOC can monitor violations of U.S. 

airspace, track potentially dangerous aircraft, and coordinate and direct an operational response. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request continues to strengthen the 

AMOC by fully incorporating the U.S. Coast Guard into AMOC management and 

decision-making, and expanding AMOC’s inteligence capability. 

CONCLUSION

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for this opportunity to testify about the work of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection. CBP is committed to providing our front-line agents and officers with the 

tools they need to effectively achieve their primary mission of securing America’s 

borders. We look forward to answering any questions you may have at this time. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Borkowski. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Major General Salazar for his 

testimony. 

Major General. 
14 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL HUGO SALAZAR, ADJUTANT 

GENERAL, ARIZONA NATIONAL GUARD 

Major General SALAZAR. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, 

Ranking Member Cuellar, Members of the subcommittee. I have 

the privilege of being appointed as the adjutant general by my Governor, and I appear here this morning representing the 7,500 men 

and women in the Arizona National Guard as the adjutant general. 

As everyone knows, the Arizona National Guard has a dual mission, State and Federal mission, but what I am here for this morning is to discuss another mission, which is the support that we provide our law enforcement agencies in the State of Arizona through 

two different missions, as you mentioned, Chairwoman Miller, as 

well as the Joint Counter Narcotics Task Force, which I will talk 

about briefly. 

The National Guard—program was created in 1989. It authorizes 

up to 4,000 National Guard men and women to serve in support 

of law enforcement agencies. In Arizona that program is called the 

Joint Counter Narco Terrorism Task Force, which is a mouthful 

and will be referred to as JCNTF. 

Since 1989 JCNTF has continued to provide mission support to 

law enforcement, providing a variety of different types of missions, 

which I will discuss briefly. We currently support over 30 law enforcement agencies and fusion centers, and we perform primarily 

linguist support, investigative analyst support, communications 

support, and the air and ground reconnaissance observation mission. 

In JCNTF the Governor does have the ability to conform the 

State plan and prioritize the mission sets. In this case our Governor has directed that I shift as many resources available to form 

what we call the ground reconnaissance mission, and she considers 

that a high-value mission, and we will continue to do so as the resources become available. 

Madam Chairwoman Miller, you mentioned Operation Jump 

Start. That was the first Presidential declared operation in 2006, 

2008. In that particular mission there were 6,000 National Guard 

personnel authorized the first year, 3,000 the second year. Of that 

we received 40 percent of the workforce, and so we had a substantial number of National Guard personnel rotating through the 

State of Arizona for 2 years in support of the mission sets that 

were dictated by the Department of Homeland Security. 

The primary missions that were provided there were entry identification teams, which are personnel on a high ground, basically, 

using different types of technology. There is always some type of 

technology with these entry identification teams, providing the eyes 

and ears for Border Patrol and communicating what we see 

through those agents as we see them. 

These operations are always going for 24 hours, 7 days a week 

non-stop, and we rotate our soldiers and airmen through those positions. In addition to the entry identification teams in Operation 

Jump Start, there was quite a bit of maintenance and engineering 

and aviation support as well. 

A second mission, which is the mission that we are currently performing, is called Operation Phalanx. This was authorized by the 

President in July of last year, with operations beginning on 1 Octo-
15 

ber of last year. That mission is scheduled to end this June with 

operations basically ceasing the first or second week of June because of the funding. 

The funding for Operation Phalanx was initially a program for $135 million, and that number has been subsequently reduced to 

$110 million. That authorized 1,200 National Guard personnel for 

the four Southwest border States. 

Again, because of the prioritization, Arizona received in this case 

46 percent of those forces, which equates to 560 personnel that we 

have had on the borders supporting Customs and Border Patrol, 

performing primarily entry identification teams, eyes and ears of 

24 hours a day, 7 days a week, along with a variety of different 

entry identification positions in near proximity to the ArizonaMexican border. 

In addition to the entry identification teams, there is a small 

handful that provide camera support as well as inteligence analysis. But Operation Phalanx, the No. 1 priority is entry identification team observation again. 

As the adjutant general, I am extremely proud of the support 

and demonstrated professionalism members of our National Guard 

provide law enforcement through the enduring—and during mission of the counter drug support program, Operation Jump Start, 

and Operation Phalanx. 

The unique skill sets that the military brings to bear in support 

of law enforcement agencies is a force multiplier and enhances the 

operational capabilities of the law enforcement agencies we are 

supporting. 

Rather than short-term missions like Operation Jump Start and 

Operation Phalanx, an argument can be made that the military 

support to law enforcement would be better served by increasing a 

sustained National Guard JCNTF program. This argument was reinforced in March 2009 and again in April 2010 by the Governor 

of Arizona, when she formally requested additional aviation and an 

increase in JCNTF of the President and the Secretary of Defense. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning, and I am 

here today to invite your questions and comments. Thank you. 

[The statement of General Salazar follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL HUGO E. SALAZAR

MARCH 15, 2011 

OPENING REMARKS

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished Members of the subcommittee; I am honored to represent the men and women of the Arizona National 

Guard. Since September 11, 2001, over 9,000 of our Arizona Soldiers and Airmen 

have been mobilized and served, or are currently serving in harm’s way. 

As you know, the National Guard has a dual mission and must be ready and capable of performing both its State and Federal mission. In addition to serving the 

Nation on a Federal deployment or mobilization, members of the National Guard 

also serve the State and as such, stand ready if called upon by the Governor when 

needed to assist in disaster response to protect the lives and property of the citizens 

of the State. As The Adjutant General of Arizona, I am a Federally recognized General Officer but also have the privilege of serving as a State employee appointed by 

our Governor to serve as the Director of the Arizona Department of Emergency and 

Military Affairs. Today, I appear before you in a State status representing the State 

of Arizona in my capacity as The Adjutant General and Director of the Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs. 
16 

The dual mission and locality of National Guard forces located throughout our 

communities make us a viable option for assisting both our Nation and State in 

times of crisis. In addition to the mobilizations already mentioned, the last 5 years 

have included a response by the Arizona National Guard to two separate Presidential declarations to enhance the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS); specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with detecting and 

deterring illegal activity along our border with Mexico. I would like to take the opportunity today to address the role of the Arizona National Guard with respect to 

these efforts. 

NATIONAL GUARD STATUS—STATE ACTIVE DUTY, TITLE 32, TITLE 10

Before discussing National Guard operations on the Southwest Border, it is important to note the various authorities that Soldiers and Airmen can operate under, 

as these directly impact mission sets, command and control, and ultimately organization readiness. There are three different statuses that a National Guard Service 

Member can operate under while performing military duties: ‘‘State Active Duty,’’ 

‘‘Title 32,’’ or ‘‘Title 10’’. 

Under State active duty status, the National Guard is, at all times, a State Government entity operating under the command and control of the Governor of Arizona and the Adjutant General. National Guard forces under State Active Duty are 

paid with State funds and perform duties authorized by the Governor and in accordance with State law. While National Guard forces are in a State Active Duty status, 

the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code, § 1385), which restricts Federalized troops 

from performing law enforcement duties, does not apply because they are not under 

the command and control of the Federal Government. The Posse Comitatus Act, 

along with its supporting legislation and regulations, precludes Federal military 

forces from acting as a primary instrument of law enforcement. It has come to symbolize the separation of civilian affairs from military influence. Nonetheless, National Guard troops in a State Active Duty status may participate in law enforcement duties in accordance with the applicable provisions of State law and as directed by the Governor of Arizona. 

The U.S. Constitution also authorizes the National Guard to operate under State 

control but in the service of the Federal Government—‘‘Title 32’’. Title 32 of the U.S. 

Code, authorizes the use of, and provides Federal funds to National Guard forces 

performing a Federal mission while under the command and control of their respective Governor. For example, National Guard forces were deployed by Governors 

using Federal funds and in compliance with prescribed Federal operational standards to our Nation’s airports following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Although, Federal appropriations were used to fund National Guard forces for a 

Federal mission, Posse Comitatus did not apply because National Guard forces were 

not under the command and control of the Federal Government, but rather with 

their respective Governors. 

Title 32 funds are also provided to National Guard forces to prepare and train 

Service Members for Federal missions. Title 32 U.S. Code § 502(a) authorizes Federal funding for weekend drills and annual training assemblies to ensure unit readiness and military skill-sets. If National Guard forces are needed on a full-time basis, 

section 502(f) provides for funds in addition to those requirements under 502(a). 

When National Guard forces are under Title 32 duty status, section 502(f) of the 

same title provides for Federal funds to execute the Federal mission. However, while 

troops are executing their mission under 502(f), as a matter of fiscal policy, there 

is no requirement for those troops to attend their monthly unit training assembly 

each month or their 2-week annual training as provided for in section 502(a). A review of the fiscal policy under 502(f) is needed to grant Governors and Adjutant 

Generals the option of requiring Title 32 troops to attend the monthly training requirements under 502(a) to maintain unit readiness and not degrade military skillsets. 

A good example of requiring troops to attend drill while performing the duties as 

a full-time National Guard member is the Arizona National Guard’s counter-drug 

program. Title 32 § 112 provides for the authorization and funding for the Joint 

Counter Narco-Terrorism Task Force, the Arizona National Guard’s counter-drug 

program. Under this section, National Guard members may be ordered to perform 

full-time National Guard duty under section 502(f) of Title 32 to support the Federally mandated counter-drug program. However, section 112(b)(2)(A) requires National Guard members to also participate in the training required under section 

502(a). This is to ensure that the use of units and personnel of the Arizona National 

Guard supporting the counter-drug program does not degrade the training and readiness of such units and personnel. This requirement recognizes the importance of 
17 

requiring National Guard members to continue to drill with their regularly assigned 

units so that the program does not degrade the readiness of each individual service 

member’s assigned unit. 

Finally, in addition to State Active Duty and Title 32 status, National Guard 

troops can also be in a ‘‘Title 10’’ status. National Guard troops under Title 10 U.S. 

Code are Federally funded and Federal controlled for National defense purposes. 

The Federal Government has the authority to ‘‘Federalize’’ National Guard forces 

to mobilize and deploy troops for Federal missions. These troops are commonly 

known to be in ‘‘Title 10 duty status,’’ meaning that the President and the Federal 

Government solely command and control units under this title. This approach places 

the Federalized National Guard forces in Title 10 status under the Command and 

Control of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and a Combatant Commander. 

It severs the National Guard’s relationship with its State Governor. 

ARIZONA BORDER OPERATIONS—HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Geographically speaking, Arizona has a total area of just over 113,998 square 

miles and is the sixth-largest State in the Union. With an estimated population of 

well over 6 million, Arizona is currently ranked as the second-fastest-growing State 

by the U.S. Census Bureau. Arizona shares 389 miles of international border with 

Mexico and has seven major Ports of Entry. Found between Arizona’s ports of entry 

are a variety and combination of barriers that include pedestrian fencing, vehicle 

fencing, Normandy barriers, triple strand barbed wire fencing and cattle guard 

crossings located on Tohono O’odham Indian Reservation only. 

JOINT COUNTER NARCO-TERRORISM TASK FORCE (1989–CURRENT)

Pursuant Title 32, section 112 of the U.S. Code, the National Guard Counter Drug 

program is authorized up to 4,000 National Guard members performing drug interdiction or counterdrug activities in all 54 States and territories. In Arizona, the 

State Counter Drug program is referred to as the Joint Counter Narco-Terrorism 

Task Force (JCNTF). JCNTF began operations in 1989 and is currently the third 

largest (behind California and Texas) of all National Guard counterdrug programs 

in the States and territories. The mission of the JCNTF is to provide military 

counterdrug and drug demand reduction support to local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies and community-based organizations. 

The JCNTF is currently staffed with 81 Army National Guard Soldiers and 46 

Air National Guard Airmen totaling 127 personnel serving on Full Time National 

Guard Duty status in accordance with United States Code, Title 32, Section 112. 

These Soldiers and Airmen are assigned to National Guard units throughout the 

State and are authorized to perform ‘‘Support-Only’’ Counter Drug duties. 

According to the President’s budget request, the National Guard Counter Drug 

Program is expected to remain flat for fiscal year 2012, which, due to the rising cost 

of conducting business, continues to slowly reduce the support available to Law Enforcement agencies. Arizona’s program has shrunk over the years from a program 

consisting of well over 300 personnel in the early 1990s to a program of approximately only 130 personnel today. 

In fiscal year 2010, JCNTF’s support to local, State, and Federal drug law enforcement agencies resulted in a total of $7,025,300 in property, 801 weapons, 450 vehicles and $39,634,210 in cash seized or recovered. In addition, 1,421 lbs of cocaine, 

4.3 lbs of crack, 150 lbs of heroin, 131,221 lbs of marijuana, 726 lbs of 

methamphetamines and 20,044 marijuana plants were seized during operations supported by members of the Arizona National Guard serving on JCNTF. 

The JCNTF currently provides Supply Reduction support to over 30 law enforcement agencies and fusion centers such as the Metro Intelligence Support and Technical Investigation Center throughout the State. Currently, approved JCNTF support missions include the following categories: 

Linguist Support (2a).—Supports over 30 agencies with transcribing pre-recorded 

tapes and other Spanish media in direct support of criminal investigations. 

Investigative Case and Analyst Support (2b).—Embedded analysts in law enforcement offices throughout the State of Arizona serve to improve information sharing 

between Federal, State, and local agencies; provide deconfliction of on-going narcotics investigations; result in better utilization of law enforcement resources; and 

enable supported agencies to affect accurate strategic analysis for key Southwest 

border initiatives such as Domestic Highway Enforcement. 

Communication Support (2d).—Technical experts are assigned to law enforcement 

agencies such as the United States Customs and Border Protection at their stations 

along the international border and assist with command and control operations. 

This support requires the mastery of many complex monitoring devices, cameras, 
18 

ground sensors, and voice communication equipment and directly enhances officer 

safety in the field. 

Surface Reconnaissance (Nighthawk) (5a).—JCNTF’s ground reconnaissance 

teams support local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies with uniquely 

suited advanced optical technology such as the FLIR RECON III system. These 

teams operate covertly in support of law enforcement in field conditions and provide 

military-specific skills to supported agencies’ interdiction efforts against the flow of 

drugs that enter the United States between Arizona’s Ports of Entry. Based on 

input from the Arizona Governor, the JCNTF is shifting available resources towards 

its ground reconnaissance mission in order to increase the footprint along the international border with what is a proven military unique skill-set. Over the past 12 

months, we have added an additional Nighthawk team and will continue to shift 

JCNTF resources to this mission as resources become available. Since 1 October 

2010, Arizona Nighthawk teams have been instrumental in the seizure of over 

17,000 pounds of marijuana, 25 weapons, assorted confiscated equipment, and the 

apprehension of over 200 smugglers and undocumented aliens. When compared to 

the annual budget for the entire JCNTF program, this mission alone provides a 

complete return on investment for the operating cost of the entire 130 member task 

force. 

Aerial Reconnaissance (5b).—JCNTF employs both the OH–58 helicopter and RC– 

26 fixed-wing aircraft as aerial observation assets. Arizona National Guard OH–58 

helicopters are available to support law enforcement during both day and night operations using Forward Looking Infrared systems, thermal imaging reconnaissance, 

Aviator’s Night Vision Imaging System, live video downlink and Nightsun illumination systems. The RC–26 aircraft is employed as a regional asset for high value 

counter-drug and narco-terrorism cases. This Air National Guard fixed-wing platform provides superior stand-off capability for covert operations. Both aerial assets 

provide enhanced officer safety, improved interdiction operations in remote drug corridors, and other forms of valuable aerial command and control capabilities. 

Demand Reduction Support (6).—Drug Demand Reduction (DDR) teams work 

closely with community-based organizations and support the specific needs of local 

communities and school systems. All DDR efforts are focused on identifying, supporting, educating, and mentoring/coaching Arizona youth in collaboration with local 

community organizations. 

OPERATION JUMP START (JUNE 2006–JULY 2008)

Operation Jump Start was a Presidentially-declared, 2-year, $1.2 billion program 

spread across the four Southwest Border States. The mission required 6,000 

Guardsmen the first year and 3,000 the second year. The Department of Homeland 

Security and Customs and Border Protection allocated forces based on their assessed needs that resulted with Arizona receiving 40% of the forces—the largest percentage of the four Southwest Border States. Guard members from 51 of the 54 

States and Territories served in Arizona performing duties that included Entry 

Identification Teams, camera operators, logistical support, aviation support, and engineering support. During the first year of Operation Jump Start, an average of 

2,400 National Guard personnel conducted operations in support of law enforcement 

efforts in Arizona. That number was reduced to 1,200 personnel the second year. 

OPERATION PHALANX (JULY 2010–CURRENT)

Operation Phalanx authorizes 1,200 Soldiers and Airmen across the four Southwest Border States to support the Department of Homeland Security. Arizona was 

authorized 560 of the 1,200 personnel for the mission which equates to 46%. Operations began in Arizona on 1 Oct 2010 and plans are currently being finalized to 

end all operations in June 2011. 

Like Operation Jump Start, National Guard personnel are funded under Title 32 

§ 502(f)—in accordance with the published Department of Defense order. The authorized missions for Operation Phalanx are: Overt Entry Identification Teams 

(EIT); Remote Video Surveillance System support; and Intelligence Analysts to support DHS. These mission sets were selected by DHS without input from the respective State Governor or Adjutant General and support was limited to only DHS Federal law enforcement agencies. The key differences between Operation Jump Start 

and Operation Phalanx are primarily in the total number of personnel authorized 

for the missions as well as the types of approved mission sets. Unlike Operation 

Jump Start where aviation and engineer support were significant, aviation and engineer support are not authorized for Operation Phalanx. Additionally, unlike Operation Jump Start, all National Guard personnel on orders in Arizona during Operation Phalanx are organic to the Arizona National Guard. 
19 

Of the 560 personnel authorized for Operation Phalanx in Arizona the majority 

of the personnel are tasked to support entry identification sites that operate on a 

24-hour basis in close proximity to the Arizona-Mexico border. Due to the increased 

threat and violence along the International Border, Arizona National Guard personnel are armed and assume a higher arming status than similar missions during 

Operation Jump Start. Rules for the Use of Force have been clearly defined, published, and provided to each member on the mission. Two of the entry identification 

sites are supported with a Mobile Surveillance System provided by Customs and 

Border Protection. All entry identification team sites and camera support operations 

are conducted in the Tucson Sector of Customs and Border Protection. 

Funding for Operation Phalanx was initially programmed for $135 million but 

was reduced to $110 million. The cost of Arizona’s portion during Operation Phalanx 

is estimated at $34 million through 30 June 2011. 

During Operation Phalanx, Arizona initiated numerous cost-saving measures focused on a solid relationship with Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Fort Huachuca 

and law enforcement partners. Use of existing active duty installations for lodging 

and contracted apartments saved an estimated $25,000 per day in lodging expenses. 

More importantly, it also bolstered force protection and increased the safety for Soldiers and Airmen. The relationship with law enforcement partners has been exceptional with a positive partnership at all levels. Border Patrol equipment (radios, vehicles, and thermal technology) has been entrusted with our National Guard Soldiers and Airmen to enhance operations. Additionally, using law enforcement provided equipment when available has resulted in significant savings to the Arizona 

National Guard. 

One of the limitations of having personnel on orders during Operation Phalanx 

is a direct result of the type of funding source: Title 32, Section 502(f). Personnel 

on 502(f) orders with Operation Phalanx are not authorized, except under certain 

circumstances, to attend monthly drills at their parent Arizona National Guard 

unit. This creates a negative impact on unit readiness and especially when the individual volunteering to serve on Operation Phalanx is in a leadership position at his/ 

her unit. 

Throughout the duration of Operation Phalanx, the Arizona National Guard has 

supported the Department of Homeland Security in a commendable manner and the 

working relationship between National Guard and Law Enforcement has been nothing short of exemplary. Currently, Arizona National Guard plans are being finalized 

to end Operation Phalanx on 30 June 2011. To complete all administrative and 

logistical actions required, operations will effectively stop no later than the second 

week of June. 

CLOSING REMARKS

As the Adjutant General of the Arizona National Guard, I am extremely proud 

of the support and demonstrated professionalism members of the National Guard 

have provided law enforcement agencies during Operation Jump Start, Operation 

Phalanx, and the long-standing State counter drug support program. The unique 

skill sets the military brings to bear in support of law enforcement agencies act as 

a force multiplier in their continued efforts to secure the international border and 

deter the flow of illegal drugs and associated violence along the border. 

The Arizona National Guard’s Joint Counter-Narco Terrorism Task Force has enjoyed a positive working relationship with local, State, and Federal law enforcement 

agencies for over 20 years. JCNTF soldiers and airmen are aware of the impact they 

are making in the counter drug and border security arenas, and individual readiness is enhanced from their experience performing real-world missions on a daily 

basis. This readiness makes our military units stronger and better trained for wartime missions. 

The Arizona JCNTF is currently staffed with 127 personnel serving on Full Time 

National Guard Duty status. The military unique skill sets, training, and specialized equipment that Arizona National Guard members bring to the mission enhance 

the operational capabilities of the law enforcement agencies they support. Rather 

than short-term operations such as Operation Jump Start and Operation Phalanx, 

an argument can be made that military support to law enforcement efforts would 

be better served with an increase in funding to JCNTF. Increasing JCNTF support 

would allow law enforcement elements—potentially in all jurisdictions—to more effectively synchronize, plan, and integrate National Guard resources and personnel, 

knowing they will have a sustained and predictable level of support from JCNTF 

for an extended period of time. This argument was reinforced on 11 March 2009 and 

6 April 2010 when, to support the growing instability along the Arizona-Mexico bor-
20 

der, the Governor of Arizona formally requested additional aviation assets and an 

increase in JCNTF personnel of the President and the Secretary of Defense. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and invite your questions and comments. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, General. 

At this time I recognize Mr. Stana for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE 

Mr. STANA. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller and Mr. Cuellar, for 

the opportunity to testify at this morning’s hearing. 

After over 4 years and $1 billion, Secretary Napolitano in January ended the SBInet program as originally conceived, because it 

just doesn’t meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards. In its 

place the alternative Southwest border technology program is one 

which I believe, Chairwoman Miller, you described in your opening 

statement and Mr. Borkowski will probably describe in greater detail in his question-and-answer period. 

But it consists of RBSs, MSSs, underground sensors, handheld 

devices, and integrated fixed towers, which look an awful lot like 

the towers, or will probably look an awful lot like the towers, in 

the SBInet program. 

For fiscal year 2011 DHS plans to use $185 million of funds to 

begin the process of getting the non-towered technology buys done. 

This would be the RBSs, MSSs, underground sensors, handheld devices and so on. For fiscal year 2012 in the President’s budget, CBP 

has requested $242 million to fund the first three of five planned 

integrated fixed tower buys, okay, the first three sectors. 

The fourth and fifth will be downstream. There will be a total of 

five for a total cost of about $570 million. So all told, we are planning on spending about $755 million in Arizona alone and would 

essentially leave a gap of about 62 miles on the Tohona O’odham 

nation, where none of this technology is likely to be fielded. 

If funding is approved, the integrated fixed tower deployments in 

Arizona will likely begin in March 2013 and will likely be finished 

by 2015 or maybe early 2016. Then the process goes down the border until about 2021 or 2026, depending on which estimate we use. 

The whole border will be covered by the new technology deployment program. 

Our work is on-going. We are doing the work for this committee 

and this subcommittee, and I would like to just share a few preliminary observations. 

First, just to clarify things, the decision to cancel the SBInet program pertained to the now obsolete SBInet system. It did not pertain to the concept, or the underlying concept, of using fixed towers 

with cameras, radars that feed into a COP. That is likely still on 

the table, although it might not have the same configuration that 

the current system has. 

Second, the contract was not canceled with Boeing, but rather its 

use will be limited to operation and maintenance on TUS–1 and 

AJO–1 and maybe some other tactical infrastructure needs. But 

the contract itself is still in place. 
21 

The second main point I would like to make is that SBInet capabilities are still in place and working in the TUS–1 and AJO–1 

areas. Reports that we have had from the Border Patrol indicate 

that it is useful. It provides continuous surveillance and enhances 

the safety of the agents, because they can recognize threats that 

are close by and take appropriate action. 

CBP plans to add a laser target finder, which now is available 

on MSS units to the SBInet towers, which the agents say they 

would find completely useful, and they would like to have them. 

The third point is the technology deployments in Arizona were to 

be informed by an analysis of alternatives, or an AOA, that analyzed the cost-effectiveness of fixed, mobile, handheld and aerial 

components and a Border Patrol operational assessment, which Mr. 

Borkowski mentioned, to determine the appropriate mix of these 

technologies along the border. 

Now, our work to date, which is not yet finished, has raised a 

number of questions regarding the technology deployment plans. 

First, it is not clear how DHS used the AOA and other inputs to 

inform the Border Patrol’s operational assessments to determine 

the appropriate mix of technology plans for Arizona. 

The AOAs did not show a clear-cut cost-effective technology alternative for any of the analysis areas, and Border Patrol judgment 

was very key in the final assessment. We have not been given access to the documents yet that would allow us to determine whether the appropriate judgments were exercised in arriving at the mix 

of technology to be fielded in the different sectors of Arizona. That 

is the key shortcoming at this point in our ability to analyze for 

you to what this new technology laydown really means. 

The second thing, and I would like to turn attention to the AOA 

itself, and that is they did it rather quickly. It was limited in scope. 

It didn’t consider a combination of technologies. It didn’t consider 

certain technology solutions such as MSS units. 

It didn’t consider a baseline solution, nor does it consider the 

possibility of reducing Border Patrol assets and what additional 

strain there might be or need for technology solutions. So that is 

a shortfall of the AOA. Subsequent AOAs may consider those 

things. 

Another point I would like to make is the Army Test and Evaluation Command was to independently assess the SBInet Block 1 capability to evaluate effectiveness and suitability. The results were 

not completed for the Border Patrol’s technical analysis, the operational analysis which prescribed the laydown of different technology components, nor was it available for the Secretary’s decision 

on whether to continue SBInet. 

Moreover, if we are going to use a fixed tower system similar to 

that deployed in SBInet, the results of the ATEC review would be 

very informative for the people making these kinds of judgments. 

I can answer other questions, you know, at the appropriate time, 

but in closing I would just like to say that the new alternative 

Southwest border technology plan is the fourth generation of camera tower and other technology systems that we have seen in the 

last 10 to 15 years or so. 

The first three have not met with complete success, I think, to 

be kind. I think this time we ought to get it right with proper plan-
22 

ning and proper analysis and judgment exercised. Thank you very 

much. 

[The statement of Mr. Stana follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA

MARCH 15, 2011 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–11–448T, testimony before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Securing the Nation’s borders from illegal entry of aliens, contraband, terrorists, 

and weapons of mass destruction, is a long-term challenge. In November 2005, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched the Secure Border Initiative network (SBInet)—a program which was to provide the Border Patrol, within DHS’s 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), with the tools to detect breaches and 

make agent deployment decisions by installing surveillance systems along the border. Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology is DHS’s new plan to deploy a mix 

of technology to protect the border. This testimony is based on GAO’s on-going work 

conducted for the House Committee on Homeland Security and provides preliminary 

observations on: (1) The status of SBInet and user views on its usefulness, and (2) 

the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and associated costs. GAO reviewed planning, budget, and system documents, observed operations along the 

Southwest border, and interviewed DHS officials. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has made 

prior recommendations to strengthen SBInet. While DHS generally agreed most information in this statement, it did not agree with GAO’s observations on the AOA 

and the potential usefulness of ATEC’s analyses. GAO continues to believe its observations are valid. DHS also provided technical comments which were incorporated, 

as appropriate. 

BORDER SECURITY.—PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATUS OF KEY SOUTHWEST

BORDER TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

What GAO Found 

In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed CBP to end the 

SBInet program as originally conceived because it did not meet cost-effectiveness 

and viability standards, and to instead focus on developing terrain- and populationbased solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such as camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region. According to DHS, the Secretary’s decision 

on SBInet was informed by: (1) An independent analysis of alternatives (AOA) to 

determine the program’s cost-effectiveness; (2) a series of operational tests and evaluations by the U.S. Army’s Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to determine its 

operational effectiveness and suitability; and (3) an operational assessment by the 

Border Patrol to provide user input. The Secretary also stated that while the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan should include elements of the former 

SBInet program where appropriate, she did not intend for DHS to use the current 

contract to procure any technology systems under the new plan, but rather would 

solicit competitive bids. SBInet’s current surveillance capability continues to be used 

in Arizona. Specifically, there are 15 sensor towers (with cameras and radar) and 

10 communication towers (which transmit the sensor signals to computer consoles 

for monitoring), currently deployed in the Border Patrol’s Tucson Sector. In addition, 

on the basis of user feedback, the Border Patrol considers the current SBInet capability to be useful, including providing continuous surveillance in border areas 

where none existed before and enhancing agent safety when responding to potential 

threats. There are certain shortcomings including coverage gaps and radar performance limitations in adverse weather. 

The Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan is to incorporate a mix of 

technology, including an Integrated Fixed Tower surveillance system similar to that 

used in the current SBInet capability, beginning with high-risk areas in Arizona. 

But, due to a number of reasons, the cost-effectiveness and operational effectiveness 

and suitability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system is not yet clear. First, the AOA 

cited a range of uncertainties, and it is not clear how the AOA analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and budget decisions regarding the optimal mix 
23 

1 An RVSS is a remotely controlled system of daylight and infrared cameras mounted to a permanent structure. The camera images are transmitted to and monitored and recorded at a central location. 2 An MSS consists of camera and radar systems mounted on a truck, with images being transmitted to and monitored on a computer screen in the truck’s passenger compartment. 3 An Integrated Fixed Tower ‘‘system’’ consists of various components and program support 

activities. The components include fixed towers, sensors (cameras and radar), a data communications network, facilities upgrades, information displays, and an information management 

system. Program support activities include those performed to design, acquire, deploy, and test 

the system; and manage Government and contractor efforts. 4 A Port of Entry is an officially designated location (seaports, airports, or land border locations) where CBP officers or employees are assigned to accept entries of merchandise, clear passengers, collect duties, and enforce the various provisions of CBP and related laws. 

of technology deployments in Arizona. Second, the ATEC independent analyses were 

not complete at the time of the Secretary’s decision, thus any results on SBInet’s 

operational effectiveness and suitability could not inform the decisions to proceed 

with the Integrated Fixed Tower system. The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request calls for $242 million to fund three of five future deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower systems in Arizona, although, depending on funding, the earliest DHS expects the deployments to begin is March 2013 with completion anticipated by 2015 or later. Consistent with its intent to solicit competitive bids, CBP 

has initiated a new acquisition cycle, asking industry for information about the commercial availability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system. GAO will continue to assess this issue and report the final results later this year. 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) key technology programs for the Southwest border. The Secure 

Border Initiative Network (SBInet) technology program was intended to provide the 

Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) within DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with integrated imagery and related tools and information to detect 

security breaches and make agent deployment decisions by placing surveillance systems along U.S. borders, beginning with the Southwest border with Mexico. Since 

fiscal year 2006, DHS has received about $4.4 billion in appropriations for SBI, of 

which it has allocated about $1.5 billion for SBInet and $2.9 billion for fencing and 

other tactical infrastructure along the Southwest border. In January 2010, DHS initiated an internal assessment of the SBInet program and, as discussed below, in 

January 2011 the Secretary of Homeland Security announced her decision to end 

the program as originally conceived because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and 

viability standards and proceed with a new technology program to secure the Nation’s land borders. 

The Department’s new technology deployment plan is called Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology. Under this plan, DHS is to deploy a mix of technologies, 

including Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS),1 Mobile Surveillance Systems 

(MSS),2 and hand-held equipment for use by Border Patrol agents. It also is to include a new Integrated Fixed Tower 3 system, similar to that currently being used 

in SBInet, which is slated for deployment along the border where the Border Patrol 

deems it appropriate beginning with five high-risk areas in Arizona at an estimated 

cost of $570 million. 

The Border Patrol is the Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing 

the border between the U.S. ports of entry.4 CBP has divided geographic responsibility for Southwest border miles among nine Border Patrol sectors. Within CBP, 

the Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA) has been responsible for 

overseeing the SBInet program. DHS reports that the Southwest border continues 

to be especially vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, including the smuggling 

of humans and illegal narcotics. CBP reported spending about $3 billion to support 

the Border Patrol’s efforts on the Southwest border in fiscal year 2010, and Border 

Patrol reported apprehending over 445,000 illegal entries and seizing over 2.4 million pounds of marijuana. 

My statement today is based on preliminary observations and analyses from our 

on-going work regarding these programs and activities for the House Committee on 

Homeland Security. We plan to issue a final report on this work later this year. As 

requested, my testimony will cover the following issues: 

1. The status of the SBInet program and user views on the usefulness of its 

technology, and; 

2. The Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and costs associated 

with these plans. 

To conduct our work, we reviewed our prior reports on the SBInet program, analyzed documents such as system descriptions, acquisition plans and proposals, budg-
24 

5On September 21, 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the Boeing Company for 3 years, 

with 3 additional 1-year options. As the prime contractor, Boeing is responsible for acquiring, 

deploying, and sustaining selected SBInet technology and tactical infrastructure projects, and for 

supply chain management for selected tactical infrastructure projects. 

et requests and justifications, cost-effectiveness and system-effectiveness and -suitability plans and analyses. Further, we observed various types of technology operating at command centers at the Tucson Sector and its Tucson, Ajo, and Nogales 

stations. Also, we interviewed relevant DHS (Border Patrol, OTIA) and prime contractor 5 officials about matters such as the decision to end the SBInet program, its 

implications for the future of the program, cost-effectiveness and operational effectiveness and suitability analyses, and budget requests. We selected the Tucson, Ajo, 

and Nogales stations because they are located in high-risk areas along the Arizona 

border with Mexico and also because the Border Patrol has deployed various types 

of surveillance technology in these areas, including SBInet. We did our work for this 

statement from December 2010 to March 2011. We are not making any new recommendations in this statement but we have made prior recommendations to 

strengthen the SBInet program. While DHS generally agreed with the approach and 

status described in this statement, it did not agree with our observations on the 

AOA and the potential usefulness of ATEC’s analyses to inform future technology 

deployment decisions. GAO continues to believe its observations are valid and will 

address these issues as our study proceeds. DHS also provided technical comments 

which were incorporated, as appropriate. 

We are conducting our on-going work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our 

audit objectives. 

DHS HAS ENDED THE SBInet PROGRAM BUT NOT THE CONTRACT OR KEY TECHNOLOGY

CAPABILITY WHICH USERS CONSIDER USEFUL

After an internal assessment initiated in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced in January 2011 that she had directed CBP to end the 

SBInet program as originally conceived. According to DHS, the Secretary’s decision 

was informed by an independent analysis of cost-effectiveness, a series of operational tests and evaluations, and Border Patrol input. The prime contractor is to 

continue limited performance under the SBInet contract using a 1-year option for 

SBInet operations and maintenance services in Arizona beginning on April 1, 2011, 

with a possible 6-month extension. Further, according to CBP and the contractor, 

following a March 2010 decision by the Secretary halting further deployment of 

SBInet beyond the Tucson and Ajo Border Patrol stations, no additional SBInet deployments are expected. 

In addition, the Secretary’s decision to end the SBInet program limited Block 1 

deployments to the Tucson and Ajo stations in the Tucson Sector, but did not affect 

the current SBInet Block 1 capability, which was developed based on updated requirements from the Border Patrol. The Block 1 capability consists of 15 sensor towers (with day/night cameras and radar) and 10 communication towers, which transmit surveillance signals to the Common Operating Pictures (COP) at station command centers. This capability remains deployed and operational in Arizona, as part 

of the Border Patrol Tucson Sector’s overall technology portfolio. According to contractor and Border Patrol officials, there were several original SBInet concepts that 

were not included in the Block 1 capability due to early design/cost trade-offs and 

Border Patrol agent feedback that they did not need them to perform their mission. 

Also, certain elements proved technically difficult and costly to include in the Block 

1 capability. For example, the concepts to integrate transmissions from RVSS and 

MSS units into the COP, transmitting COP images into agents’ laptops in their vehicles and tracking Border Patrol agent deployments on the geographic display were 

not included. 

OTIA and Border Patrol Consider Current SBInet Capability Useful 

OTIA and Border Patrol officials told us that the SBInet program’s Block 1 capability has been useful since being deployed in February 2010 at the Tucson station 

and August 2010 at the Ajo station. For example, a shift commander at the Tucson 

station described the capability as considerably better than the technology that was 

available at the sector prior to the SBInet deployment. Further, according to COP 

operators in Tucson, the current SBInet sensor package is responsive to key mission 
25 

6 Unattended ground sensors are sensors buried in the ground and are intended to detect motion and transmit a signal to a central monitoring location. 

requirements by giving them the capability to achieve persistent wide-area surveillance and situational awareness. 

Officials at Border Patrol headquarters stated that the Block 1 capability gave 

them a capability they did not have before. These officials also stated that, most importantly, the Block 1 capability helped them achieve persistent surveillance and 

situational awareness to enable an appropriate response to border intrusions and 

choose the location of interdiction, which they described as a tactical advantage. 

They also noted that the height of the towers allows for additional surveillance into 

terrain and brush thereby allowing the Border Patrol to shift personnel to gap areas 

where surveillance does not exist. 

Other examples of system usefulness offered by Border Patrol officials included 

a centralized point of data integration (through the COP), increased probability of 

arrest upon detection (by controlling the point of interdiction by means of camera 

and radar), improved agent safety when responding to potential threats, verification 

of whether a ground-sensor indicated a threat or not, efficiency and effectiveness in 

directing agent responses, and a tiered deployment of technology. For example, at 

the Ajo Station, a Border Patrol official explained that tiered deployment included 

mobile technology units that are positioned at the border line, and Block 1 sensor 

towers that are deployed off the line where they can monitor intruders who might 

have eluded interdiction at the border. 

The Secretary’s January 2011 announcement also stated that the SBInet capability had generated some advances in technology that had improved Border Patrol 

agents’ ability to detect, identify, track, deter, and respond to threats along the border. It further stated that the new border technology deployment plan would also 

include, where deemed appropriate by the Border Patrol, elements of the now-ended 

SBInet program that have proven successful. 

On the basis of limited data, the operational availability of deployed SBInet components has been consistent with the relevant requirement that expects SBInet to 

be operationally available 85 percent of the time. According to prime contractor operations and maintenance statistics for a 1-week period in January 2011, SBInet in 

the Tucson and Ajo Stations was operational over 96 percent of the time. According 

to the contractor’s logistics manager who oversees the operation and maintenance 

of SBInet, since the deployment is relatively recent, a full year’s worth of data would 

be needed to make conclusive determinations about long-term operational reliability 

and identify areas of persistent problems. The times that SBInet was not available 

were due primarily to camera malfunctions and power failures. 

According to Border Patrol and prime contractor officials, the SBInet Block 1 capability is receiving new features from the contractor in response to on-going user 

input and feedback. These features include adding an ‘‘eye-safe’’ laser target illuminator (the eye-safe feature minimizes the potential for injury to a person exposed 

to the laser), adding a ‘‘standby’’ mode to the radar (wherein scanning is suspended 

until needed), and integrating the next-generation unattended ground sensors 6 into 

the COP. However, this applies only to new sensors intended for Block 1—the Border Patrol has not selected a vendor for next-generation sensors for elsewhere along 

the border and outside of SBInet. 

The usefulness of SBInet’s Block 1 capability notwithstanding, OTIA and Border 

Patrol officials told us that it has certain shortcomings. These shortcomings include 

not having the mobility to respond to shifts in risk, facing terrain coverage (lineof-sight) gaps, some of which are mitigated through other technologies, and performing poorly in adverse weather. Further, according to OTIA, the SBInet capability as configured by the prime contractor is a proprietary and not an open architecture. Thus, it is unable to incorporate, for example, next-generation radar and 

cameras without significant integration work and cost. 

In addition, the SBInet capability has been costly to deploy and maintain. Specifically, the total task-order cost for the Block 1 deployment in Arizona was about 

$164 million. The operations and maintenance costs for the deployment are estimated to be up to about $1.5 million per month, or about $18 million per year. 

ALTERNATIVE (SOUTHWEST) BORDER TECHNOLOGY IS SLATED FOR DEPLOYMENT, BUT

COST- AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND SUITABILITY OF THE INTEGRATED

FIXED TOWER SYSTEM ARE NOT YET CLEAR

DHS is implementing a new approach for acquiring and deploying border security 

technology called ‘‘Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology’’ to replace the SBInet 

program. As part of this approach DHS is to deploy a mix of technologies, including 
26 

7The AOA process is a key first step in the acquisition process intended to assess the operational effectiveness, costs and risks of alternative system solutions for addressing a validated 

mission need. 

RVSS, MSS, and hand-held equipment for use by Border Patrol agents. It also is 

to include a new Integrated Fixed Tower system that is slated for deployment along 

the border where the Border Patrol deems it appropriate, beginning with five highrisk areas in Arizona at an estimated cost of $570 million. While other elements of 

the plan may be deployed sooner, the deployment schedule for the Integrated Fixed 

Towers envisioned by OTIA and the Border Patrol is planned to begin in 2013, depending on funding availability. This plan suggests that OTIA and the Border Patrol have determined that the Integrated Fixed Tower system is a cost-effective solution in certain locations. However, due to the questions we have about how the 

Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) 7 analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and budget decisions, the basis for DHS’s technology deployment plan is not 

yet clear. Further, the results of independent analyses were not complete at the 

time of the Secretary’s decision to end the SBInet program, thus any results on 

SBInet’s operational effectiveness could not inform the decisions to proceed with a 

possibly similar Integrated Fixed Tower system. 

DHS Implementing Broader Border-Security Technology Approach to Include Deploying a New Integrated Fixed Tower System 

According to the Border Patrol, its operational assessment for Arizona calls for deploying Integrated Fixed Tower systems to five high-threat areas in the State, beginning with the Nogales, Douglas, and Casa Grande Stations as part of this approach. These deployments will include 52 sensor towers, which is less than the 91 

sensor towers envisioned under the original SBInet deployment plan. Border Patrol 

officials explained that they reviewed the contractor’s original analysis of where to 

put the towers and determined that other solutions, such as RVSSs and MSSs, were 

more appropriate due to terrain and other factors such as population density. 

According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, depending on the availability of 

funding, the deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower system component of the 

Arizona technology plan are expected to begin around March 2013 and be completed 

by the end of 2015 (or possibly early 2016), with other sector deployments sequentially following the Arizona sector. OTIA estimates that the entire Integrated Fixed 

Tower system acquisition for Arizona would cost about $570 million, including funding for design and development, equipment procurement, production and deployment, systems engineering and program management, and a National operations 

center. In this regard, the President’s fiscal year 2012 DHS budget request for 

BSFIT calls for $242 million to fund the first three Integrated Fixed Tower system 

deployments for Arizona, which include 36 sensor towers. 

Border Patrol officials told us that the existing SBInet capability and the requested Integrated Fixed Tower systems are intended to form the ‘‘baseline or backbone’’ of its evolving technology portfolio, where appropriate in high-risk areas in 

Arizona, with some exceptions. For example, in the urban areas of the Douglas and 

Naco Stations, RVSS units would likely be considered the backbone because they 

are better suited for populated areas where SBInet’s radar capability is not as effective. A Border Patrol official said that Integrated Fixed Tower systems could be an 

important technology component in additional areas along the Southwest border, 

but that the agency had not yet made those determinations, pending the outcome 

of forthcoming operational assessments. 

DHS Has Initiated Actions to Acquire an Integrated Fixed Tower System Capability 

In one of its first actions following the Secretary of Homeland Security’s announcement to end SBInet, DHS issued a Request for Information (RFI) in January 

2011 to industry regarding the commercial availability of surveillance systems based 

on the Integrated Fixed Tower system concept, consistent with its stated intent to 

acquire future border technologies in its new plan through full and open competitions. OTIA and Border Patrol officials explained that the RFI would engender competition and better options for the Government, in terms of finding out about stateof-the-art industry capabilities and obtaining feedback on requirements to help refine them. However, they expect similar benefits in terms of capability, performance, 

and cost that such competition would yield, as compared to the SBInet Block 1 capability. For example, OTIA and Border Patrol officials acknowledged that the surveillance system sought by the RFI is essentially the same as the one deployed in Block 

1 in terms of expected capability and performance in meeting operational and effectiveness requirements. 
27 

In February 2011, DHS conducted an ‘‘Industry Day’’ to provide potential vendors 

with a better understanding of Border Patrol’s technology needs on the Southwest 

border and collect information about potential capabilities. During the session, DHS 

provided information on potential procurements for Integrated Fixed Tower systems 

and a range of other surveillance technology, such as RVSS and unattended ground 

sensors. Following its information-collection activities, should DHS decide to move forward 

with requests for proposal for various types of technology, including the Integrated 

Fixed Tower system, these actions should be timed in such a way as to make maximum use of the results from the cost-effectiveness analyses discussed below. While 

the initial deployment actions will be in Arizona, it is envisioned that the contracts 

could be used to deploy technology anywhere on the Southwest border. However, to 

accomplish this, DHS will need to ensure that the requirements specified in the request for proposal are sufficient for deployment not just in Arizona but throughout 

the border. 

Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for the Integrated Fixed Tower System Raises 

Questions 

According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, the Secretary’s decision on the future of SBInet and the Integrated Fixed Tower system was informed by an AOA 

that analyzed the cost-effectiveness of four options-mobile (e.g., MSS), fixed (Integrated Fixed Towers), agent (e.g., hand-held equipment), and aviation (Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles). On the basis of our review of available information about the AOA 

to date, there are several areas that raise questions about how the AOA results 

were used to inform Border Patrol judgments about moving forward with technology 

deployments, including the Integrated Fixed Tower system. As we continue our 

work for the committee, we plan to examine each of the following areas in detail 

to obtain additional insights into DHS’s decision making regarding the cost-effectiveness of a range of border technology options. Specifically, 

• It is not clear how DHS used the AOA results to determine the appropriate 

technology plans for Arizona. For instance, the AOA identified uncertainties in 

costs and effectiveness of the four technology alternatives in each of the four 

geographic analysis areas, meaning that there was no clear-cut cost-effective 

technology alternative for any of the analysis areas. Yet, the AOA observed that 

a fixed tower alternative may represent the most effective choice only in certain 

circumstances. 

• Because of the need to complete the first phase of the AOA in 6 weeks, the AOA 

was limited in its scope. For instance, the AOA did not consider the combination 

of technology approaches in the same geographic area and did not consider technology solutions, such as RVSS units. Urban areas were outside the scope of 

the AOA. Hence, it is unclear how DHS made decisions for proposed technology 

deployments in such areas. Further, the first AOA did not examine as an alternative the use of only existing Border Patrol equipment and agents without the 

addition of any new technology approaches. The AOA should have assessed the 

technology approaches based on the incremental effectiveness provided above 

the baseline technology assets in the geographic areas evaluated. According to 

study officials, the omission of a baseline alternative was corrected in the second AOA and did not change the conclusions of the first AOA. 

• A more robust AOA could result in conclusions that differ not just in the Border 

Patrol sectors yet to be evaluated in future AOAs, but also in the Tucson and 

Yuma sectors considered in the first AOA. While the primary purpose of the 

second phase of the AOA was to expand the analysis to three additional Border 

Patrol sectors (San Diego, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley), being able to conduct the analysis over several months allowed the study team more time to consider additional measures of effectiveness and technology options. DHS plans to 

conduct another AOA that would cover the remainder of the Southwest border. 

According to study officials, while the potential for different results existed, the 

results from the second AOA did not significantly affect the findings from the 

first AOA. 

Further, we have questions about how the AOA analyses and conclusions were 

factored into planning and budget decisions regarding the optimal mix of technology 

deployments in Arizona. Specifically, according to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, 

the AOA was used to develop the Arizona technology deployment plan and related 

procurement plans and to provide cost data to be used for the Border Patrol’s operational assessment and the fiscal year 2012 budget request for Integrated Fixed 

Tower systems. However, because AOA results were somewhat inconclusive, it is not 

yet clear to us the basis for including three of the four alternatives in the manner 

prescribed in the budget request (the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle alternative was 
28 

not). For a program of this importance and cost, the process used to assess and select technology needs to be transparent. The uncertainties noted above raise questions about the decisions that informed the budget formulation process. We have not 

yet examined the Border Patrol’s operational assessment to determine how the results of the AOA were considered in developing technology deployment planning in 

Arizona and, in turn, the fiscal year 2012 budget request. 

Independent Evaluation of Test Results to Determine Operational Effectiveness and 

Suitability Not Yet Completed 

The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) was to independently test 

SBInet’s Block 1 capability and evaluate the results to determine its operational effectiveness and suitability (i.e., the extent to which the system fits it its operational 

environment and is useful to Border Patrol to meet the agency’s mission). Because 

the Integrated Fixed Tower system could be similar to the sensor towers and COP 

used in SBInet Block 1, the ATEC could inform DHS’s decision about moving forward with technology deployments. However, the testing and evaluation was not 

complete at the time DHS reached its decision regarding the future of SBInet or requested fiscal year 2012 funding to deploy the new Integrated Fixed Tower systems, 

as discussed earlier. An initial briefing on the emerging results from the testing was 

provided to DHS on March 2, 2011, with a final report due sometime in April 2011. 

As our work proceeds, we will further address the questions raised about the AOA 

process, the test and evaluation results, and CBP’s proposed new acquisition strategy. We will also continue to assess the status of the SBInet program in light of 

the Secretary’s decision and the actions emanating from this decision. 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the subcommittee, 

this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank all the witnesses for their testimony today. 

I would just make an observation at the beginning of my questioning here. I will turn to myself, recognize myself to begin my 5 

minutes of questioning. You know, this committee was formed, actually, after 9/11, and we have several pictures on the walls here 

of the Trade towers. We all remember that horrific day on 9/11. 

Subsequently, the Congress formed this committee in a very 

challenging environment, trying to bring together under an umbrella various portions of different agencies, et cetera, et cetera. As 

we think about homeland security, a big part of that, of course, 

would be securing our borders. 

I only mention that is why I always go back to the Northern border, because we have similar challenges, but unique challenges on 

both borders. On the Northern border, without quantifying it, certainly it is known that we have four to five times as many hits on 

the TIDEs list along the Northern border as what we have on the 

Southern border—so, as I say, a different type of challenge. 

But along the Southern border, it seems to me that the complexion and the dynamics of what is happening on the Southern 

border is changing and has changed rather dramatically, particularly in the last several years, where perhaps before it was overwhelmingly illegal immigrants coming here for economic opportunity, et cetera. Now you have the spillover of the drug cartels. 

To the extent that—I don’t need to be alarmist here, but certainly it does seem to be almost a war zone situation in some 

areas. I would look for clarification on that. 

But I mentioned the beginning of this committee, because I am 

not sure at what point the Department of Homeland Security and 

this Congress thinks about intermingling some of the budgetary requests from the Department of Defense and the Department of 

Homeland Security. 
29 

One of the things that we tried to do after 9/11 was share resources in the Operation and Integration Center, and I would like 

to get to that at some point, that we are going to be opening next 

week as a great example of that of all the various agencies, all the 

stakeholders sharing information, analyzing data, intel, et cetera, 

and getting it out into the hands of our stakeholders. 

But, you know, we think about border security in theater, in Afghanistan, et cetera, and then we have our own border on the 

Southern border that we are having all of these challenges with. 

So I have a question for Major General Salazar. 

I, and I think most people, were very, very enthusiastic about the 

President when he requested the National Guard along the border. 

I have been there. I have seen some of the things the Guard is 

doing, from putting up some of the fence to various things that has 

been happening with our men and women and our Guardsmen 

along the border there. 

I am disappointed that the funding is going to run out in June. 

That is one of the things, I think, this Congress and this committee 

will be looking to think about what we really need to do with the 

National Guard. I am just wondering if you could flesh out a bit 

for us, first of all, the construct of the Guardsmen and women who 

are there. 

I am not quite clear where they are all from, how they cycle 

through, the 2 weeks, 4 weeks, and various States that they are 

coming from. I ask that question in the context do you think it 

would behoove the Federal Government to mission the Guard in 

the various States to have border security as a part of their mission, where all States would participate in this type of thing? 

A follow on to that question, one of the things, certainly in theater, that happens—I will tell you a bullet doesn’t know if you are 

inactive duty or you are a Guardsmen. That is so, along our border 

as well, as you seek to be a force multiplier, I think, for the proud 

men and women in Customs and Border Patrol. 

Do you think that the Customs and Border Patrol is armed properly? Do you think, for instance, a Stryker brigade would be advantageous along the Southern border and really utilizing various 

types of armaments that we do use in theater to secure that border 

against these drug cartels? 

I know it is sort of a long question, but I am just trying to understand how the Guard is being utilized, how we can most effectively 

utilize the guard as we go forward, and perhaps other units of the 

military. 

Major General SALAZAR. Chairwoman Miller, I will try to get all 

aspects of your answers there. Just as a point of order, we have 

not been—we, being the Arizona National Guard have not been 

building any fences since Operation Jump Start, which ended in 

2008. 

Like all these missions that we do in the National Guard, we do 

not dictate the mission sets that we provide. The Department of 

Homeland Security has always prioritized the mission sets. For Operation Phalanx and the counter drug program, the JCNTF program, neither of those operations have any kind of engineer or 

fence work that is part of their mission sets. 
30 

As for the question about how we organize, in Operation Phalanx, for example, we received what is called 502(f) Title 32 funding. Every person that is on the program is on the program for an 

extended period. They are on active duty orders serving the National Guard. 

The one disadvantage with the type of funding we received for 

Operation Phalanx, which was the same type of funding we received for Operation Jump Start, is that those individuals that are 

serving on Operation Phalanx are not allowed to go to drill and 

perform the weekend drills. So when we have soldiers or airmen 

that volunteer for this mission, they no longer participate in their 

unit of assignment, which is a readiness issue. 

The difference between that and JCNTF, because of the type of 

Title 32 Section 112 funding, does authorize those soldiers and airmen to continue participating in their unit, maintaining their readiness, both individually as well as the unit. So from that standpoint, there is a significant difference. 

Having experienced Operation Jump Start, which is where we 

had units rotate through from all over the country, as opposed to 

Operation Phalanx, which is the current mission, where it is all 

being supported by Arizona National Guard personnel, financially 

it is an extremely more expensive operation to be rotating units 

through as opposed to the current mission of just using Arizona 

National Guard organic units. 

Given the size and scope of the mission set, yes, we are pretty 

comfortable being able to field up to 500, 600 Arizona National 

Guard personnel on the border. 

Mrs. MILLER. My time has expired, but just so I understand. So 

in Arizona the National Guard that is in Arizona, for instance, is 

only the Arizona National Guard. There are no other State National Guardsmen or women there. 

Major General SALAZAR. Yes, ma’am. That is true. The 560 personnel that are currently serving on Operation Phalanx are all fulltime National Guard, and they are all Arizona National Guardsmen. 

Mrs. MILLER. Do you know if that is true in Texas as well? It 

would be just the Texas National Guard? 

Major General SALAZAR. For Operation Phalanx, I do know that 

Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California are all supporting that mission with organic National Guardsmen in that specific State. Operation Jump Start was significantly larger, and we were the one 

State that required outside support from other States. 

Mrs. MILLER. Well, I appreciate that answer, because it does 

seem to me that other States should be assisting with this, because 

if you take that amount—I don’t know what percentage that is— 

out of the Guards in the respective States, but that would definitely be a readiness issue for that particular State, where you 

have got sort of the big burden of the border protection, where you 

are protecting the border for the entire country. 

That may be something that this committee and this Congress 

wants to look at. So I appreciate that. 

I am over my time. We think we will have a second round of 

questions, but at this time I turn to my Ranking Member, Mr. 

Cuellar. 
31 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

In August 2010 we passed H.R. 6080, the 2010 emergency border 

security supplemental appropriation, which provided $600 million 

to strengthen border security and to help reduce violence along the 

Southwest border. This funding allowed for the hiring of 1,000 new 

Border Patrol agents to be assigned to the Southwest border. 

In order for us to provide our legislative oversight and to ensure 

that we appropriately are allocating resources to the areas that 

need the most assistance, I have asked CBP where these new border patrol agents would be assigned. 

I am going to ask if they can put the chart up on the screen. 

Members, I am going to give you a handout in a few minutes also 

that shows what is up there on the screen. Tucson, which is already the largest CBP sector with 3,361 agents in fiscal year 2010, 

will receive 500 new agents. El Paso, which is the second largest 

sector with 2,718 pages, will receive 187 new agents, which is the 

second largest allocation. The San Diego area, which is the third 

largest sector with 2,588 agents and the Rio Grande Valley, which 

is the fourth largest with 2,418, each will receive 150 new agents. 

The remaining sectors, Laredo, Del Rio, El Centro, Yuma, Marfa, 

the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth sector, respectively, in 

the number of agents assigned, none of these sectors will receive 

any of the new Border Patrols out of this plus-up. 

I have also asked for statistics regarding the number of agents 

already assigned to each sector prior to this plus-up and the number of apprehensions that each sector made in the fiscal year 2010. 

Mr. Fisher, you and I have talked, and when I asked you for the 

factors to be used, you used apprehensions. Then later, when I 

asked you to explain why those numbers were allocated, you came 

up with some other vague threat, risk, other, without being able to 

define those. 

A few minutes ago Mr. Borkowski, you also said that CBP uses 

apprehensions to measure how effective they have been with the 

enforcement of border apprehensions. 

In fact, Mr. Fisher, when I asked you to provide me the factors, 

the only thing you gave me—Members—was apprehensions. You 

all should get a copy of the handouts of this one to see what each 

sector gets in apprehensions. 

CBP provided the statistics for the creation of the graph that I 

have displayed overhead, and I put this graph, which lists all the 

Border Patrol sectors along the Southwest border, shows the ratio 

as to how many undocumented persons were apprehended per Border Patrol agent assigned to sectors in fiscal year 2010. 

[The information follows:] 
32 

Mr. CUELLAR. I have listed the sectors in order, starting with the 

highest apprehension rates to the lowest. For example, Tucson, 

Members, is the one at the left side, which is the apprehensions is 

the one in the blue. The red is the additional numbers that each 

sector is supposed to be getting. Those are done by 10s. Then the 

lowest is El Paso, which has the lowest amount of apprehensions, 

but gets the second largest number of officers. 

So I have listed the sectors in order, starting with the highest 

apprehension rates to the lowest. For example, Tucson, as I mentioned, has a ratio of 62.3 apprehensions per Border Patrol agent. 

El Paso has the lowest ratio of 4.4 apprehensions per Border Patrol 

in fiscal year 2010. El Centro, which has the second highest apprehension rate at 26.8, yet this sector is not receiving any new Border Patrol agents. 

Chief Fisher, I want to give you the benefit of the doubt. I don’t 

think these allocations are political, but to an outside observer, it 

might sure look that way. It would look as the amount allocated 

for El Centro was moved to El Paso. In fact, if you look at the red, 

I think that red should be where the second largest is. Maybe you 

made a mistake on that, but it looks like that allocation is wrong. 

I don’t know—I don’t see Ms. Sanchez here, but I am sure that 

her or Dan Lungren from California and any other folks would 

question as to why the second-highest apprehension rate per agent 

is not receiving any agents, while the lowest sector that has the 

lowest rate of apprehension is getting the second allocation of new 

agents of 187 under the supplemental. Can you explain that? 

Mr. FISHER. Congressman, I would be happy to. As a matter of 

fact, I want to make sure that I am clear, because I am not explaining myself clearly as it relates to staffing. 

It is true that apprehensions are a factor that we take into consideration for a number of things, not the least of which is staffing 

levels. It is inaccurate to suggest that it is the only thing that we 
33 

take into consideration, for instance, the supplemental that you 

had mentioned. 

Of those 1,000 Border Patrol agents for the supplemental, 500 of 

those agents will be going to the Tucson area. That is permanent 

full-time equivalents. The other 500 will be dispersed among four 

corridors along the Southwest border to make up what is called the 

mobile response teams. 

Now, although they are assigned to a sector, because we have to 

assign them to those areas, the corridor concept in those four locations are consistent with which we have identified areas along the 

Southwest border to be able to manage risk both in terms of the 

threat, which is the intent and capability of all those seeking to do 

harm into this country, and to identify threat along the Southern 

border in particular in terms of volume of activity. 

We also take into consideration vulnerability, which makes up 

that threat picture. So it is true that—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Fisher, I am sorry, but let me interrupt. 

Mr. FISHER. Please. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Apprehension, No. 1. Give me in a concrete manner what the second factor is. 

Mr. FISHER. The second factor would be effectiveness, which by 

our definition is the proportion of apprehensions subsequent to a 

detected entry. In other words, of those individuals that we detect 

coming between the ports of entry, we want to proportionately increase the amount of arrests that we make along the Southwest 

border. That is one additional—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Third factor? 

Mr. FISHER. The third factor would be inteligence in terms of 

what is happening along our border both respect to any potential 

violence within that corridor, transnational criminal organizations 

operating in that area, and any associated—to give you a third and 

a fourth, any associated crimes related to smuggling or other 

crimes within the border communities that are taking place along 

the Southwest border. 

Mr. CUELLAR. The last time, I think—I don’t know if it was Mr. 

Duncan or somebody had asked you the question about the definition, operational definition, and you were using something different 

from what we had put in 2006. Part of that definition talks about 

enforcing the border, that is, you know, the intrusions into the 

United States, which means apprehensions. 

So are you coming up with other factors beyond that definition 

that we put in statute in 2006? 

Mr. FISHER. No, sir, not at all. Matter of fact, I believe Congressman Duncan was referring to the 2006 Fence Act, whereby operational control was defined by the prevention of all illegal activity. 

I am just suggesting the manner in which we do that is not inconsistent. It is a little bit more sophisticated in terms of staffing models. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Well, I don’t know what you mean by more sophisticated, but given the benefit of doubt so we will understand what 

you mean, again, apprehensions—and I just want to have a sense, 

but I met with you, I have talked to your staff, and we still have 

no idea what you are talking about, with all due respect. 
34 

Apprehensions is one. Mr. Borkowski said that is the main measure to look at stopping people about coming into the United States 

What is the other one—threat? 

Mr. FISHER. Well, Congressman, first, I would like to clarify it 

wasn’t my intent to be either condescending or in using the word 

‘‘sophistication’’ to allude to the fact that this particular committee 

wouldn’t understand it. I was suggesting in terms of how we do our 

staffing models, we have matured the way that we look at it, and 

we look at things just—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Fisher, let me ask you, why don’t you put that 

in writing and send that to us in a very succinct way? Because this 

is the second time I have sat down with you, and I still don’t understand. I have been doing this probably not as long as you, but 

I think I have a working understanding. Could you provide that to 

the committee? 

If I can just ask one question, the emergency supplemental was 

signed into law in August 2010. The funds were available immediately. How many Border Patrol agents have you hired under the 

emergency funding? Because in talking to the homeland appropriators, they said that you still haven’t given them answer as to how 

many you have hired. I understand it takes, what, 18 months. 

Where are you exactly on hiring under that emergency process? 

Mr. FISHER. Congressman, I will have to get back specifically for 

the question—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Whoa, whoa, whoa. You don’t understand how 

many people—you as the chief don’t understand how many people 

you have hired at this time? 

Mr. FISHER. No, I can—we have over 20,000 Border Patrol agents 

right now. 

Mr. CUELLAR. No, no, no. Under the supplemental bill that we 

passed last August in 2010, you were supposed to hire 1,000, because there was an emergency. The funds were available immediately. How many Border Patrol agents have you hired under the 

emergency funding? 

Mr. FISHER. I don’t know specifically under that specific appropriations, but we have hired—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Chief Fisher, you are saying that as the chief 

of the Border Patrol, an emergency bill that got passed in August 

2010, you are telling me that you don’t know how many people you 

have hired under that emergency? It didn’t happen last month. It 

happened August 2010. 

Mr. FISHER. Under the specific appropriations, because those 

numbers would be different depending upon when we started hiring in October, both in terms of backfilling the attrition positions 

and onwards to our goal this fiscal year of hiring 21,370, I don’t 

know specifically against the emergency appropriations how much 

of that total that we have done thus far, but I would be able to follow up and get you that answer, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, first question, I still don’t understand you. 

Second question, I still don’t understand your question. 

Madam Chairwoman, I know you have been very indulgent. 

But I would like to ask you to give us that information also as 

to how many people under the emergency bill that we passed in 

August 2010, 1,000 people, and they were supposed to be so the 
35 

National Guard can come in. The National Guard will be stepping 

out, and Border Patrol is supposed to be coming in. 

I am surprised that you don’t know how many people you have 

hired under that, how many have been interviewed, background investigations, how many have been sent to the BPP Academy. I 

would ask you to please submit that in writing to the committee. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. At this time I would also look for unanimous consent to have Mr. Green join our questioning of the witnesses today. 

Without objection, that will be so ordered. 

I would just comment to Mr. Green you have been to several of 

our committee hearings, and we would invite—I think there is a 

vacancy. We would certainly invite you to join us, because you are 

a very, very active participant and very interested in these issues, 

and we are appreciative of that. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I gratefully accept 

your comments. Thank you. 

Mrs. MILLER. At this time the Chairwoman would recognize Mr. 

McCaul of Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Chief Fisher, I would also be interested in your answer to Ranking Member Cuellar’s question, if you could forward that to my office as well that answer. 

Mr. FISHER. I will, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Borkowski, it is good to see you again. I want to allude back 

to, I guess, it was about a year ago. You and I and Congressman 

Cuellar were down in Laredo on the Mexican border and ended up 

at midnight, like something out of a movie, with this equipment 

from the Department of Defense. I think you and I and Congressman Cuellar were very impressed with this technology. 

Can you give me an update on the deployment of this technology 

and what your plans are to use it? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes, thank you. I also recall that session. 

In fact, if you were to look at the new Arizona technology plan 

in total, it includes elements called agent portable surveillance systems, APSSs, which are tripod-mounted, long-range, infrared sensors. Those are among the things that we looked at there. 

So we are in fact in this plan intending to procure those as part 

of the Arizona deployment. We are in fact procuring them through 

an Army vehicle. So, yes, we did take advantage of what we 

learned from that. We did incorporate it into the operational assessment the Border Patrol did, and we do intend to procure those 

systems. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I am very glad to hear that. I look forward to its 

deployment across the entire Southwest border, including my State 

of Texas. We have 1,200 miles with Mexico. 

Mr. Stana, you mentioned that 755 million in Arizona alone for 

technology. What does that leave for the rest of the Southwest border? 

Mr. STANA. Well, I guess that depends on what the Congress appropriates—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes. 
36 

Mr. STANA [continuing]. But that is what this expenditure is envisioned in just Arizona alone. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. You know, again, Congressman Cuellar alluded to the politics of the situation. It just seems like Arizona is 

getting all the attention, and Texas is not. I just want to impress 

upon you that—and I understand the apprehensions are very high 

in the Tucson sector, but we do have a large, you know, 1,200 miles 

that we share. I think, you know, our State should be given that 

attention as well. 

Mr. Stana, you mentioned that this would not be completed, the 

technology piece on the border would not be completed until 2021 

or as long as 2026. Is that correct? 

Mr. STANA. That is our understanding. They are starting with 

Arizona, and they will go to neighboring sectors, but by the time 

this sequential process is finished with the AOAs and the judgments made by the Border Patrol and the fielding of the technology, it would be 2021 to 2026 before the last Southwest border 

sector would be—then to the Northern border. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. That is a long time, and you are talking 10 

to 15 years. It took us a decade to put a man on the moon, and 

yet we are talking about camera surveillance, you know, that kind 

of stuff, that technology that, quite honestly, the Department of Defense has already manufactured through R&D at taxpayer expense. 

I don’t understand why this takes so long. You have a crisis 

going on down there. Everyone knows it. We know how dangerous 

it is in Mexico, and we know how dangerous it is at the border. 

Why can’t we ramp up this process? Why can’t we expedite it? 

What can we in the Congress do to send that message to the administration that we need to do this faster? 

Mr. Borkowski. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes, sir. Certainly, we could buy more, and we 

could put them wherever we need to. In fact, the plan, one of the 

differences in the new plan is that it actually has the flexibility to 

adapt as the threat evolves. So it is very much focused on Arizona, 

because, as you noted, that is where we have over 200,000 apprehensions compared to the rest of the border. 

We do expect things to evolve, and we actually have funding in 

the budget in the President’s request for what we call emergent requirements. Among other things, that is to deal with what we see 

as a result of tightening up Arizona. 

In addition, the systems we are buying are systems that the military has provided. There are a whole set of these things. The integrated fixed towers—there are such systems already existing by 

the military. So we can buy them. The question is: Where do we 

put the first ones and why do we put them there? 

However, we will that allow us to respond. If there is a movement of traffic somewhere else that requires us to deploy somewhere else, we can shift our plan to adapt to that—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate that. I hope we can do it more expeditiously. If I have to go home and tell my constituents it is not going 

to be until 2026 that this border is secure, they are not going to 

accept that message. I think they are right in not accepting that. 

Last, on the question of the National Guard, General, your deployment will end in June is my understanding. What is the plan? 
37 

Major General SALAZAR. Congressman, we are not those that create the plans. Basically, unless there is additional funding, the mission is going to end. This is the Operation Phalanx mission. The 

counter drug program, that is still continuing. We have about 140 

personnel there continuing doing that mission, which we have been 

doing for over 20 years in support of law enforcement. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So it is over. The National Guard will be removed 

from the border as of June. 

Major General SALAZAR. For Operation Phalanx, yes, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I was always concerned that, you know, your 

hands are tied. You are in a support role, not operational down 

there to begin with, and I understand Posse Comitatus and the 

concerns there, but, you know, they weren’t doing what they are 

trained to do, essentially. 

I talked to my Governor about it. He said, you know, eventually, 

the Guard’s backing is a bit of a Band-Aid. We need a permanent 

force down there. We talk about technology. You need the response 

piece as well, the manpower to respond. 

Mr. Borkowski, what are we going to do about the transition as 

the Guard deploys out of the region? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, I think I would offer that to the Chief. I 

could give you my perspective, but the chief is the operational expert there. Would that be something that—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Chief, do you have a response? 

Mr. FISHER. Yes, Congressman. As a matter fact, along Texas 

and across the other three States as well, the majority of the National Guard are providing what is called entry identification 

teams. It is a lookout post, observation post, where National 

Guardsmen and women are put up on a high point with optics, 

daytime/nighttime capabilities, to inform the Border Patrol agents 

where the activity is. 

Those missions and that requirement will remain, and Border 

Patrol agents will be doing those, if those EIT sites are still required. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, it seems like there is going to be a big gap 

missing as the Guard pulls out, and I think I would like to see a 

very thoughtful plan as to how to replace them. 

So with that, I yield back, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman 

from Michigan, Mr. Clarke. 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller. 

You know, even though the Southern border has a lot more documented illegal crossings than the Northern border, Chairman Miller, properly cited, the Northern border faces unique challenges. 

I have got two questions. One is essentially how do we increase 

Northern border control? Secondly, what are the tailored mix of 

technologies, the likely existing technologies that we could deploy 

to better secure that border? 

But just before I go and pose the questions, I just want to note 

that the Detroit border sector contains 10 percent of the Nation’s 

border miles, approximately 863 of those miles, yet only four of 

them are under operational control, at least by CBP. 

Ranking Member Cuellar raised the issue that for me still begs 

the question on what is operational control, especially as a new 
38 

Member, since Congress 2006 stated that it means preventing all 

unlawful entries, but yet in the National border patrol strategy, I 

believe at least in 2004, indicated that the objective was to stop 

those penetrations in the high-priority areas. 

But even still, the GAO back in 2010 indicated that when it 

interviewed certain border sector offices, including Detroit, which is 

the area that I represent, those offices indicated that additional resources were needed to better secure the border. 

This question is to anybody with CBP: What are the steps that 

you are currently taking to address those identified needs, either 

through more effective partnerships or through additional resources? Then I have got a question regarding technology after 

that. 

Mr. FISHER. Congressman, I will take that answer to that question, if that is okay. You are correct. As a matter of fact, when I 

proudly served 2 years in Detroit, a huge difference in terms of the 

threat and vulnerability that I was experienced on the Southern 

border. That 860 miles that you talk about is water border, so it 

provides a very unique challenge to how we approach that particular threat. 

What is interesting also is I don’t believe that in order to minimize the risk in an area like the Detroit or State of Michigan, that 

we would want to overwhelm with Border Patrol agents alone. Certainly, the infrastructure and technology or the infrastructure and 

fence, for instance, wouldn’t be applicable. 

Then so the question is to what extent do we need technology, 

if in fact the threat as defined was the same on the Southern border, which I don’t believe it is. For instance, there is, I don’t think, 

enough camera poles that we would be able to put a long even 

more so than the 860 miles, if you take into consideration all the 

inlets, all the rivers and those crossing points. 

So the approach for Detroit in particular, and certainly along the 

Northern border, and as we start our sustainment strategy along 

the Southern border in the out years, is really going to be predicated on three things. It is going to be information and inteligence, 

which is really going to be a key indicator on what that threat is 

and how we can minimize the risk. 

The second thing is going to be the integration. As you aptly 

noted, operational integration, our ability to work with a joint terrorism task force, the border enforcement security task forces for 

ICE, for instance, working with our State and local partners as 

force multipliers, that has in our history and will continue in the 

future to be a key indicator on our ability to not only know what 

is coming at us, but certainly to build the operational plans as a 

law enforcement force, not just the Border Patrol, but within the 

community against those particular threats. 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Chief. 

Just to pick up on that, and this is for anybody in CBP, the chief 

outlined the differences with the Northern border. Much of the border is right in the middle of a body of water. Other areas are in 

the middle of forest. 

What are the tailored mix of technologies that you would use to 

better secure that area, just using your term of art, Assistant Com-
39 

missioner Borkowski? But this is to anyone that could address 

that. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, let me start, but I would also like to suggest we should hear from General Kostelnik, because his air and 

marine is a big part of the technology solution here. 

But there are a number of technologies along rivers and such. 

We do have radars, we do have cameras, and we have started to 

deploy some of those. Within wooded areas that is a little trickier, 

because radars and cameras don’t help you. But there are a number of sensors that we can use to detect activity. 

So for us the focus is on recognizing whether or not a vulnerability is being exploited so we can respond to that knowledge. It 

is not dealing with hundreds of thousands of people trying to come 

across the border, which is a significant difference. It is identifying 

where there is an issue so that the resources we have can be properly focused on it. That is how we would use technology, and we 

are investigating those kinds of systems. 

With that, I think it is probably important for General Kostelnik 

to talk about how we use the air and marine assets. 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, I could just add that over the last 5 

years, while there has been a lot of visible focus on the Southwest 

border, in the long lead areas that are very difficult to acquire 

high-end equipment, aviation in particular and maritime to a lesser 

extent, the agency actually has been investing heavily in the 

Northern border. 

Over the last 6 years we stood up five new air branches, Detroit 

obviously one of the big ones up there, but air branches all across 

the Northern border to lay in aircraft and aviation support to support our officers and agents on the ground. 

In the maritime, this committee has actually been part of the 

plus-up in the maritime environment, and we have added significant number of marine branches not only in the Great Lakes, but 

in other areas across the Northern tier and accordingly, because we 

have actually a faster lead time on acquisitions, have fielded the 

very capable new generation of SAFE boats. 

You probably have seen these. Both we and the U.S. Coast 

Guard operate these things. They are sealed aluminum hull vessels. We operate the 33- and 38-foot boats on the Great Lakes. 

These are boats that are capable of 60 miles on the water, three 

manned armed crew. We are carrying not only Border Patrol 

agents on these boats as crew, but also office of field operation customs type doing port inspections. 

Of course, with the UAVs it is a very more problematic approach 

with the issues we have with COAs and problems with civilian 

aviation traffic, but we have made a tremendous amount of 

progress in the UAV program in the Northern tier as well, having 

fully deployed an operational two aircraft in North Dakota and 

having recently this past year, since we last briefed the committee, 

acquired additional COA airspace. 

We can now fly from Minnesota all the way across the Northern 

tier to the west to Spokane, Washington, and, of course, 2 years 

ago developed and do have the COAs for operational work on the 

eastern side of the Great Lakes, having flown and deployed to Fort 
40 

Drum, partnered with the 10th Mountain Ranger Division there, 

partnered with the Air National Guard in Syracuse. 

We have flown the St. Lawrence Seaway. We have flown Lake 

Ontario. While we do not have dedicated UAVs or COAs active for 

the Great Lakes proper, including Detroit, we do have as a matter 

of record, you know, emergency COAs available to us from the FAA 

such that should there be a National high-end contingency event 

anywhere along the Northern border, we could get the necessary 

COAs from the FAA for a National security event in 1 day. 

We do have the asset not only from the Northern tier asset, but 

the ability to distribute a system to fly and operate aircraft from 

any of our four operational launch and recovery sites. 

So while we continue to explore with new technology like the 

OIC we are going to open next week and other types of activities 

that A.C. Borkowski has talked about in terms of the land investment, integrating these airborne assets, which are very difficult to 

acquire, take time to get, a lot of that infrastructure is in place. 

Efforts like the OIC, through much quicker development opportunities through OIT software and computers, is starting to tie those 

aircraft, those boats not only to the COPs with the command and 

control infrastructures, but also through developments that we are 

applying in the Southwest border that equally apply to bringing 

the agents into that connectivity. 

Today we can see live streaming video from our Predators to 

handheld devices that would fit in your hand—probably your 

BlackBerry, you know, in the next few weeks. I mean, that is how 

far technology has come. 

So I would ask you just take a fair and balanced view that we 

have not lost our focus on the Northern border. We have been 

working it behind the scenes for a long period of time, and much 

of the technological investments in particular that we invest in the 

Southwest border we can quickly apply to the Northern border, and 

that is always part of the plan. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

The Chairwoman at this time recognizes Mr. Quayle, of Arizona. 

Mr. QUAYLE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Chief Fisher, I have a question. It is starting in June we are 

going to have a drawdown of the 1,200 National Guard troops from 

the Southwest border in Arizona. That is a little over 530. At the 

same time we recently canceled SBInet, so a lot of the technological 

force multipliers that would have been in place—hopefully, would 

have been in place—are now gone, and they won’t be in place till 

probably 2013, I think, at the earliest, and maybe not until 2015 

in Arizona, which is my home State. 

My only concern is what is the Border Patrol going to do to kind 

of bridge that gap between the drawdown of the National Guard 

troops and the implementation of the force multiplier via technology, which we don’t know when that is going to be actually implemented? 

Mr. FISHER. Yes, Congressman. I can tell you from the time that 

we stood up the National Guard deployments in Arizona and across 

the Southwest border, but in particular Arizona, to the drawdown, 

which will be complete by June time period, we have increased 
41 

both in terms of permanent Border Patrol agents and detailed Border Patrol agents into Arizona. 

So the capacity that we have built in the State of Arizona in 

terms of Border Patrol agents capability and for technology is at 

or exceeding what the Guard has right now in terms of those resources. So I don’t necessarily think there is going to be a huge 

gap. 

In other words those entry identification teams will not go unguarded, if you will. Border Patrol agents, if the operation still requires it, will be manning those. It just won’t be the National 

Guard. 

Mr. QUAYLE. Okay. Thank you. 

Now, Mr. Stana, I saw in your testimony you discussed how DHS 

has ended the SBInet program, but not its contracts or key technology capabilities. What has DHS actually ended? 

Mr. STANA. Well, what it has ended is the concept of moving forward with the SBInet capability, which is a camera day and night, 

radar on top of a tower that feeds into a COP that has the possibility of certain other inputs as the primary vehicle for using technology to be the force multiplier you mentioned. 

It now is going with a more tailored approach sector by sector, 

almost station within sector by station, to see which kinds of technology is most appropriate for a certain area, a certain terrain, a 

certain threat. 

What our problem is to date is that we haven’t seen the documents—we hope to see them soon—but we haven’t seen the documents yet that translate their view of what the alternatives are 

and the cost effectiveness of these alternatives into operational assessments and budget and planning. That is a black hole for us at 

this time, so I cannot say today that I totally agree with the 

laydown that they have prescribed. 

Mr. QUAYLE. So you can’t even say if there are significant differences between the new technology laydown plan and what—— 

Mr. STANA. Well, there are differences in the mix of technologies 

used, but I think one of the messages I bring to you today is that 

if you think that ending SBInet means you won’t be seeing towers 

on the Southwest border with cameras and radars on top of them 

that feeds into a COP somewhere in the station house, no, that is 

probably going to be in the next generation. The question is: Is that 

going to be the main technology fielding? 

Mr. QUAYLE. So do you think it is going to be the same technology, just different contractor? Or and figure out—— 

Mr. STANA. Well, it could be. I mean, there are only so many 

ways you can configure camera, radar on top of a tower with a 

COP. I know that, for example, the contractor that currently does 

SBInet is likely to compete again or throw its hat in the ring again. 

Whether it is selected again or not is hard to say at this time. 

But, yes, I mean, there are only so many of these things out 

there and fielded, and there are only so many to select from. In 

fact, if you look at the RFI, the request for information that CBP 

is putting out. It looks very similar to the kinds of documents we 

saw when SBInet was beginning in terms of the desired capabilities. 

Mr. QUAYLE. Okay. Thank you. 
42 

Major General Salazar, first of all, thank you for your service 

and what you do. I was just wondering have you seen or do you 

have any concerns yourself from the drawdown that will occur 

starting in June? First of all, what is the effect then from your 

standpoint of being able to secure various areas, especially in the 

Tucson sector, with the deployment of the National Guard troops? 

Do you see any negative effect on the drawdown coming up starting 

in June? 

Major General SALAZAR. Congressman, I am not in the position 

to be able to answer the question on what would be the effect. That 

is really more of a question for law enforcement and for one or the 

other members of the panel here. 

As far as the impact on the National Guard, you know, it boils 

down to a job, to be honest. Many individuals that, you know, volunteered to perform this mission are going to be out of a job. So 

those individuals will either go back to their civilian employment, 

if they had it, or they will be continuing looking for a job or deploying or doing whatever is needed to put food on the table for their 

families. 

The impact on the National Guard from a readiness standpoint, 

there is none, because we still had the requirement for the Federal 

and State mission. It is more of a personal impact on those individuals that no longer will have employment, because they are off orders in June. 

Mr. QUAYLE. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. MILLER. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman 

from New York, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

In recent years Congress has provided very significant increases 

for Border Patrol agents, border fencing and technology projects 

such as SBInet. The GAO report is quite critical that Customs and Border Protection received over $1 billion for the SBInet program 

with little to show for it due to technology and integration problems. 

Mr. Borkowski, I appreciate very much your emphasis on the distinction between the Southwest border and that of the Northern 

border. As part of the Northern border project of SBInet, remote 

video surveillance systems were deployed along the Niagara River 

in the Buffalo sector and in the Detroit sector. 

This technology was chosen because of the unique operational 

area, which consists of coastal maritime Lake Erie, riverine Niagara River, Irving, Buffalo, and rural environments. How effective 

has this particular system been in securing the Northern border 

against illegal border activity? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. The feedback, Congressman, that we have gotten from the Border Patrol, which would be the one who would 

make the assessment, has been very positive. We now have technology in areas where it has not in the past existed. 

Now, there have in the past been RVSS, remote video surveillance systems, and those are day and night cameras that are remotely controlled on towers. There have been some of those in Buffalo. This filled in some gaps in Buffalo. 

We are also using, frankly, these are systems. We have about 

250 of these deployed along the Southwest border. Of course, the 
43 

environment—I was raised in Buffalo and Rochester—it gets much 

colder there. We had problems with lenses freezing over, those 

kinds of things. 

So part of this was to take a look at how well they actually held 

up in that environment. They do seem to hold up very well. They 

went up actually very quickly, very cost effectively, and the feedback that we got back from the Border Patrol has been very positive in what that has allowed them to do in terms of seeing what 

is going on. 

I would like to make one point of clarification, if I could. When 

we talk about SBInet and how much money has gone to SBInet, we 

have had trouble with the definition of the term ‘‘SBInet.’’ I don’t 

call what we put up in Buffalo or Detroit SBInet. The system we 

were putting in Arizona is SBInet, and we have been kind of loose 

with terminology in the past. 

It is important, because the $1.5 billion that the GAO talks about 

includes almost a billion for the SBInet in Arizona. But the rest of 

it is for things like the Northern border—mobile surveillance systems, tactical communications. Just to be clear, we try to make a 

distinction among those technologies. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. 

And for both Mr. Borkowski and Chief Fisher, the GAO report 

found that only 69 miles of the 4,000-mile border is currently considered under effective control. Thirty-eight of those effective control miles are in the Buffalo sector. 

Mr. Fisher, in your testimony you emphasized the importance of 

strong partnerships with the Federal, State, local, and Tribal agencies, as well as the Canadian government, to protect the border and 

expand inteligence and information sharing. 

I recently visited the Border Enhancement Security Task Force, 

BEST, in Buffalo, where they discussed their role in securing the 

border. Their partnerships have allowed them to make 284 arrests, 

95 indictments, 44 convictions, and the seizure of approximately 

7,200 pounds of controlled substances, 2.3 million in U.S. currency, 

49 firearms, 38 vehicles, since the inception of the program in 

March 2008. 

However, the recent GAO report referenced that numerous partners have cited challenges relative to undermining the full capability of the program. Can you help us understand that a little bit 

better? 

Mr. FISHER. Yes, Congressman, I will try. I mean, one of the 

things when you look at operational control as defined and applied 

and you look at the Northern border, I mean, one of the deficits the 

Northern border chiefs had over the years is because predominantly the definitions were predicated on technology, they were 

predicated on fence. 

We realized that in the Northern border in particular, a lot of the 

personnel enhancements and the fence not only were not going to 

go proportionately to the Northern border, but in a lot of those 

areas it didn’t make sense to put fence along the Northern border. 

So what we asked the chiefs to do at the time is take into consideration the relationships and the operational coordination that you 

are doing. 
44 

What we are doing right now is trying to figure out: How do we 

quantify that in terms of whether it is op con miles or a greater 

sense of situational awareness? Because at the end of the day, 

what we really want to know about is that information and 

inteligence. Of those individuals that are intending to come into 

this country on the Northern border, do they have the capability? 

By what means would they try to come across the Northern border, 

both in terms of location and techniques, tactics, and procedures? 

That is a little bit different model than taking a look at the senior fence applications or camera systems across a broad desert 

area. So we are trying to get better modeling to try to put a little 

bit of fidelity in terms of how we assess that—again, and assess the 

risk not necessarily in terms of linear border miles, because it is 

a different operational environment with a different threat as defined. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I think my time has expired. Thank you, Madam 

Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South 

Carolina, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. McCaul asked for some answers to the questions from Chief 

Fisher. If your office could make sure that—I think it would be 

beneficial to everyone, but I would like to have a copy of that as 

well. Thank you. 

Chief Fisher, I want to say thank you for taking the opportunity 

to meet with me recently as I try to understand your on-going mission at the Southern border. 

As you know, from South Carolina we are a long ways from both 

the Northern and the Southern border, but it is an interest to the 

folks back home when it comes to immigration and illegal immigration and this situation with Hezbollah being in bed with the cartel 

in Mexico and implications that may have for years to come. So I 

know you have got quite a challenge and continue to learn more 

and more at each hearing that we have. 

I want to address my questions today to General Kostelnik. 

I understand that UAVs are supposed to be a force multiplier 

that could basically remain in the air much longer than normal 

planes and require much fewer assets. The employment of UAVs 

has been touted as a way to, I guess, stimulate and expand the surveillance gaps affecting the remote sections of the border. 

However, during Secretary Napolitano’s SBInet review, it was determined that UAVs were not suitable to patrol large swaths of 

border such as those along the Arizona-Mexico border. These systems require ground control station and satellite link, and costs 

have increased from $4.6 million to $10.5 million. 

Can you just clarify what missions UAVs are best equipped for 

and provide insight as to why UAVs were not chosen as an alternative to SBInet? 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, thank you, Congressman. I will be 

happy to elaborate on that. In fact, I am not sure what exactly 

those costs are relative to, but we actually have been operating 

UAVs along the Southwest border for more than 6 years now, first 
45 

with the Border Patrol proper and then with U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection. 

Today we have three operational aircrafts sited at Sierra Vista. 

We have one operational aircraft at NAS Corpus Christi. We have 

COA airspace to fly from the State of Louisiana to the State of 

California. So that is a lot of airspace to fly. 

Basically, although the UAS is not a panacea, it does have a very 

unique characteristic that manned aircraft just cannot have. In 

fact, we operate 26 different kinds of aircraft in homeland security. 

The Predators and the Guardians supply a very unique capability. 

They are very small, so in many circumstances can’t be seen. That 

is an advantage over the larger airplanes. 

We don’t carry crew, so there is man-related equipment on the 

aircraft, so therefore, you can put all your payload into sensor technologies and equipment. Because of the combination of the technologies, we can fly these aircraft for 20 hours. 

So you are in South Carolina. Not only are we concerned with 

the Southwest border and the Northern border, we are also now 

concerned with the littorals, which would cover the coast of South 

Carolina. In fact, back in their hurricanes 3 years ago, we actually 

put the UAVs in to work. We flew across your State, the complete 

coastal environment, taking high imagery synthetic aperture radar 

cuts of all the coastal infrastructure. 

Given the things that are going on in Japan, I mean, this is another opportunity to highlight the uniqueness of what UAVs can 

bring to bear. In that instance we now have a track record of all 

the coastal environment from the isthmus of Florida all the way to 

Dover, Delaware. Those were taken as a matter of record with the 

Predator mission during the hurricane, a 2,300-mile flight, a 20- 

hour mission. 

Today, if we were to have a nuclear event like is going on in 

Japan right now, I mean, the inability to fly manned aircraft over 

those sites to understand what is going on, you know, gives a 

unique opportunity for UAVs. If we had UAVs deployed, the Predators over there, we could actually put the UAV over the top of any 

of those reactors. 

At the end of the day, you know, for 20 hours, it would give unprecedented situational awareness—slow-motion video, able to take 

high-definition radar cuts of all the physical infrastructure, great 

for comparison. That would be a wonderful capability to have for 

emergency response. 

So not only are the Predators—we are flying nightly. We have 

four operational sites. Last night we had weather at two sites, but 

we did fly and extended mission in the Caribbean out of our site 

at the Cape. That would be the aircraft that would support issues 

in South Carolina all the way up the eastern seaboard. 

Mr. DUNCAN. General—— 

General KOSTELNIK. We also flew operational missions out of Sierra Vista along the Arizona border. So not only are they on-going 

force multipliers for the agents and troops on the ground, but they 

are unique capabilities in unique circumstances. 

Mr. DUNCAN. General, I think we all appreciate the capability of 

UAV, and I appreciate that you all are using those on the Northern 
46 

and the Southern border and over my State at times, and definitely 

over Japan, what a tragedy. 

But my understanding is that UAVs are not flying for 20 hours. 

The FAA is limiting those. Can you touch on that for me? 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, there really isn’t an FAA limit. I 

mean, we have had this debate. There are clearly operational 

issues with flight in the National airspace, but clearly with the 

COAs that we have in the Northern tier, the COAs we have all 

across the Southern tier and the isthmus of Florida, we have more 

airspace today then we can fly. 

Our constraints over the flying hours—a Predator Guardian can 

fly 20 hours. That is our mission capability. But to do that—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. How many hours are they averaging, would you 

say? 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, our missions, some of the higher missions are 15 or 16 hours. A good many of the missions are 10 

hours. Some of the training missions, depending on the circumstances, are shorter. We are not flying to the full potential, not 

because of aircraft or airspace limitations, but because we are still 

building the force. We are still growing the crews. 

To fly a 20-hour mission actually takes three sets of crews, two 

operational, because a crew has to fly the aircraft when it is up and 

away, and a third crew to land. So you have to launch the crew 

someplace, have two crews from the distribute area, which we do, 

that fly it, and then have a crew to recover. 

So really, although they are unmanned, there is plenty of manpower—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. How many people are on a crew? 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, we fly the aircraft on most operation 

missions with a two-man crew. One pilot flies the aircraft, and one 

pilot operates the sensor. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Air Force requires 119 people per UAV, based 

on the data that I was given. 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, when you look at the—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. One hundred nineteen and two is a big difference. 

General KOSTELNIK. No, no, when you honestly get into it, I 

mean, yes, there are more people involved if you need them or 

want them, but you get more benefit from it. So the kind of people 

that are involved in those, okay, so we have a control set. It just 

takes two to operate the aircraft. 

But taking the data takes more people. In our instance on occasions we will have a Border Patrol agent or an office of field ops 

in the control set, or we might have a lawyer with us or other local 

law enforcement because of the mission. That gives us more people 

involved in the mission that you can log to that, but also more capability. 

The data that comes out of our aircraft is now sent to processing, 

exportation, and dissemination cells. This is another distributed infrastructure. We have two of those, one at the AMOC in Riverside, 

one at North Dakota. In that you have your analysts. 

That is another five people, full-time, that are in there to tell the 

sensor operator where to look and the pilot where to fly. They do 

real-time data reduction, and they are talking to other intel specialists distributed throughout the system. 
47 

As we have stood up the new joint command in Arizona, those 

people and with the warfighters are taking that information and 

working on that. So when you look at it, you might have on one 

of our given missions, because of all this distributed interest, there 

could be 50 people involved. But, you know, if it was unmanned 

aircraft feeding the same data set infrastructure, it would be the 

same number. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I would be curious to find out—— 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. The Chairwoman is trying to be lenient 

with the time, but we are way off our time here, and I want to 

make sure everybody has an opportunity to question. 

The Chairwoman would now recognize the gentlelady from 

Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairwoman and the Ranking 

Member. 

Let me thank everyone who is here for their service. 

I want to thank Ranking Member Cuellar for raising some, I 

think, crucial issues that I would like to address. 

First of all, I want to put on the table, Chief Fisher, that the continuing resolution proposed has listed $500 million in cuts to CBP’s 

budget, and that would occur in 2011, meaning that you have obligations, and it would occur at that time—if you could keep that 

question on your mind. 

If I could have Mr. Kostelnik to keep on his mind a question on 

the impact of these cuts would have on ports. I come from a city 

with a large port. Those are vulnerable. It is a vulnerable area 

there, and I am very interested in that. 

But let me just comment, and if you would include your comments to me on this statement. I remember being able to go to 

Mexico and have dinner with friends, dinner with families, and 

then come back. Over the last couple of months, we have seen teenagers leave El Paso and are shot dead. We have seen our ICE 

agents attacked, one tragically losing his life. 

I think we are, frankly, at the worst point that I have ever seen, 

and I do not suggest the worst point I have ever seen under this 

administration. I think it has been steadily deteriorating, not with 

any respect for the hard work that our men and women are doing 

on the border. I think it has been challenging, whether it is on 

President Reagan’s border, President Bush I’s border, President 

Bush II’s border, Clinton’s border, Carter’s border, or our present 

President. 

My question, then, is as you answer the question about the $500 

million in cuts, are we ever going to get control? How much more 

can our friends in Mexico do? Obviously, local officials are killed, 

prosecutors are killed, law enforcement are killed. The drug violence is an epidemic and out of control. 

So this is not a commentary on the individual work that is going 

on, but it really is asking for a truthful assessment of what is needed, how this cut will impact. 

I will go to you just very quickly and thank you, Major General 

Salazar, for your work. You made a good point that you follow orders. Could I just ask you, however, would it be helpful if this Congress decided to continue the mission of the National Guard? 
48 

Major General SALAZAR. Congresswoman, you know, I am here 

as the adjutant general and to basically echo the comments of my 

Governor, who has been very vocal about the fact that she believes 

that there should be an increased presence of National Guard supporting law enforcement. 

It has never been anything but supporting law enforcement because of the unique skill sets that we bring. We are talking about 

a lot of technology, communications, radar, sensors, Predators. The 

National Guard, the military personnel, the men and women in our 

Guard have those skill sets, and we can bring that skill set to support law enforcement. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So it is not a wartime skill set. It is you are 

going to be supportive of a civilian force. Is that correct? 

Major General SALAZAR. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So—— 

Major General SALAZAR. We use those skill sets to do the mission 

that law enforcement is doing on the border. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So in the cutting, not providing funding, 

States on the border like yours, I assume if I had my major here 

from Texas, they might say the same thing. 

Major General SALAZAR. Yes, ma’am. I think we will echo the 

concerns of our Governors in that we need to do more to secure the 

border. If that means utilizing the National Guard skill sets to enhance the current operations of law in force, I would agree with 

that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Chief Fisher, would you answer the question about the $500 million cut and the conditions at the border with 

the drug violence? 

Mr. FISHER. Yes, Congresswoman, I will. Matter fact, with respect to the cuts, we are continuing even what we started last year 

and when I became the chief and made to take a look at contingency plans and efficiencies within the workforce. CBP continues 

that effort today. 

But in terms of what we are seeing in Mexico as it relates— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What did you say about the cuts? I didn’t hear 

you. 

Mr. FISHER. I beg your pardon. I said in terms of the cuts, what 

we are doing and continue to do this year is taking a look at efficiencies in the event that we had any cuts in our budget in terms 

of discretionary funds, how we do that within the Border Patrol in 

terms of—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But you would be in essence looking to cut 

what you might need. You would be in essence leaving programs 

out. 

Mr. FISHER. Well, in some cases we may, depending upon if they 

still meet our operational priorities. What it does—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have $500 million to cut out of a budget that deals with horrific drug violence and the cartels and the 

murderous activities that are going on? Do you have that amount 

to cut? 

Mr. FISHER. Well, what we are doing, Congresswoman, is taking 

a look at all the cuts in different increments to be able to see what 

the offsets are going to be. For instance, if we identify some cuts 

within our operations in terms of deployment, there is going to be 
49 

an impact to that. What we do is we minimize that impact across 

our borders and try to minimize any impact that—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, then, you would be belt-tightening, and 

there would be some programs that will be sacrificed. 

Mr. FISHER. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. 

Mr. Kostelnik, if you forgive me for pronunciation, but the same 

question to you and tied into our ports. 

General KOSTELNIK. We are, as you know, a force provider for 

the Border Patrol. So we provide the maritime units along the 

ports. Obviously, we have multiple air branches in Texas. 

So 2011 was not a good year for us in terms of re-capitalization 

anyway, but we do have follow-on acquisition that is on-going for 

new maritime vessels that would be unaffected by the continuing 

resolution and those expected cuts. 

For us it would likely manifest itself at some point into reduction 

in flight hours or on the water hours, and—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So there would be an impact on homeland security. 

General KOSTELNIK. Depending on the level of the cuts and timing, yes, there certainly—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, first of all, we all believe in belt-tightening. I think the question is whether or not homeland security is 

a place to belt-tighten or be efficient. So the question is ports 

across America would be impacted. You would have to pull back on 

some of the resources or the utilization of that. Is that correct? 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, I think at some point, depending on 

the level of cuts, there would have to be a reduction in float and 

flight hours from air and marine. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well—— 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. Again, the Chairwoman is 

trying to be lenient with the time, but I want to make sure everyone has an opportunity to question. 

At this time the Chairwoman would recognize the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I especially 

thank you for the unanimous consent request. Like you and other 

Members of the committee, I believe that border security transcends politics, and we should do what we can to work together to 

make sure that we secure all of our borders. 

I want to thank the persons who are here today. You are doing 

a great service for our country, and it is most appreciated. Because 

you do such a great service for the country, as one American I want 

you to know that I am concerned about the safety of our men and 

women, who work along the border. 

I am concerned about the border. Don’t get me wrong. That is of 

paramount importance—all borders, but also the safety of the men 

and women who work along the border and as well as those who 

work on the other side of the border. 

You know of the incident that has occurred, and my concern is 

whether or not our personnel on the other side of the border, 

whether they are secure enough to work in that environment and 

not be able to protect themselves with proper armaments. Do they 

need to have weapons? I have an opinion, but I would like to hear 
50 

from the experts as to what we should do to make sure that they 

can protect themselves. 

Chief Fisher, if you would, do our agents on the other side of the 

border need the ability to protect themselves? I understand that 

they are guests, and they are in the host country, but what about 

their safety? 

Mr. FISHER. Yes, Congressman. First, thank you for your concern, and I share your concern with any U.S. person that is in Mexico. 

But in particular the Border Patrol doesn’t have that many Border Patrol agents that are assigned in Mexico. Matter of fact, the 

overwhelming majority are assigned at the embassy, so the answer 

to your question would really depend on what their function is and 

what they are actually doing. 

So for those individuals working at the embassy and force protection provided, we are doing everything we can in terms of getting 

risk assessments and threat assessments, working with 

NORTHCOM, for instance, and working with our CBP attache ́ in 

Mexico City, to constantly evaluate that and make recommendations to us. All those will be taken into consideration in the near 

term. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

Would anyone else like to respond? 

Let me move to another topic. We obviously will do our proactive 

prevention, and that is the best way, I think, to help ourselves with 

this border protection, as opposed to reactive apprehension. 

I do want to talk to Mr. Stana—I seem to have lost—Mr. Stana, 

you about a concern. Our staff—and I salute them, the staff personnel, for what they are able to do. They literally sift through the 

sands of information and find pearls of wisdom. They have accorded me one pearl of wisdom that I would like to share with you. 

It reads that ‘‘GAO has also noted that CBP currently does not 

have the ability to detect illegal activity across most of the Northern border.’’ That is a fairly significant statement. Will you please 

elaborate on what that actually means? 

Mr. STANA. Yes, Mr. Green. In fact, that observation was made 

in connection with the report on the Northern border security that 

we just finished last fall. I know the Chairwoman is well aware of 

that report. 

The number of miles on the Northern border that is under operational control is about 2 percent. That is mainly because unlike 

the Southwest border, where you have maybe 19,000, 20,000 Border Patrol agents covering 1,900 miles, you have got maybe 2,000 

agents covering 4,000 miles—wide open spaces, no tactical infrastructure, very little of the air assets, you know, in comparison to 

other locations. 

The radar capabilities for detecting low flying aircraft aren’t 

what the Border Patrol would like them to be. So there are many 

risks, many vulnerabilities. This has been documented not only in 

our reports, but in reports that have been done by CBP and others. 

You know, the threat is different. As has been pointed out by 

other members of the panel, you can’t expect that Border Patrol or 

any other single organization to do it alone, or you would be 

beefing up the size of the Border Patrol or any other organization 
51 

tremendously. But it is incumbent on the organizations up there to 

coordinate and cooperate with the resources that they have. 

Mr. GREEN. I think it appropriate that someone have an opportunity to respond. Who would like to respond? 

General KOSTELNIK. I will respond to some of that, because clearly the terrain and the geography is very different. While there is 

a large amount of expansive space and fewer agents, it really is a 

different environment. 

Along a lot of it, particularly out in the western part, there is no 

infrastructure on either side of the border to really to support this 

kind of activity. So I think there is some, you know, some merit 

in the case that there is a lot that we don’t know that is going on. 

Certainly, we have a different threat base. There is a different 

flow, whether it is weapons or cash or illegal substance of some 

kind. So, really, I think, again built on growing our technology and 

growing our capability, as we have slowly been doing on the air 

piece and now we are starting to do on both the water and the land 

piece, we are starting to deal with some of these unknowns. 

We worked closely with the Guard over the years to put in 

ground-based radar to improve our look-up. We are slowly adding 

more capability with look-down with the UAVs. We are aggressively partnering, as we always have, with our Northern neighbors 

on intel functions to target our activities where there is need. But 

there are still a lot of unknowns, and those are the kinds of things 

that we are going to have to track. 

But behind the scenes in the areas that we think are highest 

risk, we are employing our best effort in terms of people, our best 

effort in terms of technology and supporting infrastructure with 

aircraft or maritime. Clearly, in the area of the Great Lakes, where 

there is more population, there is more activity and therefore more 

risk. 

I think you are seeing, you know, a concerted focus by the 

vestiges of the old SBI, some of the new things that we are doing 

like the OIC, what we have put specifically to boats, what we have 

put in the new AW–139 helicopters. We are increasingly going to 

grow those capabilities. 

The world is an uncertain place. We have a broad area to cover. 

Again, I mentioned that we still have the littoral. With all of the 

pirating activity that is going on on the world stage, there is not 

a lot of protected infrastructure on the sides of the country—on 

both sides. 

Our new commissioner has come and looked at that, and we are 

starting to focus on thinking about how do you protect the littoral 

part of the country as well. We have seen now fully submersible 

submarines that can sortie out of Colombia with more than 3,000- 

mile range. They can land north of where most of our border protective infrastructure is. 

So the world has become more complex, and it is a matter of 

prioritization, where you put your assets and what are your National priorities. The help, in a way, is the growth in IT infrastructure and—— 

Mr. GREEN. My time has expired. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank the gentleman. 
52 

We are going to go to a second round of questions here. I know 

that those Members that are remaining have lots of other questions 

as well, so we wanted to do so. I think this is just an excellent 

panel that we have here today really getting to a lot of our questions. We appreciate all of that. 

I am going to go back to—well, first of all, let me talk about the budget. For instance, it has been mentioned about the $500 million 

on the CR. That is primarily the SBInet that Secretary Napolitano 

has said is not necessary anymore. So that is principally what that 

figure is. 

But, you know, budgets really are a reflection of the Congress reflecting the will of the American people, I think. I think it is clear 

that the will of the American people is to secure our borders. They 

certainly have that will. They have the political will. I think it is 

for the Congress to demonstrate the political will that the American people have, and that is really what this hearing is trying to 

get at today. 

So one of my earlier questions was about the potential to co-mingle some of the budgetary issues between the Department of Homeland Security as well as the Department of Defense. 

I am going to go back to my question again, and perhaps to Chief 

Fisher and to Major General Salazar as well, about the utilization 

of not only the National Guard, but whether or not, because of 

what is happening on the Southern border, which seems to be a 

complexion that is now changing to the dynamic that is very similar to a war zone situation with the overspill of the drug cartels 

into our country, how we not only secure our border, but to keep 

that kind of element out of America. 

I wonder if it is something that we should be looking at as actually using, as I say, perhaps a Stryker brigade. You know, a 

Stryker brigade, my understanding, for instance, that the Guardsmen, I think, maybe only Pennsylvania is currently training and 

has a Stryker brigade, but it would be something perhaps that this 

Congress should look at. 

If you have a Marine Stryker brigade on the other side of that 

border, I think those drug cartels are going to think twice about 

coming across that. That is not, believe me, any slap on what is 

happening with the Customs and Border Patrol at all. You do a 

wonderful, fabulous job. But I think we need to beef it up. 

So I am thinking in those terms. I mean, we are talking about 

UAVs, which is an off-the-shelf technology, has had great impact 

in theater, and we are looking at other kinds of technology. 

One of the things that this committee is going to be looking at 

as well is other types of, in addition to the UAVs, the land systems, 

robotic land systems, again, that we have had excellent success 

with in theater. The terrain in Afghanistan certainly is rougher in 

most cases than what we have on the Southern or Northern border, 

so if it can be utilized there, again, the taxpayers have already paid 

for this fantastic technology, and I think it has application for 

homeland security as well. 

So I would just throw that out in regards to a Stryker brigade 

or other beefing up of military along the Southern border to either 

Chief Fisher or Major General Salazar, if either one of you would 

like to comment on your thoughts on that. 
53 

Mr. FISHER. Chairwoman, thank you very much. I will go first, 

and the general, if he chooses to respond as well. 

We have been working with Department of Defense for the last 

20 years or so both in terms of the counter drug missions under 

Title 10, Title 32, and we continue to work with the Department 

of Defense, and through our primary point of entry is 

NORTHCOM. 

We identify to NORTHCOM by way of Joint Task Force North 

in El Paso, Texas, our operational requirements on a yearly basis. 

Matter of fact, we are just starting to do that on a quarterly basis 

now so that we can have a lot more mobile and flexible deployments on that. So we welcome any continued opportunity to work 

with the Department of Defense under a border security mission. 

Mrs. MILLER. General, again, I am not sure whether or not 

Guardsmen and women have had the opportunity to train on a 

Stryker brigade, but if you are familiar with the Stryker, I mean, 

I think it has application for a homeland security type of mission 

because of the ability for it to run on just regular roads—and everything else. I think it just has that type of application, but your 

comments on that. 

Major General SALAZAR. Yes, ma’am. Excuse me. 

I guess, just to be honest, it would have to come down to: Do we 

feel that using a Stryker brigade would be a demonstrated use of 

force? Is that going to have an impact? Because when you talk 

about specifically capabilities of what we can provide to law enforcement, we could provide the same type of observation and reconnaissance with a much smaller package like the entry identification teams that we are doing now. 

A Stryker brigade, in my opinion, would probably be a little bit 

too much, unless the use of force is the objective, which I wouldn’t 

be able to analyze or provide any kind of input if that is really an 

effective use of a Stryker brigade. 

Mrs. MILLER. I appreciate that. I think you can see from the 

questions of our committee here that there is great consternation 

about the runoff—and the runout in June of the National Guard 

along the border. So I am sure we are going to be talking amongst 

ourselves about that. 

Major General SALAZAR. Yes, ma’am. If we are talking fiscal responsibility here, and so we can, in my personal opinion and from 

experience in Arizona, you would get a lot more bang for the buck 

using the funds to enhance entry identification team type support 

as opposed to the huge cost of bringing in a Stryker brigade. 

Mrs. MILLER. I appreciate that. 

General Kostelnik, in regards to the UAVs, and I think you have 

answered most of my questions, but I was wondering a bit about 

the UAVs around the Northern border in regards to the type of 

drones that you are using there, et cetera. 

Is there any problem with weatherization on those drones? It 

might be a simple question, but I wonder about that sometimes. Do 

you have de-icing? Do you run into any particular weather problems with the type of equipment that you are using there? 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, you may recall that last year—I mean, 

a couple of years ago, we actually put the Predator for the first 

time into the climatic lab down at Eglin Air Force Base, first time 
54 

any of the family series had ever been there. To their credit, the 

Army put in a Warrior at the same time, so we actually understand a fair amount about the aircraft. 

It does not have a de-icing system. Most aircraft don’t. Most 

manned aircraft have anti-icing systems, but there are many scenarios where manned aircraft have trouble in icing, so you fly out 

of it. The Predator is very much the same. 

We have been up now operational for, I think, 3 years in North 

Dakota. There are days, clearly, in certain forecasts when we can’t 

fly. It is not a panacea. It is limited, but there are the same limitations on manned aircraft. But most of the time icing is not an 

issue. I mean, we can fly clearly in winter weather. Those aircraft 

have flown in 28-degree weather routinely, but they have the same 

limitations as manned aircraft do. 

Mrs. MILLER. General, you also mentioned about the CAOs. I 

would just mention to you in addition to Homeland Security, I also 

sit on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and our 

committee has just passed out the reauthorization for the FAA, 

which the House will be taking up, I think, next week—excuse me, 

in 2 weeks. 

But at any rate, one that we put in there is a plan to expedite, 

actually, the CAOs for various agencies and try to develop a plan 

quicker because of some of the problems that we are well aware of 

that you are facing. Again, I understand the agency, FAA, and 

their mission may be different than ours, but we are all Americans 

first and foremost, and we need to be integrating some of these 

areas. 

I will just mention the Detroit sector in particular. At Selfridge 

Air National Guard Base, we thought in 2010 that we were going 

to get a ground mission for UAVs, and I don’t know where that is 

now. In the Detroit metropolitan area, because of the size of that 

hub, they are talking about moving it—the ground mission—somewhere else, because the FAA won’t give you the CAO on that, so 

if you have any comment on that. 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, I mean, flight of the National airspace 

and the COAs are really all about, you know, managing risk. The 

system you fly has a lot to do with it, and that is why we chose 

the Predator B. It is the safest of all of the UAVs out there. You 

know, we lost our first aircraft back in 2006, but we have had really no major accidents since then. All of our aircraft are, you know, 

kind of operational. 

But when you get into the metro areas, where there is a lot of 

commercial traffic, you know, that is where the FAA is most concerned. They like to have more studies. They like to have more information. They are very careful of who they authorize to fly in the 

National airspace, because there is such a wide variety of risk associated with the aircraft, a very small handheld UAV like model airplanes all the way up to the Global Hawk and everything, you 

know, kind of in-between. 

But I think we have given as a matter of National security the 

FAA, you know, the best model, the best platform and the best mission requirements pool, you know to further the policy of what aircraft should be allowed to fly. I think, quite frankly, we have made 

a lot of progress. 
55 

With the brackets that we have had in upstate New York and 

the experience we have had in North Dakota and the progress we 

have made out west, I believe the Great Lakes, you know, is going 

to come. 

But we are still growing pilots. We don’t have enough pilots for 

the aircraft we currently have. There is clearly a lot of significant 

focus going on in the Southwest border, and we have a lot of National contingency response. So I think is going to come, but it is 

still going to take some time. 

As far as the ground controls, you know, it is just a matter of 

getting the GCSs. While it is easier to get the aircraft on contract, 

it is much more problematic to get the ground control stations as 

fast as we get the aircraft. 

So although we are funded for added ground control stations as 

well as Predators this next year, we will get the two Predators that 

this committee helped us get delivered this calendar year, one in 

October and one in December, but we won’t get the GCS for another year after that. So that kind of delays where and when we 

can fly things on the ground. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. 

My last question—I am giving myself a little bit of extra time 

here—and I do have to mention about the Operational Integration 

Center, which is at the Great Lakes branch of the Northern border 

wing there. We are very excited to have that grand opening next 

week. 

I have had an opportunity to tour that facility several times as 

it has been under construction, and just as recently as several 

weeks ago. I think it is going to be a critical component, an excellent component of a complete total force concept along the Northern 

and the Southern border. Certainly it is a pilot there, but it could 

be utilized at either border. 

One of the things that we learned from 9/11 and the 9/11 Commission recommendation, which in my office I keep telling my staff 

this is not shelfware. We need to look at this often and remind ourselves that some of their key recommendations was, again, how we 

had to move from the need to know to the need to share. 

The Operational Integration Center, just for the committee to understand, is again, essentially all of the various stakeholders in 

that sector, including our counterparts, our Canadian counterparts, 

State police, local first responders, Air and Marine, the Customs 

and Border Patrol, the Coast Guard—I am sure I am missing a 

few, but everybody who has a stake in the entire thing—and then 

analyzing all of this data properly. 

To the very best of our ability, again, so that you put something—there is no second for information, good information, in all 

of your businesses, good information and intel—and getting that information out into the hands, ultimately, of the men and women 

who are on the front lines so that they can utilize that kind of information to be so much more effective. 

So I am very, very enthusiastic about the OIC. I don’t know if 

you have any comment about—either of you—how you might see 

that unfolding. 
56 

Mr. FISHER. Yes, we do share your enthusiasm, Congresswoman, 

and look forward to the implementation and getting that information used for operational effectiveness. Thank you. 

Mrs. MILLER. Mr. Borkowski. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Just to add to that, we are very excited about 

it for several reasons. One of them is that that Operational Integration Center was designed with the unique nature of the Northern border in mind. It is also true that we expect to gain some lessons for the rest of the border, but as Chief Fisher and General 

Kostelnik have indicated, a lot of the effectiveness on the Northern 

border is based on that sharing. 

The second thing I would point out is that the way we designed 

and developed the Operational Integration Center represented a 

change from how we designed, say, SBInet and some of our past 

history, as did the deployment of the RVSS. It was a much more 

structured acquisition process. It was a much more detailed relationship with our operational users. The result was to produce 

something with a lot less problems then we had with the SBInet. I don’t want to—so there is something learned there about how 

to buy things, that I don’t want to pretend that our processes are 

all mature, because they are not. Many of our processes are still 

very rudimentary—even our analysis of alternatives, sound but rudimentary compared to DOD. 

But I think what you are seeing with the OIC and with some of 

the other things that we have started to build processes for is the 

effectiveness of those processes. I don’t want to say we are all the 

way there, but we are starting to show the results of some of that 

discipline. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

At this time I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Cuellar. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Chief Fisher, the new CR, H. Res. 48 that I believe we are going to vote on this afternoon, will cut $107 million for construction of 

Border Patrol facilities. These funds were for replacements of existing Border Patrol facilities in four States, including Texas, Washington, Maine, and New York. 

I believe the ones in Texas—one of them was in Freer. I don’t 

represent that area, but I just passed it just about 2 days ago on 

Sunday, so I am very familiar with that station. If there was any 

need shown to upgrade these facilities, why weren’t these projects 

moved up forward last year? If it was so important, why are we letting go of this money? 

Mr. FISHER. Congressman, I will tell you as we look at all facilities within the Border Patrol and our deployments, we take a look 

at interior stations, for instance, and we look at deployments, if we 

are going to be increasing staffing or attriting down staffing in different locations. 

All of that was taken into consideration when we make the recommendations on which Border Patrol stations or facilities—some 

cases, if we are going to be doing co-location, it would just make 

sense to do that as opposed to continuing building, either adding 

to pre-existing facilities or adding new facilities. That is all the 

process that we went into to make our recommendations to the department. 
57 

Mr. CUELLAR. Again, I speak of Freer, because I am familiar 

with that, and I don’t know if you would like to work there, but 

I am sure the men and women that work there would like to have 

a better place. If you are in a small rural area, I think the folks 

in a small rural area would appreciate a better place. 

So when did this change from a priority to a non-priority so you can let go of this unobligated $107 million that we are going to be 

voting on this afternoon to cut? 

Mr. FISHER. Well, the specific time on the priority, Congressman, 

I would have to get back to you on that. But I do share your interest. Certainly, the men and women of the United States Border Patrol require adequate facilities, because we are asking them, you 

know, quite honestly, to protect this country. We are focused on 

that as well. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Can you put that in writing and again share it to 

all the committee? 

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Second thing is let us talk about administrative 

costs at Border Patrol headquarters. How many agents do you have 

at headquarters? 

Mr. FISHER. Approximately 230. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Can you afford, without affecting your mission they are at headquarters, to move some of those to the border, 

where there has been an emergency declared? 

Mr. FISHER. We have in some instances, Congressman, yes. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Could you put it down in writing? Well, let me ask 

you this: How many do you think you can afford leaving from headquarters and allow them to go down to the border? 

It is like in the State, when I was in the State government, there 

was always a concern about the superintendent’s office having this 

overhead, administrative costs, putting more for the teachers in the 

classroom. This is the same type of logic that I am using. How 

many folks can you let go from headquarters and send them back 

to the border, where they can provide security at the border? 

Mr. FISHER. We will provide you that report, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Do you have any idea right now? 

Mr. FISHER. I do not. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Could you let go of some? 

Mr. FISHER. I beg your pardon? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Could you move some to the border? 

Mr. FISHER. I don’t know at this point. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. As the chief of the Border Patrol, I have 

asked you several questions today, and you have not been able to 

answer at least three of them. 

Mr. FISHER. Well, Congressman, I will tell you specifically 

when—you know, with 230 Border Patrol agents in our headquarters, that was an increase from 34 as we were transitioning to 

the Department of Homeland Security. 

One I receive requests from the field in terms of increased staffing levels, there is a whole host of things that are taken into consideration, and I have got a very competent staff that informs me 

on their judgment on what the impacts are going to be whenever 

you moved any Border Patrol agent. I expect that will be the process of this case as well. 
58 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Will you specifically let us know if you can 

move any of your Border Patrol agents who are at headquarters, 

without affecting the mission there, down to the border, where I believe they were—where they were supposed to have been going to? 

Let me ask you this: Under the supplemental bill that you don’t 

have the answer as to how many you have hired so far, is there 

any intention to have any of those people go up to headquarters? 

Mr. FISHER. Not at this point, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Not at this point. 

Mr. FISHER. Not to increase our authorized levels of headquarters. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Again, if you can put that in writing and 

share with the subcommittee. 

This is a general question. According to a recent GAO report, 

CBP had, I believe it was $639.4 million, Mr. Stana, on our obligated balance, and it is a customs user fee account as a result of 

excess collections from the temporary fee increase and elimination 

of North America Free Trade Agreement country exemption from 

January 1, 1944 to September 30, 1997. 

I think GAO first identified these unused funds in 2008. Bottom 

line is we got $639 million there in a bank account. Is that correct, 

Mr. Stana? 

Mr. STANA. Yes, that is my understanding. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. 

Gentleman, if you had $639 million sitting in an account, why 

have we not moved it? I can understand probably the answers will 

be, well, are we authorized to use this money or not? If not, has 

any brought that to our attention? I am sure that Chairman Miller, 

myself could find a lot of ways to use this money to help borders 

both at the Northern or at the Southern border. 

Mr. Kostelnik, we would be happy to get you more UAVs. I am 

a big supporter, and I like the job that you are doing. 

Same thing, Mr. Borkowski. 

I am just saying is there a way that we can move this money? 

Because if you talk to border sheriffs, they will say, ‘‘Hey, we will 

take a share of this.’’ If we talked to Homeland, instead of giving 

money back, we would love to take that. What can we do to help 

you, in other words, to get this $639 million unobligated balance, 

if it is still there? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Congressman Cuellar, we can give you much 

more detail, but we do have some legislative proposals about how 

to use those fees. In the past there have been times where we have 

been able to move some of that, but it is important to understand 

that in large measure those funds from our officers, we have to 

project the cost of those officers, we have to project the cash flow. 

Right now we are looking at a deficit, not a surplus. 

So we will give you the detail, but in the past when we have had 

surpluses that we thought would be continuing surpluses, we have 

sometimes been able to move those funds to other purposes. Right 

now we are very concerned about paying the salaries of our existing officers. We will get you some more detail on that. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, I have got to close, but can you just get us 

and work with Mr. Stana as to—they are unobligated $639 million. 
59 

Give us some suggestions how we can help you, at least the onetime purchases like equipment? 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Any last questions? 

We will go to the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Just a follow up, General. Out of the 10,000 new Border Patrol 

agents and 20,770 plus or minus agents, how many of those are involved in the UAV program? This is a follow-up to our question 

earlier, General. 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, it is a complex answer. I mean, we 

have only hired, you know, dedicated 24 new UAV pilots. During 

this same time period of that growth, our total pilot force has increased from a force of about 535 in 2005 to a force of about 850 

today. 

What we do is we are dual qualifying our pilots who fly manned 

aircraft to also fly the unmanned. It reduces risk on the unmanned 

side. It is more of a popular mission, because flying UAVs isn’t a 

popular mission for most of the pilots. They would rather fly really 

aircraft. 

So actually we have probably about 60 pilots either dedicated or 

dual qualified that are flying in some part of our mission, and it 

is still not enough. We are growing more. We are training pilots 

not only for the up and away flying with the launch and recovery 

as we speak. 

It is the biggest shortfall in all of the UAV community. Not only 

us, but Department of Defense has the same issue. There are not 

enough pilots actually to fly the airborne equipment that we have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, that segues into including staff and maintenance cost. What is the cost per flight hour for the UAV versus the 

Custom Border Protection’s manned aviation assets? 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, you know, that is a good question. 

Again, it is complex in how you put it, but I asked our head budget 

guys, because I thought I would probably get that question today, 

because it is kind of the assent that they are expensive. The reality 

is while not, you know, cheap, they are not really expensive compared to the manned thing. 

So in the newest aircraft we have the Guardian, which is a Predator with a sea view radar. It does a comparable mission to our P– 

3s. So a P–3, for example, with a nine-man crew, that is the aircraft that if you bought it new today, it would probably cost you 

about $80 million. It costs us around $7,000 per flight hour to fly 

that aircraft. 

The Predator, you know, costs us about $20 million total for the total system—actually about $18 million, aircraft, satellite time, 

the ground control station, everything you need, and it costs us a 

little over $3,000 to about $3,500 an hour to operate the Predator. 

Now, if you looked at an aircraft in between, like the MEA, 

which is a King Air light twin engine aircraft with similar capability, that aircraft costs about $20 million. In fact, we have five 

of them up in Hagerstown, Maryland. We get the first multi-role 

enforcement aircraft this summer. It costs us about $20 million for 

the aircraft. It is a similar mission as the Predator, only it is 
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manned, but it can only fly about 6 hours. It costs us just about 

the same, about $4,000 an hour to operate. 

So the operational costs are really about the same. Of course, 

getting to your point earlier about the flight time, it is a very important piece of aviation, because the bulk of the cost, if you look 

at the whole cost, not just the flying our cost, but the whole operational cost for a system, it is heavily driven by the launch and recovery pieces. That is where you burn up tires, you know, you expend your extra fuel in the high speed. 

So much of the cost to operate an aircraft, that actually is in the 

launch and recover phase. So oddly enough, the longer you can fly 

an aircraft, the more cost-effective it is going to be. So if we had 

the pilots, we would certainly be flying our Predators for 20 hours 

they are capable of, and we would get a much better full loaded 

operational cost of the system. 

Mr. DUNCAN. We have got some airframes that are, you know, 

20 years old. I mean, you get a lot of—you spread that cost out over 

a lot of years on a regular aircraft. Is that similar in a UAV? I 

mean, technology is changing. Are you going to be able to get the 

20 years out of an airframe UAV? 

General KOSTELNIK. Well, you know, it is actually you have to 

go back to the history, because originally back in 1994 these were 

kind of conceived as high-risk throwaway items in a combat zone. 

The original Predators cost about $2 million apiece and were considered, you know, you would lose a lot of them in combat. 

Today the Guardian and the Predators are much more sophisticated, but they are still plastic airplanes. They are still built with 

unique and novel technologies that are fairly easy to repair. Over 

the last 5 years, launch and recover, and particularly landing, has 

been a problem not only for us, but all of the services. We have had 

several landing incidents, where the aircraft, or piece of it, was 

damaged. 

For very small amounts of money, we have been back, because 

it is basically a plastic aircraft and a fairly simple engine to go 

back and make repair on all those aircraft. There is not a lot of 

data on the long-term service life of Predators, because they were 

never intended for that. 

But now as the services, the big services and the DOD, have procured more of these and are going to procure even more over a long 

period of time, there will come a time when service life becomes an 

issue. But because of the composites these aircraft are designed to, 

replacing wings, replacing tails, they are going to be much easier 

and much cheaper to accomplish than the classic, you know, metal 

type aircraft. 

So I think the story in the long run is going to be a good one 

just because of the construction technique. The reality is the 

strength and the long-term viability of these things are going to be 

driven by the sensors that you carry. So we are not only flying the 

sensors that the DOD is, but we are looking at new technologies 

for radiation sensors, for supporting groups on the ground with systems like beta, which will help detect moving things. I think these 

aircraft are going to be around for a long time. 

Of course, in our manned aircraft fleet, we have aircraft still in 

service today that are approaching 40 years old. So if you keep 
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them safe and modernize them, they will still be the best value for 

the service. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I appreciate that. We are spending a lot of money 

on technology and other things, and I think a lot of times simpler 

is better. I keep going back to what the folks in South Carolina 

think we should do, and that is concrete still and barbed wire, and 

maybe think of a simple approach. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman for the leniency. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Again, I want to thank all of the witnesses. I think this has been 

an excellent hearing. We certainly have had, I think, very good 

questions on both sides and excellent answers as well. I just appreciate all of your service to the Nation. Certainly as you represent 

the men and women in Customs and Border Protection and Air and 

Marine and National Guard, GAO as well, we thank you so very, 

very much for all of you appearing here today. 

The hearing record will be held open for 10 days. If any committee Members have any additional questions that they would like 

to ask, we will try to get them responded to as well. 

Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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