NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

PETE G.

, Appellant

,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.G., N.G.

, A ppellee s

.

No. 1 CA

- JV 15

- 0427

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD28945

The Honorable William R. Wingard, Judge Pro Tem

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate

, Mesa By Suzanne Sanchez Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office

, Mesa By Amanda Adams

C ounsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Maurice Portley joined.PETE G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2 G E M M I L L

, Judge:

¶1 Pete G. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to his children, A.G. and N.G

. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Shai Z . (“ Mo ther”) are the biological parents of

A.G. and N.G

. , who were born in 2013 and 2014, respectively. 1 In August

2014 , A.G. and N .G. w ere taken into temporary care by the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)

. In October 2014

, t he juvenile court found the children dependent and approve d a case plan of family reunification concurrent with severance and adoption

.

¶3 The juvenile court ordered DCS t o provide, and Father to engage in

, reunification services

, includ ing substance

- abuse treatment and testing. Over the next nine months , Father failed to participate in the services provide d , failed to keep in contact with DCS, and routinely missed

vi sits with the children

. In August 2015, DCS filed a motion to terminate Father’s parental rights under Arizona Revised Statutes (“ A.R.S. ”) section

8

- 533

, and an initial severance hearing was scheduled for September 10,

2015

. Father failed to appear at th e initial severance hearing , and the juvenile court continued the hearing to October 2 6 , 2015.

¶4 Father also failed to appear , without good cause, at the
October 26, 2015 continued initial severance hearing, and the juvenile court proceeded in his absence. See A.R.S. § 8

- 863(C) (allowing the court to proceed with termination proceedings if the parent has notice of them and fails to appear without just cause); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 66(D)(2). The court

found that Father had proper legal notice of the hearing s, was absent without good cause at the pretrial conference, and was therefore deemed to

have admitted the factual allegations against him

. After receiving testimony and exhibits, t he court also determined that Father was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities due to a history of chronic drug and

alcohol abuse , and that reasonable grounds existed to believe Father’s

1 Mother’s parental rights were terminated in November 2015, and she is not a party to this appeal.PETE G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3 substance abuse would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period. 2

Father timely appeals and w e have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8

- 235(A),

12

- 120.21(A)(1), and 12

- 2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Although the right to the custody and control of one’s

child ren is fundamental, it is not absolute. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of

Econ. Sec. , 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11

– 12 (2000). As applica ble here, t o justify termination of the parent

- child relationship, the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence supporting at least one of the statutory grounds under A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B )

. Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 214
Ariz. 326, 329, ¶ 18 (App. 2007). We will not disturb the court’s order terminating parental rights unless its factual findings are clearly erroneous and no reasonable evidence exists to support them. Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of

Econ. Sec. , 202 Ariz. 76, 78

– 79, ¶ 9 ( App. 2001). “ [ W ] e will presume that the juvenile court made every finding necessary to support the severance order if reasonable evidence supports the order. ” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 17 (App. 2004 )

.

¶6 Under A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(3), the juvenile court may terminate parental rights to a child if “the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs,

controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasona ble grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.”

¶7 At the hearing, the DCS case manager testified that Father failed to participate in rehabilitation services offered, including drug treatment and drug testing. The case manager explained that, in the tests he had provided for DCS, Father tested positive for illegal substances. Father then stopped testing altogether. The case manager also expressed his opinion that Father would continue to abuse illegal substa nces because of Father’s failure to enga ge in the r ehabilitative services provided

. Finally, he testified that Father was unable to discharge parental duties, including
basic care of the children, because of Father’s substance abuse.

¶8 Based on the case m anager’s testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing

, the court found that Father was abusing illegal

2 The court also found that severance was in the children’s best interests. Father does not challenge that finding on appeal.PETE G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4 substances. The court determined that because of Father’s substance abuse,

h e w as unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. The court also found that Father failed to engage in treatment offered, and thus, Father’s substance abuse was likely to continue for an i ndefinite and prolonged period.

¶9 The findings of fact on this record are sufficient to support the

conclusion that Father was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities

due to substance abuse , and that this condition will continue for an indeterminate period

. See A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(3). Moreover, contrary to

Father’s contention , the court’s findings and conclusions were “ suffici ently specific to enable the appellate court to provide effective review. ” Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 241, ¶ 25 (App. 2012 ) ; see also

Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 66(F)(2)(a) (requiring that the court “[m]ake specific findings of fact in support of the termination of parental rights and grant the motion or petition for termination”).

CONCLUSION

¶10 For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s term ination of Father’s parental rights to these children

. 3

3 Because we find the juvenile court correctly severed Father’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(3), we need not address Father’s arguments that the court did not make adequate findings under A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(8)(c) regarding the likelihood that Fat her would be able to care for the children

in the future.