UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4211

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GLEN RANGER,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (1:18-cr-00340-RDB-1)

Submitted: July 21, 2020 Decided: September 16, 2020

Before MOTZ, HARRIS, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Cullen Macbeth, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Robert Hur, United States Attorney, Jason D. Medinger, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Barbara S. Sale, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Glen Ranger pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to two counts of producing 

child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The district court varied downward 

from Ranger’s Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Ranger to a total of 480 months’ 

incarceration. On appeal, Ranger argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable 

because the district court failed to consider his argument that the child pornography 

Guidelines should not be entitled to deference. Ranger also argues that his sentence is 

substantively unreasonable because, in fashioning Ranger’s sentence, the district court 

considered the possibility that Ranger would earn good-conduct time credits while 

incarcerated. We affirm.

We review a criminal sentence for both procedural and substantive reasonableness 

“under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S 38, 41 

(2007). In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court 

properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an 

opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-51. If there 

is no significant procedural error, then we consider the sentence’s substantive 

reasonableness under “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “Any sentence that is within 

or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United 

States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 230 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, the “district court must address or 

consider all non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain 
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why [it] has rejected those arguments.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 206 (2019). “The sentencing judge should set forth enough to 

satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned 

basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.” United States v. Blue, 877 

F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he district court must 

provide some individualized assessment justifying the sentence imposed and rejection of 

arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on § 3553.” Ross, 912 F.3d at 744 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). And while “it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing 

court’s rationale from the context surrounding its decision,” we “may not guess at the 

district court’s rationale, searching the record for statements by the Government or defense 

counsel or for any other clues that might explain a sentence.” Id. at 745 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). However, in certain circumstances, “[t]he context surrounding a district 

court’s explanation may imbue it with enough content for us to evaluate both whether the 

court considered the § 3553(a) factors and whether it did so properly.” United States v. 

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006). Such contextual indicators may exist 

when “the sentence imposed is explicitly tailored to address a defendant’s individual 

characteristics.” Blue, 877 F.3d at 521. 

The district court did not explicitly reject Ranger’s argument that the child 

pornography Guidelines should not be entitled to deference. However, the court mentioned

multiple times that that it did not presume that the Guidelines were reasonable. It also 

stated: “The sentencing guideline calculation reflects the gravity of your crime, and the 
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sentencing guideline calculation indeed recommends life—life imprisonment.”*

 Further, 

the court imposed a sentence that was explicitly tailored to address Ranger’s individual 

characteristics by repeatedly noting Ranger’s defiant attitude and crafting a sentence that 

provided Ranger an opportunity for release near his 90th birthday. Under these 

circumstances, we conclude that the district court adequately addressed Ranger’s nonfrivolous arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence. 

Next, Ranger argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the 

district court considered the possibility that he would earn good-conduct time credits while 

incarcerated. Ranger maintains that by considering those potential credits in fashioning 

hissentence, the district court relied on an improper factor outside of § 3553(a) and rejected 

policies articulated by Congress. We recently addressed this argument and held that 

recognizing the chance that a defendant could earn good-conduct time credits when 

calculating the length of the defendant’s sentence does not render the sentence 

substantively unreasonable. United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 669-72 (4th Cir. 2020)

(noting district court’s consideration of good-time credits fell under § 3553(a) factors). 

Ranger’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence is therefore without 

merit.

* Ranger’s total offense level and criminal history category directed an advisory 

Sentencing Guidelines range of life imprisonment. However, the statutory maximum 

sentence for each count was 360 months, making Ranger’s applicable Guidelines range 

720 months imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e); USSG § 5G1.2(b).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED