Present: All the Justices 

NICHOLAS EVERETTE WRIGHT 

v. Record No. 062527 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 January 11, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

The issue in this appeal concerns whether a circuit

court, after accepting a plea agreement of the type 

specified in Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C), can nevertheless impose a

term of suspended incarceration and a term of post-release 

supervision pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-10(g) and 19.2-

295.2(A) when such terms are not mentioned in the plea 

agreement. Because general principles of contract law 

apply to plea agreements and the law in effect when a 

contract is made becomes a part of the contract as though 

incorporated therein, we will affirm the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals of Virginia holding that such additional 

terms can be imposed. 

A grand jury indicted Nicholas Everette Wright for the 

willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Bruce 

Nelson, Jr., during the commission of robbery in violation 

of Code § 18.2-31(4).1

 Before trial, Wright entered into an 

 1

 A violation of Code § 18.2-31(4) constitutes capital 

murder and is punishable by death, imprisonment for life, 
2

“Agreed Disposition” with the Commonwealth pursuant to Rule 

3A:8(c)(1)(C).2 In relevant part, the plea agreement 

provided: (1) the Commonwealth would amend the indictment 

to charge first degree murder instead of capital murder; 

(2) Wright would plead guilty to the charge of first degree 

murder and be sentenced to imprisonment for life; and (3) 

Wright would acknowledge violation of the terms of his 

probation in three unrelated felony convictions for which 

he received three five-year concurrent, suspended sentences 

and be sentenced to five years imprisonment to run 

consecutive to any other sentence imposed on him. 

Upon determining that Wright voluntarily and 

intelligently entered a plea of guilty to the charge of 

first degree murder and after hearing a proffer of the 

evidence, the Circuit Court of Rockingham County accepted 

the guilty plea as well as the plea agreement. The court 

concluded that the plea agreement was “an appropriate 

disposition in this matter.” The circuit court found 

Wright guilty of first degree murder in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-32 and, in accordance with the terms of the plea 

 

or imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than 

$100,000. Code § 18.2-10(a). 

2

 Under Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C), a defendant and the 

Commonwealth may enter into a plea agreement in which the 

Commonwealth “[a]gree[s] that a specific sentence is the 

appropriate disposition of the case.” 
3

agreement, sentenced Wright to life imprisonment.3 Pursuant 

to the requirements of Code §§ 18.2-10(g) and 19.2-

295.2(A), the circuit court also imposed an additional 

sentence of three years imprisonment but suspended that 

sentence, imposing three years of post-release supervision. 

Wright subsequently moved the circuit court for 

clarification of its sentencing order. In that motion, 

Wright asserted that the additional three-year term of 

suspended incarceration and post-release supervision 

constituted an addition to or revision of the plea 

agreement that was improper and not within the circuit 

court’s authority under Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C). Wright asked 

the circuit court to enter a sentencing order consistent 

with the terms of the plea agreement. After hearing 

argument on Wright’s motion, the circuit court determined 

that, in this case, the additional period of suspended 

incarceration and post-release supervision was statutorily 

mandated and thereby included in the plea agreement even 

though it was otherwise silent on the subject. Thus, the 

court concluded that it had not altered the terms of the 

parties’ plea agreement and denied Wright’s motion. 

 3

 The circuit court also revoked the five-year 

concurrent, suspended sentences in the other three prior 

felony convictions and directed that the five-year sentence 

run consecutive to Wright’s life sentence. 
4

The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the judgment 

of the circuit court. Wright v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 

58, 636 S.E.2d 489 (2006). The Court of Appeals held that 

the basic rules of contract law apply to plea agreements 

and that “ ‘the law in force on the date a contract is 

formed determines the rights of its parties.’ ” Id. at 62, 

636 S.E.2d at 491 (quoting Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. 

App. 600, 606, 513 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1999)). Because Code 

§§ 18.2-10(g) and 19.2-295.2(A) were both “in effect at the 

time the plea agreement was formed,” the Court of Appeals 

concluded “the plea agreement necessarily included the 

suspended sentence and post-release supervision as a matter 

of law.” Wright, 49 Va. App. at 62, 636 S.E.2d at 491. To 

hold otherwise, according to the Court of Appeals, would 

“require trial judges to disregard the mandatory provisions 

of the statutes when imposing sentence pursuant to a plea 

and create an anomaly in our sentencing procedures.” 

Wright, 49 Va. App. at 64, 636 S.E.2d at 492. 

The sole issue now before this Court is whether a 

circuit court, after accepting a plea agreement of the type 

specified in Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C), can then impose an 

additional period of suspended incarceration and postrelease supervision pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-10(g) and 

19.2-295.2(A) when such terms were not included in the plea 
5

agreement.4 This question presents a matter of statutory 

interpretation and is subject to de novo review by this 

Court. See Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 

634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). 

Wright contends that the circuit court erred by 

imposing the additional term of suspended incarceration and 

post-release supervision. According to Wright, the circuit 

court in effect rejected the plea agreement but failed to 

afford Wright the opportunity to exercise his rights 

provided in Rule 3A:8(c)(4), specifically, to withdraw his 

guilty plea and choose to have his case heard by another 

trial judge, or to maintain his guilty plea and face the 

possibility of a less favorable disposition than the one 

provided in the plea agreement. Thus, Wright contends that 

he is entitled to be sentenced in accordance with the terms 

of his plea agreement with the Commonwealth or to have the 

opportunity to exercise his rights under Rule 3A:8(c)(4). 

We do not agree. 

 4

 We emphasize that the plea agreement at issue was 

silent with regard to the requirements set forth in Code 

§§ 18.2-10(g) and 19.2-295.2(A). We do not decide today 

whether a circuit court would have to reject a plea 

agreement containing an agreed disposition that directly 

conflicted with particular mandated statutory requirements 

such as the ones before us, those relating to the taking of 

a defendant’s blood, saliva or tissue for DNA analysis, see

Code § 19.2-310.2, or those imposing certain minimum 
6

For felony offenses committed after July 1, 2000, for 

which the punishment includes an active term of 

incarceration in a correctional facility, except in cases 

when a circuit court orders a suspended term of confinement 

of at least six months, the provisions of Code § 18.2-10(g) 

require a circuit court to “impose an additional term of 

not less than six months nor more than three years, which 

shall be suspended conditioned upon successful completion 

of a period of post-release supervision pursuant to [Code] 

§ 19.2-295.2.” Similarly, for that same class of offenses, 

the provisions of Code § 19.2-295.2(A) direct a circuit 

court to “impose a term of post[-]release supervision of 

not less than six months nor more than three years.” The 

provisions of these two statutes are mandatory. Alston v. 

Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 769-70, 652 S.E.2d 456, 462 

(2007). They comprise part of the maximum term of 

incarceration permitted by statute and are added to the 

term that can otherwise be imposed upon a convicted felon. 

See id. at 770, 652 S.E.2d at 462 (citing Williams v. 

Commonwealth, 270 Va. 580, 584, 621 S.E.2d 98, 100 (2005)). 

Nothing in the statutes suggests that their terms are not 

applicable when, as in this case, a defendant enters into a 

 

sentences, see, e.g., Code §§ 18.2-12.1, -53.1, -57, and –

255(A). 
7

plea agreement that fails to address the mandatory 

requirements. 

To the contrary, the provisions of both Code sections 

constituted a part of Wright’s plea agreement as though 

they were incorporated therein. In Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 

651, 203 S.E.2d 123 (1974), we stated that “[t]he law 

effective when the contract is made is as much a part of 

the contract as if incorporated therein.” Id. at 653, 203 

S.E.2d at 125; accord Buchanan v. Doe, 246 Va. 67, 72, 431 

S.E.2d 289, 292 (1993); Marriott v. Harris, 235 Va. 199, 

215, 368 S.E.2d 225, 233 (1988); Harbour Gate Owners’ 

Ass’n, Inc. v. Berg, 232 Va. 98, 105, 348 S.E.2d 252, 257 

(1986); Maxey v. American Cas. Co., 180 Va. 285, 290, 23 

S.E.2d 221, 223 (1942); Esparza, 29 Va. App. at 606, 513 

S.E.2d at 888. As the Court of Appeals held, this 

principle of contract law applies to plea agreements. 

Wright, 49 Va. App. at 62, 636 S.E.2d at 491 (citing 

Esparza, 29 Va. App. at 606, 513 S.E.2d at 888); see also

United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 179 (1st Cir. 

1985) (“[P]lea bargains are subject to contract law 

principles insofar as their application will insure the 
8

defendant what is reasonably due him.”) (citations 

omitted).5

Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err by holding that 

“the plea agreement necessarily included the suspended 

sentence and post-release supervision as a matter of law.” 

Wright, 49 Va. App. at 62, 636 S.E.2d at 491. The circuit 

court’s imposition of the three-year term of suspended 

incarceration and post-release supervision did not alter or 

modify the terms of the parties’ plea agreement. Contrary 

to Wright’s argument, the circuit court did not implicitly 

reject the plea agreement but, instead, sentenced Wright in 

accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. Wright 

therefore was not entitled to an opportunity to exercise 

the rights afforded under Rule 3A:8(c)(4) when a circuit 

 5

 Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have applied 

contract principles to plea agreements. See e.g., United 

States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004); United 

States v. Peglera, 33 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1994); United 

States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979); 

State v. Crockett, 877 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Nev. 1994); State 

v. Bethel, 854 N.E.2d 150, 166 (Ohio 2006); In re 

Palodichuk, 589 P.2d 269, 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). But 

see United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 375 (6th Cir. 

2004) (stating that although general principles of contract 

law apply to plea agreements, “‘[a] guilty plea, however, 

involves the waiver of at least three constitutional rights 

by a defendant . . . [and,] therefore, the analogy of a 

plea agreement to a traditional contract is not complete or 

precise, and the application of ordinary contract law 

principles to a plea agreement is not always 

appropriate.’ ”) (citing United States v. Skidmore, 998 
9

court rejects a plea agreement of the type specified in 

Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C). 

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals. 

Affirmed. 

 

F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. 

Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1990))).