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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40590

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ADAM LAFRANCE,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MCKINLEY COUNTY

Robert A. Aragon, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Santa Fe, NM

Mark A. Perlata-Silva, Assistant Appellate Defender

Albuquerque, NM 

for Appellee

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1} The district court granted Defendant Adam LaFrance’s motion to suppress all 

evidence resulting from a traffic stop in which Defendant was a passenger. The State 

appeals arguing the district court lacked sufficient evidence to conclude the arresting 

officer had unlawfully expanded the scope of his investigation when questioning 

Defendant. We affirm, holding that the officer asked impermissible questions beyond the 
scope of the initial reason for the stop and did not otherwise develop independent 

reasonable suspicion. See State v. Tuton, 2020-NMCA-042, ¶ 10, 472 P.3d 1214.

BACKGROUND

{2} Deputy Brandon Salazar was patrolling I-40 near Gallup, New Mexico when he 

stopped a vehicle for following a semitruck too closely, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 

66-7-318(A) (1978, amended 2021). Deputy Salazar approached the vehicle where 

Defendant was the passenger and stated he would give the driver a warning for 

following too closely. The driver offered Deputy Salazar his driver’s license, but 

explained that the vehicle was rented, and therefore not registered in his name. Deputy 

Salazar requested the rental agreement and the driver said he would pull it up on his 

phone. Deputy Salazar asked the driver to go to his patrol car so that he could check 

the driver’s identification before he would let the two men go. After about ten seconds, 

the driver left his vehicle and sat down in the passenger’s seat of Deputy Salazar’s 

patrol car. 

{3} As the driver continued to search for the rental agreement on his phone, Deputy 

Salazar questioned him about his travel. He asked the driver where he and Defendant 

were coming from, and the driver replied that they had come from California. Deputy 

Salazar then asked how long the two men had been there, and why they had travelled 

to California. The driver explained they had been there for two days for a painting job. 

The officer pressed further, asking where in California the driver and Defendant had 

been, and seeking specific details about the painting job. Deputy Salazar then reiterated 

to the driver that he would only issue a warning for following too close, and mentioned 

that he would need to obtain the vehicle identification number (VIN) from the rental. He 

asked the driver to remain next to his patrol car while he recorded the VIN. 

{4} When Deputy Salazar approached the driver’s vehicle, he also questioned 

Defendant about their trip. Deputy Salazar asked Defendant where the two men were 

coming from, what they had been doing in California, how long they had been there for, 

and what kind of job the driver had performed in California. Defendant provided answers 

that were inconsistent with the answers the driver had given to Deputy Salazar. 

{5} Deputy Salazar asked the driver to return back to the passenger seat in the 

patrol car, asked the driver if there were any illegal substances in the vehicle, and 

requested consent to search the vehicle. The driver initially consented and then 

declined. Deputy Salazar detained the two men in order to apply for a search warrant, 

suspecting that they were involved in drug trafficking, noting that they had provided 

inconsistent stories. After obtaining a warrant and searching the vehicle, Deputy Salazar 

found a backpack in the trunk that contained a large bag of methamphetamine. 

Defendant was charged with trafficking by possession with intent to distribute, and 

conspiracy to commit trafficking, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-31-20 (2006) and 

30-28-2 (1979). 
{6} Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence resulting from the traffic stop, 

arguing that Deputy Salazar had improperly expanded his investigation in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article II, Section 10 of 

the New Mexico Constitution. The district court granted Defendant’s motion, finding in 

relevant part: 

1. Deputy Salazar knowingly and deliberately embarked upon a 

fishing expedition when speaking with . . . Defendant about the 

latter’s recent travel history and the reasons behind it;

2. Deputy Salazar conducted an investigation of . . . Defendant’s 

recent actions, designs and purposes that was utterly unrelated to 

the original reason for the traffic stop and the legitimate law 

enforcement concerns emanating therefrom;

3. The conclusion reached by . . . Deputy [Salazar] that . . . Defendant 

was engaged in the transport of illegal drugs because the story of 

his travels and objectives was incredible, is itself divorced from 

reality and the product of a determined and concealed desire to 

conduct a search rather than a reasoned deduction based on the 

evidence which allows for the formulation of probable cause. 

The State appealed.

DISCUSSION

{7} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and 

fact. We review factual determinations for substantial evidence and legal determinations 

de novo.” State v. Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 10, 357 P.3d 958 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “In the absence of factual findings, when the evidence 

conflicts, we consider the evidence that supports the district court’s ruling, and we draw 

all inferences and indulge all presumptions in favor of that ruling.” Tuton, 2020-NMCA042, ¶ 8 (text only) (citation omitted). “Our review of a district court’s determination of 

whether reasonable suspicion existed is based on the totality of the circumstances.” 

State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. A law officer may 

develop reasonable suspicion based on “specific articulable facts, together with rational 

inferences from those facts, that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable 

person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.” State v. Simpson, 2016-

NMCA-070, ¶ 11, 388 P.3d 277 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The 

burden to show reasonableness is on the [s]tate.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30.

{8} We limit our review to determining whether Deputy Salazar’s conduct was 

reasonable under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution because it 

provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution in this instance. See id. ¶ 55 (“[The analysis in State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC034, ¶ 37, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836, overruled on other grounds by Leyva, 2011-
NMSC-009, ¶¶ 17, 55], requiring a reasonable justification for the initial stop and that all 

questions asked during the stop be reasonably related to the reason for the stop or 

otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion, ensures that investigating officers do not 

engage in ‘fishing expeditions’ during traffic stops. This approach comports better with 

the broader protections provided under Article II, Section 10, which we have determined 

are best analyzed under a case-by-case approach rather than bright-line temporal tests 

developed under the Fourth Amendment.”). 

{9} “[U]nder Article II, Section 10, both the duration and [the] scope of a stop must be 

reasonable under the circumstances and . . . even questions that do not prolong the 

encounter are improper if they are not reasonably related to the reason for the stop or 

otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion.” State v. Bell, 2015-NMCA-028, ¶ 16, 

345 P.3d 342 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “Unrelated 

questions are only justified (1) if supported by independent reasonable suspicion, (2) for 

reasons of officer safety, or (3) if the interaction has developed into a consensual 

encounter.” Tuton, 2020-NMCA-042, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). An officer may ask “limited questions about travel plans” when those questions 

are “reasonably related to the initial stop.” Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 37; see State v. 

Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 1, 15, 138 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d 830 (holding that 

questions about travel plans were reasonable because the driver’s name was not on a 

vehicle rental contract, which gave “the officer . . . a right to investigate whether the 

vehicle was stolen”).

{10} The State initially argues that the standard of reasonable suspicion for “an 

expansion of an investigatory stop fundamentally differs from the constitutional 

reasonableness of an initial investigatory stop because the initial governmental intrusion 

on personal privacy and liberty is greater than an expansion of an initial investigation.” 

(Emphasis added.) More specifically, the State argues that the standard for reasonable 

suspicion to expand an investigation is essentially lower because expansion does not 

require either specific or individualized suspicion of criminal activity, and because 

expansion “is evaluated in terms of the evolving nature of the stop relative to whether 

the actions taken are reasonable to resolve or explain the suspicious circumstances.” 

{11} Reasonable suspicion required to expand an investigative stop “need not 

necessarily be of a specific crime.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 23. Similarly, an officer 

may develop reasonable suspicion to investigate more than one individual in limited

circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 28, 144 N.M. 37, 

183 P.3d 922 (deeming the expanded questioning of the driver of a vehicle reasonable 

after the passenger—who police suspected had committed a separate crime—admitted 

to having evidence of a drug crime in his pocket). Expansion of an investigation does 

entail “a graduated response to the evolving circumstances of a situation.” Id. ¶ 16. 

Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded that the standard for reasonable suspicion to 

expand an investigation is less than that of reasonable suspicion to initiate an 

investigation. In either case, “[r]easonable suspicion must consist of more than an 

officer’s hunch that something is amiss; it requires objectively reasonable indications of 

criminal activity.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 23. “A law enforcement officer must have 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal activity has been or may be 

afoot in order to expand an investigation.” Id. ¶ 59 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

{12} Here, our review requires us to determine if Deputy Salazar’s questions were 

reasonably related to the initial stop, or if he had otherwise developed independent 

reasonable suspicion to question Defendant. The State does not argue that Deputy 

Salazar questioned Defendant for reasons of officer safety or because the interaction 

had developed into a consensual encounter. Our review of the record shows the same.

{13} Deputy Salazar pulled the driver over for following too close to a semitruck on the 

interstate. He told the driver he would issue a warning, and asked the driver to come to 

his patrol vehicle to verify his identification and the information in the rental car 

agreement. Deputy Salazar then asked a series of questions about travel plans 

unrelated to the rental agreement or initial stop: where in California the driver and 

Defendant had been, what kind of painting job they had done, how big the room they 

painted was, how much they had been paid, when they had arrived in California, who 

the two men worked for, how they would find their jobs, what color they had painted the 

room in California, and if they had done any sightseeing during the trip. Deputy Salazar 

then asked Defendant a series of similar questions. 

{14} These questions were not related to the initial reason for the stop—following a 

semitruck too closely. Although an officer may ask some questions, the questions must 

be “reasonably related to scope of the initial stop.” Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 37. As 

such, Deputy Salazar’s extensive questioning of Defendant exceeded the degree 

permissible under the New Mexico Constitution. See Tuton, 2020-NMCA-042, ¶ 12. 

{15} We must next determine whether Deputy Salazar otherwise developed 

independent reasonable suspicion to expand his investigation and ask Defendant 

questions that were unrelated to the original stop. “Courts defer to the training and 

experience of the officer when determining whether particularized and objective indicia 

of criminal activity existed.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 23 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Although we defer to an officer’s training and experience, “[r]easonable 

suspicion develops when the officer becomes aware of specific articulable facts that, 

judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred 

or was occurring.” Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

{16} Deputy Salazar testified that he had experience and training specific to 

identifying smugglers of narcotics. He stated that he initially developed reasonable 

suspicion when he asked the driver to exit the vehicle, but “both occupants stayed in the 

vehicle for roughly fifteen to twenty seconds, and communicated, which [he] believed 

was them getting their stories situated before exiting.” However, the lapel camera 

footage shows that the driver spent no more than ten seconds in the vehicle after 

Deputy Salazar asked him to come to the patrol vehicle. During that brief interval, 

neither the driver nor Defendant made any overt, furtive movements by reaching into 
areas of the vehicle. Cf. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 60 (holding an officer possessed 

reasonable suspicion after witnessing the defendant’s furtive movements appearing to 

hide something under the passenger’s seat before stopping his vehicle).

{17} Deputy Salazar also testified that the driver appeared uneasy in his patrol 

vehicle, stating that he had “short, shallow breathing, which is a sign of nervousness.” 

However, our Courts have declined to “equat[e] simple nervousness with reasonable 

suspicion.” State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 29, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (holding 

that a defendant’s “fidgety and nervous demeanor . . . did not suffice to create 

reasonable suspicion” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Rather, 

“[d]emeanor is only one factor to be considered in weighing the totality of the 

circumstances, and those circumstances as a whole must be reasonably connected to 

the expansion of an investigation.” Tutton, 2020-NMCA-042, ¶ 14. Nervousness alone 

cannot justify reasonable suspicion. Cf. State v. Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶ 4, 145 

N.M. 40, 193 P.3d 587 (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion—in part—

because the “driver’s hand was visibly trembling, and he appeared uncommonly 

nervous”). 

{18} The State finally argues Defendant’s inconsistent responses gave Deputy 

Salazar reasonable suspicion that he and the driver were involved in some other 

criminal activity. However, Deputy Salazar only could have asked those questions if he 

had reasonable suspicion to do so. By the time Defendant had provided inconsistent 

answers, Deputy Salazar had unlawfully expanded the scope of his investigation. By 

way of comparison, he had no reason to believe the two men were travelling in a stolen 

rental vehicle before asking his questions, cf. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 15, nor did 

he witness anything about the vehicle or Defendant’s behavior that would have justified 

such extensive questioning. Cf. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 37 (concluding it was 

reasonable for an officer to question the defendant about travel when the vehicle had a 

misplaced registration tag, suspicious tools in the back and smelled of gasoline); Leyva, 

2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 61 (concluding it was reasonable for the officer to inquire into the 

presence of weapons or other contraband in the vehicle after witnessing the defendant 

appear to hide an unknown item under the seat of his car while being pulled over); 

Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶¶ 16-17 (concluding it was reasonable for an officer to 

question the defendant where the vehicle smelled heavily of air freshener, perfume, or 

aftershave, and the backseat of the car had been removed). Furthermore, Deputy 

Salazar did not have a valid reason to expand his investigation to Defendant, then a 

passenger of the vehicle, and not subject to the reason for the initial stop. See 

Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 28 (deeming the expanded questioning of the driver of 

a vehicle reasonable after the passenger, who was suspected of committing a crime 

unrelated to stopping the driver, admitted to having drugs in the driver’s vehicle). See 

also State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 22, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (declining to 

hold that an officer possessed reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment when 

the “[s]tate had not established individualized, particularized suspicion that [the 

defendant—who was not the subject to the initial investigation—] had committed or was 

about to commit a crime”).
{19} We therefore hold that the district court reasonably concluded that Deputy 

Salazar had embarked on a fishing expedition when asking Defendant questions 

unrelated to the original reason for the traffic stop. See Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 55.

CONCLUSION

{20} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge 

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge