IN THE 

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

JESSE MESA, 

Petitioner, 

v.

HON. WARREN J. GRANVILLE, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE 

OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA, 

Respondent Judge, 

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Real Party in Interest. 

No. CR-16-0053-PR

Filed December 21, 2016 

Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable Warren J. Granville, Judge 

No. CR2015-001779 

AFFIRMED 

Order of the Court of Appeals, Division One 

Filed Jan. 6, 2016 

COUNSEL:

Eric W. Kessler (argued), Sandra Hamilton, Mesa, Attorneys for Jesse Mesa 

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, Karen Kemper 

(argued), Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Amy Kalman (argued), Mikel 

Steinfeld, Deputy Public Defenders, Phoenix, and Amy P. Knight, 

Kuykendall & Associates, Tucson, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Maricopa 

County Public Defender’s Office and Arizona Attorneys for Criminal 

Justice 

Natman Schaye, Arizona Capital Representation Project, Tucson, Attorneys 

for Amicus Curiae Arizona Capital Representation Project 
MESA V. GRANVILLE (STATE) 

Opinion of the Court 

2

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE

CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER and JUSTICES BRUTINEL, TIMMER and 

BOLICK joined. 

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court: 

¶1 Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(i)(1), the 

state, within sixty days of arraignment, “shall provide to the defendant 

notice of whether [it] intends to seek the death penalty.” Here, the State did 

not file such a notice after Jesse Mesa was arraigned; instead, after 

discovering new evidence, it obtained a second indictment adding two 

charges, dismissed the first case, and filed a death notice in the second case. 

We hold that when the state complies with Rule 16.6 in dismissing a 

prosecution and obtains a new indictment, the time limits for filing a notice 

under Rule 15.1(i)(1) start anew, absent bad faith by the state or prejudice 

to the defendant. We further hold that the untimely filing of a death notice 

does not itself invalidate the notice but may result in sanctions, including 

an order striking the notice, under Rule 15.7. 

I. 

¶2 A grand jury indicted Mesa in May 2014 for first degree 

murder and other charges (the “2014 charges”) related to the shooting of a 

clerk in a Phoenix smoke shop. Mesa was arraigned the same month. The 

State did not file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and trial was 

set for June 2015. 

¶3 Lorenzo Garcia was also indicted in May 2014 for charges 

related to the same crime. In October 2014, Garcia engaged in a “free talk” 

and told prosecutors that he and Mesa had discussed robbing the smoke 

shop at gunpoint. Garcia said that a girl named Erica “Vibe” Vasquez had 

waited outside as a “lookout.” Garcia also stated that Mesa had shot the 

clerk in the face and that Mesa later laughed while telling others the clerk 

had talked about his children before he was killed. 

¶4 After the free talk, the State investigated the reliability of 

Garcia’s information, including conducting a polygraph test on Garcia in 

December 2014. Garcia eventually entered into a plea agreement. In a 

March 2015 interview, Vasquez told investigators that Mesa had said he 

had shot the clerk in the head. She also said that Mesa bragged about the 
MESA V. GRANVILLE (STATE) 

Opinion of the Court 

3

shooting and recounted the clerk mentioning his children while begging 

Mesa not to shoot him. 

¶5 Based on the information obtained from Garcia and Vasquez, 

the State obtained a new indictment of Mesa in April 2015. The new 

indictment alleged the same charges as the first indictment but added 

charges of first degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first degree 

murder (the “2015 charges”). Mesa was arraigned in May 2015. After the 

arraignment, the State dismissed the 2014 charges without prejudice. 

¶6 The parties stipulated to extend the time for the State to file a 

death notice for the 2015 charges, but Mesa reserved an objection to the 

State’s failure to file a notice for the 2014 charges. In September 2015, the 

State filed a notice of intent within the stipulated deadline, and the trial 

court set the trial for August 2017. 

¶7 Mesa moved to strike the State’s notice of intent, arguing that 

it was invalid because the State had not timely filed a notice after he was 

arraigned for the 2014 charges. Denying the motion, the trial court ruled 

that the new indictment restarted the time limit under Rule 15.1(i)(1). Mesa 

sought special action relief in the court of appeals, which declined 

jurisdiction. We granted review to address recurring legal issues of 

statewide importance. 

II.

¶8 Rule 15.1 addresses disclosure by the state in criminal cases, 

and subsection (i) mandates “Additional Disclosure in a Capital Case.” 

Rule 15.1(i)(1) provides: 

The prosecutor, no later than 60 days after the arraignment in 

superior court, shall provide to the defendant notice of 

whether the prosecutor intends to seek the death penalty. 

This period may be extended up to 60 days upon written 

stipulation of counsel filed with the court. Once the 

stipulation is approved by the court, the case shall be 

considered a capital case for all administrative purposes 

including, but not limited to, scheduling, appointment of 

counsel under Rule 6.8, and assignment of a mitigation 

specialist. Additional extensions may be granted upon 

stipulation of the parties and approval of the court. The 
MESA V. GRANVILLE (STATE) 

Opinion of the Court 

4

prosecutor shall confer with the victim prior to agreeing to an 

extension of the 60 day deadline or any additional extensions, 

if the victim has requested notice pursuant to A.R.S. Section 

13-4405.

¶9 This case also involves Rule 16.6, which governs dismissals of 

a prosecution. A court may dismiss a case upon the prosecutor’s motion as 

long as it is not filed to avoid the provisions of Rule 8, which concern a 

defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.6(a). Such a 

dismissal is “without prejudice to commencement of another prosecution” 

unless the court finds that the “interests of justice” require otherwise. Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 16.6(d). Here, consistent with Rule 16.6, the trial court dismissed 

the 2014 charges without prejudice. 

¶10 Mesa argues that Rule 15.1(i)(1) imposes a “jurisdictional” 

deadline for the filing of the state’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 

Once a defendant is arraigned on charges of first degree murder and the 

deadline passes, Mesa contends, the state is barred from seeking a death 

sentence for that murder, even if, as occurred here, the state commences a 

new prosecution. These arguments, however, run counter to both the 

language of Rule 15.1(i)(1) and our general approach to determining time 

deadlines when a new prosecution follows a dismissal without prejudice. 

¶11 When a case is dismissed without prejudice, the state’s filing 

of a new indictment generally begins a separate matter. See Godoy v. 

Hantman, 205 Ariz. 104, 105 ¶ 1, 106 ¶ 8, 67 P.3d 700, 701–02 (2003); State v. 

Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 137, 589 P.2d 5, 11 (1978). Time limits under the rules 

begin anew for the separate matter “absent a showing of bad faith on the 

part of the prosecution or prejudice to the accused.” Rose, 121 Ariz. at 137, 

589 P.2d at 11 (restarting speedy trial time limits); see also Godoy, 205 Ariz. 

at 106 ¶ 7, 67 P.3d at 702 (restarting change-of-judge time limits). Relying 

on Godoy, the trial court here concluded that the deadline for filing a death 

notice restarted when Mesa was arraigned on the 2015 charges. 

¶12 If the general rule reflected by Godoy and Rose applies, the 

State timely filed its notice in September 2015. Mesa argues that the State 

acted in bad faith because it sought a new indictment and dismissed the 

2014 charges in order to circumvent the Rule 15.1(i)(1) deadline. The 

record, however, reflects that the State sought a new indictment and filed 

its notice in 2015 after learning additional information that significantly 
MESA V. GRANVILLE (STATE) 

Opinion of the Court 

5

changed Mesa’s alleged role in the murder. These actions do not reflect bad 

faith. Cf. Rose, 121 Ariz. at 137, 589 P.2d at 11 (noting record did not reveal 

bad faith in holding that speedy trial time limits began anew upon refiling 

after dismissal).

¶13 Mesa also argues that he was prejudiced by restarting the 

deadline. Citing Holmberg v. De Leon, 189 Ariz. 109, 938 P.2d 1110 (1997), 

Mesa argues that the passage of time between his arraignment for the 2014 

charges and the State’s filing a death notice based on the 2015 indictment in 

itself constituted prejudice, because for most of that time he did not have a 

capital defense team in place. We do not read Holmberg to hold that the 

passage of time alone establishes prejudice. Instead, in finding actual 

prejudice to the defendant and the administration of justice, Holmberg noted 

that the state failed to file notice until a few weeks before the scheduled trial 

date, some fifteen months after the defendant had been arraigned and after 

the parties had engaged in extensive discovery with no mention of the 

death penalty. Id. at 112, 938 P.2d at 1113. Rather than hold that the passage 

of time alone established prejudice, this Court noted that the defendant had 

been handicapped in preparing his defense and the state had recognized at 

the time of indictment that the case involved a potential capital offense. Id.

¶14 We reject Mesa’s argument that the passage of time between 

his initial arraignment and the State’s filing its notice establishes 

“prejudice” that would preclude restarting the Rule 15.1(i)(1) time periods. 

Although he is correct that a capital defense team was not assembled until 

after the 2015 indictment, he has not specifically identified how he was 

prejudiced by the delay in terms of preparing his defense. And unlike the 

defendant in Holmberg, Mesa received the State’s notice almost two years 

before the 2017 trial date. Finally, although resetting the deadline may 

expose Mesa to a death sentence, that result is not the sort of prejudice that 

would preclude treating a successive prosecution as a separate matter with 

its own time deadlines. See, e.g., Rose, 121 Ariz. at 137, 589 P.2d at 11 

(finding no prejudice while recognizing charges could effectively be barred 

if speedy trial deadlines did not begin anew upon refiling). 

¶15 Mesa also argues that the rule reflected by Godoy and Rose 

should not apply because Rule 15.1(i)(1) speaks in mandatory terms: “no 

later than 60 days after the arraignment in superior court, [the state] shall 

provide to the defendant notice of whether [it] intends to seek the death 

penalty.” A notice filed outside this deadline (or an extended deadline as 
MESA V. GRANVILLE (STATE) 

Opinion of the Court 

6

ordered by the court), Mesa maintains, is invalid if it relates to the murder 

for which the defendant was previously arraigned. 

¶16 We reject the argument that a late filing in itself invalidates a 

Rule 15.1(i)(1) notice. The rule does not expressly address the consequences 

of a late filing. Rule 15.7, however, generally authorizes sanctions for a 

party’s failure to make “a disclosure required by Rule 15.” Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 15.7(a). Because the notice required under Rule 15.1(i)(1) is among the 

disclosures required by Rule 15.1, an untimely notice could result in 

sanctions under Rule 15.7(a). Under the latter rule, the trial court shall 

impose appropriate sanctions, “unless the court finds that the failure to 

comply was harmless or that the information could not have been disclosed 

earlier even with due diligence and the information was disclosed 

immediately upon its discovery.” Id. Read together, Rules 15.1(i)(1) and 

15.7 do not invalidate an untimely notice of intent to seek the death penalty, 

but instead may support sanctions, including an order striking the notice. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7(a)(6) (authorizing “[a]ny other appropriate 

sanction”). 

¶17 Our conclusion comports with prior decisions, although we 

recognize that Rule 15.1(i)(1) has been amended since those cases were 

decided. See State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 555–56, 917 P.2d 692, 698–99 (1996) 

(noting trial court’s discretion under Rule 15.7 in holding trial court did not 

err in allowing state to file a notice of intent after the deadline). In State v. 

Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 24, 918 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1996), we held that the trial 

court did not err by allowing the state to file its death notice one day after 

the deadline when the defendant knew of the state’s intent a week earlier 

and had time to prepare for trial. Jackson expressly rejected the argument 

that Rule 15.1 “acts as a statute of limitations, and therefore the state’s 

failure to strictly comply with the rule divested the trial court of jurisdiction 

over the capital case.” Id.; see also Barrs v. Wilkinson, 186 Ariz. 514, 516, 924 

P.2d 1033, 1035 (1996) (following Jackson and noting death penalty may be 

precluded when “the state’s violation is particularly egregious or the 

defendant will clearly suffer harm”). But when a notice was filed more than 

a year after the deadline, thereby prejudicing the defendant and the 

administration of justice, we held that the trial court had to strike the notice. 

Holmberg, 189 Ariz. at 112–13, 938 P.2d at 1113–14. In so ruling, Holmberg 

distinguished situations in which the state “discover[s] aggravating 

circumstances during trial preparation.” Id.
MESA V. GRANVILLE (STATE) 

Opinion of the Court 

7

¶18 Mesa argues that rule amendments in 2003 implicitly rejected

cases such as Lee, Jackson, and Holmberg. Before those amendments, the rule 

regarding disclosure in capital cases specifically authorized Rule 15.7 

sanctions if the prosecution failed to make required disclosures. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 15.1(g)(5) (2003). The 2003 amendments eliminated this reference, 

but this change does not reflect any intent to alter prior case law and to 

make the timely filing of a notice of intent a jurisdictional requirement. 

Instead, the 2003 amendments deleted references to Rule 15.7 in particular 

rules - such as then-existing Rule 15.1(g)(5) and Rule 15.2(g)(3) (governing 

a defendant’s disclosure) - and added the current, general language in Rule 

15.7, which applies to all subsections of Rule 15 and states that “[i]f a party 

fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 15 any other party may move to 

compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions.” See Order Amending 

Rules 8.4, 8.5, and 15, Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Comment to 

Rule 5.3, Rules of Criminal Procedure, R-00-0003 (Oct. 16, 2003). 

¶19 Mesa also notes that Rule 15.1(i)(1) was amended in 2009 to 

change the requirements for extending the deadline for filing a notice of 

intent. See Order Amending Rule 15.1(i)(1), Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

and Adding a Comment Thereto, R-07-0019 (Sept. 16, 2008). Under former 

Rule 15.1(i)(1), the prosecutor could extend the notice period for thirty days 

upon stipulation of counsel. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(i)(1) (2008). “Additional 

extensions” were granted upon motion of the state and approval of the 

court. Id. Under current Rule 15.1(i)(1), the prosecutor can extend the 

notice period for sixty days upon written stipulation filed with the court. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(i)(1) (2016). Additional extensions are now “granted 

upon stipulation of the parties and approval of the court.” Id. Mesa reasons 

that because the current rule provides that extensions of the deadline will 

be granted “upon stipulation of the parties,” any filing beyond the deadline 

is invalid without the defendant’s consent.

¶20 The Court amended Rule 15.1(i)(1) based on the 

recommendations of the Capital Case Task Force (“Task Force”). Petition 

to Amend Rule 15.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, R-07-0019 (Nov. 

21, 2007). The Task Force recommended the change so that a stipulated 

sixty-day extension of the deadline would result in the case being 

considered a capital case for administrative purposes before the state 

actually filed a notice. Id. at 2. This would allow the immediate assignment 

of resources to the case, permitting defense attorneys and investigators to 

begin identifying mitigation evidence and to urge the state not to seek the 
MESA V. GRANVILLE (STATE) 

Opinion of the Court 

8

death penalty, which would conserve judicial and capital defender 

resources and resolve capital cases efficiently and effectively. Id. Thus, the 

amendment sought to forestall the possibly unnecessary filing of a notice 

by the state. Nowhere in the rule petition was there any suggestion that the 

amendment was meant to fundamentally change prior practice and to make 

a timely filing of the notice a jurisdictional prerequisite for seeking the 

death penalty. Interpreting the amendment this way would not further its 

stated purpose of reducing rather than increasing the number of cases in 

which notices are filed. 

¶21 Finally, Mesa asserts that the State’s filing a notice of intent to 

seek the death penalty with respect to his 2015 charges violates his rights to 

due process under the Federal or Arizona Constitutions. Insofar as Mesa is 

arguing that the delay between his arraignment on the 2014 charges and the 

notice with respect to the 2015 charges was in itself prejudicial, we reject 

this contention. Rule 15.1(i)(1), for reasons we have noted, did not shield 

Mesa from being subjected to the death penalty for the smoke shop murder 

merely because the state did not provide a timely notice with respect to the 

2014 charges. We accordingly reject Mesa’s constitutional arguments for 

striking the State’s notice. Cf. Lee, 185 Ariz. at 556, 917 P.2d at 699 (rejecting 

argument that untimely notice violated due process). 

¶22 In sum, we hold that the time limits for filing a notice under 

Rule 15.1(i)(1) restart when the state complies with Rule 16.6 in dismissing 

a prosecution and obtaining a new indictment, absent bad faith by the state 

or prejudice to the defendant. We further hold that the untimely filing of a 

death notice does not itself invalidate the notice but may result in sanctions, 

including an order striking the notice under Rule 15.7. 

III.

¶23 We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to strike the 

State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and we remand to the trial 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.