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GLOBAL AL–QAEDA: AFFILIATES, OBJECTIVES,

AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 18, 2013

Serial No. 113–44

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Seth Jones, Ph.D., associate director, International Security and Defense 

Policy Center, RAND Corporation ...................................................................... 3

Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D., Christopher DeMuth chair and director, Critical 

Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute ................................................ 20

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, senior editor, The Long War Journal, Foundation for 

Defense of Democracies ....................................................................................... 29

Thomas Hegghammer, Ph.D., Zuckerman fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University ..................................................... 44

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Seth Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 6

Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................. 22

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn: Prepared statement ........................................................... 31

Thomas Hegghammer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .............................................. 46

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 74

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 75

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 76

(1)

GLOBAL AL–QAEDA: AFFILIATES, 

OBJECTIVES, AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 

THURSDAY, JULY 18, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The committee will come to order. Without objection, all 

members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitation in 

the rules of the committee. 

We have been told that al-Qaeda is on its last legs, that al-Qaeda 

died with bin Laden, and that whatever remnants of al-Qaeda that 

remain are too weak for us to be concerned about. The purpose of 

this hearing today is to see whether that is a correct statement or 

an incorrect statement. 

These locations in red are where al-Qaeda operated prior to 9/11. 

Since September 11th occurred, we are now looking at the global 

al-Qaeda today. The red is al-Qaeda. And the blue is other terrorist 

groups that operate in these regions of the world, primarily the 

Middle East and North, Western, and Eastern Africa. And our purpose of this committee hearing today is to go into depth about alQaeda’s presence and to some extent, other terrorist groups as 

well. 

I will submit the rest of my statement for the record, and I will 

turn over to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from California, to 

hear his remarks in his opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your brevity. It will 

not be reciprocated. [Laughter.] 

Mr. POE. You have 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you for your maps. I will notice that the 

first map did not show Iran in blue as an area of non-al-Qaeda terrorist base. Certainly, Iran was as worthy of being marked in blue 

on your first map as on your second. 

Al-Qaeda has failed to carry out a major attack in the United 

States since 9/11. However, the danger posed by al-Qaeda to the 

United States is still significant. Al-Qaeda’s structure has become 

more decentralized, less of an integrated corporation, closer to a 

franchise. Its chief terrorist activity is now being conducted by its 

local and regional affiliates. 

2

Over the past few years, al-Qaeda’s core in Pakistan has been 

weakened. We have killed four of the top five leaders. And, of 

course, the top of their leadership changes from time to time as 

some are dispatched to where they ought to go. 

On May 23 of this year, the President outlined tighter rules for 

drone strikes. The President discussed how our system to make an 

effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. He stated 

that this war, like all wars, must end, but the intensity of this war 

is less than virtually all of the others that we have faced and its 

length is longer than virtually—well, than certainly all of the wars 

we have faced. Obama has announced his intention to work with 

Congress to refine and ultimately repeal the 2001 authorization for 

use of military force, which is now 12 years old, is laudable but 

even while our activities in Afghanistan wind down, terrorism directed at the United States and its allies remains a significant 

threat. 

It is true, as the President says, that not every collection of thugs 

that uses the al-Qaeda name poses a credible threat to the United 

States, but it is also true that the war against terrorism is not 

over. 

The fastest growing al-Qaeda affiliate is in Syria. Jabhat alNusra is emerging as the best motivated, best trained, and best 

equipped force fighting the Assad regime. The modern umbrella 

group, the Free Syrian Army, has been losing fighters and capacities to Jabhat al-Nusra. And Jabhat al-Nusra has even taken to 

assassinating competing rebel commanders. I will be interested in 

learning from our panelists what role Qatar and the Saudis have 

played in funding Jabhat al-Nusra and other questionable groups 

in Syria. 

The Alawite community in Syria is in the cross-hairs of Sunni extremists. And we have to arm the best elements in Syria but do 

so quite carefully. In March of this year, I joined with Eliot Engel, 

the ranking member of this committee, and House Intel chairman 

Mike Rogers in introducing the Free Syria Act, which would authorize the President to provide lethal assistance to carefully vetted 

Syrian opposition groups. 

Through al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, we have seen chaos 

in Libya since 2011. We have seen it spill into surrounding regions, 

including the Tuareg fighters, who supported Gaddafi and have 

taken weapons into Mali. And then we saw those weapons in the 

hands of those who killed three Americans in Algeria. 

It is, of course, the most jingoistic and politically popular thing 

to say that America should take the lead in everything. The fact 

is France took the lead in Mali. We supported. And we have to get 

away from the natural attractions of Machismo and realize this is 

a complicated conflict in which sometimes we will play a secondary 

role in some of the theaters. 

This will be a long effort. I doubt there will be any triumphal end 

to this war. We have to manage this problem and do so at the least 

cost of lives, treasure, the least cost to our privacy, and the least 

cost to our other competing foreign policy objectives. 

Eventually, even those who have been told that objectives can be 

achieved over a period of many decades through terrorism will 

come to realize that al-Qaeda methods and al-Qaeda ideology will 

3

not improve the world and will not bring about a worldwide caliphate, but until we win this war, it will continue. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back the remainder of his time. 

All other members of the subcommittee who wish to make an opening statement, I am asking that they submit those for the record. 

I will introduce each witness and then give them time for their 

opening statements before questions. Dr. Seth Jones is Associate 

Director of International Security and Defense Policy Center at the 

RAND Corporation as well as an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies. He specializes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, including a 

focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and al-Qaeda. 

Dr. Fred Kagan is Christopher DeMuth chair and director of the 

Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, previously an associate professor military history at West Point. Dr. 

Kagan is a contributing editor at the Weekly Standard and has 

written for Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, and other periodicals. 

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a senior editor of the Long War Journal. 

Mr. Joscelyn is also a frequent contributor to the Weekly Standard 

and was a senior counterterrorism adviser to Mayor Giuliani during the 2008 Presidential campaign. 

Dr. Thomas Hegghammer is the Zukerman fellow at Stanford 

University Center for International Security and Cooperation and 

a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment in Oslo. Dr. Hegghammer frequently advises government 

agencies in North America and in Europe on counterterrorism 

issues. 

I want to welcome all four of our panelists here today. Each of 

you have 5 minutes. Your statements have already been made part 

of the record. And we will stick to the 5-minute rule after each of 

you have testified. And members of the committee will ask you 

questions. Dr. Jones, you are first. 

STATEMENT OF SETH JONES, PH.D., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, 

RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, and other members of the committee. Thanks for inviting me 

and a really esteemed crew here on global al-Qaeda. 

I would first point out that I think the growth of al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria and other recent developments make this hearing particularly timely and important. 

In reviewing al-Qaeda’s evolution since 1988, I am going to make 

three arguments in my opening remarks. First, contrary to some 

interpretations of the weakness of al-Qaeda today, I would respond 

that it is actually quite resilient. As I look at both al-Qaeda as it 

stood reflected, in part, in your map, Mr. Chairman, there has been 

a net expansion in the number and the geographic scope of alQaeda affiliates and allies over the past decade, indicating that alQaeda, at least in my view, and the movement are far from defeated. I will explain in a moment what I mean by al-Qaeda. 

4

This growth in my view is caused by at least two factors. One 

is the Arab uprisings, which have weakened regimes across North 

Africa and the Middle East and created an opportunity for alQaeda and its affiliates to establish or attempt to establish a foothold or a safe haven. I would submit that the developments in 

Egypt are of particular concern. It is where the current head of alQaeda is from. And it is another potential avenue for a foothold depending on how that situation develops over the next several weeks 

and months. 

In addition, the growing sectarian struggle across the Middle 

East between Sunni and Shi’a, which has been funded on the 

Sunni side by both states and non-state actors, has increased the 

resources available to militant groups, including to al-Qaeda and 

its affiliates. So the first point is that I think there has been a 

slight net expansion in al-Qaeda’s geographic scope and its number. 

Second, however, this expansion has, along with the weakness of 

central al-Qaeda in Pakistan, recently anyway, created a more diffuse and decentralized movement. And I do think this is important 

because I think what we see as we look at Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, 

Iraq, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Somalia, al Shabaab, Yemen, the al-Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 

North Africa, the main affiliates, they largely as I interpret it run 

their operations somewhat autonomously, though they still communicate with the core and still may take some strategic advice. 

And I would note that what is interesting in the Syrian front is 

the attempt from the core in Pakistan to adjudicate a dispute between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and then to 

have the affiliate in Syria essentially break away from Iraq, the alQaeda in Iraq segment, and swear allegiance directly to the core 

element in Pakistan, which to me symbolizes that there is still 

some importance to that leadership. 

Now, the way I would, if pressed, define al-Qaeda today would 

include the core in Pakistan. And I would say, even if Zawahiri 

were killed, there are at least three potential replacements that sit 

in Iran today, all of whom are quite well-esteemed and are members of what was called the Management Council and one that sits 

in Yemen. So, even with the death of Zawahiri, I still think you 

would get a movement that would continue. 

And, then, third, let me just say that within this disparate movement, most al-Qaeda affiliates are not actively plotting today attacks against the United States homeland. In the near term, I 

would probably say the Yemen contingent poses the most serious 

threat in the sense that we see the most notable plots coming out 

of Yemen, along with the inspired networks. 

I think the Boston bombings should be viewed in the al-Qaeda 

context. The bomb-makers reviewed al-Qaeda documents from Inspire magazine, listened to al-Qaeda leaders including Anwar alAwlaki, and must be viewed as inspired individuals of al-Qaeda. 

Other groups do not appear to pose a threat, at least in the near 

term, to the U.S. homeland, but I think, as the Syria context 

shows, the Jabhat al-Nusra’s recruitment and funding networks in 

Europe, in particular, should be a cause of U.S. policy-makers. 

5

So, taken together, I will just conclude by saying these arguments suggest that the U.S. needs to adopt a nuanced approach to 

countering al-Qaeda. Where there is a direct threat, I think there 

is opportunity for the U.S. to pursue terrorists. And I think where 

there is not a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, as we saw in 

North Africa, with al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, having allies 

like France take the lead is well within our grounds. 

Let me just say my final sentence. To conclude, this is going to 

be likely a long war, much like the Cold War, and I think we need 

to view it in those terms. This is really a decades-long struggle. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

6


81977a-1.eps

Testimony 

Re-Examining the AI Qa'ida Threat to the 

United States 

Seth G. Jones 

RAND Office of External Affairs 

CT-396 

July 2013 

Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade on July 

18,2013 

This product IS part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates 

to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight 

bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address 

the challenges facing the publiC and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 

its research clients and sponsors. RAN D'E is a registered trademark. 
7


81977a-2.eps

Published 2013 by the RAND Corporation 

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4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 

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To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact 

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8


81977a-3.eps

Seth G. Jones 1 

The RAND Corporation 

Re-Examining the AI Qa'ida Threat to the United States2 

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

United States House of Representatives 

Global al Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges 

July 18, 2013 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

inviting me to testify at this hearing, "Global al Qa'ida: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future 

Challenges." The growth of al Qa'ida's affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and other recent 

developments make this hearing timely and important. 

In reviewing al Qa'ida's evolution since 1988, I will make three arguments in this testimony. First, 

al Qa'ida has been resilient. 3 There has been a net expansion in the number and geographic 

scope of al Qa'ida affiliates and allies overthe past decade, indicating that al Qa'ida and its brand 

are far from defeated. This growth is likely caused by several factors. One is the Arab uprisings, 

which have weakened regimes across North Africa and the Middle East, creating an opportunity 

for al Qa'ida affiliates and allies to secure a foothold. In addition, the growing sectarian struggle 

across the Middle East between Sunni and Shi'a actors has increased the resources available to 

Sunni militant groups, including al Qa'ida. Second, this expansion - along with the weakness of 

central al Qa'ida in Pakistan - has created a more diffuse and decentralized movement. AI 

Qa'ida's local affiliates largely run their operations autonomously, though they still communicate 

with the core leadership in Pakistan and may seek strategic advice. Third, within this disparate 

movement, most al Qa'ida affiliates and allies are not actively plotting attacks against the U.S. 

homeland. In the near term, AI Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) likely presents the most 

immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, along with inspired networks like the Tsarnaev brothers 

that perpetrated the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Other groups, such as Jabhat alNusrah in Syria, do not appear to pose a near-term threat to the U.S. homeland. But Jabhat al1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the authors alone and should not be 

interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the 

RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to 

federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-apPointed commiSSions and panels; and private 

review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective 

analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the 

world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 

2 This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT396.html. 

3 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, "AI Qaeda's Uncertain Future," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 

36, 2013, pp. 635-653. 
9


81977a-4.eps

Nusrah's growing recruitment and funding networks in Europe should be a cause of concern for 

U.S. policyrnakers. 

Taken together, these arguments suggest that the United States needs to adopt an increasingly 

nuanced - but long-term - approach to countering the al Qa'ida movement. In cases where al 

Qa'ida poses an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, either through an affiliated group or an 

inspired network, the U.S. government should work with local partners to target al Qa'ida 

operatives overseas and at home using a combination of military, law enforcement, economic, 

diplomatic, and information tools. In areas where al Qa'ida does not pose a significant threat to 

the homeland, the U.S. government should support local countries and allies as they take the 

lead - much like the United States did in supporting France's counterterrorism efforts in Mali in 

2013. Perhaps most importantly, U.S. policymakers should view the al Qa'ida threat as a 

decades-long struggle like the Cold War. 

This testimony is divided into four sections. The first outlines al Qa'ida's objectives. The second 

section examines its organizational structure. The third focuses on the al Qa'ida threat to the 

United States today. And the fourth section offers a brief conclusion. 

AI Qa'ida's Objectives 

What are al Qa'ida's objectives? The answer depends, in part, on which al Qa'ida figure one is 

referencing. AI Qa'ida leaders in various parts of the world - Abu Bakr ai-Baghdadi (also known 

as Abu Du'a) in Iraq, Abdelmalek Droukdal in North Africa, Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohammed in 

Somalia, Nasir al-Wahishi in Yemen, and Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani in Syria - tend to have 

parochial goals. They want to establish Islamic emirates in specific countries or regions, though 

they may be agnostic about a broader violent jihad. For al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 

leader Abdelmalek Droukdal, for example, the goal is to overthrow regimes in North Africa, 

especially Algeria, and replace them with an Islamic regime. And France, rather than the United 

States, is the most significant foreign enemy. 

For al Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, the primary goal is broader: to overthrow regimes in key 

Muslim countries.' The governments in these areas constitute the "near enemy," or a/-Adou alQareeb 5 AI Qa'ida leaders have also attempted to target the United States and its allies as the 

"far enemy," or al-Adou ai-Saeed, who support them. But attacking far enemy countries is a 

4 See, for example, "AI-Gaida: Constitutional Charter, Rules And Regulations," Harmony Document AFGP2002-B00175, p. 2; "Interior Organization (of al Qa'ida)," AFGP-2002-000080, pp. 2-3. 

5 On the establishment of a caliphate see, for example, Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The 

Most Critical Stage Through Which the Ummah !Mil Pass, Translated and Published by the John MOlin 

Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, May 23,2006. 

2 
10


81977a-5.eps

means to an end, not an end in itself.' Contrary to some arguments, most al Qa'ida leaders are 

not interested in establishing a global caliphate and do not seek to overthrow regimes in much of 

the world T For Zawahiri, the envisioned caliphate includes a specific swath of territory in North 

Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, as highlighted in Figure 1. These areas reflect a modified 

version of the Ummayad caliphate, which lasted from 661 to 750 AD. 

Figure 1: Map of Zawahiri's Envisioned Pan-Islamic CaliphateS 

In his book Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, Zawahiri writes, "it is the hope of the Muslim 

nation to restore its fallen caliphate and regain its lost glory."g Most of its leaders are inspired by 

the works of such individuals as Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam. Qutb argued that only a strict 

following of sharia as a complete system of morality, justice, and governance would bring 

significant benefits to humanity.1O Modem-day Islam, he wrote in his book Milestones, had 

become co rTUpt, and he compared the modern Muslim states with jahiliyya. As used in the 

Qur'an, jahiliyya describes the state of ignorance in which Arabs were supposed to have lived 

6 Sayyid Qutb, Ma'alam fi al-tariq [Milestones] (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2007). 

7 See, for example, David J. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 

165-227. 

8 See the National Counterterrorism Center's interactive map of al Qa'ida's pan-Islamic caliphate at 

http://www.nctc.gov/site/map/index.html. Accessed on December 27, 2012. 

9 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, trans. by Laura Mansfield (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG 

Publications, 2002), p. 201. 

10 Qutb, Ma'alam fi al-tariq. 

3 
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before the revelation of Islam to the Prophet Mohammed at the beginning of the seventh 

century." In two of his key works, In the Shadow of the Our'an and Signposts on the Road, Qutb 

pleaded for contemporary Muslims to build a new community - an Islamic emirate - much like the 

Prophet Mohammed had done a thousand years earlier.'2 An emirate refers literally to a territory 

ruled by an "emir," which is sometimes translated as "commander," "prince," "governor," or "ruler." 

In early Islamic history, emirates denoted local Muslim principalities or small kingdoms nominally 

subordinate to the Islamic caliphate, established as part of Islam's steady expansion eastwards 

and westwards," According to Qutb's interpretation, the only just ruler is one who administers 

sharia according to the Qur'an.'4 After his execution by the Egyptian government in 1966, Qutb's 

fiery ideology was influential for Islamic radicals from Morocco to Indonesia. 15 

In order to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate, Zawahiri has long sought to replace regimes within 

this area. To accomplish this goal, al Qa'ida's strategy rests on violent jihad; joining an existing 

order through peaceful means was never part of bin Laden or Zawahiri's strategy. Captured al 

Qa'ida documents show that Bin Laden and Zawahiri emphasized guerrilla campaigns as the 

main vehicle of its jihad against apostate governments. '6 During the 1990s, for example, the 

curriculum of al Qa'ida's training camps in Afghanistan and Sudan focused primarily on guerrilla 

warfare and theological indoctrination. Even after al Qa'ida turned to terrorism in 1996, it 

developed terrorism capabilities alongside its guerrilla war capabilities, not as a replacement of 

themH 

Organizational Structure 

Over time, the al Qa'ida movement has become more diffuse and decentralized. In 2001, al 

Qa'ida was composed of a shura council and several committees, such as those dedicated to 

military, media, finance, and religious issues. It was hierarchically structured. The shura council 

was the most powerful committee, and served as an advisory body to Osama bin Laden, who 

acted as its chairman. The shura council met regularly, sometimes once a week, to discuss 

11 The Our'an 5'50 

12 On Qutb's ~o~k ;ee Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism In Egypt (Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1985); Olivier Carre, Mystique el potitique (Paris: Presses de la FNSP et Cer!, 

1984); Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Muslim Arab World (Albany, 

NY: SUNY Press, 1996). 

13 Brynjar Lia, "Jihadi Insurgents and the Perils of Terntorialisation," Paper presented at the International 

Studies Association's 52th Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, March 16-19, 2011, pp. 6-7. 

14 See, for example, Qutb, Ma'alam fi al-tariq, p. 57. 

15 Steve Call, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanislan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet 

Invasion to September 10,2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), p. 113. 

16 Kim Cragin, "Early History of AI-Qa'ida," The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, NO.4 (2008), pp. 1047-1067 

17 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris.' Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, First Edition (Washington, 

DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2004), pp. 63-66; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside AI Oaeda: Global Network of Terror, 

First Edition (New York Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 5-9, 69-72; Daniel Byman, The Five Front 

War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), pp. 15-16. 

4 
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81977a-7.eps

important issues. Today, al Qa'ida is a more decentralized organization and can be divided into 

four tiers: central al Qa'ida, affiliated groups, allied groups, and inspired networks. Figure 2 

highlights al Qa'ida affiliates and several key allied groups. This loose movement today is an 

expansion from 2001, when central al Qa'ida was based in Afghanistan. The organization had a 

small number of allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the Taliban, but it did not possess a 

large coterie of affiliates and allies in North Africa and the Middle East. 

Figure 2: AI Central, Affiliates, and Some Allied Groups 

First, central al Qa'ida includes the organization's leaders based in Pakistan. It is led by Ayman 

al-Zawahiri, who is buttressed by such figures as Abu Zayd ai-Kuwaiti (Kuwaiti), Hamza alGhamdi (Saudi), and Abd ai-Rahman al-Maghrebi (Moroccan). There are still a range of 

Americans in central al Qa'ida (such as Adam Gadahn) and operatives that have lived in America 

(such as Adnan el Shukrijumah). AI Qa'ida's senior leadership, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

retain a degree of oversight and, when necessary, may adjudicate disputes among affiliates or 

provide strategic guidance. There are three al Qa'ida senior leaders in Iran - Saif al-Adel, Abu 

Khayr ai-Masri, and Abu Muhammad ai-Masri - who could potentially replace Zawahiri if he were 

killed, though it is unclear whether they would return to Pakistan. 

The second tier includes affiliated groups that have become formal branches of al Qa'ida. What 

distinguishes "affiliates" from other groups is the decision by their leaders, or emirs, to swear 

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bayat (loyalty) to al Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan. These organizations include al Qa'ida in Iraq 

(based in Iraq), al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (based in Yemen), al Shabaab (based in 

Somalia), al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (based in Algeria and neighboring countries), and 

Jabhat al-Nusrah (based in Syria). Jabhat al-Nusrah is the most recent affiliate. As the war in 

Syria began to intensify in 2011, al Qa'ida in Iraq leaders utilized their established networks in 

Syria and created Jabhat al-Nusrah as their operational arm. AI Qa'ida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr alBaghdadi explained that "we laid for them plans, and drew up for them the policy of work, and 

gave them what financial support we could every month, and supplied them with men who had 

known the battlefields of jihad, from the emigrants and the natives.,,18 As Jabhat al-Nusrah 

established its own sources offunding, fighters, and material, it became increasingly independent 

from al Qa'ida in Iraq. Asserting his independence from al Qa'ida in Iraq, Jabhat al-Nusrah leader 

Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani declared his loyalty directly to al Qa'ida's central leadership in 

Pakistan. "This is a pledge of allegiance from the sons of the al Nusrah Front and their supervisor 

general that we renew to the Sheikh of Jihad, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, may Allah preserve 

him," Jawlani announced in April 2013. 19 

The third involves allied groups that have established a direct relationship with al Qa'ida, but have 

not become formal members. This arrangement allows the groups to remain independent and 

pursue their own goals, but to work with al Qa'ida for specific operations or training purposes 

when their interests converge. In Pakistan, one example is Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (led by 

Hakimullah Mehsud), whose interests remain largely parochial in South Asia. But they have been 

involved in attacks overseas, including the failed 2010 attack in New York City led by Faizal 

Shahzad. Outside of Pakistan, there are other allied groups like the Muhammad Jamal network in 

Egypt and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. Both groups participated with al Qa'ida in the Islamic 

Maghreb operatives in killing Christopher Stevens, the U.S. ambassador to Libya, in September 

2012. 

Finally, the inspired networks include those with no direct contact to al Qa'ida central, but who are 

inspired by the al Qa'ida cause and outraged by perceived oppression in Afghanistan, Chechnya, 

and Palestinian territory. They tend to be motivated by a hatred of the West and its allied regimes 

in the Middle East. Without direct support, these networks tend to be amateurish, though they can 

occasionally be lethal. Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the ringleader of the 2013 Boston bombings, was 

motivated by the extremist preaching of now-deceased al Qa'ida leader Anwar al-Awlaki. 

Tsarnaev and his brother also used al Qa'ida propaganda materials, including an article from 

18 Audio Statement by Abu Bakr ai-Baghdadi, April 10,2013. 

19 Audio Statement by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, April 10, 2013. On the broader debate between Jabhat 

al-Nusrah and al Qa'jda in Iraq also see Thomas Joscelyn, "AI Nusrah Front Leader Renews Allegiance to al 

Qaeda, Rejects New Name," Long War Journal, April 1 0, 2013. 

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Inspire magazine, to build the bombs. But many others, such as the cell led by Russell Defreitas 

that plotted to attack New York City's John F. Kennedy International Airport in 2007, were 

rudimentary and their half-baked plot would have been difficult to execute. 

Taken together, the al Qa'ida movement is more diffuse movement today. But there has been a 

growth in the number and geographic scope of al Qa'ida affiliates and allies over the past decade, 

indicating that al Qa'ida and its brand are far from defeated. This growth has been facilitated by 

the Arab uprisings, which have weakened regimes across North Africa and the Middle East.'o In 

addition, the growing Sunni-Shi'a struggle across the Middle East involving countries and substate actors has increased the resources available to Sunni militant groups like al Qa'ida. 

The AI Qa'ida Threat to the U.S. Homeland 

Not all al Qa'ida affiliates and allies present a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. In the near tenn, 

AI Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula likely presents the most immediate threat, along with inspired 

networks like the Tsarnaev brothers that perpetrated the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. 

The growth in social media and the terrorist use of chat rooms, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 

other sites has facilitated radicalization inside the United States. While al Qa'ida leaders did not 

organize the Boston attacks, they played a key role by making available the propaganda material 

and bomb-making instructions utilized by the Tsarnaevs. 

Other affiliates do not appear to pose a near-term threat to the U.S. homeland. AI Qa'ida in the 

Islamic Maghreb is focused on overthrowing regimes in North Africa, including Algeria. AI 

Shabaab's objectives are largely parochial. It has conducted attacks in Somalia and the region, 

even though some Americans have fought with al Shabaab in Somalia. And al Qa'ida in Iraq and 

Jahbat al-Nusrah are primarily interested in establishing Islamic emirates in their respective 

countries and the region. Indeed, the vast majority of al Qa'ida activity has been in the context of 

an insurgency where it has attempted to overthrow "near enemy" countries.21 Between 1998 and 

2011, al Qa'ida and its affiliates in Yemen, Iraq, North Africa, and Somalia conducted nearly 

1,000 attacks, killed over 8,000 people, and wounded over 12,000 others." As Figure 3 

20 On al Qa',da and the Arab uprisings, see Hoffman, "AI Qaeda's Uncertain Future," pp. 635-653; Seth G. 

Jones, "The Mirage of the Arab Spring," Foreign Affairs, Vol 92, No.1, JanuarylFebruary 2013, pp. 55-63. 

21 Fawas A Gergez, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

2005). 

22 Data are from the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the 

Study ofTerrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Accessed at www start.umd.edulgtdl on June 29, 

2012. 

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highlights, approximately 98 percent ofthese attacks were part of an insurgency where 

operatives tried to overthrow a local government or secede from it - and were not in the West 23 

Figure 3: AI Qa'ida Attacks, 1998-201124 

300 

250 +"-,,,--,,,,,,,,,,-,,,,,,,,,, j Near Enemy Attacks 1"",,,,,,,,,,,,,,_,,,,,,,,,,,,_,,, ___ , __ ,,,,,,,,_,,,,, 

II Total Attacks 

150 

o +",-,,,,,,,,,-

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 

I 

2008 2009 2010 2011 

Still, most of al Qa'ida's affiliates and several of its allies pose a threat to the United States 

overseas, Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, for instance, has planned attacks against U.S. diplomats 

and infrastructure in Tunis, including the U.S. embassy. As previously noted, al Qa'ida in the 

Islamic Maghreb and its allies were involved in the 2012 attack that killed U.S. Ambassador 

Christopher Stevens. 

Other groups, like Jabhat al"Nusrah, could be a long,term threat Jabhat al,Nusrah's access to 

foreign fighters, external network in Europe and other areas, and bomb-making expertise suggest 

that it may already have the capability to plan and support attacks against the West There 

appears to be a growing contingent of foreign fighters - perhaps several thousand - traveling to 

Syria to fight in the war. A substantial portion of these fighters are coming from the region, 

including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Some have come from Chechnya. Others have 

apparently come from Afghanistan and Pakistan. But a significant number also appear to be 

coming from the West, especially from Belgium, France, and Sweden. Extremists have traveled 

23 The data for fatalities were lower. Approximately 55 percent of fatalities from al Qa'ida attacks were in 

near enemy countries, largely because the September 2001 attacks in the United States killed nearly 3,000 

~eople. Without the September 11 data, however, 89 percent of fatalities were in near enemy countries. 

4 Data are from the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the 

Study ofTerrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Accessed online at www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 

8 
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to Syria from other European countries. According to Spanish officials. for example. a network 

based in Spain and Morocco sent approximately two dozen fighters to Jabhat al-Nusrah over the 

past year. It is unclear how many of these fighters have returned to the West, but some have 

apparently returned to Germany, Denmark, Spain, and Norway among others. In October 2012, 

authorities in Kosovo arrested the extremist Shurki Aliu, who had traveled from Syria to Kosovo 

and was involved in recruiting and providing material to Syrian opposition groups. A small number 

of Americans - perhaps less than a dozen - have apparently traveled to Syria to fight with the 

Syrian opposition. 25 

It is currently unclear whether most of these fighters will remain in Syria over the long run, move 

to other war zones such as North Africa, or travel to the West to conduct attacks. And even if 

some return to the West, it is uncertain whether they will become involved in terrorist plots, focus 

on recruiting and fundraising, or become disillusioned with terrorism. Still, foreign fighters have 

historically been agents of instability. They can affect the conflicts they join, as they did in post2003 Iraq by promoting sectarian violence and indiscriminate tactics. Perhaps more important, 

foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational terrorist groups such as al Qa'ida, because 

volunteering for war is the principal stepping-stone for individual involvement in more extreme 

forms of militancy. When Muslims in the West radicalize, they usually do not plot attacks in their 

home country right away, but travel to a war zone first. A majority of al Qa'ida operatives began 

their militant careers as war volunteers, and most transnational jihadi groups today are byproducts of foreign fighter mobilizations.26 

U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts 

Based on an examination of counterterrorism efforts against al Qa'ida's since its establishment in 

1988, three steps can help weaken al Qa'ida. 27 The first is implementing a light footprint strategy 

that focuses on covert intelligence, law enforcement, and Special Operations Forces to conduct 

precision targeting of al Qa'ida and its financial and logistical support networks. In Afghanistan, 

the United States should withdraw most conventional forces, relying primarily on clandestine 

operatives as it has done in Colombia, Philippines, and other counterinsurgencies. Most of the 

terrorists involved in serious homeland plots after September 11 - from Jose Padilla's plot to blow 

up apartment buildings in the United States to Najibullah Zazi and Faisal Shahzad's plots to 

conduct terrorist attacks in New York City - were motivated by the large U.S. conventional 

military deployments overseas and by a conviction, however erroneous, that Muslims were its 

25 Author interview with government officials from Europe and the Middle East, April and May 2013. 

26 Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," 

International Security, Vol. 35, No.3, Winter 201 0111, pp. 53-94. 

27 Seth G. Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of AI Qa'ida Since 9111 (New York: Ww. Norton, 

2012). 

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helpless victims. A light footprint strategy means refraining from large numbers of U.S. forces in 

Muslim countries. The bulk of the U.S. military should focus on such tasks as preparing for 

conventional wars in the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, and other theaters. 

The second step is helping local governments establish basic law and order as a bulwark against 

al Qa'ida and other extremists. In cases where al Qa'ida does not pose a significant threat to the 

homeland, the U.S. government should support local governments and allies as they take the 

lead - as the French did in Mali in 2013. The U.S. government should work with local 

governments using a combination of military, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and 

information tools. The countries most in danger of becoming an al Qa'ida safe haven lie in an arc 

that extends from North Africa to the Middle East and South Asia, an area that once made up the 

Umayyad Caliphate from 661 to 750 AD. It is no coincidence that al Qa'ida has attempted to set 

up its affiliates in these areas: al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, al Shabaab in the 

Horn of Africa, al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, al Qa'ida in Iraq, Jabhat al-Nusrah in Syria, 

and al Qa'ida central in Pakistan. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Arab Spring has 

undermined stability and eroded the strength of governments across this arc. The U.S. goal 

should be to establish effective and legitimate governments with security agencies capable of 

undermining al Qa'ida's ideology and capabilities. 

The third is aggressively undermining al Qa'ida's extremist ideology. In 1999, the State 

Department disbanded the U.S. Information Agency, which played a prominent role in countering 

Soviet ideology during the Cold War. Today, no U.S. government agency has the lead role for 

countering al Qa'ida's ideology. The State Department has the lead for public diplomacy, but has 

not developed a comprehensive inter-agency strategy to counter al Qa'ida's ideology. The CIA is 

involved in some clandestine activity, but most senior officials do not view undermining al Qa'ida's 

ideology as its core mission. The Department of Defense is also involved in some efforts, but they 

are dispersed among U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and other 

organizations. Ultimately, it is the President and the National Security Staff's responsibility to 

appoint a lead agency and hold it responsible. 

These three steps - utilizing a light footprint strategy, improving the effectiveness of governrnents 

in countries threatened by al Qa'ida, and undermining al Qa'ida's ideology - would help weaken 

al Qa'ida. 

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A Long War 

Let me add a final note. One of the most important battlefields will be on the Internet since the 

struggle against al Qa'ida and its allies remains, in part, a battle of ideas. Over the past decade, 

radicalization has become much less formal. "Extremists are moving away from mosques to 

conduct their activities in private homes and premises," a British intelligence report concluded. 

"We assess that radicalization increasingly occurs in private meeting places, be they closed 

prayer groups at mosques, self-defense classes at gyms or training camps in the UK or 

overseas.,,28 

The rise of the Internet and social media fundamentally changed terrorist activities. Individuals 

like Anwar al-Awlaki, Adam Gadahn, and Shaykh Abdallah Ibrahim al-Faisal utilized YouTube, 

Facebook, Twitter, Internet chat rooms, and other forums to distribute propaganda, recruit new 

supporters, and seek financial aid. Some, like Awlaki before his death, were successful in 

motivating individuals to conduct terrorist attacks. Others, like Gadahn, largely failed. As one al 

Qa'ida communique blithely noted in 2011, "In today's world, there's a place for the underground 

mujahideen who support the religion of Allah, men and women and youths in their cities and 

villages, and from their homes, and with their individual creativity and what is possible for them, 

as long as they are parallel with the general plans of the mujahideen ... the arena of electronic 

warfare.,,29 

Yet al Qa'ida increasingly stumbled here. Parents, siblings, wives, and other family members of 

operatives were often devastated - even embarrassed - about their relatives' terrorist activity. 

The wife of Mohammad Siddique Khan, the lead London bomber in 2005, was "ashamed" of her 

husband's activities. One of Najibullah Zazi's relatives remarked that "I'd bring him myself' to 

justice for his actions. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's parents were troubled by their son's attempt 

to blow up a Northwest Airlines Hight, and had warned U.S. and Nigerian authorities that he was 

radicalizing. Abdulmutallab's Internet colleagues were also shocked, with one harshly 

reprimanding him for giving "Islam a bad name." And Faisal Shahzad's father-in-law was 

incredulous that he would "go to this extreme" with a wife and "two really lovely children." 

Many al Qa'ida operatives also failed to practice what they preached. Anwar al-Awlaki was 

arrested twice in San Diego for soliciting prostitutes. Adnan el-Shukrijumah was arrested in 

Broward County, Florida for child abuse and battery. Adam Gadahn was arrested in Orange 

County, California for assault and battery. These were the activities of criminals and gangsters, 

28 Quoted in Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MIS (New York Alfred A. 

Knopf, 2009), p. 827. 

29 As-Sahab Media, "You Are Held Responsible Only for Thyself - Part Two," June 2011. 

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not hallowed religious leaders. AI Qa'ida leaders also came under withering criticism from 

Muslims worldwide, including deeply conservative Sunni leaders. Ayman al-Zawahiri faced 

criticism for slaughtering Muslims in his 2008 Internet question-and-answer session. Senior 

officials from Palestinian Hamas, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad 

dismissed al Qa'ida's leaders - and their ideology - as un-Islamic and supporting a fringe 

phenomenon. 

In the end, the struggle against the al Qa'ida movement will be long - measured in decades, not 

months or years. Much like the Cold War, it is also predominantly an ideological struggle. AI 

Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri said it best in a 2005 letter to al Qa'ida in Iraq leader Abu 

Mus'ab al-Zarqawi: "1 say to you: that we are in a battle, and more than half ofthis battle is in the 

battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of 

our Umma.,,30 

30 Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, July 9, 2005. Released by the Harmony Project, 

Combating Terrorism Center, West Point. 

12 
20

Mr. POE. Dr. Kagan? 

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, PH.D., CHRISTOPHER 

DEMUTH CHAIR AND DIRECTOR, CRITICAL THREATS 

PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. KAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman. And thank you to the committee for holding the hearing on 

this topic and scoped in this way. 

I think it is extremely important that we be able to have a conversation about what the threat actually is, divorced somewhat 

from what we actually want to do about it. And so I want to make 

it clear of what I am not here today to do. I am not here today to 

propose a solution. I am certainly not here today to propose invading other countries or repeating Iraq or something else like that. 

There is a caricature of what the position is of some of those who 

critiqued the current administration’s strategy. My main critique is 

that we do not have a strategy that is remotely adequate. And I 

think, as Seth said, extremely well, what is required is a nuanced 

strategy that will require different approaches, that will require 

creativity, but that, above all, will understand that the al-Qaeda 

network is a holistic network, the parts of which interact with one 

another, and that the administration’s attempts to parse out only 

those groups that currently have the stated intent of attacking the 

United States and treat them as threats and the others as much 

less threats or not threats at all is extremely dangerous and distorts the actual threat from the movement as a whole because, as 

Seth explained, the groups interact with one another in a variety 

of ways. And they also changed their minds. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was not, from the outset focused on attacking the 

United States directly. One would have made long odds that we 

would not have anything connected to the Islamic emirate or the 

caucuses in any way show up on our shores. Groups do change 

their positions. And that is something that we need to be very cognizant of. 

Seth’s point about the sectarian war is extremely important. The 

context within which we are having this conversation today is fundamentally different from the context in which we were having 

anything like this in the early 2000s in the early part of the struggle. The sectarian war in the Middle East, which is expanding rapidly, is our concern for a number of reasons, but from this standpoint, it is our concern because that sectarian conflict opens up 

room and space for radicals like al-Qaeda and affiliates to expand 

their reach as a way of claiming that they are protecting Sunni 

populations against Shi’a attacks. We have seen this in Iraq. It 

was, unfortunately, very effective for al-Qaeda in Iraq. And it is effective for al-Qaeda in Iraq again. And it is tremendously effective 

for Jabhat al-Nusra. The more that you have an expansion of sectarian conflict, the more you will have initiative for and scope for 

and encouragement for extremist groups, some of them affiliated 

with al-Qaeda, to take root and take advantage of public fear. 

I want to highlight a couple of things that I think have been lost 

in this discussion and thank the terrific staff at Critical Threats 

Project, Katherine Zimmerman, who is here, and Sasha Gordon, for 

their work on al-Qaeda and on Yemen, in particular, to say part 

21

of my concern stems from the fact that the places where we have 

had strategies like Yemen, the strategy is failing. It is not working. 

We have had a strategy of very limited direct attacks against senior al-Qaeda and Arabian Peninsula leaders, coupled with a strategy that focused on the diplomatic resolution of the challenges in 

Sana’a and assistance to the Yemeni security forces. 

Most of the fighting against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

was done by the Yemeni security forces. And they did a very good 

job of retaking ground that AQAP had taken. And I think the ranking member’s point is a very important one. We certainly do need 

to work through our allies whenever possible and strengthen our 

allies whenever we can in this fight. The problem is that the Yemeni security forces are not only not being strengthened. Not only 

are they being weakened, but they are fracturing. And we have 

counted more than 24 mutinies in brigade-level units in the Yemeni security forces over the past couple of years. 

The rate of mutinying has been accelerating. We have had instances of elite units engaged in the fight with al-Qaeda being effectively dissolved in place by mutinies and the Yemeni Government response. This is a force that is cracking, unfortunately. And, 

as a result of that, we are seeing AQAP reattack into Abyan, reattack into areas that it had been driven out of, and begin to reestablish itself. 

And I raised this specific case because Yemen has been held up 

as a model. And there are even some people who ignore the fact 

that Afghanistan has no coastline and suggest that we should 

apply the Yemen model to Afghanistan. And before we have that 

conversation, it is incredibly important to understand that the 

Yemen model isn’t working in Yemen. 

And if there is any desire on the part of the committee, I would 

be happy to talk about similar challenges that our strategy in Somalia is facing where our allies there, who are even more limited 

in capability, are running into very predictable challenges to their 

ability to maintain gains, let alone to expand on them. 

So my bottom line is I think that Seth may have been a little 

bit too optimistic. I think that we actually need to consider the possibility that we are starting to lose the war with al-Qaeda and that 

we really need to rethink our strategy. Such as it is, very, very fundamentally in light of the fact that we maybe need to recognize 

that it actually is failing for all the damage that we have done to 

the core group in Pakistan. 

Thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kagan follows:]

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Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

On "Global al-Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges" 

The Continued Expansion of Al Qaeda Affiliates and their 

Capabilities 

Frederick W. Kagan 

Christopher DeMuth Chair and Director, Critical Threats Project 

American Enterprise Institute 

July 18, 2013 

The views expressed in this testimofl.V are those of the author alone alld do Ilot necessarily represent those ofihe 

American Enterprise Institute 
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Frederick W. Kagan 

July 18,2013 

The war against al Qaeda is not going well. Afghanistan has seen the most success, since 

Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been able to prevent al Qaeda from 

re-establishing effective sanctuary in the places from which the 9/11 attacks were planned and 

launched. The killing of Osama bin Laden has not been followed-up in Pakistan with disruption 

to the leadership group there on the scale of operations that preceded the Abbottabad raid. Al 

Qaeda affiliates in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and West Africa have dramatically expanded their 

operating areas and capabilities since 2009 and appear poised to continue that expansion. 

Progress against al Shabaab, the al Qaeda affiliate in Somalia, is extremely fragile and shows 

signs of beginning to unravel. New groups with al Qaeda leanings, although not affiliations, are 

emerging in Egypt, and old groups that had not previously been affiliated with al Qaeda, such as 

Boko Haram in Nigeria, appear to be moving closer to it. Current trends point to continued 

expansion of al Qaeda affiliates and their capabilities, and it is difficult to see how current or 

proposed American and international policies are likely to contain that expansion, let alone 

reduce it to 2009 levels or below. Americans must seriously consider the possibility that we are, 

in fact, starting to lose the war against al Qaeda. 

What Is al Qaeda? 

The policy debate about al Qaeda has been bedeviled by competing definitions of the group and, 

consequently, evaluations of the threat it poses to the United States, as Katherine Zimmennan 

shows in a major paper that will be forthcoming from the Critical Threats Project at the 

American Enterprise Institute (AEl) in September. Whereas the Bush Administration saw the 

group as a global network of cells, the Obama Administration has focused narrowly on the "core 

group" in Pakistan around bin Laden and, after his death, around his successor, Ayman al 

Zawahiri. The current administration has also labored to distinguish al Qaeda franchises that 

have the intent and capability to attack the United States homeland from those that do not, 

implying (or sometimes stating) that the US. should act only against the former while observing 

the latter to ensure that they do not change course 

Parsing the al Qaeda network in this way yields two sets of groups: al Qaeda "core" in Pakistan 

and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (in Yemen) are the only two formal franchises that have 

declared their intent to attack the American homeland and demonstrated the capability to do so. 

AI Qaeda in Iraq, Jabhat al Nusra (in Syria), al Shabaab (in Somalia), al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (in West Africa), and the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus (in Chechnya and Dagestan, 

Russia), have not announced their intentions to attack the US. homeland and have not attempted 

to do so. In the Obama Administration's view, therefore, these groups are of far less direct 

concern to the US. and their gains, while worrying, are not necessarily immediate threats to 

American national security. 

This relatively sanguine view of al Qaeda rests on a number of assumptions whose validity is 

highly questionable. It assumes that franchises that do not now have the intent to attack the US 

are unlikely to develop that intent in the future (or, alternatively, that it is preferable to wait until 

they do develop such an intent before taking action against them). It also assumes that the 

franchises are not mutually-supporting in any important way, such that groups that do not 

themselves intend to attack the homeland will not provide material support to the franchises that 

do. The first assumption is highly problematic. AI Qaeda affiliates are fund-raising 
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Frederick W. Kagan 

July 18,2013 

organizations as well as terrorist groups. They depend on attracting donations from like-minded 

supporters around the world, but particularly in the Persian Gulf area. They shape both their 

operations and their media around selling their product--terror--in ways that they think will be 

most attractive to those supporters. Attacking the American homeland is unquestionably a fundraising hit, so the fiscal incentive is for trying to do so. The al Qaeda ideology itself, of course, 

is also fundamentally anti-American and tends easily, although not inevitably, toward attacking 

us. 

The second assumption is demonstrably false. AI Qaeda affiliates definitely move fighters and 

other resources around, and those that are not actively aiming to attack the U.S. do not shun 

those that are. Both al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab actively support al Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula, for example, and the "core group" in Pakistan reportedly receives 

financing from its affiliates. 

Prioritizing groups within the network according to whether they are actively working to attack 

the homeland makes some sense; ignoring or downplaying the significance of those not currentl y 

engaged in that endeavor does not. Let us briefly consider, therefore, the state of play in some of 

the maj or theaters in which an al Qaeda affiliate is now operating. 

Afghanistan 

American airpower supporting local Afghan militias drove al Qaeda from its training bases near 

the major Afghan cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad in 2001, but the group retreated to mountain 

fastnesses near (but not over) the Pakistan border. Since there is now some debate about the 

wisdom of introducing American ground forces into Afghanistan in the first place, it is worth 

remembering that only the operations of those (very limited) ground forces we deployed in 2002 

actually drove al Qaeda out of Afghanistan almost entirely. Although limited al Qaeda cells and 

individual (generally low-ranking) leaders have remained in Afghanistan (primarily in the 

extremely rugged and remote areas of Afghanistan'S northeast), the leadership group never 

returned, nor have new training camps or bases been established. The continued limited al 

Qaeda presence in Afghanistan and periodic statements by the group, however, indicate that it 

has not abandoned the desire to re-establish itself in its former strongholds. Continued success in 

Afghanistan therefore requires ensuring that the ANSF remains strong and coherent enough to 

prevent al Qaeda from returning after the withdrawal of U.S combat forces. 

Pakistan 

The death of bin Laden was a major blow to al Qaeda, but not as major as one might have hoped. 

Analysts had differed before the raid about the likelihood of a smooth succession and had 

considered the possibility offracturing and power struggle, since Zawahiri, bin Laden's obvious 

successor, is an Egyptian (bin Laden was Saudi) and far less charismatic. But Zawahiri took the 

reins with relatively little ado and seems to have established his control not merely over the "core 

group" in Pakistan, but also over the global movement. Affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and 

Somalia have all appealed to him on various matters, including leadership, internal disputes, and 

affiliate prerogatives regarding other affiliates. It was reasonable to conjecture that killing bin 

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Frederick W. Kagan 

July 18,2013 

Laden would cleave a wedge in the group's leadership, but things have unfortunately not evolved 

in that direction thus far 

President Obama's courageous and correct decision to put "boots on the ground" briefly in bin 

Laden's compound offered the hope of a more decisive blow against the organization of another 

variety. The vast trove of information reportedly pulled from bin Laden's home could have 

contained the data needed to conduct targeted strikes rapidly against other key al Qaeda leaders 

around the world, potentially decimating the group's top echelon. Although a number of such 

strikes were reported after the Abbottabad raid, they did not comprise anything like a decisive 

blow. The diplomatic fallout from the raid was so severe, moreover, that the pace of targeted 

strikes in Pakistan has reportedly fallen dramatically from its pre-bin Laden peak. It may be, as 

administration sources suggest occasionally, that there are not many worthwhile targets left 

because the "core group" is functionally decimated. Let us hope so--since we cannot have a 

meaningful discussion about this matter without access to highly sensitive classified materials 

that the administration is rightly reluctant to make public--because the alternative is simply that 

the "core group" is no longer under the kind of pressure it faced before bin Laden's death. 

AI Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsnla (AQAP) 

Almost all analysts agree that AQAP poses a direct and immediate threat to the U.S. homeland 

for the excellent reason that it has already attempted attacks against us on three separate 

occasions. The group was formed in 2009 as the result of a merger between al Qaeda in Yemen 

and the remnants of the original Saudi al Qaeda group driven out of the Kingdom after the 

Saudis began a major crackdown against the group in 2006. It began to increase its operations 

against Yemeni forces and foreign targets within Yemen almost immediately (in addition to 

conducting the very-nearly-successful "underwear bomb" attack on Christmas 2009). It seized 

upon the arrival of the Arab Spring in Yemen in 2011, creating an insurgent wing (Ansar al 

Shari a). As Yemeni Security Forces were drawn toward the capital to deal with the threat to 

President Ali Abdullah Saleh's power, AQAP forces seized two key provinces along the southern 

coast, began expanding into others, and threatened Aden, Yemen's second city, with isolation 

and a growing car-bomb campaign. 

The U.S. and Saudi response was initially focused on negotiating a resolution to the Yemeni 

Spring (which ultimately led to the departure of Saleh) and, secondarily, on a combination of a 

very limited number of targeted strikes against AQAP leadership and limited support to the 

Yemeni Security Forces (YSF) gradually redeployed to retake their land. As AEl's Critical 

Threats Project's Katherine Zimmerman and Sasha Gordon have described in detail, the initial 

YSF counter-offensive was largely successful. Yemeni forces drove AQAP out of the provinces 

it had taken, broke the partial siege of Aden, and established local fighting groups to help keep 

AQAP from returning while allowing some YSF troops to redeploy. Some have pointed to the 

"Yemen model" as an example of the right way to conduct operations against al Qaeda 

franchises--some even advocate transplanting that model to Afghanistan. 

But the "Yemen model" is already breaking down in Yemen. As Sasha Gordon has reported, the 

YSF is gradually dissolving as the political crisis remains unresolved and current President Abdu 

Rabbu Mansour Hadi tries to root out the remnants of power broker patronage networks from 
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Frederick W. Kagan 

July 18,2013 

within the anned forces. There have been well over 20 mutinies in Yemeni brigades and other 

tactical fonnations, including in elite units. One brigade fonnerly in Yemen's (now-disbanded) 

Republican Guard was effectively dissolved in place with soldiers taking their weapons home or 

selling them. The popular committees that had been initially successful in holding ground 

against AQAP had reverted to tribal fighting, to fighting with the YSF, alienating the local 

population, and even to fighting with each other by the start of this year, although we have not 

seen reports of such conflicts since May. Although many YSF troops and popular committees do 

continue the struggle against AQAP valiantly, AQAP has begun its own counter-offensive into 

the lands from which it had been expelled and also resumed its targeted assassination campaign. 

It is likel y that the Yemeni fight against AQAP has passed its zenith and that AQAP will, in fact, 

gradually reclaim operating space and even territorial control over parts of the country--at least, 

that is the current trajectory. 

Iraq and Syria 

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had been driven from almost all of its strongholds in central and western 

Iraq, retaining a limited foothold in Ninewah Province and isolated outposts around Baghdad by 

the beginning of2009. Its support in Syria was limited to logistical facilitation pennitted and 

overseen by the Assad regime. Today, AQI has regained control of many of its former staging 

areas in and around Baghdad and has reconstituted its ability to launch weekly waves of multiple 

car bomb attacks as the work of Jessica Lewis and Ahmed Ali at the Institute for the Study of 

War has shown. The group is expanding its capabilities at an accelerating rate, and the Iraqi 

Security Forces appear to be unable to contain it, despite numerous offensive and defensive 

operations. 

AQI is benefitting from two phenomena--the inability of the ISF to maintain adequate pressure 

on the group without the enablers and support it had expected to receive from the United States 

after 2011, and the increasingly sectarian policies of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki, which have 

driven a considerable portion of the Sunni Arab population away from the political process and 

toward a renewal of insurgency. The re-mobilization of Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militias is 

accelerating sectarian conflict in a cycle reminiscent of2006 after the al Qaeda bombing of the 

Samarra mosque. 

The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has allowed the al Qaeda in Iraq support nodes to 

evolve into a fully-fledged combat franchise. Ayman al Zawahiri, in fact, recently recognized 

Jabhat al Nusra (IN) as an al Qaeda affiliate independent of AQI and reporting directly to him. 

That decision created tension with AQI's front organization, the Islamic State ofTraq, and has led 

to the declaration of a broader Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Levant). Distinct from Jabhat 

Nusra, this group is actively conducting operations in Syria against both the regime and the 

moderate opposition functioning under the rubric of the Free Syrian Anny. Despite the tensions 

caused by Zawahiri's recognition of Jabhat al Nusra, AQI continues to cooperate with and 

support IN, which provides support to the fight in Iraq in tum. IN has benefitted from the active 

support of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, although the latter has ceased and Riyadh is now attempting 

to strengthen the moderate opposition against IN. The moderate opposition has received 

extremely limited external support, leaving IN fighters often better anned and better trained than 

other opposition troops, which, in tum, has allowed IN to gain leverage over the moderate 

4 
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Frederick W. Kagan 

July 18,2013 

opposition and even the tacit support oflocal pockets of Syrian population. JN and lSI are 

attempting to set up Islamist states in areas under their control, with the panoply of "morality 

police" and Sal afi st regulation that we have seen in other areas dominated by al Qaeda and 

affiliated groups. 

The entry of Lebanese Hezbollah fighters directly into the Syrian conflict--numbering in the 

thousands--has at least for the moment given the Assad regime the advantage, allowing it to 

regain ground around Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. These regime gains are likely to radicalize 

the opposition further, as al Qaeda and associated groups around the Muslim world have 

announced their intention to send fighters to Syria. Groups of fighters from the Caucasus have 

been identified in Syria, and the emir of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, Doku Umarov, 

recently reversed his opposition to the movement of fighters from his region to Syria. The 

Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) has also recently claimed that it has sent 

(or is sending, or will send) fighters to Syria--although we do not assess that it has done so or 

will do so for a variety of reasons. Its announcement makes clear, however, that Syria has 

become a clarion call for Salafists around the world, who are reinforcing the al Qaeda affiliates 

in that conflict even as the West continues to dither about providing any assistance to the 

moderate opposition. If this trend continues, we can expect to see the Syrian opposition continue 

to radicalize to the great benefit of several al Qaeda affiliates, which are not only gaining 

operating space, but are also gaining respect and admiration in the Salafist world. Over time, 

they may even gain respectability in the eyes of some Sunni who are more concerned with the 

sectarian fight against Assad's 'Alawite (Shi'a) group than with the fact that they dislike the 

Salafist worldview. Nothing succeeds like success, after all. 

AI Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 

AQTM was formed in Algeria on the basis of Sal afi st groups that have been fighting the Algerian 

government for decades. Algerian forces had reduced the group to a fringe organization notable 

mainly for the kidnapping-for-ransom operations it conducted (and from which it derived a 

considerable profit) rather than for its ability to conduct terrorist strikes. But the fall of 

Moammar Qaddafi's regime and the disorder that followed flooded the Sahel with weapons and 

encouraged alienated minorities like the Tuaregs to take up arms. As a result, two al Qaeda 

associates in Mali--Ansar al Din and the Movement for Tawhid (Unity) and Jihad in West Africa 

(known by its French acronym, MUJAO}-took control of northern Mali and began a drive on 

southern Mali that ultimately drew French forces into the fight to prevent them from gaining 

control of the routes to Bamako, Mali's capital. French forces, supported to a limited extent by 

Malian and other African Union troops, retook the population centers of northern Mali, but have 

only driven the Salafists into the hinterland. French forces have already begun withdrawing, 

furthermore, and it is not likely that the AU forces with which they are theoretically to be 

replaced will be able to sustain, let alone expand their gains. Mali is also becoming a magnet for 

Salafists in Africa, and AQTM has seized the opportunity to expand its reach across the Sahel and 

back into Algeria in a couple of dramatic terror attacks. Violence is also spreading to Mali's 

neighbors, including uranium-producing Niger. 
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81977b-7.eps

Conclusion 

Frederick W. Kagan 

July 18,2013 

AI Qaeda affiliates have unquestionably expanded their operational reach and capability, and 

even the amount of territory they actively control and de facto govern, dramatically since 2009. 

These affiliates are not simply localized groups with local grievance that happen to be flying the 

al Qaeda flag, moreover. Neither are they new-they all spring from groups that have been 

active for at least a decade and, in many cases, several decades. They all actually adhere to the al 

Qaeda ideology, they all have founders and/or current leaders who fought with bin Laden or his 

associates against the Soviets in Afghanistan or with the Taliban in the 1990s. They are by no 

means all actively working to attack the United States at this time, and some have denied that 

they intend to attack the U.S. at all. But how much stock can we put in those facts~ 

Virtually no one believed that AQAP posed a threat to the U.S. homeland before the Christmas 

Day underwear bombing attempt. No one believed that the Pakistani Taliban posed a threat until 

the Times Square bombing attempt. No one thought that the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus 

was of any serious concern, yet it appears that the Boston Marathon bomber received 

encouragement, ifnot active support, from that group during his visit to Dagestan in 2012. We 

cannot be certain--and should not be comfortable assuming--that AQI, JN, and AQlM will not 

decide to attack the U.S. homeland as their counterparts in the al Qaeda movement have already 

done. We can be certain, however, that they will have much more extensive resources and 

capabilities than any group that has yet tried to attack us, if and when they do. 

6 
29

Mr. POE. Mr. Joscelyn, you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR EDITOR, THE 

LONG WAR JOURNAL, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking 

Member Sherman, and other members of the committee, for having 

me here today. And I am honored to be on this panel besides these 

gentlemen and to testify before you on this topic. 

Like Fred, one thing at the outset I would say is I am somewhat 

solution-agnostic. I am basically a nerd who follows the details on 

a day-to-day basis. And so that is sort of what I am here to discuss. 

And, you know, I think that there is a good, sizable debate to be 

had about the actual solutions in various areas about how to approach this, what I characterize, as they have as well, as an expanding enemy. 

The three points—I would like to keep to the bullet point format. 

I will say there are three points I would sort of boil this down to. 

The first is that a lot of times when we talk about al-Qaeda, we 

talk about the threat to the U.S. homeland, and the ability to carry 

out mass casualty attacks. And that is understandable as that is 

the first goal of the U.S. Government, to prevent such attacks. 

I would say from a comprehensive review of al-Qaeda’s literature 

and a comprehensive review of their assets and their operational 

capacity, that has not been their only goal throughout their entire 

existence, not even close, that attacking us was always a tactic as 

part of their larger strategum in the game that they are playing, 

which involves politics in a variety of countries and uncertainties 

of guerrilla warfare along those lines. 

In that regard, I would point to the 9/11 Commission report, 

which pointed very early on, now more than two decades ago, that 

Osama bin Laden actually employed a strategy of what I characterize as planting seeds in a variety of countries to try and hopefully cultivate what we now see as affiliates or branches. 

Now, these efforts have not been fruitful in every country. They 

have had fits and starts. And they have not always worked out. 

But I would argue that in some ways, in some spectacular ways, 

these efforts have actually worked. And so I don’t think the growth 

of the affiliates is, in fact, a surprise or anything we should take 

as some sort of random event that just happens by happenstance. 

The second point is the committee expressed interest in sort of 

the delineation between al-Qaeda’s core and the affiliates. Part of 

my concern is that we talk about the al-Qaeda core as if it is this 

group in Afghanistan, Pakistan solely, which is totally distinct 

from everything else that is going on around the world, and that, 

therefore, if we just kill off the core, the threat from al-Qaeda as 

it manifested itself on 9/11 is no longer a worry for us. 

I think even the Bush administration got into that at times as 

well, making statements like, ‘‘We killed 75 percent of senior alQaeda leaders.’’ You know, President Obama has now said that we 

killed 73 percent of senior al-Qaeda leaders. You kind of wonder, 

you know, how many times we can kill three-fourths of the senior 

al-Qaeda leaders. You know, they are able to replace their ranks. 

30

And in that vein, al-Qaeda’s core is not confined, I would argue, 

to Afghanistan, Pakistan. The way I look at it based on al-Qaeda’s 

literature, including a recently published letter from Ayman alZawahiri, is that it is basically where their general command is actually headquartered. And they have a series of committees and 

advisers surrounding Ayman al-Zawahiri. But the general command dispatches operatives around the globe to oversee their interests. And I won’t get into the nerd analysis for you right now, but 

I can point to specific operatives we know are in touch with the 

general command, who have been dispatched by the general command, and they are operating in places such as Egypt, Libya, 

Syria, Yemen, Sinai, you know, across the globe basically. 

The third and final point is that, you know, a lot of the discussion centers on, of course, again, the threat to the U.S. homeland. 

And we should be happy that they haven’t been able to execute 

something on the level of a 9/11-style attack. That is the good 

news. Certainly America’s defenses have improved through the 

years. We have thwarted plots. We have also gotten lucky on occasion, avoiding mass casualty attacks. But I just want to highlight 

something in my testimony. 

When you talk about the threats to the U.S. homeland now, they 

are more diffuse, not just abroad but also to us here in this country. Since 2009, the way I look at it, there have been plots from 

the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula starting on Christmas Day 

2009; plots by the Pakistani Taliban in May 2010, which had the 

failed Times Square bombing. They actually took credit for that at 

my Web site. They emailed us the credit for that operation. 

The Pakistani Taliban, according to the Obama administration, 

which has done a good job of describing the Pakistani Taliban, has 

a symbiotic relationship with al-Qaeda. There is a recent plot early 

this year connected to al-Qaeda members in Iran which involved 

derailing the train from New York to Toronto. And we have seen 

recent evidence that al-Qaeda in Iraq, according to the Iraqi Government anyway, may have considered dispatching operatives to 

launch some sort of chemical weapons attack in Europe and also 

the U.S. 

In that regard, I point out that al-Qaeda in Iraq actually was 

tied to the 2007 failed attacks in Glasgow and London and was actually tasked in 2004 by al-Qaeda’s general command with coming 

up with a plan to attack us. 

So, just to wrap this up quickly, most of the affiliates spend most 

of their assets doing something else, fighting guerrilla warfare, trying to gain turf for themselves elsewhere. Most of their assets are 

not deployed against us in any immediate threat capacity. However, I think we have to be very careful not to assume away that 

threat and to understand that these threats manifested themselves 

very rapidly. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]

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Testimony of Thomas Joscelyn 

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Senior Editor, The Long War Joumal 

Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

United States Congress 

"Global al-Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges" 

July 18,2013 
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81977c-2.eps

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Shennan and members of the Committee, thank you for 

inviting me here today to discuss the threat posed by al Qaeda. We have been asked to "examine 

the nature of global al Qaeda today." In particular, you asked us to answer the following 

questions: "What is [al Qaeda's] makeup? Is there a useful delineation between al Qaeda's core 

and its affiliates? If so, what is the relationship? Most importantly, what is the threat of al Qaeda 

to the United States today?" 

I provide my answers to each of these questions in the following sections. But first, I will 

summarize my conclusions: 

• More than a decade after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks there is no commonly 

accepted definition of al Qaeda. There is, in fact, widespread disagreement over what 

exactl y al Qaeda is. 

In my view, al Qaeda is best defined as a global international terrorist network, with a 

general command in Afghanistan and Pakistan and atliliates in several countries. 

Together, they form a robust network that, despite setbacks, contests for territory abroad 

and still poses a threat to U.S. interests both overseas and at home. 

It does not make sense to draw a firm line between al Qaeda's "core," which is 

imprecisely defined, and the atliliates. The atliliates are not populated with automatons, 

but they are serving al Qaeda's broader goals. And al Qaeda has dispatched "core" 

members around the globe. As the 9/11 Commission found, AI Qaeda's senior leaders 

have always pursued a policy of geographic expansion. The emergence of fonnal 

atliliates, or branches, has been a core al Qaeda objective since the early 1990s. While 

the atliliates have varying degrees of capabilities, and devote most of their resources to 

fighting "over there," history demonstrates that the threat they pose "over here" can 

manifest itself at any time. 

• In addition to its atliliates, al Qaeda operates as part of a "syndicate" in Central and 

South Asia. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in 2010, "A victory for 

one [member of the syndicate] is a victory for alL" Al Qaeda and its allies control 

tenitory inside Afghanistan today. If additional parts of Afghanistan fall to the syndicate 

in the coming years, it will strengthen both al Qaeda's ideological messaging and 

operational capability. 

What is al Qaeda? 

This should be a straightforward question to answer. But in reality there is no commonly 

accepted understanding of al Qaeda Writing in 2003, Bruce Hoffman wrote that there was 

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81977c-3.eps

"[d]isagreement over precisely what al Qaeda is.'" It is "remarkable," Hoffman noted, that "al 

Qaeda remains such a poorly understood phenomenon" even after the 9/11 attacks. Incredibly, 

any attempt to answer basic questions about al Qaeda's structure (similar to the ones proposed by 

this committee), "provokes more disagreement than agreement in government, intelligence, and 

academic circles." 

Ten years later, Hoffman's words still ring true. In early 2013, the Canadian Security 

Intelligence Service (CSIS) commissioned a workshop of experts to assess the future of al 

Qaeda. CSIS was interested in how al Qaeda will adapt to the "death of Osama bin Laden, the 

popular uprisings spreading across the Middle East and North Africa, and the global recessionary 

pressures that are causing governments to re-evaluate their [counterterrorism] strategies." The 

final report issued at the conclusion of the workshop reads: "Workshop participants recognized 

that part of the challenge in imagining AQ's future lies in the very definition of AQ" 

Unsurprisingly, there was a "lack of consensus" among the experts. Echoing Hoffman's 

assessment a decade earlier, CSIS found: "How AQ adopts to the challenges and opportunities 

that will shape its next decade is a source of spirited debate amongst government officials, 

academic experts, think-tank analysts and private consultants.,,2 

"At its broadest," the CSIS report's authors found, "the phenomenon includes a central group of 

senior leaders commonly referred to as AQ Core, regional affiliates which together with that core 

make up the AQ network, like-minded groups in the network's key operating areas (eg, fellow 

travelers), homegrown Islamist extremists in Western countries, sympathisers across the globe 

and the AQ ideology itself." Despite this complex mix, the workshop's participants concluded 

that the "AQ Core and its network affiliates" will have "the most profound" impact "on the 

broader phenomenon's future prospects." For the most part, 1 concur with the CSIS definition of 

al Qaeda. 

The Al Qaeda Network 

The backbone oftoday's al Qaeda consists of its "general command" in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan (others refer to this as the "AQ Core") and its formal affiliates. The established al 

Qaeda affiliates include: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 

and its the Islamic State ofTraq (lSI), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQTM), and Shabaab in 

Somalia. All of the affiliates have publicly sworn hayctt (an oath offealty) to al Qaeda's senior 

leadership. Jabhat al Nusra in Syria should also be included in this list as well, because the group 

has openly proclaimed its allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri. Collectively, al Qaeda's general 

command and the affiliates form an international terrorist network that is focused on both 

1 Dmce HoHman, -'AI Qaeda, Trends in Tenorism and future Potentialities: An Assessment," The Rand 

Corporation, 2003. 

::: C'anadi,Ul Securily Inlclligl.~lcc Sen-icc, "The FutlLfl' of 1\1 Qacda: Rc'mlls of a ForCSlghl Project,'· \Xlorld 'ito/atch: 

Expelt Notes Senes pubhcatton No. 2015-05-01, May t, 2013; http://\;V\V\VCSlSscrs. gc.ca/pb lctns/cdmctrch/20 13040 1_ thjtr J_1gd -eng. asp. 

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81977c-4.eps

acquiring territory and executing terrorist attacks against the West. There is evidence showing 

that al Qaeda's general command guides the overall strategy pursued by the affiliates and even 

sometimes gets involved in specific tactical matters. However, the affiliates enjoy a large degree 

of latitude in deciding how to run their day-to-day operations. Relentless pressure from the U.S. 

and its allies has repeatedly disrupted the network, making the general command's job more 

difficult. 

In addition to the established affiliates, there are numerous associated jihadist organizations that 

the AI Qaeda Network either intluences or outright directs without otlicially recognizing the 

group as an atliliate. Consider two brief examples. In Mali, AQIM has fought alongside Ansar 

ai-Dine (AAD), which was designated a terrorist organization by the State Department in 

March3 At the time, the State Department noted that AAD "cooperates closely with" and "has 

received support trom AQIM since its inception in late 2011." AAD "continues to maintain close 

ties" to AQIM and "has received backing trom AQIM in its fight against Malian and French 

forces" Similarly, Boko Haram in Nigeria is not a formal al Qaeda atliliate, but according to the 

U.S. government the group has maintained ties to three atliliates. "There are reported 

communications, training, and weapons links between Boko Haram, al Qaida in the Lands of the 

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which may 

strengthen Boko Haram' s capacity to conduct terrorist attacks."" 

Still other pro-al Qaeda organizations have emerged since the beginning of the so-called Arab 

Spring under the name Ansar al Shari a (Partisans of Sharia Law). The very first Ansar al Sharia 

was simply a rebranding of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula -- that is, it was a new name 

chosen by an established al Qaeda affiliate.' It is hardly surprising, therefore, to learn that other 

Ansar al Shari a chapters are run by jihadists with known ties to al Qaeda. 

Ansar al Shari a Tunisia is headed by Seifallah ben Hassine (also known as Abu lyad al Tunisi), 

who has been designated by United Nations as a terrorist6 Ben Hassine previously established 

the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), "in coordination with" al Qaeda, according to the UN. 

Ben Hassine has known ties to a constellation ofal Qaeda terrorists, including the group's senior 

leaders, and the TCG played a key role in the September 200 I assassination of Northern Alliance 

leader Ahmed Massoud. Other UN-designated al Qaeda terrorists hold leadership positions 

within Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, to07 Ansar al Shari a Egypt is led by Egyptian Islamic Jihad (ED) 

3 U.S. DepuTtment or Slate Media Note, OlTi<..:t: of the Spokesperson, '-Terrorist Designulions of Allsar al-Dine:-

March 21. 2013; http://wmv.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206493.htlll. 

'1 hllp.//vvww .revliardsi'orj uSlice.netlindex.cfm?page=shekau&language=english (lust (lcce'jsed July 16. 2013). 

5 Tho1l1a~ Joscelyn, -'Stale D<..:partmcnt J\n~ar a1 Sharia an aha~ rOT AQAP," The T.ang War JOllmal, OcLohLr 4, 

2012. http://www 1011gwarioumal.org/archives/20 12/l O/state _ depaliment_ ans.php. 

o Iholllns Joscelyn, '-AI Qaeda [Illy orchestr.nted assault on US Embassy in fUlllsin,-- The Long If'arJollrna/, 

October 2, 2012; hltp://vVW\V long\''''(;Irjolml(;ll"org/(;Irehive~12012/10/al_ qacda_ally_ orche~"php" 

-; Thomas Joscelyn, "T'rom al Qaeda m Ttaly to Ansar al Shana TUlllSIa," The T,onx War Journal, November 2 [, 

2012, http://www 1ongwarjoumal.org/archives/20 12/ll/fj'ol1l_ a1_ qaeda_in _ita.php. 

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leaders who have remained loyal to al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri.' Ayman's younger 

brother, Mohammed al Zawahiri, has played a starring role at Ansar al Sharia Egypt's events. 

Other Ansar al Shari a chapters, including inside Libya, have known al Qaeda ties as well. The 

groups calling themselves Ansar al Sharia are all open about their support for al Qaeda's agenda. 

We cannot rule out that the possibility that these organizations are simply al Qaeda's attempt at 

rebranding. It is easy to connect the dots. 

The point is that outside of the formal afliliates, the AI Qaeda Network holds sway over dozens 

of organizations that are, at a minimum, ideological kinsmen. We often cannot see the 

operational ties between these groups because al Qaeda still maintains a substantial clandestine 

apparatus that is tasked with hiding such relationships. For some of these organizations, there 

may very well be no concrete ties and their relationship to al Qaeda'sjihad is purely rhetorical. 

The al Qaeda-Ied 'syndicate' in Afghanistan and Pakistan 

In Central and South Asia, al Qaeda has forged what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

has called a "syndicate" of terrorist groupS.9 "What we see is that the success of anyone of these 

groups leads to new capabilities and a new reputation for all," Gates said during a press 

conference in 2010. "A victory for one is a victory for all" 

Gates continued: "It's dangerous to single out anyone of these groups and say if we could beat 

that group that will solve the problem. Because they are, in effect, a syndicate of terrorist 

operators." Gates blamed al Qaeda for orchestrating the syndicate's attacks in Afghanistan, 

Pakistan and India. The "syndicate" description remains apt today, as there is no evidence that 

this coalition has frayed in the wake of al Qaeda's senior leadership losses.'" 

Consider this brief sketch of the main groups that belong to the syndicate. 

In Afghanistan, al Qaeda has fought alongside the Taliban since the mid-1990s. Before the 

September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden established the 55th Arab Brigade to serve as al Qaeda's 

contribution to the Taliban's side in Afghanistan's bloody civil war. The 55th was crushed during 

the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, but was later reconstituted as part of the 

Lashkar al Zil, or "Shadow Army"" This paramilitary fighting force is still very much alive. 

8 Thomas Joscelyn, "Ansar al ShaTia Egypt founder "honored to be an extension of al Qacda, '" The rong War 

November 27,20 12; hup://'\,",v\v.long\vm:journnl.org/archives!2012/11/ansm"_nl_shariu_egyp.php. 

Craig Whitlock, "(i-ules. AI-Qaeda has (lssembled (J 'syndic<lle" oftelTor groups." Was/lIl/gfon Post, Jamwry 20, 

2010. http://mticle,.washingtonpost.com/201 0-0 1-20/world/36888348 _1_ qaeda-a1-qaeda-syndicate-of-terroristoperalors. 

[11/\1 Qacda can also he descrihed as the tip of the jihadisL spear. For an analysis of al Qacda 's rclalionship~ with 

various other jihadist organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, see: Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, "Analysis: 

AI Qaeda is the tip of the jihadist spear," The Long War Journal, October t-l, 2009: 

http://\v\vw.kmg\-\arjolilllal.org/archivcs/2009/1 O/analy sis _ al_ qacda _is.php. 

11 nlll ROgglO, "AI Qaeda·s parallllhtary 'Shadmv Anny·," The T.ong War Journul, febmary 9, 2009; 

http://www .1ongwmjourna1. orgl archivesl2009!02/a1_ qaedas -paramilita .php. 

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The U.S. has targeted members of the "Shadow Army" in recent weeks12 And, in early June, the 

US. Treasury Department added an al Qaeda explosives expert to its list of designated terrorists. 

This expert, a Libyan, is "in charge of lED component construction at the AQ electronics 

workshop" and has "provided AQ paramilitary brigades in Afghanistan with timers, circuits, 

mines, and remote control devices for use in IEDs."" Senior Taliban commanders continue to 

facilitate al Qaeda operations inside Afghanistan as wel1. '4 

Other groups fighting in Afghanistan, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), have 

long been part of al Qaeda's plan!' The IMU operates throughout the country, as well as in 

Pakistan, and also maintains a facilitation network in neighboring Iran. The Islamic Jihad Union 

(UU), a splinter of the IMU, continues to fight alongside other al Qaeda-affiliate parties and take 

part in anti-Western plotting. Allies such as the Eastern Turkish Islamic Party (ETIP) provide 

fighters and leaders for the syndicate, too. 

In Pakistan, al Qaeda helped establish the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, 

which has unleashed a prolific terror campaign inside Pakistan, fought in Afghanistan, and even 

exported its operations elsewhere around the globe. Recent reports indicate that the TTP has sent 

a contingent to Syria, but some within the TTP have denied that claim. As recognized by the 

State Department, the TTP is clearly a part of al Qaeda's camp as the two maintain a "symbiotic 

relationship.",6 

11 Rill Roggio, "AI Qacda 'paramilitary c01111l1andcL' Haqqani Nctvvork lcadcl fC110rtcd killed in rCCl.l1t drone 

strike," The [,ong War Journui, July 6, 2013; 

http://yv\\\v.long\\"mjournal.org/archives/20 13/07/al_qaeda_military_co.php. See also: l)atrick Megahan and Bill 

Roggio, "AI Qacda facilitator t<lrgctcd in easlern Afghanistan:' The Long War JOl/rnal, JUlle 15,2013; 

http://www.longwmjournal.org/archivesl20 13106/al_ qaedajacilitator _2 php. 

13 U.S. Deparlmenl of the Treasury Pn..:ss Rck<lsc, "Treasury Dcslf:,'lla1L:s SL:nior AI-Qa'ida Bomb Maker:- June 6, 

2013. http://v,,-\v\V treasury. gov/press-centeripress-releaseslPagesfj 11973 .aspx. 

1-1- See, for instance: Patrick Megahan and Bill Roggio, -'ISAF targets al Qaeda facilitator in eastern Afghalllstan,'-

The Long /VarJoul11a/, May 17,2003: 

http://wyr..,\Y.longYmTjoumal.org/archives/201 JI05/isaf _targets_ al_ qaed _ 6. php. 

1 ~ The Long War Journal's regular revie\y of press releases from NATO's International Security Assistance r orce 

(lSA},) h<ls revealed <l st<lggering degree of <..:oordination between the IMU <lUU al Q<leu<l, <lS well as other insurgent 

groups. Osama hin Laden helped conVlllce the Talihan to host the Tl\11J in thc late [990s. Sec Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: 

The Rise o/AJililanf Islam in Cenlral Asia. Penguin Dooks: 2003. Page 229. C'Din Laden has encouraged the 

Taliban leaders to embrace a pan-Islamic ideology; for example, he played a key role in persuading the Taliban to 

I:-rl vc sanclLLary to the T1\.11 J in [999. ") For anolher good de~eription or al Qaeda's mn LLenee on the TMU sec lhL 

NatlOnal ConSOl1illll for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) database: 

http://\v\vw.stClrl lund.edltistClrU(iClta_ colle<..:lions/lops/terrorisl_ organiLation .-l)fofilc.asp?id=4075 (last accessed .TlLly 

16,2(13). 

16 According to the State Department, "TTP [Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan] and al Qaeda have a symhiotic 

relationship; TTP dra\vs idcological guidance from al Qaeda, \vhile al Qaeda relics on TTP for safe havcn in the 

Pashtun areas along the Arghan-Pakislani border. Thi~ lllutual eooperaLion gi\e~ TTP aeces~ Lo hoth al Qaeda's 

globClI iL:rrorist nclwork and the opcrationCll e;>,p("'TI("'~lce of ltS members. Given the proximity of the t\VO groups Clnd 

the natlu-e of lheir rei<ltionship, T I'p is a force multiplier for <ll Qaeda." Philip J. CrO\vley, "Designalions of Tehrik.-e 

Taliban Pakistan and '1\\'0 Senior Leaders:' State Depmiment Press Statement, September 1,2010; 

http://wmv.state.govlrlpa/prs/ps/2010109/14G545.htrn 

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81977c-7.eps

The Haqqani Network, straddling the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, remains one of al 

Qaeda's most important allies. The Haqqanis provide not only key logistical support for the 

syndicate's Afghan-focused operations, but also a safe haven from which al Qaeda can direct 

attacks against the West. As the authors of a recent, in-depth profile of the Haqqani Network 

concluded, "the Haqqani Network has long served as a local enabler of al Qaeda and its global 

jihad.,,'7 A string of plots against Europe and the U.S. have been traced to Haqqani-controlled 

territory. " 

Other Pakistan-based, al Qaeda-allied groups include: Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUH), 

Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and 

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). All of these groups have decades-old ties to al Qaeda, and have 

cooperated with al Qaeda in operations. These organizations have provided al Qaeda with a deep 

roster of skilled operatives who have replaced fallen terrorist commanders. 

What is the relationship between al Qaeda's "core" and the affiliates? 

All of the established al Qaeda affiliates - Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda 

in Iraq (AQI), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Shabaab and, I would add, Jabhat al 

Nusra in Syria - have sworn an oath of bayat (loyalty) to al Qaeda's general command and 

Ayman Zawahiri. As Osama bin Laden's chief co-conspirator, Zawahiri was involved in all 

facets of al Qaeda's operations, from strategic questions to attack planning. Prior to the slaying 

of bin Laden: Zawahiri negotiated mergers with al Qaeda affiliates (such as AQTM), reprimanded 

problematic commanders (such as deceased AQI head Abu Musab al Zarqawi), and oversaw at 

least parts of al Qaeda's international operations (from calling off a planned 2003 attack on New 

York City's subways to orchestrating other attacks). 

It is impossible to assess how frequently the affiliates are in contact with the general command, 

as much of that data is not available to the outside world. But Zawahiri is in charge of the AI 

Qaeda Network. The affiliates recognize Zawahiri as their leader, even when they disagree with 

his decisions. And Zawahiri is still communicating with his subordinates, even ifhis missives are 

delayed due to security concerns. For instance, Zawahiri communicated with one of his Egyptian 

followers, Muhammad Jamal al Kashef, in 2011 and 2012. '9 

l~ 131'O\vn, Vahid and Rassler, Don. FuunlUinhC'ud o/Jihad: The Haqqani Sexus, 1973-2012. Ne"v York: Columbia 

University Press, 2013. P. 229. 

18 Ibid. pp. 229 - 233. 

19 Thomas Joscelyn, "CommUlllcatlOlls \Vlth Ayman al 7,awahm hlghllghted m "Nasr C1ty cell' case," The rong War 

Journal, Februm:.' 10,20 13; http://w\v\Y.long\vmjoumal.org!archivesI2013/02/col11l1lunications_ ·with.php. 

7 
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81977c-8.eps

In April and May of this year, Zawahiri sent messages to, and received replies from, the heads of 

al Qaeda's affiliates in Iraq and Syria.2() Those communications revealed a serious dispute 

between the emirs of al Qaeda in Iraq and labhat al Nusra over who commands al Qaeda's 

growing army in Syria. Zawahiri ruled in labhat al Nusra's favor, but the head of al Qaeda in 

Iraq subsequently defied Zawahiri's order. 21 It remains to be seen how this dispute is worked out, 

but it should be noted that the squabble is over al Qaeda's successful growth inside Syria. Tn 

other words, they are not arguing over who owns an unsuccessful franchise. And even with 

AQl's open defiance, labhat al Nusra has proven to be extremely deferential to Zawahiri. 

Despite AQI's rancor, AI Qaeda's general command has gained a new affiliate inside Syria since 

late 2011. To put it another way, suppose Zawahiri were to entirely lose AQI's loyalty (so far, 

there is no reason to believe this is the case), he has still gained labhat al Nusra. 

Another serious dispute has erupted in Somalia, where Shabaab's leadership has reportedly 

executed al Qaeda operatives with well-established pedigrees, including Ibrahim al Afghani. 

This cannot please a! Qaeda's genera! command, as a! Afghani was loyal to al Qaeda during the 

Battle of Tora Bora and the years that followed. 

The AI Qaeda Network is not comprised of automatons. Like all manmade organizations, the 

terror network houses personalities who may clash and sometimes have competing interests. This 

does not necessarily mean, however, that the network has "fragmented" or "splintered," as some 

analysts contend. Keep in mind this striking example: Prior to 9111 there was a significant 

amount of internal dissent over whether al Qaeda should launch its most devastating attack in 

history. The 9/11 attacks became al Qaeda's signature strike, and yet several high-level al Qaeda 

members disagreed with bin Laden's decision to move forward with the operation. This did not 

force these senior jihadists outside of al Qaeda's ranks. In fact, some of them went on to praise 

the 9111 attacks after the fact while maintaining their leadership positions. 

Since its inception in the late 1980s, al Qaeda has faced substantial hurdles. Yet, the organization 

has proven to be remarkably adaptive, in part, because its leaders devised a strong plan for 

broadening their base of support within the jihadist world and beyond. The plan relies upon loyal 

followers throughout the world, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The al Qaeda "core" is imprecisely defined. 

There is no standardized definition ofal Qaeda's "core." In general, when US. officials and 

independent analysts use this tenn, it appears that they are referring to a! Qaeda's senior 

leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is headed by al Qaeda emir Ayman a! Zawahiri. 

The a! Qaeda honcho is, in tum, served by severa! committees and an unknown number of 

advisers. As far as I can tell, this is what is meant by the "core" of a! Qaeda. As I've made clear 

2(' Thomas Joscelyn, --Analysis: Zawahiri's letter to al Qaeda bnmches in Syria, Iraq," The Long War Journal, June 

10, 2013: htlp:llw\-\ \V .long\vmjoumal.org/archi vcs120 13/06/,maly sis _ <:Illcged _lcl.php. 

~1 Thomas Joscelyn, "T~lanl1c State of Traq leader defles 7.m;vahm III alleged audIO message:' The Tong Wur Journal. 

June 15. 2013; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archivesI20 13/0Glislarnic _state _ of)ra _3. php. 

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81977c-9.eps

in my testimony, I prefer the term "general command" to "core" (which I have used elsewhere) 

as this is what is used in al Qaeda's own correspondence. 

It does not make any sense to assume that "core" al Qaeda members, as they are commonly 

referred to, are confined to Pakistan and Afghanistan. We know, for example, that al Qaeda's 

senior leaders have dispatched or otherwise rely upon numerous terrorists around the world to do 

their bidding, both as part of the group's operational cells, as well as within the AI Qaeda 

Network's affiliates Consider the following examples. 

Headquartered in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is led by Nasir al 

Wuhayshi, a terrorist who served as Osama bin Laden's aide-de-camp for several years prior to 

9111. Wuhayshi was bin Laden's protege and remained loyal to the al Qaeda master even through 

the darkest times, including the Battle of Tora Bora in late 2001, when all could have been lost. 

Bin Laden later returned the favor, rejecting a plea by some AQAP members to replace 

Wuhayshi as their leader with Anwar al Awlaki, the charismatic al Qaeda ideologue who has 

since been killed in a drone strike. Some ofWuhayshi's most trusted lieutenants, including 

several former Guantanamo detainees, also served al Qaeda in Afghanistan well before the 9/11 

attacks. Together, they are advancing al Qaeda's global jihadist agenda, simultaneously fighting 

for territory inside Yemen while overseeing plots against the United States. 

According to the Obama administration, the terrorist who leads al Qaeda's network inside Iran 

today is a Kuwaiti named Muhsin al Fadhli. Few al Qaeda terrorists were trusted with 

foreknowledge of the 9111 attacks; al Fadhli was one of them. The network that al Fadhli 

oversees is the result of an agreement with the Iranian regime that was brokered by Osama bin 

Laden's right-hand man, who traveled to and from Iran. This Iran-based network serves as a 

"core" pipeline for al Qaeda's senior leadership. At least several important al Qaeda operatives 

have served this Iran-based network while living in other Gulf countries. After 9/11, numerous al 

Qaeda leaders, including members ofthe group's management and military councils, fled to Iran 

where some were held under house arrest. One of these senior al Qaeda members is Saif al Ade1, 

who has since been allowed to leave Iran, although it is unclear where he is currently stationed. 

Al Ade1 and his ilk did not cease being "core" al Qaeda members simpl y because they fled to 

Iran after the fall of the Taliban's Afghanistan. 

A Defense Department report ("AI Qaeda in Libya A Profile") published by the Library of 

Congress in August 2012 identified at least two senior operatives who were dispatched to Libya 

to oversee al Qaeda's efforts there. The first is known as Abu Anas al Libi, who was long ago 

convicted of terrorism charges for his role in al Qaeda's 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and 

Tanzania. Abu Anas is coordinating his efforts with al Qaeda's senior leadership in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. The second terrorist identitied in the report, Abd al Baset Azzouz, was sent to 

Libya by Ayman al Zawahiri. Another al Qaeda terrorist who was not identified in the Defense 

Department's report, but is known to operate inside Libya, is Faraj al Chalabi (or al Shibli), who 

9 
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81977c-10.eps

was detained earlier this year after returning to Libya from Pakistan. 22 AI Chalabi may have been 

involved in the September 11, 2012, terrorist attack in Benghazi. 

In March, the State Department offered a $5 million reward for information leading to the 

capture of an American known as Jehad Mostafa, who is believed to be Ayman al Zawahiri's 

emissary to Shabaab, al Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia. Shabaab is currently engaged in serious 

intighting and it is not publicly known how Mostafa's role has been atfected. 

There are credible reports that senior al Qaeda operatives, including a member of the group's 

Shura council, have gone to Syria. And Ayman al Zawahiri has appointed a longtime al Qaeda 

operative known as Abu Khalid al Suri to resolve the dispute between Jabhat al Nusra and al 

Qaeda in Iraq. 

Other core al Qaeda members have returned to their home countries in the wake of the Arab 

Spring. One declassified Abbottabad document shows that Osarna bin Laden recommended that 

a terrorist named Mohammed Islambouli leave northern Pakistan for Kunar, Afghanistan. 

Mohammed's brother, Khaled Islarnbouli, was the assassin who killed Egyptian president Anwar 

Sadat. While bin Laden was willing to lose some al Qaeda leaders, he was not willing to lose 

Mohammed Islambouli, who is the equivalent of royalty injihadist circles and is today a free 

man inside Et,'ypt, where is joined by other Zawahiri loyalists who have either been freed from 

prison or returned from abroad. 

Nasir al Wuhayshi, Muhsin al Fadhli, Abu Anas al Libi, Abd al Baset Azzouz, Jehad Mostafa, 

Abu Khalid al Suri, Mohammed Islambouli: These are just some of the men who can be counted 

on to advance al Qaeda's agenda outside Afghanistan and Pakistan. It does not make sense to 

consider them anything but "core" al Qaeda members. 

AI Qaeda's Affiliate Strategy 

The emergence of al Qaeda's affiliates is no accident. Al Qaeda has always sought to push 

forward its agenda by working with, co-opting, or otherwise directing like-minded jihadist 

groups. The principal Al Qaeda organization - its general command - is itself a joint venture, 

which bin Laden's organization and Ayman al Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EU) forged 

through a merger. 

Al Qaeda began laying the groundwork for the emergence of its atliliates in the early 1990s.23 

Bin Laden was headquartered in Sudan at the time and, according to the 9/ II Commission, "had 

a vision of himself as head of an international jihad confederation." Bin Laden established an 

"Islamic Army Shura," which "was to serve as the coordinating body for the consortium of 

~2 Thomas Joscelyn, "Benghazi suspect fled to Pakistan, recently detained in Libya'-- The Long War Journal, March 

14, 2013: http://www.longwmjournal.org/archives/2013103/a1_ qaeda-linked _ beng.php 

23 My colleague at the Foundation for Dl'fCll':>C o[Dcmocracic~, Jonatlulll Sdl<U1LCL ha~ wrilkn an c:-..cdknl primer 

on hm;v al Qaeda 's affllJates began to develop. Schanzer, J'.1nathan. AI-Qaeda '8 Armies: -"'fiddle F.asi A.//iliuie 

Groups & The ;Vext Generation afTerror. Washington, D.C.. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004. 

10 
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81977c-11.eps

terrorist groups with he which he was forging alliances." The Shura "was composed of his own 

al Qaeda Shura together with leaders or representatives of terrorist organizations that were still 

independent." 24 

As part of this Islamic army, bin Laden "enlisted groups from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, 

Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea." The burgeoning 

al Qaeda network "also established cooperative but less formal relationships with other extremist 

groups from these same countries; from the African states of Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and 

Uganda; and from the Southeast Asian states ofBurrna, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia." Al 

Qaeda also supported etforts in the Balkans, Central Asia, Chechnya, and the Philippines. Bin 

Laden and al Qaeda pursued a "pattern of expansion through building alliances" and had laid the 

"groundwork for a true global terrorist network,,25 

Tn 1996, bin Laden was forced to leave the Sudan for Pakistan and then Afghanistan. But al 

Qaeda's strategy of alliance building continued. The 9/11 Commission wrote: "The alliance with 

the Taliban provided al Qaeda a sanctuary in which to train and indoctrinate fighters and 

terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other jihad groups and leaders, and plot and staff 

terrorist schemes ,,2(, In addition to maintaining his own facilities, bin Laden "also provided 

support to and benefited from the broad infrastructure of such facilities in Afghanistan made 

available to the global network ofTslamist estimates.',27 During this period in Afghanistan, al 

Qaeda continued "to collaborate closely with the many Middle Eastern groups - in Egypt, 

Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, and elsewhere - with which it had been 

linked when Bin Ladin was in Sudan."28 And al Qaeda "reinforced" and "bolstered" its ties to 

still other groups. 

It is estimated that from 1996 to September 11, 2001, between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters 

"underwent instruction in Bin Laden-supported camps in Afghanistan," with only some 

becoming full-tledged al Qaeda members. The remaining newly-trained jihadists were a 

"potential resource for al Qaeda." 29 

The connection between bin Laden's original plan, which evolved through the years, and the 

emergence of al Qaeda's affiliates has not been lost on outside observers. Tn 2011, a 

Congressional Research Service report noted: "Tn many ways, the dispersion of AI Qaeda 

affiliates fits into the larger strategy of Bin Laden and his associates. They have sought to serve 

as the vanguard of a religious movement that inspires Muslims and other individuals aspiring to 

~4 91 [ 1 Commission Report. p. 5R. 

WII Conmlission Rep0l1, p. 66. 

:::' 9111 C'onunission Report. pr. 66 -- 67. 

~8 9/1 1 Commls~lOn Report. p. 67. 

~9 Ibid. 

11 
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81977c-12.eps

join a jihadi movement to help defend and purify Islam through violent means.,,30 Mter all, the 

name "Qaeda" means "base," from "which its members hope to build a robust, geographically 

diverse network." 31 

What is the threat of al Qaeda to the United States today? 

Today, the AI Qaeda Network is more geographically diverse than ever. Al Qaeda and its 

affiliates are fighting in more countries than at any other time before or after 9111. It has several 

established afliliates, which it lacked on September 11, 2001. The ebb and now oftighting 

changes the scope of al Qaeda's footprint on a regular basis, but the network has shown the 

capacity to challenge for territory across Mrica, through the Middle East and into Central and 

South Asia. Meanwhile, al Qaeda's general command maintains safe havens in the Kunar and 

Nuristan provinces of Mghanistan today. 

It is true that al Qaeda's affiliates allocate most of their resources to waging guerilla warfare 

against their "local" enemies. But if we have learned anything since 9111 it is that the gains made 

by al Qaeda "over there" can easily lead to a threat against Americans "over here.,,32 Indeed, al 

Qaeda's expansion in recent years has led to more threats against the U.S. Homeland, not less. 

Here are four examples. 

First, AQAP has emerged as a threat to the U. S Homeland. AQAP was decimated after 2003 by 

a relentless counterterrorism campaign. But in early 2009 the group was reborn after al Qaeda's 

Saudi and Yerneni wings united. By December 25,2009, AQAP had placed a suicide bomber on 

board a Detroit-bound plane. Luck and the vigilance of the passengers on board Flight 253 saved 

the day. Prior to the Christmas Day bombing attempt, many counterterrorism analysts assumed 

that AQAP was only interested in attacking targets inside Yemen. Several attempted attacks by 

AQAP have followed that initial failure 

Second, months later, in May 201 0, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) dispatched a terrorist to Times 

Square. The SUV bomb did not go off, saving numerous lives. The Pakistani Taliban is the same 

group, discussed above, that shares a "symbiotic relationship" with al Qaeda. The Pakistani 

Taliban's resources are devoted, by and large, to operations inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

And yet the group almost detonated a truck bomb in the heart of New York. 

Third, on April 22 of this year, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) announced that 

they had disrupted an al Qaeda plot to derail a passenger train traveling from New York to 

30 Jolm Rollins. -'AI Qaeda and .A.ffiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. 

Policy," Congressiollnl Research Service, Jamwry 25, 201 I. 

31 Ib;d 

.3~ The 'overthere"-"over here" dynamIc \vas first employed hy the 9111 COmrnISSlOtl. See 9ft [ CommlsslOll Report, 

p.3G7. 

12 
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81977c-13.eps

Toronto. This was the first known al Qaeda plot against Canada since 9/11. RCMP officials said 

the plotters received "direction and guidance" from al Qaeda members in Iran. 

Fourth, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has had a hand in plots against the West. In 2004, according to 

the Department of Homeland Security, Osama bin Laden instructed then AQI emir Abu Musab 

al Zarqawi to assemble a cell capable of striking the U.S. In 2007, failed attacks in London and 

Glasgow were tied back to AQr,33 And in June of this year Iraqi officials claimed to have 

disrupted a sarin and mustard gas plot that was intended to target Iraq, Europe and the u.S34 

Luckily, these plots have either been foiled or failed for other reasons. It has always been 

difficult to mount a large-casualty attack against the U.S. Homeland. But the diversity of 

attempted attacks against the U.S. Homeland demonstrates that while the Al Qaeda Network is 

fighting for territory "over there," it remains a threat to Americans "over here." 

33 Raymond Donner, Jane Perlez and Eric Schmitt, "I3ritish Inquiry off-ailed PIOb Points to Iraq's Qaeda Group'--

The ;Vcw lork 1'lIl1es, December 14,2007: 

http://w\vw.nytimcs.comI2007!12114/worldlLlLfopl./ 141ondon.html '?pugcwantcd=,,!ll& _r=O. 

34 nlll ROgglO, "Traq breaks up al Qaeda chenncal \vearons celi," The T.onx War Journal, June L 20LL 

http://www.longwmjournal.org/archivesI2013/OG/imCLbreaks_up_al_qa.php 

13 
44

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

Dr. Hegghammer, is that correct? 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. That is correct. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. You have 5 minutes, sir. Thank you for 

coming from California to be here today. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS HEGGHAMMER, PH.D., ZUCKERMAN 

FELLOW, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me. 

And thank you, Ranking Member and all of the distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. It is a great honor to be here. 

I have been doing academic research on al-Qaeda since before 

9/11. And never has the future of the jihadi movement seemed 

more unpredictable to my eyes than it does today. Still, for this testimony, I have decided to try to look ahead and speculate about the 

long-term future of al-Qaeda. And in these opening remarks, I will 

highlight my three most important conclusions. 

First, it is my assessment that we are past the peak of organized 

jihadi terrorism in the West. Al-Qaeda core is weak, and most affiliates are not systematically targeting the U.S. homeland. The 

main threat in the next 2, 3, perhaps 5 years is ad hoc attacks by 

unaffiliated agents, which are harder to prevent but less lethal on 

average. Affiliates seem to be holding their fire against the West, 

partly because they have primarily local agendas, for which overseas operations are not very useful, and partly because they seem 

to fear the U.S. military response that comes with attacks on the 

homeland. So deterrence, in other words, appears to be part of the 

story here. And to maintain this deterrence vis-a`-vis jihadi organizations, the U.S. in my view should continue to use military force 

in counterterrorism selectively, primarily against those groups with 

a proven willingness to attack the U.S. homeland. Using heavy 

force against groups that have not yet attacked us runs the risk of 

provoking the very behavior we are trying to prevent. 

My second and more pessimistic point is that the jihadi movement writ large is thriving and will be with us for another decade 

at least. I think that the optimists were basically wrong in commenting on the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring was not an end of 

the Cold War moment for jihadism. Al-Qaeda core may be very 

weak, and al-Shabaab in Somalia may be experiencing setbacks, 

but the other affiliates are doing just fine. And the new Ansar alSharia groups in North Africa are growing. The Syrian war, with 

its staggering numbers of foreign fighters, has been a major boost 

to the movement. For now, most of these groups are not targeting 

the West. This could change, however, and we should pay particular attention in my view to Jabhat al-Nusra because it disposes 

of so many Western operatives. 

My third point, which is more of a guess, really, is that I expect 

to see a second wave of serious plots in the West some 4, 5, 6 years 

down the line. And the most likely perpetrator will be an organization that we do not yet know about. It could, of course, come from 

existing affiliates as well, but these groups have the disadvantage 

of being known to us and they are led by people who have seen 

what drones can do, which means they are less likely to try sysVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:43 Sep 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\071813\81977 HFA PsN: SHIRL
45

tematically attacking the West. And if they do, we know where to 

direct the retaliation. 

Future groups, on the other hand, might be less visible to our 

agencies and be led by a new generation prone to overestimating 

their own capabilities. Their chances of success will depend on our 

continued vigilance and ability to spot such grouplets early. More 

than ever, we need a concerted effort, both in the intelligence community and the academy, to make sense of this rapidly changing 

jihadi landscape. 

Thank you for your attention. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hegghammer follows:]

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81977d-1.eps

The Future of Anti-Western Jihadism 

Prepared Testimony for the Hearing on 

"Global al-Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges" 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

July 18, 2013 

Thomas Hegghammer 

Zuckerman Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University 

Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) 

FFI Forsvarets 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this testimony are my own and do not represent those of Stanford 

University, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, or the Norwegian Government. 
47


81977d-2.eps

Introductory remarks 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you very 

much for inviting me to testify. It is a great honour. I have been doing academic research on al-Qaida 

since before 9/11, and never has the future of the jihadi movement seemed more unpredictable to 

my eyes than now. Still, for this testimony I have decided to look ahead and speculate about the 

long-term future of al-Qaida. In this presentation I will highlight my three most important 

conclusions. 

First, it is my assessment that we are past the peak of organized jihadi terrorism in the West. AIQaida Core is weak and most affiliates are not systematically targeting the US homeland. The main 

threat in the next 2-3 years is ad-hoc attacks by unaffiliated agents, which are harder to prevent, but 

less lethal on average. Affiliates seem to be holding their fire against the West, partly because they 

have local agendas for which overseas operations are not very useful, and partly because they seem 

to fear the US military response that comes with attacks on the homeland. Deterrence, in other 

words, appears to be part of the story. To maintain this deterrence vis-a-vis jihadi organizations, the 

US should continue to use selective military force in counterterrorism, but primarily against those 

groups with a proven willingness to attack the US homeland. Using heavy force against groups that 

have not yet attacked us runs the risk of provoking the very behaviour we are trying to prevent. 

My second and more pessimistic point is that the jihadi movement writ large is thriving and will be 

with us for another decade at least. The optimists were basically wrong - the Arab Spring was not an 

"end of the Cold War moment" for jihadism. AQ core may be dying, and al-Shabaab experiencing 

setbacks, but other affiliates are doing just fine, and the new Ansar al-Sharia groups in North Africa 

are growing. The Syrian war, with its staggering numbers of foreign fighters, has been a major boost 

to the movement. For now, most of the groups are not targeting the West. This could change, 

however, and we should pay particular attention to Jabhat al-Nusra, because it disposes of so many 

Western operatives. 

My third point, which is more of a guess, is that I expect a "second wave" of serious plots in the 

West some 4-6 years down the line. The most likely perpetrator will be an organization that we do 

not yet know about. Existing affil iates have the disadvantage of being known to us, and they are led 

by people who have seen what drones can do. This means they are less likely to try attacking the 

West, and if they do, we know where to direct the retaliation. Future groups, on the other hand, 

might be less visible to our agencies and led by a new generation prone to overestimating their own 

capabilities. Their chances of success will depend on our continued vigilance and ability to spot such 

grouplets early. More than ever, we need a concerted effort, both in the intelligence community and 

the academy, to make sense of this rapidly changing jihadi landscape. 

Thank you for your attention. 
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The Future of Anti-Western lihadism 

This testimony explores the future of jihadism, in part because the past and present are already 

quite well described in the literature and partly because there has been considerable debate among 

experts in recent years about al-Qaida's future. Peter Bergen has literally declared the group 

"defeated", while a book by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross sets out to explain "why we are still losing the 

war on terror.'" Earlier this year, former CIA officials Paul Pillar and Bruce Riedel published op-eds on 

the very same day making diametrically opposing arguments about the future of al-Qaida-' With this 

testimony I weigh in on this debate and deliberately engage in some qualified speculation about alQaida's future. 

My overall view is relatively optimistic, in that I see al-Qaida Core as severely weakened, 

affiliates as largely uninterested in targeting the West, and the macro-trend for the jihadi movement 

as downward-pointing. However, I also see the decline as a long and slow one with plenty of 

opportunities for temporary surges in activity. In addition, I make two specific predictions: one is 

that conservative forms of Islam ism and locally oriented varieties of jihadism will remain major 

forces in Middle Eastern politics for at least a decade, probably two decades, to come. The other is 

that, some 4-6 years down the line, we may see attempts to form new organizations emulating AQ 

Core's strategy of systematically targeting the West. I should note a limitation in my empirical focus: 

my main concern is the future of anti-Western jihadism; space does not allow for assessments of the 

future of every regional group or of all current trends in jihadi ideology. 

From here the analysis proceeds in five steps. First I clarify key terminology; Second, I briefly 

describe the situation today. Third, I explain why the jihadi movement has declined. In the fourth 

part I present the case for a second wave of anti-Western jihadi terrorism and in the fifth I address 

some counterarguments. 

1) Definitions 

One of the reasons why people often disagree when discussing jihad ism is that the prevalent 

concepts are so slippery that we end up talking about different things. To avoid confusion, let me 

clarify what I mean by the following key terms: 

Islamism refers to any form of political activism in the name of Islam (both violent and nonviolent). 

lihadism refers to any form of violent Islamism (both the locally and globally oriented 

varieties) 

Anti-Western jihadism is a subcategory of jihadism and refers to a particular strategy of 

prioritising Western targets. It is also known as "global jihadism" and "BinLadenism" from 

the man who championed it. AI-Qaida Core pursues this strategy, while the affiliates, for the 

most part, do not. 

AI-Qaida refers to al-Qaida Core and its affiliates combined. 

AI-Qaida Core refers to the mother organization headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. It has been 

the main, but not the only perpetrator of anti-Western jihadism. 

Affiliates or "regional organizations" refer to jihadi groups such as AQAP or AQIM that have 

organizational links with al-Qaida Core and are sympathetic to its ideology without 

necessarily sharing all its aims or its strategy. 

1 Peter Bergen, "Time to declare victory: al Qaeda is defeated" } CNN.com, 27 June 2012; Daveed GartensteinRoss, Bin Laden's Legacy: Why We're Still Lasing the War on Terror (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2011). 

'Paul R. Pillar, "Algeria Attack Represents al Qaeda's Dying Gasp", The Daily Beast, 24January 2013; Bruce 

Riedel, "New AI-Qaeda Generation May Be Deadliest One", AI-Monitor. com, 24 January 2013. 

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Independents refer to individuals and grouplets who are willing to follow al-Qaida's strategy 

of attacking in the West, but who lack links to a jihadi organization. 

Foreign fighters refer to people who travel to fight in regional jihad fronts. They are 

generally not prepared to follow al-Qaida's anti-Western terrorist strategy, which is why 

they seek out conflict zones to begin with. However, some foreign fighters radicalize in the 

field and end up taking part in attacks in the West. 

2) The actor landscape today 

Let me briefly provide a bird's eye view of the jihadi actor landscape today. First, I, like many others, 

see al-Qaida Core as severely weakened. Many of its leaders have been killed or detained, its 

membership is low (reportedly well under 100), its plot frequency and quality is down, it runs fewer 

training camps, and accommodates fewer foreign recruits. It is, essentially, losing personnel faster 

than it can recruit. 

Second, the affiliates are alive and well, but most refrain from systematically attacking the West. The 

"older" affiliates, such as AQAP, 151, AQIM, al-Shabaab, the Caucasus Emirate, et ai, are all under 

various degrees of pressure, but most of them are doing just fine and show no sign of imminent 

collapse. The younger affiliates (such as Jabhat al-Nusra) and sympathizing organizations (such as 

the Ansar al-Sharia groups), seem to be doing even better. 

The crucial point about the affiliates is that most of them seem either unwilling or unable to attack in 

the West. For all the talk of AQ connections, AQIM and 151 have staged remarkably few attacks in 

West. AQAP has been an exception, but after the killing of al-Awlaqi and Samir Khan in 2011, their 

international plotting activity - as reported in open sources - appears to be declining. 

Third, despite the Boston bombings and the London stabbing this spring, the plotting activity of 

independents in the West appears to be declining. In the United States, for example, their activity 

level, measured in attempted plots, is down substantially from the record highs of 2009 and 2010. 

Fourth, foreign fighting remains very popular, much more so than anti-Western terrorism. Syria is 

the prime destination, but other destinations such as AfPak, Mali and Yemen continue to draw a 

steady trickle of foreign recruits. 

Fifth, conservative forms of Islam ism are thriving in both the Middle East and in Europe. In Egypt, for 

example, Salafis constitute an important political constituency. In Saudi Arabia and much of the Gulf, 

conservative clergy continue to wield significant formal and informal influence. Europe has seen the 

emergence of several "semi-radical" organizations - such as al-Muhajiroun in the UK and the 

Prophet's Umma in Norway - groups that express admiration for al-Qaida but mostly stop short of 

perpetrating violence in the West. 

The bottom line is that the Arab Spring appears not to have the same effect on Islam ism as the fall of 

the Soviet Union had on radical leftism. The overall situation today is reminiscent of - though not 

identical to - that of the 1990s, when, like now, several jihadi groups with local and regional agendas 

were operating in across the Muslim world. Then as now, Western governments were unable or 

unwilling to pursue them militarily, and the groups themselves were unable or unwilling to attack in 

the West. Then as now, Europe had semi-radical communities operating just within the confines of 

the law and regularly sending foreign fighters to conflicts in the Muslim world. 

The main difference is that in the 1990s, al-Qaida Core did not have the notoriety as it has today, 

and its strategy of targeting the West was largely untested. There were occasional episodes of antiWestern terrorist activity, but for most groups, systematically targeting the West was inconceivable, 

which is why Bin Ladin's initiative attracted so much controversy from other activists at the time. 

Today, AQ Core's "America first" strategy is very much on the table, and the rhetoric of all groups is 

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substantially more anti-Western. This means that "going global" represents a shorter ideological 

leap for jihad is today than for their predecessors in the 1990s. 

3) Why AQ Core is weak and affiliates hold back 

The decline of al-Qaida Core is the easiest aspect of the current state of affairs to explain. It is 

fundamentally a story of what terrorism scholars call government "learning", i.e., gradual 

accumulation of information about the identity and location of the members of the rebel group, 

which in turn allows for increasingly targeted and more effective repressive measures. At the 

beginning of the war on terror, al-Qaida enjoyed an informational advantage over the US 

government - as do all terrorist groups at the outset of their campaigns - because it knew where to 

find us but we did not know where to find them. With the help of time and massive investments in 

intelligence, we were able to map the organization, contain it, and eliminate leaders faster than it 

could train new ones. 

Learning is also behind the moderate decline in attacks by independents. Advances in data 

mining and analysis have allowed governments to collect, accumulate, and exploit data about the 

fringes of the jihadi network to a much greater extent than before, allowing for the identification of 

many, though not all, plots before they reach execution. Governments are helped here by the fact 

that true lone wolves are extremely rare, and that, for most individuals, the radicalization process 

involves socialization with other activists and/or consumption of jihadi propaganda online, both of 

which leave traces to be exploited. This, incidentally, is one of several reasons why the Internet is 

proving to be less of a boon to terrorists than many analysts predicted some years ago. For all their 

skill using the internet for propaganda distribution, jihadists are struggling use the web for 

operational purposes; they are having particular problems avoiding surveillance and establishing 

trust between one another online. 

The more contentious question is why the affiliates are not attacking in the West more 

often. One argument holds that this is a capability issue, i.e, that the groups are not operationally 

capable of circumventing the many countermeasures and detection systems that Western 

governments have put in place since 9/11. This argument is unconvincing for two main reasons. One 

is that several affiliates, especially AQIM and al-Shabaab, do have economic resources and human 

assets that should arguably enable them to carry out at least some attacks in the West. The other 

reason is if capability was the main problem, we should still expect to see more attempts. The 

combination of high intent and low capability is observable in the form offailed and foiled attacks. 

The fact that we do not see many such attempts, except from AQAP, suggests most affiliates are not 

really trying. 

I argue that the relatively low supply of anti-Western plots from the affiliates reflects low 

motivation, which in turn has two origins: a preference for local targets and fear of US retaliation. 

For all their anti-Western rhetoric and declared allegiance to al-Qaida Core, many affiliates appear to 

place greater emphasis on achieving local political objectives than inflicting harm on the West. We 

can infer this preference from the content of group declarations. Some groups say explicitly that 

they do not plan to attack in the West; others are more ambiguous in their statements, but reveal 

their preferences by devoting more attention to local topics than to global ones or describing close 

enemies with more vitriol than distant ones. Groups also reveal their preferences by the way they 

allocate operational resources. Most affiliates devote their resources overwhelmingly to local or 

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regional operations. Even those organizations that have attempted operations against the West 

have conducted a much larger number of operations in the local theatre. This is in stark contrast to 

AQ core, which devoted nearly all of its resources after 2001 to attacks in the West. By far the most 

plausible explanation for these allocations is that groups value local political gains higher than 

international ones. If your aim is to establish control over a given territory and you are caught up in a 

fight with a regional enemy, it makes little strategic sense to attack the West. However, you might 

have an incentive to launch verbal attacks on the West, because this makes you appear strong and 

principled in your local setting. 

Attacking the West makes makes even less strategic sense for such groups given the cost to the 

organization of provoking the ire of the American military. There is solid evidence from captured 

documentation that leaders of jihadi organizations think strategically and make decisions based on 

an informed calculus of costs and benefits. Leaders are, as a rule, not suicidal or irrational. There is 

also extensive evidence - from internal strategy documents - that leaders are aware of the 

capabilities of the us military and seek to avoid unnecessary exposure to these capabilities. In the 

1990s, some jihadi leaders explicitly admitted fearing US retaliation and cited it as a reason not to 

pursue Osama bin Ladin's "America first" strategy. Such explicit admissions are rare today, but it 

would be surprising if the prospect of retaliation did not factor into the decision calculus in an era 

where the US has proven much more willing to use force against terrorists than perhaps ever before 

in modern history. Most likely, affiliate leaders understand that targeting the US homeland might 

bring their own demise. 

4) Reasons to expect a "second wave" 

Given that AQ core is weak, that the affiliates seem largely deterred, and that independents are too 

loosely organized to sustain terrorist campaigns, it is my assessment that the prospect of a wave of 

large-scale jihadi plots in the US is unlikely in the short term. What we will see instead is a steady 

trickle of ad-hoc attacks, some of which may be large in scale, but on overage they will be less lethal 

than plots directed by organizations. 

In the longer term, however - 4-6 years down the line, I believe we may well see attempts to mount 

one or more new organizations that will adopt Bin Ladin's "America first" strategy in an attempt to 

finish what he started. It important to underline that this effort will probably have to be organized 

and relatively centralized for the attacks to be of strategic significance. I expect something 

coordinated, along the lines of AQAP's Awlaqi/Khan cell in Yemen in 2009-11, but on a somewhat 

larger scale. Such an initiative could emerge within a faction of an existing organization, as was the 

case of the Awlaki/Khan ceil, or it could occur as a result of a dynamic of competition (for outside 

funds and recruits) between grouplets in an area with many actors, such as Afghanistan/Pakistan. 

My guess would also be that such an initiative would benefit from logistical support from some of 

the semi-radical communities in Europe, as did the first al-Qaida. 

I see six reasons why such a scenario might materialize. The first is the historical precedent - many 

terrorist campaigns follow a pattern whereby there is an early spike in activity (a product of the 

above mentioned informational advantage) followed by decline, followed by a second, lower peak, 

as the group or movement tries, usually unsuccessfully, to turn the ship around. 

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The second reason is that the jihadi movement is very conscious of its own history and keen to 

avenge past defeats. This may make a new generation of militants want to emulate the original alQaida and finish what Bin Laden started. 

The third reason is that there will be arenas for at least one new generation of jihadis to socialize, 

train and get indoctrinated in the years ahead. As mentioned, the regional affiliates will continue to 

exist for the foreseeable future. The future founders of the second al-Qaida are likely to emerge 

from the lower ranks of existing organizations. The semi-radical communities of Europe are also 

likely to survive for several more years, especially considering the number of Europeans in Syria and 

the coming release from prison of many icons of Western jihadism imprisoned in the early 2000s. 

The fourth reason is that there will still be grievances to provide resonance to the AQ narrative. AntiAmericanism runs very deep in the region, and there are many possible events - from small symbolic 

ones to real military interventions - that may bring a resurgence of anti-Western attitudes in the 

region. Moreover, several of the old conflicts highlighted by al-Qaida as symbols of Muslim suffering, 

such as Palestine, Chechnya, and Kashmir, will persist. In addition, in some Arab countries, the high 

expectations that accompanied the Arab spring may be dashed by continued malgovernance. 

The fifth reason is that the ability of Western and Middle Eastern intelligence agencies to monitor 

jihadi groups may decline in the years ahead. This can happen as a result of reduced funding; many 

countries are having to cut public spending, and large counterterrorism apparatuses may not be 

sustainable during lulls in terrorist activity. Another way is through normative or legal restraints. In 

many Western countries, drone strikes and extrajudicial killings are politically controversial, and 

some agencies may see their hands partly tied as a result. Another possible mechanism is 

complacency: if relatively little happens in terms of plots against the homeland, vigilance may 

decrease. Finally, agencies may be distracted by other, more pressing issues; this is a particularly real 

risk for partner agencies in Middle Eastern countries experiencing unrest. 

Sixth, we may see unexpected technological advances, for example in digital stealth technology, that 

empower groups seeking to operate transnationally. As alluded to earlier, governments today seem 

to have the upper hand on the Internet; because they can often track, view, and store the 

communications of terrorists. This may change if there is a quantum leap in encryption, for example, 

that allows terrorists to avoid detection for some time. 

S) Reasons not to expect a "second wave" 

I see five main objections to the prediction of a second wave of organized anti-Western jihadism. 

One consists of saying that the deterrent described above is likely to last, so that no rational actor 

will dare to launch a campaign on the homeland in the foreseeable future. While I believe this to be 

true in the short run, I am much less sure about the long run. Even if most groups are deterred, there 

can always be outliers willing to take high risk, for example because poor information make them 

overestimate the chances of success, or because they value the short term status benefits that come 

with militancy. It is generally hard to predict the emergence and characteristics of new radical 

actors, especially small terrorist groups. The social sciences have much to say about group behavior 

once the group is established and we know its preferences. We know much less about why groups 

emerge and how preferences are shaped. It is hard to categorically dismiss the possibility that a new 

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group, led by younger, more optimistic activists, may emerge and attempt to wage a terrorism 

campaign against the US. 

A second objection would consist of arguing that there has been a permanent normative 

backlash against anti-Western terrorism that will prevent the new Bin Ladin from attracting 

followers. There is some truth to this. There is measurably less popular support for al-Qaida, 

terrorism and suicide bombings among Muslims today than ten years ago. Also, there has been a lot 

of criticism of al-Qaida's anti-Western strategy from within the jihadi movement. However, the 

normative backlash has not been pervasive by any means. There are still many activists who consider 

attacks in the West legitimate. Moreover, it would not take many people to wage a campaign of the 

kind envisaged here. Even though the mean level of support is declining, there is still ardent support 

at the margins. 

The third and perhaps strongest objection is that our knowledge of the jihadi movement and 

our coercive capabilities are so great that any such initiative will be nipped in the bud; New Bin 

Ladins will essentially be spotted early and liquidated. This is why I expect such an initiative, if 

successful, will most likely emerge from the understudied fringe of an existing network. Moreover, I 

expect the leaders of the "next a I-Qaida" to proceed more discreetly than Bin Ladin did when he 

announced his jihad against the United States in the 1996. 

Conclusion 

The bottom line of my assessment is that we are past the peak of organized jihadi activity in the 

West, but we will see a steady trickle of minor attacks and we may see second wave some 4-6 years 

down the line. This prediction is of course little more than an educated guess, and it is vulnerable to 

unexpected political developments, of which we have seen more than a fair share over the past 

couple of years. For example, Western countries could get drawn into the Syrian conflict for reasons 

other than counterterrorism, which would substantially increase the terrorist threat against those 

countries from both Sunni and Shiite militants. 

My main policy recommendation is for the US government to continue a differentiated 

approach to jihad ism, according to which the hardest measures are reserved for those groups with a 

proven intention to systematically target the US or European homeland. A strategy that uses heavy 

force against actors without such intentions risks provoking the very anti-Western militancy we are 

trying to curtail. 

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Mr. POE. I want to thank all of you for being here. I want to go 

back to the map that I showed you earlier. Won’t you comment on 

the map? It is over to your left or right, whichever way you want 

to look. And you can see that according to this map, al-Qaeda’s 

presence is in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, 

Algeria, Mali, Libya, Niger, Tunisia, Morocco, and Nigeria. My 

question is, do you agree that those are accurate countries that alQaeda has a presence in or not? Dr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman just looking at that for the first time, 

I would say that al-Qaeda or one of its allies is present in the countries you have identified. Let me just say two things. One is that 

in some of these cases, I would call them, really, an al-Qaeda affiliate in the case of Somalia and Yemen; in other cases, as in parts 

of Algeria, there may be the group Those Who Sign With Blood or 

down in Mali, Ansar al-Dine allies. They have a foreign affiliate. 

Mr. POE. Al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates. 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Let’s use that terminology. Dr. Kagan? 

Mr. KAGAN. Yes. Like Dr. Jones, I would agree that there are alQaeda or affiliated or allied movements in all of those statements. 

We might argue about some of the ‘‘blobology.’’ And I think the Afghan presence at the moment is a little less than what is implied 

there. 

Mr. POE. Fine. 

Mr. KAGAN. But in general terms, yes. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Joscelyn? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. You know, it is funny. We have this conversation 

about putting together a map at the Long War Journal constantly, 

about how to do this because it is actually very tricky. 

Mr. POE. You can use my map. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Yes. I agree with most of it. I would have to sort 

of pick at it a little bit, I think. See, here is the challenge. Okay? 

You look at, for example, an area like the Sinai, where we are 

tracking terrorists right now and who is there and we are tracking 

al-Qaeda operatives right there. They seem to have built the force 

in the hundreds, if not thousands, in the Sinai right now, including 

specific individuals. In fact, there is a great article up at the Long 

War Journal today about a former doctor to bin Laden, who has 

been basically running some jobs there. 

The problem is I agree with most of the map. I would have to 

sort of pick over it a little bit more. But I think it does make sense 

to say that you have al-Qaeda or affiliated groups and you also 

have associated movements, which the collusion there is often a lot 

stronger than people give them credit for. 

Mr. POE. And there are some want-to-be’s in the groups, too. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. There are some want-to-be’s. You have some guys 

who are really just flying the flag who aren’t really connected to 

the overall network, but I think there are a number of groups. You 

know, Seth had mentioned Ansar al-Dine, for example. The Treasury Department’s designation of them is very clear. The State Department’s designation is very clear that they have been working 

very carefully and closely with AQIM for a long time. So it is reasonable to include those groups in your map. 

Mr. POE. All right. Dr. Hegghammer? 

55

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. Well, I agree largely with the map and also 

with the comments that have been made already. I would also have 

added perhaps a little red dot in the Sinai. 

Mr. POE. Little red dot to the Sinai. 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. In Egypt, yes. But I would also mention in 

this context that the size of the area covered is not necessarily a 

measure of strength. Some of the groups happen to be in desolate 

areas. So they get a lot of red ink there. 

Mr. POE. Because there is nobody else there. 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. That is right. 

Mr. POE. There is nobody in those areas. 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. Some of the smaller dots have very powerful 

affiliates. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Thank you. 

Dr. Kagan, if I wrote your comments down correctly, you said 

that the United States lacks an overall strategy. What does that 

mean? And explain it briefly? 

Mr. KAGAN. Sir, I do not think that we have articulated a strategy for defeating al-Qaeda as a global network with affiliates and 

its associates. I think that we have undertaken a collection of tactics and we have made a number of broad statements about this. 

But I believe that this is a challenge that is worthy of the kind of 

analytical and planning effort that went into NSC–68 or any other 

extremely serious war. And, candidly, especially after the death of 

Osama bin Laden, I looked for a major planning effort of that variety to think about what the next stage was. And I do not believe, 

at least if that has happened, then I am completely unaware of it. 

Mr. POE. So if I understand what you said, overall strategy of the 

United States to deal with al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda operatives, affiliates, 

we don’t have one of those. But if events occur, we have tactical 

response to each specific attack. Is that a fair statement or not? 

Mr. KAGAN. Well, more than that. I mean, there is an offensive 

component to what the Obama administration is attempting to do. 

And there is a theory behind I think what they are undertaking 

with their targeted strikes and other activities. But I don’t see a 

coherent, holistic strategy that says, ‘‘This is the network we are 

looking at. These are the effects we need to generate on the network. These are how we are going to apply all the tools of government and so forth to do that.’’ And I think it is going to require 

an effort of that magnitude to scope the problem and then scope 

a strategy that might be successful. 

Mr. POE. Let me ask you this question. I want to talk about alNusra in Syria and their influence in Syria. What are they doing 

in Syria? I guess of all of the rebel groups there, I am concerned 

about them. How influential are they? And what are they actually 

doing? Does anybody want to weigh in on that? You all know. So 

just somebody tell me. 

Mr. KAGAN. Sure. I am happy to keep talking. Jabhat al-Nusra 

is extremely influential in Syria, and I think its influence is generally growing. That has largely to do with its ability to receive 

large amounts of external aid. 

Mr. POE. From? 

56

Mr. KAGAN. From Qatar, from other countries in the Gulf, and 

from the international——

Mr. POE. Governments are supporting al-Nusra? 

Mr. KAGAN. I can’t prove that governments are supporting 

Jabhat al-Nusra. 

Mr. POE. You think they are? 

Mr. KAGAN. But I believe that the Qatari Government has been, 

and I have seen indications that the Kuwaiti Government may be 

as well, or elements within the Kuwaiti Government may be as 

well. Certainly private jihadi donors within the Gulf and elsewhere 

in the world are supporting the movement. And, as a result of that, 

it is probably the best armed and equipped fighting force in Syria. 

I think we are already in a situation where there is going to be 

a conflict between the Free Syrian Army and the moderate forces 

that it represents and Jabhat al-Nusra under almost any scenario 

unless there is a complete Assad victory, which I think is very unlikely. Right now my assessment is Jabhat al-Nusra probably 

would win that fight. 

Mr. POE. So, as we progress, those are the two factions on either 

side that are going to come to conflict. And your money is on alNusra. 

Mr. KAGAN. Unless the situation changes, I think that al-Nusra, 

Jabhat al-Nusra, has the advantage. They also have the advantage 

in that they have been establishing local government and they 

have been setting up local authorities in various different parts of 

Syria that they control and are trying to build themselves now. I 

don’t think they actually have a whole lot of pocket or support for 

the ideology, but we have seen this phenomenon before that they 

are effective defenders. And, therefore, they put themselves into 

leadership roles. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

Ranking member, Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

I don’t want the panel to think that the absence of Democrats 

here reflects any disinterest or that my own absence soon will do 

that. As it happens, we have scheduled an important caucus meeting at the same time as this hearing. And, of course, this hearing 

was delayed by votes on the floor. 

My concern is not just with an attack on the American homeland, although that is a natural focus. I think that attacks on U.S. 

interests of blood and overthrow of relatively friendly governments 

pose as great a threat to us as anything else, even a modest attack, 

at least, on the U.S. homeland. I am concerned, not just with alQaeda and its affiliates, but just about any one inspired by the 

same movement. 

This is a complicated area. I mean, in World War II, we could 

put a color on the map. There were neutrals. There were countries 

on our side. There were countries against us. Kuwait exists only 

because we liberated them. Now we are told that the Kuwaiti Government and elements in it are allowing private monies and even 

government monies to go to Jabhat al-Nusra. That confuses me a 

little bit. What confuses me more is the testimony we have heard 

that, on the one hand, Iran is sheltering three of the most important al-Qaeda leaders. 

57

On the other hand, Jabhat al-Nusra may be part of an effort to 

obliterate the Alawite community. This focuses our attention on the 

Shiite/Sunni divide and Iran. 

Does Iran have those al-Qaeda leaders under house arrest or 

should we call it hospitality? Mr. Joscelyn? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, the answer is both, but because what Seth 

is talking about in terms of the network inside Iran is very important. In July 2011, then December 2011, then February 2012, and 

then October 2012, the Obama administration’s Treasury and State 

Departments’ designated al-Qaeda network inside Iran that operates under an agreement between the Iranian regime and alQaeda. So those are the four things I would point you to to go look 

at. And there is specific factual detail in those designations that is 

a very rigorous process the Treasury Department and the State Department go through to explain that. 

What they have done is since 2005, at least, there has been a facilitation network inside Iran to basically shuttle fighters to south 

Asia and elsewhere. And simultaneously the Iranian——

Mr. SHERMAN. So those that are motivated, can arrive in Iran 

and then end up in Afghanistan or Pakistan? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Sure. And in some cases, I uncovered, for example, that in 2010, one of Osama bin Laden’s last plots against the 

West used the same facilitation network to try and execute 

Mumbai-style attacks in Europe. So it is a robust facilitation network. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I see what al-Qaeda gets out of it. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. They get a sanctuary in a place where we are reluctant to use drones. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Sure. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What does Iran get out of it? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I think they want to influence where alQaeda is attacking. They don’t want al-Qaeda coming after them. 

They also have common enemies. They have common interests and 

throughout. They don’t have common enemies in Syria right now, 

which is what I think your question was really pointed at, which 

is that right——

Mr. SHERMAN. Wouldn’t it upset the alliance, if you will, for Iranians to know that this is a group bent on the destruction of the 

Alawite community when Iran sees itself, first and foremost, as a 

defender of Shiites, even different flavors of Shiites, than they 

themselves embrace? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Sure. Even beyond that, you have Hezbollah and 

the IRGC on one side of the Syrian war and al-Qaeda and its affiliate and related groups on the other. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. So they are directly in conflict. I mean, this is 

something we are watching right now. Just to your point, 

Muhammed al-Zawahiri, who is the brother of Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

for example, released a statement calling for attacks against Shiiteled governments because of what is happening in Syria. So this is 

the type of statement from somebody in al-Qaeda’s sphere that 

shows there is clearly tension over Syria. 

58

The head of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has certainly 

ratcheted up the rhetoric against Iran as well. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Finally, where do al-Qaeda and its affiliates and 

allies get their money? And have we been all too willing to do business with those who countenance such contributions? Dr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. Sure. The proper answer is it depends on which affiliates you are referring to. There is a lot of redundancy among alQaeda’s affiliates. Some are involved in illegal or in some cases 

legal charcoal trade. Most get some funding from different players 

in the Gulf. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Charcoal? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. There is——

Mr. SHERMAN. That can’t be a high-profit item. 

Mr. JONES. Well, when you are able to tax various elements of 

it, you might be surprised. But the broader point that timber trading, gem trading, there have been a range of—when you control 

trade in a given area, you can tax individuals living there. So there 

is a redundancy in——

Mr. SHERMAN. Looking at all of the allies and affiliates of alQaeda as a group, what portion of their money comes from—what 

would I say?—revenues they have generated? And what percentage 

comes from donations from governments and individuals in the Islamic world? 

Mr. JONES. I would say I could not put a percentage. And I would 

say I have never seen anybody put a reliable percentage on it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Give me your best guess. 

Mr. JONES. I would say that a fairly significant amount of funding of al-Qaeda’s core and its affiliates does come from wealthy donors is the way I would put it in the Gulf. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I will ask each member of the panel if you 

can just give me your best guess number. What percentage from 

the wealthy donors? What percentage from——

Mr. KAGAN. Sir, I don’t make up numbers. And I have never seen 

evidence. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. You know, I have never seen a specific budget. 

However, I would say that I agree with Seth that a significant percentage comes from donors in the Gulf, sure. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And one quick follow-up. Maybe the doctor can—

and that is, what happened to Osama bin Laden’s personal fortune? And is that being deployed by this? You know, he was once 

worth tens of millions of dollars. Go ahead. 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. Regarding the first question, I would also say 

that I don’t know. And I haven’t seen any numbers from people 

who know. My guess would be that the proportion of funds coming 

straight from donors in the Gulf to al-Qaeda and its affiliates as 

a whole is relatively small, although this varies between affiliates. 

So perhaps the only affiliate that we in the open source world 

know of is the account of al-Qaeda in Iraq in the mid 2000s. And 

they got quite a lot of their money from the foreign fighters that 

were coming from the Gulf. They were bringing the money with 

them. That was their main supporter. But if you go to another 

group, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, they get most of the 

money from a completely different one, which is kidnappings. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

59

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. As the ranking member 

mentioned, the Democrat Party has an important caucus this afternoon. And yes, you may. I will yield. And he may need to leave, 

too. So I will turn the question over to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman. Thanks for 

your testimony. Particularly enlightening for me was some not surprising but new news with Qatar and Kuwait being brought into 

the discussion; like I said, not surprising but a little new for me 

anyhow. 

Having served in Iraq—and, Tom, you served there as well—I 

have got to tell you I was particularly frustrated, disappointed in 

disagreeing with the administration on the lack of a status of forces 

agreement when we departed. I would like, I think, Dr. Kagan, 

maybe Dr. Jones, your comment on the effects of that regarding alQaeda particularly and then looking forward to Afghanistan, recent 

posturing, whether it is posturing or not, the same relative discussion regarding Afghanistan and the status of forces agreement in 

relation to resurgent or revitalized al-Qaeda in both areas. 

Mr. JONES. I think those are very good questions. I think the failure to establish and reach a status of forces agreement in Iraq in 

the U.S. withdrawal allowed two things: It allowed al-Qaeda in 

Iraq to regenerate. Its attacks are greater this year than they were 

in the last year of U.S. involvement in 2011. 

And, second and perhaps more important there, it allowed alQaeda and Iraq to help establish Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. Those 

were two I think devastating steps in that region that the U.S. 

withdrawal from Iraq at least allowed. 

And, second, that means that the agreement in Afghanistan assuming it comes will be quite important. I think if the United 

States leaves Afghanistan with an active al-Qaeda presence up in 

Kunar, Nuristan, Nangarhar Provinces, it does create the possibility for a reestablishment of the organization in an area that it 

does have local allies. 

Mr. KAGAN. Congressman, thank you. Thank you for your service. And thank you for your question. 

I think you can identify three main reasons why the departure 

of U.S. forces from Iraq has contributed to the revitalization of alQaeda in Iraq. One was that the Iraqi security forces were not designed to be able to continue to conduct operations against AQI 

without American enablers. We knew as we were building the ISF 

that it would not have the capability to replicate our ISR capabilities, to replicate our precision strike capabilities, or to do a variety 

of other things that were allowing us and allowing the Iraqi security forces to conduct precise operations that were effective, highly 

effective, against the al-Qaeda organization. 

What we have seen as we have watched Iraqi security forces try 

to operate against the movement is that they have reverted to patterns that will be familiar to people who have watched how they 

tried to operate on their own in 2006. And they have been largely 

ineffective, although they have been in some cases, courageous. 

That pattern would be replicated in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Forces in my opinion are incapable of operating effectively without American enablers after 2014. And we would be 

60

inviting exactly the same situation in Afghanistan that we have in 

Iraq now if we withdrew all of our enablers. 

The second major driver in Iraq has been that the departure of 

all of our forces, which also, not inevitably perhaps but coincidentally perhaps, matched the departure effectively of all of our influence in the country, enabled, perhaps encouraged, Prime Minister 

Maliki to embrace his sectarian side. And it is surely not an accident that it was pretty much on the way home from Washington, 

DC, when he gave the orders to have Vice President Tariq alHashimi arrested, which began a process of sectarization, driving 

Sunni out of the political process. We had been acting as a significant break on that kind of sectarianism by putting pressure on 

him, by having visibility on the situation. We are performing a different role in Afghanistan but still a stabilizing role that would go 

away. 

And, lastly, we were performing a critical peacekeeping function 

along the green line between the Kurds and the Arabs. And we 

have seen revival of conflict along that line now. And I think you 

could fear a revival of civil war in Afghanistan if we cease to play 

a peacekeeping role there. 

Mr. PERRY. So real quickly and not many seconds for big foreign 

policy issues like this, but if you could, the future of al-Qaeda in 

Iraq based on current trends and their proclivities as you see them, 

either, any one of you gentlemen? And then our relationship with 

Pakistan post a pullout of Afghanistan and the resurgent alQaeda? 

Mr. KAGAN. Well, I am very concerned about the trajectory that 

al-Qaeda in Iraq is on, particularly conjoined because you can’t separate it from the trajectory that Jabhat al-Nusra is on. And I fear 

the possibility of the establishment of an effectively al-Qaeda-controlled area that crosses from western Iraq into eastern Syria, 

along those tribal lines. And, of course, as you know, the tribes 

straddle the border as well. That is of tremendous concern to me. 

And I think that the issue of threat to the United States is, as my 

colleagues have made, important because we need to think about 

the capabilities and capacities that an organization that had that 

kind of breathing space would have to plan, develop, and conduct 

a task against the United States if it so chose. And I find that very, 

very worrisome. And I find the likelihood that it will continue to 

deteriorate in Iraq very high. 

And I have a very serious concern that I would like to air here, 

which is that there will be a natural tendency for the United States 

to be drawn in on the side of Nouri al-Maliki in the name of conducting operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq. And those of you who 

have served in Iraq and have seen that on the ground know exactly 

what the danger is. 

We really will run the risk of becoming the hit squad, a sectarian 

hit squad, for al-Maliki in a way that will simply make us appear 

to be the enemy of the Sunni people without being effective against 

this group. So we are going to have to approach this with a great 

deal of nuance and complexity such as I don’t see apparent so far 

in our discussions about this such as there have been any. 

Mr. POE. Next turn to the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider. 

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Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 

witnesses for your testimony and insights today. 

I would like to pick up—Dr. Kagan, you talked a little bit about 

Syria and al-Qaeda’s increasing influence in Syria. We recently saw 

the assassination of Commander Kamal Hamami, who is one of the 

senior members of the military council. 

And, Dr. Jones, in your testimony, your submitted testimony, you 

talked about a U.S. strategy to include—I will quote you—‘‘three 

steps utilizing a light footprint strategy, improving the effectiveness of governments in countries threatened by al-Qaeda, and undermining al-Qaeda’s ideology to help weaken al-Qaeda.’’ In Syria, 

in particular, which in many ways someone wants to describe in 

this room as a hub state at the center, to the whole panel, how do 

you see our strategy developing to address the threat of al-Qaeda 

in Syria to take us in a direction that will provide the best outcome 

in a very bad situation? 

Mr. JONES. Well, I think the results are fairly straightforward. 

The decision not to intervene in any way in Syria strengthened alQaeda’s affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. It is, as I think virtually everybody here has said, probably the most capable al-Qaeda affiliate on 

the globe with the weapons it has seized from, among other places, 

Syrian military bases that it has helped overrun. 

I think the strategy has got to include two elements of it, which 

may appear contradictory but I think one can find ways to deal 

with. One is to take down the Assad regime. And second is to 

weaken Jabhat al-Nusra at the same time. I am not sure we are 

doing either particularly effectively right now. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

As you look at Jabhat al-Nusra and my understanding is, in addition to Jabhat al-Nusra, there are other al-Qaeda fighters coming 

into Syria from other places, work to take down the Assad regime, 

other al-Qaeda fighters in weakening the Free Syrian Army, the 

prospects for the opposition, how do we address that issue? 

Mr. JONES. Well, I think if you look at Syria today and you look 

at some of the polling data that has come out of the region, it looks 

like the support for al-Qaeda’s ideology, including Jabhat alNusra’s ideology, in Syria is small, is minimal. We saw it recently 

in Mali when the French deployed. I think the issue is sidelining 

is—I think the bulk of the Sunni opposition to the Assad regime 

does not buy into Jabhat al-Nusra’s ideology of an Islamic Emirate, 

at least in their vision. I don’t think the bulk of the population in 

Syria supports an Islamic Emirate, at least in the al-Qaeda vision. 

And so I think the way to do this is to work with a range of those 

opposition groups to target and undermine the ideology of Jabhat 

al-Nusra. 

I don’t think there is much popular support within Syria for alQaeda’s ideology. That is in my view their biggest weakness, not 

just in Syria but in other areas we see them operate. 

They need a vacuum. They don’t have a lot of popular support. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that is a great point, but, Dr. Kagan, as 

you mentioned, the potential for a vacuum across the border between Iraq and Syria, in that land where you do have tribal affinities, any thoughts or advice you would have for us how to address 

that or what to be watchful for? 

62

Mr. KAGAN. Yes. Look, I am happy to say very forthrightly that 

we need to be providing lethal support to the Free Syrian Army 

and we need to be—because that is one of the best ways to accomplish the goals that staff identified, which are the correct goals. 

On the one hand, hastening the fall of the Assad regime, the protraction of this war is one of the greatest dangers to national security from the standpoint of bringing in more foreign fighters, 

strengthening the al-Qaeda front, turning this more and more into 

a sectarian conflict. The sooner that one can move past that stage, 

if it is possible—and now it is looking much harder—the better it 

would be. But, most of all, because I believe that there is very likely to be a conflict between the moderate forces, which I would entirely agree with Seth, represent the will of the majority of the Syrian people and Jabhat al-Nusra, it is critical for us that the moderate forces win that fight. 

And we should be working now to ensure that the outcome of 

that fight is not endowed, which might be a way of limiting its 

scale when it actually happened. And that would have positive effects in Iraq also. It is obviously very difficult to imagine what we 

could do directly in Iraq to shape the situation there, but anything 

that we can do to weaken the rear of al-Qaeda in Iraq and its ability to use Syria as a base of support, which it is using now, would 

limit its ability to operate freely in Iraq, but I don’t have a good 

answer for you about what to do in Iraq. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I wish I had more time, but I see 

that I am out. I will yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman. 

Just a follow-up question from Mr. Schneider’s comments. You 

mentioned strategy, strategy, strategy. Big picture. What is alQaeda’s strategy? What is the point? Can you keep it simple, Dr. 

Jones? 

Mr. JONES. I will keep it simple. In my view, Ayman alZawahiri’s strategy includes the establishment of a caliphate that 

cuts across North Africa, the Middle East, and into South Asia. If 

you were to ask the affiliate leaders, you would probably get a 

more parochial answer, Islamic Emirates, in their regions. So I 

think the core would have a slightly different answer than most of 

your affiliate leaders. 

Mr. POE. All right. We turn now to Mr. Cotton from Arkansas 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COTTON. Can I answer your question as well, Judge Poe? 

Mr. POE. Yes, you can answer my question. 

Mr. COTTON. I think their strategy is simple. They want to eject 

America from where they want to establish a caliphate, and they 

want to kill you and they want to kill your constituents. That is 

where I think their strategy is. 

Can we talk about what I might call the ghost of Syria future? 

Al-Nusra right now is a potent force in Syria 21⁄2, 3 years ago. Was 

there much al-Qaeda presence at all in Syria? Can we just go down 

the panel? Does anyone think there was much al-Qaeda presence 

in Syria 21⁄2, 3 years ago, before the uprising? 

Mr. JONES. No. Well, Syria was used as a major funnel for fighters into Iraq. So it was used for Iraq facilitation. 

Mr. COTTON. Dr. Kagan? 

63

Mr. KAGAN. That was a very limited and carefully controlled, 

ironically, by the Assad regime pipeline because he feared precisely 

this would happen. So it was a very limited presence. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. That is right. There was a pipeline that was run 

by Abu Ghadiya, who was the al-Qaeda facilitator. The U.S. forces 

had to take direct military action against him inside Syria because 

the Assad regime wouldn’t crack down on him. He was aided by 

Assif Shawkat and other Syrian officials. 

Mr. COTTON. Dr. Hegghammer? 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. I concur. 

Mr. COTTON. Okay. So not my presence in al-Qaeda in Syria 21⁄2, 3 years ago. Target of opportunity has arisen. I have asked for the 

map to be put back up. The point here is not the extent of the blobs 

but where they circle around. AQIM, Syria, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Shabaab are all forming a circle around Egypt. 

I would like to get your perspective on the risk that we face of 

having the kind of magnet or flypaper effect in Egypt given the fact 

that the Muslim Brotherhood is founded there intellectually and 

philosophically, the hearts of their world. Ayman al-Zawahiri is 

Egyptian, has deep ties there and the risk that America faces, either of a situation like Syria or perhaps a situation like Algeria, 

going forward in Egypt. 

Mr. JONES. I think we already saw a statement within the last 

week from leaders of al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb al-Nusra 

front and Al-Shabaab supporting jihad against the Egyptian military in Egypt. I would also note the Muhammed Jamal group was 

involved in the assassination of U.S. Ambassador Stevens in Libya. 

So Egypt is concerning for, as several people here said, what is 

going on in Sinai, what has gone on with Muhammed Jamal’s network in Egypt, and also what we are seeing as potential support 

for the opposition to the Egyptian military. 

Mr. COTTON. Dr. Kagan? 

Mr. KAGAN. In addition, I agree with everything that Seth said. 

In addition to that, we are tracking fighters moving from Gaza into 

Egypt in order to fight the Egyptian military as part of this takeover. There have been a number of want-to-be claims, you know. 

And want-to-be claims are want-to-be claims until they do something and then they get recognized. So I don’t think we should dismiss them. I am deeply concerned about this. 

And the revolution against Morsi or whatever we are going to 

call it has absolutely cemented a narrative of ‘‘I told you so’’ from 

the faction, from Zawahari’s faction, which those rejected political 

course. And their slogan now is, ‘‘Bullets, not ballots.’’ So I am very 

concerned. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just real quick, al-Qaeda has been pursuing a 

two-pronged strategy in Egypt since 2011. One is dawa, or proselytization, inside Egypt’s urban areas and settled areas. We don’t 

know how extensive those efforts have been, fruitful in terms of 

earning new recruits but keep your eyes out for it. They have also 

used the urban areas as facilitation points for the attack in Libya 

and elsewhere. And simultaneously in the Sinai, they have been 

building this contingency of al-Qaeda-related groups in the hundreds of thousands in the Sinai. And I pretty much guarantee you 

are going to see terrorist attacks from that group very soon. 

64

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. I agree. I think there is a very clear risk of 

more violence in Egypt in the coming year, but I do think also that 

in the mid and long term, that that threat is manageable, both because the militants in Sinai will be squeezed between, you know, 

a police state in central Egypt and Israel. So those actors together 

I think will be able to manage that. So the casualty here will be 

democracy in Egypt and the sort of the momentum of the Arab 

Spring. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you all for your time and your perspective. 

Let’s hope that the map in 2015 doesn’t have a blob in Egypt. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, sir. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. And it is an honor to 

have so much wisdom here. If we were to add all of your degrees 

up together, it would look like a thermometer. So I appreciate you 

guys being here. 

We have got to get this right. I mean, I look out along the group 

here, and I see a lot of young people. And, you know, I am 58 years 

old. And when I look back, when we had the first oil embargo, it 

was in the ’70s. And we have been dealing with Middle East conflicts in this country for a long time. We have got to get it right. 

We want to keep our young men and women here to grow America 

strong. 

And I want to start with you, Dr. Jones. You stated that you felt 

al-Qaeda was not a direct threat to the U.S., but they claimed responsibility for 9/11 and indirectly with the Boston Marathon, as 

you said, Mr. Joscelyn, that Osama bin Laden wanted to spread 

the seeds of al-Qaeda or jihad by seeding countries all over the 

world. And these were people that were sympathetic to their beliefs. And I think we see that happening. I think Boston was a 

great example of that. Unfortunately, it was here. 

And so my questions come back to, what is the sentiment and 

the mindset of al-Qaeda fundamentalists today versus that at its 

creation back in the ’80s toward the U.S. and Western countries, 

I guess Western beliefs more in general? I want to kind of rotate 

between you guys. So if you would first just kind of answer that 

question? 

Mr. JONES. Two things. One is I do believe al-Qaeda is a threat. 

So not all of its affiliates pose a threat. 

On your question, I think the biggest difference is the social network and social media have allowed the views of key al-Qaeda 

leaders to influence young Muslims in multiple locations. And so 

what we have seen is and what makes this different, I think the 

ideology coming from Ayman al-Zawahiri in my view is not that 

different from what he was writing about in 1998 and 2000 and 

2001, but he has got more access to key mediums to push that information out to influence individuals so that the organization can 

be more decentralized. You can reach Americans in Detroit and 

New York and Boston online. 

Mr. POE. Right. 

Mr. JONES. And that makes this a very different organization 

than what existed back in September 11th and in many ways a 

more dangerous one. 

Mr. POE. All right. Let me ask you guys this, and you guys all 

join in. So would you consider our lack of border security? Could 

65

that be a national security threat, you know, not just our northern 

border but our southern and our coastal? And just is that a national security threat, the lack of border security that we have in 

this country today? 

Mr. JONES. It should be a cause of concern, yes. There are foreigners that are moving back and forth across the U.S.-Mexican 

border. 

Mr. POE. All right. That was going to be my other question. Do 

you believe the entry through our borders is a security concern? 

And are they coming? So Dr. Kagan? 

Mr. KAGAN. It is a concern, but I would say that what we are 

seeing that concerns me even more is a tendency in the policy debate and in the administration’s policies to try to redraw the defensive line, where we are going to actually take action at our borders 

or inside our country. 

And although the border issue is important, if we harden our 

borders as much as we want to but give the enemy all the free hits 

they want from outside, I guarantee you they will find a way 

through our very large borders, even if we harden them more. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Mr. Joscelyn, the national security threat to our 

borders? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. It is a national security concern/threat. I can tell 

you that Hezbollah, in particular, is one of the terrorist organizations that uses facilitation. My view is that anywhere that there is 

an open or permissive environment, our enemies are pretty good at 

finding it. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Hegghammer? 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. In my view, the main challenge is identifying 

the people with a bad intention crossing the border because we 

have to let people cross borders. The problem is——

Mr. POE. We are just talking about securing them, not closing 

them. So I agree. 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. Right. So in that case, I don’t think that increasing the hard physical measures will have a particularly great 

effect on this. Most of the operatives are coming in through legal 

means. 

Mr. POE. Okay. So you kind of answered my next question. And 

I want to see if the sentiment is the same with all of you. So based 

on your statements and answers, you recommend securing the borders, the southern, northern, and our coastal borders, to a certain 

degree more than we have now? Would you all agree pretty much 

with that? 

[No response.] 

Mr. POE. We will take that as an affirmative. 

My last question is—and this goes back to developing policy so 

that we can get it right for now and from this point forward—how 

do you mount a campaign against an ideology, like radical Islam, 

whose goal is to remove the calf, or the nonbeliever, you know, or 

the Western ideologies? When there is not a nation state and when 

there is not an identified leader, what policies would you recommend that America can do in the Middle East or around the 

world that would make us more effective at this? If you guys can 

kind of briefly go through that, if you guys don’t mind? 

66

Mr. JONES. Well, I think one of the major mistakes that the U.S. 

has made in the last several decades is to get rid of organizations 

like the U.S. Information Agency that did provide a way to push 

back against ideologies. If you look at the successes of the U.S., 

against the Soviet Union, it was things like Radio Free Europe and 

Radio Liberty and the U.S. Information Agency that were able to 

combat that ideology. We do not have an organized, collective effort 

to push back against extremist ideology. 

Where it has been done successfully—and I think it is worth 

looking at the successful efforts. Saudi Arabia, in facing a very serious threat from al-Qaeda between 2002 and 2008—and Tom has 

written a really good book about this—did use a very effective 

strategy to delegitimize al-Qaeda in their state. So we have got 

some good examples of where it has been done. We have got some 

good historical examples. I think we need to push those through. 

Mr. POE. Could those policies be used here in the United States? 

I mean, we have got two different governmental systems here. 

Mr. JONES. Yes, some of them can. Yes, some of them can——

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. JONES [continuing]. Because it involved getting moderates to 

come out against the—moderate Muslims to come out against——

Mr. POE. All right. Let me hear from Dr. Kagan real quick. 

Mr. KAGAN. One of the most effective things that I saw in my 

time in Afghanistan was the Jordanian, the JET team, the Jordanian Education Team, which went around. It was the deradicalizing Jordanian preacher. And he just went around and collected crowds of hundreds and told them what the Quran and the 

Hadith actually say, which is not what they had been told. 

We actually absolutely have tools now. Obviously we are not 

going to bring Jordanians around to do that here, but we actually 

have tools to do this. But I want to make a key point here. The 

ideology does not exist in a vacuum. We are fighting an organization that has embodied this ideology now, and it is seen to have 

embodied this ideology. If al-Qaeda is seen to succeed, the ideology 

will be seen to be successful. If al-Qaeda is seen to be defeated, the 

ideology will be to a considerable extent discredited. And we really 

mustn’t imagine that we can talk about the—and I know that you 

weren’t suggesting this but—that we can talk about the ideology as 

distinct from its pragmatic, practical manifestation in the world 

today. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Joscelyn? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just real quick, one of the biggest looming issues 

for al-Qaeda, ideologically and otherwise, is the slaughter of their 

fellow Muslims around the world. More victims of al-Qaeda and 

their associated terror have been Muslims than Westerners or any 

other religion. That is generally who they kill. And that is a big 

problem that they have message-wise. What I have not seen is a 

unified purpose across the board, emphasize that everywhere we 

can, that understanding that their principal enemies are actually 

their fellow Muslims and not the West, on a day-to-day basis. 

Mr. POE. Do you mind if I ask Dr. Hegghammer? Dr. 

Hegghammer? 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. So I think that today it is very difficult to undermine this ideological phenomenon because it is really several 

67

different things. It is not one coherent ideology, one coherent message that we can kind of pick apart with arguments. They want different things, these groups. And so it is very difficult to undermine 

it with a sort of information strategy. And maybe there was a time 

years back when there was a more coherent message that we could 

have targeted, but that is no longer the case. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

I am going to now recognize Mr. Schneider from Illinois for 5 

minutes. And then we will go to Mr. Perry for 5 minutes from 

Pennsylvania. Go ahead. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

Dr. Hegghammer, you talked about Sinai and the concentration 

or increasing numbers of militants, operatives, terrorists gathering 

in Sinai. Where in Sinai are they gathering? 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. Well, I think Mr. Joscelyn may know more of 

the details here, but I suspect that most of the bases and sort of 

the armed casualties are up in the mountains, where the reach of 

the Egyptian police is limited. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. It is the northern Sinai principally. 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. Northern Sinai, yes. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I think what Tom has said about the security 

forces, there are pressures from both Israel and security forces is 

right. My one big problem, concern there is that they have overrun 

security forces in places like Arish and elsewhere. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. And they have also been able to mount limited attacks via rockets and elsewhere in Israel and that sort of thing. So 

you are going to see a pickup in the tempo there. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And that is kind of where I am going with the 

questions. I mean, we saw today I think three Egyptian police were 

killed in Sinai. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Yes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. They are having an increasing freedom of movement, but that mountainous area is a difficult area. Between the—

I don’t know if we call it a nascent government emerging in Egypt 

and Israel and U.S. support for both of them, what strategy should 

we be taking there to make sure that al-Qaeda doesn’t get another 

foothold in Sinai? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, we certainly have to support. This is a 

tough situation because you have the politics of the whole thing 

and then you have the security concerns of the whole thing. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. And oftentimes they can conflict. But we certainly 

have to support some measures security-wise from the Egyptian regime against the al-Qaeda presence there just because it is a growing presence and it is going to be a threat to our interests around 

the region. Again, the big problem is balancing that with our other 

interests inside Egypt. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Hegghammer, any thoughts on that? 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. I think I would concur with that pretty much 

exactly. It is a trade-off between, well, democracy in Egypt and security in Egypt. So it is a political issue. Where is that balancing 

point? You can’t have both at this point. 

68

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I would posit that the balancing point moves 

over time. We have to manage that process across time. I will turn 

to you, Dr. Jones, because it is a different world with the Internet 

where messages can go from Afghanistan or Pakistan across the 

entire Middle East and even into this country. What messages—I 

will open this to everyone—do you think we need to be communicating and working with our allies to help them communicate so 

that we can start to win the battle of hearts and minds as well as 

the battle on the ground? 

Mr. JONES. Well, I think part of this is providing forum for legitimate Muslim leaders with support networks to get their views out 

because when young impressionable kids because that is who many 

of them are, not all of them, are surfing through the Internet and 

that evolves into jihadist forums, they need a balance of views. I 

mean, ultimately this means giving a forum to legitimate individuals. 

If you take the example of solidarity in Poland during the Cold 

War, we didn’t have to create anything. It was giving air to legitimate locals. I mean, this is I think what we are talking about now, 

legitimate moderate networks, giving them the space and the ability to air their views and to directly denounce al-Qaeda. One of alQaeda’s most significant pushbacks over the last several years was 

Dr. Fadl in Egypt, who put out a book that denounced Ayman alZawahiri, led to huge fissures. That is the kind of stuff I think, letting that air, is quite useful. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Are there other names of people we should be 

watching or reaching out to in the Arab world that are in that 

sense the legitimate voice or a legitimate voice that can push back 

on the message of al-Qaeda and other groups like that? 

Mr. JONES. There is a whole range of people, sure. There is a 

whole range of people across Egypt, across Saudi Arabia. I can 

push you names of individuals that have outright denounced 

Osama bin Laden’s and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s vision of Islam as unIslamic, yes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So if it is not prohibited, if you could give it to 

us, that would be helpful. So I would welcome those names. 

Dr. Kagan, you look like you have something to add or——

Mr. KAGAN. Just to testify to what Seth is saying, having seen 

it on the ground, as I said, in Afghanistan, the effectiveness of this. 

There were times when those Jordanian preachers were preaching 

and there were Taliban in the audience who were asking them 

questions and getting confused because they weren’t winning the 

arguments. Afghanistan, you know, there is a highly illiterate population. It is easy to mislead them. In Egypt where it is more cosmopolitan, it is harder. 

But giving voice to the people who will make these arguments 

and especially, as Seth says, in the areas, like in Saudi Arabia, like 

in Jordan, where they has been very effective deradicalization programs, we should be building on that. We should be helping them 

to build on it. And we should be asking them what we can do to 

help them build on it because it is their interest as well. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So if I can just take one more second? I think 

that is critical. I think those are the types of sorts of investments 

69

we can make with a very high return on investment. So I appreciate it. Again, I thank you all for your time. 

Mr. POE. Thank you for your questions. The chair will now recognize Mr. Perry from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks again, gentlemen. I am interested in your perspective of 

al-Qaeda’s influence in the camps, the refugee camps that have become somewhat like cities in Jordan, and what we can look forward 

to in the near future or the further term as Syria grinds on. 

And then I would like—why don’t we do that and then see how 

much time we have left to talk a little strategy. 

Mr. JONES. Just very briefly, Jabhat al-Nusra has recruited 

fighters out of camps, refugee camps, in Lebanon, has recruited individuals out of Jordan, and has recruited individuals, in particular, out of camps in Turkey. So it is a great way for these organizations to recruit, gain some funding, but also to gain intelligence 

about pipelines. In fact, it is worth noting that the most significant 

pipeline of fighters moving into Syria right now is through Turkey, 

which is a NATO country. And so in that sense, there has been a 

lot of recruitment in Turkey, in particular. 

Mr. PERRY. Did you have something you wanted to add, Mr.——

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just real quick. That is right. In fact, the alQaeda and Iraq network that sort of Jabhat al-Nusra has built 

itself off of includes very prominent figures in Jordan who do that 

recruiting. And they have been doing that recruiting since back in 

your days when you were deployed in Iraq. It is some of the same 

network guys sending fighters into Syria today, including a guy 

that goes by the nom de guerre Arab Usa Yef. He is very prominent in doing that. So it is very much in that regard the same type 

of enemy you face in Iraq. 

Mr. PERRY. So, then, do we need to be concerned about not only 

recruiting in the camps and transitioning across geographical 

boundaries but influence in those nation states where the camps 

are in Turkey and Jordan and what that portends? Do we need to 

be concerned or not? And how much? 

Mr. JONES. I think we absolutely need to be concerned. We also 

need to be concerned about the spill over of violence into several 

of these countries. Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, in particular, are 

three areas where there is a possibility not just of initial recruitment or additional recruitment but also the spill over of violence, 

not just sectarian violence, although that is part of it. But yes, this 

is the potential for regional spill over. 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. If I can add that I agree completely that 

there is a very distinct risk of spill over? They are not entirely sure 

whether the refugee camps should be the main concern here. After 

all, these are people who have left the conflict. So they have taken 

the decision not to join it. And if you look back at Iraq, hundreds 

of thousands of people left Iraq at the height of the conflict. And 

they produced relatively little spill over in the region. There are 

certainly examples, but, you know, compared to the scale of the exodus, the security implications were not all that large. 

So, you know, in the best scenario, you get something similar 

from Syria, but I think we should keep an eye on sort of multiple 

70

ways in which the spill over can happen, not just the refugee 

camps. 

Mr. PERRY. And maybe rightly or wrongly, I just see the camps 

as somewhat large, sprawling, lawless, almost cities at this point, 

without government structures and so on and so forth, that lend 

themselves to that type activity. I guess, on the other side of the 

equation, they lend themselves to our ability to be involved and be 

present and gather intelligence and so on and so forth. I just wonder how acute the threat may be. 

If we could move on, regarding the previous line of questioning, 

the strategy that the United States should take regarding our 

pseudo-allies, like Qatar, like Kuwait, who will have actors within 

that will be willing to fund—and that is really I think hard for 

their government or us to influence. But the state itself, if the 

states themselves, are sponsoring through funding, what should be 

our strategy? I know it is a delicate circumstance, but what would 

you folks think should be our best plan for that? 

Mr. KAGAN. You know, I want to make it clear that I have seen 

reports that there is Kuwaiti funding and so forth, but I am not 

sure exactly who or what. And it is something that I think merits 

looking into. And I was surprised by that, candidly. I would not 

have expected that. And so my first suggestion would be getting to 

the bottom of whether that is true or not and why that is being 

tolerated in a state like that, where there is a much greater ability 

of the family to influence that kind of thing. 

Qatar is an entirely different problem because Qatar maintains 

its sort of balancing position between Saudi and Iran and us and 

with Al Jazeera and with al-Qaeda. They have a new emir. He is 

a young guy. It may conceivably be possible to help him see the 

light some more and help him understand that the policies he has 

been pursuing have not been helpful to him in the region, which 

is, in fact, true. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, I can’t tell you how much I appreciate you being in 

here because we rely on you guys, the experts, to inform us so that 

we can help influence foreign policy. And if you can bear one more 

questions? It is a three-part question. It will be real quick. What 

role should the U.S. play in Syria? To what capacity? And would 

it stabilize or destabilize that region more, you know, with the spill 

over into Jordan, the threat to Israel, you know, in that whole 

area? And if you can just say what your thoughts are on that briefly, I would greatly appreciate it. Go ahead, Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. I think the U.S. role in Syria should be to support 

the overthrow of the Assad regime. I think it is in U.S. interests. 

I do think one has to be very careful about how one does that and 

who one is providing both lethal and non-lethal assistance to, but 

I think this is a covert, clandestine war. This is really one that is 

done by the U.S. intelligence community and special operations 

forces. And I think if it is not done, we will not be able to influence 

the end results, none of which will be in our interest. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Dr. Kagan? 

Mr. KAGAN. I agree with that. I think this is not a case where 

putting a lot of U.S. boots on the ground is wise. And I would not 

71

advocate for that. I am not sure that our role can be entirely clandestine. I think that there may be a requirement to do damage to 

the Syrian ability to use its airfields to receive critical supplies 

from Iran and other places and also to conduct operations. 

I do not think that a full no-fly zone would be necessary at this 

point. I think there is much more nuance in that discussion than 

we have had so far in what kinds of tools we could apply beyond 

covert aid to assist. But I think it is absolutely vital because I 

think that all of the trend lines are that the longer this conflict 

goes in the way that it is going, the more destabilizing it will be, 

the more spill over there will be, and the more damage to American interests and security there will be. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Joscelyn? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just real quick, in terms of sponsoring the Syrian 

opposition, I am for it as long as we have a very good idea of how 

our enemies are constituted and what groups they are working 

with. 

Mr. POE. Right. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. They can’t co-opt them. That is a very difficult 

black box a lot of times. Obviously that is why we are still talking 

about it, you know. 

As far as destabilization, it is already about as destabilized as it 

can get. And I can’t see it getting any better absent U.S. intervention or intervention from the outside world. That doesn’t mean 

boots on the ground, but definitely it is a destabilizing factor. 

And, lastly, just real quick, there has already been a threat to 

this to U.S. interests out of Syria, which it needs to be highlighted 

more often, which is that last year the Jordanian regime, the kingdom, shut down a plot, a very complicated plot, to attack the U.S. 

Embassy that involved staging attacks against other targets to sort 

of build up to a massive attack on the U.S. Embassy. You are already seeing that type of spill over. And those were Jabidah, and 

those were trained fighters throughout the region. 

Mr. POE. Doc? 

Mr. HEGGHAMMER. My view is that the U.S. should provide 

weapons to the moderate part of the Syrian opposition, but it 

should also do two things. One is to make absolutely clear to the 

Syrian opposition how much support they can expect to get because 

the biggest problem with providing a little bit of support is that 

you can get drawn in. You have the sort of slippery slope phenomenon. And so you can maybe see part of the Syrian opposition 

taking risks that they otherwise wouldn’t take because they think 

they have the American support. So, then, you know, if you provide 

a little, then make absolutely clear where the line goes. Make sure 

to communicate that this does not mean that there is more to follow in case there is a crisis. 

The other thing that is crucial is to prepare for the civil war that 

comes after the fall of Assad. There will be one. And it will be crucial to plan for that and to distribute the resources with that conflict and the constellations in that conflict in mind. 

Mr. POE. Gentlemen, again I appreciate it. I know the members 

of this committee appreciate it and Congress appreciates your expertise in being here. And thank you. 

This subcommittee is adjourned. 

72

[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(73)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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81977n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfull)' requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held by the 

Subcommittee all Terrorism, Nonproliferation_ and Trade in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Ofticc Building (and 

m"ailablc lio;/c on the Committee website at ,\y\vw ford~.!hJff~rs.hDl1SC.uOV) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SlIBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

n1Ursda~ July IX, 20]3 

2:00 p.lTI 

Global al-Qaeda: Aftilintes. Objecti,es. and Future Challenges 

Seth Jones. Ph.D 

Associate Director 

International Security and Defense Policy' Center 

RAND Corporation 

Frederick W. Kagan. Ph.D 

Christopher DeMuth Chair and Director 

Critical Threats Project 

American Enterprise Institute 

Me TIlomas Joscelyn 

Senior Editor . 

The Long War JOLlmal 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Thomas Hegghammer. Ph.D 

Zuckenl1an Fellow 

Center for International Securit~ and Cooperation 

St.'1nford University 

By Direction of the Chairman 
75

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

M[NUTES OF SUHCOMMITTEE ON ____ ----'J:..:e',,'r"'m.::';''''''':c.:.:N:::o1'''rp'''ro:.::il'''lf':c'':::'I::i"::.''.:.:''''''':c"..:T,::.'''''',;,'--____ [TEARING 

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Recesses ~I L--.to ~_) L--.to ~_) L--.to ~_) L--.to ~_) L--.to ~_) L--.to---1 

Presiding Membcr(s) 

Bel'_ Ted Poe 

Check III/ of tlte followillg flltlt app(J',' 

Ollen Session [ZJ 

Executive (closed) Session D Televised [ZJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Record~taJled) [ZJ 

Stenogl'9l'hic Record [ZJ 

Global al-Qaeda: Affiliates, Objective,,', (lml FutuJ'e Challenges 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Reps. Poe, Shel'lnull, Sclmeidel, Cook, Pel'l)', Yoho, COItOIl 

NON·SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (111u,'kwith all· iftileyare /lot members offill! committee.) 

HEARING \VTTNESSF.S: Same as meeting notil'U Ett;tched? Yes 0 No D 

(If "~IO ", please list he/ow and include fille, agelu.YJ deparlm(!nt, or orgnnization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Lisl "fly stel/"", ""t", submilledfor IiIe l'ecO/'r!.j 

TIME SCHEDTJLlm TO In:CONVENE 

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Subcommittee St ll'cctOl' 
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81977e-1.eps

Rep. Ted Poe 

Opening Statement 

We have been told that al-Qaeda is on its last legs. That al-Qaeda died with bin Laden. That 

whatever remnants of al-Qaeda that remain are too weak for us to worry about. 1'd like to know 

if that's true or if there is trouble around the bend that is coming our way. We're here today to 

help understand what the threat from al-Qaeda really is. 

Now we know that there hasn't been a large-scale successful attack on the homeland since 

9111. That's a good sign. But the question is if that means that we are winning the war against alQaeda All around the world al-Qaeda and their atliliates have expanded over the past several 

years. 

This is a map of where al-Qaeda was before 9/11. The red is al-Qaeda. As you can see, alQaeda is mostly in Afghanistan, but with a small presence in Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Libya. 

That's a total of 5 countri es. 

This is a map of present day. The red is al-Qaeda and the blue is other terrorist groups. 

Where it is shaded red and blue is where both al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups are located. If 

you look at the map, you see that AI-Qaeda is in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, 

Somalia, Algeria, Mali, Niger, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Nigeria. That's a total of 13 

countries. That's almost 3 times as many countries as before 9111. 

Let's review. While core al-Qaeda in Pakistan may have taken a beating over the past several 

years, its atliliates are gaining strength in Africa, the Middle East, and the Caucuses. The most 

concentrated threat was previously from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Now, we face a whole 

bunch of affiliated groups that are transnational, interconnected, and deadly. Allowing them to 

grow in power does not mean we are winning. If anything, it means that an attack on the United 

States is more likely. 

In Somalia, AI-Shabaab continues to control a big part of the country despite African troops 

coming in to try and restore order. AI-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri otlicially recognized alNusra in Syria as an al-Qaeda branch. With better weapons than most, al-Nusra is one the 

strongest groups in the Syrian civil war now. In Iraq, al-Qaeda has made a comeback following 

the withdrawal of US. troops. AI-Qaeda in Iraq is putting the country on pace to have as many 

casualties as it did in 2008. After insisting we leave, Prime Minister Maliki is now begging us for 

help. Across North Africa, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has been linked to both the 

Benghazi and Algeria attacks. We all witnessed the horrific attack on our consulate in Benghazi 

that killed four Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens. 

In Algeria, al-Qaedajihadists attacked a gas plant and took nearly 800 people hostage. 

During the rescue operations, more than 80 people were killed, including 3 Americans. One of 
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81977e-2.eps

them was my constituent, Victor Lovelady. Just last week, in a hearing on North Africa, 1 heard 

from Victor's brother Mike. Mike, with Victor's family sitting behind him, told us what it was 

like to have your own government sit you down and tell you your loved one has just been killed 

by al-Qaeda. No American should ever have to get that news. 

What's worse, be it Benghazi or Algeria, we can't seem to tind those responsible and bring 

them to justice. It has been nearly a year since Benghazi and there has not been one perpetrator 

indicted or taken out. This shows weakness and invites more attacks from radical extremists. 

I'm afraid the lesson that al-Qaeda takes away from all this is that if you hit America abroad, 

there won't be any consequences. That it's more likely America will pack up and leave rather 

than go after the perpetrators and bring them to justice. 

Some have simply measured our success against al Qaeda by the number of attacks on the 

US homeland. But it is more complicated than that. The truth is attacking the United States is not 

al-Qaeda's main objective. What al-Qaeda really wants to do is establish an Islamic caliphate 

with strict sharia law all the way from Afghanistan to Morocco. Attacking the United States is 

only one of the ways it obtains that objective. 

Over the last 4 years, al-Qaeda has been moving toward that goal by expanding in new 

regions of the world. They are increasing their size and scope. They are reaching new 

populations. We need to have an open and honest discussion about the threat of al-Qaeda. 

When our special forces executed the raid in Pakistan that killed bin Laden, troves of 

information were captured. This information is vital for understanding al-Qaeda and its 

objectives, yet the Administration has been keeping it all to themselves. According to press 

accounts, there are hundreds of thousands of documents. The Administration has only publically 

released 17. I'd urge the Administration to reconsider. Simply saying the threat is no longer there 

does not make it true. 

This Congress and the American people deserve to know the truth about the enemies we face. 

The goal of this hearing is to bring that truth to light. 

2 

81977f.eps

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