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i 

80–761 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–32] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2014 NAVY, 

MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE 

COMBAT AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 17, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 17, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 Navy, Marine Corps and Air 

Force Combat Aviation Programs ....................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 17, 2013 ..................................................................................... 33 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2013 

FISCAL YEAR 2014 NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE COMBAT 

AVIATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ................................................ 3 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Davis, Lt Gen Charles R., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; and Lt Gen Burt Field, USAF, 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements ........................... 7 

Skinner, VADM W. Mark, USN, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition); LtGen 

Robert E. Schmidle, USMC, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps 

for Aviation; and RADM Bill Moran, USN, Director of the Air Warfare 

Division ................................................................................................................. 5 

Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Davis, Lt Gen Charles R., joint with Lt Gen Burt Field ............................... 102 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 37 

Skinner, VADM W. Mark, joint with LtGen Robert E. Schmidle and 

RADM Bill Moran ......................................................................................... 57 

Sullivan, Michael J. .......................................................................................... 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 129 

Mr. McIntyre ..................................................................................................... 129 

Mr. Veasey ........................................................................................................ 131 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Barber ......................................................................................................... 146 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 137 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 135 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 140 

Mr. Veasey ........................................................................................................ 147 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2014 NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR 

FORCE COMBAT AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 17, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:24 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. The hearing will come to order. The subcommittee 

meets today to receive testimony on the Navy, Marine Corps and 

Air Force budget requests for the combat aircraft programs for fiscal year 2014. 

We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses. We have Mr. 

Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisitions and Sourcing in Government Accountability Office. 

We have Vice Admiral W.M. Skinner, Principal Military Deputy 

of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development and 

Acquisition. 

We have Lieutenant General Robert Ron Schmidle, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation. And we have Rear Admiral Bill Moran, Director of the Air War Division of the U.S. 

Navy. 

We have Lieutenant General Burton Field, Air Force Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements. And Lieutenant General Charles Davis, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. 

All of our witnesses today have very short titles. I thank you for 

your service and look forward to your testimony today. 

We have a number of issues to cover today, but my opening remarks will focus on the F–35 [Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter] 

and Strike Fighter inventories. The F–35, a fifth-generation fighter, is required to achieve the effects necessary to win an integrated 

anti-access and area-denial environment. So I was encouraged to 

note that the F–35 program was fully funded in both the research 

and development and the procurement accounts for fiscal year 

2014, as well as the future years defense program. The F–35 did 

well in testing last year, but with about one-third of flight testing 

completed, much testing remains to demonstrate and verify its 

performance. 
2 

Going forward, F–35 software development is of particular concern. While software management practices have improved, significant challenges lie ahead as software integration and testing continue to lag behind plans. This is an area that the subcommittee 

continues to watch to ensure that the final software block of the 

development phase is completely on schedule. 

While the capability of the F–35 is needed for the future, the Air 

Force, Navy, and Marine Corps cannot ignore the modernization 

and life-extension upgrades for their legacy fleets of AV–8Bs [Harrier II vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) ground-attack 

aircraft], F/A–18s [Hornet fighter jet], A–10s [Thunderbolt II close 

air support aircraft], F–15s [Eagle fighter jet], and F–16s [Fighting 

Falcon fighter jet]. These critical upgrades are required to maintain 

the capability and capacity necessary to execute the national military strategy. 

I was encouraged to note that the Navy’s Strike Fighter shortfall 

was reduced from 56 last year to 18 this year as a result of increased F/A–18E/F [Super Hornet fighter jet] procurement and expected lower utilization rates of legacy fighters. 

Based on the vague defense strategic planning guidance announced last year, the Air Force, for a second year in a row, is not 

reporting a projected Strike Fighter shortfall through 2030. These 

projections are based on our legacy fleets receiving the modifications made during depot availabilities. 

Just last week, the Air Force announced that it planned to 

ground 17 combat squadrons for the rest of the fiscal year because 

the funds required to operate and maintain these squadrons are no 

longer available due to sequestration. We don’t yet know what the 

long-term effects sequestration will have on Navy, Marine Corps, 

and Air Force Strike Fighter modernization to include inventories. 

If these arbitrary cuts also affect Air Force and Navy’s ability to 

make the necessary capability and life extension modifications, decreased Strike Fighter inventories could result in risks that I am 

not willing to accept. 

Before we begin, I would like to welcome all of our panel members. And I would like to say that as we do have our discussions 

today, I would appreciate your information and insight as to the effects of sequestration. Now, as I am fond in saying in these hearings, I voted against this mess, and I voted against this mess because I believed it would happen, but one of the ways that we have 

been, I think, shackled in this is that the Department of Defense 

had been previously restrained of telling the American public and 

even this committee and the subcommittees what the effects of sequestration would be. 

And so since we had this long term of sequestration without detailed substance to its effects, we have been inhibited in our ability, 

as the DOD [Department of Defense] has, to advocate for sequestration to be set aside. Just yesterday we had a hearing where the 

commandant of the Marine Corps indicated that from our traditional military policy objectives of being able to win in two major 

combat areas, that even the new strategy that the President’s articulated of merely one major contingency operation, that the Marine Corps would find it difficult to prevail, and even won. 
3 

We need to have that information so we can effectively make the 

argument that it should be offset. And I think today’s hearing, regardless of the question that you are asked, if you could give us 

some information, insight as to what you foresee sequestration affecting, I would appreciate it. 

When we talked to the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ budget yesterday, they acknowledged that the budget they delivered did not take 

into consideration sequestration. So the follow-on questions had to 

address that. I would appreciate today if you would just, on your 

own, digress into the effects of sequestration as it would affect your 

answer if it is continued, because we need that information to offset it. 

We are going to then begin with our panel members unless my 

ranking member would like to make a comment, and we could always return back to her statement if she would like. With that, we 

will begin, then, with—would you like to make a comment or would 

you like to return to a comment later? 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I would like to just keep this short and say that 

we are very interested in the budget process. And I will submit my 

opening statement for the record so that we can hear our panel. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. I appreciate the dedication of my ranking 

member and her bipartisan spirit also. 

All right. Turning to Michael Sullivan, if you would begin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Sanchez, members 

of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the F–35 Lightning II Fighter this afternoon. My remarks 

and the statement that I have put forward is limited to the F–35 

and doesn’t go into more of the other general tactical air issues. 

I have submitted a written statement for the record, and I would 

like to take a few minutes now to hit the high points of our work 

on this program regarding where it has been, where it is now, and 

what may lie ahead. 

The F–35 acquisition program began in 2001 with an estimated 

cost of about $231 billion. And today, 12 years later, the program 

is estimated to cost about $390 billion. The average cost to buy a 

single F–35 aircraft since the beginning in 2001 has about doubled 

from an estimated $69 million in 2001 to $137 million today. 

Needless to say, the program had significant risk when it started, and that risk has translated into this cost growth. There are 

many reasons for that risk, but chief among them are poorly understood requirements at the beginning, and overlapping schedules for 

testing and buying F–35s. 

In the past 2 years, the program appears to have stabilized to 

some degree. Since 2010, when the program had a Nunn-McCurdy 
4 

breach, the Department of Defense and all the Services came in to 

the program and restructured it and did some very good things, in 

our opinion, about adding reasonable costs and limiting requirements and adding schedule and some manpower to the program. 

So since then, since that restructuring took place, the program 

has now delivered all 14 developmental aircraft. They have all been 

delivered to the test program. More test flights are taking place on 

a daily basis on the program. Procurement aircraft deliveries, while 

still not meeting original delivery schedules from the original program, have picked up and have closed the schedule gap significantly, so there is a lot more aircraft being delivered today. And 

there is additional progress being made in one of the very high risk 

areas, which is software management. At this point in time, the Government has invested about $28 billion to buy 121 aircraft, and development flight testing is now 

about a third complete. This overlap between testing and production represents additional cost, in that design changes to the aircraft that come from flight testing must be reworked into the aircraft already produced. So there are retrofit costs. To date, the cost 

of that rework on the first 58 aircraft that have come off the production line is about $900 million. That adds about $15.5 million 

to the cost of each of these 58 aircraft. About $830 million more 

of future rework is planned as a result of concurrent testing and 

production. 

The program still has tremendous challenges ahead, even though 

it seems to have stabilized in the last couple of years. For example, 

there are still significant risks with the helmet-mounted display 

system, the software development to deliver Block 3 capability, 

which is the full-up integrated warfighting capability for the aircraft, still has a long way to go, and there is continuing overlap between flight test and production. 

Most importantly, probably, the future annual funding needs of 

the program represent the most significant risks moving forward. 

This program will require about $12 billion on average over the 

next 15 to 20 years, and that is quite a bit of money for the Congress to have to appropriate. 

The imperative now is to demonstrate that the F–35 program can 

effectively perform against costs and schedule targets in the new 

baseline and deliver on the promises made. Until then, it will continue to be difficult for the United States and all of our international partners, there are eight international partners, to plan, 

prioritize and budget for the future, retire aging aircraft, as we will 

hear more about today, and establish basing plans with a support 

infrastructure. 

Achieving affordability and annual funding requirements and in 

addition to that, to life-cycle operating and support costs will, in 

large part, determine how many aircrafts a warfighter can ultimately acquire, sustain, and have available for combat. 

That is the end of my statement. Thank you very much. I will 

take questions when the time comes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. Turning to Admiral 

Skinner. 
5 

STATEMENTS OF VADM W. MARK SKINNER, USN, PRINCIPAL 

MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION); 

LTGEN ROBERT E. SCHMIDLE, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR AVIATION; AND 

RADM BILL MORAN, USN, DIRECTOR OF THE AIR WARFARE 

DIVISION 

Admiral SKINNER. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of the 

Navy’s aviation programs. 

Joining me today are Lieutenant General Robert Schmidle, Deputy Commandant for Marine Aviation, and Rear Admiral Bill 

Moran, Director of Air Warfare for the United States Navy. 

On behalf of us all, I thank you and all members for your steadfast support to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen who are meeting the Nation’s commitments around the 

world. 

With the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide a 

brief statement and submit a separate formal statement for the 

record. 

The Navy Marine Corps team is forward-deployed and forwardengaged, performing missions around the globe. Today naval aviation components are in the skies of Afghanistan protecting troops 

and Afghan civilians on the ground, providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance off the coast of Korea, over the Sea of 

Japan, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa, and they are providing maritime security along the world’s vital sea lanes from 

which the United States and our trading partner economies can 

prosper, conducting antipiracy and drug interdiction patrols, and 

supporting global partnerships to strengthen ties to our allies and 

friends, all the while standing as a force of deterrence to those who 

would do harm to our Nation or our Nation’s interests. And while 

our sailors and marines are doing all of this and more, they are 

also training for their next deployment or the next operation. 

In support of the defense strategic guidance, we are developing 

and recapitalizing to support the President and the Secretary of 

Defense’s strategic priorities to rebalance to the Pacific to ensure 

we provide the capability and the capacity to maintain an important presence in this region today and for the foreseeable future. 

We continue to assess and reshape our naval aviation plan to reflect the priorities of this defense strategy with the reality of factof-life, topline reductions consistent with the Budget Control Act of 

2011. As such, this year’s aviation and strike weapons plan strikes 

a balance between capacity, capability, affordability, and the maintainability of the industrial base. 

To fulfill our Nation’s commitments and strategic priorities, the 

Department of the Navy’s 2014 aviation budget request includes 

funding for research and development and procurement of 165 aircraft, and 3,505 strike weapons. 

Selected specific items include continued investment in fifth-generation F–35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to provide multimission 

capability across the full spectrum of conflict; new carrier-based 

unmanned air system capabilities; the CH–53K [Super Stallion 
6 

cargo helicopter] heavy-lift aircraft; and all-weather moving target 

capability strike weapons, including procurement of EA–18G 

[Growler] electronic attack aircraft, P8 [Poseidon] multimission 

maritime aircraft, the MV–22 [Osprey] assault aircraft, tactical 

Tomahawk cruise missiles, and capability improvements to the 

F/A–18 Super Hornets, and air-to-air missiles, and modernization 

of our attack and utility rotary wing aircraft. 

We have important work to do to close out your capability gaps 

and risks. In doing so, however, we are working to deliver the full 

capability and capacity that our warfighter needs in an affordable 

manner. 

The Secretary of the Navy remains strongly committed to investing in the required aviation and strike weapons programs to support our national priorities, and we have placed that commitment 

to work over the last year with the delivery of more than 200 tactical rotary wing and unmanned aircraft, but we recognize that it 

is not possible to simply buy our way to recapitalizing our force. 

To achieve our recapitalization goals, we are continually focusing 

on improving affordability in all naval aviation programs. For example, we are increasing implementation of new cost-reduction initiatives, like competition and early standup of depot maintenance. 

We are striving to use multiyear procurement strategies, strengthening an acquisition workforce culture to ensure that we provide 

the best return on investment and be the best possible stewards of 

the taxpayers’ money. 

Mr. Chairman, the strength of our naval aviation force is also 

closely coupled with our naval aviation industrial base. Over and 

over again, naval aviation has shown to be a critical element of the 

Nation’s global reach, global presence, and when called upon, the 

tip of the Nation’s interdiction force. We recognize that we have 

been successful in executing our duties, not only because of our 

sailors and marines, but because of our civilian workforce and the 

aviation industrial base. 

However, one of the key challenges to our future aviation programs, and therefore to elements of that same industrial base, is 

the increasing cost of development and procurement. To this end, 

the Department of the Navy is investing in design for affordability, 

requiring the use of open architecture systems where applicable, 

employing fixed price contracts to control cost at production, and 

limiting disruptive changes to contracts. 

Ultimately we recognize that as we balance requirements, manage the increasing pressure to our topline, and factor in industrial 

base considerations, it is ever more important that our naval aviation programs closely align with not only with the priorities outlined in the new defense strategy, but the Government and industry continues to work together to increase efficiencies and improve 

affordability to support current force and help us build the future 

force of naval aviation. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee today, and me and my colleagues 

look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Skinner, General 

Schmidle, and Admiral Moran can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 
7 

Mr. TURNER. Great. Thank you. We will turn next to General 

Davis for his statement. And for those of you who are not speaking 

about the written statements, you, of course, will be responding to 

questions. I will close the hearing, also asking if there are any closing remarks, so if as the hearing is proceeding, if there are things 

that you think of that you would like to add, at the end, you will 

have an opportunity to provide those for the record. 

General Davis. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN CHARLES R. DAVIS, USAF, MILITARY 

DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION; AND LT GEN BURT FIELD, 

USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, PLANS AND 

REQUIREMENTS 

General DAVIS. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, 

and members for the subcommittee, thank you for very much for 

this opportunity. And I stand before you today reminding everybody that our Air Force proudly provides you the ability—your Air 

Force provides you the ability to surveil and if required, strike any 

spot on this planet if required at any time, while defending our borders and protecting our allies, and we are very much committed to 

that mission. 

Although as we look in this environment of fiscal uncertainty, 

our focus remains on our five core missions: air and space superiority; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; rapid global 

mobility; global strike; command and control. And that is the 

means by which we deliver global reach, global power, and global 

vigilance. 

In 2012, your Air Force flew global precision tac-aircraft that accomplished over 28,000 sorties and 41,000 hours in support of overseas contingency operations. In support of these operations, our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance airmen provided intelligence that shaped combat plans for 33 named operations, enabling the removal of 700 enemy combatants from the fight, and 

built awareness for our coalition forces and over 250 troops in contact engagements. 

Our special operations personnel executed over 1,600 strike missions and 7,700 specialized mobility missions. 

On the home front, Air Force fighters, air refuelers and early 

warning aircraft have flown almost 64,000 total sorties supporting 

Operation Noble Eagle since September 11, 2001. 

As a testament to the capability of our total force, the National 

Guard and Air Reserve have flown more than 65 percent of these 

Operation Noble Eagle sorties, with the Air National Guard currently operating 17 of our 18 airspace control alert sites across the 

United States. 

Our fiscal year 2014 budget attempts to—our request attempts 

to retain the critical force structure and maintains the Air Force 

ability to rapidly respond to global demands. It is involved quite intricately from a concerted effort to balance risk, modernization, and 

force structure reductions with a commitment to readiness and taking care of our people. 

There is still a considerable uncertainty in the fiscal year 2014 

Air Force topline funding level. The fiscal year 2014 budget will not 
8 

reverse the damage done by the fiscal year 2013 sequestration that 

Chairman Turner alluded to. Recovering and warfighting capability, improving readiness requires at least a reduction in 

OPSTEMPO [Operations Tempo] or additional resources or a combination of the both. 

Now, recently in their posture hearing, our Chief and Secretary 

did a good job basically going over the very specific impacts of sequestration. I will cover them at the top level, but it is a reminder 

that reduced flying hours have and will cause harm to units that 

have had to cease flying operations and may result in severe rapid 

and long-term unit combat readiness degradations. 

Cuts to Air Force modernization programs will, over time, cost 

more taxpayer dollars to rectify the contract restructures and program inefficiencies, the increase in unit cost and the delay in delivery of capabilities to the warfighter. 

In spite of these ongoing budget concerns, however, many of our 

fighters and weapons do see some enhancements as a result of the 

fiscal year 2014 budget. These include the A–10, F–15, F–16, F–22 

[Raptor fighter jet], and AMRAAM [Advanced Medium-Range Airto-Air Missile]. For example, we will modernize a portion of our 

F–16 and F–15 floats with advanced radars, countermeasures and 

situational awareness. But I have to caution you on how we use the 

term ‘‘modernization’’ and ‘‘investment accounts’’ in this context. 

The systems that we are putting on these weapons and weapons 

systems are, in many ways, just bringing in the capabilities and 

technologies that have been developed as much as 10 years ago, 

and in some cases, they have been fielded that long. So we are really just bringing a lot of these airplanes as they currently exist up 

to the current state of the art of capability to match current threats 

with very little growth in the ability to handle future demands. 

More troubling to me is that roughly half of our modernization 

budget today has to go to maintain just the current performance 

levels of our fighter fleet and really adds no new combat capability. 

Going forward, I have to worry about what the budgets and the 

outyear budget numbers will do to our ability to continue to ramp 

up our production on F–35 and replace some of these aging airplanes. But as we navigate the uncertain way ahead to mitigate 

risk in critical areas like readiness, force structure modernization, 

we will continue to work with Congress to develop executable 

options. 

Personally, I worry that unresolved budget issues will threaten 

our ability to recapitalize our aging fighter and bomber fleets. I 

think we all need to be mindful of one fact, and that is that one 

nation that plays very prominently in our defense strategy recently 

flew two new stealth aircraft within a 22-month period. In robust 

defense budget times, this took us over 9 years. 

Nonetheless, our objectives are to remain as steady as possible 

today and set a course toward full-spectrum readiness, preserve a 

highly responsive and scalable force, and overcome force structure 

modernization challenges in order that we continue to have your 

Air Force provide the Nation the world’s most capable air power 

now and in the future. And I do look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Davis and General 

Field can be found in the Appendix on page 102.] 
9 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. I appreciate that very, very 

frank statement of—as we look to this issue in this hearing, we are 

not merely doing oversight of the status of the expenditure programs. We really are looking what had always been identified as 

a critical path to both maintain current capabilities and obtain future capabilities to respond to emerging threats and capabilities of 

adversaries, and the funding, both in sequestration and in reduced 

budgets, is disruptive of that. And I think your clarity that you are 

providing us is very important. 

And I am going to turn, General Schmidle, to you first. In your 

written testimony, page 8, there is a discussion of—the words are, 

the Marine Corps may experience elevated operational risk in 2020 

as the predicted shortfalls come to fruition. And you identify that 

the Marine Corps may experience elevated operational risk in the 

2020s if the predicted Strike Fighter shortfall comes to fruition. 

Please describe why you believe the Marine Corps faces this elevated operational risk and what the Department of the Navy is 

doing to mitigate those risks? And also, you know, as I was just 

saying, this doesn’t just fall on the Navy. You are here in front of 

us as to what we need to be doing and what the Administration 

needs to be doing. In part, this hearing is to establish that record 

to show that we are at an operational risk and what needs to be 

done to ensure that we don’t have a shortfall as you described. 

General. 

General SCHMIDLE. So chairman, if I could, the shortfall in the 

outyears, in the Strike Fighter shortfall is an inventory shortfall. 

What is happening to us today, though, that is much closer is the 

shortfall that we have in terms of the numbers of airplanes that 

we actually have available for training on the flightline today. 

So as an example, in the F/A–18 community, we have 257 airplanes in the Marine Corps. One hundred and two of those airplanes are what is called out-of-reporting status, in other words, 

they don’t exist on the flightline. And with the advent of sequestration now, we are not going to be able to induct the numbers of airplanes in the third and fourth quarter through the depot so that 

we can do the high flight hour inspections so that we can keep the 

airplanes flying. 

And what that is going to translate to is beginning in January 

of 2014, our nondeployed squadrons will now have as few as six 

airplanes available for training on the flightline. And what that 

means, of course, is obvious: The squadrons that are forward and 

that are going forward are going to have a full complement of airplanes, but the squadrons that are home and training will have 

fewer jets. And so you are either going to train pilots to a lower 

standard or you are going to overfly those airplanes, put more 

hours on them to train people, and then that is going to drive them 

into the high flight hour inspections again. 

Now, this year we have sufficient money to do the high flight 

hour inspections at 8,000 hours in order to get our F/A–18s, our 

legacy fleet out to 10,000 hours, but any disruption in that, for instance, if the full effects of sequestration, what that will do is it 

slows down the throughput through the depot to do those inspections, and that will cause us to have less airplanes on the ramp 

when we get ready to—as we go forward in terms of trying to train. 
10 

So the inventory shortfall that we mentioned in the statement in 

the outyears is clearly a challenge, but in the near term, we actually have a more near-term challenge, because we are trying to get 

our legacy F/A–18s through to the JSF, to the Joint Strike Fighter, 

transition as we go forward. 

We have similar problems with the AV–8 Harrier. It is not quite 

as significant. We are now going to fly that airplane to 2030. We 

originally had planned on the end of its service life being in 2012. 

So we are having to—that airframe itself is in pretty good shape, 

but we are going to have to do modifications to the airplane, avionics modifications in order for the airplane to remain survivable 

and relevant as we go forward. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

General Davis, you mentioned in your written testimony that 

depot delays will require the grounding of some of the affected aircraft and that sequestration cuts to Air Force modernization will 

impact every one of the Air Force’s investment programs, creating 

inefficiencies, raising unit costs, and delaying delivery of value capabilities to warfighters in the field. You also note that the fiscal 

year 2014 budget request does not enable full recovery of 

warfighting capability, capacity and readiness, and that additional 

resources will be required. 

What effects will sequestration have in the current fiscal year in 

the Air Force inventory, and what additional resources will be 

needed in fiscal year 2014 to make the fighter fleet whole again? 

General DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I will tell you that we are just beginning to try to figure out the effects of what is going to be imposed on our depots. We already know that we are about 60 aircraft and 30 engine inductions behind in that process. It is a mix 

across all the airframes, not just the fighters. 

Trying to buy that back is going to take more than a year. So 

those airframes that will be affected will not come back in 2014. 

I mean, the workforce, the throughput, the capability just doesn’t 

exist, so it will have to come back over time. When we get through 

this, I would like to just let my partner, General Field, here talk 

a little bit about how they will attempt to do something with the 

readiness in the fighter squadrons, but specifically, as we talk 

about in the sequestration impacts, while we were able to put significant funds against buying radars for F–15 Cs and Es, we had 

to decrease the quantities that we bought those particular radars 

at. That is increasing the unit cost. So that means those programs 

stretch out over at least a couple of years of increase to finish the 

programs on those two airplanes. 

As we look at what happens, we will probably delay the start of 

the F–16 Combat Avionics Performance Enhancement System, the 

CAPES program, as we look and see how much money we have to 

start that and how quickly we can ramp up the replacement of the 

radars on the F–16s. 

One thing that is very troubling is that we know that some portion of our fiscal year 2013 buy of F–35s will be cut. It is 3 to 5 

airplanes. We don’t know. It will depend on negotiation status, it 

will depend on a lot of things as it plays out. So that right there 

starts, you know, at about a third of a squadron’s worth of mod-
11 

ernization that will be pushed off at least another year, and we 

don’t know exactly what 2014 will go from there. 

So there is a spreading cut across all of our programs in terms 

of the modernization. And I will let General Field talk about what 

it takes just to buy back a little bit of that combat capability on 

the operational squadrons. 

General FIELD. Thank you. Based on the fiscal constraints that 

we are facing in fiscal year 2013, we have just decided to stop flying up to 13 combat Air Force squadrons. These are squadrons that 

are coded to go out and fight for the Nation’s wars or be a presence 

across the globe as required. 

The reason that we ended up in that position is that we 

prioritized our commitments. We started with the commitments to 

Afghanistan; we looked at commander requirements, again starting 

with CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command]. We tried to keep fully funded the forces in Korea, 

and as much as possible in Japan. And then we looked at all the 

commitments on a short notice to both of those theaters. We also 

maintained our commitment to support the French as they help the 

government of Mali in Africa. And then we are looking to maintain 

our training pipeline for our new and senior air crews. All of those 

are a big balancing act, and we are trying to prevent an unrecoverable situation in the outyears. 

The upshot of that is that we ended up essentially running out 

of money, and so that is why we had to stop flying those 13 air 

squadrons. Some of those squadrons are currently deployed, either 

in Afghanistan or somewhere else around the globe. And they will 

come back. Four of them come back and they will stop flying as 

soon as they return home. 

The requirement to regain that readiness after a 6-months 

grounding is a little bit unknown, because we are definitely in uncharted waters. We have never before, in the middle of a fiscal 

year, stopped flying a third of our combat air forces because of 

some kind of money issue. So we will have a lot of work to do and 

catching up to do. 

It will take essentially a very dedicated and focused effort to 

come up with the right training plan to recover that readiness, it 

will take time and it will take resources. I promise you that we will 

put the focused effort into the recapitalization of that readiness, 

but we are going to need some assistance both within the Department of Defense and without on the time and the resources. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, before I go into my last very quick 

question and hand it over to my ranking member, I just wanted to 

tell you that all of us on Capitol Hill are very aware of the personal 

effects that sequestration has. As we are listening to the effects on 

what are real and necessary capabilities that they are diminished, 

and we heard that in all the hearings. I have heard from General 

Wolfenbarger of Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force 

Base that frequently that the men and women who are in uniform 

and the civilian employees are not aware enough of the fact that 

their Members of Congress understand that they have kids in college, they have house payments to make, they have vacations that 

are being cancelled as a result of the effects of sequestration. So 

even as we talk about the programs today, I want you to know. 
12 

And please tell those under your command and who you work with, 

that Congress is very aware of the personal effects. 

And I have one real quick question and I will hand it over to my 

ranking member, and that is, you know, you just told us the real 

and necessary capabilities of each of the areas of your operations 

will be affected by sequestration. There, I think, is a misnomer in 

Congress, and that is there is a belief that sequestration will actually result in savings, but the message I was hearing from each of 

you today and as evident in your written statements is that especially in the area of acquisitions, as we have decreased funding, we 

are actually probably going to, on the other side, have increased 

costs to achieve what are real and necessary modernizations or 

sustainment of capability. 

From your review of sequestration, I am going to ask, you know, 

all five of our Generals and Admirals today, could you please report, do you believe in what you are currently seeing in the implementation of sequestration if you assess that these reduced funding 

effects from sequestration will result in higher costs in the future. 

General. 

General DAVIS. Sir, they absolutely will. I mean, you just go back 

to the depot and the expense of trying to buy back those airplanes 

that we have to put back on the ramp, the price of that will go up, 

we will have to lay on additional workforce, additional something 

to get there. Every one of these items that I mentioned that we are 

not going to buy for the airplanes this year, whether it is an 

F–35 or radar for the F–15, when we decrease just one or two out 

of a lot buy, every unit in that lot goes up; a very inefficient price 

tag. 

So I am sure we could take for the record and get you an answer 

back if we cut three or four or five or whatever the units are for 

F–35s coming out, what that will increase the unit lots, each airplane in that unit as we go from there. 

And I look at our programs, and we ask our programs to go 

through multiple restructuring drills as we tried to guess what the 

2013 number was going to be and start preparing what the outyear 

numbers will be, the inefficiencies of the program is not being effectively managed and executed while they are out doing drills. I 

worry about that, and that is an unaccounted cost we haven’t seen 

yet. 

Mr. TURNER. General Field. 

General FIELD. Sir, I agree with General Davis. I think it will 

be increased cost. In addition, in terms of readiness, it will be either increased cost or increased time if we don’t increase the cost 

to get back to the readiness levels that we would like. You have 

heard from both sides of me, from General Davis, General 

Schmidle, that the depot is a—in their working depots are going to 

be a big factor of that. 

We think that it is going to take more sorties to regain that readiness because of the 6 months of standing down from flying, and 

that is all dependent upon aircraft availability. And aircraft availability is dependent on how well the depots produce spare parts 

and the inspections required for our aircraft. And if that is reduced, 

then that backlog will just continue to grow. 
13 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Admiral Moran. And as you are moving 

to answer, please take General Davis’s offer of providing additional 

record information for the record when you actually get that data 

as a standing question from our subcommittee that I would like 

each of you to undertake. Admiral. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, sir. Right. I completely agree with my colleagues from the Air Force. And I would only add that since sequestration spreads itself across multiple lines, in a test and—in 

the test programs, we are likely to see the effect of that to stretch 

out tests, which means delivery of capability later, which means 

you have got to carry your legacy platforms longer. So there is a 

multiple effect that occurs over time. That is all I have, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. General Schmidle. 

General SCHMIDLE. For the record, just two quick things to pile 

on real quick. So with regard to the depot, one of the other concerns there, too, is the civilian workforce. Of course, most of the 

work that is being done, for instance on our airplanes is being done 

on the second and third shift, and those are the kinds of folks that 

there is discussion about—you know, about the effect of sequestration on them. 

And the other point on the readiness piece, so you don’t fall off 

the cliff in readiness overnight. It is sort of insidious. As the money 

starts to dry up and you become less and less ready and as we 

start to climb back out of that again, as General Field said, it is 

going to take us a while. And we are not quite sure how long, because, again, we have never been in a position where we have effectively gone down to those lower levels of readiness and then had 

to ramp back up again. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Admiral Skinner. 

Admiral SKINNER. Mr. Chairman, I think it will certainly add inefficiency into the way we procure our aircraft. You know, the CNO 

[Chief of Naval Operations] testified yesterday that it is going to 

cost us $6.1 billion in Navy investment accounts, and certainly that 

is going to cost us some tails that we will probably have to move 

towards the end of the production line. My folks got their controls 

last week. They are going through it now and looking at how they 

are going to manage their programs, but certainly, this is the third 

time we have replanned 2013. Just the inefficiency of doing that is 

going to impact the cost, but I would agree with my colleagues, and 

that it will certainly increase our costs across the board. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, Mr. Sullivan, my fellow Ohioan here, you 

might be prepared that you are probably going to get a request 

from our subcommittee to look at JAO [Joint Air Operations] capturing these increased costs from sequestration. 

To my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for your service to our country and for being before us today. I have 

a lot of questions on the F–35, because Mr. Turner and I have been 

taking a look pretty heavily at the F–35, but I think I want to start 

with Global Hawk [RQ–4 high-altitude unmanned surveillance aircraft]. I was pleased to see that the Air Force, General Davis, followed the fiscal year 2014 NDAA [National Defense Authorization 

Act] that requires continued funding for Global Hawk Block 30 operations, but it is unclear to me how the Air Force intends to follow 
14 

the requirements of the fiscal year 2014 defense appropriations bill 

which directs the Air Force to use some old fiscal year 2012 funding, that is about $300 million or so, to procure three more Global 

Hawk Block 30 aircraft. 

How is the Air Force planning to address this issue? If buying 

three new aircraft doesn’t make sense, is there a way to use it for 

upgrades or some other piece of Global Hawk operation aircraft? 

For example, we are told that the Global Hawk doesn’t work well 

in poor weather. Is there some fix or upgrade or something that 

somebody’s working on with respect to that? 

General DAVIS. Yes, ma’am. I think our Secretary said in his 

hearing that this has been a difficult discussion with Congress and 

he realizes that a lot of the Congress does not agree with the Air 

Force position that we have no firm requirements for the Global 

Hawk Block 30 airplanes past the end of the calendar year 2014, 

and that he fully intends to pursue avenues available to him to try 

to request to allow the United States Air Force to use that money 

for much higher priorities than Global Hawk Block 30. And we still 

have to work through that process and that will probably be a difficult conversation we have yet to go. 

So the premise that some of those dollars could be used to improve the capability of the airplane may be true, but I think our 

Air Force would come back and tell you that we have a few other 

higher priorities that we need to fix if we have the opportunity of 

putting that money against such things as bringing combat squadrons back up to combat readiness status or buying back some of the 

F–35 capability we lost. And we understand that that is going to 

be at the congressional discretion, but that is kind of our position 

right now. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Thank you for that. With respect to the 

F–35, when we were over with the contractor recently—well, let me 

begin by just relooking at some of these numbers. 

Mr. Sullivan, you said that in the beginning, we thought that the program would cost us $231 billion, but 12 years later it has cost 

us, or the estimate is $390 billion? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. So we went from thinking that one airplane more or less would cost us about $69 million and now it is at $137 

million on average, because—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is the average across—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Depending on the lot and how it comes out, et 

cetera. Okay. So I gather that that is about a $129 billion difference just in 12 years. Am I correct on my math there? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Thank you. So we were over and talking to 

the contractor and it seems to me—I mean, I understand about 

fixed costs and variable costs. And their comment to us was that 

as we cut back on the number of planes that we are asking them 

to produce in a year or this year or next fiscal year, whatever was 

projected, that obviously the cost becomes higher per unit on that. 

So we are really not saving as much as we thought we would or 

as some in the Congress thought the sequestration thing would do. 

And they also felt that as we pulled back because of sequestration and other issues and lowered the amount of aircraft that we 
15 

created or have produced, that our allies, who are also on the order 

block to grab some of that, are also pulling back. 

Is that correct from your understanding and how you see the 

things going on with the F–35? 

Who is procuring? Who wants to answer that? 

General DAVIS. Well, to answer the first of part of your question, 

ma’am, we obviously know that there will be a cost increase and 

it will affect the rest of our budget. We know our European partners, at least the ones that are buying the CTOL [conventional 

take-off and landing] airplanes, the United States Air Force are 

very closely watching the moves we make and will be very interested to see what the impacts to their unit cost will be when we 

negotiate the reduced buys as a result of 2013. And then, if we can 

recover those buys in 2014 back up to at least to the 19 that the 

President requests, then we will see how that plays out, but there 

will be an ongoing effect from 2013 to 2014. 

So I do know that that is playing very heavily in their decisions, 

and they are very much and in a lot of the same situations we are 

in terms of having challenges with their budgets. So from that aspect, that is my input. 

Admiral SKINNER. Congresswoman, I would also say that there 

is a cost to concurrency. As we dialed back our production requests, 

it is because there was a certain amount of concurrency that we 

would have to take the jets that we were buying, and in some future time, we would have to go back and modify those jets and 

bring them up. So when we start talking about as we dial back our 

production numbers and the cost per unit goes up, if we buy them 

later in the buy, then our concurrency costs go down. So we have 

to look at the entire business case there with regards to balancing 

the cost of concurrency against the cost of dialing down our production lots and having an increased unit cost. To the—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So are you trying to say that may—I understand 

the fact that we were going to buy some and we would go back and 

put in the fixes that we needed, or if we weren’t all the way up 

to developing, but as we went on, we developed actually what we 

needed, we would come back and fix. So are you saying let’s just 

wait and wait this out till we have the right fixes to everything and 

then purchase? 

Admiral SKINNER. I think what we have seen in the production 

numbers that are currently in the budget, that is exactly what we 

are doing. We have dialed back some of our production numbers so 

that we can take a look and fix some of these issues. We have also, 

I believe, after—in future contracts with the contractor, we will 

share the cost of concurrency, so there is an incentive to the contractor to reduce these issues in the jets as soon as possible, but, 

yes, exactly. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And my understanding is also that these foreign 

partners that we have, well, they are sort of seeing that same cost 

line, and they are saying, why don’t we wait until the end, because 

the unit is going to be so much less expensive for us than for now. 

So it is like, who is going to go first? Is that what you are seeing 

also from our—we don’t have—do we have someone that is working 

with the international groups? Mr. Sullivan. 
16 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yeah. I just wanted to say that there is—the program, when the original baseline of the program would have had 

1,500 F–35s under contract by now. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And how many do we have? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And what we have now is somewhere around a 

little bit more than 350; 365, I believe. And the reason that that 

happened was because of the problems that they had in designing 

the aircraft. They had weight issues early, they had a lot of problems—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Very slow production. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. And other things, yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So I think my point is that they have—you know, 

the program has been very slow to deliver on its own. I mean, it 

was a very tough climb for this program to meet the requirements. 

Concurrency was part of that as well. So now you have the test 

program, which is about a third complete, so they still have 66 percent of the test program to go, and those changes will continue to 

flow into aircraft that we buy. As I said in my statement, there are 

58 aircraft that are built now, that have been produced, production 

aircraft that are being retrofit as we speak. They have projected 

that there will be another—I think the total cost from retrofit from 

the test program is going to be somewhere around $1.7 billion, and 

that is going to play out over the next 3 or 4 years. So right now 

the program itself is just now beginning to hit—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Its stride. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. Its stride, and it still actually is 

below its original schedule for deliveries. I don’t think that is, you 

know, a huge issue for the program now. They are beginning to hit 

their stride. 

On the other side of this, I think, is—and something that the 

generals and admirals really need to be concerned about is all of 

the—as the F–35 has been delayed and as the aircraft are slow in 

getting out, that is more and more cost for extending the life of 

their legacy aircraft. I think to date, because of delays to the F– 

35 program, they have had to invest as much as $8 billion in just 

keeping the existing legacy aircraft—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. They have got to have planes to fly. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Let me ask you, Mr. Sullivan, since we are on this 

issue, these cost overruns or these—I don’t know how we call them. 

There is just so much more cost—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. To it. Who—is it because we were 

just—we just want too much and we were pie in the sky when we 

made this contract, or were there physics limits to this and we 

should have known better? I mean, where do we—at whose feet do 

we lay $129 billion? And I am asking that only because I have a 

set of generals over here telling, oh, my God, the—you know, basically the sky is falling, because, you know, you are hollowing out 

what is going to be for the future, and where do we get that that 

money, we need to get that money, and yet we are $129 billion 

more than an original $231 billion. 
17 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. Well, I think on this program, and others can 

speak on this as well, but I think the requirements for the F–35, 

three variants, one that is going to take off from an aircraft carrier, 

one that has a short takeoff and vertical landing capability, an incredible set of requirements for one program to achieve. 

So I would lay most of the cost growth that you see—you know, 

the development costs under a cost plus contract and development 

have doubled, and the procurement costs as they learn more about 

how to really build to these requirements—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Come down. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. The unit cost for the aircraft is not 

what they thought it was going to be. The commonality that they 

were hoping for in these variants was—one of the things that this 

program was supposed to be able to bring was, you know, maybe 

50 percent or more of these three aircrafts would be common, and 

as they got more and more into the requirements and the technologies that would be needed to achieve these three variants, they 

found out that that wasn’t happening, either. So it was misunderstood requirements would be the genesis of the problems that this 

program has encountered, I think. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. I don’t mean to keep 

going on, on this subject. If the gentlemen there have any last comments to make on this issue of the F–35 and the fact that we have 

eaten so much money in trying to get there, I would love to have 

your comments. Otherwise, you know, we are going to continue 

this. It is not going to be a topic that goes away. 

General DAVIS. Ma’am, just to add to—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, General Davis. 

General DAVIS. Yes, ma’am, if I could. As was mentioned here, 

to extend our F–16 fleet with new radars and similar amounts of 

capability that was not an original program we had in our books, 

the Combat Avionics Performance Enhancement System for 300- 

plus F–16s, which is about $480 million just in development. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And that is because you don’t have the production 

planes off the F–35 that you thought you were going to have then? 

General DAVIS. It is because we—yes, ma’am. We had to extend 

the F–16 fleet to fill in that gap based on these issues that were 

brought up. So there is a complex set of fall-out costs that go well 

beyond the unit costs to the airplane as we deal with this. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. Thank you. I think—thank you very much. 

And I think we will probably have some follow-up questions on that 

very issue of how much is this really costing us? 

Mr. TURNER. And also they can put those answers in their closing statements. 

Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

A couple of questions. And I am trying to understand the CH– 

53K ‘‘Kilos’’ [K model] are not in the budget. Is that correct? Or the 

buy for it? Foreseeable future, is it? 

Admiral SKINNER. No, sir. I think the CH–53s are in the budget. 

Mr. COOK. They are? 

Admiral SKINNER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Because they know the ‘‘Echo’’ [E] model is 

probably very—is 30 years old. Is that correct? 
18 

Admiral SKINNER. Yes, sir. We are in a current development program for the CH–53K that will replace the CH–53 Echo. I will let 

my colleague—— 

General SCHMIDLE. So the 53 Kilo is currently being built right 

now. The first model is down in Palm Beach, Florida, but it is 

going to replace the 53 Kilo. And it is funded and Sikorsky has 

been developing the test demonstrator for us, and it is going to be 

able to carry 27,000 pounds 110 miles, and it is going to do for us 

everything—it is going to carry three times as much as the current 

53 Echo that we have in the inventory. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. I want to back up a little bit to a comment that 

you briefed us yesterday on the issue of the Growlers versus the 

EA–6s [electronic warfare aircraft], the old Prowlers. And I was 

concerned about, you know, whether there might be a gap there between that. And, of course, I was led to believe that the F–35 

would fill the void on that. We wouldn’t need at least in the Marine 

Corps, the EA–6s or the Growlers, the EA–18. And maybe I am 

getting it wrong. 

And so I was a little bit concerned about that, because the EA– 

6, that is a very, very old platform, it is almost as old as me, but 

not by much. And it just seems like I want to make sure there is 

that crossover. Electronic warfare is something that is extremely 

important to me. And if you can just address that again a little bit. 

General SCHMIDLE. So I could. So the plan is still to sundown, 

or to take out of service, the legacy EA–6Bs by 2019. What the plan 

is inside the Marine Corps is to leverage the capabilities that we 

have in F–35 in addition to other capabilities from ground and airborne platforms in a system-of-systems approach to electronic 

warfare. 

And I would offer to you that I would be happy to come and brief 

you or the committee in a classified setting, and I think I could do 

a much better job of explaining how we would intend do that. 

Mr. COOK. No. I am not worried about that. I am just worried 

about any delays in the F–35 and whether that gap there, if here 

we go again, the same thing we were addressing in the avionics 

and the F–16s because of production in the F–35 might be delayed 

and delayed and delayed and it is going to affect other programs. 

Am I wrong in interpreting it as such? 

General SCHMIDLE. No. You are absolutely right. And I think 

that is why you have heard from everybody here at the table that 

we are concerned about keeping the program on schedule and 

about, you know, the Harriers. We were going to retire those last 

year, and now we are going to take them out another 17 years. So 

it is clearly an issue. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

your service. In the short time I have, I wanted to ask Admiral 

Moran or Admiral Skinner, it is our understanding the Navy has 

a requirement for 40 squadrons to fill 10 carrier air wings with 4 

squadrons each. Of the squadrons, the Navy has 35 and the Marine 

Corps provides 3 squadrons with an agreement to supply 5. 

The question is: Does the Department of the Navy have enough 

Strike Fighter squadrons to fill 10 carrier air wings and still meet 
19 

the marine commitments, including the overseas rotations and the 

marine expeditionary unit deployments, or are you several squadrons short of this requirement? 

Admiral MORAN. Sir, thank you for the question. I think the 

agreement that we have with the Marine Corps called TACAIR 

[Tactical Aviation] Integration, which you correctly termed as five 

additional squadrons, on any given day, the Marine Corps has a 

number of squadrons that they can rotate through to support our 

carrier air wings to fill that void. 

We currently have our full allotment of Navy Strike Fighter 

squadrons to fill out the 10 carrier wings you referred to, and with 

the help of the Marine Corps to fill out the gaps that we had between 35 and 40, we are able to do that and support our deployed 

operations. And we are programmed to, inside both the F/A–18E/ 

F program and the F–35C program over time, to complete that 40 

squadrons of Strike Fighters per 10 air wings. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. The fiscal year 2014 budget request 

also shows the Navy eliminated 13 Super Hornets that it was supposed to buy this year, however, the tactical aviation shortfall was 

reduced. Can you clarify for us how you account for the reduction 

in aircraft and a corresponding reduction in the shortfall? What is 

the tactical aviation shortfall this year for 2014? 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, sir. General Schmidle referred to it earlier. 

Our Strike Fighter inventory management is largely based on our 

ability to control how we utilize the aircraft, so it is a primary factor that determines—— 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Right. 

Admiral MORAN [continuing]. Over time. The second part of that 

is our ability to inspect the airplanes out to a certain life. For legacy platforms, currently we can inspect them out to 9,000 hours. 

Last time when we reported the number, we were allowed to inspect only out to 8,600 hours. So that additional 400 hours per aircraft across the fleet is a significant bonus for us in terms of driving the number down or managing the number down. 

And, finally, Congress was kind enough to add 13 E/Fs in the 

budget in 2013, which drove the number further down. So while we 

did lose 13 in DON [Department of Navy] in 2013, Congress was 

kind enough to add 11 back in, so the net effect was very small. 

So when you add all those three things together and you put it 

through the machine, the Strike Fighter shortfall projected out in 

2023 long-term is approaching around 18 airplanes. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you for additional clarification 

on that. 

At the Navy League last week, there were presentations on both 

the funded flight plan of the Super Hornet and additional advancements being considered. Please tell us about the importance of the 

modernization program for the Super Hornets in order to take that 

aircraft out for another 25 years or more. You can talk some about 

combat avionics. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, sir. Much like what the Air Force described 

in getting their fleet up to being able to deal with threats today, 

our flight plan that you referred to does invest significant amount 

of money in bringing all of our Hornets, Block 2 Hornets, up to 

AESA [Active Electronically Scanned Array]-capable Hornets. 
20 

And then there are several other programs that I would be happy 

to come back, and in a classified setting to talk to you, to walk you 

through those investments. They are all in the classified world, but 

they are very significant, they are fully funded in 2014, and there 

will keep our Super Hornet fleet very relevant well into the late 

2020s and early 2030s. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you. And, General, you mentioned about the Harrier and being extended to 2030, originally to 

be retired by 2013. What was the year it was first put into full 

service, the Harriers? 

General SCHMIDLE. I am not sure of the first variant. The variant that we are flying right now, the B model, I would have to take 

that to get the exact year for you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 129.] 

General SCHMIDLE. I would be guessing. I would say it is in the 

late 1980s. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yeah. I was thinking it was back in the 1980s. 

Okay. 

General SCHMIDLE. Yeah. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Due to our gavel rules, Mr. Garamendi 

would be next. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. My questions go to the 

ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] systems for 

both the Navy and the Air Force. It is not at all clear what the 

overall vision and strategy is for ISR as it relates to everything 

from satellites to various manned and unmanned systems, and we 

really need to understand that. So whatever you gentlemen might 

want to do for the record, or in classified to develop that information would be, I think, very helpful as we try to sort out what to 

do with some difference of opinion between Congress and at least 

the Air Force with regard to the Global Hawk and other platforms. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

pages 129–130.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. My question specifically goes to Admiral Skinner and the MC4 [MQ–4C Triton surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle], the Triton system and what you called Point Mugu and I 

call Camp Malibu. What is the cost of building the program at 

Camp Malibu? 

Admiral SKINNER. Well, sir, we went out—I think in the recent 

budget we went with an allocation, if I recall, of about $59 million 

from Military Construction to put in the appropriate modifications 

to the existing infrastructure at Point Mugu, sir, to host the MQ– 

4 Tritons at that particular air base. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That was for a hangar? 

Admiral SKINNER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What about the other infrastructure, communications, housing, et cetera? 

Admiral SKINNER. Well, housing is already there, sir. I know that 

I can probably take the question for the record and get you the 

exact cost breakdown, but if we intend to base our Tritons at that 
21 

particular base, then certainly we would enhance all of that infrastructure in order to accept those airframes. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 130.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. There is no communication infrastructure, is 

there, for this particular point? 

Admiral SKINNER. Well, there is a robust communications infrastructure at Point Mugu. They have a large sea range. They have 

a lot of communications. Whether or not they could be modified 

quickly to accept the Triton, I would have to take that for the 

record. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Has the Navy developed a full cost for basing 

this system at that location? 

Admiral SKINNER. To my knowledge, we have, sir, but like I said, 

I can take it for the record and get it back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 130.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When will it be back? 

Admiral SKINNER. Probably within 30 days. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We are going to be doing a national defense authorization within 30 days. That process is already under way. 

Admiral SKINNER. We can get it as soon as possible. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It would seem to me you would not proceed 

without a full cost for the program, would you? Without knowing 

the full cost, in which case you ought to be able to deliver it tomorrow morning. 

Admiral SKINNER. We will go back and get it to you as soon as 

possible, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will be waiting. A year ago, you were going to 

base this at Beale. Why did you decide to change? 

Admiral MORAN. I can help with that. Beale was an effort to join 

with the Air Force in where we train crews and maintainers to operate Global Hawks across the Services. When we got the indication that the Air Force might not be going down that path, the 

Global Hawk path, we decided to base our BAMS [Broad Area Maritime Surveillance] out of one west coast site and one east coast 

site. The east coast site is still to be determined. It is either Jacksonville or Mayport, and the west coast site would be Point Mugu, 

as you say. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And you did that decision with full understanding of the cost of developing Point Mugu as opposed to basing 

at—and I am unaware that the Air Force is abandoning Beale for 

the Global Hawk. 

Admiral MORAN. I didn’t mean to imply they were going to abandoned Beale. It is just the BAMS program along with the Air Force 

future Global Hawk was where we were going to join together, and 

it wasn’t clear to us when we had to make decisions on where to 

base and put the infrastructure in that it was in time for delivery 

of the BAMS platform. 

To your earlier question on communications, the concept behind 

controlling BAMS is that we are going to put the controlling capability to talk to the airframe when it is forward in orbit at a collocated site at Whidbey Island as part of the P–8 BAMS integration. 

Where you have the manpower expertise that operate P–8s and 
22 

P–3s [Orion maritime surveillance aircraft] today, that same expertise will operate the BAMS vehicles when they are forward. The 

only thing that we are going to be required out of Point Mugu is 

the launch and recovery element for the aircraft itself. So it is not 

as robust as I think you might believe. And we can get a much 

clearer answer to you on the total cost for both sites to enable the 

BAMS program to get under way on the west coast. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 130.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please do so. 

Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. I have some more questions, but 

I will take it in the next round. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mrs. Roby. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to each of 

our witnesses that are here today. We certainly appreciate your 

service to our country, but that of your families as well. So I just 

want to thank you for that. 

General Davis, you mentioned in your written testimony that all 

three mission areas in the air-to-surface munitions inventory are 

short of inventory objectives and those missions are standoff, direct 

attack, and penetrator munitions. Could you provide this subcommittee with a list of those munitions and amounts that could 

be increased to the budget request, and if authorized and appropriated, could be executed in the fiscal year 2014? 

General DAVIS. Yes, ma’am, we certainly can. Let me just kind 

of give you the broad brush on those. As we face these very challenging times of budget reductions it seems munitions quite often 

are the flexible accounts we have to go to, to balance the budget 

accounts. 

Our current, just to give you some ideas, we can buy more of our 

Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles. The production lines allow 

it, at least at a baseline variance. And it would probably be better 

if we gave you the exact objective quantities in a classified format, 

just so you know, but we are probably somewhere around 50 percent of that requirement right now. We are using a lot of Hellfire 

missiles, as you can imagine, in conjunction with the Army. We 

could certainly increase the quantities on those. 

JDAM weapons, the Joint Direct Attack Munitions, were significantly increased in ’14 to fill in shortfalls of the numbers we used. 

But they do have a very large production line to handle all the 

world’s demands, if you will, because a lot of customers buy that. 

The one thing that we can increase that is probably of critical nature right now is our AMRAAM missiles. Our subcontractors to 

Raytheon are in the process of trying to recover the ability to build 

solid rocket motors for rockets, and we are partnering with a company in Norway as well as bringing up to speed another company 

in the United States to be able to build those rocket motors at the 

rates we need to match the guidance sections at Raytheon. So we 

are probably at the max on our AIM–120 AMRAAM missiles. So we 

can give you a little bit more detail on that. But there is some capacity in some of the weapons, but not all of them. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 
23 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I am going to go out of order for a 

minute and jump down to Mr. Garamendi to finish his questioning. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This series of questions goes to the Air Force, similar to the questions that I placed to the Navy. What is your vision and strategy 

for ISR? 

General DAVIS. Sir, let me just mention back to one I know of 

interest to everybody, obviously it is Global Hawk. I will say this 

and we can bring the operational context into it. We did not do that 

without carefully looking at how we cover that mission with the 

U–2 [‘‘Dragon Lady’’ reconnaissance aircraft] and other classified 

platforms, and that would be one we probably need to go into some 

detail with in another forum, because there are systems out there 

that can do this in a variety of different ways. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Overall, this whole ISR thing is confused. There 

have been changes. We have made changes, you have made 

changes, the Navy has made changes, and it is confused, and it 

frankly doesn’t make much sense. So we need to understand what 

your vision—Navy, Air Force, and others—what the vision is for 

the Department of Defense so that we can help make rational decisions about what needs to be done and what money needs to be 

spent. And until that happens, I remain very, very concerned. 

General DAVIS. I do, sir. Let me put a little more context in that. 

We have pretty much heavily funded ISR for a very permissive environment for a couple of decades, so we are in the process now of 

trying to look at all the assets with our operational requirements, 

with our intel [intelligence] requirements, to try to rationalize a 

program that has operated almost totally uncontested and prepare 

it for a scenario where it is not going to have that freedom. So you 

have got to understand that we have a program that has got to do 

some very significant transitions over next few years in a challenging budget. We owe you those details—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes, you do. 

General DAVIS. But it is not without the context of how we got 

into a situation that probably in many ways does not make sense. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I appreciate all of that, and we really do need 

to have that and it probably has to be in a classified briefing where 

we can spend time on it. 

You did say something, General Davis, that I found curious, and 

that is you have higher priorities, and then you mentioned the F– 

35 and one other piece of equipment. When we have that lengthy 

discussion, I would like to know what the higher priorities are. And 

we ought to also have a discussion about where these systems are 

likely to be used—in an environment without contention, or one 

with contention. For example, Africa. Not much contention there 

right now. So anyway, we need to have a much deeper discussion. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 130.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. With regard to the Navy on this thing, I don’t 

understand why you are developing a new base when, in fact, you 

have adequate facilities at an existing base where you were going 

to go. Frankly, your discussion that well, the Air Force decided to 

change doesn’t make any sense when, in fact, if the Air Force decides to change, there would be excess capacity at Beale. 
24 

So we need to get into this in great detail, and I would suggest 

that you not go forward until we have such great detail available 

to you. 

For example, if the Air Force is not going to use the Block 30s 

at Beale, then there is an excess capacity there in a hangar that 

is already in place with all of the infrastructure, including all of 

the communications in place ready to go. I will take a comment. 

Admiral SKINNER. Well, we owe you the details, sir. I reviewed my written statement. We put $79 million in MILCON [Military 

Construction] in the budget for Point Mugu and Andersen Air 

Force Base out in Guam for putting the Triton out in the Pacific. 

But we owe you the detail. We have an ISR roadmap that our N26 

requirements organization has put together, and we will bring that 

detail to you very rapidly and have that discussion. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I would appreciate it. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your assistance on this matter. I 

know it is of concern to you as well as to me. Thank you, and I 

yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. 

We will turn to Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask a couple 

questions about the F–35 in particular, basically the capabilities. I 

know that with various planes and what have you that you can upgrade them by putting different radars on there, but I wanted to 

know particularly with everything going on in North Korea right 

now, and we saw the show of force in South Korea by some of the 

current fighters that we have, and we know everything that has 

happened in other parts of the world, can you discuss the importance of advanced stealth capability that the F–35 will give us in 

the future to meet the increase in threats around the world? 

And I was curious, is there anything, because I know that some 

people have said, no, you can upgrade certain jets that we already 

have in our fleet and make it just as good as the F–35. I just want 

to hear from you directly, is that the case? Anybody. Any of the 

officers. 

General SCHMIDLE. If I could, to begin with we really do need to 

take this discussion offline in a classified setting. What I can tell 

you is that what the F–35 is going to bring is much more than just 

the one capability you mentioned. It is going to bring a capability 

to fuse information that is beyond anything that we have today. So 

that, I think, that would be best served though if we could sit down 

with you in another forum and walk you through all of those capabilities. 

Mr. VEASEY. Okay. I wanted to also talk about the ramping up 

of the F–35. It appears that the Department has finally stabilized 

the production rate for the F–35 program and is committed to increasing the ramp rate beginning in 2015. I understand that the 

unit costs have been coming down year over year. Can you tell the 

committee what you expect the costs of the F–35A CTOL variant 

to be when the program reaches full production rate in 2018? General Davis. 

General DAVIS. We always have an interesting discussion every 

time you talk about the unit cost of an airplane, there are so many 

factors that go it, between fly-away and everything. If you look at 
25 

what the last production lot was negotiated for, it was roughly at 

a flying cost of around $100–105 million for the airframe, and 

roughly around $15–16 million for a conventional engine. I will tell 

you once we get to the rate in 2015, that curve continues down, but 

it depends on the numbers we are able to buy with our budgets 

that we have between now and then. 

So while we hope it will decrease and continue to, I couldn’t 

begin to tell you exactly what the 18 number would be. I am sure 

we can get that for the record and give you the projections that the 

program office has for you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 131.] 

Mr. VEASEY. One last question I wanted to ask Admiral Moran 

about the additional capabilities that the F–35 could bring to the 

fleet and its program and the importance to the Navy’s tactical 

aviation recapitalization effort. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes. As our Chief testified to yesterday, the F– 

35 is a key component of the future air wing mix that we are planning on. And much like what you just heard from the other gentlemen here, to really fully appreciate what that capability is and how 

it blends in with our other assets in the carrier wing, we would 

have to come back and talk to you in a classified setting. We would 

be happy to do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 131.] 

Mr. VEASEY. And one more question, if the chairman wouldn’t 

mind. I know that one of the things that the military is looking to 

do is to be able to respond more quickly to situations like what 

happened in Benghazi. What sort of role would this particular 

plane be able to play in that sort of a situation and being able to 

respond to things like that in the future? 

General SCHMIDLE. Sir, I think one of the things that we talk 

about when we talk about crisis response just with my colleagues 

to the left of right of me here with the Navy and Marine Corps 

team is having that capability afloat, if you will, and the variants 

of the F–35 that we are buying, including the B variant that the 

Marine Corps is buying, will be on amphibious shipping and it will 

be in floating in addition to the AF–35s that will be on carriers. 

So I think what it is going to bring to the Nation is a lot more flexibility in terms of our ability as a Nation to respond to those kinds 

of crises. 

Admiral SKINNER. Sir, if you recall, we had an F–15 pilot shot 

down in Libya and we had assets, because of this very team we are 

talking about, we had assets on top of him very, very quickly and 

had him extracted from country very, very quickly, because we had 

those types of assets in amphibious shipping close into the country. 

And that would be the same thing with additional capability that 

the B could bring to the fight. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General Field, I know General Schmidle has done a great job of 

balancing that line between what we can talk about and what we 

can’t talk about, but yet, we are in this situation where we have 

to paint the picture of how dire things are and that the military 
26 

that we have now and that we have been able to conduct operations with will not be the military that we have at the end of sequestration and the significant budget cuts if we allow them to all 

go into place. 

So capturing and articulating that unacceptable level of risk is 

difficult, because the word ‘‘risk,’’ you know, we are Americans. We 

rise above risk. So when you say something is at risk, we say well, 

we always succeed. What is risk? 

But the reality is, is that there are significant threats out there. 

There are people who are developing significant capabilities that 

will make the whole dynamics of what General Davis was saying 

about we can go anywhere, deliver a force anywhere and have a 

full capability, that this is not just at risk, but may be a new paradigm where we are not capable of having the force that we had 

before. 

So in your statement, you described a decreased fighter force 

structure of 1,900 total fighter aircraft as an increased risk to carry 

out the national military strategy. That is a reduction from a 2,000 

fighter aircraft inventory of just 2 years ago. Could you please give 

us an understanding of what does that risk mean? I know with 

General Schmidle saying there are capabilities we have to talk 

about offline, but this risk has to be articulated in a manner where 

it can be dealt with by Congress and the Air Force. 

What does that mean, increased risk, and what does Congress 

need to do about it? General. 

General FIELD. Yes, sir. This is another bit of a classified situation, so we can come back and talk to you about that, but here is 

how I would lay it out in this forum. 

Our current inventory of just fighter aircraft, if that is what we 

are going to talk about, is barely able to meet the requirements in 

a couple of the scenarios that we were planning against where requirement and demand equal one another. And when you have a 

situation where today, our readiness forces are, as we measure 

them today, about 50 percent, what we would call totally ready, 

that presents in a situation, in my opinion, of great risk. 

When you talk about sequestration and now you take nine of 

those fighter squadrons and you sit them on the ground, like General Schmidle said, this is not something that happens overnight. 

That readiness level and the proficiency of those air crew will 

decay over time. But within about a month and a half to 2 months, 

they will be out of currency in several specific events, and within 

about 3 to 4 to 5 months, we are going to have to do something 

very significant in terms of getting them back up to speed, especially in terms of this high-end threat that you alluded to. 

And that threat is not just confined to some of the bigger nationstates on the globe. Those guys produce very effective systems, and 

they sell them to other countries. So in the Middle East, for example, there are several countries that provide a significant threat to 

airborne assets. We can address that threat in several ways. You 

can address it through systems and technology and you can address it through tactics, techniques, and procedures. And you, we, 

all of us at this table, will address it across that whole spectrum. 

And whatever we have in our kit bag is what we will fight that 

scenario with, and we will try to do it where we minimize the cost 
27 

to our forces and maximize the destruction to the enemies, and 

that is what we have trained to do for, on this table, our entire professional career. 

Now, at the end of the day, readiness is about a couple things. 

It is about ready to do what, and, again, like you said, at what 

risk? So if we were at a risk level that was pretty high before, and 

now we ground or stop flying nine fighter squadrons and four 

bomber squadrons, that is obviously going to increase the risk depending on when those forces were called upon to do something. 

So readiness is a balancing act that we all have to pay attention 

to and it is readiness now to do something and then we have to 

pay attention to what kind of readiness to do what will we need 

to be at in 2020. 

We have talked a little bit about how many F–35s should have 

been on the ramp right now, and how many new tankers should 

have been on the ramp right now, and I know that we owe Congresswoman Sanchez a little look at that ancillary cost of keeping 

legacy aircraft afloat that we hadn’t planned on. And if we continue 

down that road and focus on readiness only for today, then we will 

be, 10 years from now, we will be with the same equipment, 10 

years older, in a lesser readiness level than we are now. So we are 

going to have to take some risk, between now and 10 years from 

now, in terms of how much ready for today’s fight versus how much 

ready for tomorrow’s fight. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I know that this is a difficult thing to 

discuss in an open format, but when you have the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps yesterday saying that with the President’s direction to take our military strategy from two major contingency operations down to one, and that with sequestration he gave us what 

was going to be required to undertake one and be successful and 

that sequestration took us below that level, I think people don’t 

necessarily understand that when you go from two major contingency operations to one, that means if we are occupied, others, not 

just the United States being at risk, but others could have mischief 

threatening our other allies. And certainly as we look to your diminished capacity, we look to the issue of who else besides us are 

at risk, and what does that mean for the world that those who 

might do harm to others are not as deterred knowing that our force 

structure is not what it has been. 

And that we have to articulate clearly, and I looked for each of 

you to help us find a way to say this that is not classified so we 

can convince those who don’t hear what you tell us in classified formats the message so that we can set this aside and get our budgets 

reformed. 

Ranking Member Loretta Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And these are difficult 

decisions that we are trying to make here and we appreciate getting the information from you so we can make better decisions, because that is really the role of Congress, is to try to figure out what 

we can. 

My fear is that we invest our moneys in these F–35s—look, we 

need the F–35. We all know that. It is not going away. Mr. Veasey, 

don’t worry about that. He represents Dallas and Fort Worth over 

there, you can probably tell. And we went to your place to take a 
28 

look at them. And it is not because of that reason that we are asking the questions. We are asking the questions because we are trying to figure out how do we get this all done? 

My fear is we buy a bunch of planes and what we have seen in 

some countries and we always, amongst ourselves, always are talking about these countries who buy planes but they don’t have the 

pilots trained or they don’t have the maintenance capabilities or 

operational capabilities to even know how to fly them. So we don’t 

want to end up with a bunch of planes and also have our people 

untrained to be able, as you said, to not be able to fly these things. 

So how do we do this? It is a very difficult thing to take a look at. 

I also want to talk about the F–22 right now, because I am looking at the budget and what I see is, F–22, okay, we have, what, 

about 180 or so of these that we made, not we, but great people 

on the line, obviously, and it costs about $370 million apiece. The 

Air Force is requesting $919.5 million for upgrades to the 187 F– 

22 aircraft we already have in service. That is about $5 million an 

aircraft. And the funding in this range more or less continues in 

the budget through fiscal year 2018. 

So can you tell me, $5 million, on average, $5 million worth of 

upgrades on a plane that we spent $320 million on and continuing 

forward for the next 4 or 5 years, what are we doing? What are 

we buying? Given the pressures that we have, what is that doing? 

And is it really $900 million every year for the next 4 or 5 years 

in order to—what are you doing with that, $5 million a plane for 

the next 4 or 5 years. 

General FIELD. Ma’am, I can talk to some of the capabilities of 

the F–22. In 2007, I went to Marietta, Georgia, and I picked one 

up from the factory, signed my name on the piece of paper, and the 

flyaway cost of that airplane was $91 million. So, again, this whole 

how things cost out and how much it costs per flying hour is, in 

my opinion, a very arcane and constrained science. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. If you were in a business, General, if we were in 

a business and I had my fixed costs, and that includes R&D [research and development], and my variable costs, and at the end of 

the whole thing I got to one large number and I divided it by the 

number of widgets I made, you know, yours might have cost me 

$70 million or what have you, but if my first one costs me $300 

million or $800 million, if I am a business person, we are always 

talking about how we are Americans and business is the business 

of America, if I am a business person, I am not in business if I sell 

each of those planes at $90 million apiece. 

Do you see what I am saying? So it might have cost you, that 

particular one, less. But now we are going to go back and we are 

putting $5 million, on average, maybe it is just a few, maybe it is 

the whole thing, maybe every year there is something new to put 

on it, what is in this $900 million number every year? 

General FIELD. So what it does is it enables us to operate in 

those contested environments within those threat systems that are 

being built around the world and proliferated around the world, 

whether those are new mobile surface-to-air missile systems, 

whether those are new radars that link together to make an entire 

system more capable. 
29 

What the F–22 does, because in terms of its speed and stealth 

and its fusion capability, it allows us to change the nature of that 

battle space and pick out areas that are vulnerable that would not 

be vulnerable to aircraft that don’t have that kind of capability on 

there. 

So what the upgrades over the next 5 years do is it improves the 

radar ground mapping of the aircraft so that it can find targets better on the ground; it improves the data link capability on it; and 

it puts some of our advanced weapons like the AIM–120D [advanced medium-range air-to-air missile] and the AIM–9X [Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missile] into the aircraft. 

All of those are necessary to operate in that very tough, very 

high-threat environment. And right now those F–22s, combined 

with our legacy aircraft, whether they are Air Force, Navy, or Marine, help provide a synergistic effect to how effective all of those 

aircraft are, and we have proven that time and again in exercises 

both within the United States and outside the United States. 

So that is the value that we have. And it is expensive, but I 

think that we are going to, if something bad were to happen 

around the world, that is the kind of capability we are going to 

need to initially operate in that environment, to change that battle 

space so that the rest of our legacy aircraft have a better chance 

of survival and being effective in that combat arena. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you for that. Again, I would go back to this 

whole hollowing out of, are we really going to have the skill set? 

And when I look at that, Mr. Chairman, I not only see it from, will 

our airmen be able to fly these souped-up things we soup up every 

year, but will we even be graduating people who can enter the Air 

Force Academy, for example, if we are not investing in our schools. 

Because there is always a tradeoff, domestic spending versus having the weapons in storage for when we need them. It is a very difficult thing for us to do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having called this 

hearing. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. I appreciate your partnership in working on all those important issues. 

Gentleman, as I am promised you, we will conclude with you providing any closing thoughts that you have. You don’t need to feel 

compelled. But I always want to have the opportunity in case there 

is something that has preceded your testimony that you thought 

you would like to add to the record. 

Mr. Sullivan, I will begin with you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I have nothing to add, Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Admiral Skinner. 

Admiral SKINNER. Nothing to add, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. General Schmidle. 

General SCHMIDLE. I do have something to add. 

Mr. TURNER. Very good. 

General SCHMIDLE. Just a couple of things. The first thing, Mr. 

Chairman, your discussion before about how we can talk about this 

in an unclassified environment, back to what the Commandant 

said yesterday at the hearing, I think the issue he was getting at, 

and you articulated, is ‘‘capacity.’’ That is a simple word, but that 

really just defines what we are talking about. We have capabilities, 
30 

but it is the capacity that we have that is affected by some of the 

things we have been talking about. 

And if I could, the last thing, we the Marine Corps actually have 

two F–35 squadrons stood up right now. One of them is in Florida. 

It has 11 airplanes and 17 pilots. It actually has 13 airplanes. We 

borrowed two from the Brits which we are flying. We have two 

British pilots in this squadron. And we have an operational squadron, that is our training squadron, we have an operational squadron in Yuma, Arizona, that has 4 airplanes and 7 pilots and 166 

maintainers. And we actually have marines out there turning 

wrenches on this airplane right now today without any contract 

maintenance and they are flying airplanes out there. By the end 

of this year, they will have 16 airplanes in Arizona by September 

of this year. We are going to declare the initial operating capability 

of that squadron in 2015, and then we are going to deploy it to 

Japan in 2017. So that is kind of our plan right now. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. That was a very excellent point. Admiral Moran. 

Admiral MORAN. Nothing to add. 

Mr. TURNER. General Field. 

General FIELD. Yes, sir. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for allowing us to appear before you and discuss these very important topics today. General Davis and I know that we owe some of 

you some homework and we will get that back to you as soon as 

possible, either in terms of a document or probably in a couple of 

cases a briefing, that we need to come back and have a more enriched discussion in a classified environment. 

I would like to emphasize the troubling effects of sequester that 

we have on our current and future readiness. For the first time in 

my memory, Air Force combat forces are not flying due to the lack 

of funding in the middle of a fiscal year. While we are protecting 

the current fight, those scheduled next to deploy and baseline 

training, at a large number of bases, combat training operations 

have come to a complete halt. If you have the opportunity to visit 

airmen at these bases, you are going to find the silence a bit 

unnerving. As we speak, their combat capability and effectiveness 

are eroding. 

For example, by canceling our weapons instructor courses, we 

have created a gap in the production of graduate-level instructors 

that will have long-term impacts on a generation of warfighters. 

Those instructors are the heart, the soul, and the brains of our 

warfighting capabilities. Over the years, phenomenal training programs have been developed and they sustain a United States Air 

Force that is second to none. But we have just terminated a large 

portion of those full-spectrum training operations. 

The effects of sequestration on weapons systems sustainment 

and the Flying Hour Program will not disappear on the first of October with the new fiscal year. We are developing a Return to Fly 

Program for those affected units, but it will take time, additional 

resources, and a reduced OPSTEMPO to fully recover. 

The sooner we begin to fly a full training program, the sooner we 

will recover, but make no mistake, it will be an uphill battle. The 

greatest challenge will be to find the balance between minimizing 
31 

the impact on readiness and preserving investment dollars for modernization, recapitalization of our fighter and bomber fleets, and 

the preferred munitions inventories, all the while meeting the requirements our defense strategies demand overseas. As we discussed, this is a delicate and very tough balance. 

So we appreciate the support of the subcommittee and the HASC 

[House Armed Services Committee], and I ask for your continued 

support to mitigate the effects of sequestration into fiscal year 2014 

and beyond. The sooner we can stabilize training, modernization, 

and munitions funding, the sooner we can ensure that we are on 

the track to fulfill our Nation’s requirements now and in the 

future. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Well said. 

General Davis. 

General DAVIS. Nothing, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. With that, I thank each of you for participating and 

thank you for your dedication. 

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 17, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 17, 2013 

(37) 

Statement of Hon. Loretta Sanchez 

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Tactical Air and 

Land Forces 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2014 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force Combat 

Aviation Programs 

April 17, 2013 

Today’s hearing will focus on the Fiscal Year 2014 Navy, Marine 

Corps, and Air Force requests for aircraft development, modifications, and procurement. This area of investment represents the 

largest single portion of the DOD’s entire procurement funding request. While the combat capability the Navy, Marines, and Air 

Force bring to our Armed Forces is the best in the world, it comes 

at a very high cost. 

The total Navy request for aircraft procurement and modifications, including the Marine Corps, is $18 billion. To put that figure 

in context, the Navy request for shipbuilding in FY14 is only $14 

billion. 

For the Marine Corps, which is primarily a force designed for 

ground combat, the FY14 request for aircraft procurement and 

modifications is about $3.5 billion. To put that figure in context, 

the Marine Corps entire budget for buying new ground equipment 

is only $1.3 billion. 

And finally, the Air Force request for aircraft procurement and 

modifications is about $11.4 billion. While less than the Navy and 

Marine Corps, $11 billion is still more than the entire defense 

budgets of the Netherlands, Colombia, Poland, Singapore, Greece, 

and many other countries. 

So, in FY14 it is clear that DOD continues to invest significant 

resources in maintaining the United States’ status as the world’s 

premier combat aircraft force. The question before the subcommittee today is whether or not these investments are sustainable given the many other pressures on military service budgets 

and the DOD budget as a whole. 

It is important to remember that while the Navy, Marines, and 

Air Force are proposing to spend more than $30 billion on new aircraft and modifications to current aircraft, we have: 

• 17 squadrons of Air Force fighter aircraft that have no 

money to fly; 

• an entire Aircraft Carrier battle group that did not deploy as 

planned; and 

• most of the U.S. Army has been forced to stop conducting 

training above the squad level. 
38 

At some point, it may be time to question whether or not the 

U.S. military can afford to have what amounts to three separate 

‘‘Air Forces’’—one for the Navy, one for the Marines, and one for 

the Air Force itself. For example, could the Nation perhaps get by 

with only two Air Forces instead of three? With sequester cuts now 

an unfortunate reality, it may well be time to relook assumptions 

that haven’t been challenged for a decade or more. 

I thank the witnesses for their service and look forward to their 

testimony. 
39 

GAO 

For Release on Delivery 

at 2:00 p.m. EDT 

Aplil17.201;3 

GAO-13-500T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

F-35 JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER 

Program Has Improved in 

Some Areas, but 

Mfordability Challenges 

and Other Risks Remain 

Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

GAO 

Accountability'" Integrity'" Reliability 
40 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The F-35 Lightning II, the Joint Strike 

Fighter, is DO~'s most costly and 

ambitious aircraft acquisition. The 

program is developing and fielding 

three aircraft variants for the Air Force, 

Navy, Marine Corps, and eight 

international partners. The F-35 is 

critical to long-term recapitalization 

plans as It is intended to replace 

hundreds of existing aircraft. This wI!! 

require a long-term sustained funding 

commitment Total U.S, investment is 

nearing $400 billion to develop and 

procure 2,457 aircraft through 2037. 

Fifty-two aircraft have been delivered 

through 2012 The F-35 program has 

been extensively restructured over the 

last 3 years to address prior cost, 

schedule. and performance problems, 

DOD approved a new acquisition 

program baseline in March 2012. 

GAO's prior reviews of the F~35 made 

numerous recommendations to 

improve outcomes, such as increasing 

test resources and reducing annual 

procurement quantities 

This testimony is largely based on 

GAO's recently released report, GAO13-309 This testimony discusses (1) 

progress the F-35 program made in 

2012, and (2) major risks that program 

faces going forward. GAO's work 

included analyses of a wide range of 

program documents and interviews 

with defense and contractor officials. 

'What GAO Recommeuds 

GAO has made prior recommendations 

to help reduce risk and improve 

outcomes, which DOD has 

implemented to varying degrees. 

F-35 .JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER 

Program Performance Has Improved in Some Areas, 

but Affordability Challenges and Other Risks 

Remain 

What GAO Fouud 

The new F-35 acqUisition baseline reflects positive restructuring actions taken by 

the Department of Defense (DOD) since 2010, including more time and funding 

for development and deferred procurement of more than 400 aircraft to future 

years. Overall, the program progressed on several fronts during 2012 to further 

improve the current outlook. The program achieved 7 of 10 key management 

objectives and made substantial progress on one other. Two objectives on 

aircraft deliveries and a corrective management plan were not met. The F-35 

development test program substantially met expectations with some revisions to 

fhght test plans and made considerable progress addressing key technical risks 

Software management practices and some output measures improved, although 

deliveries to test continued to lag behind plans. Manufacturing and supply 

processes also improved-indicators such as factory throughput, labor efficiency, 

and quality measures were positive. While initia! F-35 production overran target 

costs and delivered aircraft late, the latest data shows labor hours decreasing 

and deliveries accelerating 

The F-35 program still faces considerable challenges and risks. Ensuring that the 

F-35 is affordable and can be bought in the quantities and time required by the 

warfighter will be a paramount concern to the Congress, DOD, and international 

partners. With more austere budgets looming, F-35 acquisition funding 

requirements average $12 6 billion annually through 2037 (see below). Once 

fielded, the projected costs of sustaining the F-35 fleet have been deemed 

unaffordable by DOD officials; efforts to reduce these costs are underway. 

Software integration and test will be challenging as many complex tasks remain 

to enable full warfighting capability. The program is also incurring substantial 

costs for rework-currently projected at S 1. 7 billion over 10 years of production-to 

fix problems discovered during testing. With two-thirds of development testing 

still to go. additional changes to design and manufacturing are likely. The 

program continues to incur fmanclal risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for 

$57.8 billion before completing development flight testing 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition Funding Requirements 

Dollars (ihen year In b)lilonSi 

,. 

,. 

14 

12 ----------c=0-tr.TI-1r+~+r+r+r~4t_+4-·---'-----·----·-~-·---·---·· 

10 

FIsca!year 

_______________ United States Government Accountability Office 
41 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the F·35 Lightning II, 

also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). At a cost approaching $400 

billion, the F·35 is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and 

ambitious acquisition program. The program is developing and fielding 

three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and eight 

international partners. The F·35 is the linchpin of U.S. and partner plans 

to replace existing fighters and support future combat operations. In a 

time of austere federal budgets, DOD continues to project significant 

long-term sustained funding requirements for the F-35 while, at the same 

time, pursuing several other expensive systems. Over the past 3 years, 

DOD has extensively restructured the F'35 program to address poor cost, 

schedule, and performance outcomes. Most recently, in March 2012, 

DOD established a new, more realistic, F-35 acquisition program baseline 

that reflects increased costs, longer schedule times, and deferred 

procurement of 41 0 aircraft to the future. Appendix I tracks program 

baseline changes since the start of system development in 2001. 

We have reported annually on F-35 issues since 2005. ' My testimony 

today is largely based on the results of our latest review,2 and addresses 

(1) the progress the F-35 program made in 2012 and (2) the major risks 

that the program faces going forward. To conduct our work, we reviewed 

program status reports and briefings, management objectives, test plans 

and results, and internal DOD analyses with a focus on accomplishments 

in calendar year 2012 compared to original plans for that year. We 

obtained manufacturing data and cumulative outputs from the start of 

production in 2007 through the end of 2012, and discussed development 

and production issues and results to date, future expansion plans, and 

improvement efforts with DOD, F-35 program, and contractor officials. We 

toured the aircraft manufacturing plant, obtained production and supply 

performance indicators, identified cumulative and projected engineering 

changes, and discussed factory improvements and management controls 

with members of the contractor's work force and DOD plant 

representatives. We evaluated DOD's restructuring actions and impacts 

1See related GAO products at the end of this statement 

2GAO, F-35 Joint Strike 

Is a Major Concern, 

Page 1 

Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term Affordabflity 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11,2013) 

GAO-13-500T 
42 

F-35 Program 

Performance 

Improved in 2012 

Development Testing 

Objectives Were Achieved 

on the program, tracked cost and schedule changes from program start to 

the March 2012 baseline, and determined factors driving the changes, 

We obtained current projections of acquisition funding needs through 

2037 and estimated life cycle sustainment funding requirements, We 

conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards, 

The F-35 program made progress in 2012 on several fronts, The program 

met or substantially met most of its key management and development 

testing objectives for the year, We also found that the program made 

progress in addressing key technical risks, as well as improving software 

management, manufacturing, and supply processes 

The F-35 program met or substantially met most of its key management 

objectives established for calendar year 2012, The program office 

annually establishes major management objectives that it wants to 

achieve in the upcoming year, The F-35 program achieved 7 of its 10 

primary objectives in 2012, Those included, among other things, the 

completion of development testing on early increments of software, the 

beginning of lab testing for both variations of the helmet mounted display, 

the beginning of pilot training for two aircraft variants, and the completion 

of negotiations on the restructured development contract Although the 

program did not complete its software block 33 critical design review as 

planned in 2012, it did successfully complete its block 3 preliminary 

design review in November 2012 and the critical design review in late 

January 2013, The program did not meet its objectives to (1) deliver 40 

production aircraft in 2012 and (2) receive approval from the Defense 

Contract Management Agency of the contractor's plan for correcting 

deficiencies in its system for tracking and reporting cost and schedule 

progress4 

3 Software capabHlties are developed, tested, and de!lvered In three major blocks. Block 3 

IS to provide the F-35 its full warfighting capability 

4This specifically refers to the contractor's Earned Value Management System. which has 

been found to be deficient. Earned value management is a disciplined process for 

tracking, controlling, and reporting contract costs and schedule. DOD requires its use by 

major defense suppliers to facilitate good insight and oversight of the expenditure of 

government dollars. 

Page 2 GAO·13·500T 
43 

Progress Made in 

Addressing Key Technical 

Risks 

The F-35 development flight test program also substantially met 2012 

expectations with some revisions to original plans. The program 

exceeded its planned number of flights by 18 percent. although it fell short 

of its plan in terms of test points' flown by about 3 percent, suggesting 

that the flights flown were not as productive as expected Test officials 

had to make several adjustments to plans during the year due to 

operating and performance limitations with aircraft and late releases of 

software to test. As a result, none of the three variants completed all of 

their planned 2012 baseline points, but the test team was able to add and 

complete some test paints that had been planned for future years. Testing 

accomplished on each of the aircraft variants in 2012 included: 

Conventional takeoff and landing variant (F-35A)-accomplished high 

angle of attack testing, initial weapons separation, engine air start, 

expansion of the airspeed and altitude envelopes, and evaluated 

flying qualities with internal and external weapons.' 

Short takeoff and vertical landing variant (F-35B)-accomplished the 

first weapons release, engine air start tests, fuel dump operations, 

flight envelope expansion with weapons loaded, radar signature 

testing, and tested re-design air inlet doors for vertical lift operations 

Carrier suitable variant (F-35C)-conducted speed and altitude range 

verification and flights with external weapons, prepared for simulated 

carrier landings, and conducted shore-based tests of a redesigned 

arresting hook. 

In 2012, the F-35 program also made considerable progress in 

addressing four areas of technical risk that could substantially degrade 

the F-35's capabilities and mission effectiveness. However, additional 

work remains to fully address those risks. These risk areas and the 

actions taken in 2012 are discussed below: 

1. Helmet mounted display (HMO)-OOO continued to address technical 

issues with the HMO system. The original helmet mounted display, 

integral to mission systems, encountered significant technical 

5Flight test points are specific, quantifiable objectives in flight plans that are needed to 

verify aircraft design and performance. 

60ue primarily to operating restrictions and deficiencies in the air refueling system, the F35A did not accomplish as many flights as planned and fell short of planned test points by 

about 15 percent 

Page 3 GAO-13-500T 
44 

Output Improved 

deficiencies and did not meet wariighter requirements. The program is 

pursuing a dual path by developing a second. less capable helmet 

while working to fix the first helmet design. In 2012, DOD began 

dedicated ground and flight testing to address these issues. Both 

variations of the helmet mounted display are being evaluated and 

program and contractor officials told us that they have increased 

confidence that the helmet deficiencies will be fixed. DOD may make 

a decision in 2013 as to which helmet to procure 

2. Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALlS)-ALIS is an important 

tool to predict and diagnose aircraft maintenance and supply issues. 

ALiS systems with limited capability are in use at training and testing 

locations. More capable versions of ALiS are being developed and 

program and contractor officials believe that the program is on track to 

fix identified shortcomings and field the fully capable system in 2015 

Limited progress was made in 2012 on developing a smaller, 

transportable version needed to support unit level deployments to 

operating locations 

3. Arresting hook system-The carrier variant arresting hook system 

was redesigned after the original hook was found to be deficient, 

which prevented active carrier trials. The program accomplished risk 

reduction testing of a redesigned hook point to inform this new design. 

The preliminary design review was conducted in August 2012 and the 

critical design review in February 2013. Flight testing of the 

redesigned system is slated for late 2013. 

4. Structural durability-Over time, testing has discovered bulkhead and 

rib cracks on the aircraft. Structural and durability testing to verify that 

ali three variants can achieve expected life and identify life-limited 

parts was completed in 2012. The program is testing some 

redesigned structures and planning other modifications. Officials plan 

to retrofit and test a production aircraft already built and make 

changes to the production line for subsequent aircraft. Current 

projections show the aircraft and modifications remain within weight 

targets. 

In 2012, the F-35 aircraft contractor and program office took steps to 

improve the program's software management and output. The program 

began the process of establishing a second system integration laboratory, 

adding substantial testing and development capacity. The program also 

began prioritizing and focusing its resources on incremental software 

development as opposed to the much riskier concurrent development 

approach. In addition, the program began implementing improvement 

initiatives recommended by an independent software review, and 

Page 4 GAO-13-500T 
45 

Manufacturing Process 

Metrics Improved 

evaluated the possible deferral of some of the aircraft's capabilities to 

later blocks or moving them outside of the current F-35 program 

altogether. At the same time, program data regarding software output 

showed improvement. For example, program officials reported that the 

time it took to fix software defects decreased from 180 days to 55 days, 

and the time it took to build and release software for testing decreased 

from 187 hours to 30 hours, 

Key manufacturing metrics and discussions with defense and contracting 

officials indicate that F-35 manufacturing and supply processes improved 

during 2012, While initial F-35 production overran target costs and 

delivered aircraft late, the latest data through the end of 2012 shows labor 

hours decreasing and deliveries accelerating, The aircraft contractor's 

work force is gaining important experience and processes are maturing 

as more aircraft are built. The labor hours needed to complete aircraft at 

the prime contractor's plant decreased, labor efficiency since the first 

production aircraft improved, time to manufacture aircraft in the final 

assembly area declined, factory throughput increased, and the amount of 

traveled work declined, In addition, program data show that the reliability 

and predictability of the manufacturing processes increased while at the 

same time aircraft delivery rates improved considerably, Figure 1 

illustrates the improvement in production aircraft delivery time frames by 

comparing actual delivery dates against the dates specified in the 

contracts. 

Page 5 GAO·13·500T 
46 

Figure 1: F-35 Production Aircraft Deliveries Compared to Contract Dates 

Month 

Feb·13 

Nov-12 

Aug-12 

May-12 

Feb-12 

Nov-11 

Aug-11 

May·11 

Jan·11 

Ocl·10 

Juj·10 

Apr-10 

~ 

1~lllffflllllffllllll;IIIIII;/~'~'9~9'9 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ 

AIrcraft 

F-35 Program Still 

Faces Risks 

. __ Actualdelivery'l'on!h 

~ ... - - Oqgmal contra<:(uai delivery month 

Note The numbered aircraft are in order of delivery. AF;;;: U.S. Air Force 

Corps F-358, CF "" U S. Department of the Navy F-35C. and BK "" United 

BF US. Marine 

F-35B 

Ensuring that the F-35 is affordable and can be bought in the quantities 

and time frames required by the warfighter will be of paramount concern 

to the Congress, U.S. military and international partners. The acquisition 

funding requirements for the United States alone are currently expected 

to average $12.6 billion per year through 2037, and the projected costs of 

operating and sustaining the F-35 fleet, once fielded, have been deemed 

unaffordable by DOD officials. In addition, the program faces challenges 

with software development and continues to incur substantial costs for 

rework to fix deficiencies discovered during testing. As testing continues 

additional changes to design and manufacturing processes will likely be 

required, while production rates continue to increase. 

PageS GAO-13-500T 
47 

Long-Term Affordability 

Remains a Concern 

The March 2012 acquisition program baseline places the F-35 program 

on firmer footing, but aircraft are expected to cost more and deliveries to 

warfighters will take longer than previously projected, The new baseline 

projects the need for a total of $316 billion in development and 

procurement funding from 2013 through 2037, or an average of $12,6 

billion annually over that period (see figure 2), Maintaining this level of 

sustained funding will be difficult in a period of declining or flat defense 

budgets and competition with other "big ticket items" such as the KC-46 

tanker and a new bomber program, In addition, the funding projections 

assume the financial benefits of the international partners purchasing at 

least 697 aircraft If fewer aircraft are procured in total or in smaller 

annual quantities-by the international partners or the United States-unit 

costs will likely rise according to analysis done by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OS D) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

(CAPE) office, 

Figure 2: F-35 Program Budgeted Development and Procurement Funding Requirements, Fiscal Years 2013-2037 

" 

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 202:6 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2017 

Fisca!yC'3r 

Note: Development and procurement of the Marine Corps variant is included in the Department of the 

Navy budget accounts 

Page 7 GAO·13·500T 
48 

Software Development 

Challenges Remain 

In addition to the costs for acquiring aircraft, significant concerns and 

questions persist regarding the cost to operate and sustain the F-35 fleet 

over the coming decades. The current sustainment cost projection by 

CAPE for all U.S. aircraft, based on an estimated 30-year service life, 

exceeds $1 trillion. Using current program assumptions of aircraft 

inventory and flight hours, CAPE recently estimated annual operating and 

support costs of $18.2 billion for all F-35 variants compared to $11.1 

billion spent on legacy aircraft in 2010. DOD officials have declared that 

operating and support costs of this magnitude are unaffordable and the 

department is actively engaged in evaluating opportunities to reduce 

those costs, such as basing and infrastructure reductions, competitive 

sourcing, and reliability improvements. 

Because of F-35 delays and uncertainties, the military services have 

made investments to extend the service lives of legacy F-16 and F-18 

aircraft at a cost of $5 billion (in 2013 dollars). The Navy is also buying 

new F/A-18E/F Super Hornets at a cost of $3.1 billion (in then-year 

dollars) to bridge the gap in F-35 deliveries and mitigate projected 

shortfalls in fighter aircraft force requirements. As a result, the services 

will incur additional future sustainment costs to support these new and 

extended-life aircraft, and will have a difficult time establishing and 

implementing retirement schedules for existing fleets. 

Over time, F-35 software requirements have grown in size and complexity 

and the contractor has taken more time and effort than expected to write 

computer code, integrate it on aircraft and subsystems, conduct lab and 

flight tests to verify it works, and to correct defeds found in testing. 

Although recent management actions to refocus software development 

activities and implement improvement initiatives appear to be yielding 

benefits, software continues to be a very challenging and high-risk 

undertaking, especially for mission systems" While most of the aircraft's 

software code has been developed, a SUbstantial amount of integration 

and test work remain before the program can demonstrate full warfighting 

capability. About 12 percent of mission systems capabilities have now 

been validated, up from 4 percent about a year ago. However, progress 

7Mission systems are Critical enablers of F-35's combat effectiveness, employing next 

generation sensors with fused information from on-board and off-board systems (i.e,. 

electronic warfare, communication navigation identification, electro-optical target system, 

electro-optical distnbuted aperture system, radar, and data links), 

Page 8 GAO·13-500T 
49 

Rework Continue to Add 

Cost cmd Risk 

on mission systems was limited in 2012 by contractor delays in software 

delivery, limited capability in the software when delivered, and the need to 

fix problems and retest multiple software versions. Further development 

and integration of the most complex elements-sensor fusion and helmet 

mounted display-lie ahead 

F-35 software capabilities are being developed, tested and delivered in 

three major blocks and two increments-initial and final-within each 

block. The testing and delivery status of the three blocks is described 

below: 

Block 1.0, providing initial training capability, was largely completed in 

2012, although some final development and testing will continue 

Also, the capability delivered did not fully meet expected requirements 

relating to the helmet, ALlS, and instrument landing capabilities. 

Block 2.0, providing initial warfighting capabilities and limited 

weapons, fell behind due to integration challenges and the 

reallocation of resources to fix block 1.0 defects. The initial increment, 

block 2A, delivered late and was incomplete. Full release of the final 

increment, block 2B, has been delayed until November 2013 and will 

not be complete until late 2015. 

Block 3.0 providing full warfighting capability, to include sensor fusion 

and additional weapons, is the capability required by the Navy and Air 

Force for declaring their respective initial operational capability dates. 

Thus far, the program has made little progress on block 3.0 software 

The program intends initial block 3.0 to enter flight test in 2013. This is 

rated as one of the program's highest risks because of its complexity 

Although F-35 manufacturing, cost, and schedule metrics have shown 

improvement, the aircraft contractor continues to make major design and 

tooling changes and alter manufacturing processes while development 

testing continues. Engineering design changes from discoveries in 

manufacturing and testing are declining in number, but are still substantial 

and higher than expected from a program this far along in production 

Further, the critical work to test and verify aircraft design and operational 

performance is far from complete. Cumulatively, since the start of 

developmental flight testing, the program has accomplished 34 percent of 

its planned flights and test points. For development testing as a whole, 

the program verified 11.3 percent of the development contract 

specifications through November 2012. As indicated in table 1, DOD 

continues to incur financial risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for 

$57.8 billion before completing development flight testing. 

Page 9 GAO-13-500T 
50 

Table 1: F·35 Procurement Investments and Flight Test Progress 

Concluding Remarks 

W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 

This highly concurrent approach to procurement and testing increases the 

risk that the government will incur substantial costs to retrofit (rework) 

already produced aircraft to fix deficiencies discovered in testing. In fact, 

the F-35 program office projects rework costs of about $900 million to fix 

the aircraft procured on the first four annual procurement contracts. 

Substantial rework costs are also forecasted to continue through the 10th 

annual contract (fiscal year 2016 procurement), but at decreasing 

amounts annually and on each aircraft. The program office projects about 

$827 million more to rework aircraft procured under the next 6 annual 

contracts. 

Restructuring actions place the F-35 program on firmer footing, although 

aircraft are expected to cost more and deliveries to warfighters will take 

longer. Going forward, ensuring afford ability is of paramount concern as 

more austere budgets are looming. The program continues to incur 

financial risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for $57.8 billion before 

completing development flight testing. Meanwhile, the services are 

making significant investments to extend the life of existing aircraft and to 

buy new ones to mitigate shortfalls due to F-35 delays. Overall, the F-35 

Joint Strike Fighter program is now moving in the right direction after a 

long, expensive, and arduous learning process. It still has tremendous 

challenges ahead. The program must fully validate design and 

operational performance against warfighter requirements, while, at the 

same time, making the system affordable so that the United States and 

partners can acquire new capabilities in the quantity needed and can then 

sustain the force over its life cycle. DOD and the contractor now need to 

demonstrate that the F-35 program can effectively perform against cost 

Page 10 GAO·13-500T 
51 

GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

and schedule targets in the new baseline and deliver on promises. Until 

then, it will continue to be difficult for the United States and international 

partners to confidently plan, prioritize, and budget for the future; retire 

aging aircraft; and establish basing plans with a support infrastructure, 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and members of the House 

Armed Services Committee, this completes my prepared statement I 

would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have 

For further information on this statement, please contact Michael Sullivan 

at (202) 512-4841 or sulhvanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

are Bruce Fairbairn, Travis Masters, Marvin Bonner, W Kendal Roberts, 

Megan Porter, and Erin Stockdale. 

Page 11 GAO-13-500T 
52 

Appendix I: Changes in Reported F -35 

Program Quantity, Cost, and Deliveries, 2001-

2012 

------------------------------ _F_irs_t_pr~_d_uc_ti_on_air_~~_d_e_!iv_e_ry ___________ ~O_O_8 ____ ~~~ _____ 2_0_10 ____ 2_0_10 ______ 20_1_1_ 

!nitial operat!onal capability 2010·2012 2012-2013 2012·2015 TBD TBD 

FuH-rate production --"----------2-012--- 2013 2013 2016 2019 

GAO "n3Iys,s of DOD dUla 

Note· TBo means to be determined, 

Page 12 GAO-13-500T 
53 

Related GAO Products 

(121139) 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-13-294SP. Washington, D.C .. March 28, 2013. 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term 

Affordability Is a Major Concern. GAO-13-309. Washington, D.C.: March 

11,2013 

Joint Stnke Fighter: 000 Actions Needed to Further Enhance 

Restructuring and Address Affordabi/ity Risks GAO-'12-437. 

Washington, D.C .. June 14, 2012. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Added Resources and Reduced Risk, 

but Concurrency Is Still a Major Concern. GAO-12-525T. Washington, 

D.c.. March 20, 2012. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Implications of Program Restructuring and Other 

Recent Developments on Key Aspects of DOD's Prior Alternate Engine 

Analyses. GAO-11-903R. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2011. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but 

Progress Still Lags. GAO-11-325. Washington, D.C .. April 7, 2011. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting 

Warfighter Requirements on Time. GAO-10-382. Washington, D.C.: 

March 19, 2010. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing 

Development Increases the Government's Financial Risk. GAO,09-303. 

Washington D.C.: March 12,2009. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks. 

GAO-D8-388, Washington, D.C .. March 11, 2008. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. 

GAO-07-360. Washington, D.C .. March 15, 2007. 

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing 

Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. GAO-06-356. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2006. 

Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter 

Program with Different Acquisition Strategy. GAO-05-271. Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

Page 13 GAQ·13·500T 
54 

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56 

Michael J. Sullivan 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team 

O.S. GAO, Dayton Field Office 

(937)258-7915 

sullivanm@gao.gov 

Mr. Sullivan currently serves as Director, Acquisition and 

Sourcing Management, at the O.S. Government Accountability 

Office. This group has responsibility for examin'ng the 

effectiveness of DOD's acquisition and procurement practices in 

meeting its mission performance object and requirements. In 

addition to directing reviews of maj weapon system 

acquisitions such as the Joint Strike Fighter, , Global 

Hawk, and various other major weapon acquisition programs, Mr. 

Sullivan has developed and directs a body work examining how 

the Department of Defense can apply best practices to 

nation's largest and most lJy advanced weapon systems 

acquisition system. Th work has spanned a broad range of 

critical to the successful delivery of systems, including 

technology development; product development; transItion to 

productIon; tware development; 9rogram management; 

requirement-setting; COSt estimating; and strategIc portfolio 

management. The findings and recommendations from this work 

have played a rna or role in the department's recent acquisition 

90licy revisions. Most recently, he has directed the GAO's 

annual assessment of major weapon systems 9rograms for the 

Conqress and GAO's work with Congress in Lablishing 

acquisition policy reforms. His team also provides the Congress 

with early warning technical and management challenges facing 

these investments. 

Mr. Sullivan has been with GAO 27 years. He received a 

ti Science Indiana University 

Masters Degree Public Administration from the School of 

and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University. 
57 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

T ACT1CAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

STATEMENT OF 

VICE ADMIRAL W. MARK SKINNER 

PRINCIPAL MILITARY DEPUTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION) 

AND 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT SCHMIDLE, USMC 

DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION 

AND 

REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM MORAN, USN 

DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE 

BEFORE THE 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

ON 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S A VIA nON PROCUREMf'NT PROGRAM 

APRIL 17,2013 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 
58 

INTRODUCTION 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Sanchez, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, 

we thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of 

the Navy's (DoN) Aviation programs. Our testimony will provide background and 

rationale for the Department's Fiscal Year 2014 Budget request for aviation programs 

aligning to our strategic priorities and budgetary goals. 

The United States is a maritime nation with global responsibilities. OUf Navy and 

Marine Corps' persistent presence and multi-mission capability represent U.s. power 

projection across the global commons. They move at will across the world's oceans, seas 

and littorals, and they extend the effccts of thc sea··base deep inland. Naval Aviation 

provides our nation's leaders with "offshore options." We enable global reach and 

access, regardless of changing circumstances, and will continue to be the nation's 

preeminent option for employing deterrence through global presence, sea control, mission 

nexibility and when necessary, interdiction. We arc an agile strike and amphibious 

power projection force in readiness, and such agility requires that the aviation arm of our 

naval strike and expeditionary forces remain strong. 

There arc several central themes to our 2014 Naval Aviation Budget plan: 5th generation 

fighter/attack capability; persistent multi-role intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance; supporting capabilities such as electronic attack, maritime patrol, and 

vertical lift; robust strike weapons programs; and targeted modernization of the force for 

relevance and sustainability. 

First, we arc acquiring F-35 5th generation fighler/a!tack aircraft while maintaining 

sufficient legacy aircraft inventory capacity. Our plan will integrate 5th generation 

technologies into the carrier air-wing and expeditionary forces while maintaining and 

modernizing the capability of the legacy fleet F-35 will be a "day-one" capable strikefighter that is flexible and survivable. The F-35B wil! replace Marine Corps legacy F/A18A-D Hornet and A V -8B Harrier and the F-35C will complement the capabilities of the 

F/A-18EIF Super Hornet. We have maintained our F-3SB and F-35C procurement 

profile achieving the program procurement stability in line with the improvements in 

program accountability, discipline and transparency. Thc overall F-35 development 

program is adequately resourced and has realistic schedule planning factors to complete 

System Development and Demonstration. Although challenges still remain, the Navy 

and Marine Corps are fully committcd to both the F-35B and F-35C variants as we 

believe this aircraft is on sound footing towards delivering full Block 3 capabilities. 

The FI A-18EIF will continue to receive capability enhancements 10 sustain its lethality 

well into the next decadc. Future avionics upgrades will enable network-centric 

operations for situational awareness and transfer of data to command-and-control nodes. 
59 

To meet the demand for persistent, multi-role intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) capability, the Navy and Marine Corps are building a balanced 

portfolio of manned and unmanned aircraft, leveraging other service capacity where able, 

but valuing the unique contribution of maritime ISR. Unmanned systems have 

experienced high growth in the past decade and have proved to be invaluable assets for 

the joint force commanders. Because of their increasing presence, importance, and 

integration on the maritime and littoral battlefields, the roadmaps for the unmanned air 

systems are now included alongside the manned aircraft platforms in the mission 

categories they serve. The Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillancc and 

Strike (UCLASS) air system will provide a persistent aircraft carrier-based 

rcconnaissance and strike capability to support carrier air-wing operations beginning by 

the end of the decade. MQ-4C Triton will provide persistent Jand-based maritime 

surveillance and complement our P-8 Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA); MQ-8 

Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) will provide 

ISR support to our Littoral Combat Ships (LCS); and smaller unmanned systems as the 

RQ-21 A Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (STUAS) and RQ-7B Marine Corps 

Tactical UAS (MCTUAS) will provide the shorter duration, line-of-sight reconnaissance 

capability essential for the unit level. 

The Fiscal Year 2014 Bndget request enables Naval Aviation to continue recapitalization 

of our aging fleets of airborne early warning, maritime patrol, electronic attack, and 

vertical lift platforms. 

The Department is recapitalizing our Heet of E-2C airborne early warning aircraft with 

the E-2D. E-2D integrates a new electronically-scanned radar that provides a twogeneration leap in technology with the capability to detect and track emerging air and 

cruise missile threats in support of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (rAMD). We 

continue efforts to replace our aged fleet of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft with a modern 

P-8A equipped with a sensor suite that provides persistent undersea and anti-surface 

warfare capabilities. Electronic attack capabilities, both carrier-based and expeditionary, 

continue to mature with plans to field sixteen EA-18G squadrons, while we also continue 

development of the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) to replace the legacy ALQ-99 

Tactical Jamming System. 

The Navy and Marine Corps are participating in Joint Future Vertical Lift efforts to 

identify leverage points for future rotorcraft investment. Currently, the Department 

continues to modernize vertical lift capability and capacity with procurement of MH60RIS, AH-1Z, UH-IY. CH-53K. MV-22B, and the fleet of Presidential Helicopters 

(VXX program). 

Finally, within our Fiscal Year 2014 Budget request, the Department is continuing 

investments in the strike weapons programs that enable any deterrence or combat 

operation to ultimately succeed. Strike weapons investments include the Air Intercept 

2 
60 

Missjle/AIM-9X Block 2; Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB lI); the Joint Standoff Weapon 

(JSOW C-l); Tactical Tomahawk Cmise Missiles (TACTOMIBLK IV); and the 

Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM). These capabilities ensure our 

Navy and Marine Corps warfighters can and will dominate in the air, on the world's 

oceans, seas and littorals, and in any land-combat operation. 

TACTICAl-AVIATION (TACAIR) 

F-35BIF-35C Lightning II: 

The Department of the Navy remains firmly committed to both the F-35B Short Take-Off 

and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant and the F-35C Carrier Variant (CV) of the Joint 

Strike Fighter (JSF) program, as they are essential to our immediate and long-range Navy 

and Marine Corps aviation strategy and the nation's security. F-35 will supplant the 

DoN's aging TACAIR fleet by replacing the Navy and Marine Corps legacy F/A-18A-D 

Homet and the Marine Corps A V -8B Harrier. The incorporation of F-35B and F-35C 

aircraft into our naval foree will provide the dominant, multi-role, fifth-generation 

capabilities that are essential across the full spectmm of combat operations to deter 

potential advcrsarics and cnable future naval aviation power projection. 

The F-35B STOVL variant combines the multi-role versatility and strike fighter 

capability of the legacy F/A-18 with the basing flexibility of the A V-8B. The Marine 

Corps will leverage the F-35B's sophisticated sensor suite and very low obscrvable 

(VLO) fifth-generation strikc fighter capabilities, particularly in the area of data 

collection and information dissemination, to support the Marine Air Ground Task Force 

(MAGTF) well beyond the abilities of today's MAGTF expeditionary attack and strike 

assets. Having these capabilities in one aircraft will provide the joint force commander 

and the MAGTF commander unprecedented strategic and operational agility. Similarly, 

the F-35C complements the FI A-18EIF Block II and EA-18G in providing survivable, 

long-range strike capability and persistence in an access-denied environment. Together, 

the F-35B and F-35C will provide the Expeditionary Strike Group and Carrier Strike 

Group commanders a survivable, "day-one" strike capability in a denied access 

environment with the tactical agility and strategic f1exibility to counter a broad spectrum 

of threats and win in operational scenarios that cannot be addressed by curren! legacy 

aircraft. 

With the resources applied H' the F-35 program at the March 2012 Milestone B 

recertification and reflected in Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget request, the overall 

F-35 development program is adequately resoU[ced with realistic schedule planning 

factors to complete System Development and Demonstration (SDD). The SDD contract 

renegotiation has been completed and includes these updated planning factors. Although 

challenges still remain, this plan has strong support within the Department of the Navy as 

3 
61 

we believe it places the development program on sound footing towards delivering full 

Block 3 capabilities. 

DoD established the F-35 program with a planned measure of concurrent development 

and production that balanced cost, risk, and need for T ACAIR modernization. 

Concurrency, however, is a transient issue in which risks progressively decline through 

the end of SDD. Over the past year, the F-35 program has worked with Lockheed Martin 

to implement a concurrency management structure and refinc the estimate of concurrency 

costs based on discrete test and qualification events. As more testing is completed, 

concurrency risks are progressively reduced as the design is confirmed or issues 

identified requiring changes are incorporated. Earlier aircraft are open to a greater need 

for changes, and as succeeding Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Jots arc built, their 

cumulative requirements for retrofit modifications decline. Furthermore, beginning with 

LRIP 5, Lockheed Martin is contractually obligated to share in the costs associated with 

concurrcncy. 

F-35 sustainment costs remain a concern. The DoN continues to support the F-35 Joint 

Program Office (JPO) in its disciplined approach to analyzing and reducing sustainment 

costs. While the JPO and the Services made progress this past year identifying 

approximately $30 billion (CYI2$) in projected life-cycle savings, there is more work to 

do in this area and the focus remains. The DoN, working in concert with the JPO, will 

analyze options outside of the Program Executive Office's (PEO) span of control to 

reduce operating cost such as rcviewing basing options and sequencing. unit level 

manpower/squadron size, and discrete sustainment requirements. Through these 

combined efforts, the Department believes the PEO can increase convergence on an 

affordable F-35 sustainment strategy that both meets the required level of Service/Partner 

performance and lowers the total life cycle cost of the overall program. 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President'S Budget requests $1.0 billion in Research, Development, 

Test & Evaluation (RDT&E,N) to continue the F-35 SDD program and $2.9 billion in 

Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) for ten F-35 aircraft (six F-35B and four F-35C) with 

associated aircraft hardware, modification requirements. and spares. The request 

includes funding for Block 4 for systems engineering and planning to achieve follow on 

capabilities for emerging and evolving threats. Maintaining procurement rate, and an 

eventual optimum production ramp rate, is eritical towards achieving F-35 affordability 

goals and preventing excessive expenditures on aircraft with limited service-life and 

decreasing operational relevance. 

The DoN is aware of the many challenges that remain on the F-35 program, but the 

program is improving and showing accountability, discipline, and transparency. The F35 is an essential future NavylMarine Corps Aviation capability and the Department is 

fully committed to the F-35B and F-35C variants of this program. The DoN continues to 

closely monitor all F-35 development, production, and sustainment to ensure that this 

4 
62 

capability is obtained at the lowest cost, at the earliest date possible, to meet our national 

security obligations. 

F/A-18 Overview 

The F I A-18 Hornets have consistently met readiness and operational commitments. 

There are 24 Navy Super Hornet squadrons with 506 F/A-18E/Fs; deliveries and 

squadron transitions will continue through 2016. There are II Navy and II Marine 

Corps F/A-I8 A-D squadrons with 621 legacy A-D Hornets. While the F/A-18A-Ds 

transition to the F/A-I8E/F and F-35, the current inventory of F/A-18A-Ds will comprise 

more than half of the DoN's strike fighter inventory well into 2013. Super Hornets and 

legacy Hornets have conducted more than 189,000 combat missions since September 11, 

2001. Over the last twelve years of eombat operations, deployed ashore and aboard our 

aircraft carriers at sea, Department of the Navy F I A-18s have provided vital over watch 

and direct support to our troops in combat, on the ground, and in multiple theaters of 

operation, brought significant precision ordnance and laser-guided munitions to the fight, 

and have employed thousands of rounds of twenty-millimeter ammunition supporting 

forces during strafing runs. 

Both the legacy Hornet and the Super Hornet were procured with an objective of20 

years' time in service. The average legacy Hornet has exceeded that goal (73 percent of 

legacy aircraft exceed 20 years of age) and the Super Hornet is already at almost 30 

percent of its expected 20 year life. Based on current trends we anticipate that most 

aircraft will substantially exceed 20 years in service. 

F/A-18 A/B/C/o (Legacy) Hornet 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $59.5 million in APN is for the 

continuation of a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and system upgrades and 

obsolescence programs for the inventory of 621 legacy FI A-18 Hornets. Funds requested 

will procure and install SLEP kits required to extend the service life of select candidate 

F/A-18A-D aircraft to 10,000 flight hours. The High Flight Hour (HFH) inspections and 

SLEP modifications can extend the FI A-18A-D service life beyond 8,000 flight hours. 

Continued investment in Program Related Engineering (PRE) and Program Related 

Logistics (PRL) funds within the Operations and Maintenance, Navy accounts is critical 

for sustaining the combat relevancy of the DoN's legacy platforms through the TACAIR 

transition. 

The F/A-I8 A-D was designed for, and has achieved. a service life of 6,000 flight hours. 

These aircraft have perfonned as expected through their design life and now service life 

management of this aircraft is intended to extend this platform well beyond its designed 

6,000 flight hours. Naval Aviation has been successful in achieving 8,000 flight hours 

per aircraft and is pursuing a strategy to go as far as 10,000 flight hours on select aircraft. 

5 
63 

Ongoing service life management initiatives continue to demonstrate excellent return on 

investment (ROI) against the effort to close the Strike Fighter shortfall gap. 

Flying aircraft outside their design life is not without risk and comes with less 

predictability and more variability. In order to mitigate this risk, engineering analysis 

will continue to ensure our ability to address these discoveries, lesson burden on the 

operating forces, and ensure needed aircraft availability. Fleet Readiness Centers have 

the capacity to execute the required number of HFH inspections and SLEP modifications. 

In order to maintain warfighting relevancy in a changing threat environment, we will 

continue to procure and install advanced systems such as Joint Hclmet-Mounted Cueing 

Systems (JHMCS), Multi .. Function Information Distribution System (MIDS), APG-73 

radar enhancements, Advanced Targeting FUR (A TFUR) upgrades, and UTENING for 

the Marine Corps on selected F/A-lSA-D aircraft. 

The continued outstanding efforts of the NavylMarine Corps team will further define 

necessary actions required to manage aging F/A-18 A-D aircraft, address discovery of 

potentially greater than expected fatigue and corrosion, and ensure required availability 

of aircraft untilloint Strike Fighter Fleet Introduction. 

F/A-18 ElF Super Hornet 

The f<iscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $206.5 million in APN for tasks 

common to F/A-iSEIF and EA-lSG production; $491.9 million in APN to implement 

aircraft commonality programs to maintain capabilities and improve reliahility/structural 

safety of the Super Hornet Hcet; and $2!.9 million RDT &E,N to support the F/A-1SE/F 

Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP). 

The FI A-I SElf< significantly improves the survivability and strike capability of the carrier 

air-wing. The Super Hornet provides increased combat radius and endurance, and a 

twenty-five percent increase in weapons payload over legacy Hornets. The production 

program continues to deliver on-cost and oll-schedule. 

TIlere are no F/A-1SEIF aircraft programmed in Fiscal Ycar 2014; only the 21 EA-lSGs. 

Fiscal Year 2013 is the final planned procurement year to complete the Program of 

Record (POR) of 552 F/A-1SE/F aircraft. The Congressional add of 11 F/A-1SE/F in 

2013 changes the total numher of aircraft 10 563 which \vill be incorporated into the POR 

with the next budget submission. A Multi-Year Procurement contract for 124 FI A-18EIF 

Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers (Fiscal Years 20!O through 2(13) was signed on 

September 24,2010. In December 2010, the Secretary of Defense added 41 F/A-IS ElF 

aircraft to the Fiscal Year 2012 President's Budget request in Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2014. 

6 
64 

All Lot 30 (Fiscal Year 2006) and beyond F/A-18E1Fs and EA-18Gs have the APG-79 

Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar system installed in production, and a 

retrofit program exists to modify 133 Lot 26-29 Block n aircraft with the AESA Radar. 

More than 300 APG-79 AESA Radars have been produced to date. The Navy plans to 

equip all 415 Block II Super Hornets with AESA Radars, providing the Super Hornet a 

significant increase in detection range, lethality and survivability over the legacy Hornets. 

Successfully deployed since 2007, AESA Radar equipped squadrons are highly valued by 

fleet commanders because of their ability to share tactical baltic space management data 

with the non-AESA radar tactical aircraft in the carrier battle group. The F/A-18EIF and 

EA-18G with the APG-79 are force multipliers. 

Production Engineering Support (PES) and Integrated Logistics Support (11.,S) funded 

efforts common to both F/A-ISEIF and EA-ISG aircraft are included in the F/A-18EIF 

budget lines independent of whether FI A-lSEIF aircraft are being procured. These two 

support cost elements are not proportional to the number of aircraft being procured and 

are not duplicative to the funding in PES and ILS of the EA-lSG budget. 

The $491.9 million in APN implements commonality efforts to maintain capabilities and 

improve reliability/structural safety of the Super Hornet tleet. The Super Hornet uses an 

incremental development/eommonality approach to incorporate new technologies and 

capabilities, to inelude: Digital Communication System (DCS) Radio, Multi-Functional 

Information Distribution System (MfDS), Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), Joint 

Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), ATFUR with shared real-time video, 

Accurate Navigation (ANA V), Digital Memory Device (DMD), Distributing Targeting 

System (DTS), Infrared Search and Track (lRST) and continued advancement of the 

APG-79 AESA Radar. 

The $21.9 million RDT&E.N request supports the F/A-18EIF SLAP requirement. 

Currently, the F/A-18 Elf Hee! has Hown approximately 30 percent of the available 6,000 

total flight hours. Thc remaining service-life will not be adequate to meet operational 

commitments through 2035. In 2008. the Navy commenced a three phased F/A-1SEIF 

SLAP to analyze actual usage versus structural test data and identify the feasibility of 

extending F/A-ISEIF service life from 6,000 to 9,000 flight hours via a follow-on SLEP. 

The F/A-JSEfF SLAP will identify the neeessary inspeetions and modifications required 

to achieve 9,000 Hight hours and increase total and arrested landings, and catapults 

beyond currently defined life limits and is currently assessed as low risk. The SLMP 

philosophy has been applied to the F/A-18E/F fleet at an earlier point in its lifecycle than 

the F/A-18A-D. This will optimize Fatigue Life Expended, t1ight hours, and total 

landings aligning aircraft service life with Heet requirements. 

7 
65 

TACAIR Inventory Management 

The Navy and Marine Corps continue to carefully monitor strike fighter inventory 

requirements and projected availability. The Fiscal Ycar 2013 Presidcnt's Budget 

shortfall of 56 was assessed as manageable. The Strike Fighter Shortfall (SFS) is 

currently predicted to peak at 18 in 2023. The shortfall continues to fall primarily as a 

result of decreased FI A-18EIF utilization rates and flight extensions for FI A-18A-D 

aircraft after successful completion of the High Flight Hour (HFH) inspections and 

repair. The shortfall is based on the following assumptions: The DoN will maintain its 

current taetical fixed wing force structure; utilization rates' will not increase; the delivery 

rate of F-35B/C does not slip further to the right; and SLEP efforts on legacy Hornets will 

allow most of them to fly past S,OOO flight hours to an extended authorization of 9,000 

hours after completing the HFH inspcctions with a subset of those aircraft attaining 

10,000 flight hours with SLEP modifications. 

While the SFS continues to fall within the executable levels throughout the DoN, the 

Marine Corps may experience elevated operational risk in the 2020's if the predicted 

shortfall comes to fruition. Over the past two Presidential Budgets, the Marine Corps 

TACA[R transition completion has extended from 2023 to 2030. 

The Marine Corps has been driven to evaluate inventory availability amongst its Harrier 

and Hornet fleet in the later years and adjust its transition priorities and timing. The last 

active Marine F/A-IS squadron is currently scheduled to transition in 2026, and the 

current FI A-18 reserve squadron does not receive its F-35's until the year 2030. 

Additional pressures are felt with an increase of PI A-18A-D aircraft reaching S,OOO 11ight 

hours and requhing extensive depot time to inspect, repair, and extend service-life. The 

Harriers were expected to complete their transitions in 2022 in the Fiscal Year 2011 

President's Budget. and then 2026 in Fiscal Year 2012 President's Budget. The Harriers 

are now planned to rcmain in service until 2030 due to reduced F-35 ramp rates and the 

fact that they have more flight hour life remaining than the Hornets. 

As legacy F/A-IS squadrons are reduced, the service shortfall number must be considered 

in proportion to the primary mission aircraft inventory requirement. Due to a lower 

number of F/A-18 squadrons in the 2023 to 2026 timeframe, the shortfall number 

associated with the Maline Corps will have a more signifieant impact on their few 

remaining PI A-I8 operational squadrons. 

Additionally, the AV-SB is operating with an IS aircraft shortfalL One AV-8B squadron 

will be retired at the end of Fiscal Year 2013 to meet USMC manpower reductions, 

allowing the remaining squadrons to operate with a two aircraft shortfall. In Fiscal Year 

2014, the Navy will transition two additional squadrons from F/A-ISC to F/A-ISE and 

then redistribute those F/A-lSC aircraft amongst the DoN requirements. 

8 
66 

The DoN continues to meticulously manage the fatigue life and flight hours of our 

tactical aircraft. Since 2004, we have provided fleet users guidance and actions to 

optimize aircraft utilization rates while maximizing training and operational 

opportunities. The Inventory Forecasting Tool (IFf) projects the combined effects of 

transition plans, attrition, and pipeline requirements on the lotal strike fighter aircraft 

inventory. The 1FT is updated in conjunction with budget submittals to provide forecasts 

of the strike fighter inventory compared to the requirements. The tool utilizes these 

critical variables to project future inventories - F/A-18E/F and F-35B/C deliveries, force 

structure, aircraft usage rates, stmcturallife limits, depot turnaround time, Fatigue Lifc 

Expenditure (FLE), arrested and field landings, and catapult launches. 

Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) I EA-6B Prowler 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget request includes $19.7 million in RDT&E,N for 

Electronic Warfare (EW) Counter Response; $10.1 million RDT&E,N for MAGTF EW, 

$48.5 rrJllion in APN for common Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) systems; $18.6 

million in APN for all EA-6B series aircraft; and $14.4 million APN for MAGTF EW. 

Currently, 57 EA-6Bs in the Navy and Marine Corps support 51 operational aircraft in 10 

active squadrons, one reserve squadron, and two test squadrons. This includes 24 Navy 

and Marine Corps Improved Capability (ICAP) II aircraft and 27 ICAP III aircraft. 

Following the final Navy EA-6B transition to EA-18G in 2015, all remaining ICAP III 

EA-6Bs will transfer to and be operated by the Marine Corps, or be in pipeline for final 

disposition. Final retirement of the EA-6B from the Department's inventory will be in 

2019. 

Marine aviation is on a path towards a distributed AEA system of systems that is a 

critical element in achieving the MAGTF EW vision: a composite of manned and 

unmanned surface, air, and space assets, on a fully collaborative network providing the 

MAGTF commander control of the electromagnetic spectrum when and where desired. 

In development are the ALQ-231 Intrepid Tiger 11 communications jammer, UAS EW 

payloads, a Software Rcprogrammable Payload and an EW Services Architecture to 

facilitate collaborative networked Electronic Wad'are Battle Management. 

The Intrepid Tiger II is currently canied on the AV-8B in U.S. Central Command's 

(CENTCOM) Area of responsibility (AOR) and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(MEU). Intrepid Tiger II and similar electronic warfare capabilities will eventually be 

fielded on unmanned, fixed-wing, and rotary-wing platforms to provide direct AEA 

support to the MAGTF. Intrepid Tiger II development and procurement is in response to 

Marine Corps requirements for increased precision EW capability and capacity across the 

MAGTF and provides EW capability directly to tactical commanders without reliance 

upon the limited availability of tl1C low density/high demand EA-6B Prowler. 

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Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) / EA-18G Growler 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget request is $2.0 billion in APN for procurement 

of 21 EA-18G aircraft; $ILl million in RDT&E,N for integration of Jamming 

Techniques Optimization improvements and evolutionary software development; and 

$257.7 million RDT&E,N for Next Generation Jammer (NGJ). 

The first EA -180 squadron deployed in an expeditionary role in November 2010 to Iraq 

and subsequently redeployed on short notice to Italy in March 201 I, in support of 

Operation NEW DAWN (OND) and Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP). Since 

the initial deployment, Growlers have flown morc than 2,300 combat missions. The EA180 received accolades from both CENTCOM and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 

Europe for its enabling combat capability contributions to the battlespace. 

In 2009, the Navy began transition from EA-6Bs to EA-18Gs. The first carrier-based 

EA-18G squadron deployed in May 2011. All three active component Navy 

expeditionary squadrons and four of the 10 carrier based squadrons have completed 

transition to the EA-18G. The 10 carrier based EA- J 8G squadrons will fulfill USN 

requirements for airborne electronic attack; six expeditionary EA-18G squadrons will fill 

the joint, high-intensity AEA capability required by the loint Forces Commander 

previously fulfilled by the USN and USMC EA-6B. The Navy will be divested of EA6Bs by 2015; the Marine Corps by 2019. The program of record is for 135 EA-18G 

aircraft, of which 114 have been procured to date. Tbe final procurement of EA-18Gs is 

planned for 2014. The EA-18G fleet has flown approximately six percent of the 7,500 

total flight hours per aircraft and are meeting all operational commitments. 

The NOJ is new electronic warfare technology that replaces the 40-year old ALQ-99 

system. It is designed to provide modified escort power in support of joint and coalition 

air, land, and sea tactical stlike missions. NGJ is critical to the Navy's vision for the 

future of airborne electronic attack strike warfare. Funding is vital to maintain schedule, 

allowing the program to transition (0 the technology development phase and ensure 

timely start of the EA-I8G long lead integration activities. 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $152.0 million in RDT&E,N for 

continuation of System Development and Demonstration and added capabilities to 

include In-Flight Refueling, Tactical Targeting Network Technology, Secret Internet 

Protocol Router Chat, and the Advanced Mid-Term Interoperahility Improvement 

Program, and $1,264 million in APN for five Full Rate Production (FRP) Lot 2 aircraft 

and advance procurement (AP) for Fiscal Year 2015 FRP Lot 3 aircraft and EOQ funding 

forthe proposed Multi-Year Procurement for Fiscal Years 2016, 2017, and 2018. 

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The E-2D AHE is the Navy's carrier-based Airborne Early Warning and Battle 

Management Command and Control system. The E-2D AHE provides Theater Air and 

Missile Defense and is capable of synthesizing information from mUltiple onboard and 

off-board sensors, making complex tactical decisions and then disseminating actionable 

information to Joint Forces in a distributed, open-architecture environment. 

Utilizing the newly developed AN/APY-9 Mechanical Electronic Scan Array radar and 

the Cooperative Engagement Capability system, the E-2D AHE works in concert with 

surface combatants equipped with the Aegis combat system to detect, track and defeat air 

and cruise missile threats at extended range and provide Battle Group Commanders 

reqnired reaction time. 

The E-2D AHE program is in Full Rate Production. On March 1,2013, the Acquisition 

Decision Memorandum was signed and the Secretary of Defense certification for the 

fiscal Year 2014-201S Multi-Y car Procurement was sent to Congress. Initial 

Operational Capability (JOC) is on track for first quarter Fiscal Year 2015. 

A V -8B Harrier 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $41.6 million in APN funds to continue 

the incorporation of Obsolescence ReplacementlReadiness Management Plan systems; 

electrical and structural changes; upgrades to air-to-air weapon system employment and 

integration components: inventory sustainment and upgrade efforts to offset obsolescence 

and attrition; UTENING Pod upgrades; and AV-SB F402-RR-40S engine safety and 

operational changes. 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $35.8 million in RDTE,N funds to 

continue Design, Development, Integration and Test of various platform improvements 

such as: Engine Life Management Program (ELMP), Escape Systems, Joint Mission 

Planning System (JMPS), and Block upgrades to various mission systems, 

communications systems. navigation equipment. weapons carriage and countermeasures, 

and the Obsolescence Replacement (OR)lReadiness Management Plan (RMP). 

The A V -SB eontinues to be deployed heavily in support of operational contingencies. 

Each MEU deploys with embarked A V -8Bs. The A V -SB, equipped with preeision 

weapons, LlTENING targeting pods with a video downlink to ROVER ground stations, 

and bcyond visual range air-to-air radar missiles, has continued to be a proven, invaluable 

asset for the MAGTF and joint commander across the spectrum of operations. By the 

end of 2013, the A V -SB win receive the H6.1 Operational Flight Program enabling full 

integration of the Generation 4 UTENING Targeting pod. Based on current F-35B 

transition plans, the RatTier out-of-service date has been extended from 2022 to 2030. As 

a result, the A V -8B program must focus on sustainment efforts to mitigate significant 

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legacy inventory shortfalls, maintain airframe sustainment, and address reliability and 

obsolescence issues of avionics and subsystems. Additionally, this aircraft must be 

funded to maintain combat relevance to include tactical datalink and sensor 

improvements in order provide continued operation in support of operational 

contingencies and transition qualified aircrew to the F-35. The current digital aided 

Close Air Support (CAS) technology installed on the AV-8B is obsolete. 

Operation ODYSSEY DAWN confirmed the expeditionary advantages of STOVL 

capabilities by placing the Hanier as the closest fixed-wing asset to Libya. Such 

dynamic support slashed transit times to the battlefield by two-thirds and kept close air 

support aircraft on station without strategic tanking assets. Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM has confirmed the sortie generation eapabiJity and multi-role nature of the 

A V -8B Hamer. Capability upgrades, obsolescence mitigation, and readiness initiatives 

musl be funded to ensure the A V -SB remains relevant, healthy and sustained through 

2030. 

ASSAUI,T SUPPORT AIRCRAFT 

MV-22 

The Fiseal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $ 43.1 million in RDT&E, N for 

continued product improvements and $1.49 billion in APN for procurement and delivery 

of IS MV-22s (Lot 18). fiscal Year 2014 will be the seeond year of the follow-on V-22 

multi-year procurement (MYP) contract covering Fiscal Years 2013-2017. The funds 

requested in the Fiseal Year 2014 President's Budget request fully fund Lot 18, procure 

long lead items for Lot 19 and provide the balance of required Economic Order Quantity 

funding for the MYP. The Marine Corps continues to field and transition aircraft on 

time. The APN request includes $ I 60.8 million to support the ongoing Operations and 

Safety Improvement Programs (OSIP), including Conection of Deficiencies and 

Readiness. 

The follow-on MYP, which hegins in Fiscal Year 2013, will procure at least 9l MV-22s 

over five years and includes significant savings of approximately $1 billion when 

compared to single year procurements. The stability of the MYP supports the Marine 

Corps' need to retire old aircraft and field new and better capabilities. This stability also 

benefits the supplier base and facilitates cost reductions on the part of both the prime 

contractor and sub-tier suppliers. 

Through introduction of the Osprey tilt-rotor capability into combat, the service has 

gained valuable insight with respect to readiness and operating costs. These 

improvements continue to have a clear effect on increasing aircraft availability and 

decreasing flight hour costs. At the close of Fiscal Year 2012, the mission capability rate 

of the MV-22 increased eight percent over Fiscal Year 20] 1 and the cost per flight hour 

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decreased six percent in the same period. To keep thcse improvements on track, a 

readiness OSIP was introduced into the Fiscal Year 2012 President's Budget. This OSIP 

provides a stable source of cmcial modification funding as the Ospreys continue to 

improve readiness and reduce operating cost. 

CH·53K Heavy Lift Replacement Program 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $503.2 million RDT&E,N to continue 

Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) of the CH-53K. Since completing 

its Critical Design Review in July 2010, the CH-53K program commenced system 

capability and manufacturing process demonstration, and started fabrication of the first 

five test aircraft (one ground test aircraft, four flight test aircraft). During Fiscal Year 

2014, the program will assemble and check-out the first of these test articles needed to 

support developmental test activities and flight test of the CH-53K. 

The new-build CH-53K will fulfill land and sea based heavy-lift requirements not 

resident in any of [oday's platforms, and contribute directly to the increased agility, 

lethality, and presence of joint task forces and MAGTFs. The CH-53K will transport 

27,000 pounds of external cargo out to a range of 110 nautical miles, nearly tripling the 

CH-53E's lift capability under similar environmental conditions, while fitting into the 

same shipboard footprint. The CH-53K will also provide unparalleled lift capability 

under high altitude, and hot weather conditions, greatly expanding the commander's 

operational reach. 

Maintainability and reliability enhancements of the CH-53K will improve aircraft 

availability and operational effectiveness over the current CH-53E with improved cost 

effectiveness. Additionally, survivability and force protection enhancements will 

dramatically increase protection for both aircrew and passengers, thereby broadening the 

depth and breadth of heavy lift operational support to the joint task force and MAGTF 

commander. Expeditionary heavy-lift capabilities will continue to be critical to 

successful land- and sea-based operations in future anti-access, area-denial environments, 

enabling sea-basing and the joint operating concepts of force application and focused 

logistics. 

The CH-53E aircraft currently in service continue to meet unprecedented operational 

demand but are approaching 30 years of service and growing ever more challenging to 

maintain. To keep the "Echo" viable until the "Kilo" enters service, the fiscal Year 2014 

President's Budget request, $67.7 million APN for both near and mid-term 

enhancements. These modifications include Condition Based Maintenance software 

upgrades, T-64 Engine Reliability Improvement Program kits. Critical Survivability 

Upgrade, Smart Multifunctional Color Display and sustainment efforts such as Kapton 

wiring replacement and improved Engine Nacelles. 

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A TTACK AND UTILITY AIRCRAFT 

UR·IY II AH·IZ 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $47.1 million in RDT&E, N for 

continued product improvements and $821.0 million in APN for 25 H-l Upgrade aircraft: 

J 5 UB-J Y and 10 AB-IZ aircraft. The program is a key modernization effort designed 

to resolve existing safety deficiencies, enhance operational effectiveness, and extend the 

scrvice-life of both aircraft. The 85 percent commonality between the UH-J Y and AI-!-

1 Z will significantly reduce lifecyclc costs and the logistical footprint, while increasing 

the maintainability and deployability of both aircraft. The program will provide the 

Marine Corps with 349 B-1 aircraft through a combination of new production and a 

limited quantity of remanufacturing. 

The B-1 Upgrades Program is replacing the Marine Corps' UH-l Nand AH-J W 

helicopters with state-of-the-art UH-l Y "Yankee" and AI-!-l Z "Zulu" aircraft. The new 

aircraft are fielded with integrated glass cockpits, world-class sensors, and advanced 

helmet-mounted sight and display systems. The future growth plan includes a digitallyaided, close air support system designed to tie these airframes, their sensors, and their 

weapons systems together with ground combat forces and capable DoD aircraft. Lowcost weapons such as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) will 

increase lethality while reducing collateral damage. 

The UH-l Y aircraft achieved IOC in August 2008 and FRP in September 2008. The 

"Yankee Forward" procurement strategy prioritized UH··! Y production in order (0 

replace the under-powered UH-IN fleet as quickly as possible. The AH-IZ completed its 

operational evaluation (OT-1I3C) in June 2010, and received approval for FRP in 

November 2010. The AH- IZ achieved lOC in February 2011. As of March 30, 2013, 

104 aircraft (74 UH-l Ys and 30 AH-IZs) have been delivered to the Fleet Marine Force; 

an additional 77 aircraft arc on contract and in production. Lots 1- 6 aircraft deliveries 

arc complete. The last two aircraft from Lot 7 (the first two AH-IZ Build New (ZBN) 

aircraft) will deliver in Fiscal Year 2014. Lot 8 deliveries arc progressing on or ahead of 

schedule. AU aircraft deliveries since Lot 3 have been completed ahead of the contracted 

schedule date by an average of 33 days. 

In December 2011, to address existing attack helicopter shortfalls, the Marine Corps 

decided to pursue an all AH-JZ Build New (ZBN) procurement strategy and leave AH1 W airframes in the inventory rather than removing them from service to begin the 

remanufacture process. The transition to an all ZBN airframe strategy began with Lot 10 

(Fiscal Year 2013) as reflected in the cunent USMC program of record. The previous 

mix of J 31 remanufactured AH-IZ and 58 ZBN aircraft has been revised to delivery of 

37 remanufactured AH-! Z and 152 ZBN aircraft. The total aircraft procurement numbers 

remain the same at 160 UH-l Y sand 189 AH-IZs for a total of 349 aircraft. 

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EXECUTIVE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT 

VH·3D/VH-60N Executive Helicopter Series 

The VH-3D and VH-60N are safely performing the Executive Lift mission worldwide. 

As these aircraft continue to provide seamless vertical lift for the President and Vice 

President of the United States, the Department is working closcly with HMX -1 and 

industry to sustain these aircraft until a Presidential Replacement platform is fielded. The 

Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests an investment of $85.7 million to continue 

programs that will ensure the in-service Presidential fleet remains a safe and reliable 

platform. Ongoing efforts include the Cockpit Upgrade Program for the VH-60N, 

Communications Suite Upgrade, Structural Enhancement Program and the Obsolescence 

Management Program. The VH-3D Cockpit Upgrade Program, a Fiscal Year 2012 new 

start program, will provide a common cockpit with the VH-60N and address a number of 

obsolescence issues. Continued investments in the in-service fleet will ensure continued 

safe and reliable execution of the Executive Lift mission. These technology updates for 

legacy platforms will be directly leveraged for the benefit of the ensuing rcplaccment 

program (VXX). 

VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Aircraft 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget rcquest includes $94.2 million for continuing 

efforts on VXX, the follow-on program for Presidential helicopters. 

Significant progress has been made in the past year and the program requirements and 

acquisition strategy have now bcen approved. The acquisition approach includes full and 

open competition for integration of mature subsystems into an air vchicle that is currently 

in production. This strategy will enable the program to proceed directly into the EMD 

phasc. Contractor proposals are expected this summer for the El'vID effort, along with 

priced options for production. The milestone B review and subsequent contract award 

are planned to occur during Fiscal Year 2014. The first of the planned inventory of 21 

aircraft could begin fielding as early as 2020. 

KC-BOJ 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $166.7 million for procurement of one 

KC-130J's included in the first year of the MYP requcst and continued product 

improvements of $47.6 million. Targeted improvements include air-lo-air refueling hose 

reel reliability, aircraft survivability through advanced electronic countermeasure 

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73 

modernization, and obsolescence upgrades to the Harvest HAWK ISRlWeapon Mission 

Kit. 

Fielded throughout our active force, the USMC declared IOC for the KC-J3OJ transition 

in 2005; bringing increased capability, performance and survivability with lower 

operating and snstainment costs to the MAGTF. Continuously forward deployed in 

support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM (OIF/OEF) since 

2005, the KC-J30J continues to deliver Marines, fuel and cargo whenever and wherever 

needed. In 2012 the KC- 130J remained in high demand, providing tactical air-to-air 

refueling, assault support, close air support and Multi-sensor Imagery Reconnaissance 

(MIR) in support of OEF, Special Purpose MAGTF Afghanistan, and deployed MEUs. 

Continuously deployed in support of OEF since fielding in 2010, the bolt-on/bolt-off 

Harvest HAWK ISRlWeapon Mission Kit for the KC-13OJ continues to provide the 

extended MIR and CAS required by Marine forces in Afghanistan. Three mission kits 

have been fielded to date, with three more kits on contract to deliver in Fiscal Year 2014. 

Funding included in the Fiscal Year 2014 Budget request will be used to maintain 

operational relevance of this mission system through Hellfire P4 compatibility and the 

addition of a full motion video transmit and receive capability. 

The USMC has procured 48 KC-130J s, 31 aircraft short of the 79 aircraft program of 

record. The three aircraft included in the FY 2013 budget will complete the Active 

Component (Ae) requirement of 51 aircraft. The Marine Corps will use the AC backup 

aircraft to accelerate the Reserve Component (Re) transition from the legacy KC-130T 

aircraft to the more capable, more efficient, KC-130J beginning in Fiseal Year 2015. 

Aircraft requested in the Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget request will further 

accelerate the RC transition. Delays in procurement would force the Marine Corps to 

sustain the KC-130T aircraft longer than planned at an increased eost. 

P-8A Poseidon 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $317 million in RDT &E, N for 

integrated development and associated testing and $3.503 billion for procuremcnt of 16 

FRP P-8A Poseidon aircraft which are scheduled to begin delivery in May 2016. APN 

funding supports Advanced Procurement CAP) for the subsequent FRP procurement lot 

The P-8A Poseidon recapitalizes the maritime Patrol Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW), 

Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) and armed ISR capability currently resident in the P-3C 

Orion. The P-8A eombines the proven reliability of the commercial 737 airframe and 

avionics that enables integration of modern sensors and robust eommunications. The 

program is on track for IOC in late 2013 when the first squadron will have completed 

transition and is ready to deploy. The P-8A program is meeting all cost, schedule and 

performance parameters in accordance with the approved Acquisition Program Ba~eline. 

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Tn August 2010, the P-8A program obtained Milestone C approval, authorizing the Navy 

to proceed with procurement of LRIP Lots 1, 2, and 3 for six aircraft in fiscal Year 2010, 

seven aircraft in Fiscal Year 2011, and eleven aircraft in Fiscal Year 2012. The Navy has 

awarded contracts for all LRIP aircraft. All six LRIP Lot 1 aircraft have been delivered 

to Patrol Squadron 30 at Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, FL, and LRIP Lot 2 deliveries 

are now commencing. The firs! Fleet squadron (VP-16) has completed P-3C to P-8A 

transition training, and the second squadron transition (VP-5) is underway and on-track. 

Patrol Squadron! 6 continnes preparations for the first operational P-8A deployment in 

December 2013. The P-8A SDD effort has completed Initial Operational Test and 

Evaluation (IOT&E), delivered software updates to address previously identified 

deficiencies, and initiated testing of these software updates in preparation for a first 

quarter Fiscal Year 2014 Follow-On Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) period. Results of 

Operational Testing (OT) are being analyzed in preparation for release of the Beyond 

LRIP report and subsequent FRP decision review. The production configuration has 

been shown to be mature and stable throughout the Integrated Test and JOT&E phases. 

The program has completed proposal evaluations and expects to complete contract 

negotiations in time to award the fourth production lot in June 2013. As fleet deliveries 

of the Increment 1 configuration accelerate, integration and testing of P-8A Increment 2 

capability upgrades continue. In particular, Phase 1 of Increment 2 Multi-Static Active 

Coherent ASW capability is on-track for flight testing in Fiscal Year 2014. Fiscal Year 

20! 3 began prototyping and development of the more extensive P-8A Increment 3 

upgrades, which expand the P-8A evolutionary acquisition strategy to deliver the next 

level of required P-8A capability. 

P-3C Orion 

In Fiscal Year 2014, $37.4 million is requested for P-3C airframe and mission systems 

sustainment. Over two-thirds ($26.7 million) is for wing modifications to support the 

Chief of Naval Operation (CNO) "P-3 Fleet Response Plall", as well as supporting EP-3E 

requirements, which are executed within the P-3 Airframe Sustainment Program. The 

legacy P-3C fleet conlinues to provide ASW, ASUW, and ISR support for Joint and 

Naval operations worldwide. The P-3C is being sustained to maintain warfighting 

capability and capacity until completion of P-8A transition in Fiscal Year 2018. 

The P-3C aireraft is well beyond the original planned fatigue life of 7,500 hours for 

critical components, with an average airframe usage of over 18,000 hours. Since 

February 2005,174 aircraft grounding bulletins have impacted 131 P-3 aircraft. In 

December 2007, the Navy's ongoing RDT&E funded P-3 Fatigue Life Management 

Program determined that in addition to existing structural fatigue issues associated with 

the forward lower wing section (Zones 2-4), the lower aft wing surface (Zone 5) of the p. 

3 aircraft showed fatigue damage beyond acceptable risk resulting in the grounding of 39 

P-3 aircraft. As of February 2013, a total of 88 aircraft have been grounded for Zone 5 

fatigue. P-3 groundings due to known material fatigue will eontinue for the remainder of 

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75 

the P-3 program, and unknown fatigue issues will continue to present persistent risk until 

P-8A transition is complete. A return to pre-December 2007 aircraft availability numbers 

was achieved in December 2010 and 85 P-3C mission aircraft are available today. 

Preserving funding for Zone 5 and outer wing installations is critieal to sustaining the 

minimum number of P-3Cs until replaced by the P-SA. The Navy will continue to 

closely manage the service life of the P-3C through transition to the P-8A Poseidon. 

EP-3 Aries Replacement/Sustainment 

In Fiscal Year 2014, the President's Budget request is $55.9 million in APN for EP-3 

Aries Replacement/Sustainment. The APN request supports the procurement and 

installation of multi-intelligence eapahilities and modifications necessary to meet 

emergent classified requirements. These efforts are necessary to keep the platform viable 

until the EP-3 capabilities are recapitalized. 

The EP-3E Aries is the Navy's premier manned Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, 

Reconnaissance, and Targeting (AISR&T) platform. The Joint Airborne SIGINT 

Common Configuration includes Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) spiral upgrades. These 

upgrades. in conjunction with Secretary of Defense and the ISR Task Force (ISR TF) 

surge efforts. are fielding a robust Multi-Intelligence (INT) capability inside the Future 

Years Defense Program. Multi-INT sensors, robust communication, and data links 

employed by the flexible and dependable P-3 air vehicle help ensure effective J\ISR&T 

support to conventional and non-conventional warfare across the curren I Range of 

Military Operations. Operating around the globe, the EP-3E continues to satisfy critical 

Joint, Combatant Commander, and Service airborne ISR priorities and requirements. 

The Navy is in the process of developing the AISR&T Family of Systems construct to 

recapitalize the EP-3 AISR&T capabilities within existing Program of Record platforms: 

MQ-4C Triton, VTUAV, P-8A, H-60, and E-2D. The strategy has been further refined to 

focus on module systems and payloads required for the Navy to conduct AISR&T on a 

variety of vchicles, providing Combatant Commanders with scalable capability and 

capacity. The inclusive full-spectrum approach of the Navy's sea and shore-based 

manned amI unmanned platforms aligns with the eNO's priorities. 

UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (UASs) 

MQ-4C Triton VAS 

The Fiscal Year 2014 Prcsident's Budget postpones the MQ-4C Triton (formerly known 

as BAMS for Broad Area Maritime Surveillance) Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 

until Fiscal Year 2015. The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $375.2 million 

in RDT &E,N to continue Triton SDD; $52.0 million APN for procurement of long-lead 

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materials for the first lot of LRIP aircraft; and $79.2 million in MILCON to refurbish a 

maintenance hangar at N AS Point Mugu, CA, as well as a Forward Operating Base and 

hangar for Pacific operations at Andersen AFB, Guam. Though LRIP is delayed one 

year, Triton will start establishing five globally-distributed, persistent maritime ISR orbits 

by providing operational ISR beginning in Fiscal Year 2016. The program is scheduled 

to perform First Flight this quarter, commencing a rigorous integrated flight test program, 

to support Milestone C planned for Fiscal Year 20] 5. The MQ-4C Triton is a key 

component of the Navy Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Force. Its persistent sensor 

dwell, combined with networked sensors, will enable it to effectively meet ISR 

requirements in support of the Navy Maritime Strategy. 

The Navy procured two Air Force (USAF) Global Hawk Block 10 UASs in Fiscal Year 

2004 for demonstration purposes and to perform risk reduction activities for the Triton 

UAS Program. In April 201 !, Navy accepted three additional Block 10 aircraft from the 

USAF to he utilized as spare parts assets. These aircraft, known as BAMSDemonstrators, have been deployed to CENTCOMs AOR for over four years. These 

demonstration assets are adequate to cover all Navy needs through the transition to Triton 

in Fiscal Year 20! 6. 

MQ-8B Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) and 

Associated Rapid Deployment Capability (ROC) Efforts 

The MQ-8 Fire Scout is an autonomous vertical takeoff and landing tactical LJA V 

(VTUA V) designed to operate from all air-capable ships, carry modular mission 

payloads, and operate using the Tactical Control System and Line-Of-Sight Tactical 

Common Data Link. The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $48.7 million of 

RDT&E, N to continue development of an endurance upgrade (MQ-8C), to continue 

payload and LCS integration with the MQ-8B, and integrate radar on the MQ-8B. The 

request ineludes $76.6 million of APN for the production of one Fire Scout MQ-8C 

aircraft, multiple Ship Control Stations, and initial spares to support the MQ-8C Rapid 

Deploymcnt Capability. Procurement of ship-based control stations is aligned to both the 

LCS schedule and the outfitting of other ships to support Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) missions. Commonality of avionics, software, and payloads between the MQ-8B 

and MQ-8C has been maximized. The MQ-8B and MQ-8C use the same ship-based 

control station and other ship ancillary equipment. 

Fire Scout was deployed to Afghanistan in April 2011, and has amassed more Ihan 4,300 

dedicated ISR flight hours in support of U. S. and coalition forccs. Successful 

deployments aboard USS SIMPSON, USS KLAKRING, USS BRADLEY, and USS 

SAMUEL B. ROBERTS have supported SOF and Navy operations since 2012. Fire 

Scout has flown more than 1,500 hours from frigates, performing hundreds of 

autonomous ship board take-offs and landings. The Fire Scout program will continue to 

support integration and testing for LCS-based mission modules. 

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These unforeseen early deployments and high operational temp, combined with 

previously undiscovered and coo'ected reliability issues with the MQ-8B, have caused 

delays in Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). Acquisition planning, which 

leverages investments in VTUA V rapid deployment capabilities, is in work to ensure Fire 

Scout will continue to support the LCS mission packages. 

Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D) 

Thc Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $21 million in RDT&E, N to complete 

the Navy UCAS-D efforts to research a tactical jet-sized, carrier-suitable. lowobservable-relevant, unmanned aircraft system. The Fiscal Year 2014 Budget request is 

to complete the autonomous aerial refucling (AAR) demonstration with surrogate 

aircraft, the Navy UCAS Capstone artifacts to capture all lessons learned, disposition of 

test articles, test beds, intel1echlal properties, and contract close-out efforts. The UCAS-D 

program will demonstrate UAS carrier operations and autonomous AAR, and mature 

required technologies to Technology Readiness Level six (TRL-6) in support of potential 

follow on unmanned acquisition programs. The aviation/ship integration portion of the 

program is meeting all technical objectives, with surrogate aircraft flights in the vicinity 

of aircraft carriers completed in 2009 and 2010. Since then, the X-47B has completed 

envelope expansion testing, land-based carrier control area and catapult testing, and is 

now completing the land-based approach and trap build-up to conduct carrier 

qualification testing, to include catapult and arrested landings, in the summer 2013. The 

latest AAR testing period was completed in January 2012 utilizing a manned surrogate 

aircraft, and AAR development and testing will continue throughout 2013. The program 

is constrained hy USN CVN schedules and planning. Currently the program is working 

closely with Navy leadership to reduce risk and align program and CVN operational 

schedules to best accommodate demonstration objectives. 

Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) System 

The Fiscal Year 20J4 President's Budget requests $146.7 million in RDT&E, N for 

UCLASS System efforts. The UCLASS system will enhance carrier capability and 

versatility for the Joint Forces commander through integration of a persistent and mission 

t1cxible unmanned aircraft into the Carrier Air Wing no later than Fiscal Year 2020. The 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council issued a memorandum in December of 2013, 

reconfinning the need for an affordable, adaptable carrier-based ISR platform with 

precision strike capability. The OCLASS system will provide persistent lSR with 

precision strike capabilities for missions ranging from permissive counter-terrorism 

operations, to missions in low-end contested environments, The UCLASS system will 

also provide enabling capabilities for high-end denied operations from the carrier strike 

group. It will be sustainable onboard an aircraft carrier, as well as ashore, and will be 

designed to minimize the logistics footpdnt of the current carrier air wing. The UCLASS 

system will have the ability to pass command and control information along with sensor 

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data to other aircraft, naval vessels, and ground forces. Sensor data will be transmitted, 

in either raw Of processed forms, at appropriate classification levels, to exploitation nodes 

afloat and ashore. Interfaces will be provided with existing ship and land-based 

command and control systems, including ISR tasking, as well as processing, exploitation, 

and dissemination systems. The UCLASS system will achieve these capabilities through 

the use of a carrier-suitable, semi-autonomous, unmanned Air Segment, a Control System 

and Connectivity Segment, and a Carrier Segment. 

Tactical Control Station (l'CS) 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $8.4 million in RDT&E, N for the 

Tactical Control Station (TCS). TCS provides a standards compliant, open architecture, 

with scalable command and control capabilities for the VTUAV system. In Fiscal Year 

2014, TCS will continue to transition to the Linux operating system software to a 

technology refrcshed control station, cnhance the VTUA V Ocean Surveillance Initiative 

for ships Automatic Identification System and sensor track generation, and develop an 

interface to an ISR Process Exploit Dissemination (PED) system. The Linux operating 

system conversion overcomes hardware obsolescence issues with the Solaris based 

control stations and provides lower cost software updates using DoD common application 

software. In addition, the TCS Linux upgrade will enhance collaboration with the Navy's 

future UAS common control station. 

Cargo Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS) 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget is requesting funding for continued CUAS 

deployment in Fiscal Year 2014. CUAS operations started in November 2011, and have 

delivered over three million pounds of cargo in 1,300 mght hours to date. Thc CUAS is 

meeting rapid development capability goals and is also supporting the development of 

UAS concept of operations (CONOPS). 

The purpose of the Cargo UAS capability is to develop CONOPS to '"get trucks off the 

roads" in combat zones. minimizing the improvised explosive device threat to logistics 

convoys. The CUAS provides a low risk, persistent, 24-hour capability for dispersed 

forces on the battlefield. This capability mitigates the requirement for manned ground 

vehicles to resupply forces in remote locations. The CUAS also augments manned 

aviation assault support assets and airdrop methods when the weathcr, tcrrain, and enemy 

pose an unsuitable level of risk. CONOPS expansion in 2012 induded autonomous cargo 

delivery to a way point and cargo retrograde from spokes back to the main base. 

RQ-21A SmaU Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (STUAS) 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $16.1 million in RDT&E, N ($5.0 

million USN, $11.1 million USMC) and $66.6 million in PMC for five RQ-21A systems 

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which include 25 air vehicles that will address Marine Corps ISR capability shortfalls 

currently supported by service contracts. This Group 3 UAS will provide persistent ship 

and land-based ISR support for tactical-level maneuver decisions and unit level force 

defense and force protection missions. Milestone B and contract award occurred in July 

20 I O. Milestone C and LRIP decisions are scheduled for the third quarter of Fiscal Year 

2013. RQ-21A will enter into IOT&E no later than the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 

20]4. 

RQ-7B Marine Corps Tactical UAS (MCTUAS) 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $0.7 million in RDT&E, N 10 continue 

development efforts and government engineering support and $26.4 million in APN to 

support the continuation of congressionally mandated Tactical Control Data Link 

(TCDL) retrofits for RQ-7B Shadow units. USMC Shadow squadrons have seen 

continuous service in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2007. The Marine Corps received its 

] 3th RQ-7B Shadow system in first quartcr Fiscal Year 2012, completing baseline 

fielding for four squadrons. The USMC Shadow systems arc identical to Army Shadow 

systems, bringing interoperability and commonality between Army and Marine Corps 

unmanned aircraft units operating side-by-side in Afghanistan. An lS-month initiative to 

weaponize two USMC RQ-7B systems with a laser-guided projectile was started in the 

first quarter of Fiscal Year 2012. 

STRIKE WEAPONS PROGRAMS 

Tactical Tomahawk ELK IV Cruise Missile Program 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $312.5 million in Weapons 

Procurement, Navy (WPN) for procurement of an additional 196 BLK IV weapons and 

associated support, $26.1 million in OPN for the Tactical Tomahawk Weapon ContI'o! 

System (TTWCS), and $4.5 million in RDT&E for capability updates of the weapon 

system. WPN resources will be for the continued procurement of this versatile, combatproven, deep-strike weapon system in order to meet surface and subsurface ship-fill loadouts and combat requirements. OPN resources will address the resolution of TTWCS 

obsolescence and interoperability mandates. RDT&E will be used to initiate engineering 

efforts for Image Navigation (INA V), which provides an upgrade to reduce mission 

planning time-lines and reduce reliance upon GPS navigation. 

Tomahawk Theater Mission Planning Center (TMPC) 

TMPC is the mission pJanning segment of the Tomahawk Weapon System. Under the 

umbrella of TMPC, the Tomahawk Command and Control System (TC2S) develops and 

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distributes strike missions for the Tomahawk Missile; provides for precision strike 

planning, execution, coordination, control and reporting; and enables Maritime 

Component Commanders the capability to plan and/or modify conventional Tomahawk 

Land-Attack Missile missions. TC2S optimizes all aspects of the Tomahawk missile 

technology to successfully engage a target. TC2S is a Mission Assurance Category I 

system vilal to operational readiness and mission effectiveness of deployed and 

contingency forces for content and timeliness. The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget 

requests $7.9M in RDT &E and $45.5M OPN for continued TMPC system upgrades and 

support. These planned upgrades support integration, modernization and interoperability 

efforts necessary to keep pace with changes, retain capability and exploit capahilities of 

the Tomahawk missile and external organizations to include providing an alternate GPS 

denied navigation system (ImageNav), rewrite/update of Tomahawk Planning System's 

nnsupported legacy software code, and technology refreshes to reduce vulnerability to 

cyber attacks. These resources are critical for the support of over 180 TC2S operational 

sites: Cruise Missile Support Activities, Tomahawk Strike and Mission Planning Cells 

(5th, 6th, 7th Fleet), Carrier Strike Groups, Command and Control Nodes, Surface and 

Subsurface Firing Units and LabslTraining Classrooms. 

Sidewinder Air-Intereept Missile (AIM-SIX) 

The Fiscal Year 20J4 President's Budget requests $39.2 million in RDT&E and $117.2 million 

in WPN for this joint DoN and USAF program. RDT &E will be applied toward AIM9XfBLK 11 developmental/operational tests and requirements definition for Joint Staff directed 

Insensitive Munitions requirements, as well as initial AIM-9XlBlock Ul development 

activities. WPN will be for production of a combined 225 All-Up-Rounds and Captive Air 

Training Missiles and missile-related hardware. The AIM-9X/BLK II Sidewinder missile is 

the newest in the Sidewinder family and is the only short-range infrared air-to-air missile 

integrated on USNIUSMCIUSAF strike-fighter aircraft. This fifth-generation weapon 

incorporates high off-boresight acquisition capahility and increased seeker sensitivity through 

an imaging infrared focal plane array seeker with advanced guidance processing for improved 

target acquisition; a data link; and advanced thmst vectoring capability to achieve superior 

maneuverability and increase the probability of intercept of adversary aircraft. 

Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAMJAIM-120) 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $2.6 million in RDT&E and $95.4 

million in WPN for production of 54 tactical missiles and missile-related hardware. 

AMRAAM is a joint Navy and Air Force missile that counters existing aircraft and 

cruise-missile threats. It uses advanced electronic attack capabilities at hoth high and low 

altitudes, and can engage from beyond visual range as well as within visual range. 

AMRAAM provides an air-to-air first look, first shot, first kill capability, while working 

within a networked environment in support of the Navy's Theater Air and Missile 

Defense Mission Area. Prior missile production delays due to rocket-motor anomalies 

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are being addressed. We now anticipate AIM-120D production will recover for both the 

Air Force and the DoN in the mid-2014 timeframe. 

Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $46 million in RDT &E for the 

continued development of this joint DoN and USAF (lead) weapon and bomb-rack 

program. SDB I1 provides an adverse weather, day or night standoff capability against 

mobile, moving, and fixed targets, and enables target prosecution while minimizing 

collateral damage. SDB II will be integrated into the internal earriage of both the Navy 

(F-35C) and Marine Corps (F-35B) variants of the joint Strike Fighter. The Joint 

Miniature Munitions Bomb Rack Unit (JMM BRU) BRU-61A/A is being developed to 

meet the operational and environmental integration requirements for internal bay carriage 

of the SDB II in the F-35B and F-35C. SDB H entered Milestone B in August 201 0 and 

successfully completed its Critical Design Review in January 20 II. JMM BRU will 

enter Technology Development in July 2013. 

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $0.4 million in RDT&E for continued 

JSOW-C-l tcst activity and $136.8 million in WPN for production of 328 All-Up 

Rounds. The JSOW-C-l variant fills a critical gap by adding marilimc moving-target 

capability to the highly successful baseline JSOW C program. JSOW C-l targeting is 

achieved via a data-link and guidance software improvements. 

Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $12.2 million of RDT&E for the 

development of Telemetry and flight termination sections and the Block 1 follow-on 

development and (est program and $111.9 million of WPN for production of 143 All-UpRounds and Captive Training Missiles. The AARGM cooperative program with Italy 

transforms the Jegacy High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) into an affordable, 

lethal, and f1exible time-sensitive strike weapon system for conducting Destruction of 

Enemy Air Defense (DEAD) missions. AARGM adds multi-spectral targeting capability 

and targeting geospecificity to its supersonic fly-oul to destroy sophisticated enemy air 

defenses and expand upon the HARM target set. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on 

the F/A-18CID aircraft was reached in July 2012 and forward deployed to U.S. Pacific 

Command (P ACOM). The program was approved for Full Rate Production (FRP) on 

August 20, 2012 and the first FRP contract was awarded on September 10, 2012. 

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Hellfire Weapon System 

1be Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $33.9 million in WPN for 363 Hellfire 

All-Up-Rounds and training assets, to provide maximum operational flexibility to our 

warfighters. The Hellfire is an Army led program. The DoN continues to support legacy 

Hellfire weapons as well as procure and support technology enhancements that will 

provide the warfighter the flexibility to prosecute new and emerging threats. The Hellfire 

missile continues to be a priority weapon for current military operations as it enables our 

warfighters to prosecute Military Operations on erhan Terrain (MOUT) and other high 

valued targets of opportunity. 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) 

The FIscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $32.722 million in PAN&MC, for 

procurement of 1,103 APKWS II Precision Guidance Kits. Milestone C was achieved in 

April 2010. TOT &E was successfully completed in January 20! 2; declaring IOC in 

March 20 J 2. The program recei ved a favorable Full Rate Production (FRP) decision in 

March 2012 and the FRP contract was awarded in July 20]2. APKWS II provides an 

unprecedented precision guidance capability to DoN unguided rocket inventories 

improving accuracy and minimizing collateral damage. Program production is on 

schedule to meet the needs of our warfighters in today's theaters of operations. 

Joint Air-ta-Ground l\lissile (JAGM) 

The FY 2014 President's Budget requests $5.5 million in RDT&E for continued extended 

Tcchnology Development (TD) of JAGM. JAGM is a Joint Department of the 

ArmylDepartmenl of the Navy pre-Major Defense Acquisition Program with the Army 

designated as the lead service. The Government utilized full and open competition to 

initiate the TD phase of the JAGM program. In the TD Phase, the two contractors 

completed a Preliminary Design Review (PDR), wind tunnel and ground testing, and 

flight testing in support of initial Navy platform integration activities. The originally 

planned 27-month TD phase is complete, USD(AT&L) provided approval to extend the 

J AGM TD Phase, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated the Department of the Navy's 

AH-JZ Cobra aircraft as a threshold platform for the JAGM program. 'Ibe Services 

recognize that Hellfire capability and inventory isslles need to be addressed and the 

requirement for JAGM remains valid. The extended TD Phase addresses afford ability 

concerns with the JAGM missile, and discussions continue between the DoN, the Army 

and OSD on the path forward. 

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Responses to the Specific Questions 

From the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee 

Discussion of the validated 1,240 DoN Aircraft Strike-Fighter force structure 

inventory DoN Requirement and the projected peak inventory shortfall through 

2025. 

The 1,240 aircraft strike-fighter force is the projected DoN inventory needed to support 

the anticipated operational demand through the 2024 timeframe. The Navy inventory 

requirement of 820 aircraft supports 40 active duty Strike Fighter Squadrons composed of 

440 aircraft, and two reserve squadrons with 20 aircraft. In order to maintain the 

operational aircraft, support aircraft arc required for aviator training, flight test, attrition 

reserve and the depot pipeline. This inventory projection is estimated based on historical 

averages and assumes 100 percent squadron entitlement (no productive ratio reductions), 

service life of F/A-18EIF aircraft is 9,000 flight hours, and FI A-18A-D aircraft are 

extended to 9,000 flight hours (with 150 aircraft reaching 10,000 night hours). This 

inventory projection does not account for potential future efficiencies gained from 

TACAIR Integration (TAl). Both services remain committed to TAl. 

The Marine Corps TACAIR requirement is 420 aircraft. To meet operational demands, 

commitments, and force stmcture requirements the Marine Corps will have 18 active and 

two reserve squadrons. Integral to our current forcc structure reductions, our tactical 

aviation squadrons were restructured to optimize the support thcy provide to the Marine 

Air Ground Task Force. The Marines increased their flexibility and responsiveness by 

increasing the number of 16 aircraft squadrons (from seven to ninc) thereby enabling 

tactical flexibility for simultaneous expeditionary afloat and ashore operations with 

current and future employment mode!s. A total of 254 aircraft: nine active squadrons of 

16 F-35B aircraft, five active squadrons of 10 F-35B aircraft, four active squadrons of 10 

F-35C aircraft, two reserve squadrons of 10 F-35B aircraft, two training squadrons of 25 

F-35B aircraft, and 10 F-35C aircraft supplementary to USN training squadrons. 

Additionally, there are six F-35B aircraft for test and evaluation, and 70 (58 F-35B, 12 F35C) Backup Inventory Aircraft (BAl) and 30 (25 F-35B, 5 F-35C) Attrition 

Replacement (AR) aircraft. The inventory requirement is based on detailcd projected and 

historical operational analysis, optimization of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) mullimission capabilities, complete legacy T AC AIR replacement by the F-35, and expected 

improvements in reliability, maintainability and survivability. 

The DoN T ACAIR shortfall is the amount of aircraft by which operational requirement 

(force structure demand) exceeds the aircraft available for tasking. To keep pace with the 

issue and provide analytical rigor to decision makers, DoN utilizes the Inventory 

Forecasting Tool (1FT) to project the combined effects of transition plans, attrition, and 

pipeline requirements on total strike fighter aircraft inventory. The 1FT is updated in 

conjunction with annual budget submissions to provide a forecast of strike fighter 

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inventory compared to requirements. The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget Strike 

Fighter Shortfall is predicted to peak at 18 in 2023. The reduction in shortfall, from last 

year, is a result of a decrease in F/A-18E/F utilization rates and flight extensions for F/A18A-D aircraft after successful completion of the High Flight Hour (HFH) inspections 

and repair, and the addition of 11 congressionally added F/A-18EIF aircraft in 2013. 

The Strike Fighter Shortfall is projected to fluctuate throughout the next 20 years. To 

date, the DoN has been able to mitigate its shortfall with the successful execution of its 

Legacy F/A-lSA-D HFH inspection and repair program, and a reduction in utilization 

rates across the F/A-18A-F fleet. The continued efforts of the NavyfMarine Corps team 

will further define necessary actions required to manage aging FI A-I8 A-D aircraft, 

address discovery of potentially greater than expected fatigue and corrosion, and ensure 

required availability of aircraft until JSF Fleet Introduction. 

The USN and USMC continue to adjust transition plans as F-35 procurement ramps arc 

flattened. The Marine Corps is taking advantage of higher service life remaining in its 

A V -SB inventory by dclaying the majority of their transitions to the end of the transition 

plan. This will reduce the demand for FI A-18A-D in the later years. Sustainment and 

relevancy funding will be imperative to maintain the requisite operational capability of 

the A V -88 throughout the 2020' s. 

Discussion of the service life assessment program being conducted to evaluate the 

feasibility of extending the service life of the F/A-UlElF to 9,000 and 12,000 night 

hours and a description ofthe funding currently contained in the FY 2013-2016 

FYDP for such program. 

The F/A-18ElFs have flown approximately 30 percent of the total Hight hours available 

at the 6.000 hour limit and this will not be adequate to meet operational commitments out 

to 2035. As a resull. the three-phased PIA-l SElF Service Life Assessment Program 

(SLAP) commenced in 2008 will last through 2018. Its goal is to analyze fleet actual 

usage versus structural test data to identify the feasibility of extending FI A-18E/F service 

life from 6.000 flight hours to 9,000 night hours via a follow on Service Life Extension 

Program (SLEP). The Fiscal Year 20]4 President's Budget includes a request for $104.S 

million RDT &E (Fiscal Years 2014-2018) to support the F/A- !8EIF SLAP requirement. 

One of the FI A-J 8E/F SLAP goals is to define the necessary inspections and 

modifications required to achieve 9,000 flight hours. Current SLAP methods would 

allow feasibility studies to assess an F/A-18E/F service life to 12,000 flight hours. Other 

SLAP goals relate to increasing total landings, arrested landings and catapults beyond 

currently defined life limits. Phase A, which developed methodologies to be used in 

assessing airframe, flight controls, and subsystems, is complete. Phase B constitutes a 

majority of the SLAP analysis activities and as analysis is completed will feed into SLEP 

extension activities. 

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The F/A-lSE/F SLAP is incorporating lessons learned from the F/A-ISA-D analysis. 

The FI A-lSEIF SLAP was started sooner in its life cycle than the F/A-J8A-D SLAP, and 

encompasses the entire weapon system vice just the airframe. The FI A-I SElF SLAP also 

has the advantage of having a third lifetime of test cycles completed on certain test 

articles providing detailed information on high fatigue areas early in the program. The 

Service Life Management Program (SLMP) philosophy has also been applied to the F'lA1 SElF fleet much sooner in its lifecycle than the FI A-I SA-D, which will optimize Fatiguc 

Life Expended (HoE), flight hours and total landings so that they all converge at 

approximately the same time, which should align aircraft service life with flcet 

requirements. 

Provide an update OIl the tbree pbases oflegacy F/A-18A-D airframe, major 

subsystems and avionics service-life assessment and extension programs, and a 

discussion regarding the estimated costs, implementation risks, schedule, and depot 

capability in executing these programs, 

The F/A-18A-D SLAP showed that the airframe can fly to 10,000 hours with significant 

modifications and inspections to maintain airworthiness. The inspection results to date 

have matched the previously briefed models. The FI A-lSA-D aircraft have been kept 

operationally relevant through upgrades. 

SLEP goals of 10,000 flight hours will likely involve wholesale replaecment of aircraft 

structure (ccnter barrel. inner wings, etc.) as weI! as repairs and inspections. Squadron 

commanders manage each aircraft's service life (Hight hours, wing root fatigue, landings, 

catsltraps) to ensure full utilization of available service life. The progress of the SLMP is 

reviewed periodically at the three-star level via the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) 

process. 

The F/A-18A-D SLEP Fiscal Year 2014 requirement is funded. The SLEP cost estimates 

have not changed from previous years. The FI A-18A-D SLEP effort has utilized a 

phased approach since inception. This approach addresses the most critical airframe 

requirements first to ensure timely fielding of priority inspections and modifications. 

This approach reduces both airworthiness and cost risks and allows for future program 

trade space to m.itigate potential program-wide delays. 

To meet fleet requirements prior to the completion of SLEP Phases A-C the F/A-1SA-D 

airframe required an HFH inspection designed to extend the service life beyond S, 000 

FHs. HFH inspections have been ongoing for four years. The HFH inspection has been 

and continues to be a necessary effort (0 keep the aging F/A-IS A-D fleet flying and to 

meet resourcing requirements as aircraft reach 8,000 hours. The HH! suite continues to 

be revised as a result of completed SLAP and SLEP analysis. Ninety-six aircraft have 

completed the HFH inspection requirements and 83 are currently in work. Additional 

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pressures are being felt with an increasing number of PI A-18A-D aircraft reaching 8,000 

night hours and requiring extensive depot time to inspect, repair, and extend service life. 

Furthermore, the Master Aviation Plan has PI A-18A-D operational commitments through 

2030. To meet this plan a comprehensive SLEP is required to extend the service life of at 

least 150 F/A-18A-D to 10,000 flight hours. F/A-18A-D SLEP Phases A and Bare 

complete and SLEP Phase C is now underway. Analysis thus far has identified flight 

safety critical areas of the airframe that will require inspections and modifications to 

reach service life goals of J 0,000 night hours. Installation of flight safety critieal SLEP 

modifications began in Fiscal Year 2012 but the final SLEP configuration will not be 

fully dctermined until all the non-recurring engineering has been eompleted in Fiscal 

Year 2016. Overall, the SLEP Phase C effort is on schedule and is anticipated to 

eomplete in Fiscal Year 2016. 

The DoN is conducting SLEP inspections/repairs at six locations. The six locations 

include: NAS Lemoore, Lemoore, CA; NAS North Island, San Diego, CA; NAS 

Jacksonville, Jacksonville, FL; Boeing, Cceil Field, Jacksonville, FL; MCAS Beaufort, 

Beaufort, SC; and NAS Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA. While less complex SLEP mods 

can be done at all sites, major SLEP modifications will he done concurrently during 

major depot events such as Center Barrel Replacement modifications or during other 

scheduled maintenance events. These major modifications are planned to be conducted 

at NAS North Island, San Diego, CA, and NAS Jacksonville, fL, Fleet Readiness 

Centers. 

In order to maintain a tactical advantage, procurement and installation of advanced 

systems will continue. Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing Systems (JRMCS), Multi-Function 

Information Distrihution System (MlDS) and UTENING for USMC)) are being installed 

on selected FI A-18A-D aircraft. The Marine Corps is upgrading 56 Lot 7-9 FI A-18As 

and 30 Lot lOll I F/A-lSCs to a Lot 21 avionics capability with digital communications, 

tactical data link, JHMCS, MlDS and UTENING. 

The March 2013 Flight Hour and Inventory Report shows the average flight hours on 

DoN operational P/A-l8 A-D models at 7,208, 6,371, 6,882, and 6,687 respectively. 

Discussion on the health of the F/A-18A-F, EA-18G and A V-8B tleets. 

F/A-18A-F/EA-IRG 

The F/A-18A-D has been a highly effective aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps in 

OIF/OEF, and will continue as such in future conflicts. The F/A-18A-D aircraft have 

been kept opcrationally relevant through upgrades that include: Combined Interrogator 

Transponder to determine friend or foe, JRMCS, MIDS, Link-16 data-link, advanced 

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Integrated Defense Electronic Counter Measures, APG-73 radar and digital CAS. The 

aircraft was originally designed for 6,000 flight hours, and was extended to S,OOO flight 

hours by analysis. Extensions beyond S,OOO night hours require inspections and/or 

repairs/modifications. 

Although the FlA-1SA-Ds are out of production, the existing inventory of 621 Navy and 

Marine Corps aircraft will comprise over half of Naval Aviation's TACAIR force 

structure through 2013. They are scheduled to remain in inventory through 2030. The 

SLMP continues to monitor and improve the health of the legacy FfA-ISA-D fleet 

through analyses of TACAIR inventories and the management of usage rates at the 

squadron level. Eighty-two percent of the FI A-lS/\/D fleet has over 6,000 night hours 

and 52 aircraft have flown more than 8,000 !light hours. To meet USN and USMC 

operational commitments out to 2026 for active squadrons, and through 2030 for 

USMCR, the DoN will SLEP 150 aircraft to extend their service life to 10,000 flight 

hours and continue HFH inspections. 

The FI A-lgB!F began Pull Rate Production (FRP) in 2000. Eighty five percent of the 

total procurement objective has been delivered (4S2 of 563), which ine1udes an additional 

11 FI A-18E aireraft added by Congress in Public Law 113-6. Initial Operational 

Capability (IOC) was achieved in September 2001. The Fiscal Year 2014 President's 

Budget supports the 15th year of FRP. This installment includes planned procurement of 

EA-lSG as follow-on to EA-6B (FI A-I SElF and EA-18G share a common Boeing 

production line). 

The FI A-18EfF neet has nown approximately 30 percent of the total flight hours 

available at the 6,000 hour limit and this will not be adequate to meet operational 

commitments out to 2035. As a result, the F/A-18EIF SLAP commenced in 2008 and 

will continue through 2018 with a goal of achieving 9000 hours. 

Twenty-one EA-lSG aircraft are planned to be procured in Fisca1 Year 2014 to stand-up 

two additional Navy Expeditionary squadrons bringing the total to 10 carrier based 

squadrons and six expeditionary squadrons. Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) Kits are 

proeured via a separate contract. To date, 85 aircraft have been delivered; this represents 

74 percent of the Inventory Objective of 135 aircraft. FRP was approved November 

2009 and IOC was achieved in September 2009. The 10 carrier-based EA-18G 

squadrons will fulfill the USN requirements for airborne electronic attack; six 

expeditionary EA-18G squadrons wiil fill the joint, high-intensity AEA capability 

required by the Joint Forces Commander previously fulfilled by the USN and USMC EA6B. EA-18Gs in-service have flown approximately five percent of the 7,500 total night 

hours per aircraft and are meeting all operational commitments. To date, eight squadrons 

have completed or are in transition including three active component expeditionary 

squadrons. The first EA-18G squadron deployed in an expeditionary role in November 

2010 in support of Operation New Dawn (OND) and redeployed in March 2011 in 

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support of Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD)/Operation Unified Protector (OUP) combat 

operations. The first carrier-based EA-18G squadron deployed on board the USS George 

H.W. Bush (CVN 77) in May 2011. 

Our adversaries' expanded use of the electromagnetic spectrum has increased the Joint 

requirement for expeditionary AEA, while at the same timc increasing the operational 

necessity for the Carrier Strike Group to maintain its own organic ABA capability. Thc 

current jamming pods (ALQ-99) on the EA·18G have reached capability capacity and are 

growing obsolete from a sustainment point of view. Continued support for the Next 

Generation Jammer (IOC 2020) program development is required. 

The current USMC inventory consists of 134 AV-SB aircraft. This number includes 34 

Night Attack and S2 Radar aircraft, 16 TAV·S8 trainers, one Day Attack upgrade, and 

one CNATT maintenance trainer. Of the lotal inventory, 31 aircraft (23 percent of 

USMC inventory) were out of reporting for Planned Maintenance Interval (PM!) and 

special fe-work during CY 2012. The inventory decline is the result of combat losses last 

September at Bastion Airfield, OEF which accounts for the loss of eight AV-S8s (six 

destroyed, two damaged) and increases the Ready for Tasking (RFT) gap significantly to 

a small community that is inventory constrained. 

The AV-SB was originally a 6,000-hour airframe. In 2010, PMA-257 transitioned to a 

Fatigue Life Expended (FLE) model that more accurately measures actual stress history 

on individual airframe components, enabling the airframe to fly beyond 6,000 honrs. 

Fleet averages for Night Attack, Production Radar, and Remanufactured Radar variants 

of the Harrier are 29.4 percent, 19.2 percent, and 31.S percent FLE, respectively. 

However, the A V -S8 is currently experiencing an increasing number of required 

modification and obsolescence issues. Intangibles that wit! affect service life arc aircraft 

components that enter obsolescence or reach end of service life before the airframe 

planned fatigue life expended reaches 100 percent. Reduction in demand signal may also 

cause proportional reduction in sub venders ,md supply contractors. 

The AV-SB was originally scheduled to stop flying in 2012. Suh-contractors and vendors 

had divested manufacturing lines of AV-88 material in anticipation of the 2012 sundown. 

Delays in the procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter coupled with the service life limits 

of the FI A·18 A-D necessitated the extension of the A V-8B to 2030 to avoid aT ACAIR 

inventory shortfall. The DoN purchased all UK GR-9 aircraft, engines, parts supply, and 

support equipment in 2011. The GR-9 buy was a supply gap filler allowing NAVSUP 

immediate access to supply inventory, to develop long term sustainment strategies and 

give industry time to re-develop parts production lines to support the A V -SB to 2030. 

The purchase had an immediate impact in reducing supply backorders. GR-9 part 

31 
89 

analysis is ongoing and will continue to support the A V -SE supply system over the next 

decade. 

Discussion of current and future capabilities inherent in the F/A-18EIF that do not 

meet future Combatant Commander operational requirements for strike-fighter 

aircraft. 

The FfA-18EIF is a highly capable aircraft designed to meet and defeat loday's threats 

with growth potential for the future. The F/A-JSE/F provides increased combat radius 

and endurance, greater weapons payload and increased survivability over Legacy F/AlSA-D aircraft. Block (Lot 26 and up) aircraft, with the APG-79 Active Electronically 

Scanned Array (AESA) radar system and low obscrvable technology, have extended airto-air detection range and arc capable of performing well in the range of threat 

environments, up to "anti-access". Block II Super Hornet includes upgraded avionics 

and sensors, some of which cannot be retrofitted 10 a Legacy FI A-18A-D aircraft. The 

Super Hornet will be a complementary platform on the nation's carrier decks with the F35C into the 2030s and will meet current and projected requirements, with planned 

investments in the Fiscal Years 2014-2018 and beyond. These investments in F/A-lSEIF 

night plan increments, to include upgraded avionics, sensors and networks, will ensure 

relevancy against emerging and future threats. 

JSF and FI A-I SElF capabilities arc complementary, with an ideal balance of versatility, 

lethality, survivability, and capacity that will pace the threat and support foreseen Carrier 

Strike Group mission requirements through 2030. The timely delivery of lSI' is critical 

to our ability to meet operational demands and to maintain the desired mix of strike 

fightcr aircraft on our carrier decks. 

Discussion regarding the analysis and probability of when the F·35B and F-35C are 

scheduled to declare Initial Operational Capability. 

The Navy and Marine Corps, in accordance with the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defensc 

Authorization Act (NDAA) Public Law 112-239, will provide updated lOe information 

on June 1, 2013. 

The IOe dates for F-35B and F-35C are being determined by senior leadership. The 

Navy and Marine Corps require Service specific operational capabilities as defincd in the 

1'-35 Operational Requirements Document (ORD) prior to considering declaration of 

rOc. Achieving these capabilities are event driven and dependent upon the progress of 

the re-baselined F-35 program. 

For the F-35B to achieve TOC, the Marine Corps requires: One squadron of ten F-35B 

aircraft with Block 2B software release and required spares, ground support equipment, 

tools, technical publications, and a functional Autonomic Logistic Information System 

32 
90 

(A LIS) (including supporting peripherals); one squadron manned with trained/certified 

personnel capable of conducting autonomous operations; F-35B aircraft with the requisite 

performance envelope, mission systems, sensors, and weapon clearances; home base 

supporting infrastructure and facilities ready and capable of supporting and sustaining 

operations; qualifications/certifications required for deploying on F-35B compatible ships 

and to austere expeditionary sites; the ability to execute the TACAIR directed mission 

sets; and Joint Program Office and F-35 contractor procedures, processes, and 

infrastructure capable of sllstaining operations of the JOC squadron. The reduced ramp 

rate has delayed the completion date of the Marine Corps' transition to the Joint Strike 

Fighter by over four years. The Marine Corps' JOC is event driven based on the key 

operational and sustainment capabilities required to support operations. 

For the F-35C to aehieve fOC, the Navy requires: One squadron of ten F-35C aircraft 

with Block 3F software release, full stealth and ORD compliant avionics/weapons 

capabilities (Block 3F) with the capability to execute the F-35C's primary mission sets; 

functional ALIS (including peripherals) and carrier integration modifications in place to 

support CVN deployments, ailworthiness and flight deck certifications; trained aircrew, 

maintainers, and support personnel; and SDD/OPEV AL complete and Joint Program 

Office/F-35 contractor procedures, processes, and infrastructure capable of sustaining 

operations of the F-35C IOC squadron. 

Discussion of the known risks and issues specifically reiated to the DoN regarding 

the development, fielding and deployment of the Autonomic Logistics Information 

System (ALIS) for sustaining the F-35 as it relates to maintenance am! logistics 

operations. 

F-35 Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment (ALGS) is developed concurrently witb 

the aircraft and ALIS is being used to support test, training, and operational squadrons 

today, As with any new system, there has been a performance learning curve associated 

with this new logistics support system and it is expected to continue to be functionally 

rellned and improve performance, Currently, the Department is managing all key risk 

items. An overview of the primary AUS issues and risks affecting the DoN are: 

~ ALIS LO.3, which is supporting block IB!2A aircraft, was initially hampered by 

Certification & Accreditation (C&A) and data quality concerns. PEO(JSF) 

worked closely with the certification experts to mitigate the issues and have 

developed workaroulld solutions. 

~ ALIS LO.3 has limitations in the Prognostic Health Management (PHM) system. 

It is expected to be addressed in a future release of ALIS. 

~ ALIS J ,0.3 amended data construct does improve overall data integrity, but 

challenges remain with Mission Essential Functions List (MEFL). ALIS 

functionality is dependent upon the provision of accurately structured and 

populated logistics data (e.g., Air Vehicle Sustainment Data Build, Bill of 

33 
91 

Material). At present, the DoN has identified a number of data quality 

shortcomings that are being addressed by the Original Equipment Manufacturer 

(OEM) and PEO(JSF) personnel and interim operating procedures have been 

instituted; permanent resolution of these issues is expected by fourth quarter 

CY2014. 

)- The Air Vehicle does nol record all the flight data to the Portable Memory Device, 

which required an enhancement to ALIS 1.0.3 to enable tracking of life and 

aircraft hcalth data. Manual PHM data entries have been instituted. At this early 

stage of operational flying, data mapping immaturity has led to a lower assessment 

of actual mission capability. Manual intervention has been required. 

.. DoN AUS D~ployment Suitability: PEO(JSF) is currently managing a USMC 

instituted initiative in regards to the deployment suitability of the existing ALlS 

baseline hardware design. The current AUS baseline is too largc for the Air Combat 

Element (ACE) to embark and disembark from an L-Class ship in support of Marine 

Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations ashore. This initiative will afford 

squadron personnel the capability to transport AUS with unit deployments. 

Deployable AUS, Standard Operating Unit V2, is currently a unique requirement for 

the Marine Corps based on their expeditionary nature. The strategy to ensure 

functional deployability includes a three phase program of effort to develop 

Deployable ALIS. Phase 2A is complete and Phase 2B is currently on going which 

will finalize the deployable requirements and begin preliminary design. Phase 3 is 

targeted to he on contract by July 2013, which will complete a Preliminary Design 

Review (PDR) by the fourth quarter of Calendar Year 2013 and will have a 

production standard design ready for Authorization to Operate and Authorization to 

Connect (ATO/ATC) and delivery of initial capability by mid 2015. 

.. Successful IntegLqiiOll of PIQPulsion Svstem Sustainment intQ_ALIS: Currently the 

Propulsioll System is managed by the OEM utilizing an independent contractor 

sustainment application. This is a recognized interim operating procedure until an 

integrated solution is introduced with a future AUS release. The Air System and 

Propulsion System OEMs are developing software that will integrate their 

sustainment applications for (he JSr within ALIS. Completion of this task is 

dependent upon the resolution of Air Vehicle and Off-Board system related 

integration challenges. The prime system integrator and the engine OEM arc in the 

process of defining the remaining actions necessary to successfully integrate 

propulsion sustainment in ALIS 2.0.1, scheduled for release in fourth quarter of 

Calendar Year 2014. Achievement of this task is a priority for the Program and 

carries a high schedule risk. 

34 
92 

Provide an update on the V-22 procurement program and contractor performance, 

and performance of the MV-22 during Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. 

The V -22 program continues to perform extremely well in the field and in production. In 

Fiscal Y car 201 2, the last year of the first Multi Year Procurement (MYP I) contract, 

industry delivered 37 V-22Bs - 29 MV(Marine Corps) and eight CV(Air Force) on or 

ahead of contract schedule. The first three MYP I lots are pcrforming well and cost 

reduction initiatives are delivering expected results. The program is also on track to 

award a follow-on MYP contract (Fiscal Years 2013-2017) which will yield significant 

savings. 

The V-22's strong performance in the field continues to be demonstrated on a daily basis. 

As of March 28, 2013, 190 of 360 aircraft have been fielded to the Marine Corps. The 

combined MV and CV fleet has accumulated more than 170,000 flight hours. The aircraft 

has been continuously deployed since 2007, and the MV-22 exhibited the lowest Class A 

night mishap rate of any tactical rotorcraft in the Marine Corps over the last 10 years. 

MV-22B squadrons supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and 

the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) aboard amphibious warships are seeing mission 

capable rates in the seventy percent range and are performing every assigned mission. 

The effectiveness and survivability of this revolutionary. first-or-type MV -228 Osprey 

till-rotor has been repeatedly demonstrated across the globe. The rescue of a downed F15E airman during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN was an example of what the Navy and 

Marine Corps' expeditionary force brings to our nation. As an integral part of that 

seaborne presence, the MV-22B was able to transit over 130 nautical miles from the USS 

KEARSARGE to the objective area with unprecedented speed and agility. Twenty 

minutes from the lime he was evading capture in hostile territory, the rescued pilot was 

safely back on American [enilory aboard the USS KEARSARGE. Combined with 

current self deployments from Okinawa to Thailand and Guam in support of bilateral 

exercises, and a 2,600 nautical mile round trip simulated MEDEV AC mission to a 

submarine the V -22 is changing the way Commanders operate inside and out of their 

battle space. 

Update on the H-l procurement program and contractor performance. 

The Fiscal Year 2014 President's Budget requests $47.1 million in RDT&E, N for 

continued product improvements and $821.0 million in APN for 25 H.-I Upgrade aircraft: 

15 UH.-IY and 10 AH-IZ aircraft. The program is a key modernization effort designed 

to resolve existing safety deficiencies, to enhance operational effectiveness, and to extend 

the service life of both aircraft. The 85 percent commonality between the UH-l Y and 

AH-IZ will reduce lifecycle costs and logistical footprint significantly, while increasing 

the maintainability and deployability of both aircraft. The program will provide the 

35 
93 

Marine Corps 349 H-l aircraft through a combination of new production and a limited 

quantity of remanufacturing. 

The H-l Upgrades Program is replacing the Marine Corps' UH-IN and AH-IW 

helicopters with state-of-the-art UH-IY "Venom" and AH-IZ "Viper" aircraft The new 

Venom and Viper aircraft are fielded with integrated glass cockpits, world-class sensors, 

and advanced helmet-mounted sight and display systems. The future growth plan 

includes a digitally-aided elose air support system designed to lie these airframes, their 

sensors, and their weapons systems together with ground combat forces and capable DoD 

aircraft. Low-cost weapons such as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System n 

(APKWS II) wil! increase lethality while reducing collateral damage. 

The UH-l Y aircraft aehieved 10C in August 2008 and FRP in September 2008. The 

"Yankee Forward" procurement strategy prioritized UH-J Y production in order to 

replace the under-powered UH-l N fleet as quickly as possible. The AH-I Z completed its 

operational evaluation (OT-I13C) in June 2010 and received approval for FRP in 

November 2010. The AH-IZ achieved 10C in February 2011. As of March 30, 2013, 

104 aircraft (74 UH-J Ys and 30 AH-l Zs) have been delivered to the Fleet Marine Force; 

an additional 77 aircraft are on contract and in production. Lots 1- 6 aircraft deliveries 

are complete. The last two aircraft from Lot 7 (the first two AH- J Z Build New (ZBN) 

aircraft) will deliver in Fiscal Year 2014. Lot 8 deliveries are progressing on or ahead of 

schedule. 

In December 2011, to address existing attack helicopter shortfalls, the Marine Corps 

decided to pursue an all AH-J Z Build New (ZEN) procurement strategy and leave AHI W airframes in the inventory rather than removing them from service to begin the 

remanufacture process. The transition to an all ZEN airframe strategy began with Lot 10 

(Fiscal Year 2013) as reflected in the current USMC program of record. The previous 

mix of 131 remanufactured AH-l Z and 58 ZEN aircraft has been revised to delivery of 

37 remanufactured AH- J Z and 152 ZEN aircraft. The total aircraft procurement numbers 

remain the same at 160 UH-IYs and 189 AH-IZs for a total or 349 aircraft. 

As a result of their commitment to the United States Marine Corps and the H-l Program, 

the prime contractor has delivered 104 aircraft; keeping the program on budget and on 

schedule. On average, the prime contractor delivered the last 84 aircraft 33 days ahead of 

the contract schedule. 

Update on the H-60S and H-60R program and contractor performance. 

The Navy Helicopter force structure is based on the CNO-approved Helicopter Master 

Plan. 

36 
94 

The MH-60S and MH-60R are currently in full rate production. The Multi-Year Contract 

(MY2) with Lockheed Martin (Mission Systems & Common Cockpits) and MY8 with 

Sikorsky (Airframe) have been approved and will be executed from Fiscal Year 2012 to 

Fiscal Year 2016. The MY2 results in ]9.4 percent cost avoidance while the MY-8 results 

in 17.7 percent cost avoidance. 

MH-60S Carrier Air Wing squadrons began their transition in 2007 and will be complete 

in 2016. Expeditionary squadrons completed their transition to the MH-60S in 2004. 

MH-60S Block II lOC is realigned with Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures 

Mission Package (LCS MCM MP) IOC in Fiscal Year 2014. The requirement to tow Q20 and OASIS systems was removed; non-tow Airborne MCM (AMCM) capabilities will 

be retained. MH-60S Block III Armed Helicopter reached IOC in June 2007. 

The MH-60S is designed to support the Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups, LCS in 

Combat Logistics, Search and Rescllc, Vertical Replenishment, SUW, AMCM, Combat 

Search and Rescue, and Naval Special Warfare mission areas. 

MH-60R Carrier Air Wing squadrons began their transition in 2008 and will be complete 

in 2016. Expeditionary squadrons began their transition in 2012 and will be complete in 

2018. 

The MH-60R is designed to support Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups, Cruisers, 

Destroyers, and LCS in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Surface Warfare (SUW). it 

enables sea control and provides forward-deployed capabilities to defeat area-denial 

strategies, allowing joint forces to project and sustain power. MH-60R ASW 

improvements include upgrades to the Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS) reliability 

and APS-J53 Automatic Radar Periscope Detection and Discrimination (ARPDD) 

capability. 

MH ·60R program of record was reduced from 291 to 280 aircraft. Further reductions 

wiil take MY quantities below the contractual minimums, necessitating contract 

renegotiation. 

Small boat threats arc driving aircraft SUW lethality and survivability requirements, such 

as the MH-60S M··l97 fixed forward firing gun and MH-60RlS 2.75 inch roeket 

capability. 

37 
95 

An update on the efforts related to the V -22 program concerning the redesign, 

qualification, manufacturing and fielding of more reliable parts and subsystems and 

how it relates to planned goals for reducing current operations and maintenance 

costs. 

Component/subsystem redesign is an integral parlof the MV-22B Program's plan for 

improving readiness and reducing operating costs. At the platform Ievcl, the MV-22B 

continues to meet its Key Performance Parameters (KPP) for reliability as set forth in the 

acquisition documentation, but continue aggressive efforts to improve component 

performancc by analyzing inherent component reliability using the Critical Item Logistics 

Review (CILR) list. This disciplined, repeatable process has identified key components 

for improvement. Since July 2009, multiple component improvements have been 

incorporated and validated via on-aircraft performance with Mean Flight Hour Before 

Removal (MFHBR) improvements ranging from 50 percent to over 7,000 percent 

improvement. At the aircraft level, this has translated into a 28 percent improvement in 

Mission Capable rates from Fiscal Year 2011 to Fiscal Year 2012. 

The MV-22B Cost Per Flight Hour (CPFH) Reduction Team has been reducing costs 

through a four pillared approach targeted at improving Maintenance Practices, 

Maintenance Planning, Repair Capabilities and Contract Strategies and works closely 

with the Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) teams to incorporate the improved 

components noled above. These efforts yielded an 18 percent reduction in MV-22B 

CPFH from Fiscal Year 20 I 0 to Fiscal Year 2012 which will equate to billions of dollars 

in cos! avoidance over the life cycle of the aircraft. 

A summary of all Class A, Band C aviation-related safety issues, inciuding recent 

mishaps, trends, and analysis occurring within the past year. 

Naval Aviation Surllmary (Navy & Marine Corps) - The table below provides a 

summary of all Class A, B & C Flight mishaps from Oct 2011 through April 3, 2013. 

The rates are based on mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. 

YEAR Fllght Class Class A Class Class B Class Class C 

H(lllrS A Rate B Rate C Rate 

FY 12 1,198,216 18 1.50 20 I.67 64 5.34 

FY l3 565544 7 1.23 11 1.95 40 7.07 

38 
96 

The most recent DON Flight Class A Mishaps includes: 

.. II Mar 20l3: (Grant County, WA) EA-6B crashed during a scheduled lowlevel flight. 3 fatalities. 

" 20 Feb 20l3: (Thailand) During confined area landing, CH-46E sustained a 

hard landing and subsequent fire. No fatalities. 

" 23 Jan 2013: (NAS Lemoore, CAl F/A-18E sustained an in-flight left engine 

fire. Aircraft recovered safely. No injuries. 

" 09 Jan 2013: (Twenty Nine Palms, CAl CH-46E sustained damage to rotor 

system during confined area landing. Aircraft destroyed. No fatalities. 

.. 13 Dec 2012: (Deployed) MQ-8B Fire Scout crashed during recovery to ship. 

(UAS) 

.. 12 Dec 2012: (NAS North Island) MH-60R sustained hard landing. No 

fatalities. 

.. 11 Oct 2012: (Luzon, PI) CH-46E destroyed in hard landing, roll-over and fire. 

No serious injuries. 

Recent DON Flight Related Mishaps (FRM) or Aviation Ground Mishaps (AGM) not 

included in above table or below Navy and Marine Corps charts: 

.. 27 Feb 2013: (Cherry Point OPAREA) Airborne Low Frequency Sonar 

Transducer Assembly departed MH-60R during ASW training night. (FRM) 

,. 24 Jan 2013: (OlI the Coast of Andros Island, Bahamas) Airborne Low 

:Frequency Sonar Transducer Assembly departed MH-60R during in-flight 

operational check. (FRM) 

.. 06 Nov 2012: (MCAS Miramar. CA) F/A-18E in-flight physiological episode 

resulted in total 

39 
97 

DON Historical Mishap Rate Trend per lOOK Flight Hours per Mishap Class 

(A.O. April 3, 2013) 

Class A 

ClosS B 

Oil$S( 

2003 2004 lOOS 2006 2007 2008 2009 Z010 2011 2012 2013 

~============:=================================== 

=,.,tl"""l>lIl"''''tJe,~ 

30 26 tl~~1'I~k 6 

25 

20 4 

'" ~ 

~ 15 13 14 14 x 

"" ~ 10 2 8 '" 5 j 0 0 '" 2003 2004 200S 200S 2001 2.008 2009 2010 20H 2012 2013 

~~ 

4/0.76 3/D.56 

1211.30 

12.7011.39 

Class A Flight Mishap Historical Data for U.S. Navy 

40 
98 

30 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

~~;!lh~Num!xln:. 

UlI'IMpFtIDo 

?~UCI' 

,co.tlOt,cr 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 

8.00 

6.00 

Class A Flight Mishap Historical Data for U.S. Marine Corps 

41 
99 

VICE ADMIRAL W. MARK SKINNER 

PRINCIPAL MILITARY DEPUTY 

Viee Adm. Skinner is currently serving as the Principal Military 

Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 

Development, and Acquisition). He assumed his duties August 9, 

2010. 

Skinner was born in Houston, and graduated from the United 

States Naval Academy in ,June 1977. 

As a flag officer, he was the program executive officer for Tactical 

Aircraft Programs and commanded Naval Air Warfare Center, 

Weapons Di,;sion, and served as assistant commander, Test and 

Evaluation, Naval Air Systems Command. 

Skinner held both operational and shore commands to include 

commanding officer Patrol Squadron FORTY SEVEN; chief Test 

Pilot and commanding offIcer of Naval Force Aircraft Test Squadron, and program manager for a 

Chief of Naval Operations Special Project. 

Skinner is a graduate of the Na,y Test Pilot School and served in Force Warfare Aircraft Test 

Directorate, where he was recognized as Directorate Test Pilot of the Year in 1986. Additionally, he 

received a degree in Financial Management from the Naval Post Gradnate School, where he 

graduated as a Conrad Scholar and was awarded the Department of the Navy award for excellence 

in financial management, and the Rear Admiral Thomas R McClellan award for excellence in 

administrative sciences. 

His awards include Legion of Merit (3 awards), Meritorious Service Medal (4 awards), Navy and 

Marine Corps Commendation Medal (2 awards), Na,y and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and 

othcr unit dcploy,11ent citations and ribbons. 
100 

Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, 

Jr. 

Deputy Commandant for Aviation 

Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., USMC, 

as the Deputy Commandant for Aviation. As the Deputy 

Commandant for Aviation, he sets policy and facilitates 

the manning, training and equipping of Marine Aviation 

units. 

His command assignments include: Commanding General 

of First Marine Aircraft Wing, Commanding Officer of 

Special Purposc Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

(Experimental). and Commanding Officer of Marine 

Fighter/Attack Squadrons 251 and 115. 

Previous operational assignments include multiple tours 

flying the F-4 and F/A-1S aircraft as well as serving as the 

operations officer and air officer of an Infantry Battalion. First Battalion 9th Marines. 

Additionally, Lieutenant General Schmidle has served in the following key staff 

assignments: Deputy Commander tor U.S. Cyber Command, Assistant Deputy 

Commandant of the Marine Corps for Programs and Resources (Programs), Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Integrated Product Team 1 tor the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and 

USMC lead for the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Deputy Director for Resources 

and Acquisition in the Joint Staff J-8, Director of the USMC Expeditionary Force 

Development Center and the Military Secretary for the 32nd and 33rd Commandants of 

the Marine Corps. 

Lieutenant General Schmidle is a native of Newtown. Connecticut and graduated from 

Drew University vvith a Bachelor of Arts degree in History. He also holds a Master of 

Arts in Philosophy from American University and is currently working on his doetorate 

at Georgetown University He is a distinguished graduate and prior faculty member of the 

Marine Corps Command and StalTCollege as well as a distinguished graduate of the 

Marine Corps War College. Additionally, he has been published on a range of topics 

from military history to social psychology and philosophy. 
101 

REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. "BILL" MORAN 

DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE (OPNA V N98) .. 

Rear Adm. Moran was born and raised in the state of New York. He is 

a graduate of Valley Central High School and holds a Bachelor of 

Science degree from the United States Naval Academy (1981) and a 

master's degree from the National War College (2006). 

Moran is a P~3 pilot with operational tours spanning both coasts 

including Patrol Squadron 44, Brunswick, :\1aine; Patrol Squadron 

45, .Jacksonville, Fla.; command of Patrol Squadron 46, Whidbey 

Islaud, Wash.; aud command of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 2, 

Hawaii. He has deployed to Sigonella, Sicily; Rota, Spain; Lajes 

Azores; Keflavik, Iceland; Misawa, .Japan; Diego Garcia; Masirah, 

Oman; Bahrain; and, numerous detachments around the world. His 

other operational tours include flag lieutenaut and Battle Group 

tactical watch officer for Commander, Carrier Group Six, Mayport, 

Fla., aboard USS Forrestai (CV A 59). Moran has served extensively 

as an instructor pilot in multiple operational tours, and two tours 

"ith Patrol Squadron 30, the Fleet Replacement Squadron. 

Moran's shore assignments include: Patrol Wing 11, ,Jacksonville, Fla., as safety officer and assistant 

maintenanee offieer; the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C., as assistant Washington 

placement officer and assistant flag officer detailer; deputy executive assistant and executive assistant to 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii, from .Jnly 2000 to July 2003; deputy 

director, Navy staff from ,July 2006 until ,June 2007; and as executive assistant to the Chief of Naval 

Operations from .June 2007 until August 2008. Upon selection to flag rank, Moran assumed duties as 

commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group in August 2008. 

Moran served as deputy director, and currently serves as director, Air Warfare (OPNAV N98) on the 

staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In this capacity, Moran is responsible for the 

development, programming, and budgeting of all Naval aviation warfighting requirements. 
102 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

PRESENTA TION TO THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 2014 Department of Defense Combat A vialion Programs 

COMBINED STATEMENT OF: Lieutenant General BUlton M. Field 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

Plans and Requirements 

Lieutenant General Charles R. Davis 

Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 

April 17,2013 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
103 

l. Introduction 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to provide you with an update on Air Force tactical aviation 

programs. Today our Air Force is engaged globally, supporting the Combatant Commanders 

requirements and executing our National Strategy. 

In this environment of fiscal uncertainty our focus remains on our five core missions of Air and 

Space Superiority, Intelligence. Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Rapid Global Mobility. 

Global Strike. and Command and Control by which we deliver Global Reach. Global Power and 

Global Vigilance. It is more important than ever to balance near-term readiness with 

modernization efforts for the mid and long-term. Today' s discussion is f()Cused on Air and 

Space Superiority and Global Strike but covers all live core missions. 

2 

Our lorce structure meets most Combatant Commander requirements, but the current fiscal 

environment will necessitate that we stand down 13 lighter and bomber squadrons in Fiscal Y car 

2013. Multiple investment programs will be negatively impacted resulting in unit cost increases. 

terminations and schedule delays. There is still considerable uncertainty in the Fiscal Year 2014 

Air Force topline funding level. Tbe Fiscal Year 2014 budget request will not reverse the 

damage done by the Fiscal Year 2013 Sequestration. Recovering in warlighting capability and 

improving readiness requires a reduction in operations tempo and additional resources. 

As we work together through these difficult times, our objectives are: to remain as ready as 

possible today. set a course toward full-spectrum readiness. preserve a highly responsive and 

scalable force, and overcome force structure and modernization challenges to provide the nation 

with the world's most capable combat Air Force now and in the future. 

II. Current Environment and Operations Update 

Today, the Air Force flies and tights in air, space, and cyberspace--globally and reliably--as a 

valued member of our Joint and Coalition teams. Over 28.000 Airmen are deployed across the 

globe. including over 22.000 in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility. with another 

138.000 "committed in place" to defend the homeland. command and control our nuclear forces, 

operate remotely piloted aircraft, and support other Combatant Commander requirements. The 
104 

Air Force is an active partner in Department of Defense planning that will shift our emphasis 

from today's wars to a broader range of challenges and opportunities. The Department of 

Defense is currently reassessing the strategic guidance issued last year, but we anticipate 

continued emphasis on and planning for a rebalance to the Asia Pacific region. Our challenge is 

to provide Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen. and Marines who deploy in support of our global 

commitments with an Air Force that is capable. agile. l1exible. ready. and technologically 

advanced. 

In 2012. Air Force global precision attack aircraft new over 28,000 sorties and 41.000 hours in 

support of Overseas Contingency Operations. In support of these operations, our Intelligence. 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Ainnen provided intelligence that shaped combat plans for 33 

named operations. enabled the removal of 700 enemy combatants from the fight and built 

awareness for coalition forces in over 250 ·'troops-in-contact" engagements. Air Force Special 

Operations personnel executed over 1.600 strike missions and 7.700 specialized mobility 

missions. On the home hont. Air Force tighter. air refueling. and early warning aircraft have 

f10wn almost 64.000 total sorties supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE since September 11, 

2001. As a testament to the capability of our Total Force. the Air National Guard and Air Force 

Reserve have t10wn more than 65 percent of these Operation NOBLE EAGLE sorties with the 

Air National Guard currently operating 17 of 18 Aerospace Control Alert sites across the United 

States. 

Aviation is not without risk. In Fiscal Year 2012. there were 20 Class A aviation mishaps. 

including ten destroyed aircraft and nine fatalities. This was an increase from the Fiscal Year 

2011 numbers of IS Class A. eight aircraft destroyed, and two fatalities respectively. Analysis 

of these events found trends similar to previous years, with the top two mishap factors being 

compliance and decision making errors. 

There were 24 Class B aviation mishaps in Fiscal Year 2012. significantly down from 53 in 

Fiscal Year 2011. Similarly, Class C mishaps dropped to 443 hom 482 the year prior. 

Additionally, 

3 
105 

4 

Fiscal Year 2012 Unmanned Aerial System mishaps decreased across the board in Class A. B 

and C mishaps from Fiscal Year 2011. Class A mishaps dropped from 15 to 13. Class B mishaps 

from eight to four and Class C from 18 to 17. 

As we undergo further npdates to Defense Strategy. we must carefully balance our force between 

the active and reserve components. To get a better understanding of our Total Force mixture. we 

launched the Total Force Task Force. a team led hy general officers II'om the Active Duty. Guard 

and Reserve components. The Total Force Task Force is conducting a comprehensive review of 

Total Force requirements and will develop strategic options to ensure that the Air Force correctly 

balances the strengths of each component to sustain the capabilities required in the years ahead. 

The team is scheduled to present their findings by October L 2013. 

Additionally. The National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. which is required by 

the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act will undertake a comprehensive study 

of the structure of the Air Force to determine whether. and how. the structure should be modified 

to best fullill current and anticipated mission requirements in a manner consistent with available 

resources. The panel is scheduled to complete their report not later than February I. 2014. 

The Fiscal Year 2014 budget request retains critical force structure and maintains the Air Force's 

ability to rapidly respond to global mission demands. It evolved from a concerted effort to 

balance risk. modernization and force structure reductions with a commitment to readiness ancl 

taking care of our people. 

However, sequestration f'Jreecl the Air Force to implement immediate actions to mitigate a Fiscal 

Year 2013 topline reduction. A major impact of sequestration will be a marked decrease in 

readiness at the beginning of Fiscal Year 2014. Reductions in flying hours will cause unit stand 

downs. which will result in severe. rapid. and long-term unit combat readiness degradation. 

Within 60 days of a stand down. ajTeeted units will be unable to meet emergent or operations 

plans requirements. Depot delays will require the grounding of some of the affected aircraft. 

The deferments will result in idled production shops. a degradation of workforce proliciency and 

productivity. and corresponding fi-Iture volatility and operational costs. Additionally. 

sequestration cuts to Air Force modernization will impact everyone of our investment programs. 
106 

5 

These program disruptions wilL over time. cost more taxpayer dollars to rectify contract 

restructures and program inefficiencies, raise unit costs, and delay delivery of validated 

capabilities to wartighters in the field. The impact to modernization programs reduces our Air 

Force's competitive advantage and decreases the probability of mission success in contested 

environments. The Fiscal Year 2014 budget request does not enable full recovery of war fighting 

capability, capacity and readiness; additional resources will be required. 

III. Force Structure and Modernization 

Air Force fighter force structure is dependent on both fighter aircraft and rated manning. Two 

years ago, the Air Force determined through extensive analysis that a jc)ree structure of 1,200 

primary mission aircraft and 2.000 total aircraft was required to execute the National Military 

Strategy with increased operational risk. Last year, due to new strategic guidance and fiscal 

constraints. the Air Force rebalanced our tc)rce structure across core functions. Analysis showed 

the Air Force could decrease flghter force structure by approximately J 00 aircraft with higher 

risk, resulting in the current fighter requirement of 1.100 primary mission aircraft and J,900 total 

aircraft. 

The i\ir Force's fighter tleet is over 20 years old on average~-the oldest in our history. Without 

service life extensions and capability upgrades, it will not be possible to manage risk. The Air 

Force is pursuing programs that will modernize and extend the service life of our remaining fleet. 

The F-35 is a key component in preserving future force structure and mitigating risk. Any 

further delay in the F-35 program will create a serious shortfall (mid and far-term) in fighter 

capabilities and force structure. The Air Force is very concel11ed with recent budget reductions 

and continues to monitor how these cuts will affect risk. It is absolutely critical that 4th 

Generation sustainment and model11ization efforts continue as programmed. the F-22 continues 

to model11izc, and the F-35 matures and begins full rate production. 

In the Fiscal Year 2013 budget. the Air Force accepted risk in our Combat Air Forces by retiring 

or reclassil)iing aircraft from seven squadrons: five A-lO squadrons, one F-16 squadron, and one 

training/support coded F -15 Aggressor squadron. After reductions. we retained sut1icient 
107 

combat-coded fighter squadrons to maintain the capabilities and capacity required to meet the 

requirements of new strategic guidance at increased risk while providing a bridge to the Fifth 

Generation F-3S. 

6 

Manning these aircraft is a challenge we are aggressively working. Air Force mission success is 

dependent on fighter force structure manning. The Air Force is currently 200 lighter pilots short 

of the total manning requirement. Our projections indicate this deficit growing to approximately 

900 by 2022. excluding any additional negative impact on flying training driven by 

sequestration. The shortfall evolved from force structure rednctions that cut active duty lighter 

squadrons to a number that cannot sustain billet requirements. As a result. the Air Force is 

currently unable to produce and absorb the required number of fighter pilots across the total 

lorce. The Air Force is prioritizing available manpower at signi ticant risk to institutional 

requirements. Projected impacts include reductions in air-operations expertise during the 

development of war plans and a limited ability to train and maintain combat readiness. Recent 

programming and policy actions raised production and absorption capacity by Fiscal Year 2028: 

however, even with these changes, the Air Force will only be able to sustain a fighter pilot 

inventory capable of meeting 82 percent of our overall requirement for fighter pilot expertise. 

The A- I 0 provides our Joint Force Commanders responsive, lethal. precise, and persistent 

firepower for close air support and combat search and rescue. [t has been a steady, stellar 

performer in all recent cont1icts. Notably, the A-IO's very high operations tempo and advanced 

age present substantial sustainment challenges. Most notably, the wings on the aging aircraft 

must be replaced in order to keep the fleet f1ying through 2035 and beyond. 

Beginning in Fiscal Year 2013, the Air Force will retire 61 of the oldest A-lOs. This will leave a 

neet of 283 A- I Os through 2035. The Fiscal Year 2014 budget request ret1ects our commitment 

to fund A-I 0 modernization, sustainment, and life extension programs. Installation of the 

Helmet Mounted Cueing System. now underway, will provide increased situational awareness to 

the pilot. Operational Flight Program upgrades will provide the A-I 0 with new combat 

capabilities to employ a variety of smart weapons, improve situational awareness, and enhance 

target identilication and designation capability. Production and installation of the new 
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replacement wings are moving ahead at full-rate production levels. Other critical updates 

include an upgrade to the A-I O's transponder. allowing for secure. military-only identify friend 

or foc modes. and an improved engine turbine and aircraft monitoring system used to identify 

and monitor structural fatigues and stresses. Emphasis on the continued health and upgrade of 

the A-I 0 will ensure the aircraft continues to excel in the close air support role for the next two 

decades. 

7 

Our primary multi-role aircraft. the F-16 comprises 50 percent of the current fIghter neel. The 

Fiscal Y car 2014 budget request invests approximately $1.32 billion across the Future Y cars 

Defense Program (FYDP) for F-16 modernization, life extension. and continued sustainment to 

meet critical warfighter needs to 2025 and beyond. The majority ofthc cfl()t'ts to accomplish this 

across the FYDP will focus on the Legacy Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and Combat 

Avionics Programmed Extension Suites (CAPES) modernization program for 300 aircrati. We 

believe we will have to SLEP and modernize more. 

Legacy SLEP will extend airframe structural service life by approximately 25 percent from the 

current 8,000 hours to 10.000+ hours. adding about six to eight years. The Fiscal Year 2014 

budget request adds $18 million to continue design and development of structural modification 

kits t()l' the Block 40-52 neet to be responsive to the Air Force's total fighter requirement. 

Additionally. the Falcon Structural Augmentation Roadmap (STAR) program. ,vhich replaces 

known life-limited structural components and maintains the original design airfi'amc life of 8,000 

actual flight hours. has been re-phased to complete in Fiscal Y car 20 I 4. 

The Fiscal Year 2014 budget request adds $44 million in development, with a total of $489 

million in development and procurement funding laid in across the FYDP for F-16 CAPES. This 

will allow for the development of capabilities tor Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) 

radar. a new center cockpit display unit, data link enhancements and an improved electronic 

warfare defensive suite. These avionics upgrades must be done to keep the F -16 Block 40-52s 

relevant in a contested environment until replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

F-IS C/D 
109 

The Fiscal Year 2014 budget request invests approximately $1.9 billion across the FYDP on 

modernization and sustainment programs for the F-ISCID tleet. We project the F-15C/D tleet 

will remain viable until at least 2035, with potential for an airframe service lite extension 

following full-scale fatigue testing. This test is underway and will conclude in 2014. The Air 

Force manages the tleet through scheduled field and depot inspections under an individual 

aircrall tracking program. 

We continue to modernize our F-15C/D fleet with AESA radars, a more capable aircra1l mission 

computer, and a new electronic warfare self~protection suite, the Eagle Passive/Active Warning 

Survivability System (EPA WSS). We expect these efforts to enable 175 F-15CID aircraft to 

operate safely and effectively through at least 2035 as determined by the full-scale fatigue test. 

F-15E 

8 

The Fiscal Year 2014 budget request invests approximately $2.5 billion across the FYDP for F15E modernization and sustainment programs. This includes integrating the latest precision 

weapons to hit targets accurately and reduce collateral damage, and adding a helmet mounted 

cueing system for all n'ont seat cockpits that will reduce the F -15E's time to engage a target. 

Finally, we are adding a state-of~the-art AESA radar system that advances capabilities to identify 

and engage targets, a more capable aircraft mission computer, and a new self~protection 

electronic warfare system (EPA WSS). The Air Force expects the F-15E to be an integral part of 

the Nation's force through at least 2035. A full-scale fatigue test due to be complete in 2015, 

will provide data regarding the feasibility of a service life extension. 

Fifth Generation Fighters 

Vital elements of our nation's defense and deterrent capability arc fifth generation fighters like 

the F-22A and F-35. These advanced, state-of-the-art aircraft are absolutely essential to maintain 

our cunent global superiority that permit air, sea, and ground forces freedom of action. Each 

aircraft possess exclusive, complimentary and indispensable capabilities that provide synergistic 

etTects across the spectrum of cont1ict. As future adversaries modernize, our legacy fourth 

generation aircraft will have limited capability to operate in an anti-access and area denial 

environment. Our Air Force must continue to invest in fifth generation weapon systems, and 
110 

begin looking even further into the future, to ensure continued dominance of American 

Airpower. 

The F-22 Raptor is the only fielded U.S. fighter capable of operating in anti-access and area 

denial environments. F -22 attributes of stealth. super cruise. integrated avionics and sensors 

combine to deliver the Raptor's unique operational capability. F-22 modernization is required to 

counter advancing threats that specifically target F-22 capabilities. Accordingly. F-22 

modernization is consistent with Department of Defense Strategic Guidance to "invest as 

required to ensure [the] ability to operate effectively in [anti-access and area denial] 

environments". Focused on maintaining operational superiority against the evolving threat. the 

Fiscal Year 2014 budget request for F-22 modernization investment includes $459.6 million in 

RDT&E in addition to $460.3 million in procurement in Fiscal Year 2014. Increment 3.1 is 

fielding now and is scheduled to be complete in Fiscal Year 2017. delivering advanced airground capabilities including Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) ground mapping. threat 

geolocation. and Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) carriage. Increments 3.2A/B remain on track for 

fielding in 2014/2018 respectively. and will deliver advanced electronic protection and combat 

identillcation. AIM-120D and AIM-9X missiles, and significantly-improved ground threat 

geolocation. 

9 

The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Aviation Oxygen Generation System Study made eight 

near-term and 14 long-term recommendations for corrective and mitigating actions to prevent 

hypoxia-like events that led to the neet stand-down in May-Sept 201 L The Air Force completed 

all eight near-term actions to include replacement of the emergency oxygen system activation 

handle; modification of the pilot upper pressure garment and installation of an independent 

oxygen sensor and helmet-mounted pulse oximeter. Additionally, nine of 14 longer-term 

recommendations were implemented, with the remaining five expected to be complete by 

November 2014. Most notably. the retrofit of the Automatic Back-up Oxygen System is on track 

for completion by 2015. The first 16 Raptors at Elmendorf Air Force Base are expected to be 

complete by mid-April. The F-22 is operating safely world-wide. and Hew over 38,000 hours 

since return to Oight in September 2011. It has been over 12 months since the last unknowncause hypoxia-like event occurred. 
111 

During Fiscal Y car 2014, the Air Force will continue the balanced approach across the global 

precision attack portfolio by prioritizing investment in fifth-generation aircraft while sustaining 

legacy platforms as a bridge to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, 

The multi-role F-35A is the centerpiece of the Air Force's future fighter precision attack 

capability. In addition to complementing the F-22's world class air superiority capabilities, the 

F-35A is designed to penetrate air defenses and deliver a wide range of precision munitions. 

10 

This modern. fifth-generation aircraft brings the added benefit of increased allied interoperability 

and cost-sharing across Services and eight partner nations. The Fiscal Year 2014 budget request 

includes $4.5 billion for continued development and procurement of 19 F-35A, conventional 

take-orr and landing (CTOL) aircraft. The program has made significant strides overcoming 

software development delays and technical issues. 

During Calendar Year 2012. the F-35 program team achieved a number of significant milestones, 

including: rvlilestone B approvaL Low Rate Initial Production Lot 5 contract definitization, Lot 6 

undefinitized contract action, an Operational Utility Evaluation, a ready for training declaration: 

the start of pilot training at Eglin Air Force Base. completion of over 1.100 (cst flights, first 

weapon separation test on an F-35A CTOL, and the delivery 0[30 production aircraft to the Air 

Force and Marine Corps. These early production deliveries to our operational test and training 

neet al!olovs the Air Force to begin the necessary operational tcst and validation efit1rts of the 

CF-35) this year, while also building our initial cadre of instructors to train our future generations 

of combat-ready pilots and maintainers. 

In Fiscal Year 2013. the Air Force planned to procure 19 F-35A CTOL aircraft. As a result of 

sequestration, the Air Force will have to reduce the procurement quantity by at least three and 

potentially as many as Ji ve aircraft. 

The progress made so far and the steps wc take today are crucial in our ellorts for declaring F-35 

Initial Operational Capability (TOC). After last year's program re-baseline and Milestone B recertification, the joint services were tasked to provide Congress our updated JOe criteria and 
112 

11 

timeline estimates by June 1,2013. The Air Force fully expects to have our IOC position to you 

by this suspense. 

One last area of F-35 development to address is the Autonomic Logistics Information System. or 

ALIS. The Air Force understands ALIS is a necessary and integral element of the F-35 weapon 

system, and as such. is a top program priority. As designed. ALIS will tic F-35 mission 

planning. operational flight. ops and maintenance training. debrief. tech and flight manuals, 

prognostic health management. and supply chain management into one seamless information 

system. Early flight operations at Eglin Air ForCe? Base demonstrated ALIS initial capability to 

supp011 training, flight. and maintenance efforts. Although there were deficiencies identified and 

addressed during these early flight operations. and significant challenges remain through 

development. the Air Force remains cautiously optimistic continued ALIS development will 

deliver the required F-35 sustainment elements. 

Air-to-Surface Weapons 

All three mission areas (Stand-Oft: Direct Attack. and Penetrator munitions) in the Air-toSurtace munitions inventory are short of inventory objectives. The most critical are stand-off 

and penetrator weapons. Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and SDB weapons 

along with Low Observable platforms are force multipliers in an anti-access andarca denial 

environment and their shortage could increase friendly force attrition and drive a much higher 

level of cHort enabling the attack of other critical targets. The shortage ofpenetrator weapons 

will result in some inability to target adversary critical capabilities and increase risk. Direct 

attack munitions shortages drive the use of non-prelerredmllllitions that decrease cft"ctivcness 

and result in increased time and Air Force attrition accomplishing Combatant Commander 

objectives . 

. JASSM and JASSM-ER 

JASSM and JASSM-ER (Extended Range) are eunently the nation's only stealthy. conventional. 

precision, launch-and-leave. stand-off missile capable of fighter and bomber aircraft 

employment. It is capable of penetrating next generation enemy air defenses to strike high value. 

hardened. fixed. or mobile targets. 
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12 

Currently. JASSM is in Lot 11 production with over 1,000 missiles delivered and JASSM-ER is 

in Lot 2 production. The Fiscal Year 2014 procurement plans are to buy 182 missiles: 102 

JASSMs and 80 JASSM-ERs. Fiscal Year 2014 also funds reliability efforts and the JASSM 

Weapon System Evaluation Program for flight testing of inventory assets. The Air Force is 

ramping-up the JASSM production to the most efficient rate (360 per year) by buying 224 

missiles in Fiscal Year 2015 and 360 in Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond. While the range of 

JASSM is more than 200 nautical miles, JASSM-ER's range is over twice that (over 500 nautical 

miles) . .JASSM-ER completed Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in January 2013 with 20 

successfull1ight test shots out of 21, a success ratc of over 95 percent. The Full Rate Production 

decision for JASSM-ER is December 2013, with a plan to transition to JASSM-ER only 

production in Fiscal Year 2017 and beyond at the max production rate of 360 missiles per year. 

Air-to-Air Weapons 

AIM-120D AMRAAM 

The AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) is the Department of 

Defense's premier beyond-visual-range missile to counter existing and emerging air vehicle 

threats. operating at high or low altitude with electronic attack capabilities. AMRAAM is a key 

enabler for gaining air superiority and air dominance providing F-22. F-16, F-15. and FI A-18 

aircraft the ability to achieve multiple kills per engagement. The latest evolution of AMRAAM 

is the AIM-120D. which brings increased range and kinematics. improved high ofT-boresight 

targeting. and an enhanced two-way data link for improved accuracy and lethality at range. 

AIM-120D is an Acquisition Category ICjoint program. with the Air Force as lead service in 

partnership with the Navy. The AIM-120D Operational Test Readiness Review was successfully 

completed in May 2012 and the program is currently in dedicated operational testing. Fiscal 

Year 2014 plans are to complete dedicated operational testing. to include captive carry and free 

flight, and fielding on F/A-18 Ell' and F-15 C/O aircraft. Force procurement [or Fiscal Year 

2014 is 199 units; along with a purchase of 54 units by the Navy. The program will continue to 

update the AMRAAM technical data package to ensure a viable, producible design through the 

expected production life of the AMRAAM program, and to maintain a robust supplier base 

capable of sustaining production for the life oftlle program. 
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13 

Updates Requested by Congress 

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) uses the CV-22 Osprey's unique long range. 

speed. and vertical take-off and landing (VTOr ,) characteristics to provide special operations 

warfighters with specialized air mobility. In 2012, CV-22s completed 1,022 Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM sorties. hauling over 135,000 pounds of cargo and extracting 299 

detainees. In 2013, we will station aircraft at RAF Mildenhall, UK. the CV -22's first overseas 

squadron. 

The current CV-22 neet stands at 32 aircraft with the tlnal buy scheduled in Fiscal Year 2014 as 

part of the program's second multi-year procurement. Current funding levels support the 

procurement off our Fiscal Year 2013 aircraft and the linal three aircraft in Fiscal Year 2014. 

Declaration of full operational capability is scheduled following the delivery of the last CV-22 in 

Fiscal Year 2016. for a total of 49 operational AFSOC aircraft. 

The Joint V-22 Program omce is increasing CV -22's capabilities while executing an aggressive 

improvement program, which continues to make signitlcant progress. Since Fiscal Year 2010. 

aircraft availability rates are up over 20 percent. Particular emphasis is being placed on 

improving CV-22 engine time-on-wing, which has already seen a 62 percent increase since 

Fiscal Year 2010. These trends have continued in the first halfofFiscal Year 2013. In Fiscal 

Year 2014. we will start development of an improved engine inlet solution to address sand 

ingestion prohlems that severely degrade engine performance and necessitate costly engine 

removals and repairs due to operating and training in austere desert environments. 

Improvements to the CV -22 are being made in block increments and each block includes a 

number of modification upgrades installed as they become available. Retrotit modifications 

continue to bring the oldest CV -22s to the most current configuration. Sequestration reductions 

will delay installation of Block 20lC improvements on fielded aircraft. Future modifications and 

improvements to the CV-22 will make the aircraft even more reliable. productive. and costetlective; thus ensuring the AFSOC's long range VTOL capability is available and will provide 

specialized air mobility wherever and whenever required. 
115 

14 

Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) 

The Air Force is the only Service with a dedicated force that is organized, trained, and equipped 

to execute Personnel Recovery. Advanced helicopter capabilities, high-end tactically trained 

aircrews. and Battlefield Airmen who are trained in advanced battlefield trauma medicine allow 

these forces to provide lifesaving measures at the point of injury, anywhere in the world. These 

highly trained Airmen suppoli Air Force, Joint Coalition and Special Operations Porces in a 

wide variety of mission areas. In addition to overseas contingency deployments. these Airmen 

also serve as tirst responders during disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. 

making them some of the most highly stressed career fields in the U.S. military. Since 2001, our 

combat rescue forces saved over 7.000 lives, and in 2012 alone. they flew 4,500 missions saving 

1,128 Coalition. Joint and pminer nation lives in some of the harshest environments in the world. 

The Air Force will continue to modify existing HH-60G helicopters to keep them viable until we 

can fully recapitalize the neet with the CRH. This effOli includes an operational loss replacement 

program that returns the HH-60G fleet to numbers capable of meeting our operational 

requirements. The operational loss replacemcnt program is only a temporary bridge to allow us 

to meet operational demands until the entire fleet is recapitalized through CRH. 

The CRH will conduct day and night marginal weather combat search and rescue in order to 

recover downed aircrew and isolated personnel in hostile environments. The program replaces 

the legacy lleet of aging Hl-l-60G Pave Hawks. CRH is in source selection for 112 in-production 

helicopters and training systems configured by the original equipment manufacturer to meet the 

warfighter requirement. Our Fiscal Year 2014 budget supports contract award. 

Command and Control (C2) 

Command and Control, as a core function. is fundamental for all Air Force Core Punctions. The 

C2 vision is to provide sufficiently robust, scalable. tlexible, and rapidly deployable C2 

capabilities, enabling commanders to fully exploit air, space, and cyberspace capabilities. 

Underpinning the proper employmcnt of Airpower is the Air Operations Center (AOC) -- the 

senior element ofthe Theater Air Control System which serves as the focal point for planning, 

directing. and assessing air, space. and cyberspace operations to meet Joint Force Air Component 

Commander operational objectives and guidance. 
116 

15 

The C2 emphasis in the Fiscal Year 2013 budget complies with the Department of Defense's 

budget reduction goals while maintaining an adequate C2 capability. The Fiscal Year 2014 

budget request supports the AOC. E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

(JSTARS). E-3 Airborne Early Warning and Control System (A WACS). and Three-Dimensional 

Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR) programs. 

Investments in JSTARS will sustain the fleet pending decisions trom the Airborne Synthetic 

Aperture Radar (SAR)I Moving Target Indicator (MTI)IJSTARS Mission Area Analysis of 

Alternatives (AoA). while the E-3 A WACS will continue the Block 40/45 upgrades with the 

3DELRR program pressing towards source selection for a new ground based sensor. 

Air Operations Center (AOC) 

The AOC provides operational-level C2 of air. space, and cyberspace operations. The AOC 

coordinates closely with superior and subordinate C2 nodes. as well as the headquarters of other 

functional and service component commands to integrate the numerous aspects of air. space. and 

cyberspace operations and accomplish its mission. To etTectively integrate the Theater Air 

Control System (TACS) elements. the AOC develops and establishes theater-wide C2 guidance 

of regular and irregular warfare. providing overarching direction to all the TACS elements. The 

baseline AOC Weapons System (Increment 10.1) requires modernization to enable collaboration. 

improve inloTInation accuracy, and provide enhanced system security against known and 

projected cyber threats. The sustainment of AOC Weapon System 10.1. and the continued 

development and successful fielding of AOC Weapon System 10.2 is critical to maintain joint 

interopcrability and provide operational-level C2 to assigned and apportioned forces. 

E-8C JSTARS 

The E-8C JSTARS is the world's premier airborne Command, Control, Intelligence. 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) platform for air-to-ground Battle Management 

operations. It provides long-endurance. all-weather. surveillance and targeting of moving and 

stationary targets via GMTI and SAR technology. 
117 

16 

The Air Force completed the Airborne SARIMTI JSTARS Mission Area AoA in 2011, which 

concluded that the optimum choice for the future of Air Force MTI was to use a business jet 

class aircraft with an advanced radar and on-board Battle Management Command and Control 

(SMC2) suite. The AoA also concluded that upgrading the current E-8C fleet with an Advanced 

Radar and new BMC2 Suite would be the next best solution, but has significantly high lifecycle 

costs. In the current fiscal environment, there is a lack of funding for a 1ST ARS replacement 

surveillance aircraft. The Air Force continues to fund the operations and support of the lSTARS 

platform to meet warfighter requirements. Critical near term diminishing manufacturing sources 

(DMS) issues have been addressed through the Muitifunctionallnformation Distribution System 

(MJDS) Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and Prime Mission Equipment DMS efforts. It is 

currently estimated that DMS issues will not cause grounding of any lSTARS platforms until 

2025+. These modernization effOlis keep JSTARS viable to support the National Military 

Strategy. 

The .rSTARS weapons system has been in continuous surge operations since 2004 and this level 

of tasking is expected to continue as Combatant Commander requirements for ground and 

maritime moving target surveillance continue to escalate. Current Global Force Management 

Allocation Plan (GFMAP) taskings and projected E-8C GFMAP allocations f(l!' Fiscal Years 

2014-2015 will require continued deployment at these rates. limiting E-8C worldwide 

availability in support of emerging contingency responses. 

E-3 AWACS 

The 31 aircraft E-3 A WACS fleet is the Depaliment of Defense's premier airborne surveillance 

and BMC2 weapon system. A WACS is a key airborne element ofTACS and delivers combat 

effects of BMC2, Batllespace Awareness (BA) and Decision Superiority (DS). As a rapidly 

deployable system, the E-3 is often the first surveillance and BMC2 capability in theater. 

The E-3 fleet has struggled to consistently meet Air Combat Command's Mission Capahle 

requirement. Additionally, the depot is seeing increased corrosion in the fuselage and wings 

leading to expectations for increased aging aircraft issues in the next programmed depot 

maintenance cycles. System mission capable rates will likely deteriorate further when 

considering recent reductions to operations and sustainment budgets. 
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17 

AWACS, with its current modernization programs, is adequate for executing the National 

Military Strategy. Current modernization efforts locus on upgrading battle management mission 

systems through the 40/45 upgrade, as well as cockpit avionics to provide the A WACS with the 

computing and communications architecture to participate in a net-enabled baltlespace, and 

avionics that are free from DMS issues to meet worldwide airspace navigation requirements. 

AWACS requires these future efforts to address adversary threats and effectively participate in 

coalition and joint networked baltlespace. Future etforts include BMC2 enhancements and wideband communications to allow for net centric operations and data exchange with other weapon 

systems and elements of the enterprise as well as sensor upgrades to detect low/very low radar 

cross section air target sets and improve operations in an electronic attack environment. Future 

capability enhancements will depend on the priority and phasing relative to other Department 

efforts and difficult choices may be required to live within funding constraints. 

Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR) 

Fundamental to the Air Force's ability to provide unparalleled, expert, and sustained BMC2 is 

the ground-based Control and Reporting Center (CRC) weapon system, is the replacement of its 

1970s-era technology primary sensor that is becoming unsupportable. The mission of the CRC 

is to provide persistent tactical level BMC2 to joint and combined air, land, and sea power assets 

in support of the Joint/Combined Forces Air Component Commander's objectives. The 

3DELRR is planned to be the principal Air Force long range, ground-based sensor to detect, 

identify, track, and report aerial targets in support of theater commanders, with the Full 

Operational Capability for 35 radars scheduled for 2025. Extensive operational analyses have 

resulted in well-defined requirements based on current and future threats and scenarios. After a 

$252 million cut to the program in the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, the Air Force identified 

cost/perf01mance trades to enable the program to move the forward. 

IV. Conclusion 

The Air Force is still assessing the exact impacts of sequestration on Air Force total obligation 

authority in Fiscal Year 2014 and beyond. Any further reductions to our Fiscal Year 2014 

budget request will drive additional risks to our readiness, torce structure. and ability to 
119 

modernize an aging aircraft inventory. In addition. the outcome of the strategic choices and 

management review may drive profound changes across the Department of Defense. 

18 

As we navigate the uncertain way ahead, to mitigate risk in critical areas like readiness. force 

structure and modernization. we will continue to work with Congress to develop executable force 

shaping options, and ask support for another BRAC round to reduce excess infrastructure as a 

means to meet sizable budget reduction goals. 

Our sister services and allies expect your Air Force to provide critical warflghting and enabling 

capabilities. We remain focused on delivering Global Power. Reach. and Vigilance through our 

core missions of Air and Space Superiority. Global Strike. Rapid Global Mobility. Intelligence. 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance and global Command and Control. We look forward to 

\\/orking closely together as we address the challenges of near-term uncertainty to provide the 

ability to deliver combat air power for America when and where wc are needed. 
120 

BIOGRAPHY 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURTON M. FIELD 

Lt Gen. Burton M. Field is the deputy chief of staff 

for operations, plans and requirements, 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

He is responsible to the secretary of the Air Force 

and the chief of staff for formulating policy 

supporting air, space. irregular warfare, 

counterproliferation, homeland security, weather 

and cyber operations. As the Air Force operations 

deputy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the general 

determines operational requirements, capabilities 

and training necessary to support national security 

objectives and military strategy 

General Field was commissioned in 1979 after 

graduating from the U.S. Air Force Academy. He 

has commanded the 421 st Fighter Squadron at 

Hill Air Force Base, Utah; the USAF Weapons 

School at Nellis AFB, Nev., the 8th Fighter Wing at 

Kunsan Air Base, South Korea; and the 1 st Fighter 

Wing at Langley AFB, Va. He has also deployed 

as Commander, 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, 

Balad AB, Iraq. The general served on two major 

command staffs as well as the Joint Staff. Prior to 

his current assignment he was the Commander, 

U.S. Forces Japan, and Commander, 5th Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan. 

General Field is a command pilot with more than 3,400 flying hours in the F-16 and the F-22A. 

EDUCATION 

1979 Bachelor of Science degree, US. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo. 

1984 Squadron Officer School, by correspondence 

1985 USAF Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev. 

1986 Master's degree in business administration, Golden Gate University, Calif. 

1993 Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 

1998 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

ASSIGNMENTS 

1. July 1979 - July 1980, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz. 

2. October 1980 - May 1981, student, f-16 Replacement Training Unit, Hill AFB, Utah 

3. May 1981 December 1983, F-16 squadron pilot and instructor pilot, 430th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 

Nellis AFB, Nev. 

4. January 1984 - December 1984, F-16 instructor pilot, 80th Tactical Fighter Squadron. Kunsan AB, South 

Korea 
121 

5. January 1985 - May 1985, student, USAF Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev. 

6. May 1985 - May 1987, weapons and tactics officer and F-16 instructor pilot, 430th Tactical Fighter 

Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nev. 

7. May 1987 - July 1990, F-16 instructor pilot, academic instructor and flight commander, USAF Fighter 

Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev. 

8 August 1990 - June 1992, advanced medium-range air-to-air missile and F-22 action officer, Tactical Air 

Command, Langley AFB, Va. 

9. June 1992 June 1993, student, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 

10. July 1993 - June 1994, Chief, Standardization and Evaluation, 388th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, Utah 

11 June 1994 - June 1995, operations officer, 34th Fighter Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah 

12. June 1995 - July 1997, Commander, 421st Fighter Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah 

13. August 1997 - June 1998, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

14. July 1998 - May 2000, executive officer to Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, 

Germany 

15. May 2000 - April 2001 , Commandant, USAF Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev. 

16. May 2001 - May 2002, Commander, 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, South Korea 

17. June 2002 - May 2003, Assistant Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Europe (J5), Joint Staff, the 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

18. June 2003 - June 2005, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs for Western Hemisphere (J5), Joint Staff, 

the Pentagon, Washington, D.C, 

19. June 2005 - May 2007, Commander, 1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Va. 

20, July 2007 - July 2008, Commander, 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, Joint Base Balad, Iraq 

21. July 2008 - February 2009, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C. 

22. February 2009 - October 2010, Senior Military Adviser to the U,S, Special Representative for 

Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Pentagon, Washington, D,C, 

23. October 2010 - July 2012, Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, and Commander, 5th Air Force, Pacific Air 

Forces, Yokota Air Base, Japan 

24, July 2012 - present, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S, 

Air Force, Washington, D.C, 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

1, June 2002 - May 2003, Assistant Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Europe (J5), Joint Staff, the 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a colonel 

2, June 2003 - June 2005, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs for Western Hemisphere (J5), Joint Staff, 

the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a colonel 

3. July 2008 February 2009, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C., as a major general 

4. February 2009 - October 2010, Senior Military Adviser to the U.S, Special Representative for 

Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Pentagon, WaShington, D.C" as a major general 

5. October 2010 - July 2012, Commander, U,S. Forces Japan, and Commander, 5th Air Force, Pacific Air 

Forces, Yokota Air Base, Japan, as a lieutenant general 

FLIGHT INFORMATION 

Rating: Command pilot 

Flight hours: More than 3,400 

Aircraft flown: F-16 and F-22A 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster 

Bronze Star Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters 

Air Medal with three oak leaf clusters 
122 

Aerial Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster 

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 

2011 Eugene M. Zuckert Award for Outstanding Management Achievements by a Department of the Air 

Force Manager 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant May 30, 1979 

First Lieutenant May 30, 1981 

Captain May 30, 1983 

Major May 1, 1990 

lieutenant Colonel Feb. 1, 1995 

Colonel March 1, 2000 

Brigadier General June 1, 2005 

Major General July 2, 2008 

Lieutenant General Oct 25, 2010 

(Current as of November 2012 
123 

BIOGRAPHY 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHARLES R. DAVIS 

Lt. Gen. Charles R Davis is the Military Deputy, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Acquisition, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

He is responsible for research and development, 

test, production, and modernization of Air Force 

programs worth more than $40 billion annually. 

General Davis was commissioned in 1979 from the 

U.S. Air Force Academy as a distinguished 

graduate with a bachelor's degree in chemistry. 

His assignments include flying duties in the T-38, 

F-15, A-7, F-117A and F-16. He has also served 

on the Air Staff under the Director of Air Force Test 

and Evaluation. The general led divisions in both 

the F-16 and F-15 program offices, served as 

Director of the F-15 and Flight Training System 

Program Offices, and was the Joint Primary 

Aircraft Training (T-6A) System Program Director. 

The general commanded the 41 oth Flight Test 

Squadron, F-117A Combined Test Force and 

412th Test Wing. He also served as Program 

Executive Officer for the F-35 Lightning II Program 

Office. 

As the Commander, Air Armament Center, and the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Weapons, Air 

Force Materiel Command, Eglin AFB, Fla., he oversaw development, acquisition, testing, deployment and 

sustainment of all air-delivered weapons. He also directed and conducted test and evaluation of U.S. and 

allied air armament, navigation and guidance systems and command and control systems. Prior to his 

current position, Gen Davis was the Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, 

Mass. and the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Command, Control, and Communications 

Infrastructure and Networks. His duties encompassed the acquisition of command and control and combat 

support information systems for the Air Force comprising more than 12,000 people located at six sites 

throughout the United States while managing more than $5 billion in programs annually in support of the Air 

Force and joint and coalition forces. 

General Davis is an experimental test pilot with more than 3,400 flying hours in 53 types of aircraft. 

EDUCATION 

1979 Distinguished graduate, Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry, U.S. Air Force Academy, ColoradO 

Springs, Colo. 

1983 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College, by correspondence 

1986 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence 

1988 Distinguished graduate, Experimental Test Pilot Course. U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School, Edwards 

AFB, Calif. 

1991 Master of Science degree in mechanical engineering, California State University, Fresno 

1995 Distinguished graduate, Master of Science degree in national resource management, Industrial College 
124 

of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C 

1997 Program Manager Course, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Va. 

2004 United States Russia Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 

Cambridge, Mass. 

ASSIGNMENTS 

1. July 1979 August 1980, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz. 

2. August 1980 - March 1983, T-38 instructor pilot, flight scheduler, and squadron standardization and 

evaluation officer, 97th Flying Training Squadron, Williams AFB, Ariz. 

3. March 1983 - July 1984, assistant executive officer to the Inspector General, 82nd Flying Training 

Headquarters, Williams AFB, Ariz. 

4. July 1984 - June 1987, F-15 pilot, flight commander, Chief of Scheduling, and weapons and tactics officer, 

48th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Langley AFB, Va. 

5. June 1987 June 1988, student, U.S. Air Force Experimental Test Pilot Course, U.S. Air Force Test Pilot 

School, Edwards AFB, Calif. 

6. June 1988 February 1989. A-7 and T-38 experimental test pilot, 6512th Test Squadron, Edwards AFB, 

Calif. 

7. February 1989 - May 1991, F-16 experimental test pilot and assistant operations officer, 6516th Test 

Squadron, Edwards AFB, Calif. 

8. May 1991 - May 1992, F-16 experimental test pilot and test systems safety officer, Safety Directorate, Air 

Force Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, Calif. 

9. May 1992 - March 1994, Chief, Tactical Air to Air Systems Policy and Programs Division, Air Force Test 

and Evaluation Directorate, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

10. March 1994 - August 1994, executive to the Director, Air Force Test and Evaluation Directorate, 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

11. August 1994 - June 1995, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 

Washington, D.C. 

12. June 1995 - July 1997, Commander, 410th Flight Test Squadron. F-117A Combined Test Force, Air 

Force Plant 42, Palmdale, Calif. 

13. July 1997 - November 1998, Chief, F-16 Combat Air Force Programs, F-16 System Program Office, 

Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 

14. November 1998 - July 1999, Director, Development and Acquisition, F-15 SPO, ASC, Wright-Patterson 

AFB, Ohio 

15. July 1999 April 2001, Director, Flight Training SPO, ASC, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 

16. May 2001 - April 2003, Director, F-15 SPO, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins AFB, Ga. 

17. April 2003 - June 2004, Commander, 412th Test Wing, Edwards AFB, Calif. 

18. June 2004 - July 2006, Deputy Program Executive Officer, Joint Strike Fighter Program, Arlington, Va. 

19. July 2006 May 2009, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program Office, Arlington, Va. 

20. May 2009 - August, 2011, Comrnander, Air Arrnarnent Center, and the Air Force Program Executive 

Officer for Weapons, Air Force Materiel Command, Eglin AFB, Fla. 

21. Sept. 2011 - May 2012, Commander. and Program Executive Officer for Command and Control and 

Combat Support, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command, Hanscom AFB, Mass. 

22. May 2012 - present, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

1. June 2004 - July 2006, Deputy Program Executive Officer. Joint Strike Fighter Program, Arlington. Va, as 

a colonel and brigadier general 

2. July 2006 - May 2009, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program Office, Arlington, Va, as a 

brigadier general and major general 

FLIGHT INFORMATION 

Rating: Command pilot 

Flight hours: 3,431 hours 

Aircraft flown F-15, F-16, F-117A, A-7, T-38. and 48 other aircraft types 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster 
125 

MeritoriouS ::ierYlce Medal wltn three oaK lear Clusters 

Aerial Achievement Medal with three oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Commendation Medal 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

Combat Readiness Medal 

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 

1980 Distinguished graduate. undergraduate pilot training 

1985 Top graduate and top academic student. F-15 Fighter Training Unit 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant May 30, 1979 

First Lieutenant May 30, 1981 

Captain May 30, 1983 

Major June 1, 1990 

Lieutenant Colonel March 1. 1994 

Colonel Sept. 1, 1998 

Brigadier General Oct. 1, 2005 

Major General Dec. 20, 2007 

lieutenant General Sept. 1, 2011 

(Current as of May 2012) 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 17, 2013 

(129) 

1GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD’s ISR Enterprise, GAO–11–465 (Washington, D.C.: Jun 3, 2011). 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE 

General SCHMIDLE. In April 1971, the Marine Corps’ first operational AV–8A 

squadron was established in Beaufort, South Carolina. In January 1985, the Marine 

Corps’ first operational AV–8B squadron was commissioned at Marine Corps Air 

Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. AV–8B Initial Operational Capability, or IOC, 

was achieved in August 1985. [See page 20.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As of now, the Department has an Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) roadmap, but no coherent ISR investment strategy. Congress 

and GAO have pushed for the development of an ISR roadmap and investment 

strategy for nearly a decade. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2004 specifically required DOD to develop a roadmap to guide the development and 

integration of DOD ISR capabilities over a 15-year period and report to Congress 

on the contents of the roadmap. In addition to other matters, the 2004 legislation 

required DOD’s roadmap to include: (1) fundamental goals, (2) an overview of ISR 

integration activities, and (3) an investment strategy. In response, DOD issued an 

ISR Integration Roadmap in May 2005, which it updated in 2007 and again in 2010. 

GAO’s recent review of the 2007 and 2010 roadmaps found that while DOD has 

made progress, neither roadmap included all the elements specified by Congress or 

addressed the important issue of how to invest future resources among competing 

priorities. 1 GAO noted that without a detailed investment strategy, DOD and the 

military services may not have a common understanding of how activities should 

be prioritized. Until DOD addresses challenges related to managing funding, integrating ISR capabilities, and minimizing inefficiencies in its ISR enterprise, the department risks investing in lower-priority and even duplicative capabilities while 

leaving critical capability gaps unfilled. As a result, GAO suggested that the Congress consider establishing additional accountability in legislation, such as conditioning a portion of ISR funding on completion of all congressionally directed management elements, including the development of an integrated ISR investment 

strategy, to ensure that future versions of the ISR Integration Roadmap meet all 

of the elements of an integrated ISR roadmap identified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 as well as the 2008 House of Representatives 

Committee on Armed Services report. [See page 20.] 

Admiral SKINNER and Admiral MORAN. The Navy’s ISR Strategy involves advanced sensor development across all domains: Navy’s increased capability and capacity should be aimed at having complete visibility into regions of interest and 

overcoming an adversary’s efforts to deny access to critical areas. Advanced technologies are needed to: 

• Increase autonomy of sensors, platforms, and data processing to reduce data 

latency and manpower costs. 

• Optimize the mix of autonomous manned and unmanned platforms and sensors to increase capability and capacity to commanders and weapons. 

• Develop sensors that: 

Æ Enhance multi-INT, multi-domain collection capabilities, and improve 

visibility into contested battlespace; 

Æ Increase the number of multi-purpose, low-cost, networked, deployable, 

and expendable assets; 

Æ Process data locally and disseminate required data smartly. 

• Replace larger single-capability satellites by hosting sensor payloads on other 

types of platforms and identify options for spacebased collections: 
130 

Æ Investigate micro-, mini-, and nano-satellites to provide fine-scale temporal and spatial resolution data via common C2 paths as well as to provide persistence, increase collection fidelity and mitigate capacity issues; Æ Improve low-power sensors and battery and fuel cell technology to enhance persistence and endurance; Æ Develop and collect strategic signals of interest by improving NTM and 

tactical collection capabilities in support of emerging threats; Æ Pursue satellites technologies with greater on-board processing and direct 

downlink capabilities to deployed forces and weapon systems to reduce 

the SATCOM requirement; Æ Determine the capability and availability of other agencies’ and countries’ 

ISR assets in near real-time to support Navy/maritime collection requirements, and make greater use of international partnerships; achieve netenabled cognitive interactions between disparate forces to enhance collaborative operations, including allies. 

• Develop sensors and networks that use ‘‘Spectrum Agility’’ to work seamlessly 

across broad areas of the spectrum, increasing survivability and effectiveness; 

detect and precisely measure and map the EM environment in real-time. • Meet the growing data demand coming from new SIGINT and oceanbased 

sensors, as well as higher resolution persistent sensors coming from spacebased systems and multi-spectral sensors. 

[See page 20.] 

General SCHMIDLE. The DOD ISR Roadmap defines the DOD vision/strategy for 

ISR and was last published on 18 Mar 2010. It is a classified document that outlines 

how the DOD will satisfy the key strategic ISR goals and objectives embedded within the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), Defense Intelligence Strategy (DIS), and 

Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF). The DOD ISR Roadmap describes all important programs that must be integrated across the DOD in order to 

achieve efficient investment in new ISR capabilities, enhance the DOD’s role in fulfilling Homeland Security responsibilities, and support optimal resource planning 

and budgeting across the enterprise. The next version of the DOD ISR roadmap is 

expected within the next 90 days. [See page 20.] 

General DAVIS and General FIELD. The Air Force answered this IFR through classified briefings to Congressman Garamendi’s office on 8 and 22 May. [See page 20.] 

Admiral SKINNER and Admiral MORAN. Point Mugu, CA (Naval Base Ventura 

County or NBVC) was the original MQ–4C Triton West Coast basing location. It 

was changed to Beale Air Force Base in President’s Budget 2012 to support a 

Memorandum of Agreement signed between the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and 

the Chief of Naval Operations who agreed, in principle, to several actions anticipated to bring greater synergy and efficiencies to Q–4 Unmanned Aircraft System 

operations. Following the United States Air Force decision to divest of RQ–4B Global Hawk Block 30s in President’s Budget 2013, and in consideration of Federal Aviation Administration limitations on Unmanned Aircraft System flight operations at 

Beale Air Force Base, the Navy elected to realize the projected savings and operational advantages of basing the MQ–4C Triton at NBVC. 

The cost to build four new facilities for MQ–4C Triton maintenance, training, and operations at Beale AFB would be $121M. The cost to refurbish two facilities and 

build one new facility at NBVC would be $61.8M. The required housing, communication, and other Navy Unmanned Aircraft System support already exists at NBVC. 

By basing the MQ–4C Triton UAS at NBVC vice Beale AFB the Navy estimates a 

cost savings of $100.7M across the FYDP. [See pages 20–22.] 

General DAVIS and General FIELD. A reduced high-altitude ISR requirement (in 

which the U–2 was sufficient) and a reduced budget (the Department could no 

longer afford further investment in RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30) drove the retirement decision. 

In August of 2011, DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent 

adjustments in military strategy and determined the Department could reduce highaltitude ISR force structure requirement. The Air Force further determined the U– 

2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these reduced 

requirements. Continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was required to field a 

comparable capability to the U–2, but was not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, the U–2, that was still 

operationally viable at a considerably lower cost over the Future Years Defense 

Plan. 

To meet the Budget Control Act (BCA) requirement for budget savings, the funds 

obtained from the RQ–4 Block 30 divestiture were not moved into other accounts. 
131 

These funds were used to meet part of the required BCA budget reduction. [See 

page 23.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY 

General DAVIS and General FIELD. The Air Force is scheduled to answer this IFR 

in a SAP classified briefing on 23 Jul. Congressman Veasey is planning to attend 

this briefing along with all members of the HASC Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee which was scheduled by PSM John Sullivan. [See pages 24–25.] 

Admiral MORAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] [See page 25.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 17, 2013 

(135) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. THORNBERRY. It is clear that the world is getting more dangerous, not less. 

The situation with North Korea makes that very clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia and China are developing advanced 

stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface-to-air missile systems. Can you 

discuss the importance of the advanced stealth capability that the F–35 will give 

us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats around the world? 

Admiral SKINNER and Admiral MORAN. The F–35C provides a 5th generation 

fighter aircraft to the Navy carrier air wing and brings with it the ability to effectively engage and survive a wide range of threats, both air and surface, in contested 

airspace. It provides a ‘‘day-one’’ strike capability enabling tactical agility and strategic flexibility required to counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios that cannot be addressed by current legacy aircraft, including operations in an anti-access/area denied environment. 

F–35C’s 5th generation survivability and lethality is enhanced by very low observable stealth characteristics, fusion of onboard and off-board passive and active sensors, and real-time integration with other F–35Cs and Navy assets, which provide 

a ‘‘first detect/first shot’’ capability throughout the battlespace. The F–35C will provide a significant additive value when brought to bear with the networked fighting 

concepts of the U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group and in a joint/combined warfighting 

arena. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Can you provide the Subcommittee with an update on the F– 

35B STOVL variant’s progress in the test program and discuss why you and the 

Commandant believe this aircraft is so critical to the Marine Corps’ future? 

General SCHMIDLE. In 2011 and 2012, the F–35B test program made significant 

progress and has demonstrated key capabilities that confirm the aircraft will meet 

our requirements. As of 17 May 2013, the F–35B has conducted 1,129 test flights 

for a total of 1,588.1 test flight hours, and has successfully completed initial ship 

trials, air start testing, and released both precision and air-to-air weapons. The testing of STOVL performance capabilities continues to expand the envelope resulting 

in our first operational vertical landing in March 2013 at MCAS Yuma, Arizona. 

The Marine Corps’ transition to the F–35B STOVL is well under way with the 

establishment of VMFAT–501, the Fleet Replacement Squadron, and VMFA–121, 

the first tactical squadron. VMFAT–501 currently executes a full training schedule 

for F–35B transition pilots and maintainers. VMFA–121, which stood up in November 2012, now has 4 F–35Bs and will be fully outfitted with 16 F–35Bs by this fall. 

The F–35B supports the rapidly changing nature of expeditionary operations by 

providing flexible basing options that allow tactical aircraft to improve 

responsivenes and increase sortie generation rates. The value of STOVL has been 

demonstrated repeatedly, most recently in combat operations ashore, through the 

use of forward operating bases (FOBs) in Iraq and Afganistan, as well as during 

embarked operations throughout Central Command’s Area of Responsibility. 

Based on the testing completed to date we are confident the Marine Corps’ requirement for one tactical aircraft type, capable of multiple missions, providing the 

MAGTF with flexible expeditionary basing and the superior technology needed to 

dominate the fight is the F–35B. There are no alternatives to the F–35B that support the full range of crisis response obligations of the United States Marine Corps. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. It is clear that the world is getting more dangerous, not less. 

The situation with North Korea makes that very clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia and China are developing advanced 

stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface-to-air missile systems. Can you 

discuss the importance of the advanced stealth capability that the F–35 will give 

us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats around the world? 

General SCHMIDLE. The F–35’s low observable survivability, powerful integrated 

sensor suite, fused information displays, interoperable joint connectivity, precision 

weapons suite, and self-protect anti-air weapons, is a total package of capabilities 

that will revolutionize our Naval Air combat power in all threat and operational environments. The advanced fifth-generation stealth capability allows our aviation elements to operate in threat environments not compatible with fourth-generation air-
136 

craft without extensive and intensive electronic warfare augmentation. By using the 

F–35 in these high threat environments we reduce exposure, increase survivability, 

and improve overall mission effectiveness with tailored and precision application. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Can you speak to the additional capability the F–35 will bring 

to the Fleet and the program’s importance to the Navy’s Tactical Aviation recapitalization efforts? 

Admiral MORAN. The F–35C provides a 5th generation fighter aircraft to the Navy 

carrier air wing and brings with it the ability to effectively engage and survive a 

wide range of threats, both air and surface, in contested airspace. It provides a ‘‘dayone’’ strike capability enabling tactical agility and strategic flexibility required to 

counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios that cannot 

be addressed by current legacy aircraft, including operations in an anti-access/area 

denied environment. Key additive capabilities that F–35C will bring include very 

low observable stealth characteristics and fused active and passive sensors that will 

enhance the inherent stealth design. These fully integrated capabilities will allow 

F–35C to retain a ‘first detect/first shot’ capability throughout the battlespace. F– 

35C’s survivability and lethality will fully integrate with the other Navy Carrier 

Strike Group assets and provide increased real-time situational awareness to all 

other networked assets. As such, F–35C offers complementary, additive capability 

to F/A–18E/F in numerous mission areas. A force equipped with F–35C aircraft enables combatant commanders to attack targets day or night, in all weather, in highly defended areas of joint operations. Target set includes: fixed and mobile land targets; enemy surface units; and air threats (including advanced cruise missiles). F– 

35C will supplant some of the aging Navy TACAIR inventory by replacing legacy 

F/A–18C aircraft and early blocks of the F/A–18E/F. F–35C procurement remains 

a vital element of the Navy’s strike-fighter force mix. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Affordable F–35 recapitalization is dependent on capturing 

economies of scale as quickly as possible by increasing production as quickly as possible. It finally appears that the Department has stabilized the production rate for 

the F–35 program and is committed to increasing the ramp rate beginning in FY– 

15. Contrary to the public perception, unit costs have been coming down year-toyear. What do you expect the cost of the F–35A CTOL variant to be when the program reaches full-rate production in FY 18? 

General DAVIS. Based on the current production profile, the estimated unit recurring flyaway cost (URF) for the F–35A will be approximately $87 million (TY$) in 

FY18. The URF cost includes the airframe, electronics, engine and engineering 

change orders. The estimated flyaway cost is approximately $96 million (TY$) in 

FY18. The flyaway cost adds in non-recurring and ancillary equipment costs. The 

F–35A unit cost is subject to change if the U.S. Services or partner nations adjust 

their procurement profiles. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. It is clear that the world is getting more dangerous, not less. 

The situation with North Korea makes that very clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia and China are developing advanced 

stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface-to-air missile systems. Can you 

discuss the importance of the advanced stealth capability that the F–35 will give 

us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats around the world? 

General DAVIS and General FIELD. Since World War II, the U.S. has relied on its 

ability to control the skies over the battlefield, protecting our forces and holding any 

adversary’s targets at risk. Our potential adversaries are keenly aware of the importance of air superiority to our nation’s way of war. This is why the development and 

proliferation of weapon systems that contest our asymmetric advantage in the air 

are increasingly prevalent. For the past 30 years, our fighter fleet remained ahead 

of this evolving threat, superbly performing all its missions and supporting the joint 

warfighter in operations such as EL DORADO CANYON, DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. However, even during these conflicts we sometimes faced threat systems that posed a significant 

threat to our legacy fighter fleet. For example, during the first days of DESERT 

STORM only our fleet of F–117 stealth fighters was able to safely operate and survive in the highly contested skies over Baghdad. 

We believe that air superiority remains an imperative when fighting any adversary and maintaining the ability of our aircraft to penetrate and persist in contested 

environments is vital to the joint warfighter. As you mention, the threats we may 

face continue to evolve in technology and complexity. Potential adversaries are acquiring advanced fighters on par with or better than our legacy fleet, developing sophisticated and networked early warning radar surveillance systems, and fielding 

surface to air missile systems with increasing range and lethality. These capabilities 
137 

all work together to create advanced, and extremely dangerous, integrated air defense systems (IADS). These anti-access/area denial environments seriously challenge our ability to gain air superiority and hold targets at risk. We already face 

this challenge in some parts of the world and as you said, and these threat environments will continue to expand as these systems proliferate. 

Our legacy fleet is approaching the limits of capability modernization that permits 

them to survive and operate in these environments—they simply do not have the 

advanced stealth capability required to defeat the emerging threats. Only our fifth 

generation fighter fleet’s combination of advanced stealth, precision weapons, unmatched electronic warfare systems, fused multi-spectral battlespace awareness, 

combat identification systems, maneuverability, and speed has the ability to operate 

and survive in these advanced threat environments. All these capabilities inherent 

in the F–35, particularly its advanced stealth properties, ensure the U.S. and our 

allies have an air superiority advantage, and will enable our combatant commanders to bring the full spectrum of capabilities of the joint force to the fight. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. This committee has been concerned with the strength of the Department of the Navy’s tactical aviation fleet. Specifically, we have questioned the 

inventory size and how the Navy planned to manage a strike fighter force structure 

in the near and long term. The Navy has a requirement for 40 VFA squadrons to 

fill 10 Carrier Air Wings (CVWs) with 4 squadrons each. Of these squadrons, the 

Navy has 35 VFA squadrons, and the Marine Corps provides 3 squadrons with an 

agreement to supply five squadrons. Does the DON have enough Strike Fighter 

squadrons to fill 10 Carrier Air Wings and still meet all the USMC commitments, 

including overseas rotations and MEU deployments? Or, are you several squadrons 

short of the requirement? Does the strike fighter inventory model take into account 

these missing squadrons? The Fiscal Year 2014 budget request also shows that the 

Navy eliminated 13 Super Hornets it was supposed to buy this year. However, 

somehow the tactical aviation shortfall was reduced. How can you account for this 

reduction in aircraft and a corresponding reduction in the shortfall? What is the tactical aviation shortfall this year? 

Admiral SKINNER and Admiral MORAN. The Navy and Marine Corps have sufficient strike fighter capacity. We continue to carefully monitor strike fighter inventory requirements and projected availability and will continue to take management 

actions to meet all carrier-based and expeditionary TACAIR requirements. 

DON utilizes the Inventory Forecasting Tool (IFT) to project the combined effects 

of transition plans, attrition, and pipeline requirements on total strike fighter aircraft inventory. The IFT is updated in conjunction with annual budget submissions 

to provide a forecast of strike fighter inventory compared to requirements. This 

model does take into account the current force structure gap in TACAIR integration. 

The shortfall number decreased significantly from last year’s estimate due to 3 

primary factors: (1) lower utilization rates on Super Hornets, specifically F/A–18Fs, 

(2) aircraft that successfully completed High Flight Hour (HFH) inspections that 

were allowed to fly an additional 1000 flight hours instead of the originally planned 

additional 600 flight hours. These 400 additional flight hours per aircraft extended 

service life by up to two years, (3) PB–13 includes a Congressional add of 11 F/A– 

18E/F in FY–13, which settles the POR at 563. The Strike Fighter Shortfall is projected to peak at 18 in 2023. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. This committee has questioned the inventory size and how the 

Navy planned to effectively manage a strike fighter inventory in the near and long 

term. Last year, the Marine Corp emphasized a service life extension program 

(SLEP) for 150 F/A–18A–D aircraft, which would help bridge to the F–35B when 

squadrons become combat operational. This year, briefings indicate a new high 

flight hour inspection regime for aging legacy aircraft in order to maintain adequate 

force structure. However, the committee is getting reports that the Government 

depot-level inspections for tactical aviation are taking far longer than anticipated, 

and at a greater cost. For instance, there are reports from the Navy that 42% of 

legacy Hornet—F/A–18A–D models—are ‘‘out of reporting.’’ Moreover, inspections 

that were scheduled to take only 180 days are estimated to be taking at least twice 

as long. And, the Navy released a Request for Information (RFI) to the industry on 

capabilities available to support these depot inspections, in part because there is a 

rapidly building backlog of aircraft awaiting inspection. The costs and schedule 

analysis have not been provided to the committee on this new policy, so it remains 

uncertain that it will sufficiently address our concerns about inventory shortfalls. 

General, can you discuss the new high flight hour inspection and SLEP plan for leg-
138 

acy aircraft? And has there been an analysis on the costs and schedule of this new 

process? Can you tell the committee what percentage of your fleet is trending ‘‘out 

of reporting’’? Can you tell the committee what the actual throughput is for F/A– 

18A–D aircraft? Under the current plans, will the Marine Corps have enough squadrons to transition to the F–35B? What impact will this have on the aviators and 

maintainers to make this possible? What is the cost of this new inspection and 

SLEP plan across the FYDP? 

General SCHMIDLE. Q. General, can you discuss the new high flight hour inspection and SLEP plan for legacy aircraft? 

A. In order to meet our operational commitments through 2030, the DON plans 

to extend the life on 150 F/A–18A–D aircraft to 10,000 flight hours by way of the 

Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). All other F/A–18A–D aircraft will complete 

a high flight hour (HFH) inspection at the depot prior to reaching the current service life limit of 8000 hours. Once complete, the aircraft will be granted an extension 

authorization to 9,000 hours with recurring operational level inspections at 200 

hour intervals. If done with no other added work such as other regularly scheduled 

Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) 1 or 2, Center Barrel Replacement (CBR), or 

other avionics modifications, it is called a ‘‘Stand Alone.’’ To date, the DON has completed 101 HFH inspections and the issues identified were consistent with anticipations. In addition to the HFH inspection, each of these aircraft required engineering 

analysis and follow-on repairs or parts replacements in order to return them to an 

operational status. 

Q. Has there been an analysis on the costs and schedule of this new process? 

A. There has been analysis on the costs and schedule of HFH Inspections. The 

data is provided below. Ninety-eight HFH inspections have been completed at the 

Fleet Readiness Centers since 2008 and every year the NAVAIR 4.2 Cost Team 

evaluates the cost and schedule based on updated information. The results are then 

compared to the existing FYDP and adjusted requirements are forwarded up 

through the budgeting process. 

The ‘‘HFH Stand Alone’’ turn-around time is averaging approximately one year. 

The average cost of this inspection is currently $447,186. These are not simple inspections. Aircraft inducted into the depot have required extensive repair and there 

has not been a case where an aircraft only required the inspection making it difficult in attaining the 180 day turn-around goal. The main contributors are material 

and engineering dispositions, both of which are being closely monitored and standardized to improve throughput. As more SLEP modifications become available, they 

will be incorporated into aircraft inducted, alleviating long lead material and reducing turn-around times. 

Q. Can you tell the committee what percentage of your fleet is trending ‘‘out of 

reporting’’? 

A. As of the latest NAVAIR Flight Hour and Inventory Report (May 2013), 115 

of 258 USMC F/A–18A–D aircraft are ‘‘out of reporting’’ for various depot level 

maintenance events. This constitutes ∼45% (44.57%) of the USMC F/A–18 fleet. 

There is an increasing trend in ‘‘out of reporting’’ over the past year: May 2012 (88 

of 245, ∼36%), Sep 2012 (102 of 249, ∼41%). 

Q. Can you tell the committee what the actual throughput is for F/A–18A–D aircraft? 

A. The throughput for F/A–18A–D HFH aircraft is shown below. 

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

Total 

‘‘Projected’’ 

High Flight 

Hour (HFH) 

Inductions 

54 60 50 55 35 25 

Actual 

Induction Total 17 22 21 43 62 25 

Actual 

Completion 

Total 

3 13 17 22 32 11 

Average throughput over 6 years (2008–2013) = 51% of A/C inducted (98 completed of 190 aircraft inducted). 

Q. Under the current plans, will the Marine Corps have enough squadrons to 

transition to the F–35B? 
139 

A. Assuming the current JSF delivery plan is not reduced or delayed, the USMC 

will have enough squadrons to complete the TACAIR transition to the F–35. Successful implementation of the USMC TACAIR transition plan will be extremely difficult if the growing out of reporting problem in the USMC F/A–18A–D community 

is not addressed. More importantly, if the depot maintenance throughput is not significantly improved, the backlog of aircraft at the depot will increase to a point at 

which it will affect our ability to properly equip forward deploying units during the 

transition. 

Q. What impact will this have on the aviators and maintainers to make this possible? 

A. The F/A–18 out of reporting problem is driving USMC squadrons to train and 

operate at less than the planned mission aircraft authorization (PMAA) of 12 aircraft. Currently the USMC F/A–18 fleet averages 9 aircraft per squadron, not including the FRS. This aircraft deficit poses a unique dilemma to aviators: 1. Fly a 

smaller number of aircraft at a much higher utilization rate to maintain combat 

readiness, or 2. Sacrifice combat readiness to maintain planned utilization rates on 

the available aircraft. The first option will drive aircraft to reach the 8000 hour 

limit at a greater rate further aggravating the depot backlog and throughput problems. The second sacrifices the combat readiness at a time when USMC TACAIR 

is experiencing high operational demand. 

Bottom line for aviators—projected lack of aircraft on the flightline will cause a 

downward trend in Marine Corps tactical aviation readiness. More importantly, if 

depot maintenance throughput is not significantly improved, the backlog of aircraft 

at the depot will increase to a point at which it will affect forward deployed units. 

For the maintainers at the squadron level—the fleet is currently annotating and 

analyzing the impact of the increase in man-hours incurred by the HFH recurring 

interval inspections. 

Q. What is the cost of this new inspection and SLEP plan across the FYDP? 

A. FY13 HFH inspections and SLEP plan are fully funded. The FYDP costs are 

shown below. 

HFH OMN Budget (in $M) 

Current Budget FY (PB–14) 13 14 15 16 17 18 

HFH Inspection Budget (OMN) $26.5 $19.8 $17.0 $9.5 $14.8 $9.9 

SLEP APN–5 Budget ($636.56M FYDP)* 

Current Budget FY (PB–14) $M 13 14 15 16 17 18 

SLEP Budget 

(APN5 within OSIP 11–99) 

$54.63 $59.52 $111.64 $206.88 $106.72 $151.80 

*In PB–14, OSIP 11–99 (funding for SLEP/SLMP) was reduced by $697.28M across the FYDP (Issue #20025 -$99.26M & Issue #62294 -$598.00M). This equates 

to a 52% reduction in funding for combined HFH and SLEP in PB–14. 

The average cost of the HFH Stand Alone inspection is currently $447,186 with 

turnaround times averaging 328 to 403 days depending on the depot site. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. As you know, the F/A–18E/F Block II Super Hornet will be part 

of the Navy’s aviation backbone for the next 25 years and beyond. Both the Super 

Hornet and the F–35C will be providing force projection for our carriers. Because 

of its importance to the long-term health of tactical aviation, the Committee understands that there are efforts under way to support advancements to the current 

Block II platform. At Navy League last week there were presentations on both the 

funded ‘‘Flight Plan’’ of the Super Hornet and additional advancements being considered. Can you talk about the importance of a modernization program for the 

Super Hornets in order to take that aircraft out the next 25 years or more? 

Admiral MORAN. F/A–18E/Fs will remain critical multimission assets in the air 

wing of the future and will complement the first-day/first-strike capability of the F– 

35C. As the bulk of the strike/fighter force, the Super Hornet will continue to execute many of the same mission sets as the F–35C and will be expected to serve as 

a primary delivery platform for long-range air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. 

Continued upgrades to the F/A–18E/F platform are critical. Efforts to modernize the 

2025 Carrier Air Wing (CVW) include integration of weapons and capabilities 

through coordinated management and synchronized requirements development with 

the flexibility and agility to meet any threat. The CVW leverages networked weapon 
140 

2GAO, F–35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term Affordability 

Is a Major Concern, GAO- 13–300 (Washington, D.C.: Mar 11, 2013). 

system integration and interoperability to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess 

any threat by utilizing off board cueing, operating across the RF spectrum and with 

stealth technology to achieve full spectrum dominance to interrupt red effects 

chains. Future F/A–18E/F improvements such as Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) upgrades, Multi-System Integration (MSI) refinement, configuration modifications and improved Counter Electronic Attack (CEA) for the Advanced Electronic Scanned Array (AESA) radar, introduction of the long-wave InfraRed Search and Track (IRST) pod, Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infra-Red 

(ATFLIR) pod enhancements and improved weapons integration will allow the 

Super Hornet to meet the capability requirement of the 2025 CVW. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Sullivan, your most recent report identifies a number of technical risks the program faces that could substantially degrade the F–35’s capabilities and mission effectiveness. Can you please identify the major technical risks the 

program faces going forward. What is the status of these risks? Specifically, with 

regard to the Helmet Mounted Display, what risks remain and what actions are 

being taken in order to reduce these risks? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The key areas of risk we highlighted in our March 2013 report 

were the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), the arresting hook system 

for the carrier variant aircraft, structural durability, the Helmet Mounted Display 

(HMD), and software integration and testing. 2 While the program still faces a number of challenges going forward, it has taken positive steps to address risk in these 

areas. For example, limited capability ALIS systems are now being used at training 

and test locations and the program has made progress in developing the smaller, 

transportable version needed to support unit level deployments with the expectation 

that a fully capable system will be fielded in 2015. The program has completed the 

redesign of its carrier variant arresting hook system, conducted risk reduction testing on the new hook point, and expects to begin flight testing the entire redesigned 

system in late 2013. The program is also testing redesigned structures and planning 

for other modifications that are needed to address problems identified during the 

aircraft’s structural and durability testing. 

With regard to the HMD, the original design encountered significant technical deficiencies and did not meet warfighter requirements. Those deficiencies included degraded night vision capability, display jitter, and latency (or delay) in transmitting 

sensor data. Program officials stated that software updates are being made to improve night vision capability, filters are being added to displays to decrease jitter, 

and data latency is not as severe as originally assumed. Early developmental testing 

of these updates has shown improvement, according to program officials, but risks 

remain as additional testing still needs to be done. In addition, the program is pursuing a dual path by developing a second, less capable helmet while working to fix 

the first helmet design. Both helmets are being evaluated, and while DOD may 

make a decision as to which helmet to procure later this year, the selected helmet 

is not expected to be integrated into the baseline aircraft until 2015. 

Software integration and testing continue to pose significant risks to the program, 

although the aircraft contractor and program office have recently taken steps that 

are likely to improve software management and output. The number of lines of code 

necessary to achieve full mission capability is now estimated to be to over 24 million. While most of the code has been developed, a substantial amount of integration 

and test work remain before the program can demonstrate full warfighting capability. The specific software needed to demonstrate that capability including electronic warfare, communication navigation identification, and radar is behind schedule, and the most challenging work still lies ahead. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Sullivan, for years GAO has been a critic of the JSF program 

with regard to cost growth and schedule delays, yet your most recent report seems 

to indicate things are getting better. What changes has the program made in order 

to set it on a new path? Going forward, what critical challenges remain for the program from a cost and schedule standpoint? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. After 12 years and more than $20 billion dollars in development 

cost growth, the department has fundamentally restructured the F–35 program. In 

doing so, it has steadily lowered the production ramp-up rate over the past 3 years 

and cut near term procurement quantities. This means that fewer aircraft are being 

procured while testing is still ongoing, which lowers the risk and cost of having to 
141 

retrofit and modify aircraft. The new development flight test schedule is also more 

realistic and better resourced, using more conservative assumptions about fly rates 

and test point achievements and providing for more flights and more test assets. 

In addition, the acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics has established unit cost affordability targets for each variant of the aircraft that the program is expected to meet by the start of full-rate production in 

2019. In the area of software management, the program began the process of establishing a second system integration laboratory, adding substantial testing and development capacity, and prioritizing its resources on incremental software development 

as opposed to the much riskier concurrent development approach. 

Going forward, affordability and concurrency between testing and production will 

continue to pose significant cost and schedule challenges for the F–35 program. The 

new acquisition program baseline projects the need for a total of $316 billion in development and procurement funding from 2013 through 2037—which represents an 

average of more than $12 billion annually. Maintaining this level of sustained funding will be difficult in a period of declining or flat defense budgets and competition 

with other ‘‘big ticket items’’ such as the KC–46 tanker and a new bomber program. 

In addition, the program’s highly concurrent test and production schedule poses significant risk going forward. With nearly two-thirds of the developmental test program remaining, additional time and money will likely be needed for retrofits and 

rework of procured aircraft. At the time of our report, the program office projected 

retrofit and rework costs of $1.7 billion on aircraft procured under the first 10 annual contracts. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Sullivan, as you know, the JSF acquisition program is expected 

to require over $300 billion still to complete the acquisition and $1 trillion to operate and sustain the aircraft. How do you view affordability as a challenge for the 

program? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Affordability poses a challenge because sustaining an annual acquisition funding level of over $12 billion on average from 2013 through 2037, as 

currently projected, will be difficult in a period of declining or flat defense budgets 

and given the competition for funding from other ‘‘big ticket items’’ such as the KC– 

46 tanker and a new bomber program. It should also be noted that the program’s 

current funding projections assume financial benefits from international partners 

purchasing at least 697 aircraft. If fewer aircraft are procured in total or in smaller 

annual quantities—by the international partners or the United States—unit costs 

will likely rise according to analysis done by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. 

In addition, current F–35 life-cycle cost estimates are considerably higher than 

the legacy aircraft it will replace; this has major implications for future demands 

on military operating support budgets and plans for recapitalizing fighter forces. 

The most recent estimate by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation projects total U.S. operating and support costs of over $1 trillion for all three 

variants based on a 30-year service life and predicted usage and attrition rates. Defense leadership stated in 2011 that sustainment cost estimates of this magnitude 

were unaffordable and simply unacceptable in this fiscal environment. U.S. military 

services and international partners have all expressed concerns about long-term affordability. The program has undertaken efforts to address this life-cycle affordability concern, but until DOD can demonstrate that the program can perform 

against its cost projections, it will continue to be difficult for the U.S. and international partners to accurately set priorities, establish affordable procurement rates, 

retire aged aircraft, and establish supporting infrastructure. 

Mr. TURNER. You mentioned in your written testimony that F–35 sustainment 

costs remain a concern. What actions are the F–35 Joint Program Office and the 

Department of the Navy taking to reduce F–35 life-cycle costs? 

Admiral SKINNER. The Department of the Navy (DON) continues to support the 

F–35 program in its disciplined approach to analyzing and reducing sustainment 

costs. The F–35 program is conducting a sustainment business case analysis to identify cost reduction initiatives. The program recently held an industry day to foster 

competition for sustainment contracting, specifically targeting supply chain, support 

equipment, training operations support, and Autonomic Logistics Information System administration. A focused reliability and maintainability program is identifying 

cost drivers based on actual fleet data. These cost drivers can be targeted for improvements, either by redesign or qualification of a second source. The program also 

uses contracting standards for suppliers to reduce repair times. As the services fund 

depot standup, this will also increase the sources for repair, improving quality and 

repair times. 
142 

Importantly, the services and JPO now have a common definition of cost per flight 

hour. This seemingly simple step will allow the services to investigate the underlying assumptions for cost drivers such as training, mission personnel, engineering 

support, and assumed annual flight hours. 

The DON, working with the F–35 program, will analyze options outside the Program Executive Office’s span of control such as reviewing basing option and sequencing, unit level manpower and squadron size, discrete sustainment requirements, and appropriate use of simulation for training. Work is under way for a level 

of repair analysis to maximize cost effectiveness and fully exploit existing service 

maintenance infrastructure. Such efforts yielded savings for legacy platforms, such 

as MV–22 and EA–18G. 

Through these combined efforts, the Department of the Navy believes the PEO 

can converge on an affordable F–35 sustainment strategy that meets the required 

level of service performance and lowers the total life cycle cost of the program. 

Mr. TURNER. The Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Program had assumed cost savings in production and operations and maintenance because of Global 

Hawk program shared overhead, training, basing costs, and other operations and 

sustainment costs. In addition, there is the possibility of a break in the production 

line, with Global Hawk Block 30 termination, given the current BAMS production 

schedule. Do you know what these costs will be? 

Admiral SKINNER. The United States Air Force decision to terminate the Global 

Hawk Block 30 Lot 11 production contract in President’s Budget 2013 has resulted 

in a gap on the production line that will cost the Navy MQ–4C Triton program an 

estimated $27M (Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy). Final cost estimates will not be known until the Navy negotiates the Low Rate Initial Production 

contract with the Prime Contractor. 

Mr. TURNER. Your written testimony notes that the Marine Corps may experience 

elevated operational risk in the 2020s if the predicted strike fighter shortfall comes 

to fruition. Please describe why you believe the Marine Corps faces this elevated 

operational risk and what the Department of the Navy is doing to mitigate those 

risks. 

General SCHMIDLE. As legacy F/A–18 squadrons are reduced, the service shortfall 

number must be considered in proportion to the primary mission aircraft inventory 

requirement. Due to a lower number of F/A–18 squadrons in the 2023 to 2026 timeframe, the shortfall number associated with the Marine Corps will have a more significant impact on our remaining F/A–18 operational squadrons. For example, in 

2023 the USMC F/A–18 fleet will have three active and one reserve squadron remaining. A shortfall of (11) F/A–18 aircraft would comprise approximately one quarter of the total squadrons or one third of the active component. 

The Department of the Navy (DON) continues to manage aircraft service life of 

each aircraft at the operational level in order to achieve the maximum allowable 

service life limits prior to its sundown. The continued engineering and Service Life 

Extension Program (SLEP) kit development over the FYDP will ensure there is sufficient inventory to meet DON requirements through the transition to the F–35. 

Mr. TURNER. The total Department of the Navy strike fighter shortfall is 18 aircraft in approximately 2023. Of that amount, what is the Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall? 

General SCHMIDLE. The Marine Corps’ portion of the Department of the Navy 

strike fighter shortfall in 2023 is 11 aircraft according to the latest excursion of the 

Inventory Forecasting Tool (IFT v21 excursion C012). 

Mr. TURNER. Your written testimony notes that Marine aviation is on a path toward a distributed Airborne Electronic Attack system of systems including both unmanned and manned assets. Please describe the number and types of unmanned 

and manned assets that will be part of this system. 

General SCHMIDLE. The Marine Corps anticipates a future operating environment 

comprised of advanced Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) Warfare and digital 

threats. The Marine Corps will address these threats with the Marine Air Ground 

Task Force Electronic Warfare (MAGTF EW) concept. This approach will leverage 

all available transmitters and sensors across the MAGTF on both manned and unmanned platforms. A coordination cell comprised of EMS, Cyber, Operations, Intelligence, and Communications subject matter experts (SME) will collectively integrate collections and effects-delivery efforts in real-time. The Marine Corps will no 

longer depend on a large single-purpose platform, since the low-density, platformcentric approach has proven insufficient for meeting capacity requirements. MAGTF 

EW systems will be capable of networking with Marine and Joint assets spanning 

the air, ground, space, and cyber domains. 
143 

Any current or future airframe employed in support of MAGTF operations will 

maintain the ability to host advanced EMS payloads in support of integrated Spectrum and Cyber Operations. The Intrepid Tiger II Electronic Warfare pod, currently 

deployed to Central Command (CENTCOM) and aboard Marine Expeditionary Units 

(MEUs), is one such payload example. The types and numbers of these platforms 

and systems will be based on Service capacity and future mission requirements. 

These platforms specifically include future Group 4/5 UASs, RQ–21, F–35, KC–130J, 

AV–8B, F/A–18, AH–1, though any aircraft in the inventory will be capable of serving as a host platform in the distributed capability network. As the future linchpin 

of Marine Corps Tactical Aviation, the F–35 JSF will contribute by reducing 

counter-integrated air defense systems (C–IADS) requirements due to its inherent 

Spectrum survivability, and adding decisive networked attack and exploitation capabilities in EMS regions of significance. 

While the Marine Corps is currently achieving combat success with EMS payloads 

on manned platforms in theater and adding such capability to deployed Marine Expeditionary Units, the application of airborne Spectrum Warfare will increasingly 

gravitate towards UAS platforms. Marine Corps Aviation is actively exploring options to expand its UAS fleet with larger platforms to provide requisite size, weight, 

and power to perform a combination of standoff and penetrating Spectrum Attack 

operations. This approach will enable a deliberate Spectrum Warfare portfolio 

growth from communications-based targets by incorporating RADAR-based targets, 

directed-energy (DE) and LASER targets, as well as targets susceptible to low-yield 

electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Additionally, the Marine Corps is exploring the viability and readiness of advanced (medium-high Technology Readiness Level) Spectrum 

Attack technologies to augment baseline Intrepid Tiger 2 capability for future incorporation. 

Mr. TURNER. Like the Air Force, Naval air forces require inventories of precision 

air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Please describe which inventories and short 

of requirements and provide the committee a list of those munitions and amounts 

above the budget request that could be executed in fiscal year 2014. 

General SCHMIDLE. The following list of precision air-to-air and air-to-ground 

Naval munitions have been identified as falling short of their requirement, as defined by the POM–14 Naval Munitions Requirements Process (NMRP) output, and 

can execute the amounts shown above the budget request that could be executed 

in fiscal year 2014. 

AIM–9X: $135M for an additional 350 missiles. 

AARGM: $16.5M for an additional 22 missiles. 

JSOW C–1: $28M for an additional 92 weapons. 

GP Bombs: $237.8M for the additional components below: 

—JDAM tail kits ($72M, QTY 3,000) 

—Laser JDAM ($50.4M, QTY 3,500) 

—GBU–12 ($12M, QTY 3,000) 

—GBU–10 ($3.5M, QTY 700) 

—Computer Control Groups ($24M, QTY 2,000) 

—BLU–109 Bomb Body ($64M, QTY 2,000) 

—FMU–143 fuze ($11.9M, QTY 3,500) 

Rockets: $118M for the additional components below: 

—M151/MK152 HE Warhead ($18M, QTY 12,917) 

—MK 66 MOD 4 Rocket Motor ($24.3M, QTY 41,258) 

—WTU–1/B Inert Warhead ($1.1M, QTY 12,881) 

—WGU–59/B APKWS II Guidance and Control Section ($74.3M, QTY 

2,564) 

—LAU–61 G/A Digital Rocket Launcher ($0.28M, QTY 5) 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement you note that initial operational capability (IOC) 

dates have not been determined by leadership but you describe capabilities for IOC 

such as 10 F–35B aircraft with software block 2B for the Marine Corps, and 10 F– 

35C aircraft with software block 3F for the Navy. You also mention that you will 

report those dates by June 1st of this year. Based on the current F–35 development 

and procurement schedule, can you estimate what year the F–35B and F–35C will 

be declared IOC? 

General SCHMIDLE. IOC dates are capability based, and the services will declare 

IOC dates in a report to Congress due by 1 June 2013. The current F–35B IOC plan 

is based on appropriate software, weapon clearances, performance envelope, training, deployability, and sustainment capabilities. The Marine Corps estimates it will 

declare IOC for the F–35B between July 2015 (objective) and December 2015 

(threshold). 
144 

Mr. TURNER. Like the Air Force, Naval air forces require inventories of precision 

air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Please describe which inventories and short 

of requirements and provide the committee a list of those munitions and amounts 

above the budget request that could be executed in fiscal year 2014. 

Admiral MORAN. The following precision air-to-air and air-to-ground Naval munitions have been identified as being short of their inventory requirement. The funding above the PB14 budget request that could be executed in fiscal year 2014 is also 

provided below. 

AIM–9X: $58.1 for an additional 150 missiles. 

AARGM: $16.5M for an additional 22 missiles. 

JSOW C–1: $28M for an additional 92 weapons. 

GP Bombs: $237.8M for the additional components below: —JDAM tail kits ($72M, QTY 3,000) 

—Laser JDAM ($50.4M, QTY 3,500) 

—GBU–12 ($12M, QTY 3,000) 

—GBU–10 ($3.5M, QTY 700) 

—Computer Control Groups ($24M, QTY 2,000) 

—BLU–109 Bomb Body ($64M, QTY 2,000) 

—FMU–143 fuze ($11.9M, QTY 3,500) 

Rockets: $118M for the additional components below: —M151/MK152 HE Warhead ($18M, QTY 12,917) 

—MK 66 MOD 4 Rocket Motor ($24.3M, QTY 41,258) 

—WTU–1/B Inert Warhead ($1.1M, QTY 12,881) 

—WGU–59/B APKWS II Guidance and Control Section ($74.3M, QTY 

2,564) 

—LAU–61 G/A Digital Rocket Launcher ($0.28M, QTY 5) 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement you note that initial operational capability (IOC) 

dates have not been determined by leadership but you describe capabilities for IOC 

such as 10 F–35B aircraft with software block 2B for the Marine Corps, and 10 F– 

35C aircraft with software block 3F for the Navy. You also mention that you will 

report those dates by June 1st of this year. Based on the current F–35 development 

and procurement schedule, can you estimate what year the F–35B and F–35C will 

be declared IOC? 

Admiral MORAN. In accordance with the FY13 NDAA Conference Report (112– 

705) on H.R. 4310, the Secretary of the Navy will submit, along with the Secretary 

of the Air Force, a report to Congress declaring IOC dates for all three variants of 

the Joint Strike Fighter by June 1, 2013. 

Mr. TURNER. You mentioned in your written testimony that depot delays will require the grounding of some of the affected aircraft, and that sequestration cuts to 

Air Force modernization will impact every one of the Air Force’s investment programs, creating inefficiencies, raising unit costs, and delaying delivery of valued capabilities to warfighters in the field. You also note that the Fiscal Year 2014 budget 

request does not enable full recovery of warfighting capability, capacity and readiness and that additional resources will be required. a. What effects will sequestration have in the current fiscal year on the Air Force fighter inventory? b. What additional resources will be required in fiscal year 2014 to make the fighter fleets whole 

again? 

General DAVIS. a. The Air Force fighter force structure requirement is currently 

1,900 TAI (Total Active Inventory), and 1,100 PMAI (Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory, or ‘‘combat-coded’’ fighter aircraft). Because these force structure numbers 

are minimums set to meet our National Military Strategy at increased aggregate 

risk, the Air Force is actively managing force structure to offset the effects of sequestration. Although sequestration itself will not affect the tactical fighter inventory in the current fiscal year in terms of PMAI, some fighter units are currently 

stood down and will likely remain so throughout FY13. Overall, sequestration has 

created significant readiness shortfalls and reduced our ability to meet future 

steady-state and surge requirements. Examples of sequestration impacts include 

postponement of field level maintenance and depot inductions, reductions in depot 

production and interruption of aircraft modification and modernization efforts. 

Based on the force structure minimum of 1,900 TAI/1,100 PMAI, the Air Force’s 

ability to meet the National Military Strategy is already at increased risk, and sequestration exacerbates the Air Force’s near term readiness impacts and its ability 

to meet future requirements. 

b. It will take 3–6 months and additional funding to bring stood down fighter 

squadrons back to their pre-sequestration readiness levels, which were sub-optimal. 

Achieving full mission readiness goals will be a multiyear effort beyond what is 

achievable in FY14. For FY14, we estimate an additional 10% flying hours above 
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PB14 levels for the stood down units, or approximately $115M. In addition, to recover the deferred FY13 depot actions for the fighter fleet overall will cost approximately $34M. 

Mr. TURNER. You mentioned in your written testimony that all three mission 

areas in the air-to-surface munitions inventory are short of inventory objectives. 

Those missions are stand-off, direct attack, and penetrator munitions. 

a. Please provide the subcommittee a list of those muntions and amounts that 

could be increased to the budget request and, if authorized and appropriated, could 

be executed in fiscal year 2014. 

General DAVIS. Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) is a conventional, 

low observable, cruise missile, with standoff ranges of 200nm (JASSM Baseline) or 

500nm (JASSM–ER). The current inventory for JASSM Baseline is approximately 

1,060 units and objective inventory is approximately 2,000 units. The Air Force 

FY14 President’s Budget (PB) request is $291.2 million for 103 JASSM Baseline 

units and 80 JASSM–ER units. The Air Force supports the FY14 PB. In order to 

reach the FY14 production capacity of 175 JASSM Baseline units, an additional 

$81.4 million is required. The currently inventory for JASSM–ER is 0 units and objective inventory is approximately 3,000 units. The FY14 PB request for 80 JASSM– 

ER units is the production capacity. 

Hellfire is a direct attack munition used to prosecute time-sensitive targets. It is 

the only weapon employed on the MQ–1 Predator and the only forward firing weapon on the MQ–9 Reaper. The current inventory is approximately 2,000 units and 

objective inventory is approximately 5,000 units. The Air Force FY14 PB request is 

$48.5 million for 413 units. The Air Force supports the FY14 PB. In order to reach 

the FY14 production capacity of 7,200 across the Army, Navy, Air Force, and FMS 

procurement, an additional $492.4 million is required. 

Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II) is a standoff miniature munition designed to kill mobile targets in adverse weather conditions. The current inventory 

is 0 units and objective inventory is approximately 12,000 units. The Air Force FY14 

PB request is $42.3 million for 144 units. The Air Force supports the FY14 PB. In 

order to reach the FY14 production capacity of 173, an additional $4.4 million is 

required. 

Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) is a field-installed guidance kit with global 

positioning system aided inertial navigation system (GPS/INS) that integrates on 

500, 1,000, and 2,000 pound general purpose bombs. JDAM provides an accurate, 

adverse weather capability, and is integrated with the B–52H, B–2A, B–1B, F–16C/ 

D, F/A–18A+C/D/E/F, F–15E, AV–8B, A–10C, and F–22A aircraft. The current inventory is approximately 96,200 units and objective inventory is approximately 

150,000 units. The Air Force FY14 PB request is $188.5 million for 6,965 units 

(however, note that the FY14 Tail kit quantities in the FY14 budget documents are 

incorrect and should reflect 4,451 units, not 6,965 units). The Air Force supports 

the FY14 PB. However, the Air Force also requested $85.5M for an additional 2,879 

units in the FY14 Overseas Contingency Operations. If only the FY14 PB is met, 

an additional $141.5 million is required in order to procure an additional 5,428 

units. However, if both the FY14 PB and the FY14 OCO requests are accepted, 

an additional $66.5 million is required to procure an additional 2,549 units. The 

FY14 production capacity is 15,000 units across the Navy, Air Force, and FMS 

procurement. 

Mr. TURNER. We understand the inventory objective for the CV–22 fleet is 50 aircraft, but when the last CV–22 is delivered in 2016, the inventory will total 49 aircraft due to a class A mishap of one CV–22 in June of last year. Are there any plans 

to replace that aircraft to meet the CV–22 inventory objective of 50 aircraft? 

General DAVIS. The Air Force is currently exploring all funding options available 

to replace the CV–22 lost during training in June 2012, before the CV portion of 

the production line starts closing down in FY14. However, with budget reductions 

and sequestration, near-term funding will be difficult to find. 

Mr. TURNER. We noted that the Combat Rescue Helicopter program is currently 

in source selection. When is the contract award announcement planned? 

General DAVIS. The Air Force continues to press forward with the Combat Rescue 

Helicopter contract award and we are currently in the 4QFY13/1QFY14 timeframe. 

Mr. TURNER. You noted in your written testimony that the majority of the $1.32 

billion across the Future Years Defense Program for F–16 modernization will focus 

on the service life extension program (SLEP) and the combat avionics programmed 

extension suites (CAPES) for 300 F–16s. You also note that you will have to SLEP 

and modernize more. Does that mean you’re planning to accomplish the SLEP and 

CAPES modifications on more than 300 Block 40 and 50 F–16s? If so, how many 

additional F–16s will require the SLEP and CAPES modifications? 
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General FIELD. The current requirement as defined in the FY14 President’s Budget is to SLEP and CAPES 300 F–16 aircraft. While there is no currently approved 

requirement to accomplish SLEP or CAPES modifications to more than 300, both 

the SLEP and CAPES programs are scalable up to 635 Block 40–52 F–16 aircraft. 

Potential certainly exists for the number of aircraft programmed for modification to 

shift from 300 (up or down) in order to address USAF requirements, but specifics 

pertaining to any potential shifts are not defined at this time. 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement you describe a decreased fighter force structure 

of 1,900 total fighter aircraft as ‘‘an increased risk’’ to carry out the National Military Strategy, which is a reduction from a 2,000 fighter aircraft inventory 2 years 

ago. Please describe the increased risks in terms of meeting military objectives. 

What actions is the Air Force taking to reduce this risk? What actions can the Congress take to reduce this risk? 

General FIELD. The decision to reduce force structure was a very difficult one. 

From the mission risk perspective, a smaller force means that objectives may take 

longer to achieve; integrated air defense systems (enemy surface-to-air missiles and 

fighters, etc.) will take longer to defeat, thereby increasing the threat to our aircrews; there will be greater likelihood that the Air Force will not be able to gain 

and maintain air superiority, but may have to settle for temporary, local air superiority; and greater likelihood that joint/coalition ground (and possibly naval) forces 

will be at risk of enemy air attack for the first time since the Korean War. Insufficient capacity to support defense strategic guidance will result in more force substitutions at greater risk (particularly for air superiority missions), more difficulty conducting nearly simultaneous surge operations resulting in higher attrition and the 

potential for failure. Reduced capacity also drives a higher OPTEMPO leading to 

readiness degradation and reduced availability for enduring overseas operations. 

Within significant budgetary restrictions, the Air Force is mitigating these risks by 

modernizing and sustaining legacy fighters, by upgrading and procuring fifth generation aircraft, and by procuring preferred munitions. Congress can help reduce 

these risks by continuing to support the Air Force’s fighter force structure with stable funding; supporting the minimum inventory requirement of 1900 fighter aircraft; 

allowing continued modernization and sustainment of legacy fighters, procurement 

of fifth generation aircraft, procurement of preferred munitions, and allowing the 

Air Force to close excess installations as part of a new Base Realignment and Closure process. 

Mr. TURNER. What is the status of the Air Force’s air-to-air weapons inventory? 

Are there shortages in the AIM–120 or AIM–9 inventories? If so, please provide 

additional amounts that could be executed in fiscal year 2014 to address those 

shortages. 

General FIELD. AIM–120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) 

is a beyond-visual-range missile used to counter existing and emerging air vehicle 

threats, operating at high or low altitude and having electronic attack (EA) capabilities). The current inventory is approximately 2,500 units and the objective inventory 

is approximately 5,000 units. The Air Force FY14 President’s Budget (PB) request 

is $340 million for 181 units, which is the FY14 production capacity. 

AIM–9M Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile is a short to medium-range infrared-guided missile. The current inventory is approximately 3,100 units and the objective inventory is approximately 700 units. This missile is no longer in production, so there 

was no procurement FY14 PB request in the FY14 PB. 

AIM–9X Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile is a short to medium-range infrared-guided 

missile, with enhanced detection and tracking capabilities, and increased maneuverability. The current inventory is approximately 1,100 units and the objective inventory is approximately 1,800 units. The Air Force FY14 PB request is $120 million 

for 225 units. The Air Force supports the FY14 PB. In order to reach the FY14 production capacity of 800 units across the Navy, Air Force, and FMS procurement, an 

additional $135 million is required for an additional 350 units. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER 

Mr. BARBER. General Davis, thank you for your service to our Nation and your 

testimony before this committee today. In your testimony today, you mentioned improvements to the A–10 airframe to ensure its combat viability through 2035. I understand the A–10 is a critical close air support platform that the Services have 

come to rely upon for its effectiveness and precision. Truth be told, it is quite an 

iconic aircraft, and I’m proud to have A–10s in my district at Davis-Monthan Air 

Force Base. As the Air Force transitions a number of the A–10 fleet to the Reserve 
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Component, how is the Air Force ensuring its Reserve fleet of A–10s are kept at 

the same level of readiness as their Active Duty counterparts? 

General DAVIS. Aircraft with existing wings that are considered beyond repair will 

get new wings, regardless of whether they are Active Component (AC) or Reserve 

Component (RC). The determination of which aircraft get new wings is based on an 

inspection of the wings when the aircraft is at the depot. RC aircraft will receive 

the standard block software upgrades (OFP). All AC and RC A–10s will receive the 

same OFP upgrades. 

Mr. BARBER. General Field, thank you for your service to our Nation and your 

testimony before this committee today. I would like to begin first by saying I remain 

committed to solving the fiscal challenges and uncertainties facing our Nation today. 

I have said time and again that cuts applied in an across-the-board manner by sequestration are nonsensical and harmful to our national defense. While the CR provided the Department some flexibility, I am not satisfied. That being said, I understand the Department must adhere to the law and move forward with securing our 

national defense regardless. As the Department has begun to identify ways to be 

more efficient, top military leaders have stated that Building Partner Capacity will 

remain a critical tool for ensuring global stability. Air Force units in my State, Arizona, contribute significantly to this effort by training foreign pilots, and I am proud 

of their service and commitment to our global security. Over time, these airmen 

have developed an indispensable skill critical to the effort of Building Partner Capacity. I’m sure you can agree, as good stewards of U.S. resources, we cannot allow 

skills and expertise to erode as a result of sequestration. As such, it makes sense 

to ensure we recycle and maintain the expertise of our airmen as we integrate new 

technology. General, in this case, I’m talking specifically about the F–35 and Air 

Force basing decisions for the F–35. General Field, my question to you is this: When 

making F–35 basing decisions, how much weight will the Air Force place on bases’ 

current missions and the expertise they possess from conducting those missions 

when determining where to base the F–35? What will drive the Air Force’s basing 

decisions for future missions, specifically the F–35? 

General FIELD. The Air Force strategic basing process begins with criteria development, which outlines basing requirements. Mission is one of (normally) four categories of criteria. The mission category is comprised of elements specific to the 

weapon system being considered for basing. Each element is weighted based on 

their relative importance to the mission. The mission elements address requirements unique to that weapon system, not necessarily current missions at a particular location, or resident expertise. Regarding the F–35A, criteria for future training basing decisions will be reviewed and updated as necessary, but is not expected 

to change markedly. 

The strategic basing process is requirements-driven. In the case of the F–35A, future basing decisions will be based upon the aircraft delivery schedule and the potential for foreign military sales (FMS) of F–35A aircraft. The Air Force anticipates 

a future need to identify a long-term FMS location for F–35A training, but that is 

dependent upon future foreign sales. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY 

Mr. VEASEY. This question is for all of the flag officers. It is clear that the world 

is getting more dangerous, not less. The situation with North Korea makes that 

very clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia 

and China are developing advanced stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface-to-air missile systems. Can you discuss the importance of the advanced stealth 

capability that the F–35 will give us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats around the world. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We have not conducted the work necessary to answer this 

question. 

Mr. VEASEY. This question is for all of the flag officers. It is clear that the world 

is getting more dangerous, not less. The situation with North Korea makes that 

very clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia 

and China are developing advanced stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface-to-air missile systems. Can you discuss the importance of the advanced stealth 

capability that the F–35 will give us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats around the world. 

Admiral SKINNER and Admiral MORAN. 

• F–35C offers the first 5th generation fighter aircraft to the Navy carrier air 

wing and brings with it the ability to effectively engage and survive a wide 
148 

range and threats, both air and surface, in contested airspace. It provides a 

‘‘day-one’’ strike capability enabling tactical agility and strategic flexibility required to counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios 

that cannot be addressed by current legacy aircraft, including operations in an 

anti-access/area denied environment. 

• Key additive capabilities that F–35C will bring include very low observable 

stealth characteristics and fused active and passive sensors that will enhance 

the inherent stealth design. These fully integrated capabilities will allow F–35C 

to retain a ‘first detect/first shot’ capability throughout the battlespace. F–35C’s 

survivability and lethality will fully integrate with the other Navy Carrier 

Strike Group assets and provide increased real-time situational awareness to all 

other networked assets. As such, F–35C offers complementary, additive capability to F/A–18E/F in numerous mission areas. 

• A force equipped with F–35C aircraft enables combatant commanders to attack 

targets day or night, in all weather, in highly defended areas of joint operations. 

Target set includes: fixed and mobile land targets; enemy surface units; and air 

threats (including advanced cruise missiles). 

• F–35C will supplant some of the aging Navy TACAIR inventory by replacing 

early blocks of the F/A–18E/F and legacy F/A–18C aircraft. F–35C procurement 

remains a key element of the Navy’s strike-fighter force mix. 

Mr. VEASEY. Lieutenant General Schmidle, can you provide the Subcommittee an 

update on the F–35B STOVL variant’s progress in the test program and discuss why 

you and the Commandant believe this aircraft is so critical to the Marine Corps’ 

future? 

General SCHMIDLE. In 2011 and 2012, The F–35B test program made significant 

progress and has demonstrated key capabilities that confirm the aircraft will meet 

our requirements. As of 17 May 2013, the F–35B has conducted 1,129 test flights 

for a total of 1,588.1 test flight hours, and has successfully completed initial ship 

trials, air start testing, and released both precision and air-to-air weapons. The testing of STOVL performance capabilities continues to expand the envelope resulting 

in our first operational vertical landing in March 2013 at MCAS Yuma, Arizona. 

The Marine Corps’ transition to the F–35B STOVL is well under way with the 

establishment of VMFAT–501, the Fleet Replacement Squadron, and VMFA–121, 

the first tactical squadron. VMFAT–501 currently executes a full training schedule 

for F–35B transition pilots and maintainers. VMFA–121, which stood up in November 2012, now has 4 F–35Bs and will be fully outfitted with 16 F–35Bs by this fall. 

The F–35B supports the rapidly changing nature of expeditionary operations by 

providing flexible basing options that allow tactical aircraft to improve 

responsivenes and increase sortie generation rates. The value of STOVL has been 

demonstrated repeatedly, most recently in combat operations ashore, through the 

use of forward operating bases (FOBs) in Iraq and Afganistan, as well as during 

embarked operations throughout Central Command’s Area of Responsibility. 

Based on the testing completed to date we are confident the Marine Corps’ requirement for one tactical aircraft type, capable of multiple missions, providing the 

MAGTF with flexible expeditionary basing and the superior technology needed to 

dominate the fight is the F–35B. There are no alternatives to the F–35B that support the full range of crisis response obligations of the United States Marine Corps. 

Mr. VEASEY. This question is for all of the flag officers. It is clear that the world 

is getting more dangerous, not less. The situation with North Korea makes that 

very clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia 

and China are developing advanced stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface to air missile systems. Can you discuss the importance of the advanced stealth 

capability that the F–35 will give us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats around the world. 

General SCHMIDLE. The F–35’s low observable survivability, powerful integrated 

sensor suite, fused information displays, interoperable joint connectivity, precision 

weapons suite, and self-protect anti-air weapons, is a total package of capabilities 

that will revolutionize our Naval Air combat power in all threat and operational environments. The advanced fifth-generation stealth capability allows our aviation elements to operate in threat environments not compatible with fourth-generation aircraft without extensive and intensive electronic warfare augmentation. By using the 

F–35 in these high threat environments we reduce exposure, increase survivability, 

and improve overall mission effectiveness with tailored and precision application. 

Mr. VEASEY. Rear Admiral Moran, can you speak to the additional capability the 

F–35 will bring to the fleet and to the program’s importance to the Navy’s Tactical 

Aviation recapitalization efforts? 
149 

Admiral MORAN. The F–35C provides a 5th generation fighter aircraft to the Navy 

carrier air wing and brings with it the ability to effectively engage and survive a 

wide range of threats, both air and surface, in contested airspace. It provides a ‘‘dayone’’ strike capability enabling tactical agility and strategic flexibility required to 

counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios that cannot 

be addressed by current legacy aircraft, including operations in an anti-access/area 

denied environment. 

F–35C’s 5th generation survivability and lethality is enhanced by very low observable stealth characteristics, fusion of onboard and off-board passive and active sensors, and real-time integration with other F–35Cs and Navy assets, which provide 

a ‘‘first detect/first shot’’ capability throughout the battlespace. The F–35C will provide a significant additive value when brought to bear with the networked fighting 

concepts of the U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group and in a joint/combined warfighting 

arena. 

Mr. VEASEY. Lieutenant General Davis, affordable F–35 recapitalization is dependent on capturing economies scale as quickly as possible by increasing production as quickly as possible. It finally appears that the Department has stabilized the 

production rate for the F–35 program and is committed to increasing the ramp rate 

beginning in Fiscal Year 2015. Contrary to the public perception, I understand that 

unit costs have been coming down year-over-year. In fact, unit costs have come 

down more than 50% from LRIP 1 through LRIP 5. Furthermore, it has been 

brought to my attention that the projected unit cost per aircraft for the F–35A 

CTOL variant in Fiscal Year 2018 is projected to be approximately $75 million in 

Fiscal Year 2012 dollars ($85 million in then-year dollars) if the current production 

profile is maintained. 

Can you confirm this for the Subcommittee? 

General DAVIS. Based on the current production profile, the estimated unit recur- ring flyaway cost (URF) for the F–35A will be approximately $87 million (TY$) in 

FY18. The URF cost includes the airframe, electronics, engine and engineering 

change orders. The estimated flyaway cost is approximately $96 million (TY$) in 

FY18. The flyaway cost adds in non-recurring and ancillary equipment costs. The 

F–35A unit cost is subject to change if the U.S. Services or partner nations adjust 

their procurement profiles. 

Mr. VEASEY. This question is for all of the flag officers. It is clear that the world 

is getting more dangerous, not less. The situation with North Korea makes that 

very clear. Iran is moving toward a potential nuclear weapon. We know that Russia 

and China are developing advanced stealth fighters and proliferating advanced surface to air missile systems. Can you discuss the importance of the advanced stealth 

capability that the F–35 will give us and our allies in the future to meet the increasing threats around the world. 

General DAVIS and General FIELD. Since World War II, the U.S. has relied on its 

ability to control the skies over the battlefield, protecting our forces and holding any 

adversary’s targets at risk. Our potential adversaries are keenly aware of the importance of air superiority to our nation’s way of war. This is why the development and 

proliferation of weapon systems that contest our asymmetric advantage in the air 

are increasingly prevalent. For the past 30 years, our fighter fleet remained ahead 

of this evolving threat, superbly performing all its missions and supporting the joint 

warfighter in operations such as EL DORADO CANYON, DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. However, even during these conflicts we sometimes faced threat systems that posed a significant 

threat to our legacy fighter fleet. For example, during the first days of DESERT 

STORM only our fleet of F–117 stealth fighters was able to safely operate and survive in the highly contested skies over Baghdad. 

We believe that air superiority remains an imperative when fighting any adversary and maintaining the ability of our aircraft to penetrate and persist in contested 

environments is vital to the joint warfighter. As you mention, the threats we may 

face continue to evolve in technology and complexity. Potential adversaries are acquiring advanced fighters on par with or better than our legacy fleet, developing sophisticated and networked early warning radar surveillance systems, and fielding 

surface to air missile systems with increasing range and lethality. These capabilities 

all work together to create advanced, and extremely dangerous, integrated air defense systems (IADS). These anti-access/area denial environments seriously challenge our ability to gain air superiority and hold targets at risk. We already face 

this challenge in some parts of the world and as you said, and these threat environments will continue to expand as these systems proliferate. 

Our legacy fleet is approaching the limits of capability modernization that permits 

them to survive and operate in these environments—they simply do not have the 
150 

advanced stealth capability required to defeat the emerging threats. Only our fifth 

generation fighter fleet’s combination of advanced stealth, precision weapons, unmatched electronic warfare systems, fused multi-spectral battlespace awareness, 

combat identification systems, maneuverability, and speed has the ability to operate 

and survive in these advanced threat environments. All these capabilities inherent 

in the F–35, particularly its advanced stealth properties, ensure the U.S. and our 

allies have an air superiority advantage, and will enable our combatant commanders to bring the full spectrum of capabilities of the joint force to the fight. 

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