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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S HANDLING OF 

KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ADMITTED 

INTO THE FEDERAL WITNESS SECURITY PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

HOMELAND SECURITY, AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 4, 2013 

Serial No. 113–41 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

[Vacant] 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, HOMELAND SECURITY, AND INVESTIGATIONS

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas, Vice-Chairman 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

CAROLINE LYNCH, Chief Counsel 

BOBBY VASSAR, Minority Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

JUNE 4, 2013 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations ................................................ 1 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations ................................................ 2 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. Department 

of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

David Harlow, Assistant Director, U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Department 

of Justice; and Paul O’Brien, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal 

Division, U.S. Department of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 14 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 16 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

DoJ Interim Report ................................................................................................. 29 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S HANDLING OF 

KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ADMITTED INTO THE FEDERAL WITNESS SECURITY PROGRAM 

TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, HOMELAND SECURITY, AND INVESTIGATIONS

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sensenbrenner, Goodlatte, Scott, Conyers, and Bass. 

Staff present: (Majority) Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & 

General Counsel, Sarah Allen, Counsel; Alicia Church, Clerk; and 

(Minority) Aaron Hiller, Counsel. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair will be authorized to declare recesses during votes on the Floor of the House. 

The Chair will make an opening statement and then yield to Mr. 

Scott. 

Last month the Justice Department’s Inspector General released 

a report that should have sent chills through everyone who read it. 

The report was titled ‘‘The Department of Justice’s Handling of 

Known and Suspected Terrorists Admitted Into the Federal Witness Security Program,’’ but it just as easily could have been the 

Department of Justice’s mishandling of this program. 

The Witness Security Program, often called WITSEC, is a critical 

prosecutorial tool that has been in existence since 1971. The program protects witnesses who agree to testify in a variety of different types of criminal cases, including drug trafficking, organized 

crime, and in recent years terrorism cases. For example, the witnesses involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 

blind sheik prosecutions have been included in the WITSEC program. In order to protect them from harm stemming from their testimony, participants are relocated to a new community by the Justice Department, afforded financial assistance, and provided a new 

name and identification documents. 
2 

While conducting its periodic oversight of the WITSEC program, 

the IG discovered the Department, specifically the U.S. Marshals 

Service and the Criminal Division’s Office of Enforcement Operations, or OEO, had little or no safeguards in place to make sure 

that the American people were protected from these potentially 

dangerous individuals. While most of the details of what the IG 

discovered are contained in a much longer non-public and classified 

report, the six-page public summary alone paints an extremely 

troubling picture. 

For example, the IG discovered the Department did not actually 

know how many terrorists had been admitted into WITSEC. It had 

lost track of at least two terrorists in the program. It was not sharing critical information about potential terrorist activities by 

WITSEC participants with our national security stakeholders, including the FBI, and the Department was not providing the witnesses’ new identities to the Terrorist Screening Center, which 

meant that these new names were not included in the Transportation Security Administration’s No-Fly List. Accordingly, known 

terrorists who were trained in aviation and explosives and who 

were banned from flying were free to fly commercially at their 

whim. I would say this sounds like the plot of a Naked Gun movie 

if it were not so terrifying and true. 

One of the most important lessons after September 11th was the 

critical need for better information sharing among our national security and law enforcement entities. The IG’s report makes it clear 

that there is still much work to be done in this regard. Today I expect to hear from the Justice Department how this mismanagement was allowed to happen, how the Department intends to mitigate the potential harm to our national security that has already 

been done, and what it is doing to make sure this thing does not 

happen again. 

It is now my pleasure to recognize for his opening statement the 

Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Over the course of its 40-year history, the Witness Security Program has proven an invaluable law enforcement and 

counterterrorism tool for the Department of Justice. The program 

has enabled us to secure the cooperation of witnesses who have 

provided key testimony against some of the most egregious criminals in modern history, including the perpetrators of the 1993 

World Trade Center bombing, the attack on our embassies in East 

Africa in 1998, and the 2009 attempted bombing of New York 

City’s subway system. 

But on May 16 of this year, the Office of the Inspector General 

issued its Interim Report on the Department of Justice’s Handling 

of Known or Suspected Terrorists Admitted to the Federal Witness 

Security Program. The report raises a number of deeply troubling 

questions about the government’s handling of individuals who are 

linked to terrorist activities and admitted to the Witness Security 

Program. 

For example, it appears that until recently the Department had 

no mechanism in place to notify the FBI or the Terrorist Screening 

Center of new identities the government had provided to suspected 
3 

terrorists admitted to the program. Without that notice, TSC was 

unable to update the terrorist watch list to reflect these new identities. As a consequence, at least some of those new identities were 

left off the no-fly and selectee list, enabling these individuals to fly 

freely on commercial aircraft and evade our principal method for 

tracking the movement of known and suspected terrorists. In fact, 

it appears that in some cases, the United States Marshals Service 

expressly permitted these individuals to fly unescorted on commercial aircraft. 

In another troubling instance the OIG report suggested that the 

government altogether lost track of two known or suspected terrorists who at some point left the program on their own accord. In 

short, the report has identified several critical flaws in the Witness 

Security Program that should never have been allowed to develop 

and must be addressed immediately, to the extent that they have 

not already been addressed. 

One thing that is missing from the report and I think we should 

gain from the discussion today is a better sense of the timing of 

these incidents. Given the kinds of security flaws found in the 

audit, I can certainly appreciate the sense of urgency expressed by 

the Inspector General in his interim report and that the Chairman 

reflected in his opening statement. But it appears that the Department became aware of these problems years ago and has already 

taken substantial steps to address them, even before the OIG 

began its audit. 

Of the 16 recommendations listed in the report, apparently 15 

were completed by March 2013, 2 months before the report was circulated to our offices. If it turns out that any gaps remain in this 

program, I expect our witnesses to tell us how we can repair them 

immediately, and if those concerns have already been addressed, I 

expect to learn how they have been addressed and to be assured 

that the defects of this kind will not happen again. 

Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, it seems worth noting in advance that our discussion today will be somewhat limited by the 

public forum. When you talk about these things, there is a lot of 

sensitive information that cannot be discussed in an open forum, 

and I appreciate you holding an open session, but if necessary I 

hope we can have a more private setting where we might get more 

classified information. 

But I look forward to our discussion today and thank our panelists for being with us. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. To respond to the gentleman from Virginia, 

I think we will make that decision after we find out what the testimony is in the open session. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte, the Chair of the full Committee. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 

holding this hearing. 

The Inspector General’s recent report on the appalling handling 

of known and suspected terrorists in the Federal Witness Security 

Program raises serious concerns about whether this traditional law 

enforcement program should be used to hide and relocate suspected 

terrorists. 
4 

The IG report found that the number of known or suspected terrorists admitted to the Witness Security Program is unknown to 

the Department, that the Department has lost track of two suspected terrorists in the program, and that critical national security 

information is not being shared with other agencies. 

For example, the Inspector General found that after the known 

or suspected terrorists received a new name and necessary identity-related documents, their new names were not placed on the 

Transportation Security Administration’s No-Fly List, even though 

their previous names had been listed because they pose a threat to 

our national security. 

As a result, there was nothing to stop these terrorists from joining the general public on commercial airplanes here in the United 

States. In some cases, witnesses on the No-Fly List were even permitted to fly commercially with the Department’s approval. 

All of this is especially problematic since the IG report found 

that terrorists admitted to the program include persons who have 

been trained in aviation and explosives, and individuals who have 

been involved in bombing attacks. 

The Department’s mismanagement of the WITSEC program has 

put American lives needlessly at risk, which simply cannot be tolerated. As we saw in regard to the recent Boston bombings, the IG’s 

report highlights that a lack of robust information sharing persists 

more than a decade after the 9/11 terror attacks. 

The terror threat has not diminished since 9/11. It is everpresent and evolving, and requires effective counter-terrorism programs. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on the 

steps the Department has taken and will take to make sure that 

appropriate interagency coordination is occurring within the 

WITSEC program, across the Department and the Administration. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, other Members’ opening 

statements will be included into the record at this point. 

It is the policy of the Committee to swear in all of the witnesses. 

Would each of the witnesses please rise and raise your right 

hand? 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Let the record show that each of the witnesses has answered in the affirmative. 

The Chair will now introduce each of the witnesses. 

The first witness today is the Honorable Michael E. Horowitz, 

who was sworn in as the fourth confirmed Inspector General of the 

Department of Justice on April 16, 2012. In this capacity, he oversees a nationwide workforce of approximately 450 special agents, 

auditors, inspectors, attorneys, and support staff whose mission is 

to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse and misconduct in DOJ programs and personnel, and to promote economy and efficiency in Department operations. 

Mr. Horowitz most recently worked as a partner at Cadwalader, 

Wickersham & Taft, LLP, where he focused his practice on whitecollar defense, internal investigations and regulatory compliance. 

He also served as a commissioner on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, where he was instrumental in re-writing the guidelines for 

corporate compliance program and for fraud, anti-trust, intellectual 
5 

property, and money laundering offenses. He previously worked for 

DOJ in the Criminal Division at main Justice from 1999 to 2002, 

and as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 

York from 1991 to 1999. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree 

from Brandeis University and his law degree from Harvard Law 

School. 

David Harlow is the Associate Director for Operations for the 

U.S. Marshals Service. In this capacity, he is responsible for the 

development of the Behavioral Analysis Unit within the National 

Sex Offender Targeting Center, which assists with the 

prioritization and targeting of non-compliant and fugitive sex offenders and the safeguarding of Marshal Service employees. He 

joined the Marshals Service in December 1983 in the Northern District of Ohio, where he was promoted to Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal. 

During his tenure in Ohio, Mr. Harlow created the first Cooperative Fugitive Apprehension Team comprised of multiple law enforcement agencies in the Toledo metropolitan area. He was then 

transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia, where he served as 

Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal. Most recently, he served as Assistant 

Director for the Investigative Operations Division. He received his 

Bachelor’s degree in Law Enforcement Administration from Western Illinois University. 

Paul O’Brien is the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the 

Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. He joined the 

Department in 1995 as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Western 

District of Tennessee. In 2003, he joined the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

in Nashville, where he served as Narcotics Chief, Criminal Chief, 

First Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Interim U.S. Attorney. In 2008, 

he was appointed Chief of the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section and served in that capacity through his appointment as the 

Director of Enforcement Operations in February 2010. He is a 

graduate of Texas A&M University and earned his law degree from 

the University of Memphis. 

We will now proceed under the 5-minute rule. All of you know 

that we like to have your written testimony summarized. Without 

objection, the full written testimony will appear in the record. 

During your testimony, the green light says go, the yellow light 

says a minute, and the red light says yield the floor. 

And, Mr. Horowitz, you are first. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ, 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for inviting me to testify today about the Office of the Inspector General’s Interim Report on the Department’s Handling of Known or 

Suspected Terrorists in the Federal Witness Security Program. My 

comments today will be limited to the information contained in our 

public summary report. 

Our audit found significant deficiencies in the operation of the 

WITSEC program due to the failure of the WITSEC program to 

consult with national security stakeholders such as the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, or TSC, when admitting and monitoring 

known or suspected terrorists into the WITSEC program. For ex-
6 

ample, we found that the Department did not definitively know 

how many known or suspected terrorists had been admitted into 

the WITSEC program. 

In response to our review, the Department began an analysis of 

its WITSEC program case files to determine how many known or 

suspected terrorists were admitted into the WITSEC program. Additionally, at our recommendation, the Department compared the 

true names, aliases and government-provided identities for the over 

18,000 WITSEC program participants and their dependents to the 

TSC’s consolidated terrorist watch list. This comparison identified 

additional known or suspected terrorists who were not identified in 

the Department’s initial WITSEC program case file reviews. 

The failure to adequately monitor WITSEC program participants 

was evidenced by the fact that the Department informed us during 

our review that it was unable to locate two former WITSEC participants identified as known or suspected terrorists, and that through 

its investigative efforts it has concluded that one individual was 

and that the other individual was believed to be residing outside 

of the United States. 

We also found that the Department was not disclosing to the 

TSC the new identities provided to known or suspected terrorists 

and their dependents in the WITSEC program. As a result, until 

we brought this matter to the government’s attention, the new government-provided identities of known or suspected terrorists were 

not included on the TSC’s consolidated terrorist watch list. This 

failure meant that known or suspected terrorists could evade one 

of the government’s primary means of identifying and tracking terrorists’ movements and actions. 

It also meant that known or suspected terrorists in the WITSEC 

program who the TSC had prohibited from flying on commercial 

airlines were allowed to fly on commercial flights using their new 

identities with WITSEC program officials’ knowledge and approval. 

Moreover, these individuals, on their own accord, could have flown 

without WITSEC program officials’ knowledge and approval. 

Lastly, as a result of our review, we developed concerns about inconsistent, informal, and inadequate information sharing and coordination by the WITSEC program with national security stakeholders. Of particular concern, we found that prior to May 2012, 

the WITSEC program did not have a formal process to share 

WITSEC terrorism-related information with the FBI, and that the 

WITSEC program did not always share such information that could 

have been of potential value to the FBI. 

We believe that such information must be shared with the FBI 

immediately so that the FBI, which has the primary responsibility 

for assessing national security threats, can determine the appropriate action to take. 

In conclusion, the operations of the WITSEC program in general 

and the corrective actions, the 16 that we identified and recommended in our non-public interim report, require ongoing attention. A program that was designed to protect cooperating witnesses 

must be operated in a manner that also ensures the public safety. 

We look forward to working closely with the Department and the 

Congress to ensure that the national security vulnerabilities and 
7 

other issues identified during our review are addressed quickly and 

appropriately. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions the Subcommittee 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Horowitz follows:] 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you, Mr. Horowitz. 

Mr. Harlow? 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID HARLOW, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, U.S. 

MARSHALS SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND 

PAUL O’BRIEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. HARLOW. Thank you for inviting me here today, Mr. Chairman. Mr. O’Brien will be speaking on behalf of both of our parties. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. O’Brien. 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, 

and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to share the views of the Justice Department 

on the admission of former known or suspected terrorists into the 

Witness Security Program. Together with my colleague David Harlow from the United States Marshals Service, we are honored to 

represent the Department at this hearing. 

Over its more than 40-year history, the Witness Security Program has played a crucial role in the protection of witnesses in organized crime prosecutions, enabling prosecutors and law enforcement to bring to justice some of the world’s most dangerous and 

violent criminals, convictions that would not have been possible 

without testimony from the witnesses being protected by the program. As then Acting Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeney 

testified to Congress, ‘‘Obtaining the cooperation of insiders is crucial to the successful prosecution of traditional organized crime 

groups, international narcotics traffickers, and violent street 

gangs.’’ That was true when Mr. Keeney testified in 1996; it is 

equally true today. 

The Witness Security Program has evolved to include witnesses 

in domestic and international terrorism prosecutions. These witnesses are individuals close enough to terrorists to have information about them, their organizations, and their plans. They necessarily include a small number of former or known suspected terrorists. Cooperation from these witnesses is vital to successfully 

prosecute those who pose the most significant threat to our national security. 

In deciding whether to admit these witnesses into the Witness 

Security Program, our paramount priority is the safety of the 

American public and of the United States. Among other investigations and prosecutions, participants in the Witness Security Program have provided essential cooperation and testimony regarding 

the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City 

bombing, the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, and the 2007 

plot to bomb the John F. Kennedy International Airport. 

As these cases illustrate, the Witness Security Program is a critical tool for securing the cooperation from witnesses who are necessary to the successful prosecution of cases that are important to 

the government’s counterterrorism mission and to the security of 

the United States. To date, the FBI has not identified a national 

security threat tied to the participation of terrorism-linked witnesses in the Witness Security Program. 

Nevertheless, in 2010, the Department recognized that the program’s handling of terrorism-linked witnesses needed to be im-
15 

proved and began instituting a series of corrective measures aimed 

at, among other things, ensuring more robust information sharing 

with our national security stakeholders. Thereafter, the Department’s Office of the Inspector General also found areas in which 

the program’s handling of terrorism-linked witnesses needed to be 

enhanced. 

Since that time, the Department has worked closely with the Office of the Inspector General to develop and implement changes to 

the Witness Security Program to maintain its reliability and value 

while simultaneously protecting our citizens and our Nation from 

harm. Indeed, the Department has already complied with 15 of the 

16 recommendations made by the Inspector General and has made 

significant progress toward completing the last recommendation. 

Among the changes made by the Department is the institution 

of formal protocols that provide for special handling of former 

known or suspected terrorists admitted into the Witness Security 

Program. These protocols ensure full cooperation and information 

sharing between the Department, the United States Marshals 

Service, the FBI, the Terrorist Screening Center, and the National 

Joint Terrorism Task Force. They mandate notification to the FBI 

when a former known or suspected terrorist enters the Witness Security Program, and they require careful supervision of each terrorlinked program participant who is currently in the program. 

The Department is committed to closely monitoring the Witness 

Security Program, maintaining the security of the witnesses who 

provided critical assistance to the United States, and above all preserving the safety of the American public. Thank you for allowing 

me the opportunity to appear before you. Although I may be somewhat limited in those aspects of the program that I can discuss in 

this setting, I am pleased to answer any questions you may have 

either here or in a more appropriate forum. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Harlow and Mr. O’Brien follows:] 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. O’Brien. 

The Chair would remind Members of the Subcommittee that the 

5-minute rule will be in effect. Also, the Chair will place on the 

record that non-Members of the Subcommittee will be allowed to 

sit on the dais but will only be allowed to ask questions should 

Members of the Subcommittee yield them some of their time. 

Mr. Horowitz, your public report revealed a systematic lack of information sharing among DOJ entities that directly touches upon 

our national security. And we also found that out relative to information sharing about the Boston attacks, which are not the subject 

of this report. 

Can you comment on what you found in this respect, and are you 

satisfied, as Mr. O’Brien has said, but the holes have been patched 

in the Justice Department’s information sharing? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, we found in the course of this review that 

information was not being shared. The primary protectors and organization that the Congress and the executive branch have assigned to deal with these issues is the FBI and its Terrorist Screening Center. They were not receiving the information they needed 

to receive. That did not happen until 2012. 

We believe as a result of the audit that protocols have now been 

put in place that, if followed, will in fact address the holes, but we 

have not audited against the steps that have been taken. So the 

recommendations are not yet closed, and we will go back and follow 

up and ensure that the steps that we have recommended, that the 

Department has said they have taken, were in fact taken. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Now, the public summary of your audit indicates that a U.S. Marshals inspector was concerned that a witness was collecting information from militant Muslim groups, but 

that information was not being shared with the FBI for at least 2 

years. Has this hole been plugged? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Again, our understanding is the protocols should 

address that issue, if followed, and we will do a follow-up audit and 

issue a report that determines whether, in fact, the steps have 

been taken. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Either Mr. Harlow or Mr. O’Brien, 

the Marshals Service, which is tasked with fugitive apprehension, 

lost at least two known terrorists who were under your supervision. 

Why did that happen, and have you found them? 

Mr. HARLOW. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It is important to note 

that the Witness Security Program is a voluntary program, and the 

two witnesses in question left the program years ago—in fact, one 

more than 25 years ago—left the country years ago. They have 

since been located, and our investigative efforts have shown that 

they have not tried to reenter the country, and the FBI has determined that they have not posed a threat to the United States. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Do you know if their names and whatever 

relevant data we know of has been entered in the State Department watch list so that they would not be granted a visa and given 

to Homeland Security so that if they did show up at the airport 

they would be denied entry? 

Mr. HARLOW. Yes, sir. Those steps have been taken. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Now, another question that I have 

of both of you is are local law enforcement officials notified when 
23 

someone under the Witness Protection Program is placed in their 

community? 

Mr. HARLOW. Mr. Chairman, local law enforcement is notified on 

a case-by-case basis depending on the specifics of that witness’ history. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. And can you say which types of history would require notification of local law enforcement and which 

would not? 

Mr. HARLOW. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Many times, when a particular 

witness has an extensive criminal history, local law enforcement 

might be notified that they are going to be placed in their area. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. And which would not? 

Mr. HARLOW. General witnesses involved in the program without 

that extensive criminal history. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, what about a terrorist who was not 

indicted or charged with any type of terrorist-related offense? 

Would local law enforcement be knowledgeable about the fact that 

that person was in the community? 

Mr. HARLOW. Mr. Chairman, under our new protocols, the Joint 

Terrorism Task Force would be notified. The FBI would have the 

lead for distributing that information as they see fit. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. And are they doing it with people who are 

known terrorists who are in the program now? 

Mr. HARLOW. I am sorry, sir. I do not know that answer. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Mr. O’Brien, do you know that answer? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. First, 

the new protocols mandate that we share all information with the 

FBI when a former known or suspected terrorist is admitted to the 

program. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. What about those that are already in the 

program prior to the new protocol? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. We have shared that information with the FBI, and 

the FBI has access to the files both at the Department and the 

Marshals Service. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you. My time is up. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Following up on that last question about notifying local law enforcement, it seems to me that the more people you tell about the 

presence of somebody, the more likely there may be a breach. Who 

in the local law enforcement, if you tell them, will get this information? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Congressman, the protocols mandate that we notify 

the FBI both in the new location area where the witness is placed, 

and we also notify the FBI on the national level to make sure that 

there is redundancy built into the notification system. 

One thing that we also have been doing—— 

Mr. SCOTT. What about local police? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. So we take the lead. If the FBI determined that 

they needed to share this information with the local police, that is 

certainly something we would consider. I think it is important to 

note that these individuals are watch listed. 
24 

Mr. SCOTT. So when you say the local, you are talking about the 

local FBI. You were not talking about local law enforcement. 

Mr. O’BRIEN. That is correct. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, Congressman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Let me ask another question. How important 

is the Witness Protection Program to the Department? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. The Witness Protection Program is one of the most 

important tools prosecutors have to tackle organized crime, whether it is traditional organized crime, international narcotics cases, or 

a violent street gang. It has been one of the most effective tools 

that we have utilized in the Department to bring these individuals 

to justice, individuals that pose some of the most significant harm 

to our communities. 

Mr. SCOTT. How many of the people in the program are dangerous criminals, and how many just happened to be bystanders 

that would otherwise be reluctant to testify? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Thank you, Congressman. I think that is an important question. The program has effectively not only safely protected 

witnesses who have criminal histories and have cooperated with 

the government, those individuals that have cooperated against the 

organizations which they are members of, but the program also 

protects family members and innocent bystanders, those individuals that are also placed in peril as a result of, say, for example, 

a family member’s cooperation with the United States. So the program is designed to not only protect those individuals that are testifying on behalf of the United States but family members that 

could face retribution as a result of the cooperation of a family 

member as well. 

Mr. SCOTT. How many people do you have in the program? Is 

that a public number? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Congressman, I believe in the public summary 

there are approximately 700 individuals actively in the program. 

But as we stated, through the history of the program, the Marshals 

Service has effectively protected thousands of individuals. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, you used the term ‘‘known or suspected terrorists.’’ Many of these have not been convicted of anything; is that 

right? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. That is correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. And they are free to just up and leave. There are no 

restraints on them; is that right? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. The program is a voluntary program, and individuals can leave the program at their choosing. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what is your response to somebody that just up 

and leaves and just disappears? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Well, Congressman, the protocols address that, and 

one thing that we have implemented is that when an individual 

leaves the program, that we will provide that information to the 

FBI and notify the FBI that the individual has left the program. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you have any estimate of how many staff people 

you have to assign to each protectee? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Congressman, I think that is a question better left 

for the Marshals Service. They may not be at liberty to discuss 

those operational issues. 

Mr. HARLOW. Congressman, Mr. O’Brien is correct. 
25 

Mr. SCOTT. If you do not want to do it in general, are their budget implications to keeping track of these people? 

Mr. HARLOW. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Mr. O’Brien, we have been advised that 15 of 

the 16 recommendations from the Inspector General’s report have 

been addressed. What is left undone? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Congressman, there is one recommendation that we 

are working on. In an abundance of caution, we have decided to 

audit every WITSEC file to review those files to ensure that there 

are no other known or suspected terrorists that entered in the program, and if we do notice those individuals, we will provide that 

information to the FBI. That audit is underway. We have reviewed 

approximately 20 years’ worth of files, and that process is ongoing, 

and we are going to continue to work on that recommendation to 

see to its conclusion. 

Mr. SCOTT. The other recommendations have been—you have 

completed those recommendations? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. The other recommendations that were in the report, we believe we have completed 15 of the 16. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Mr. Horowitz, is that your understanding? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. The Department has reported to us that it has 

addressed 15 of the 16. As I said, until we audit against it and determine that, in fact, the steps were taken and that they were effective, we can not close the recommendation. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Inspector General Horowitz, your office discovered the practice of 

admitting known and suspected terrorists into the Witness Security Program while doing a routine audit of the program and decided to issue an interim report on the issue. Is it common for you 

to find something so alarming that you need to issue an interim report to stop it? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Fortunately, it is not. We thought this was of 

such importance that we needed to issue the report and make sure 

steps were taken because the gaps were still there when we started 

this audit. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Assistant Director Harlow, specifically why did 

not the Department share the new names and identities that provided known terrorists with the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center? 

Mr. HARLOW. Mr. Chairman, the success of this program for 

many, many years was built on the compartmentalization of information. As the program evolved, we failed to evolve our procedures 

and protocols. We have now changed those procedures and protocols and we actively embrace them. It is also important to note that 

the FBI is the sponsoring agency in more than 80 percent of these 

types of cases. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. So it was an intentional decision based upon a 

flawed protocol. 

Mr. HARLOW. We recognized the problem with new leadership in 

May of 2010 and started to make those changes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Deputy Assistant Attorney General O’Brien, the 

Department’s response to the IG’s report calls the participants in 

question ‘‘former known and suspected terrorists.’’ Can you tell us 
26 

what a former terrorist is? Is there any guarantee that the participants have given up their bad ways when they join the program? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to note that 

these individuals, before they are admitted into the program, go 

through extensive vetting. That vetting includes a risk analysis by 

the sponsoring law enforcement agency, and approximately 80 percent of the former terrorists that were admitted into the program, 

they were admitted after a recommendation or a sponsor by the 

FBI. These are individuals that turn on their organizations, and 

many of these individuals testified publicly against the organizations which they were members of. 

So we go through a very careful vetting before they are admitted 

to the program, which includes a risk assessment by the sponsoring 

law enforcement agency. And one thing we have done to ensure 

that there are no gaps in this risk analysis is that if it is a case 

in which an agency is sponsoring a witness into the program other 

than the FBI, we will ask the FBI to perform a risk assessment. 

Lastly—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I understand that some of them are still on the 

FBI’s terrorist watch list. Is that another failure to share information, or is that because they disagree with your assessment of the 

individuals? What would be the reason for that? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Some of the individuals, not all, are still watch listed. Some of them are watch listed in varying degrees of status on 

the watch list. I will say that the FBI, when we looked at this issue 

and began looking at this issue, the FBI performed risk assessments of these individuals, and as I said in my opening statement, 

currently the FBI has determined that there is no threat to public 

safety based on their program participation. 

That being said, Mr. Chairman, I think it is fair to say that we 

admit that the suitability and monitoring requirements historically 

employed by the program needed to be enhanced. One thing that 

we are doing now, which I think is very effective, is that we have 

quarterly meetings with the FBI and the Terrorist Screening Center, the Marshals Service and the Department, and we go over the 

list of individuals that we have identified as being former known 

or suspected terrorists and we share that information to make sure 

that we all have the requisite information that we need. 

From the beginning, we have been talking to the FBI about having greater involvement with the FBI with this program, and the 

FBI has unfettered access to the files both of the Marshals Service 

and the Department. So that type of robust information sharing is 

now in place. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me ask you a couple more questions before 

my time expires. First of all, does the fact that two of the people 

in the program disappeared, and I now understand they have been 

located but located outside the United States, does that call into 

question the soundness of the screening process that they were no 

longer a risk as a terrorist and could be called a former terrorist, 

or does it indicate that they cooperated in order to get away from 

everything and maybe back engaged in terrorist activities again? 

Do we know the answer to that? 
27 

Mr. O’BRIEN. Well, certainly, Mr. Chairman, we have no information to believe that these two individuals which you have referenced have engaged in acts of terrorism. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Why did they leave unaccounted for? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. One individual voluntarily chose to leave the program after being in the program for a short period of time. That 

individual left the program over 25 years ago. The second individual, it is my understanding, was terminated from the program 

when he no longer decided to cooperate. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Sensenbrenner. 

Welcome to the witnesses. 

Is it accurate to say, Deputy Assistant Attorney General O’Brien, 

that the Witness Security Program is critical to two missions of the 

Department, law enforcement and counterterrorism? 

Mr. O’BRIEN. I think that is a fair and accurate statement. Many 

of these witnesses who have cooperated not only have provided 

public testimony and cooperation in cases that were prosecuted in 

our Federal courts, but they have also provided information and intelligence about the organizations in which they were previously 

members of. So I think that is a fair statement. 

Mr. CONYERS. Inspector General Horowitz, by all accounts, none 

of the operational flaws identified in the Inspector General’s report 

represent a current threat to public safety or national security. Can 

we conditionally agree with that, or can we not make that statement at this time? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, as we indicated in our report, the Department has advised us that it has taken the steps that we have recommended in 15 of the 16 instances. Until we audit against that, 

though, we are not prepared to make a statement that the recommendations are, in fact, closed. 

Mr. CONYERS. So then we will be waiting to find how your audit 

of the 15 items that have been completed before the interim report 

before we will know exactly how things have turned out. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That is correct. 

Mr. CONYERS. Now, one of the more disturbing aspects of the report is the suggestion that individuals on the no-fly list, Mr. Harlow, Assistant Director of Marshals, that there were individuals on 

the no-fly list that were allowed to fly on commercial airlines. 

When did the Department of Justice become aware of this problem? 

Mr. HARLOW. Congressman, for several years now people on the 

no-fly list have not flown on commercial planes. We embrace the 

recommendations of the Inspector General’s report and we have applied those protocols. 

Mr. CONYERS. Is it possible that these individuals could escape 

detection by TSA today? 

Mr. HARLOW. Sir, all members have been put on the terrorist 

screening watch list and are on the flying watch list. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, those are the questions that I 

have. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I thank the gentleman from Michigan. 
28 

This concludes today’s hearing, and I want to thank all of the 

witnesses for attending. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit additional written questions for the witnesses or additional 

materials for the record. 

The Chair says he will talk to Members on both sides of the aisle 

to see if we want to have you come back for a classified hearing. 

And without objection, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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