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i 

79–996 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–13] 

NUCLEAR SECURITY: ACTIONS, 

ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 28, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, February 28, 2013, Nuclear Security: Actions, Accountability and 

Reform ................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, February 28, 2013 ................................................................................. 33 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2013 

NUCLEAR SECURITY: ACTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 3 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Alston, Maj Gen C. Donald, USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, 20th Air 

Force, Former Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence 

and Nuclear Integration; Brig Gen Sandra E. Finan, USAF, Commander, 

Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Former Principal Assistant Deputy 

Administrator for Military Applications, National Nuclear Security Administration; and Hon. Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy ..................................................................................................... 3 

Poneman, Hon. Daniel B., Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department 

of Energy; and Hon. Neile L. Miller, Acting Administrator and Principal 

Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration ................. 13 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Alston, Maj. Gen. C. Donald (Ret.) .................................................................. 44 

Cooper, Hon. Jim .............................................................................................. 41 

Finan, Brig Gen Sandra E. .............................................................................. 72 

Friedman, Hon. Gregory H. ............................................................................. 91 

Poneman, Hon. Daniel B. ................................................................................. 101 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

DOE Verbal Shortcuts and Acronyms ............................................................ 111 

NNSA Key Personnel ....................................................................................... 112 

DOE Organization Chart ................................................................................. 113 

NNSA Organization Chart ............................................................................... 114 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 117 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 117 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 139 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 121 
(1) 

NUCLEAR SECURITY: ACTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY 

AND REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 28, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. This hearing of the Armed Services Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces is called to order. I want to say good morning 

and welcome everybody to today’s hearing on nuclear security at 

the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA]. Before we get into the hearing, I want to welcome our 

new members to the committee. First and foremost, I want to recognize our ranking member, Mr. Cooper of Tennessee, my friend 

and colleague of many years. I look forward to working closely with 

him over the next 2 years as we carry out this important work. 

I am not sure they are here, but new to our Strategic Forces Subcommittee on the Republican side are Mr. Coffman of Colorado, Mr. 

Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Nugent of Florida, Mr. Bridenstine 

of Oklahoma. On the Democrat side: Mr. Johnson of Georgia, and 

Mr. Carson of Indiana, and Mr. Veasey of Texas. I look forward to 

working with all of you, as well as my colleagues who are returning 

for another 2 years on the Strategic Forces oversight subcommittee. 

This subcommittee has responsibility for many big critical important issues, and we are going to get into one of them right now. 

Today’s hearing is part of the committee’s continuing oversight of 

the aftermath of the security breach at Y–12 National Security 

Complex in July of last year. At this point, the facts of the incident 

are well established so I won’t repeat them. Needless to say, the 

intrusion was astonishing and completely unacceptable. 

Through its hearing and closed briefing last September, the subcommittee is aware of the immediate corrective actions taken by 

the NNSA and the DOE [Department of Energy]. Today’s hearing 

is focused on the broader implications of the incident, including organizational leadership and structural failures that enabled it to 

occur. Reviewing the testimony from our first witness panel as well 

as the other reports on DOE nuclear security stretching back 15 

years, I am deeply concerned that we have been identifying the 

same problem for more than a decade. 
2 

For instance, in a 1999 report by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, it said the DOE, ‘‘Embodied science at its 

very best and security at its worst.’’ 

Highlighting a string of recurring security problems in the 1990s, 

the board described DOE as a ‘‘dysfunctional bureaucracy that has 

proven it is incapable of reforming itself.’’ 

In 2002, a few years after Congress created NNSA in an effort 

to address these concerns, another study by the Commission on 

Science and Security found the same problems. In 2005, an independent study of NNSA security conducted by Admiral Richard 

Mies again made very similar findings saying that the problems 

were, ‘‘they are not new, many continue to exist because of the lack 

of clear accountability, excessive bureaucracy, and organizational 

stovepipes, lack of collaboration, and unwieldy, cumbersome processes.’’ 

Those reports were from 1999, 2002 and 2005. So where are we 

today? To anyone paying attention, the answer is undeniably, nowhere. The assessments done after the Y–12 incident showed that 

the exact same fundamental problems remain. Regardless of the 

structural issues, there is also a problem of accountability. The 

only people who have been fired as a result of the Y–12 incident 

are a few guards, but no Federal officials have been fired. Some 

NNSA site and headquarters security officials have been reassigned to other positions within the DOD or allowed to retire but 

not fired. This is not accountability. It is the exact opposite of what 

Secretary of Defense Gates did after the Air Force’s nuclear security problems in 2007 and 2008. His demonstration of accountability in the Air Force’s senior-most leadership is my example of 

a firm system of accountability, and it should be everyone’s. 

Our first panel of witnesses will help us explore what changes 

are needed to ensure a breach like Y–12 does not happen again. 

They are each the author of separate independent assessments of 

the Y–12 incident or broader security issues at DOD and NNSA. 

The witnesses are Major General Donald Alston, former commander, 20th Air Force, and former Air Force Assistant Chief of 

Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration; Brigadier General Sandra Finan, U.S. Air Force, Commander of the Air Force 

Nuclear Weapons Center, and former Principal Deputy Assistant 

Administrator for Military Applications, National Nuclear Security 

Administration; and the Honorable Gregory Friedman, Inspector 

General, U.S. Department of Energy. I want to thank our witnesses 

for appearing today and the time they have put in preparing their 

testimony. I know it is a labor, but we do appreciate it. 

I have a longer version of my statement that I am, without objection, going to offer for the record. Hearing none, it is so ordered. 

And with that, I want to turn to my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Jim Cooper, for any opening comments that he may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, I look forward to 

working with you and our colleagues on these important issues this 

year. I would just like to ask, in view of the shortness of the time, 

that my opening statement be inserted in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. In concert with that, as you all may 

have been told before the hearing we will be called for votes in a 

little while, so we will dispense with the reading of your opening 

statements; they will be submitted for the record without objection, 

and we will go straight to the questioning of the witnesses. The 

witness order will be General Alston, sorry, we won’t let you stay 

retired; General Finan, thanks for putting your NNSA hat on one 

last time to help the subcommittee understand these issues, and 

Mr. Friedman. 

[The prepared statements of General Alston, General Finan, and 

Mr. Friedman can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 44.] 

MAJ GEN C. DONALD ALSTON, USAF (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER, 20TH AIR FORCE, FORMER AIR FORCE ASSISTANT 

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION; BRIG GEN SANDRA E. FINAN, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CENTER, 

FORMER PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR 

FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; AND HON. GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN, 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. ROGERS. We will begin with 5-minute rounds of questions 

and then we will have a second panel after that. I will start the 

questions here. 

General Alston, you and Mr. Augustine and Dr. Meserve seem to 

have read the many reports and independent reviews of DOE security that have been conducted previously. Your letter to Secretary 

Chu calls it, ‘‘The considerable body of work that has been done on 

the subject over the past decade.’’ In particular, you mention the 

review done by Admiral Mies in 2005. You heard me, in my opening statement, mention a few others, but there are many more. 

How do your findings and recommendations compare to those contained in the findings of all the previous reports? 

General ALSTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. Your microphone needs to be turned on, please. 

General ALSTON. Need coaching and I am trainable. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question, I would say that probably the 

most disturbing thing that Dr. Meserve, Mr. Augustine, and I 

found was the recurring evidence of problems that have existed before. And when you take a close look at Admiral Mies’ work that 

he did, I count about 111 recommendations that the Department of 

Energy showed us, a matrix, we had grades on them, and without 

doing an exhaustive detailed cross-check of what Admiral Mies 

found and what we were finding but doing a rather cursory look 
4 

at that, I would take issue with a variety of those assessments in 

terms of the health of those particular findings. 

Of course, since 2005, there has been a lot of time over the 

course of those 8 years, and I can’t say that I saw any evidence of 

reaching back to the Mies reports. So I don’t know how fresh the 

management of the Mies findings and recommendations was. I 

don’t know the last time they revisited that or if that is a regular 

phenomenon that they do revisit all those findings. But just a few 

of them that point towards culture and things that we found to be 

a legacy of challenges in the Department of Energy: no team approach toward security, struggling to succeed in an atmosphere of 

conflicting viewpoints, headquarters versus the field, lab versus 

lab, site office versus contractor, academic versus operational, 

union versus management, and then non-NNSA elements in the 

Department of Energy. 

There have been recurring challenges as site field offices would 

see a need to upgrade security. We saw lack of discipline, that Admiral Mies found as well, in terms of having a broad strategic vision for what the overall security requirements and standards 

should be, and a sensitivity to elevate the unique features of each 

site as opposed to having standardized common security requirements being the principal focus and the site offices having to defend wanting to be different. But without discipline and strong central management of that, then folks could conceive, design, develop, 

and deploy systems that might not be as fully vetted and ready as 

they need to be, and I think Y–12 is a good example of that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why do you think this culture was allowed to continue? Because it did happen over years. In your opinion, after each 

of these studies, were there any consequences and then they would 

lapse back into this culture or were there never any consequences? 

General ALSTON. We found it difficult to have traceable authority 

from the field up the chain of command to find unambiguous certainty that somebody was in charge of one element of security or 

another. And because that seemed ambiguous, and because there 

was a prevailing notion that it is an eyes-on/hands-off surveillance 

mantra, that the field—the sites have, over time, enjoyed being 

distanced from the headquarters and sort of being alone and 

unafraid, and certainly, I was in a military organization and we 

didn’t like interference from the headquarters. 

However, when it comes to security, I think there are benefits to 

having good central management that may not be true for science, 

but I do believe it is true for security. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe that if there had been somebody at 

the top of the command chain held responsible for the findings of 

any of these earlier studies in a significant way by termination 

that it would have helped to eliminate that culture’s continuance? 

General ALSTON. Well, sir, that would be one action that could 

be taken, but that action alone I don’t think would necessarily have 

resulted in all of the fundamental changes that would have had to 

occur. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why? 

General ALSTON. Well, I think that gets everybody’s attention. I 

showed up on the Air Staff the same weekend that we had our unauthorized munitions transfer from Minot to Barksdale, a very epic 
5 

failure for our Air Force. So, I was there for the next 3 years working that particular problem. The Air Force did not—we worked the 

problem hard for the first year, but when we lost the Chief and the 

Secretary, life was different, and the entire Air Force had to rally 

around not a security problem, but an enterprise failure. And because we looked at this in the largest context, I believe that after 

spending 9 months working the problem to no one’s satisfaction, 

that it certainly was an extraordinary accountability action by Secretary Gates which had the Air Force focus on that problem in a 

way that we had failed to focus on it before, this is absolutely true. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. The chair now recognizes the 

ranking member for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are lots of issues 

here, too much red tape in the bureaucracy, questionable contractor 

performance. But I think that one thing folks back home understand is what do we get for taxpayer dollars? And the inspector 

general [IG] pointed out that DOE-wide we are spending something 

like $1 billion a year just in protection of facilities. And he mentions in his testimony that $700 million per year spent on complexwide protective force of about 4,000 workers, contract professionals; 

that would be $175,000 compensation for each guard; that is a lot. 

And a lot of folks back home would ask, well, we paid all these people, did we get any security and result in return? 

The focus, of course, of today’s hearing is the Y–12 facility, which 

we discover now wasn’t even nun-proofed, much less terroristproofed. And the expenditures are called for the Y–12 facility, we 

just spent $150 million a year protecting that one plant, and yet 

we couldn’t catch two 70-year-olds and one 80-year-old as they 

breached the perimeter. And as the chairman has quite correctly 

pointed out, it is hard to find that anybody was punished except 

the lowest level guard, and it doesn’t seem like this is a fair way 

to treat a security lapse of this type. 

So I know that time is of the essence, I just want to encourage 

the IG and I appreciate the work of Meserve and Finan to help us 

understand this. But the bottom line is taxpayers need to get results for their dollars. Right now in DOE, it doesn’t seem like we 

are getting those results. Welcome a comment, but I know that 

time is short. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Cooper, are you asking me for a comment? 

I think you have synthesized the high points, several of the high 

points in our reports over time. I might point out that safeguards 

and security, from our perspective, has been a management challenge at the Department of Energy for at least the last decade, so 

this is a continuing problem. And if I may respond subsequently to 

a question from the chairman to General Alston, we have found 

over time that, I think the chairman phrased it exactly correctly, 

that there has been a lack of sustained effort to cure a problem. 

There has been sort of a short-term fix and then the fix, and the 

effort to fix evaporates over time. 

And secondly, if I can, security cannot be a sideline, it has got 

to be integrated into the very essence of a production plant like Y– 

12 and all the other department facilities. So it has to be an integrated approach from the get-go to the end rather than a separate 

function. So I think those are two highlights, and your issue that 
6 

you have highlighted, Mr. Cooper, about costs are ones of course 

that concern us a great deal. 

Mr. COOPER. It shouldn’t just concern us. We paid no telling how 

many tens of hundreds, millions of dollars for cameras at Y–12 that 

didn’t work, and an alarm system that gave off hundreds of false 

alarms a day. Where is the refund from the contractor? You know, 

the best we can tell, people got performance bonuses. Excellent ratings. This is astonishing that the taxpayer got back so little for 

their money, especially in such a secure installation. I thank the 

chairman; I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 

my friend from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank all of you for 

being here. I don’t want to mischaracterize my friend’s comments 

about the 80-year-old nun, it seemed like he kind of did that in a 

rather diminishing way. I understand she was quite spry for 80, 

and that that should be taken into account. When you make the 

comparison about the guards costing about $175,000 a year for taxpayers, I have been looking at the numbers here, and that is about 

what Congress gets paid, and I am afraid the connections and the 

parallels here are a little frightening for someone like myself, because we wonder if maybe we are not all a little bit overpaid. 

It is very easy for us to kind of, as I just did, make little jokes 

about these kinds of things and sort of step back from almost a 

holier-than-thou position. It is easy from an armchair perspective 

to say ‘‘how could this ever happen.’’ And yet in a sense, that is 

a little bit—that is our job here on the committee to try to exert 

some oversight that hopefully will change a culture that has made 

a particular error here in a better direction. 

I know that if we really were all honest with ourselves, we would 

look at this from a much larger perspective. History has been pretty unkind to those who have tried to maintain nuclear security. If 

we had done that well decades ago when we first gained this technology, the Soviets would never have gained that technology and 

there never would have been a Cold War. So, this is not as unprecedented; I think I remember some story where we had to drop one 

of our atomic bombs off the coast out of a plane, I think it is still 

there, years ago. 

These are not as unprecedented as they seem, but because they 

are so serious, it occurs to me that we have to try to back up and 

ask ourselves, why is it that there is this hallmark for us letting 

these kinds of things be so easily secured when the implications 

are so profound? So I guess I am going to ask sort of a question 

for all of the panel members. If there was one thing that you could 

do in this particular instance and in a broader instance of trying 

to help both our civilians infrastructure and our military apparatus 

understand the need for more security when it comes to nuclear 

technology and weapons that have these profound implications, 

what is the one thing, General, I will start with you, that you 

would suggest that we do? Is it a mind-set? Is it a systemic issue? 

What would you postulate? 

General ALSTON. Well, sir, I would tell you that Mr. Augustine 

and I, in particular, and I think Dr. Meserve mentioned it as well, 

but the cultural challenges facing the Department of Energy when 
7 

it comes to a culture that doesn’t segment security, doesn’t segment 

safety, but rather looks at them as all essential to mission as opposed to trade space, that that is a very profound challenge because taking culture on head-on is a very challenging effort. But, 

we found that this, and I have had recent discussions informally 

with people not involved directly with this where security is now 

perceived as, you know, we have to go through the hurt right now. 

And, security is perceived as sapping strength and competing with 

science and other priorities in the Department. 

So I think there is still a long way to go in a pervasive culture 

where every last person that is working in NNSA or the Department of Energy sees security, and safety, and mission, not as separate things that need to be tended to, and prioritized, but rather 

have a common view how important and vital they are and essential every day to mission success. 

Mr. FRANKS. General Finan. 

General FINAN. Well, I would echo what General Alston just said 

and I think that is the primary thing you have to do is work on 

the culture so rather than repeat that, I think given culture as an 

issue that must be addressed, I think the next thing that we have 

to think about is lines of authority. We have to be very clear on 

who is responsible for what. We have to then follow up and give 

the authorities necessary to execute those responsibilities and once 

we do those two things throughout the chain of command, then we 

can hold people accountable. But one of the continuing things that 

NNSA and DOE before it have struggled with was defining roles 

and responsibilities and then giving the appropriate authority to 

execute those responsibilities, and that has been a longstanding 

issue that we really need to straighten out in order to create that 

accountability and ownership of that security mission. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Franks, I concur with what has been said 

previously. And maybe this is too far down in the weeds, but if 

there was, in addition to what has already been said, if there was 

one problem, and I guess it builds on what General Finan just referred to is that we need to be sure that employees at all levels are 

empowered to raise serious issues and that there is a process in 

place to ensure that those issues are, in fact, addressed. I think 

that applies in terms of safety, it certainly applies in terms of security. And it certainly was a problem, a root cause problem we found 

at least with regard to the Y–12 issue and security generally 

throughout the Department of Energy. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 

Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I would like each of the witnesses to take a 

minute and a half and talk about where we are today. This is all 

history; what has been done along the lines, if you know, to carry 

out the recommendations that have been made? We will start with 

the General, General Finan. 

General FINAN. I left NNSA over a month ago, but before I left, 

I can tell you that there was structural changes occurring within 

the security organization so they were in the process of implementing the recommendations to stand up an operationally focused 

organization that would help ensure standardization across the 
8 

fields. They were also in the process of creating standards and criteria for security so that people in the field would know what 

standard they needed to meet and what criteria would be used to 

evaluate them. There were personnel changes that had occurred in 

order to bring in what I call true security expertise. Security is a 

special skill, and we have people throughout this country who have 

those skills, and so we need to seek out those individuals and bring 

them in so that they can bring that skill set to the NNSA. So, that 

was ongoing. So, basically all the recommendations that I had out 

of my reports were being enacted at the time I left. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And Mr. Friedman. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. With regard to the recommendations we made in 

our earlier report, Congressman, we have not received the final departmental position, so we are not—we have heard anecdotal information of what steps have been taken and we are waiting for that 

to occur. In the interim, between our reports, both General Alston 

and his group and General Finan have done their reports. We have 

also issued a report on the contractor assurance system which is 

a system that NNSA has in place to evaluate contractor actions. 

We intend to go back at some point in the future and look at the 

process and determine whether the fixes that have been committed 

to and promised have, in fact, been made. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When is that point in the future? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I guess that is the pointed question I wasn’t prepared to answer. We will—it is a high priority for us because obviously security is essential in a nuclear weapons environment. 

General ALSTON. I left the effort the first week of December, and 

the draft recommendations, which we were exposed to, were not in 

the charter that Secretary Chu had given us, so I don’t think I am 

in a position to comment. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Good. Let me go back to you, Mr. Friedman. 

One of the oversight and review organizations is you, and it would 

seem to me that holding people accountable is what you guys do, 

so I am concerned about your response that at some point in the 

future and so on and so forth. I would like a more precise answer. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 

Mr. Nugent for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Friedman, just to follow up on Mr. 

Garamendi’s question, you do the inspection, you prepare a report, 

you send it to the powers to be, and they are the ones that have 

to make things accountable, am I correct on that? Do you hold 

them accountable, or do the administrators hold their rank and file 

accountable? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, our reports in these instances, Congressman, were sent to the Secretary; it is ultimately the Secretary’s responsibility to hold his subordinates responsible. 

Mr. NUGENT. I would think, General Alston, when you took over 

as related to the incident in the Air Force, were people held accountable at the upper echelons, or was it just the lowest ranking 

folks that are easy picking when something goes wrong, or do you 
9 

look at the culture, which I have heard from all three of you in regards to how things actually occur? 

General ALSTON. Initially, it was just the lower level leadership, 

wing commander, squadron commander, a couple of group commanders, so there were a handful of colonels. Following the installation of the new Secretary and the new chief of staff, I know there 

was a further detailed review, and I am not privy to exactly what 

the actions were. 

From a distance I understand that General Schwartz, as one of 

his initial responsibilities after evaluating how to do accountability 

in these circumstances, taking in stock not just the unauthorized 

movement in the nuclear weapons, but also the incident that involved some components that were opened in a box in Taiwan, that 

the chief of staff then personally dealt with the general officers in 

ways that I am just not personally privy to. 

Mr. NUGENT. You know, in experience, in regards to leading an 

organization, somebody has to be accountable. And typically, when 

you discipline the lower ranks and you mentioned it, there are 

other folks because it is a culture, and all three of you have mentioned that, a culture of really failed leadership within NNSA and 

DOE as it relates to security. How do we—if you were in charge, 

how do you fix that specifically from the IG’s perspective? Where 

does the ball finally end? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. As I alluded to in my earlier comment, Congressman, security cannot be treated as a stepchild, as a side show, it 

has got to be integrated into the process from the very outset. And 

that is one of the key issues that we have found has not been in 

place. You can call that a cultural issue, perhaps that is correct, 

and I think—I would refer to it as a ‘‘tone at the top’’ issue. It has 

to flow down from the highest levels of the Department and permeate and people have to be held accountable. I know that may 

sound like a textbook sort of lessons, but I think that is what needs 

to be done and it seems to me there has been a commitment to 

begin that process. And as I alluded to earlier, sustainability is 

really the issue. We are on a path now, we have anecdotal information that changes have been made, not personnel changes that you 

are referring to, I understand that, but changes have been made 

in the systems. The question is will that be sustained going forward? 

Mr. NUGENT. And it really is buy-in from the leadership. You can 

change systems and you can change policies, but if there is no one 

there to actually make sure that the rank and file are following the 

policies and procedures, nothing gets done from a positive standpoint. So we can talk the game, but at the end of the day how is 

NNSA and DOE actually going to hold the upper-level administrators accountable for the security that is so important to this Nation? How do you suggest that happen? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I think the administrator of NNSA reports 

to the Secretary of Energy under the current format. And ultimately, and obviously there are changes in process as we speak. 

Ultimately, it will be the responsibility of the Secretary to set the 

tone at the top with regard to security, and make sure that his subordinates and his direct reports certainly understand the emphasis 

on security and his desire to ensure that at a subsequent point, he 
10 

can come back to them and receive confirmation that security has 

been treated as a priority. 

Mr. NUGENT. I thank all three of you for your testimony, and I 

think your direction in regards to what the issues are, or more importantly—I mean, you have identified the people that actually 

have to make it happen obviously aren’t here at this point. So 

thank you very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. You know, it is astounding 

to me, we are not talking about an equipment site, we are talking 

about nuclear materials. And I keep hearing this issue about, well, 

it is a culture and we need to have more responsibility up the chain 

of command, nobody is talking about firing anybody. You know, as 

the general said earlier, when the Secretary ran off the Secretary 

of the Air Force and the chief of staff, it got everybody’s attention. 

It seems like nobody is talking about we have to go to those levels 

of responsibility and run somebody off to make sure everybody understands that security is integral, and has got to be a part of the 

system. But, I don’t hear anybody calling for that, but that is just 

me. Mr. Wilson is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here today, and Mr. Friedman, I am an alumnus of Department of Energy, so I appreciate your service there as IG, a very important position. In fact, it is so important, and General Finan, for 

both of you, you refer to an eyes-on/hands-off approach to oversight. 

Can you explain why you flagged this as a concern? Why did this 

contribute to the security failure? And where did this approach 

come from? And what has been done and it has been referenced, 

but what has been done to fix this, beginning with the general? 

General FINAN. Yes, sir. Eyes-on/hands-off was interpreted in the 

security community at NNSA to mean that Federal personnel were 

not really to interact with the contractor in executing security duties, they were only to watch them execute duties. And in many 

cases, not even allowed to interact with the contractor as they accomplished those duties. What that evolved to was basically a completely Federal hands-off policy; that said, in my Federal role, I 

can’t tell the contractor what to do. I can give general directions 

that say, okay you need to secure a site, but the Federal personnel 

then failed to give additional directions that said anything about 

how. Well, nuclear security is absolutely critical, and it is inherently a Federal responsibility, and that means the Federal personnel have a responsibility and a duty to be a little bit more specific, and in fact, tell contractors exactly how to do nuclear security. 

Now there are some variations and things like that, but what 

evolved over time was rather than evaluate—if you ask me to 

evaluate nuclear security, I am going to come up with scenarios 

that I think are significant and then I am going ask the contractor 

to execute them so I can see the contractor execute those duties. 

We took—eyes-on/hands-off took the Federal Government out of 

that role. What it did was it let the contractor decide what scenarios would be evaluated and it was all about contractor selfassessment and Federal oversight was, in fact, diminished. And so 

what happened is we really didn’t have any insight. Federal personnel in NNSA did not have insight into the details of how the 
11 

contractor was executing that mission. And so, that really is eyeson/hands-off and where it evolved to. 

Mr. WILSON. I appreciate your raising that because I am very 

grateful the Savannah River Site is in the district that I represent, 

in Aiken and Barnwell County. And, I have had the opportunity to 

visit so many times, and to see the extraordinary personnel of perimeter security, so I have seen a positive. So it is startling to me 

that something like this could occur. Mr. Friedman. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I associate myself with General Finan’s remarks. 

I think she has characterized it perfectly, but if I can take a 

minute and describe a specific that was in our original findings. 

There were very, very expensive, costly cameras and detection 

equipment at Y–12 that was inoperable for up to 6 months and just 

the backlog of repairs had never been addressed. Now, the local 

Federal officials were aware of it, but they did not feel they were 

empowered because of eyes-on/hands-off essentially, they didn’t feel 

they were empowered to force the contractor to reprioritize the 

work, the maintenance work that was being done to be sure the detection equipment was operating as intended. It was a vital essence, essential part of the perimeter defense mechanism at the 

site. And that is an example of how we have gotten to the point 

where, as I said earlier, we need to empower these individuals to 

ensure if they have a problem like that, number one, they can 

bring it up with the contractor and ensure that the issue is addressed. And number two, if it is not addressed, that it goes to the 

Administrator and that there is appropriate action taken. 

Mr. WILSON. And that is particularly startling because when we 

think of the new technologies, we think of this as better. And so 

I know that your report indicates that there should be periodic indepth reviews of contractor security, and certainly that would include that the equipment is working. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Absolutely. It is vital. There is no excuse as far 

as I am concerned, in an environment such as Y–12, one of the 

most sensitive sites in this Nation, to have equipment inoperable 

and not treat it as a critical priority to get it back on line as quickly as possible. 

Mr. WILSON. And for the protection of the American people, 

again, the new technologies we have should be used to their highest and best use, and I appreciate your efforts, all of you to do this. 

I yield the balance of my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman and the chair now recognizes 

Mr. Lamborn for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of 

you for what you have done to serve and help our country. You can 

all jump in on this question, but General Alston, I want to ask you 

a two-part question. When there was the unauthorized transfer of 

nuclear weapons from Minot to Barksdale, the Air Force really 

drilled down and saw this as a broad issue that had to be addressed, even going so far as to reemphasizing the importance of 

the nuclear mission in the Air Force all the way back to the Air 

Force Academy, which is in my district. So could you address how 

that was done? And then how does that contrast with what is being 

done, if there is a contrast with the Y–12 incident? 
12 

General ALSTON. Well, sir, thank you for that question. What we 

recognized was that the Air Force, having been flying combat missions for such an extended period of time, and with the emerging 

emphasis on irregular warfare, that conventional operations and irregular warfare were elevated in their priority in terms of the way 

the Air Force resourced itself and the tempo and deployments. And 

the price you paid for that was a de-emphasis in the nuclear part 

of our mission set. And, we were born in that strategic attack 

mind-set and capability, but we had lost that focus because of other 

competing priorities. So when we looked at the professional military education for our NCOs and our officers, we reassessed that 

there was insufficient, and, in some cases, very little to non-existent elements of nuclear in those programs so that a broad brush 

was painted across all of our airmen as opposed to just those who 

have nuclear mission responsibilities today, because we felt it was 

important that everyone in the Air Force should have a broad 

sense of what we are about as airmen. 

And so, we attacked that and there was a lot of re-attack as we 

looked and evaluated, looked and evaluated, and changed those 

programs so that we were satisfied the modules on nuclear were 

worthy at that level of education. But we didn’t want to sort of 

cashier or contract out, if you will, strategic deterrence to just the 

nuclear operators; everyone needed to understand the larger context as best we could do. 

Now the whole service was energized in the face of this epic failure, and we considered it an enterprise failure. This was mission 

failure at historic levels for us and we looked at it that way. 

The challenge, I think, with the Y–12 situation is we didn’t necessarily find a pervasive evaluation that this was mission failure 

that could be a wakeup call across the enterprise. The guys at Oak 

Ridge made a very bad mistake, but the guys at Pantex or the guys 

at Savannah River have not made that transgression. So weaknesses that might be systemic in other places with the distance 

that the sites preferred we didn’t witness a strong embrace to say, 

truly, how can we ventilate the deficiencies there and see them 

here. I believe that work took place. I just think that the self-critical capacity can be improved in the NNSA and the Department of 

Energy to make that assessment broad and legitimate. 

Mr. LAMBORN. For either of you other two, General or Inspector 

General? 

General FINAN. I agree with what General Alston stated. And 

when I took a look, I took a look just at the Federal organization 

and the Federal assessment model contained within NNSA, and 

there were structural flaws in both the organization and the assessment model, which is why I recommended a complete change 

in the organizational model and a new assessment model to reach 

out beyond Y–12 to all the other organizations because it does, in 

effect, affect all eight NNSA sites. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Again, I agree with my colleagues at the table, 

I would say that one of our, I think more important recommendations which actually sounds very subtle and may sound actually 

unimportant is that the lessons learned from Y–12, and it was a 

tremendous wakeup call because Mr. Cooper described the three intruders, they could have been three people who were armed in a 
13 

different way and had malicious intent, and could have been a real 

tragedy, so we had a tremendous wakeup call. Our point—one of 

the points we made was that it is important that the lessons 

learned from Y–12 be exported throughout the entire Department 

of Energy complex, so that we are in a mode of preventing this sort 

of thing from happening again, not just simply reacting, should it 

occur in another location. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair now recognizes Mr. Veasey for 5 minutes. 

You know, the point you just made goes back to what I said earlier, and that is, we have learned some real lessons at Y–12, but 

apparently, we have been hearing this call for these changes for a 

long time. The thing I want to assure the folks who are listening 

to this is this committee is not going to let this go, the DOE and 

NNSA are going to fix this problem going forward in a meaningful 

way. And until they do, we are going to make them wish they had. 

So this is not going away. We are—does the ranking member have 

any more comments? 

We are about to be called for votes, I want to thank our witnesses for their time and their energy and attention, and we appreciate you and we will go into recess now for our votes and bring 

our second panel back up after votes. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I would like to call this hearing of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces back to order. And apologize 

for the delay, but our votes are over for the day. And I thank our 

panelists for hanging around and look forward to their comments. 

I do want to thank you for your time and energy in preparing 

for this hearing. I know it takes a lot of time and effort, but you 

know it is important to us that you have done it. So thank you for 

that. 

What I would like to do, your full statements have been submitted for the record. Jim and I both read them, the ranking member and I have both read them, but I would like to ask each one 

of you to take about a minute and synopsize the content of your 

opening statement, and then we will just go directly to questions, 

for time sake. 

Oh, I am sorry. Didn’t introduce the witnesses. I thought I had 

done that earlier. We first have Secretary Daniel Poneman and 

Honorable Neile Miller. She is the Acting Administrator, and Principal Deputy Administrator for the NNSA. 

Secretary Poneman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL B. PONEMAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND 

HON. NEILE L. MILLER, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR AND PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL B. PONEMAN 

Secretary PONEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. We are grateful for 

the invitation to appear before you today to provide the subcommittee details on the actions the Department has taken or will 
14 

take to strengthen the security of the nuclear weapons complex in 

the wake of the July 2012 Y–12 incident. We appreciate the interest and engagement of this committee and recognize the important 

oversight role that you fulfill. 

The Secretary and I recognize the severity of the problem that 

led to this point and we have acted swiftly to identify and address 

the issues it revealed. Since the Y–12 incident, several major actions have taken place to improve security immediately and for the 

long term, and I will just mention, in deference to your request, 

Mr. Chairman, just a few. 

We restructured the contracts at Y–12 to integrate security into 

the line of command of the M&O [management and operations] 

contractor. The protective force contractor was terminated and a 

new M&O contractor has been selected to manage the Y–12 site, 

providing an opportunity for new leadership and to improve Y–12 

security culture. We held accountable both the senior Federal and 

contractor management personnel at headquarters and at the site, 

removing them from their positions. The Department’s Chief of 

Health, Safety, and Security [HSS] conducted an independent security inspection of the Y–12 security operations, including rigorous 

force-on-force performance testing, as well as no-notice and shortnotice limited scope performance testing activities as directed by 

the Secretary, and they will be conducting a follow-up review in 

April. 

The Secretary also directed HSS to conduct immediate extent of 

condition assessments of all Category 1 sites across the DOE complex to identify any immediate security issues and to follow up 

with full security inspections, including force-on-force exercises, to 

assure effective security measures are being implemented at those 

sites. NNSA conducted an immediate after-action report to identify 

causes, followed by the report, which I know you have heard about 

this morning, from General Finan. The former Deputy Administrator tasked General Finan with reviewing the Federal NNSA security organizational structure and security oversight model. And 

you have heard about her recommendations, which we are implementing, so we can talk further about that during your questions. 

Finally, we had an independent group—actually they were individuals, all of whom have distinguished, long careers in national 

security and in nuclear matters. Each one provided thoughtful advice on the DOE’s nuclear security structure, specifically all Category 1 nuclear facilities, and we are now reviewing and discussing 

their advice on how to improve security at Y–12 and across the nuclear enterprise. 

So in conclusion, the series of personnel and management 

changes that I have described today have been made to provide effective security at the Y–12 site and across the DOE complex. We 

are working to carry out the structural and cultural changes required to secure all Category 1 nuclear materials at this and all of 

our facilities. Our management principles hold that our mission is 

vital and urgent. Nowhere is that more true than here. 

The security of our Nation’s nuclear material and technology is 

a core responsibility of the Department in support of the President 

and in defense of the Nation. The incident at Y–12 was unacceptable and served as an important wakeup call for our entire com-
15 

plex. The Department is taking aggressive actions to ensure the reliability of our nuclear security programs across the entire DOE enterprise, and will continue to do so. 

In that effort, the Department looks forward to working with this 

subcommittee, sir, to ensure the security of the Nation’s nuclear 

materials. And, Acting Administrator Miller and I would be very 

pleased to answer any questions from you and members of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Poneman can be found in 

the Appendix on page 101.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Ms. Miller, did you have an opening statement? 

Ms. MILLER. No, sir. Mr. Poneman is giving the statement. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Well, thank you. And, I will start off with 

the questionings for Secretary Poneman. 

As Deputy Secretary for the Department of Energy, you talked 

about this being unacceptable, and you just made some reference 

to some corrective actions, and you talked about how you have now 

completed an integration in the line of chain of command with a 

new contractor. What is different in this line of chain of command? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Okay. At the time of the incident, Mr. 

Chairman, there were two separate contracts at the site. One was 

the overall management operations contract for the site. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. You are talking about the line of chain 

among the contractors, not within the Department. Have you altered that in any way? That once the contractor notifies the Department of anything, good or bad, has the chain from that contact 

person up the stream been modified at all? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Yes. But the way the contract is structured 

affects it. But I will go right to the part you asked. One of the 

things that General Finan found in her report was that there was 

lack of clarity, that the organization known as NA–70 for nuclear 

security was exercising some authority in line management over 

security activities at the site, as was activities under our infrastructure and operations, the so-called double zero. That was confusing. We have ended that. We have made it very clear that the 

line management must go down from the Administrator through 

the Infrastructure and Operations Office. And that has removed 

the security organization, NA–70, from that. 

NA–70’s role has been clarified so that their role is to develop the 

plans, it is a staffing function, and then to evaluate the performance. That had the additional change in the field, Mr. Chairman, 

that the evaluation of performance under the contract was no 

longer done by the field Feds, which was creating, in General 

Finan’s review, too close of a situation between the people on the 

site, between the contractor and the Fed. 

And so I think we have really clarified it, but the other fact that 

actually bears on this as well is there was also confusion that was 

created by having these two separate contracts at the site, and we 

have immediately folded the Proforce [protective force] security 

boots-on-the-ground contract under the M&O contract, just to clarify. 
16 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Under this new structure, if we were to have 

another incident, who would be the ultimate person responsible for 

security at that Y–12 site? 

Secretary PONEMAN. The line management is always responsible, 

going straight down from the Secretary down through the NNSA 

Administrator. 

Mr. ROGERS. Walk me through it. Secretary—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. Deputy Secretary, NNSA Administrator, the 

director of the Federal site for the NNSA, and then it goes straight 

from that person to the senior contract official. 

Mr. ROGERS. And that was not the case when this incident occurred? 

Secretary PONEMAN. There was confusion because there were directives that were coming out of the NA–70 organization that could 

have been confusing in terms of where the accountability was from 

the perspective of the people at the site. 

Mr. ROGERS. Aside from the contract with the contractor being 

terminated, which it was about to expire anyway, you mentioned 

that responsible people were reassigned. You put removed from 

their responsibilities, but they weren’t fired. Why weren’t they 

fired? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Sir, the first thing we had to do in the incident was we, as you have said many times, hold the people accountable. So we did that both at the site and at the headquarters. 

The top three officials at the headquarters responsible for nuclear 

security were removed from those positions. The top two relevant 

officials on the Federal side at the site were removed from their positions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why weren’t they fired, though? Why were they just 

removed? This is a nuclear facility. 

Secretary PONEMAN. That is true, sir. There are additional disciplinary actions that have been underway. We have due process 

and various procedural safeguards that occur in our system, and 

those are now being pursued. But the important thing in terms of 

protecting the nuclear material was to get those people out of that 

line. Most of them are out of the NNSA entirely. And in addition, 

we ensured that people at the contractor level knew they had lost 

our confidence. And the top two officials responsible at Y–12 on the 

contractor side were also removed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, you know, you heard me earlier talk about 

Secretary Gates. He fired the Secretary of the Air Force and the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force when he had a similar incident. I 

think that is the model. Do you disagree that should be the model 

in how we respond to serious security violations at important facilities like this? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I certainly agree, Mr. Chairman, that accountability is absolutely crucial. I am not deeply intimate with the 

details of the 2007 Air Force incident. I have the highest regard for 

Secretary Gates. But I think the principles that he described in 

terms of accountability are very much ones that we share. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I would hope so, and I would hope you start 

reflecting those going forward, because that is the kind of action 

that sends a clear message that these lapses in security will not 

be tolerated, because the other factor here is this has been going 
17 

on for 10 years. We have had study after study after study. So, 

frankly, the folks at the top of the food chain really should have 

known about this before it happened and shouldn’t have been allowing it to happen. 

But with that, I will turn to my ranking member, Mr. Cooper, 

for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the witnesses. 

I am sorry we have to be here, because this incident never should 

have happened. 

You say that you are for accountability, but wasn’t the main contractor there, Babcock & Wilcox, still able to receive 60 percent of 

its award fee, or $36 million, right after the incident happened? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Mr. Chairman, the way that—— 

Mr. COOPER. I am not the chairman. I am the ranking member. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Oh. Sorry. Mr. Ranking Member. The award 

fee under the terms of the contract—and I think it is a very fair 

question to pursue how we structure these in terms of compensation, I think that is an absolutely fair point—the only amount of 

fee that was available for security was zeroed out. So that was removed from the contract. 

The way they got to the 40 percent reduction of fee was by taking all of that and then going beyond that. There are other things 

happening at the site in terms of naval reactor fuel, in terms of directed stockpile work, and so forth. And the way that the contract 

is structured, the fee is bucketed. And we took the fee that was 

available to take away, away, and that was a series that we have 

actually followed up in subsequent incidents also seeking to claw 

back fee, because we agree the American people should not be paying for underperformance when it comes to security. 

Mr. COOPER. And how much of the fee do you expect to claw 

back? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Well, the numbers that you have cited 

there, there is 40 percent in the episode at Y–12 for the contract. 

Mr. COOPER. But I thought you said there were further efforts 

going on. 

Secretary PONEMAN. There was a $10 million fee that was clawed 

back for another episode elsewhere in the complex. 

Mr. COOPER. But immediately prior to the incident, your agency 

in its wisdom had given Babcock & Wilcox an excellent rating for 

its safeguards and security work, and they received their full $51 

million incentive fee in fiscal year 2011, even though, as has been 

testified to, the cameras weren’t working on a wholesale basis, took 

months and months to ever do repairs. Why do they get their entire incentive fee right prior to the incident? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, this flags exactly one of the 

deficiencies in the structure that preceded this incident, because 

there was, as again General Finan’s report I think makes very 

clear, a tendency to not have the boots-on-the-ground analysis and 

review, but to have the evaluation based on what the contractor 

said, and then have an on-paper review. That is why separating 

that role out from the site and putting it into the nuclear security 

organization at headquarters would hopefully correct that. 

We did not see the things in advance the way we should have. 

Obviously, had we seen those things in advance, we would have re-
18 

placed all 62 cameras ahead of time. I am hoping, and I believe 

that both the organizational and the cultural changes that we are 

going to institute pursuant to the Finan report will prevent this 

kind of thing from happening in the future. 

Mr. COOPER. With all due respect, it doesn’t sound to me like you 

are taking responsibility, because aren’t you the Deputy Secretary 

and haven’t you been the Deputy Secretary for some time? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Yes, sir. And from the moment I heard 

about this incident, I have been doing everything I can in every dimension to make sure that nothing like this ever happens again. 

I do feel deeply responsible. 

Mr. COOPER. You have been doing everything you can, and the 

questions to my colleague, Ms. Sanchez, were submitted 5 months 

after the hearing testimony? The copy we got, you needlessly duplicated one question twice. Doesn’t look like much effort was put into 

this. And I know this is just an exchange of paper, but—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman—— 

Mr. COOPER. Do you feel like you are taking responsibility? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Yes, sir, I do. I take responsibility for everything that happens in the Department and I am—— 

Mr. COOPER. Has your pay been reduced? Are you threatened in 

any way? What sanctions have you faced? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, I am doing everything I can 

to address the problem, and I will do that as long as I am in this 

position. And I will be very open to working with this committee 

and all others to make sure that nothing like this can ever happen 

again. 

Mr. COOPER. But meanwhile, as the inspector general told us in 

his testimony, your Department is spending about a billion dollars 

a year securing various facilities, hiring 4,000 guard personnel 

through various devices, and in some places it is one prime contract, in some cases it is split two primes, and in some places it 

is a subcontract. There seems to be no rhyme or reason to this. But 

if you divide, you know, the salary component of that, $700 million 

by the 4,000 employees, that’s $175,000 per guard. Where is this 

money going and what results are we getting for this? That is a 

lot of money, and my guess is the guards aren’t actually being paid 

nearly that much. Who is making the difference? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, there are a number—I don’t 

have the exact calculation you have before you—there are a number of both physical assets in terms of huge facilities with thick 

walls, BearCats and various perimeter fences and various security 

systems, all of which requires an investment. 

But to be clear, the money itself is not going to solve the problem 

if we don’t have the clarity in the lines of responsibility and in the 

authorities that go with it and, frankly, the cultural shift that is 

required to go with it. It is not a problem that will be solved by 

dollars. And the dollars that are invested in it are very important, 

because we need to get the assets, both the human assets and the 

physical assets, but that’s only part of the problem. 

Mr. COOPER. Trust me, I am not suggesting spending more 

money. I am asking what value the taxpayer got for this extraordinary outlay over many years. And this is, according to your own 

IG, money spent on employee compensation. 
19 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, we have large, large quantities of both highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, all 

of which is extraordinarily sensitive. That material is very, very 

well defended. It is of absolute paramount importance. 

Mr. COOPER. It’s well defended when an 82-year-old nun got into 

Y–12? How can you possibly say that? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, the episode that occurred, as 

we have repeatedly testified in this and the prior hearing, is absolutely unacceptable. It is a wakeup call. There are several—— 

Mr. COOPER. Then how can you say it was well defended? It was 

not well defended. That is why we are having this hearing. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, what I am trying to say is 

that there are a number of additional layers of security. It is unacceptable that they penetrated the perimeter fence. That is unacceptable, a wakeup call. We are taking the appropriate actions. The 

concertina wire is around it. There are other additional layers, including, you know, military-style forces, including various physical 

impediments. And I can assure you that there are many more layers that are defending that very, very sensitive material. 

Mr. COOPER. So we really had nothing to worry about. There 

were many more layers of security left and it was all fine. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, that is not at all what I am 

saying. You have heard us from day one, Secretary Chu and I have 

been consistent, this was unacceptable. And, it is a shocking breach 

of the security that we thought was in place. 

That having been said, your specific question went to the actual 

material itself, and I am only saying, not that there is any reason 

for complacency, far from it, quite the opposite, but to say that we 

do have additional measures of protection that is needed for that 

material. It is unacceptable what happened, and we have to make 

sure that that part gets fixed as well. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, in all due respect to the witness, it 

still does not sound like he is really taking responsibility for this. 

Secretary PONEMAN. I want to be very clear, Congressman. I accept responsibility for this. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, what punishment have you suffered for it? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I am working—— 

Mr. COOPER. Other than attending this hearing? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I am working on this problem, sir, as hard 

as I can. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 

the former chairman of this subcommittee, Mr. Turner of Ohio, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Poneman, I want to thank you for your efforts to try 

to address this. I happen to know that you are a very hands-on 

Secretary, you and I having worked together on an issue with respect to the Mound facility. I was very impressed by the fact that 

you do rise to a very hands-on level. So that’s why I think this 

whole problem leaves most of us scratching our head, wondering: 

where are we and why do we have this circumstance? 

So I am going to ask you a couple questions that I think frame 

the topic in the level of oversight where we have concerns. So I am 
20 

going to ask you a broad, basic question. Is there ever a situation 

where a security failure at one of the facilities protecting our nuclear infrastructure would result in the termination of an employee 

of DOE or NNSA due to their performance? 

Secretary PONEMAN. It could, sir. What we can do—— 

Mr. TURNER. I am sorry. So the answer then is yes? 

Secretary PONEMAN. The—— 

Mr. TURNER. Because it’s a pretty direct question. I am not asking you is it in the realm of possibilities. I am asking you, is there 

ever a situation where a security failure at one of our—the protection of one of our nuclear facilities would result in the termination 

of an employee of DOE or NNSA due to performance? It’s a yesor-no question. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, if—it depends—— 

Mr. TURNER. There is no ‘‘depend.’’ It is like a—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. No. 

Mr. TURNER. Because it already says ‘‘ever’’, so ‘‘ever’’ encompasses the whole scope—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Of possibilities. Is there ever a situation? 

Secretary PONEMAN. It could, yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Yes. Okay. 

Now, in taking that broad statement where you have acknowledged that there is a situation where a failure could result in termination due to performance, I am then going to ask you the next 

step of that, because I am not just asking your opinion, because 

you are actually—you know, you are in the chain of—line of command here of understanding the execution of this. 

So would one of those situations be where all of the safeguards 

were down, where someone could get all the way into one of our 

buildings, and nobody does? What I am asking you in this, and I 

am going to be clear, we had a breach where people actually got 

all the way into this building. Right? All the way to the building. 

Secretary PONEMAN. To the building, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. That is what I am saying, to the building. Is there 

ever a situation where someone would lose their job for performance where no one penetrated, there was no breach, but the safeguards were down that would have permitted it? Because that is 

certainly what I would consider to the level of a failure of performance. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, what I can’t do is answer a 

hypothetical. It depends on—— 

Mr. TURNER. It is not hypothetical. It really is very, very clear. 

You have a job that has no margin of an error: protect these facilities. Right? And we only can protect these situations through the 

application of technology operated by people. And the people were, 

you know, we’re subject to their performance as to whether or not 

it works. 

So if someone isn’t performing and the system is down, even if 

there is no breach, but it is their responsibility and their fault that 

the system is down and someone could get all the way—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. Right. 
21 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. When I say ‘‘into,’’ I mean touch the 

building, not inside the building, is that enough for someone to be 

terminated due to performance? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Sir—— 

Mr. TURNER. Because I think, this committee thinks that if we 

have an agency that is governmental that has the responsibility for 

protecting these facilities and we have a system where those in 

charge think that you don’t even have to do your job to keep your 

job, then we don’t have something that is working. So it is a simple 

question. If the system goes down where someone could go in and 

touch the side of the building and no one does, it is not a real 

breach but the system has come down due to their performance, is 

that the type of lack of performance that should result in termination? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I can tell you that can and has resulted in 

removal from position. 

Mr. TURNER. So the answer is yes? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I said removal from position. That is what 

we did. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, that is not termination. 

Secretary PONEMAN. And that gets into a level of law and due 

process—— 

Mr. TURNER. So you are testifying before this committee today 

that if the entire security system of our nuclear infrastructure facilities went down on the perimeter of a building that allowed 

someone to go in and it was a result of their performance, it is not 

a terminable offense—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. I did not say that—— 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Under your agency? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I did not say that, sir. I said we can remove 

them—— 

Mr. TURNER. Then please tell me the opposite—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. I am telling you—— 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Because that has to be true. It has to 

be that it would result in someone losing their job. If not, we need 

to pass a law here. We need to, like, stop doing oversight and actually do legislation, because if you don’t have performance to be able 

to protect the facility, then we don’t really have protection, we don’t 

have security. Is it a terminable offense—terminate-able offense? 

Secretary PONEMAN. You and I are both lawyers. You are asking 

a technical legal question. I want to make sure I am absolutely accurate—— 

Mr. TURNER. If you don’t have clarity on this, then I think that 

this committee needs to put something in our next piece of legislation that absolutely makes it clear that if, due to the performance 

of individuals, that the security system fails, that it would be an 

offense resulting in termination, because that clarity, I think, certainly is with the American public. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, as I told Chairman Rogers 

and as I told you when you were chairman of this committee, we 

are always ready to work with you and with this committee to 

make sure we have the right kind of laws in place. I am not trying 

to be evasive. We moved the people out of the positions. There are 

due process protections. And if we can come back to it in more de-
22 

tail, there may be a very simple yes/no answer, but I am not acting 

as a lawyer today, and I don’t want to give you an inaccurate—— 

Mr. TURNER. I wasn’t asking you a lawyer question, I was asking 

you a scope of responsibility and authority question. I mean—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. And in that, I am very confident—— 

Mr. TURNER. It shouldn’t require lawyers to understand whether 

or not, if there is a failure of performance to that level, that that 

would be an offense for which there would be termination. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

I am going to clarify with the Secretary. Is the due process you 

are talking about, is that the union contract? 

Secretary PONEMAN. No. I am talking about the procedural due 

process that any Federal employee is entitled to when he is facing 

some—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, they can have that due process in response to 

their termination, can’t they? I mean, you terminate them, and 

then they have got the due process to appeal it—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. We have to—— 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. And try to fight that termination. But 

it just seems to me like you are claiming that they have got a right 

to go through all this before you can terminate them. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Well, what we can do and what we did do, 

Mr. Chairman, was remove these people from the responsibility for 

anything having to do with security immediately, pending finding 

out what further disciplinary action was available, and that disciplinary action is subject to due process. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I am a recovering attorney, too. I think that 

due process would not impede firing people who would let an 82- 

year-old woman get into a nuclear facility. 

But having said that, the chairman recognizes the gentleman 

from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I share the chagrin 

of the former chairman and the current chairman. It seems to me 

that with the breaches that occurred, that there should have been 

terminations. Just shifting persons around doesn’t really achieve 

the level of accountability of something as extraordinarily important. And I have the perception of having actually worked at the 

Savannah River Site, and so by working there, I actually had a 

good feeling about the perimeter security, the persons who were 

monitoring and indeed acting, and I felt secure. And I know that 

the people who worked there, lived there, raised their families 

there, retire there feel secure. 

But I am concerned that I have also seen studies that there is 

a culture with DOE, with NNSA that has not stressed security. 

And so how can we reassure people who live in these communities 

that indeed a culture of lack of appreciation of security is being addressed? 

Secretary PONEMAN. It is a great question, Congressman. You 

can reassure them by saying that the top three security officials at 

the headquarters responsible for Y–12 at that time were removed 

from their positions, that the two top Federal officials at the site 

were removed from their positions, that the contractor that actually 

had the boots-on-the ground professional force was terminated full 
23 

out, that the top two officials at the management and operations 

facility, they were also retired and taken out of the picture. Everybody in that chain of command, from the individual responders and 

to the senior officials responsible for security specifically at that 

site, were removed. 

At the same time, that would not be enough. We have undertaken the organizational and structural changes, we have replaced 

all the cameras, we have put concertina wire around the whole facility, all the Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) improvements, the central alarm station has been upgraded. All of the things we should have known about but found 

out about through this unfortunate and terrible incident, we have 

taken those steps. So I do think that the American people can take 

assurance from that. 

Mr. WILSON. Administrator Miller. 

Ms. MILLER. I just support what the Deputy Secretary has said. 

First and foremost, culture is going to be affected by the leadership 

and management and their attitudes toward security, safety, and 

everything else that we do. And we are looking very hard and have 

been making serious changes within the NNSA to directly address 

leadership and management issues as they affect security, safety, 

and everything else we do. 

Mr. WILSON. And I am equally concerned that there seems to be 

a lot of reliance on self-assessment by contractors, that the overseers are depending on the contractors. Is that being changed? 

Secretary PONEMAN. That is being addressed, sir. And I think 

that did contribute to the problems that we faced before. General 

Finan’s recommendation is, we believe, a sound one, which is to 

start with the basis of the contractor’s assessment, but then instead of having that assessed in the field where there is a possibility of the Feds being too close to the contractors, that function 

is being clearly vested in the headquarters organization, the NA– 

70 organization, and then that is going to be further subject to further overview by the Health, Safety, and Security Office. 

Mr. WILSON. And, Ms. Miller. 

Ms. MILLER. Yeah. I would like to also emphasize, we have the 

sites now reporting directly to the Administrator, and in this way, 

we expect security, as well as other things, but security to be a 

clear line of accountability from the Administrator through to the 

site manager, the sites, as the implementers of the policy that the 

security policy organization, that the Deputy Secretary was just referring to, those policies and orders that they issue are then— 

which is their responsibility, and it is also their responsibility to 

assess the performance of the sites in implementing those orders— 

is just as clear that the line of accountability for implementing it 

at the site goes directly from the site to the Administrator. 

Mr. WILSON. And related to that is, there was the recommendation that headquarters staff visit sites and rotate between the sites. 

And is that being done? 

Ms. MILLER. Headquarters staff is now both in the implementing 

side, as well as in the policy and assessment side, regularly scheduled and going to sites. And as well as the rotations are, we have 

put this in throughout the NNSA. We are very conscious of the fact 
24 

that people staying in one place for too long may lead to people becoming complacent. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you both. And I do know that when the 

headquarters staff visits, it creates an extraordinary level of attention. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes my friend and colleague from Arizona, 

Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Poneman, I want to try to get three questions in here, 

if I can quickly. First, I have had the opportunity to see hearings 

on this before, some in a private setting, and so I have probably 

already expressed the commensurate level of bewilderment. And, 

you know, I don’t seek to patronize anyone to remind us all that 

the materials that are kept in these facilities are, you know, are 

highly technically challenging to create, and yet to weaponize them 

is a much lesser difficulty technologically to do. So, I mean, the implications here are pretty profound, and I think everyone knows 

that. 

I guess quickly one question I wanted to ask. It seems like the 

contractors that had reported these lapses in safety precautions 

were treated very differently than those they reported to, who in 

some cases ignored their warnings. Is that your perspective? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I am not sure, Congressman, I am tracking 

which contractors you are referring—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, the contractors, on-the-ground contractors 

that were there that were watching the cameras. I am told that 

there was a significant reporting on their behalf prior to these incidents, saying, you know, that we had some technical challenges 

and that we really weren’t up to—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. Yes, sir. Some of those deficiencies had been 

earlier noted in earlier reports. That is true. 

Mr. FRANKS. And yet they were, you know, handled pretty roughly, it sounds like, and the folks that they reported to weren’t. And 

I will leave that there, sir, because I want to get to another. 

The previous panel emphasized sort of the line of responsibility. 

And I think that that is something that is almost ubiquitous 

throughout the entire human dynamic. You know, somebody has 

got to have responsibility. Everybody’s responsibility is nobody’s responsibility. But it appears to me that DOE and the NNSA have 

not really addressed that effectively within NNSA, because DOE 

continues to have an oversight office under HSS, and NNSA now 

has a split security between an office responsible for policy and 

oversight and another office that is responsible for program execution. 

And I am just wondering, how do all these DOE offices ensure 

that there is accountability for making sure that the security program is properly executed at these DOE sites? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Okay. So I now understand the first part, 

and I will just say very quickly, both contractors involved had their 

leadership removed. So they both paid the appropriate accountability price, just on that first part of your question. And I know 

you wanted to get to the second one. 
25 

On the second one, it is a very good question, and as you just 

heard the Acting Administrator say, we believed that part of the 

problem here, as General Finan pointed out, was that there was 

this confusion. The clarity of the line management down through 

this infrastructure and operations, that’s the line management. 

They are responsible for execution. They had to take away the interference with that line management was coming out of the NA– 

70 nuclear security organization. So they just make the plans and 

evaluate it, but that is all inside NNSA. And so to have a further 

check, because these materials are so sensitive and do need to be 

secure, is to have a check on the check by having HSS perform an 

outside independent oversight role outside of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration. 

Mr. FRANKS. But just a yes or no quickly. Is it your testimony 

before this committee that the line of responsibility, that any ambiguities there have been dealt with? 

Secretary PONEMAN. We are in the process of implementing General Finan’s recommendations. I would like to come back to this 

committee when I can tell you that we feel like—— 

Mr. FRANKS. To me, Mr. Chairman, that seems seminal to this 

whole discussion. 

Secretary PONEMAN. We agree. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me shift gears quickly, and I will ask both of 

you, because I will run out of time here and you both can answer 

the question still. When you think about these potential breaches 

of security in the future, you know, there are all kinds of issues out 

there, and I am just wondering one specific question, and I would 

welcome you to mention any others that are on your mind. But, 

you know, there is a significant increase in technology across the 

world with intentional electromagnetic interference, or these EMP 

[electromagnetic pulse] device capability, which seems to me that 

it could really put these facilities at risk, and even further, you 

know, the potential of a major EMP event, either geomagnetic disturbance or a high-altitude nuclear burst. 

Can you tell me, are we protecting our critical defense apparatus 

like the Y–12 facility against these three prongs of EMP: the E1, 

E2, and E3? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman Franks, I am well aware of 

your thought leadership on this challenge. I have talked to former 

Secretary Jim Schlesinger and Mr. Ikle, may he rest in peace, and 

what I am here to tell you is that we are very focused on addressing all of those kinds of threats, which don’t, as you well know, affect only Y–12, but frankly everything, far, far beyond that. We 

would love to work more closely with you on this subject. The executive orders and the Presidential Directive 21 that the President 

just issued addressed exactly this kind of problem. It is something 

that is a huge problem. It is going to take a lot of work to get into 

a safe place, but we are very focused on it, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Before I go to Mr. Garamendi, I want to clarify. You stated a 

minute ago that you are in the process of implementing General 

Finan’s findings. That is just at NNSA, that is not at DOE. What 
26 

are you doing at DOE to deal with the problem that Mr. Franks 

just addressed? 

Secretary PONEMAN. The problem that Mr. Franks just addressed 

actually goes well beyond NNSA and will require various parts of 

our organization, including our Chief Information Officer, which 

has technical capacity to deal with the EMP issues. 

Mr. ROGERS. No, no. I am talking about his earlier issue dealing 

with the chain of command on reports by the contractor—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. Okay. 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. Of deficiencies that are not being remedied. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Mr. Chairman, those issues are among 

those that have been addressed by what we call the three wise 

men, of whom you had one here testifying this morning. We are 

having internal discussions precisely on this question of how to 

make sure that the larger DOE organization works effectively in 

ensuring the same kind of oversight that we are talking about inside of NNSA, because as you know, Mr. Chairman, there is some 

Category 1 material that is outside of the NNSA and we have to 

make sure it is all well protected. 

One thing that has been done is there was some confusion as between overall directives that are departmental-wide and those directives that are specific to NNSA. General Finan’s recommendation, which we are following, says we need to be clear that the 

DOE directives are those that are binding is the baseline. Anything 

beyond that, because of the special needs and requirements of 

NNSA, should be done as only a way to augment or strengthen and 

should not be any way to confuse or distract from the overall directive that governs the whole Department. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman, Mr. Garamendi, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the testimony both of you have given, and I was 

reading your testimony also. While you have explained verbally 

and in some writing the organizational structure, it is not clear to 

me exactly how that chain of command and organizational structure is actually in place; therefore, I would appreciate it if you 

could deliver to our committee staff a detailed organizational 

chart—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. With the accompanying job descriptions. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Happy do it, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think that would be helpful, at least for me, 

to understand the words that you have said and how it works out. 

From the previous questions asked, it is not just within the NNSA, 

it is also within the Department and the organizational structure 

therein. So if you would do that, I would appreciate it. 

Secretary PONEMAN. We would be very happy to provide this. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 117.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That would at least allow me the opportunity to 

understand more completely your testimony. And I thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 
27 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

I want to follow up. We heard in the earlier panel of all the studies over the years. Why do you think it is that these longstanding, 

well-documented deficiencies in security at this particular facility 

were allowed to go on so long? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Well, the things that we have found since 

the episode, Mr. Chairman, were that, even though some of these 

things were noticed, that our internal reporting chain was broken, 

was the phrase that I think was used in some of the reviews. And 

so you can rest assured that if we had known what was actually 

the situation on the ground—— 

Mr. ROGERS. So you weren’t aware of any of those studies from 

2002, 2005—— 

Secretary PONEMAN. Well, I thought you were asking specifically 

about the—— 

Mr. ROGERS. No. I am talking about the 10 years, the 4 studies 

over 10 years, with General Finan’s been the most recent. The 

three prior to that, were you aware of those studies and their findings? 

Secretary PONEMAN. After the—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Mies, yeah. 

Secretary PONEMAN. After the Y–12 episode, I became aware. I 

actually—— 

Mr. ROGERS. So before that, you weren’t aware of them? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Well, the one study I was aware of, and I 

don’t know if this is one of the ones that you are referring to, I 

helped former Senator Baker and Mr. Hamilton look at the episode 

of the lost hard drive at Los Alamos, and I was aware of that one. 

And the thing that we found there was, in fact, the same kind of 

problem of division of the security mission from the line organization was a source of challenge. What I did not realize was that that 

particular problem was still persisting to the degree that it obviously was. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why? Why were you not aware? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I was not aware that the cultural and sort 

of the situation at Y–12, which we found out post hoc, was occurring at the time, because it had not come to my attention. I can 

assure you if it had, I would have acted. 

Mr. ROGERS. Who do you think should have reported that to you? 

These were general officers who were doing these studies, very 

high ranking, important, thoughtful people who were making these 

reports. Were they just to be put on the shelf or were they to be 

given to policymakers who could implement changes? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I would have to know, sir, which studies you 

are referring to and if they were done during—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Mies in 2005, for example. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Yeah. Sir—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Who should have told you about that? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I don’t know who would have told me about 

a 2005 report. 

Mr. ROGERS. Should Ms. Miller have told you about it? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Sir, it was a 2005 report, and I just don’t 

know what happens in terms of the shelf life of these reports and 

when they get repeatedly briefed. We are responding to the respon-
28 

sibilities we have got. Anything that we have done to look at the 

problem, we obviously have to be fully accountable for. It is always, 

always a good thing to go back and see what has been done 

through time. That is why when this episode happened, we did look 

at those reports and we found a number of things that need to be 

addressed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Let me ask this. Ms. Miller, who do you report to 

on security matters? Who is your immediate superior? 

Ms. MILLER. My immediate superior is the Deputy Secretary. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Were you aware of Admiral Mies’ study? 

Ms. MILLER. I became aware of Admiral Mies’ study. I joined the 

NNSA in 2010. 

Mr. ROGERS. 2010. 

Ms. MILLER. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ROGERS. And when you arrived in 2010, how long was it before you became aware of Admiral Mies’ study? 

Ms. MILLER. I knew of Admiral Mies’ study a little bit before 

then. I did not become aware of the contents of it for probably the 

first year that I was there. 

Mr. ROGERS. And so you knew about it by 2011, midyear. 

Ms. MILLER. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ROGERS. Did you take any action to inform Secretary 

Poneman that you have a cultural problem that has got to be addressed? 

Ms. MILLER. I did not take any actions to inform Secretary 

Poneman. I did begin to take actions within the NNSA to address 

cultural problems that, again, affect—— 

Mr. ROGERS. What actions specifically? Did you fire anybody? 

Ms. MILLER. No. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. Let me ask this. 

Ms. MILLER. There were no firing offenses. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chief of security for DOE has been there for 20 

years. Clearly, given these studies that I have referred to—and 

what were they? The Commission on Science and Security did one 

in 2002, Admiral Mies in 2005. And, yeah, there was a couple others we went through in our earlier panel. But my point is, so your 

chief of security clearly should have been handed a copy of those 

studies, wouldn’t you think, Secretary Poneman? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Presumably when they came out, that 

would have happened. 

Mr. ROGERS. That would have been on his watch to know we 

have got an installation under my domain of responsibility and we 

now have a study that says there is problems. Would that make 

sense, that he would get a copy of it? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I would presume that all of those studies 

you referred to were reported to the Department contemporaneously. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah. Would you turn your microphone on, please? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Sorry. I would assume, sir, that those reports when they came out would have been reported to the Department contemporaneously. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. And the person, the relevant person would 

have been the chief of security, wouldn’t it be? 
29 

Secretary PONEMAN. It certainly would have been relevant. Of 

course, the organization was different at that time, and I—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it doesn’t matter. Chief of security is over security over all your installations. Isn’t that correct? The DOE chief 

of security. 

Secretary PONEMAN. What I am saying is I don’t know who was 

the chief of security in 2002, 2005, et cetera. I don’t—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I am telling you the same guy has been there for 

20 years. The guy who is the chief of security now has been the 

chief of security at the Department of Energy for 20 years. All of 

these installations fall under his responsibility. My thinking is that 

if a report comes out and says, we have a flawed culture of security 

problems at Y–12 comes out, that should have been presented to 

the chief of security. Now, no remedies were taken to the equipment and the other deficiencies in that system. He wasn’t fired. 

Who does the chief of security at DOE report to? 

Secretary PONEMAN. The chief of security reports to the Secretary and to the Deputy Secretary. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Secretary PONEMAN. But that person, just to be clear, Mr. Chairman, does not have line authority over the sites. I am not—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Why not? 

Secretary PONEMAN. Because that‘s the nature of the problem. In 

other words, we need to make sure that the line of authority runs 

straight down through the—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Who is responsible for establishing line authority 

within the Department of Energy? 

Secretary PONEMAN. The Secretary. 

Mr. ROGERS. Was he fired? 

Secretary PONEMAN. No, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for any additional questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we are talking about HSS. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Yes. 

Mr. COOPER. The Office of Health, Safety, and Security. I think 

we are talking about Glenn Podonsky, who has been there some 29 

years. I was interested in Mr. Podonsky, as you point, because of 

a news article dated February 22, 2013, just a few days ago, in 

which he said—at least he is quoted in the article as saying—he 

believes that the nuclear arms complex operated better while directly under the Energy Department’s defense programs prior to 

the nuclear agency’s formation in 2000. And I think by the nuclear 

agency, he means NNSA. And I am not faulting Ms. Miller, because she is acting and new, but this is a pretty amazing charge 

from somebody that you praise and trust. And he might not have 

line authority, but has been there a long time, knows a lot of stuff, 

you all rely on his viewpoint a lot, and he is wondering whether 

NNSA should even have jurisdiction here. 

Secretary PONEMAN. That obviously—— 

Mr. COOPER. And we have taken a step backwards since 2000. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Yeah. Obviously, Congressman, that does 

not reflect the view of the Department of Energy. We clearly believe that the structure of having NNSA as the semiautonomous 
30 

part of the Department is the right structure. We are fully on 

board with that, and there is no question about that. I also was not 

present, I saw the news reports, obviously, but that is not obviously 

reflecting the view of the Department. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, let’s forget politics for a second and the view 

of the Department, because right now the Department doesn’t have 

a lot of credibility on the security issue. Here is a guy who has 

been a loyal public servant for 29 years who is trying to express 

a viewpoint, and it might be politically correct, it might not be officially, you know, supported by the top brass, but this is, you know, 

part of your organization that you respect and trust, this is a respected individual who is questioning even the function of NNSA. 

And, of course, a commission will be established to look into lots 

of NNSA issues anyway. This is a problem. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Well, Congressman, we have, all of us, 

thought long and hard exactly about what the best way to do security is going forward out of this episode. We will continue to do 

that. We are going to take advantage of the great wisdom of the 

three experts. And we always encourage a continued questioning 

attitude and not to be complacent about where we are. We have no 

grounds for complacency. So we are going to keep at working as 

hard as we can to get this problem fixed. 

Mr. COOPER. Why do you deserve the chance to keep working at 

the problem? 

Secretary PONEMAN. I don’t think, sir, in terms of anything I deserve. I am just trying to address a problem, and I feel that that 

is my responsibility and I am going to keep working at that as 

hard as I can. I don’t think of it in terms of what I deserve or don’t 

deserve. 

Mr. COOPER. But in response to Mr. Turner’s question earlier, it 

seemed like you had a hard time thinking of circumstances that 

might even lead to, say, Air Force levels of taking responsibility. 

Secretary PONEMAN. I don’t mean to imply that. I strongly believe in accountability. We took every step that we could to make 

sure that the problem could not recur by changing the structure, 

by changing the culture and taking those steps, and by holding the 

individuals accountable. And, again, sir, we will continue to do everything we can to earn the confidence of this committee and the 

American people in that measure. 

Mr. COOPER. Maybe you could answer for the record what the average guard or protective force member makes when you divide 

out, you know, there is $175,000 going to each position under DOE 

leadership, how much take-home pay, how many benefits are these 

folks actually getting out of this amazing sum of money. They are 

paid like Federal judges, they are paid like Congressmen, yet these 

poor folks are not getting that sort of benefit. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Congressman, I have not seen the math. My 

hunch is that that number folds in a lot of physical plant and so 

forth. But it is absolutely a fair question to ask, and we will get 

you—and I assure you it won’t be 5 months, I don’t know how that 

happened—we will get that promptly to you, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 117.] 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. 
31 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Wilson, you don’t have any more questions? 

The last thing I wanted to point out was last week the DOE chief 

security officer told a reporter that the nuclear enterprise, quote, 

‘‘wasn’t working badly in the 1990s before NNSA was formed,’’ and 

that we should just abolish NNSA and go back to having everything DOE. But then we look back, and in 1999 a report by President Clinton’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board said that DOE, 

quote, ‘‘embodied science at its best and security at its worst.’’ 

Highlighting a string of recurring security problems that DOE had 

failed to correct in the 1990s, the Board described DOE as a ‘‘dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming 

itself.’’ 

The thing that I hope you take away from this, Mr. Secretary, 

is you have got to be capable of reforming yourself. I want you to 

recognize we are as serious as a heart attack about what has just 

happened here and staying after it, and we expect it to be remedied. That doesn’t just mean the NNSA. That also means the Department of Energy. And we want to know specifically that you are 

willing to terminate people that aren’t doing their job. It sounds to 

me like this chief security officer might be one of the folks that 

ought to be on your list to look at. 

But we are looking for serious reforms and line responsibilities 

so that if—and I hope we never do have another incidence like this, 

but if we do, you can show us or we can see exactly who was responsible and if they were dealt with in a prompt and appropriate 

manner. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, as I said in my 

opening statement, we not only accept, but we welcome working 

with you and this committee on these problems in exactly that dimension. 

Number two, we very much agree—obviously there are continuing concerns we need to address—we completely agree that accountability is a critical part of fixing the problem. However, we 

don’t just have a people problem. We also have a structural problem. We need to fix that. We have a cultural problem. We need to 

fix that. Not to say we shouldn’t fix all of them. We do. We are as 

serious as a heart attack as well. I am just saying that we need 

to work on all parts of the problem: accountability, culture, clarity 

of lines of responsibility, authorities that go with that. And, again, 

with your help, hopefully we will get to the place where we never 

do experience this kind of episode again, because it is something 

that is absolutely, as we have said from day one, unacceptable. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Several members went back after the last series of votes. If there 

are any members who have additional questions they would provide in writing, we will keep the record open for 10 days. I would 

ask you if any members do submit questions to you in writing, that 

you respond to those in writing in a timely manner. 

Thank you for your time and attention. This hearing is adjourned. 

Secretary PONEMAN. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 28, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 28, 2013 

(37) 

Opening Remarks - As Prepared for Delivery 

Honorable Mike Rogers 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

House Armed Services Committee 

Hearing on "Nuclear Security: Actions, Accountability, and Reform" 

February 28, 2013 

Good morning and welcome to today's hearing on nuclear security at the Department of Energy's 

National Nuclear Security Administration. This is the subcommittee's tlrst hearing of the 1 13th 

Congress, and we place a strong priority on ensuring these longstanding problems with security are 

fixed. 

Before we get into the hearing, I want to pause and welcome new members to the subcommittee. But 

tlrS! and foremost I want to recognize our ranking member, Mr. Cooper of Tennessee. I look forward 

to working closely with him over the next two years as we carry out the impOliant work of this 

subcommittee. 

With every new Congress we always have some shuffling of seats at the subcommittee level, as well 

as new members to the committee and to the House. 

New to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on the Republican side, I welcome: 

Mr. Coffman of Colorado 

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina 

Mr. Nugent of Florida 

Mr. Bridenstine of Oklahoma 

And on the Democratic side, I welcome: 

Mr. Johnson of Georgia 

Mr. Carson ofIndiana 

Mr. Veasey of Texas 

1 look forward to working with all of you, as well as my colleagues who are returning for another 

two years of Strategic Forces oversight. This subcommittee has responsibility for many big, 

critically important issues-and we're going to get into one of them right now. 

Today's hearing is part of the committee's continuing oversight of the aftermath of the security 

breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex on July 28, 2012. At this point, the facts of the 

incident are well-established, so [ won't repeat them here. Needless to say, the intrusion of an 82-
38 

year old nun and two other men into supposedly one of the most secure perimeters in the country is 

astonishing and completely unacceptable. Through its hearing and closed briefing last September, 

this subcommittee is aware of the immediate corrective actions taken by NNSA and DOE. 

Today, this hearing is focused on the broader implications of the incident, including organizational, 

leadership, and structural failures that enabled it to occur. Depending upon how you count them, 

anywhere from 6 to 10 diflerent reviews have occurred in the past six months-some narrowly 

focused on the Y-12 incident, and some focused on broader security management problems. 

Reviews are good, but now--six months after (he incident-owe need to see action. And if history 

tells us anything, it is that the Department of Energy is not known for action. 

Reviewing the testimony from our witnesses, as well as other reports on DOE nuclear security 

stretching back 15 years, I am deeply concerned that we've been identifying the same problems for 

more than a decade. And those problems remain unresolved. 

For instance, a 1999 report by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) said the 

DOE "embodied science at its best and security at its worst." Highlighting a string of recurring 

security problems that DOE had failed to correct in the 1990s, the Board described DOE as a 

"dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself." The Board 

recommended radical reorganization, calling for a new agency, either with some autonomy with the 

DOE or completely divorced from it. Congress responded by creating the semi-autonomous, 

separately-organized NNSA. 

In 2002, a few years after the creation ofNNSA, another study found the same problems. The 

Commission on Science and Security, led by former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, said: 

"the Department [of Energy's] continuing management dysfunction impairs its ability to 

carry out its science and security missions, .. ,DOE's headquarters, field. contractor, and 

laboratory relationships create a complicated layered structure in which assigning 

accountability is difficult." 

Ultimately, the Commission recommended that, if security reforn1s are to succeed: 

"the Secretary and the Administrator of the NNSA must address basic organizational 

problems at DOE, most significantly confusion over line and staff 

responsibilities." Together with a more clearly defined chain of command, DOE needs to 

reduce excess layers of management staff that have built up since the late 1980s," 

In 2005, an independent study ofNNSA security conducted by Admiral Richard Mics found the 

same problems, and said 8 years ago that they "are not new; many continue to exist because of a lack 

of clear accountability, excessive bureancracy, organizational stovepipes, lack of collaboration, and 

unwieldy, cumbersome processes." 

Those reports were trom 1999,2002, and 2005. 

So where arc we at today? To anyone paying attention the answer is undeniably: nowhere. The 

assessments done after the Y -12 incident show that the exact same fundamental problems remain. 

2 
39 

Asked by the Secretary of Energy to do an independent assessment, Dr. Richard Meserve noted in 

December that: 

"part of the challenge in providing proper oversight may relate to the extraordinarily 

complicated administrative structure within DOE, with security responsibilities spread 

across several offices at headquarters and between headquarters and the DOE field 

offices," 

One of our witnesses, Major General Don Alston, drily noted in his letter to Secretary Chu that: 

"study of a variety of DOE and NNSA organizational charts could not demystify where 

authority [for security] lies, " 

Another of our witnesses, Brigadier General Sandy Finan, made similar findings, reporting that: 

"there is no clear line of authority within the NNSA security organization" ,Absent clearly 

defined lines of the authority, many individuals assert authority, while correspondingly few 

have been assigned responsibility," 

I have an organization chart here from a 2009 report called "Leveraging Science for National 

Security," where yet another independent study tried to understand the lines of authority within 

DOE, j credit the authors for even trying to make sense of it via a diagram, Without objection, 1'd 

like to enter this for the record, 

I understand that NNSA has created a new office, NA-OO, that it believes will help clarify security 

responsibilities, But I also understand that the other security offices, including NA-70 and the 

Department of Energy's Office of Health, Safety, and Security, will remain in place and likely grow 

in size, 1 am curious how the creation of yet another office within DOE Headquarters will create 

clarity in roles and responsibilities and simplify an already bureaucratic chain of command, 

Regardless of the structural issues, there is also a problem of accountability. Based on a letter from 

Secretary Chu on January 31 (which I will also enter into the record), the only people who have been 

fired as a result of the Y -12 incident are a few guards and perhaps a few contractor employees. But 

no federal officials have been fired. Some NNSA site and Headquarters security officials have heen 

"reassigned" to other positions within DOE or allowed to retire-but not fired. 

Tellingly, the Department of Energy' s Chief Security Officer is still in place-and is being asked to 

implement solutions to a dysfunctional security management system that he has presided over for 10 

years. This is happening despite the fact that his organization performed an independent inspection 

of Y -12 only two months prior to the incident and gave its security effectiveness a resounding 

endorsement 

Further, a press report last week quotes this senior DOE security official saying that prior to creation 

ofNNSA, when the nuclear weapons complex was still a hIll part of DOE, he believes "it really 

wasn't working badly." This is either revisionist history or a terrible memory, because we remember 

the long series of security failures in the 1990s that caused that independent board to call DOE in 

1999: "security at its worst" and "a dysfunctional hureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of 

reforming itself." 

3 
40 

This isn't accountability~it is deplorable. Indeed, it is the exact opposite of what Secretary of 

Defense Gates did after the Air Force's nuclear security problems in 2007 and 2008. His 

demonstration of accountability in the Air Force's senior-most leadership is my example of finn 

accountability~and it should be everyone's. 

Last year, this committee put forward a set of proposals to fix the longstanding, well-documented 

governance problems at NNSA and DOE that were a contributing factor to this security incident. We 

are still waiting for the Administration to put forward its own proposals for reform~I am curious if 

and when we will see them. 

But one thing should be clear by now: the status quo is not working and must not be continued. 

Security of our nuclear weapons is at risk, as is the NNSA mission of sustaining our nuclear 

stockpile. Dozens ofreports and other indicators have shown that the system itself is broken, in 

addition to leadership, management, and personal failures. I will say to Ranking Member Cooper, 

and all of my colleagues, I am here to work with you to fix this broken system. It would be a crime if 

we find ourselves here next year and nothing has changed. 

We look forward to the hearing the recommendations of the congressional advisory panel created hy 

Section 3166 of the FYI3 defense authorization act. But we cannot wait a year to start making 

progress. This subcommittee is soliciting all ideas regarding how to go forward, and will continue to 

push the system to make the changes that are so obviously needed. 

Our first panel of witnesses will help us do that. They are each the author of separate independent 

assessments of the Y-12 incident or broader security issues at DOE and NNSA. We hope they will 

elaborate on their findings and recommendations, and give us a deeper understanding of the 

problems and potential solutions. The witnesses are: 

Major General C. Donald Alston, USAF (ret.) 

Fonner Commander, 20th Air Force 

Former Air Force Assistant Chief ofStaft~ Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration 

Brigadier General Sandra E. Finan, USAF 

Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center 

Former Principal Assistant Administrator for Military Applications, National Nuclear 

Security Administration 

The Honorable Gregory H. Friedman 

Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing today, I'm looking forward to our discussion. 

With that, let me turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Cooper, for any opening comments he would 

like to make. 

### 

4 
41 

Opening Statement 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing 

Nuclear Security: Actions, Accountability, and Reform 

Ranking Member Jim Cooper 

February 28, 2013 

I would like to join Chainnan Rogers in formally welcoming new members to our 

committee and [ look forward to working with all of our members for a productive 1131h 

Congressional Strategic Force Subcommittee. There is much work to be done. 

Following up on efforts to delve into the response to the inexcusable security lapse at Y12 which occurred last July. 

I look forward to examining what security refonns are warranted, what risks must be 

addressed, and how to increase performance and accountability of contractors and federal 

overseers. We must fix this broken system. 

I join the Chainnan in welcoming General Alston, General Finan and Inspector General 

Friedman to share their insights on what the deficiencies were that led to such a debacle. and 

must change. I would also like to welcome Deputy Secretary Dan Poneman and Deputy 

Administrator Neile Miller back to our Subcommittee to help us understand the implementation 

of a path forward. 

The July 28 intrusion by three peace activists, including an 82-year old nun, Megan Rice 

-who is with us here today-was historically unprecedented. They were able to penetrate, 

without being intercepted, 4 perimeter fences, at what is expected to be one of the most secure 

sites in the world. 

We owe it to the taxpayers and the security of our country to require oversight that 

ensures effective performance, accountability and responsibility. 

First, the contractors' abysmal performance was evident at every level. We spent over 

$150 million at the site last year for security in addition to funding for security upgrades. What 

we got were broken cameras for months, security guards unaware of which cmneras were down, 
42 

guards dismissing alarms, and a security force unable or unwilling to follow security procedures 

in their response. Tn the aftermath of this failure, the Department of Energy discovered that the 

security personnel were cheating on inspection tests. The security culture was a joke. 

Yet, B& W, which chose to ignore broken cameras for months and delay maintenance 

work that would have decreased the false alarm rate, received an "excellent" rating for its 

Safeguards and Security work, and received $51 million in incentive fee for FY 2011. Even 

more baffling, after the intrusion, B& W still received nearly 60% of its award fee-about $36 

million-and was only docked $12 million for poor security performance. How are we raising 

accountability and liability in the contracts? Has NNSA or DOE tried to recover some of the 

money paid for security since the contractors failed in their performance? 

Second, the federal oversight process embraced a "hands-off' approach, allowing 

contractor incompetence and abdicating effective oversight responsibility: 

At the NNSA level, NNSA site officials, despite knowing about several of these 

deficiencies, failed to force the contractors to take much-needed corrective actions despite 

problems persisting for months. The DOE IG report found that "federal officials [stated] that 

with the advent ofNNSA's contractor governance system (Contractor Assurance System), they 

could no longer intervene ( ... ) to address growing maintenance backlogs" and that "while 

federal employees knew of problems at the contractor level, they perceived that the contractor 

governance approach prohibited them from intervening in contractor activities." This lack of 

oversight had disastrous impacts on security readiness, as has become evident. 

With regard to DOE: because of concerns of excessive and overly burdensome oversight, 

the Department of Energy streamlined and eliminated many DOE safety and security directives 

despite concerns from GAO and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. The GAO noted 

in April 2012 "that the bendits of this reform are unclear because the DOE did not determine if 

the original directives were in fact burdensome and the reform did not fully address safety 

concerns." 

In addition, with support from the contracting community, DOE loosened contractor 

accountability by revising executive order (DOE Order 227.1) related to tracking corrective 

actions to address deficiencies identified by the independent Health Safety and Security Office. 

2 
43 

While we must reduce bureaucracy, DOE and NNSA must strike a workable balance to 

maintain effective oversight. 

Meanwhile, DOE's Office ofIndependent Oversight staff conducted inspections only 

every few years and lacks the responsibility and any enforcement mechanism for ensuring that 

problems identified in independent assessments are corrected. This responsibility resided with 

NNSA site offices which did not feel empowered to demand perfonnance from contractors. 

Independent oversight done by qualified and experienced experts remains a crucial 

element to ensure the security of sites with nuclear weapons-usable material. 

Thank you for your insights on the root cause of this completely unacceptable failure, and 

I look f()rward to hearing what NNSA and DOE are doing to fix it, and how Congress can help 

ensure we make meaningful change. 

This is too important a task and too expensive a mission to fail. We've had a real wakeup call. It is our responsibility and we cannot get this wrong under our watch. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

3 
44 

Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Nuclear Security: 

Actions, Accountability, and Reform 

A Statement by 

C. Donald Alston 

Major General, USAF (retired) 

February 28, 2013 

Rayburn House Office Building Room 2212 
45 

Nuclear Security: 

Actions, Accountability, and Reform 

Statement ofe. Donald Alston 

Major General, United States Air Force (retired) 

Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services 

February 28,2013 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today as part of this distinguished panel. 

With the subcommittee's permission, I would like to submit as my statement three separate 

letters, authored by Mr. Norman Augustine, Dr. Richard Meserve, and me, which we provided to 

Secretary of Energy Dr. Stephen Chu in support of our examination of physical security at 

Department of Energy Category I nuclear facilities. In October 2012, Secretary Chu asked the 

three of us to consider a variety of security models and to provide our separate, individual 

observations regarding any emerging constructs that may be viable for application across 

Department of Energy and, specifically, National Nuclear Security Administration sites. We 

provided our respective letters to Secretary Chu on December 6th oflast year. 

J would also like to provide some additional context about our assessments for the purpose of 

clarity. While Secretary Chu did not ask us to investigate the YI2 security breach in particular, 

we used that incident and resulting investigations as an entry point into a larger examination of 

the physical security construct. Additionally, we were exposed to draft corrective actions 

resulting from those investigations, but we did not evaluate these measures or their 

implementation across Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security 

Administration. Finally, our written assessments were informed by our direct engagement during 

a brief seven-week period last fall, culminating in early December. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, and members ofthe subcommittee, below are letters to 

Secretary Chu from my esteemed colleagues and me. Thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today before the subcommittee, and I welcome your comments and questions. 
46 

C. Donald Alston 

1515 North Star Loop 

Cheyenne, WY 82009 

December 6, 2012 

The Honorable Steven Chu 

Secretary of Energy 

U.S Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20585 

Dear Secretary Chu: 

In light of the perimeter security breach at the Y -12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in July 

2012, you asked me to examine a variety of organizational constructs for physical security and to provide 

you with observations on the value oftransitioning to a common model. 

My observations have been infonned by reviewing the considerable body of work that has been 

done on this subject over the past decades; through interviews and discussions with current and fonner 

DOE leaders, as well as experienced leaders outside of DOE; and by a number of site visits. I was able to 

visit DOE headquarters (HQ), Y-12, Pantex Plant, Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory, Savannah River Site, and the Calvert Cliffs commercial nuclear power plant in Lusby, MD. 

The site visits enabled discussion with maintenance and operations (M&O) contractors, DOE overseers, 

and protective force management and members, including union leaders. A very candid exchange at all 

levels with dedicated, experienced professionals greatly aided the effort. 

Four physical security organizational models were reviewed: I) a proprietary protective force 

organic to the M&O contractor responsible for site operation; 2) a protective force subcontracted to the 

M&O contractor; 3) a federalized protective force; and 4) U.S. military forces. Three of these four 

models are currently functioning within DOElNational Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); 

however, none of the four emerges as attractive long term, department-wide option without addressing 

systemic impediments that preclude effective change. 

On the grandest scale, there were indications that security was viewed as the responsibility of the 

protective forces alone rather than as the responsibility of each member of the work force. While this 

culture may not be widespread throughout the DOE complex, it is clear that leadership could fUliher 

emphasize the need to view security of our nation's sensitive nuclear materials as a shared commitment 

across the work force. The Department of Energy is responsible for America's nuclear enterprise, and 

enterprise credibility is derived from the trust and confidence our citizens, national leadership, friends, 

and allies have in the Department's ability to maintain a safe, secure and effective U.S. nuclear weapons 

complex. Importantly, this credibility factors into the daily calculus of potential adversaries and 

contributes directly to achieving an effective deterrent posture, a commodity re-earned every single day. 

A pervasive culture in which each member of the nation's nuclear weapons complex recognizes the vital 

role he/she plays in assuring both security and safety contributes directly to maintaining that credibility. 

As currently structured, no recognizable critical path exists between DOE HQ and the site 

security organizations to ensure daily security success. Study of a variety of DOE and NNSA 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifYing edits. 
47 

organizational charts could not demystify where authority lies. The Department stnIggled to articulate 

how information flows both up and down between the sites and DOE HQ and could not easily provide 

a depiction of that process. I think this environment contributes to the reality that nuclear material at 

Savannah River Site which falls under DOE's Environmental Management (EM) office can be 

secured with different standards and policies than those required at NNSA sites. The category of material 

should drive security requirements, not the organizational chart. 

Distance has been growing hetween the headquarters and the sites, a trend that follows a DOE 

legacy of decentralized management across its facilities. While this traditional arrangement may pay 

dividends for the department in many respects, security is not one of them. Recent efforts to revise 

DOE's safety and security directives and modify the department's oversight approach to provide 

contractors with the flexibility to tailor and implement safety and security programs without excessive 

federal oversight or overly prescriptive departmental requirements, as well as NNSA's "governance 

transformation" that increased reliance on contractor's self-oversight through its contractor assurance 

systems, have fortified sites' sense of independence and distance from the HQ. Sites leverage their 

unique missions and geography to justify a prefcrred "alone and unafraid" mantra, and the HQ has 

employed a largely "hands off" response. 

Mutual distrust is bred as HQ personnel in key security roles arc viewed as inexperienced 

regarding security matters and too far removed from the site to understand thc uniqueness of local 

challenges. Key leaders must have credible security experience -- especially since there is little to no 

assignment circulation of security personnel to and from the HQ; no missionaries emerge to bridge the 

gaps in trust. 

What little leverage the HQ has comes in the form of additional inspections and assessments 

"black hat" interactions that further contribute to adversarial relationships. Inspection is an absolutely 

essential tool to validate compliance and operational readiness. However, it should be one dimension of a 

composite assessment process. Depending too much on snapshot assessments and not deVeloping the 

right metrics to measure daily readiness would provide leadership little satisfaction regarding the true 

state of security preparedness and program execution. 

Further, there is a perception that corporate security policy is being written from inspection 

results. If true, the Department risks drifting from measuring original standards to an environment where 

sites lack confidence in the integrity of the inspection process as they perceive they are chasing the latest 

inspection results. In the DOEINNSA HQ construct, a dynamic or volatile policy environment led by 

DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) risks marginalizing NNSA security responsibilities. 

Of course, even if these site perceptions are inaccurate, leadership needs to be sensitive to these 

atmospherics. 

Communication is an area ripe with opportunity. Given today's environment where sites seem to 

prefer to operate independently, where there is no effective best practice/lessons learned dialogue between 

sites, no program for security information exchange with the Department of Defense (DoD) or 

commercial nuclear activities, it is not surprising that site facility staffs can and do conceive, design, 

develop, test and deploy modifications to security systems. To better understand and share risks 

associated with changes to security systems there could be a normalized process over watched by DOE 

HQ, leveraging a revitalized Sandia expert review, with hard requirements for developmental and 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 2 
48 

operational testing and red teaming that conld methodically deliver security modifications ready on day 

one. 

In my final analysis, the NNSA Administrator must always be able to answer the following 

questions: 

How ready are we today and how do we know? 

How ready will we be in 6 months and how do we know? 

A variety of sources produce the set of ingredients that create the mosaic of indicators conveying 

the current and future state of the security program. Timely, balanced reporting, where good news travels 

fast and bad news faster, not only provides content, but also serves as a barometer for the quality of the 

selt~critical culture. Quality metrics that provide both tactical and operational level content, deliver 

today's picture and, measured over time, expose trends and opportunities for course corrections. 

Collaboratively developed metrics, together with processes that actively seek input where appropriate on 

policies and standards also builds trust. Checks and balances in development of new or improved security 

capabilities, to include external review processes, provide corporate-wide awareness and ensures sites 

have support during transitions. A comprehensive human capital development program creates career 

paths at all levels and could provide for circulation up and down the chain, all the while driving greater 

security competency across the enterprise. 

Based on discussions over the past two months, the attributes ofthe objective security 

organizational construct should include: 

1) A force with a mission focus that understands the vital interdependencies and coordination 

required at all times with the M&O contractor; 

2) A well-trained, disciplined force whose professional conduct during routine operations is 

dependable and above reproach and one that is prepared to use lethal force if required during 

emergency operations; 

3) A torce conditioned and incentivized by leaders at all levels to provide timely reporting; 

4) A force that would help drive crosstalk across DOE sites, outside the department such as 

with the 000, and with commercial nuclear businesses to benctit trom others' lessons 

learned; 

5) A force with an absolute intolerance for compensating for shortfalls/deficiencies/outages 

one minute longer than necessary; 

6) A force that knows - based on facts -- how ready it is today and leaders who know how 

ready it will be 6 months from now; 

7) A force not remotely prone to work stoppage as a job action; and 

8) A force that understands the merits of centralized control and decentralized execution of 

security responsibilities. 

This updated version (dated December 10th) ofthe original letter contains minor clarifYing edits. 3 
49 

Of all the candidate security organizational models I examined, the military model is the least 

attractive to me to meet DOEINNSA needs. The advantages include a dependable, high-quality, rotating 

force that would routinely be refreshed to meet mission demands of a typically non-dynamic 

environment. However, the lack of continuity would produce a force less familiar with the site than other 

models, and transitory lcadcrship will have to adapt to a relatively unfamiliar mission (enriching uranium, 

for example). The most significant disadvantage is the division of unity of command by the introduction 

of a substantial command and control seam between protective forces and site operations with the arrival 

of Department of Defense onto the DOEINNSA playing field. Would there be any risk that geostrategic 

instabilities might make these war fighting forces the first to be redeployed abroad, driving challenging 

domestic security contingency plans? I do not see an effective role for a DOEINNSA representative in 

this model. 

The proprietary guard force, which has security personnel organic to the M&O contractor 

operating the site, provides the cleanest unity of command option. The risk of security work stoppage 

seems less likely in this model than other contractor options. Poor perfonners can be removed with ease. 

The drawback to this option is the uncertain security competencies of potential M&O contractors. This 

model is a variation on the status quo where a DOEINNSA security representative provides oversight of 

the security elements of the M&O contract. 

The model in which the protective forces are part of a company subcontracted to the M&O 

contractor has a mixed record. There is a history of work stoppage. There is a manageable seam as far as 

unity of command is concerned. History shows this model can provide a disciplined, professional force 

with valuable continuity and familiarity with the site. (I would note here that military experience probably 

makes up between 50 and 75% of the force, though most of those veterans have no nuclear security 

experience upon arrival. Good orientation and training programs make up for this significant de1iciency 

and ensure those with and without military experience are prepared to provide effective security.) At Y12, the maintenance function was not owned by the protective force which may have contributed to 

improperly prioritized maintenance of security gear, which ultimately resulted in failure. Overcome this 

specific contract deficiency and this model will present less risk than it currently does. This model is a 

variation on the status quo where a DOEINNSA security representative provides oversight of contract 

execution by the sub-contractor. 

The model I find the most attractive is the federal model. It is proven, working effectively in the 

DOEINNSA transportation business providing for a disciplined professional force. It precludes work 

stoppage risk. True, adverse actions are less swift than the contractor models and this approach does 

introduce a seam with the M&O contractor. However. this model is a substantial departure trom the 

status quo and what you trade in local unity of command you gain in more effective corporate oversight 

of security operations. I see the role of the DOEINNSA security representative as the leader of the site 

security forces and the key integrator with the M&O leadership. The long term culture shift this model 

could drive should be weighed positively in an organizational change decision. 

For your consideration, Admiral Mies oversaw an in-depth study of DOE security in April 2005, 

"NNSA Security: An Independent Review." I think a hard-hitting, 'show me' re-assessment of the 

status of his recommendations would benchmark the state of your self-critical culture and prove very 

helpful to the Department. 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarirying edits. 4 
50 

All members of your Department rapidly responded to requests for information and made time for 

discussions at my convenience. Everyone I met, both the contractors and Department personnel, were 

fOlthright, professional, and dedicated to mission success. 

I am honored you asked me to support this important project. Thank you. It was a great 

experience working with the men and women of your Department. And thank you for providing the 

support of the talented members of Center for Strategic and International Studies. I could not have 

produced this work without their tireless support. 

With great respect, 

C. DONALD ALSTON 

This updated version (dated December 101h) ofthe original letter contains minor clarifYing edits. 5 
51 

NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE 

6801 Rockledge Drive 

Bethesda, MD 20817 

Tel. 301·897·6185 Fax 301-897-6028 

norm.augustine@lmco.com 

December 6,2012 

The Honorable Steven Chu 

Secretary of Energy 

U.S. Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20585 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

This letter responds to your request that I assess certain physical security shortcomings 

experienced by the Department of Energy (DoE), most prominently at the Y-12 National 

Security Complex (Y-12), and provide observations, findings and recommendations. 

Given the relative short amount of time available for this review, my recommendations are 

more in the form of suggestions; however, they are based on over a half-century of 

managing at all levels in large organizations. I have drawn upon lessons gained during the 

ten years I devoted to government service, including several years as Under Secretary of 

the Army, and a number of years as CEO of an organization with over 180,000 employees, 

many working on sensitive national security systems. Further, in keeping with your 

request, I have been extremely candid in my assessments, which in no way suggests any 

diminishment in my overall respect for the people who are charged with such enormous 

responsibilities as are those in your Department. 

Although this letter is no doubt considerably longer than you intended, the matter at hand 

is in many respects a complex one, and its importance obviously merits careful 

consideration. This document has been prepared at the unclassified level for your 

convenience; however, I would be pleased to provide further substantiation and 

clarification of various issues at a higher level of security, should you wish. 

I would note at the outset that I am highly indebted to the people working in the 

Department of Energy, who were generous with their time and expertise and were 

extremely forthcoming, even welcoming, in sharing their views on what are often 

controversial issues. A particular debt of gratitude is owed to the staff of CSIS that 

supported us; they are a group of professionals. 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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Page 2 

APPROACH 

In conducting this review, I have read on the order of 1,000 pages of documents, some at 

classified levels, and held discussions with literally dozens of individuals, both 

management and non-management-the latter in some cases without management 

present, I visited Y-12, Pantex Plant, Sandia National Laboratories, Savannah River Site, 

DoE headquarters, and the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power generation plant. (The reason for 

conducting the field visits was to benefit first-hand from examining the different 

management models they embrace; to search for systemic problems; and to assure the 

degree of thoroughness that the task you assigned deserves.) 

The mindset you will hopefully find reflected in this letter is one commensurate with DoE's 

extraordinary responsibility of, among other things, providing for the security of sensitive 

nuclear materials and weapons. Failures in this arena can, as you know so well, directly 

impact the lives of millions of people as well as reshape the world's geopolitical landscape 

virtually overnight. Under such circumstances, there can be zero margin for error, and that 

is the attitude that has been adopted in conducting this review. 

OVERALL FINDINGS 

"Unacceptable and inexcusable" were the words aptly used by the Administrator of the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) testifying before the Congress with 

regard to the events of July 28 at Oak Ridge; as you know, three individuals, one an 82-

year-old nun, penetrated four fences and several clear-zones during the night, and when 

finally confronted, these individuals faced a trained security officer who acted principally 

as a spectator. Disconcertingly, I can see little reason why, under the specific prevailing 

circumstances, the intruding group could not have included, in addition to the three 

persons actually participating in the incursion, a well-armed follow-up group. I must 

disclose that I have been involved in dozens of failure analyses of a variety of types during 

my career, and none has been more difficult for me to comprehend than this one. 

Many security professionals with whom we spoke reacted to the Y-12 incident with 

extreme embarrassment and, as in my own case, perplexity. The overwhelming majority of 

these individuals are very proud of the work they perform and are generally aware of the 

importance of their mission ... which makes the cascade of failures that led to the events of 

July 28 all the more enigmatic. 

You asked that I address the pros and cons of various management structures that would 

better serve the Department in providing physical security, and I have done so. While this 

is important indeed, I conclude that, rather convincingly, the management structure was an 

abetting, not a root cause, of the problems encountered on July 28. The fundamental 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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Page 3 

problem was one of culture: a pervasive culture of tolerating the intolerable and accepting 

the unacceptable. 

As examples of this culture, a false alarm rate surpassing by orders of magnitude anything 

that I have ever encountered before was accepted as a fact of life. When full-time 

surveillance cameras failed, a "compensatory measure" was introduced that consisted of 

(relatively infrequent) periodic patrols. Word of no-notice tests was leaked to those 

security forces being tested. Failed security systems went unrepaired for months (yet were 

repaired within days after the Y-12 incursion when attention was focused upon the issue). 

There was cheating on proficiency exams. "Tune-up" firing was permitted prior to 

marksmanship qualification tests. Worthiness tests of hardware were delayed until the 

hardware was in working condition on the grounds that there is no sense testing hardware 

that isn't working. Strikes of the guard force were largely dismissed as being readily offset 

by substitute guards (even though we were told that as many as three sites have entered 

union negotiations at about the same time, which could limit the availability of such 

substitutes). 

The demands of securing nuclear materials, components, and devices are perhaps of 

unmatched unforgiveness-yet in general it is an endeavor of chilling monotony. 

Individual security personnel can (hopefully) expect that they will never confront a true 

threat during their entire career. Add to this the hundreds of false and nuisance alarms 

that occurred (and occur) each month-and then working 12-hour shifts (albeit some 

involving rotation )-and one has a mind-numbing challenge even for the most dedicated 

professional. (Regarding the length of shifts, as explained in one DoE report, the workforce 

likes the overtime pay and days off.) 

The various corrective action plans and numerous security reviews (going back to 1986) 

reveal a pattern of inverted priorities, to wit, from highest to lowest: 

1. Accommodate the workforce. 

2. Reduce costs. 

3. Secure nuclear materials, components and devices. 

In summary, the problem the Department faces within the context of this review is a 

culture of permissiveness, amplified by the absence of day-to-day accountability and 

exacerbated, in the case ofY-12, by an ineffectual governance structure. 

As will be discussed later, I favor the Federalized Force model for a number of reasons. 

However, if this cannot, for various reasons, be implemented, I believe that the singlecontract ("new" Y-12) model can be made to work ... as could another alternative I will offer. 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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Unfortunately, one of the most difficult things to change is a failed culture. My observations 

over the years have, however, convinced me that change can be introduced and that there 

are at least seven ingredients to successfully do so: 

1. Make sweeping changes ... begin with a "clean sheet of paper" -simply "trying 

harder" to do what you have been trying to do all along is a formula for failure. 

2. Make leadership changes wherever doubts exist as to its effectiveness. 

3. Devote a great deal of effort to communicating the new culture. 

4. Be intolerant of even the slightest reversions to the old culture. 

5. Lead by example-demand that all in leadership positions "walk the talk." 

6. Execute change fast ... prolonging change so that everyone can get used to the new 

system is self-defeating. 

7. Weed out individuals who cannot accept the new culture (Vince Lombardi: "If you 

are not fired with enthusiasm you will be fired with enthusiasm!") 

CAUSAL FACTORS (V-12) 

The following six factors seemed to predominate as triggers for the Y-12 incident ofJuly 28 

(note: one earlier assessment identified 26 specific factors that contributed to the security 

failures): 

Failure of Early Warning System. Numerous reviews ofY-12 physical security have been 

conducted over the years; however, none-including one by NNSA not long before the July 

28 incident-expressed extraordinary concerns, although several cited troublesome 

indicators. In the case of the line-management system, the headquarters relied upon the 

site management; the site management relied upon the two primary contractors; and one 

of the two primary contractors was facing a competition and the union was concerned with 

an upcoming contract negotiation. In short, bad news did not flow upward, having been 

underappreciated or filtered at every level. The speed of light exceeds the speed of dark! 

Lack of Systems Approach. Razor (or concertina) wire was in place around part of the Y12 perimeter ... but not all. There was no evidence of a disciplined analysis of single-point 

or even multi-point failure modes. DoE sites, for example, have far fewer cameras than 

does the Calvert Cliffs power plant. It was reported that sixty compensatory measures 

were in place at Y-12 to "offset" malfunctions, but from a systems standpoint many of them 

were not truly compensatory. When the necessary funding to implement the ARGUS 

security system was not forthcoming (by nearly a factor of four), ARGUS was mated to 

elements of the existing system without adequate systems testing-and then rushed into 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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Page 5 

operation-apparently without objection by the Site Office. The result was that the 

"system upgrade" actually deteriorated system performance. 

Split Responsibilities. Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI) was responsible for the security 

force hut the management and operations (M&O) contractor was responsible for the 

sensing, analysis, and display equipment. The Site Office appears to have withdrawn from 

its oversight responsibilities, having misinterpreted headquarters instructions as to its 

role. The role of a Site Office (or headquarters) with regard to contracted activities is not to 

manage those activities but rather to ensure that those activities are managed. At 

Savannah River Site, physical control of category 1 materials located at two proximate sites 

is currently overseen via two different chains of command emanating from DoE 

headquarters. 

Focus of Inspection/Testing on Compliance. In general, inspections and testing have 

focused on verifying that contract terms are satisfied or that the Design Basis Threat (DBT) 

has been countered. Immense volumes of documentation containing innumerable checklists have been produced-little of which addresses what the Department of Defense would 

consider Operational Testing (as opposed to Developmental Testing). Stated differently, 

tests have too often addressed the question, "Does the hardware or practice meet the 

design criteria rather than is it operationally effective?" Standards are often procedural 

rather than performance-oriented, and stress testing has been lacking. What is needed is 

not more inspections but better inspections. 

Compartmentalization of Responsibility. During the review team's visit to the Calvert 

Cliffs nuclear power plant it was emphasized that if, for example, a member of the security 

force noticed that a production machine sounded differently from what they normally 

heard they would view it as their responsibility to report this observation. Further, it was 

the clear responsibility of management to run the apparent anomaly to ground and to 

report their overall findings to the security officer initially reporting the issues. This is in 

stark contrast to what occurred at Y-12. 

The fact that certain sensors at Y-12 had been designated as priority 2 for repair should 

not have been an excuse for a very large number of sensors remaining inoperable for 

months, particularly when the problem was not elevated within the management structure, 

particularly induding the Site Office, for resolution. 

During visits to the previously listed sites, one heard complaints about persistent 

escapements (deficiencies) that were known and accepted because "That belongs to the 

M&O contractor," "It is part of the union agreement," "It is required by the contract," "The 

FAA wouldn't like it," "You can't cut down trees," etc. It is critically important that all 

escapements be identified and reported, resolution responsihility assigned, root causes 

found, corrections introduced and tested, and open-items formally closed. (In this regard, 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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NASA and its contractors have evolved highly effective systems in support of the human 

spaceflight program that might be conceptually helpful to the DoE.) 

Lack of Independent Verification. Testing and auditing ultimately requires 

independence from those responsible for what is being examined. At some point these two 

functions obviously must come together in the chain of command; however, in general, the 

higher that coincidence takes place, the better. This is particularly true of operational 

(performance) testing that may involve off-nominal conditions. 

The key individuals involved in such independent oversight need to be rotated periodically, 

much as audit firms are required to rotate account managers or the NRC rotates its field 

personnel. Absent this, the site offices can become relatively passive and increasingly 

insular. Site managers must be granted significant authority (and accountability) over 

work performed by contractors-not to give detailed instructions regarding work 

execution but rather to assure that contractor responsibilities are being met. Similarly, 

headquarters personnel should not seek to involve themselves in the actual execution of 

routine work, but should use their full authority to ensure that significant work is in fact 

properly executed. In short, micro management on the one hand and passivity on the other 

are not the only options. 

MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 

The suggestions that follow are driven by twelve management principles that I have 

discerned over my career (some the hard way!). These are as follows: 

1. Recognize that management is all about people. Selfless, competent, committed, 

ethicalleadership-by-example is the coin ofthe realm. 

2. Focus on the primacy of mission. 

3. Communicate expectations and listen to concerns. Establish a single chain of 

responsibility and provide commensurate authority and resources. 

4. Maintain clear-and minimal-interfaces (both technical and organizational). 

5. Assure accountability and enforce consequences. 

6. Disproportionately reward significant contributors and do not endure undercontributors. 

7. Analyze every escapement-no matter how trivial-to determine root cause, 

introduce appropriate corrections, and conduct confirmatory tests. ("There is no 

such thing as a random failure.") 

8. Provide independent checks and balances. 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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9. Maintain parallel channels for surfacing bad news (line management, auditors, 

ethics officers, suggestion boxes, etc.). 

10. Culture can be an asset but it can never be an excuse. 

11. Treat all persons with respect. 

12. Operate ethically at all times. 

Quality personnel can make up for an inadequate organizational structure, but a quality 

organizational structure can never make up for inadequate personnel. 

ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 

The myriad possible governance and management structures can conveniently be grouped 

into five basic models or hybrids thereof. Each has its advantages and disadvantages and, 

interestingly, three of the five are currently in use by the DoE, thereby offering first-hand 

experiential prototypes. These models are (a) Dedicated Physical Security-Military; (b) 

Dedicated Physical Security-Civilian; ( c) Separate Operations and Physical Security; (d) 

Separate Operations and Full-Service Security; and (e) Integrated Operations and Physical 

Security. 

(a) Dedicated Physical Security-Military (Department of Defense (DoD)) 

This model has the advantage of resolving protective force career issues, promoting 

strong discipline and providing a single, established chain of command. It suffers 

from coordination issues that may arise between two major government 

departments (DoE/DoD), rapid turnover of personnel, and a visibly expanded 

operational role of the uniformed military within the United States. Furthermore, 

assigning such a mission to 000, even given its importance, would inevitably be 

viewed as a distraction from the Department's primary mission-a mission that is 

already extremely strained due to growing resource limitations. 

(b) Dedicated Physical Security-Civilian (DoE Office of Secure Transportation - OST) 

The option of a federalized physical security force would virtually eliminate 

concerns over work stoppages, increase continuity, and offer a clear and highly 

focused chain of command. It also recognizes the paramilitary-as opposed to 

civilian-nature of defending nuclear assets. However, it poses career management 

challenges for the members of the force as they age, and it has been asserted that it 

could be more costly than some other options. This approach represents a 

transformational change that should promote creating a new culture; however, it 

would be very difficult to "unwind" ifit should later be desired to do so. (Under this 

model it is important that the Dedicated Physical Security Force have an integral 

capability to install and maintain all security systems as well as to access 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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organizations capable of developing such systems so that interface issues similar to 

those encountered at Y-12 are to be precluded.) 

(c) Separate Operations and Physical Security ("old" Y-12)) 

This model can produce significant potential interface challenges (between the M&O 

contractor and the security contractor) because of split responsibilities and 

reporting chains. It is also subject to work stoppages. On the other hand, it offers 

the advantage of a direct relationship between the Site Office and the critically 

important physical security contractor and greatly eases the problem of removing 

non-performing individuals and organizations. 

(d) Separate Operations and Full-Service Physical Security (new model) 

The primary failing of the Separate Operations and Physical Security model that was 

previously in place at Y -12 is its split of responsibility between two contractors for 

the performance ofthe physical security function. A workable excursion from this 

model that would maintain the needed emphasis on physical security professionals 

who are directly aligned with the Site Office would be to have separate M&O and 

physical security contractors but with the latter having a 'full-service" responsibility. 

That is, the security contractor would be responsible not only for providing the ProForce but also for acquiring, installing and maintaining all security systems and 

other necessary equipment-directly overseen by the Site Office. In other words, 

rather than moving the Pro-Force to the M&O contractor, move that part of the M&O 

contract related to physical security to the security contractor. This would likely 

exacerbate relationships between operating employees and security employees but 

would provide a strong physical security capability and would remove physical 

security responsibilities from the M&O contractor that is more likely to be familiar 

with science or operations than physical security. 

(e) Integrated Operations and Physical Security ("new" Y-12, Pantex) 

At the M&O level, this model unifies responsibilities for security and operations and 

provides the site office with a single point of contact. It also permits rapid 

resolution of personnel and major contractor issues. It suffers from the possibility 

of work stoppages and demands that the M&O organization and its senior members 

assume a breadth of responsibility that spans from plant operations to maintenance 

to cyber security to physical security and much more. Most potential M&O 

contractors will not be versed in the demands of providing physical security. The 

formation of joint ventures alleviates this problem but does not eliminate it. In the 

case of sites focused on research and development it confronts the challenge of 

integrating the open culture of science with the closed culture of security. 

Particularly in time of crisis the M&O contractor, security contractor and Site Office 

will need to maintain close coordination; however, this is not unique to this 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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particular model since in all cases under such circumstances operational command 

shifts to the Pro-Force, with other organizations assuming a supporting role. 

SUGGESTIONS 

Given that no single model seems to offer a perfect solution, I would rank the five principal 

options, from best to worst, as follows, with the fourth of these being undesirable and the 

fifth being unacceptable (note that the second and third of these options would be 

considerably more attractive were it possible to obtain a federal ruling/law that precluded 

strikes by employees of commercial firms charged with securing Category 1 sites): 

• Dedicated Physical Security-Civilian ("Federalized") 

• Separate Operations and Full-Service Physical Security ("New Model") 

• Integrated Operations and Physical Security ("Proprietary" -"New" Y-12) 

• Separate Operations and Physical Security ("Old" Y -12) 

• Dedicated Physical Security-Military (000) 

The above ranking is, curiously, somewhat contrary to my confessed personal prejudicesthat is, believing that the Free Enterprise System does work and that government should 

perform only those functions that the private sector cannot, or will not, perform (there are 

of course a number of such functions). However, in the case at hand, an overriding 

consideration is that the DoE is concerned with one of the most consequential missions in 

the world; furthermore, it is a paramilitary mission potentially entailing the use of deadly 

force. Such a mission is best executed with a singular focus and with the greatest possible 

authority. 

The notion that individuals under some other models, many of whom have served our 

country in combat, would abandon their posts in a work stoppage while protecting a 

Category-1 site is, frankly, incomprehensible to me. Whatever the case, the federalized 

model largely negates that happenstance. I discount the rather widely-held view that such 

eventualities are readily handled through backup plans, and do so in part because of the 

possibility that (as has recently occurred) mUltiple union contracts could expire at about 

the same time. (Note that work stoppages become a possibility even when union contracts 

contain no-strike provisions if that contract is no longer operative due to its expiration.) 

It is again emphasized that the Dedicated Physical Security-Civilian model must be a 

"total package" solution and include an integral capability to obtain and maintain all 

necessary physical security devices and equipment. 

There are at least two major disadvantages to this overall approach. First, it poses nontrivial challenges in workforce career management. Second, any attempt to implement it is 

likely to confront enormous opposition. With regard to the former, it is noted that there 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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are many government jobs (as well as M&O contractor jobs) that security force members 

can fill when they are no longer capable of meeting the high physical standards demanded 

when assuring nuclear security. Further, during the review, few if any instances were 

found where such problems have been significant (under any of the models in use). With 

regard to the latter concern, it is simply noted that the issue at hand has to do with the 

security of nuclear materials and weapons. Enough said! 

If, however, for any reason it is not practicable to implement the Dedicated Physical 

Security-Civilian model, the Separate Operations and Full-Service Physical Security model 

or the Integrated Operations and Physical Security model, the latter as used at Pantex and 

has been introduced at Y-12 following the July 28 event, should be workable. The 

Integrated Operations and Physical Security model could involve either a single contractor 

or a joint venture. Both options offer the distinct advantage of making necessary corrective 

actions regarding personnel far more expedient than the preferred approach cited above. 

(In my experience, I have found the government personnel system to be far more tolerant 

of [the relatively rare cases of] clearly substandard individual performance than the civilian 

sector.) 

The DoE is currently in the rather awkward situation of having (appropriately) abandoned 

as unworkable the Separate Operations and Physical Security model at Y-12, yet continuing 

to preserve that same model at the Savannah River Site (SRS)-with exactly the same 

security contractor! In discussions with the leadership of SRS it was clear that they are 

uniformly confident of the suitability and effectiveness of the existing situation. Based 

upon a one-day visit I would be hesitant to question that judgment since, as repeatedly 

observed herein, given capable people almost any model can be made to work. However, I 

would strongly emphasize that some models are markedly more vulnerable to problems 

than others. It is my view that the Separate Operating and Physical Security structure is 

such a model. 

Other related actions that I would commend for your consideration are: 

• Establish a separate, dedicated organization responsible for conducting physical 

security (only) inspections and audits that reports directly to the Secretary of 

Energy (or, alternatively, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Field Sites 

would be responsible for periodically reporting status of all security elements to 

this organization. 

• Reinforce the authority of Field Sites and Field Offices-nonetheless making 

clear that during actual physical security incidents the chain of command is 

entirely within the physical security management structure and that Site office 

responsibility is not to manage work but to assure that work is managed. If the 

Site Offices are present merely to observe, then it is not apparent why they are 

present. 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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• Rotate select individuals between Headquarters and field sites in order to 

enhance understanding of the distinct roles, challenges and responsibilities 

faced by these two institutions (as is commonplace in industry) and thereby 

increase overall effectiveness. This will require revisions to the existing DoE 

policies for reimbursing the cost of employee moves. 

• Place security forces on eight-hour shifts. This would have the secondary benefit 

of producing a larger Pro-Force pool. (This is undoubtedly a strike issue.) 

• Create a single office (at Sandia or Livermore) to develop standards and 

procurement guidance along with advanced equipment for security systems 

(biometrics, high resolution displays, animal-discriminating sensors, etc.). These 

standardized systems can then be tailored, by exception, to the particular local 

conditions of individual sites. (It is noteworthy that not all such solutions need 

to be high-tech. For example, Savannah River Site has implemented what 

appears to be a very effective rip-rap barrier, yet it is not in evidence elsewhere 

(excluding the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant where it is fully embraced). 

The use of dogs is another such example. 

• Review the current threat model (which is said to be five years old). Involve 

outside organizations from both the intelligence community and the special ops 

community to participate in this effort. 

• Re-balance responsibilities among NNSA and other DoE headquarters entities to 

assure that field elements operating under similar circumstances are provided 

with a single, consistent chain of command and set of procedures. The creation 

of the reporting relationship of the Field Sites to NA-OO seems appropriate for 

clarity of command but will require careful implementation to avoid the 

evolution of "stovepipes." 

• Reevaluate current training practices with the assistance of outside 

organizations (military special operations forces (SOF)). Possibilities range from 

such simple actions as increasing the number of allotted training rounds to 

enhancing force-on-force testing methodology. (I am aware that many of the 

DoE security personnel have had earlier experience with the above 

organizations!) 

• Change the culture! This can be facilitated by adopting the previously mentioned 

practices. It is emphasized that a primary benefit of the "Federalized Force" 

model is that it does provide a fresh start-a "clean sheet of paper." 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) included the following 

comment in its 1999 report regarding DoE: "A department saturated with cynicism, an 

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The Honorable Steven Chu 

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Page 12 

arrogant disregard for authority, and a staggering pattern of denial." While I observed 

nothing approaching the former two criticisms, the third does have resonance, at least with 

operations at Y -12. The pervasiveness of this sense of denial throughout DoE's physical 

security system was not determinable in the time available for this review. Nonetheless, 

there is ample reason to thoroughly reassess the activities at other sites in search of 

patterns of behavior that may also require corrective action. 

No matter what management model is adopted, the same individuals are likely to populate 

it-with the exception of a few senior managers. Fortunately, the people we met during 

our assessment appeared to be individually highly capable and clearly dedicated, but often 

overwhelmed by a culture of accommodation and passiveness when in the presence of subpar performance. Somehow, at least at Y-12, a culture of tolerance overcame a culture of 

performance. And while one could never, ever condone the actions ofthe trespassers on 

July 28, they inadvertently provided a much needed wakeup-call to those responsible for 

physical security at the nation's nuclear facilities. And while the Y-12 trespassers could 

not, in retrospect, pose a meaningful threat even given the extent of access they achieved, 

the magnitude of the failure of the security system was extraordinary. Strikingly, there 

have been incidents in earlier years at Savannah River and Rocky Flats that point to much 

the same cultural shortcomings as have been allowed to persist at Y-12. Change is 

needed ... and needed quickly. 

I would note that a great deal of additional information resides at CSIS, and I believe it 

would be a sound investment for it to be compiled and provided to the DoE. 

Finally, I am honored that you requested that I participate in such an important 

undertaking and pleased that you encouraged me to be forthright in my assessment. I hope 

that my comments will be viewed as constructively offered and that they might assist you 

and the members of your team in addressing the challenges the nation confronts in 

securing nuclear assets. 

Norman R. Augustine 

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63 

Secretary Steven Chu 

U.S. Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Ave SW 

Washington. DC 20585 

Dear Steve: 

December 6. 2012 

f am writing in response to your request for advice on the management 

of physical security at the facilities \vith Category 1 material under DOE controL 

You have explained that this request arose as a result of the event at the Y-12 

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility in July in \.vhich three people, 

including an elderly nun. \-"ere able to penetrate the securit~y fences and to 

deface the exterior of the building before being apprehended. In addition to this 

troubling breach, the first responder's casual behavior upon encountering the 

intruders was completely inappropriate given the nature oCthe site. 

The security challenge conironting the Department is a complicated one 

for a variety of reasons. The DOE approach to security has evolved since 9/11 

from something that is akin to industrial security to a system involving an elite 

paramilitary force that can defend against a sophisticated terrorist attack. This 

has been a challenge both bccause ofthe need to enhance the capabilities of the 

protective forces and because the change has entailed significant expense to 

strengthen security structures and systems at facilities that ,vere not initially 

designed with this type of security in mind. These changes had to be 

undertaken \vithin budgetary limitations at a time v,/hen the Department needed 

to pursue many other important (and expensive) programs. The changing 

demands on the weapons complex over the years have added yet another layer 

of complexity. And any change in security had to be accomplished ,yithin a 

legal and administrative structure for the Department that is extraordinarily 

complicated. 

The Department has not lacked for an abundance ofthoughtJul studies 

on the security issue over the years. Considerable change has been introduced 

as a result. but the Y-12 episode reveals that problems remaio. Although my 

examination of the security issues confronting the Department has necessarily 

been limited, I am satistied that the Y ~ 12 episode has been taken very seriously 

and considerable etlort has been made to ensure that security is strong 

throughout the complex. I have thus focused on your rcquest to consider 

\vhether there arc issues relating to the management structure for physical 

security. I know that you seek confidence that the security obligation will be 

fulfilled in an effective way for the long tern1. 
64 

Secretary Steven Chu 

December 5. 2012 

Page 2 

You specifically asked \vhether the \vholesale modification of the 

management structure for physical security is appropriate. As you know, the 

current system relics on contractors to provide security. (The details of this 

approach arc discussed further below.) The obvious alternative \\lould be to 

federalize the protective torce (partially or completely) so that the security 

officers become DOE employees. Federalization could shorten chains of 

command behveen Jederal policymakers and the implementers of security, 

would encourage consistent application of policies and procedures across sites, 

would reflect the reality that security is a central federal function at these sites, 

and perhaps most importantly. would eliminate the potential for strikes by the 

protective force. Moreover. I understand that the unions at one time advocated 

such a change in order to deal with retirement and 10ng-tenn disability concerns 

of the security ot11cers. 

An evaluation by DOE in 2009 concluded that the merits of 

federalization turned on three factors; implementation of elite force concepts in 

a cost-effective manner. deten11ination of practical avenues to address 

retirement and disability concerns. and identification of methods to address 

potential protective force \\lork stoppages. Memorandum to the Acting Deputy 

Secretary ii'om T.P. D'Agostino and G.S. Podonsky (Jan. 13,2009). The 

review found that the cost issue was the most important factor that should guide 

a decision and concluded that federalization would result in increased costs 

without commensurate benefits, particularly given the progress that had been 

made in implementing the elite force approach using contractors. The revie\v 

also concluded that federalization did not offer a viable approach to address the 

union concerns because of the ditlicultics and complexities of a transition of 

guards from private-sector employment to federal employment. And, although 

it acknowledged that the most compelling reason to pursue federalization was to 

prevent work stoppages by unionized protective force members. it concluded 

that this risk could be managed by the execution of contingency protective force 

operations in such a situation, an approach that DOE has had to take in 

connection \'lith a strike at Pantcx. Although to my mind the issue is a close 

one. I have no informed basis to challenge this recent evaluation. 

One additional factor in favor of federalization is that a dramatic change 

of this nature could facilitate the introduction of a ne\\' security culture. In a 

sense, such a step would serve to wipe the slate clean and demonstrate that very 

different performance is expected going fOf\.vard. The Office of Secure 

Transport uses federal employees and has satisfactorily fulfilled its functions. 

\vhich serves to shmv that federalization can work. But no doubt a wholesale 

change in management structure would be very expensive to accomplish. And. 

if the protective force were federal employees. the imposition of discipline 

would he more difficult and in the end federalization could reduce flexibility. 

A variant is limited federalization. For example. one might federalize 

the aD11ed component of the protective forces, while relying on a contractor tor 

the remaining services. This presumably \vould reduce the cost of the transition 
65 

Secretary Steven Chu 

December 5. 2012 

Page 3 

and \vould recognize the unique federal role of those who are authorized to use 

deadly force. Since federal employees cannot strike. this approach would 

facilitate the ability to respond to a work stoppage. But this approach \vould 

then complicate the chains of command within the protective forces. And it 

"yould make even more dif1icult the cha!1enge of providing a career path for 

those in the anned component of the protective torces. (This issue is discussed 

below.) 

I conclude that a decision to federalize all or a part of the protective 

tC)fce would be difficult, would be expensive to accomplish, and would create 

some new challenges. In the absence of compelling benefits, it is probably not 

warranted. But it is an approach that may be worthy of consideration if efforts 

to make the necessary changes cannot be accomplished by a less drastic 

appn)ach. 

A variant to the federalization of the protective 10rce as DOE employees 

is to engage another federal agency, such as the Department of Defense or the 

Department of Homeland Security, to provide security. Engagement of another 

agency to provide security would serve to complicate chains of command and 

\'Vould likcly create confusion as to \:vho was in charge at the sites. The 

interfaces between the DOE and the management and operations C'M&O") 

contractors would become even more complicated and confusing. Even if DOE 

were to engage another agency to provide security, the Department would still 

be accountable for the security posture. And, although I have not pursued the 

point. I am doubtful that another agency would be willing take on the task. I 

conclude that such an approach is not suitable. 

I thus conclude that it is reasonahle to continue to rely on private 

contractors to provide security. I hasten to add. however, that there are 

opportunities to improve the management of security. Some of my suggestions 

J()llO\v: 

l. Align authority and responsihilitv. I\t Y-12, there was a division of 

responsibility for physical protection behveen the contractor responsible 

for the protective officers and the M&O contractor responsible for the 

fences, various sensors and other equipment that are part of the physical 

protection system. The result was a fractured management structure. 

The interface behveen the contractors was clearly not thnctioning: their 

priorities "vere not aligned. Cameras in the affected area were out of 

service and had been for a considerable time and the system of detectors. 

which had recently been signiJicantly upgraded, was plagued by 

frequent false alanns. This resulted in a situation in July in \vhich the 

protective fl)l"ce did not appreciate that the alanTIs associated ,:vith the 

breach of the fences \vere "rear' and the absence of functioning camcras 

did not enable the appropriate immediate surveillance of the situation. 

Although no doubt a system involving multiple contractors could be 

made to \vork, a simplified structure in which one contractor is 
66 

Secretary Steven Chu 

December 5. 2012 

Page 4 

responsible for all elements of security \yould provide greater assurance 

that the security approach is integrated and that issues that otherwise 

would cross lines behveen contractors are addressed. 

Although a compelling case can be made for assuring that all security 

functions are the responsibility of a single contractor. there is a 

subsidiary question \vhether security should be the subject of a separate 

contract from that \vith the M&O contractor. The advantage of 

separation is that the security responsihility could be allocated to an 

entity "vith strong skills in that one area, ·whereas the M&O contractor 

presumably must be selected based on a balancing of a variety of 

capabilities. But. again. separating the security function [rom the overall 

site responsibility \vill require a complicated interface between 

contractors, with opportunities for miscommunication and misalignment 

of priorities: security should be an integral part of site operations, not an 

add-on. Indeed, a single chain of command "vill be mandatory during a 

security event. As a result. the favored course. it seems to me, is to 

require the M&O contractor to fulfill the security function and to ensure, 

through proper controls, that it meets its responsibilities. 

2. Improve federal oversight. It \vas apparent that the department's system 

of oversight did not detect and con"eet the security problems that the Y12 incident revealed. The large number of false alanns \vas tolerated, 

raising questions about the acceptance testing, readiness. and 

maintenance of the ARGUS system. The cameras \vere not viewed as 

critical security equipment, \.vith the result that a significant number 

,vere inappropriately allowed to remain out of service for an extended 

period. There were signiticant departures from expected procedures by 

the first responder. as well as significant communication deficiencies. 

The DOE oversight "system" was seemingly unaware of these problems 

and, in tact, the evaluations of the security at Y -12 had received 

consistently high marks in the period beJore the incident. The overall 

situation reveals significant failings in oversight by DOE. I appreciate 

that the approach to oversight does implicate broader issues \vithin the 

Department as to the degree of freedom and flexibility that should be 

provided to its contractors. 

Part of the challcnge in providing proper oversight may relate to the 

cxtraordinarily complicated administrative structure within DOE, \vith 

security responsibilities spread across several offices at headquarters and 

bet\veen headquarters and the DOE field offices. Indeed, \ve have had 

some diniculty in obtaining a clear organization chart that defines the 

structure for security oversight within DOE. I understand that issues 

associated \vith dit1bsc management are subject to study \.vithin the 

National Nuclear Security Administration C'NNSA ") in an effolt that is 

being led by Brigadier General Sandra Finan. A broader examination of 

DOE's internal management of security should be undertaken in order to 
67 

Secretary Steven Chu 

December 5. 2012 

Page 5 

streamline and simplifY the structure. The aim should be to establish 

clear authority and responsibility and to assure that the responsible stafr 

has the right training and experience. Although I appreciatl.! that 

different approaches to security may \vell bc appropriate as a result of 

differing circumstances at the various DOE sites, I question whether 

different standards can be justified as a result of DOE's organizational 

structure. Efforts to achieve consistency and uniformity would be 

appropriate. 

3. Enhancement of the Protective Force. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect 

of the Y -12 incident is the behavior of (he first responder. He had 

evidently received the appropriate training, but decided to ignore it. He 

seems to have immediately concluded that the three intruders were not a 

threat and, as a result he treated them as such. Although his asscssment 

proved to be correct attackers might seek cover for a serious assault by 

mimicking the appearances that evidently were so reassuring to the tirst 

responder. The episode reveals the importance of training and drills to 

reinforce appropriate actions by the protective torce. 

There are challenges associated with thc maintenance of an 

appropriately trained protective force. DOE has enhanced the 

capabilities of its protective forces significantly with the aim ofa 

establishing an elite paramilitary capability that can respond to a very 

capable and sophisticated adversary. The physical qualifications and 

capabilities of many members or the force must be maintained at a high 

leveL \\.'hich creates a challenge in establishing a career tn~ieetory lor the 

protective oilicers. Having a force that maintains its "edge" is dilIieult. 

given that actual attacks have not occurred. Indeed, overcoming 

boredom among the members of the protective force is dit1icult. The 

commercial nuclear industry has confronted many of these same 

challenges and has sought to cstablish and maintain an esprit among the 

protective torce. It encourages attentiveness by frequent foree-on-force 

drills. regular transitions among posts, and allmving other activities. 

such as access to the web while on post. in appropriate circumstances. ]t 

has sought to respond to the demanding physical challenges that may 

become more difficult as the security officers age by enabling and 

encouraging thcm to migrate to other jobs at the site. In short it has 

sought to establish and reinf()fce that the protective tixce is an important 

part of the team that operates the plant and that its members have career 

opportunities. Some of these lessons may be relevant to the DOE sites. 

4. Securitv Culture. The commercial nuclear industry has learned that the 

essential ingredient for assuring safe operations is the establishment of a 

culture in which safety is the highest priority. Management has the 

obligation to estab1ish such a culture by its \vords and deeds. including 

the allocation of resources. Each plant \vorker has an individual 

responsibility to assure that any safety issue that a worker observes is 
68 

Secretary Steven Chu 

Decemher 5. 2012 

Page 6 

addressed even it is not within the \yorker's responsibilities: if a 

supervisor fails to respond, the \vorker is obligated to raise the issue to a 

higher level and severe sanctions arc imposed if any retaliation against 

such a \vorker occurs. Given the critical importance of security at the 

Category 1 sites. I believe that an analogous security culture needs to be 

established at the DOE sites. That is. everyone on the site should 

understand that security is his or her responsibility. Establishing such a 

culture \vill be ditlicuit in a system in \vhleh individuals are othervvise 

encouraged to focus on individual responsibilities, but truly effective 

security requires such a change. 

5. Balance. The Y -12 episode has appropriately caused a heightened 

awareness of the importance of physical security. This focus should not 

be allmved to unduly distort DOE's em)rts. The aim should be to 

evaluate security using a systems approach that integrates physical, 

cyber, and personnel security in order to reduce aggregate 

vulnerabilities. Balance should be maintained. 

In developing my thinking on the charge that you presented. 1 have had 

the benefit of interactions \vith Nonn Augustine and Don Alston. as well as 

substantial assistance from the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

("CSIS"). I was aided by extensive materials assembled by CSIS with DOE 

assistance concerning the various security revie\vs undertaken over the years. by 

site visits. by discussions with DOE and contractor stan: and by interviews \vith 

knowledgeable individuals. (Some of these interviews were undcrtaken by 

CSIS staff.) I very much appreciate this assistance, Nonetheless. this letter 

reflects my perspective. My comments should not be attributed to the various 

individuals \vho have helped to shape my judgments. 

I hope this lettcr is helpfuL Please feel iree to contact me if you havc 

any questions. 

Best regards. 

Richard A. Meserve 
69 

BIOGRAPHY 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

MAJOR GENERAL C. DONALD ALSTON 

Retired Sep. 1, 2012. 

In his last assignment. Maj. Gen. C. Donald Alston 

was Commander, 20th Air Force, Air Force Global 

Strike Command, and Commander, Task Force 

214, U.S. Strategic Command, Francis E. Warren 

Air Force Base, Wyo. He was responsible for the 

nation's intercontinental ballistic missile force, 

organized into three operational wings with more 

than 9,600 people. 

General Alston was commissioned in 1978 

following graduation from the U.S. Air Force 

Academy. He has commanded at the squadron, 

group and wing levels and served as the first 

Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and 

Nuclear Integration at Headquarters U.S. Air 

Force. He has worked as a liaison officer to the 

U.S. House of Representatives, and also 

performed duties as the executive assistant to the 

Secretary of the Air Force in Washington, D.C. 

General Alston also served as the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Strategic Communications and the 

spokesperson for Multi-National Force - Iraq in 

Baghdad. 

EDUCATION 

1978 Bachelor of Science degree, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo. 

1984 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1986 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence 

1986 Master's degree in business administration, Golden Gate University, Calif. 

1995 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1998 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 

2003 National Security Management Course, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse 

University 

2011 Senior Executives in National and International Security Program, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy 

School of Government, Executive Education 

ASSIGNMENTS 

1. July 1978 - January 1979, ICBM combat crew training, Sheppard AFB, Texas; and Vandenberg AFB, 

Calif. 

2. January 1979 - December 1980, deputy missile combat crew commander, 571st Strategic Missile 
70 

Squadron; and instructor and deputy missile combat crew member, 390th Strategic Missile Wing, DavisMonthan AFB, Ariz. 

3. January 1981 - February 1982, Titan II missile combat crew commander, 570th Strategic Missile 

Squadron, Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. 

4. February 1982 - March 1984, emergency war order training instructor, 390th Strategic Missile Wing. DavisMonthan AFB, Ariz. 

5. March 1984 - May 1984, student, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

6. May 1984 - August 1987, Chief, Emergency War Order Training Branch, and Chief, Plans Division, 

Directorate of Missiles, Headquarters 15th Air Force, March AFB, Calif. 

7. August 1987 - December 1990, congressional inquiries officer, later, liaison officer, U.S. House of 

Representatives, Air Force Legislative liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

8. January 1991 - March 1993, executive assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary 

of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

9. June 1993 - July 1994, Commander, 12th Missile Squadron, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. 

10. August 1994 - June 1995, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

11. June 1995 - May 1996, Deputy Director, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Force Space 

Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

12. May 1996 - July 1997, executive officer to the Vice Commander, Headquarters Air Force Space 

Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

13. July 1997 - July 1999, Chief, Requirements Integration Branch, later, Chief, Integration Division, 

Directorate of Plans, U.S. Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

14. August 1999 - March 2001, Commander, 341st Operations Group, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. 

15. March 2001 - July 2002, Vice Commander, 21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

16. July 2002 - July 2004, Commander, 341st Space Wing, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. 

17. July 2004 - February 2005, Assistant Director, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Air Force Space 

Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

18. February 2005 - February 2006, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Communications, and spokesperson, 

Multi-National Force - Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq 

19. February 2006 - September 2007, Director of Air, Space and Information Operations, Headquarters Air 

Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

20. September 2007 - February 2008, Director, Space and Nuclear Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 

Washington, D.C. 

21. February 2008 - October 2008, Director, Nuclear Operations, Plans and Requirements, Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

22. November 2008 - June 2010, Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

23. July 2010 - present, Commander, 20th Air Force, Air Force Global Strike Command, and Commander, 

Task Force 214, U.S. Strategic Command, Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyo. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

1. May 1997 - May 1998, Chief, Requirements and Integration Branch, Headquarters USSPACECOM, 

Peterson AFB, Colo., as a lieutenant colonel 

2. May 1998 - May 1999, Chief, Integration Division, Headquarters USSPACECOM, Peterson AFB, Colo., as 

a colonel 

3. February 2005 - February 2006, Chief, Communications Division, Strategic Effects, Multi-National Force -

Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq, as a brigadier general 

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION 

Badges: Master Missile Badge with operations designator; Master Space Badge; basic parachutist 

Weapon Systems: Titan II, Minuteman III A-M CDB, Minuteman III REACT NB 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster 
71 

Bronze Star Medal 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters 

Joint Service Commendation Medal 

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Air Force Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with silver and three bronze oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Organizational Excellence Award 

Combat Readiness Medal 

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star 

Iraq Campaign Medal 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant May 31, 1978 

First Lieutenant May 31, 1980 

Captain May 31, 1982 

Major April 1, 1989 

Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 1993 

Colonel Sept. 1, 1998 

Brigadier General Aug. 1, 2005 

Major General Sept. 2, 2008 

(Current as of December 2011) 
72 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

PRESENT A nON TO THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SUBJECT: Nuclear Security: Actions, Accountability, and Refonn 

STATEMENT OF: Brigadier General Sandra E. Finan 

Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Ccnter 

Based on Previous Position as 

Acting Chief of Delense Nuclear Security, NNSA 

February 28, 2013 

NOT FOR PUBLICA nON UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTA nVES 
73 

Introduction 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished Members ofthc Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to discuss the study I conducted on the National Nuclear Security 

Administration's (NNSA) federal security organization and assessment model. Although I am 

no longer assigned to the NNSA, I am pleased to share our observations based on our 90 day 

study. 

2 

In the aftermath of the July 28, 2012 security incident at the National Nuclear Security 

Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex, the leadership of the NNSA and the 

Department of Energy (DOE) took action to address the security failures at Y -12. The initial 

information gathered revealed that issues at Y -12 were part of a larger pattern of security 

program management deficiencies within the NNSA. These security issues prompted the 1-<'NSA 

Administrator to commission a Task Force to analyze the current Federal NNSA security 

organizational structure and security oversight model and recommend possible improvements. 

The NNSA Administrator directed the Task Force to: 

• Analyze current NNSA security organizational structure and recommend possible 

improvements that would improve operational focus, oversight, and culture sustainment. 

• Analyze current NNSA security oversight model and mechanisms to determine what 

seams exist and what structures could be implemented to better ensure that the issues are 

found aud fixed before they hecome problems. 

While other reviews were aimed at diagnosing the root causes ofthe Y-12 event, the NNSA 

Administrator's direction called for this Task Force to focus on the "path forward" within the 

Federal NNSA organization. Under my leadership, the Task Force consisting ofNNSA, DOE, 
74 

and military specialists conducted extensive document reviews and interviewed Federal 

managers and statT as well as a selection of contractor security managers and others across the 

NNSA security organization. The Task Force collected and analyzed information, identified 

issues, and suggested a revised organizational structure and assessment model. 

3 

While we highlighted negative aspects of the NNSA security organization and assessment 

model, the Task Force found many great people on the NNSA security staffs. They are clearly 

dedicated, skilled, and hard-working and want to get the security mission done right. 

Unfortunately, NNSA security personnel have seen themselves thwarted by lack of management 

support and feci obstructed by some oftheir peers. Their difficulties were compounded by the 

absence of a workforce strategy to recruit, retain, and develop a cadre of talented, knowledgeable 

and experienced security professionals. Thus, it is all the more encouraging that these personnel, 

almost without exception, genuinely care about doing good work. Their continued strong desire 

to build a successful security organization is a hopeful sign for the future. 

Summary Findings 

The Task Force noted significant deficiencies in security organization, oversight, and culture 

sustainment throughout the NNSA security organizations. In the NNSA security organizations, 

line management authority was ill-defined and claimed by multiple Federal NNSA organizations. 

On the one hand, the "Federal field organizations" (federal site offices and the nuclear 

production office which oversees the management and operating contracts) exercised line 

management authority over the site security contractors via the contract management structure. 

On the other hand, the NNSA Headquarters security organization asserted that it also had such 

authority. Absent clearly defined lines of authority, many individuals asserted authority, while 

correspondingly few have assigned responsibility. This lack of clear lines of authority 
75 

contributed to a widespread practice of decision-making by consensus. When consensus failed, 

organizational elements acted independently or not at all, which undermined effective 

implementation ofthe security program. 

4 

The Task Force further noted a significant gap in the current NNSA security organizational 

structure. At the strategic level the NNSA Headquarters organization had been ineffective and 

had intervened in field tactical execution. The Federal field organizations had been ineffective in 

performing their tactical responsibilities for executing the security program and had intervened in 

strategic matters. Additionally, there had not been a clearly identified operationally-focused 

organization that bridged the gap between strategic and tactical responsibilities and addressed 

standardization, field execution, and multi-site analysis. 

The Task Force found a weak security performance assessment model. It found that NNSA 

relied overwhelmingly upon Federal staff simply reviewing contractor-provided data, rather than 

effectively assessing performance itself. At the same time, misinterpretation of the DOE Safety 

and Security Reform Plan resulted in less stringent independent oversight of security operations. 

As a result of numerous interviews, the Task Force also observed that potentially critical 

management infonnation was not being reported clearly to the appropriate decision makers. 

As concerning as these structural and assessment issues might be, the most striking result of this 

review falls in the area of culture sustainment. It quickly became evident that the Task Force 

findings closely resembled those presented in numerous prior reports. While NNSA has 

attempted to correct some identified issues over the years, it has not adequately emphasized 

effective security mission performance. In recent years, NNSA security leaders have chosen to 

emphasize security cost containment to the detriment of security program execution. The idea 

that the requirements for security performance effectiveness are subordinated to cost concerns 
76 

5 

had become a prevailing concept in the NNSA security community. This emphasis had become 

endemic throughout the NNSA security culture, so much so that fundamental facility protection 

issues such as the protection of operational capabilities came to be regarded as too expensive and 

therefore "out of bounds" for analysis. The NNSA security culture had focused on fiscal 

limitations over effective performance. This resulted in an environment in which deficiencies 

were worked at the margins rather than management addressing core issues. 

These issues underscored the critical role of effective leaders. While outside the charter of this 

Task Force, it must be acknowledged that leadership plays the key role in mission 

accomplishment. The Task Force recognized that effective leadership may compensate for 

structural deficiencies within an organization; however, restructuring alone cannot overcome 

leadership shortcomings. The best assessment model is useless ifleaders fail to effectively 

implement it. Additionally, the assessment model will not be effective unless leaders 

consistently demand comprehensive, unbiased information. NNSA must take ownership of its 

history of security failures. Leadership must take bold and enduring actions if this pattern is to 

be broken. 

NNSA Organizational Model 

The existing NNSA security organizational structure was convoluted and ineffective. The Task 

Force observed that lines of authority in virtually every organizational function were divided. 

The NNSA security function was not well organized or effectively staffed and the NA-70 policy 

development and implementation process was sub-standard. While the Chief of Defense Nuclear 

Security is the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA), this responsibility has been unevenly 

delegated and was open to inconsistent interpretation. Security staffs were responsible to 

multiple lines of authority and for some il.lllctions may not be responsible to anyone. The most 
77 

6 

fundamental issues arose from the relationship between NA-70 and the Federal field 

organizations. NA-70 believed that it had line management authority over the security elements 

within the Federal field organizations. However, the managers ofthese field organizations had 

been formally assigned line management authority. The NNSA Act states that the Chief of 

Defense Nuclear Security role includes "the development and implementation of security 

programs". The cun'ent interpretation of this provision has been a source of ambiguity due to the 

mixing ofline and stafIresponsibilities. 

Roles and responsibilities were either undefined or not followed. The Task Force identified 

numerous occasions across the NNSA security organizations where individuals were not allowed 

to perform assigned duties or assumed roles and responsibilities nominally assigned to others. 

The confusion of roles and responsibilities was evident in NA-70, within field organizations, and 

between NA-70 and the field. For example, the approved mission and function statements for 

the two major divisions within NA-70 have little apparent relationship to the way these offices 

operated and how they interacted with each other or with the NA-70. Within field organizations, 

the Task Force noted a number of instances where management precluded staff from perfonning 

the assigned roles of their position and/or assigned personnel to unrelated duties. At times, NA70 acted as a fOl1llalline management organization, and asserted responsibilities that were 

fonnally assigned to the Federal field security organizations. NA-70 personnel were frequently 

frustrated by site-level resistance to the programmatic direction they provided and Federal field 

security managers were often similarly frustrated when NA-70 used its budget authority, its 

control over the policy process, and other activities to inject itself into what the sites regard as 

their line management decision-making process. 
78 

7 

There were no clear lines of authority. There were overlapping lines of authority aod mixed 

starf and line functions. The CSA junction nowed fi'om the NNSA Administrator through the 

Chief of Dcfensc Nuclear Security to the Fcderal field organizations. Linc management 

authority went from the NNSA Administrator through the Associate Administrator for 

Infrastructure and Operations (NA- 00), to the field. However, NA-70 attempted to cxert line 

management authority and provided programmatic guidance directly to the Federal field security 

managers. While Federal field organizations administer the contracts governing the actual 

performance of the security mission, NA-70 routinely interacted with the security contractors. 

Furthermore, NA-70, not the line managers, was the primary executer of the NNSA security 

budget. 

The security policy process was sub-standard. The Task Force identified that there was no 

clearly articulated or consistently implemented NNSA security policy process. A major concern 

was the supplanting of DOE Security Orders with generic and less restrictive NNSA policies 

(NAPs). This appeared to be based on a desire to reducc funding demands through a reduction 

ofrequirements. Additionally, the Task Force noted a desire on the part of some NA-70 senior 

managers to maximize separation fi'om DOE HSS policics and activities. Within NA-70, policy 

and guidance were issued through a variety of formal and infonnal mechanisms with elTatic 

distribution. The Task Force identified that some Federal field organizations were inconsistent 

in their acceptance and application ofNA-70 issued policies. Finally, NA-70 policy and 

guidance tended to be vague resulting in widely differing interpretations by field personnel. 

The NNSA Federal security organization was not effectively structured or staffed. While 

there were clearly strategic (Headquarters) and tactical (Federal field organizations and 

contractors) levels, there was little indication of an effective operational element with 
79 

responsibi lity for security program functions such as site assistance and standardization of 

program execution. The Task Force also noted that the Federal field organizations structured 

their security functions substantially differently. This resulted in a lack of standardization of 

both organization and execution ofthe security program. At some sites there was weakening of 

the security function and reduced senior management attention. There were a number of 

personnel issues associated with the security professional staff including the lack ofa human 

capital development plan, no career path, and limited mobility. Additionally. the Task Force 

noted an overreliance on support service contractors who primarily assisted the NA-70 

organization. 

Federal Assessment Model 

8 

The Task Force expended considerable effort attempting to describe, understand and analyze the 

current assessment model and mechanisms. 

The failure to adequately assess security system performance and to clearly and unequivocally 

report deficiencies to the appropriate senior managers has been identified as a significant 

contributing cause to the Y-12 security incident. The Task Force focused upon the performance 

assessment process as implemented by Federal field and Headquarters organizations within 

NNSA. Although contractor self-assessments were the first-line elements in the security 

performance assessment process, these were outside the direct scope of the review. 

Strengthening the contractor self-assessment process is an important objective, but cannot 

replace a rigorous Federal assessment process. 

NNSA did not have an adequate security performance assessment process or capability. 

The performance assessment capabilities of Federal security organizations within NNSA were 
80 

9 

virtually non-existent. Essentially all responsibility for performance assessment was delegated to 

the Federal field organizations. The current Federal field organizations were typically limited to 

"shadowing" contractor self-assessments and/or rcviewing the reports these self-assessmcnts 

generated. Moreover, there was a tendency on the part of some field Federal stafTto adopt the 

role of defending "their" contractors rather than attempting to objectively assess contractor 

performance. At the Headquarters level, the NA-70 performance assessment [unction had only 

three full-time Federal staff members. The Task Force noted that the NA-70 assessment process 

was largely confined to the review of submitted paperwork. The result was that there was no 

NNSA Federal organization capable ofperfonning effective security performance assessment. 

The "systems-based" assessment model as implemented was ineffective for security. 

Misinterpretation, and/or misapplication of the DOE Safety and Security Reform Plan, dated 

March 16,2010, resulted in a weakened Federal security assessment program. In particular, this 

document stated: "Security Performance: Contractors are provided the flexibility to tailor and 

implement security programs in light of their situation and to develop corresponding risk- and 

performance-based protection strategies without excessive Federal oversight or overlyprescriptive Departmental requirements." This guidance was further expanded upon and 

eventually articulated in NAP-21, Transfonnation Governance and Oversight Initiative. The 

belief arose that 'eyes on, hands off precluded Federal security stafftrom conducting 

performance-based assessments of contractors. As a result, most Federal assessment was based 

on paperwork generated by the contractor. This paper-based system of assessment, without 

sufficient performance verification, was inadequate for effective evaluation of security 

operations. 
81 

10 

NNSA had no clear and consistent performance baseline for security program 

implementation. A performance baseline, set fOlth in detailed standards and criteria, is the 

keystone of an effective security program. Precisely articulated standards and criteria further 

provide an objective foundation for performance assessment. NNSA did not have the standards 

or criteria necessary to effectively measure security program performance. The absence of such 

standards and criteria diminished the ability to identify potentially significant performance 

deficiencies. The Task Force noted that the lack of standards and criteria had been coupled with 

the widespread notion that contractors must only be told "what" the mission is, not "how" the 

mission is to be accomplished. While this approach may be appropriate in other areas, it was 

ineffective as applied to security programs. Therefore, security tasks were not necessarily 

perfonned in a manner consistent with NNSA security requirements. 

The current assessment process was biased against criticism. The Task Force noted a distinct 

bias against finding and stating performance criticisms. The NNSA Federal assessment relies 

heavily on contractor selt~assessment. While an impOltant and useful tool, contractor selt~ 

assessments tend to be insufficiently objective. The primary Federal assessment role was 

performed by field staff Long-term geographic proximity to site contractors can compromise 

the objectivity of these Federal assessors. Moreover, the intermingling of management and 

assessment roles within Federal tield organizations can also contribute to less objective 

assessment. The NA-70 Headquarters performance assessment process, being paper-based, 

could not validate the information submitted. Information provided to the Task Force suggested 

that in some instances information considered to be unfavorable was being "watered down" or 

obscured. Furthermore, information was presented that indicate differing opinions were being 
82 

II 

suppressed by some senior managers in the field and at Headquarters. As a result. NNSA senior 

leadership may not have received all infonnation needed to make quality decisions. 

Recommended Organizational Structure 

Recommend an organizational structure that separates the line function for executing the security 

mission from the Headquarters stafffunction. Additionally, create an operational-level 

organization that focuses on security implementation and standardization. Distinct roles and 

responsibilities should be associated with tactical, operational, and strategic-level security 

functions. Tactical cxecution of contract administration occurs at the Federal field organizations. 

Operational implementation and standardization 01" operations across the security program occurs 

at the NA-OO level. Strategic-level policy guidance, requirements determination, and 

performance assessment occur in Headquarters NNSA, NA-70. 

In order to clarifY the line of authority, CSA must flow from the NNSA Administrator, through 

the head ofthe NA-OO, to the Federal field managers, and finally to the designated CSA at field 

sites, with no re-delegations authorized to non-Federal individuals. This authority should follow 

the same path as the line authority. The asserted security line management tie between the Chief 

of Defense Nuclear Security and the security managers in the field should be terminated in order 

to ensure a single, clear line of authority. 

In terms of clarifying line and staff functions, the current NA-70 organization needs to be 

restructured so that it serves solely as a staff organization at the strategic level. Specific 

alignment within the divisions can be varied. The most important change in NA-70 is the standup of the Performance Assessment Division -- a new function responsible for assessment of 
83 

12 

contractor and Federal field organization performance. This is the entity that the Chief of 

Defense Nuclear Security would use to verify that security programs are properly implemented. 

A new security operations organizational level needs to be stood up within the NA-OO structure. 

The responsibilities of this office are to ensure that the policies and guidance provided by the 

NA-70 staff are executed in the field. It will also ensure standardization of security procedures 

across the field locations as well as provide field assistance, and a conduit for field concerns to 

be surfaced to the NA-70 staff. 

Resource planning and budgeting, and project management responsibilities will be realigned 

from NA-70 to the new operational-level organization. This establishes a clear linkage between 

budget fonnulation and mission execution and establishes an equally clear boundary between 

budget considerations and the fonnulation of requirements. An expanded 

intelligence/counterintelligence liaison is intended to ensure that Federal security managers get 

needed information and have appropriate ties to law enforcement and intelligence-related 

agencies. 

At the tactical level in the field, the multiple lines of authority are eliminated and direction will 

come from a single line of authority. All authorities will run through the Federal field 

organization manager to the appropriate security manager. The Federal field organization scope 

of duties will include primary contract administrative functions--including reviews of contractor 

reports, analysis, security plans, and other required documentation; partnering with the executing 

contractor; remaining knowledgeable and up-to-date on the content, operations, and effectiveness 

of the contractor's security implementation; alerting management of all concerns related to 

contractor execution of the security mission. 
84 

13 

This organizational structure will help define and clarify roles and responsibilities and facilitate a 

strong mission focus. It divides resourcing II-om requirements determination in order to ensure 

that requirements are appropriately stated, weighed against budget resources and decisions made 

on accepting risks at the appropriate level. It provides a single line of authority to those 

operating in the field and maintains an appropriate span of control. 

Recommended Assessment Model 

Recommend a three-tiered assessment process that strengthens the role of Federal security 

assessment within NNSA without diminishing the legitimate need for contractors to maintain 

their own selt~assessment capabilities. 

The contractor self-assessment process continues as a first tier in the overall assessment process. 

The primary audience for the contractor self-assessments should be the contractor security 

managers themselves. However, the self-assessments should follow a consistent, program-wide 

format, and be made available for review at all higher levels of management. Contractors should 

he required to identity, report, and resolve security issues--sanctions should come when a higher 

level assessment uncovers problems that the contractor se1J~assessments fail to identify or 

properly address. Even when an issue is readily resolved and corrective actions are immediate, a 

finding should be issued and the corrective action recorded. Failure to do so inevitably hides 

potential negative trends. Contractor self-assessments should involve active performance testing 

rather than simply relying on work observation and document review--effective security 

performance can only be evaluated through testing. 

The fundamental purpose of Federal security performance assessment is to ensure that 

requirements are properly implemented. Therefore, the primary Federal assessment organization 
85 

14 

should ultimately report to the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, who is responsible for 

requirements. This provides independence not only ii'om the contractors, but also from the 

tactical-level Federal field staff whose necessary day-to-day interaction with contractor managers 

and staff risks loss of objectivity. This enables the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security to better 

ensure effective implementation ofNNSA security programs. Additionally, it provides feedback 

on performance to the operational and tactical levels. 

These Federal security assessments should include performance testing of all critical elements. 

The assessors should issue clear findings which are to be tracked and closed in a program-wide 

corrective action management system. Federal assessors should also look closely at the 

contractor seU:assessment process; "failures to identily" by the contractor self-assessment 

element should automatically rise to the level of significant findings. 

The final tier ofthe assessment model should explicitly rely upon the services of the independent 

security oversight function currently provided by HSS. NNSA should arrange for a regular 

process of comprehensive inspections. The oversight function should be encouraged to issue 

strong findings for matters of potential concern to the NNSA Administrator and the Secretary of 

Energy, and should routinely evaluate the pertonnance of contractor self-assessments and the 

Federal assessment program. 

This performance assessment model assumes a common requirements base that is employed at 

all levels and across the NNSA security program. While some allowance may be made for sitespecific issues, the fundamental elements of this requirements base should be an appropriately 

integrated system of DOE policies, NNSA implementation directives, and field operational 

guidance. The requirements base should be reflected in approved documents such as site 

Safeguards and Security Plans. Specific performance requirements should be articulated in 
86 

detailed performance standards and criteria suppOlted by a commonly understood and utilized 

performance testing process. 

Closing 

15 

Over the years, there has been tension between implementation of security and conduct of 

operations. Whenever there have been significant incidents of security concern, there have been 

corresponding swings of the pendulum towards a more rigorous security program. Security 

program emphasis has increased after espionage cases, internal security lapses, and external 

events such as the September II, 200 I attacks. However, over time, the general trend has been 

to accept more risk and to reduce the perceived burden and cost of the security mission. 

FUlthermore, the trend has been to remove security from an integral mission role, adversely 

affecting the NNSA security program. The events at Y -12 illustrate how far the pendulum has 

swung in the wrong direction. 

The Secretary of Energy characterized the Y -12 events as "unacceptable" and clearly stated that 

security is the highest organizational priority. The NNSA Administrator has been equally 

emphatic in numerous public statements since the incident. The evidence from Y-12 and from 

prior security incidents points to a culture of compromises. Moving forward, NNSA must 

establish and sustain an effective security program. NNSA must address the significant flaws in 

the current organizational structure for security and the associated assessment model. NNSA 

must clearly and consistently emphasize the importance of security. Ensuring that the right 

leadership is in the right position is absolutely critical to success. The daunting prospect-and 

the one that will require the consistent emphasis of current and future Secretaries of Energy and 

future Administrators of the NNSA-will be to instill a culture that embraces security as a 
87 

16 

fundamental and essential element of the NNSA mission. lfNNSA fails in this, then senior 

leaders will again find themselves answering to the American people for the failures of security. 

Sooner or later, the perpetrator will not be peacefully-minded. 
88 

2112/13 BRIGADIER GENERAL SANDRA E. FINAN 

BIOGRAPHY 

BRIGADIER GENERAL SANDRA E. FINAN 

Brig. Gen. Sandra E. Finan is the Commander, Air 

Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Kirtland Air Force 

Base, N.M. The center is composed of a 

headquarters staff, one wing and two wing-equivalent 

directorates: the 377th Air Base Wing and Nuclear 

Capabilities Directorate at Kirtland AFB; and the 

ICBM Systems Directorate at Hill AFB, Utah. The 

AFNWC comprises more than 3,500 Airmen at 11 

locations in the United States and Europe and is 

responsible for the entire scope of nuclear weapons 

sustainment functions, 

General Finan entered the Air National Guard in 

1982 as an enlisted cryptographic equipment 

repairperson. She receb.ed her Air Force 

commission in 1985 as a distinguished graduate of 

Officer Training SchooL She has sen.ed in a variety 

of space and nuclear assignments in missile crew 

operations; training and evaluations; satellite 

command and control; and satellite operations. The 

general has held senior staff assignments as the Air 

Force Global Strike Command Inspector General 

and the Air Force Space Command Director of Nuclear Operations. 

Her commands include a space operations squadron and missile wing. General Finan has deployed to the 

Combined Air Operations Center in Southwest Asia as the Director of Space Forces in support of Operations 

Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, Prevlously, she was the Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for 

Military Application, Office of Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of 

Energy. 

EDUCATION 

1978 Bachelor of Arts in music education, Califomia State Uni""rsity, San Bernardino 

1989 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1989 Master of Science in systems management, Uni""rsity of Southern California. Los Angeles 

1997 Master of Arts in national defense and strategic studies, Naval Command and Staff College, Newport, R.L 

1997 Anned Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 

2004 Master of Strategic Studies degree, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

2006 National Security Fellow, Syracuse Uni""rsity, NY 

ASSIGNMENTS 

1. No""mber 1982 - January 1985, Air National Guard cryptographic technician and Air Force Resen.e military 

training instructor, Lackland AFB, Texas 

2. April 1985 - May 1987, protocol officer and executi"" officer, 2nd Bombardment Wing, Barksdale AFB, La. 

3. June 1987 - August 1987, student, undergraduate missile training. Vandenberg AFB, Calif. 

113 
89 

2112/13 BRIGADIER GENERAL SANDRA E. FINAN 

4. September 1987 August 1991, senior evaluator commander and missile combat crew member, 341st 

Missile Wing, Malmstrom AFB, Mont 

5, September 1991 September 1993, command operations evaluator, 3901st Missile Evaluation Squadron, 

Vandenberg AFB, Calil, 

6, October 1993 June 1996, program manager; Chief, Standardization and Evaluation; and chief, Training 

Programs, 20th Air Force, FE Warren AFB, Wyo, 

7, July 1996 - June 1997, student, Naval Command and Staff College, Newport, RL 

8. July 1997 - September 1997, student, Joint Professional Military Education Phase II, Armed Forces Staff 

College, Norfolk, Va. 

9. October 1997 - August 1999, special assistant to the Commander; executi"" assistant to the deputy 

commander; and National Military Command System command and control officer, U.S. Strategic Command, 

Offutt AFB, Neb. 

10. September 1999 - August 2000, executi"" assistant to the Director of Security and Emergency Operations, 

Department of Energy, Washington, D. C. 

11. September 2000 - June 2001, operations officer, 21 st Space Operation Squadron, Onizuka Air Force 

Station, Calif. 

12. July 2001 - June 2003, Commander, 21 st Space Operations Squadron, and installation commander, 

Onizuka AFS, Calif. 

13. July 2003 - May 2004, student. Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

14. June 2004 - July 2006, Vice Commander, 91st Missile Wing, Minot AFB, N.D. 

15. July 2006 - May 2008, Commander, 341st Missile Wing, Malmstrom AFB, Mont 

16. June 2008 - August 2009, Director, Nuclear Operations, Headquarters Air Force Space Command. Peterson 

AFB, Colo. 

17. September 2009 December 2010, Inspector General, Headquarters Air Force Global Strike Command, 

Barksdale AFB, La. 

18. January 2011 - January 2013, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Military Application, Office of 

Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 

19. February 2013 - present, Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Kirtland AFB, N.M. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

1. October 1997 - August 1999, special assistant to the Commander; execuU"" assistant to the Deputy 

Commander; and National Military Command System command and control officer, U.S. Strategic Command, 

Offutt AFB, Neb., as a major and lieutenant colonel 

2. September 1999 August 2000, executi"" assistant to the Director of Security and Emergency Operations, 

Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel 

3. January 2011 January 2013, PrinCipal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Military Application, Office of 

Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., as a 

brigadier general 

BADGES 

Command Missile Badge with Operations Designator 

Command Space Badge 

WEAPONS SYSTEMS 

Minuteman II ICBM Impro""d Launch Control System 

Minuteman III Rapid Execution and Combat Target System 

Inertial Upper Stage Booster 

Air Force Satellite Control Network 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Joint Service Commendation Medal 

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Air Force Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster 

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90 

2112/13 

Combat Readiness Medal 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant April 5, 1985 

First Lieutenant April 5, 1987 

Captain April 5, 1989 

Major Aug, 1, 1996 

Lieutenant Colonel July 1, 1999 

Colonel Aug, 1, 2003 

Brigadier General May 7, 2010 

(Current as of February 2013) 

BRIGADIER GENERAL SANDRA E. FINAN 

3/3 
91 

Statement of Gregory H. Friedman 

Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

U.S. House of Representatives 

"Nuclear Security: Actions, Accountability, and Reform" 

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY 

!0:30AM 

February 28, 2013 
92 

Mr. Chairman and Members ofthe Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here at your request to 

testilY on actions ofthe Office ofInspector General relating to the July 2012 security breach at 

the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y12). I will also discuss related aspects of our work concerning contractor governance and 

physical security at Department of Energy and NNSA facilities. 

NNSA was established under the National Defense Authorization Act of2000 as a separately 

organized agency within the Department of Energy. This action was intended to allow NNSA to 

concentrate on its defense-related mission, free from other distractions. Its creation was, in large 

measure, a reaction to highly publicized concerns about management of the weapons complex. 

With an annual budget of nearly $12 billion, NNSA is charged with critically important national 

security missions relating to nuclear weapons refurbishment and storage, nuclear nonproliferation, and science and technology research. 

Y-12 is one of four production facilities in NNSA's Nuclear Security Enterprise. The site 

focuses on the processing and storage of uranium, an activity essential to the safety, security and 

effectiveness ofthe U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Y-12 maintains a sophisticated security 

mechanism that rclies on a well-trained and extensively-equipped Protective Force, advanced 

technology, and a variety of physical fortifications. 

Y -12 had long enjoyed a reputation as one of the most secure facilities in the United States. That 

reputation was materially damaged in the early morning hours of July 28,2012, when three 
93 

individuals gained access to the area surrounding the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials 

Facility at Y -12 and defaced the building. The security in place did not prevent this intrusion. 

Office of Inspector General Activities 

Response to Security Breach 

In response to the security breach, Special Agents of the Ortice ofInspector General promptly 

effectuated the arrest of the alleged trespassers. We are currently working with the Department 

of Justice and the local U.S. Attorney's Office on this matter. Separately, we initiated an 

expedited review ofthe circumstances surrounding the security breach and on August 29,2012, 

issued a report on the incident. This was the subject of a hearing before the Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations, House of Representatives Committee on Energy ~md Commerce on 

September 12,2012. 

Our review identified multiple system failures on several levels.' We found troubling 

breakdowns involving: 

• Inadequate response to alarms; 

• Failures to maintain critical security equipment; 

• Over-reliance on compensatory measures; 

• Misunderstanding of security protocols; 

• Poor communications; and, 

• Weaknesses in contract and resource management. 

lJnquby into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration's Y-12 

National Security Complex, DOE/IG-0868, available at: http://cncrgy.gov/sitcs/prod/tilcs/IG08680.pdf 

2 
94 

These issues directly contributed to an atmosphere in which trespassers were able to gain access 

to the protected security area directly adjacent to onc of the Nation's most critically important 

and highly secured weapons-related facilities. 

Especially important in light of the purpose oftoday's hearing, we found that the contractor 

govel11ance system and Federal oversight failed to identify and correct early indicators of the 

breakdowns in security systems. These same issues also contributed to a compromise of test 

materials that were intended to be used in a follow-on comprehensive inspection of the Y-12 

security posture. 

Compromise of Test Materials 

Subsequent to issuing our report on the Y-12 security breach, we received allegations that 

materials intended to be used by the Department of Energy's Office of Health, Safety and 

Security (HSS) to test Y-12 Protective Force personnel security knowledge had been 

compromised. 2 We immediately initiated a review to examine the allegations. We found that 

HSS performed a comprehensive inspection of the site's security organization following the 

July 28,2012, security breach at Y-12. That inspection, initiated on August 27,2012, included 

both practical exercises and tests designed to evaluate the knowledge, skills and abilities of the 

site's Protective Force. 

On the night of August 29, 2012, an HSS inspector discovered a copy of a security knowledge 

test in a Protective Force patrol vehicle while conducting performance testing. This discovery 

'Review of the Compromise of Security Test Materials at the Y-12 National Security Complex, 

DOE/IG-0875, available at: hUp://encrgy.gov/siles/prodililesilG-087S 2.pd!: 

3 
95 

led to concerns that the test had been improperly distributed to Protective Force personnel prior 

to its administration and that there appeared to be a compromise of the upcoming tcst. 

Our inquiry confirmed that the security knowledge test, including answers to the test questions, 

was compromised and improperly distributed to the very individuals whose knowledge was to 

have been evaluated. Contractor Protective Force personnel testified unifornlly that there was no 

intent to cheat on the HSS inspection. While we had no direct evidence to the contrary, we 

found the credibility of this testimony to be questionable, especially in light of test handling and 

distribution activities that, at best, demonstrated a lack of due care and negligence. The failure to 

properly safeguard the test prior to its administration was, in our opinion, inexplicable and 

inexcusable, especially given the intense focus on Y-12 and the security concerns at the site. 

As with the Y-12 security intrusion itself, we noted that the level of Federal involvement in the 

NNSA's contractor governance system was, at the very least, not sufficient for preventing the 

compromise oCthe test material. In particular, we observed that a cognizant Federal security 

official failed to take an active role in reviewing or controlling the test because he did not believe 

it was his role to do so. He also claimed that he lacked sufficient knowledge of existing local 

security protocols to provide comments on the structure of the test. This lack of Federal 

involvement paralleled the contractor governance issues that we observed during our review of 

the Y -12 security intrusion. 

4 
96 

In our view, responsible Federal officials should have the requisite knowledge to review and 

comment on Protective Force testing materials. Leaving it to the contractors to review a draft of 

the test, as was done in this case, is not an optimal situation. 

Contractor Governance 

The Y-12 security intrusion and test compromise issues raised serious concerns about NNSA's 

implementation of its contractor governance approach. NNSA's approach relies on contractors 

to assess and evaluate their own performance, with Federal oversight of contractor activities, 

especially with regard to nuclear safety and security. Since July 2007, the Department of 

Energy and NNSA have required contractors to implement self-assessment systems to measure 

perfonnance and help ensure effective and efficient mission accomplishment. Given the near 

total reliance on contractor support for mission execution and, consequently, the importance of 

contractor perfonnance, transparency and etTectiveness efforts, we reviewed the development of 

contractor assurance systems by NNSA and its contractors. 

We recently reported that, despite at least 5 years of effort, NNSA and its support offices and 

site contractors had not yet implemented fully functional and effective contractor assurance 

systems. 3 Specifically: 

• The contractor governance system was rendered incfTective by what Federal site level 

officials referred to as an "eyes on, hands off" approach to contract management; 

• Contractor weaknesses were not effectively communicated to senior management 

officials; 

3 National Nuclear Security Administration Contractor Governance, DOE/IG-088 I, available at: 

http://cnergv.gov/sites/prodnilesiIG-0881.pdf 

5 
97 

• Contractor selt:assessments were not effective in identifying weaknesses; and, 

• Performance metrics tracked in the assurance systems were not clearly linked to those 

contained in the contractor performance evaluation plans used to detel111ine fees. 

We found that NNSA had placed substantial reliance on its contractors' ability to self identify 

and correct weaknesses that threaten the safe, secure, effective and efficient operation of the 

Department's national security facilities. Our findings suggest that this reliance may be 

unjusti fled absent more intense Federal validation of contractor assertions. 

To its credit, NNSA had identified deliciencies with contractor assurance system 

implementation and recognized the need to improve contractor assurance systems and its overall 

approach to contractor governance. In December 2012, an NNSA official told us that the 

agency has decided to overhaul its governance process. NNSA's planned initiative is an 

important step forward. Based on our body of work in NNSA, we believe that comprehensive 

and sustained effort in this area is critical. 

Management Challenges 

The specific issues of contractor govemance and physical security may reflect broader issues 

facing the Department. Specifically, for over a decade, the Office oflnspector General has 

identified contract administration as a major Department of Energy management challenge. 

Because virtually all physical security at Departmental sites is contractor-provided, the way in 

which these contracts arc administered and their enormous costs have been and continue to be 

major issues. To put this in perspective, we have reported that the Department spends more than 

6 
98 

$1 billion per year protecting its facilities, related materials and data. Of this amount, nearly 

$700 million per year is spent on a complex-wide Protective Force staff of nearly 4,000 

contractor professionals. 

The Protective Force staff services are procured using three distinctly different primary 

mechanisms. At some facilities, the facility management contract includes a provision for 

Protective Force services as part of its prime contract. At other locations, the Protective Force is 

procured through a stand-alone prime contract awarded by the Department. Under the third 

model, the Protective Force is procured through a subcontract to the prime facility management 

contractor. These arrangements, which lack uniformity and consistency, result in at least 25 

separate contract instruments. 

In 2011, in our annual Management Challenges report, we concluded that there may be 

significant economy of scale cost benefits associated with Protective Force contract 

consolidation. 4 We proposed several alternatives, including the possibility of federalizing the 

Protective Force staff. We found that by either consolidating the contractor Protective Force or 

federalizing it, the Department could benefit from a more consistent approach to Protective Force 

organization, management, training, and equipment purchases. It could also improve the system 

for sharing security best practices and lessons learned between Department facilities, and 

providing the staff with greater career opportunities for advancement by allowing them to move 

between sites on a merit basis. Finally, consolidation itselfwould reduce the number of 

7 
99 

contracts, minimizing administrative costs and simplifying the process of contractor 

accountability. 

To its credit, NNSA has taken some action to consolidate the protective services at Y-12 and the 

Pantex Plant through its contract for the management of the sites. Specifically, the recently 

announced contract for consolidated management of the two sites includes Protective Force 

services to be provided by the new contractor. 

Observations 

The work of the Depmtment of Energy and NNSA are essential to U.S. national security. While 

there is no quick fix or panacea to address the problems that are the topic of this hearing, we 

believe more enlightened, effective Federal oversight is necessary if progress is to be achieved. 

This concludes my testimony and I look forward to your questions. 

8 
100 

GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN - DOE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Gregory H. Friedman was nominated by the President and 

confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Inspector General of the U.S. 

Department of Energy in 1998. Mr. Friedman started his Federal 

career in 1968 and has been with the Department of Energy, 

Office of Inspector General, since 1982. As Inspector General, 

he is responsible for a nationwide, independent program of 

audits, inspections, and law enforcement efforts related to the 

Department of Energy's programs and operations. In addition to 

his responsibilities as Inspector General, Me. Friedman now 

serves as a member of the Recovery Act Accountability and 

Transparency Board and the Governrnent Accountability and 

Transparency Board. 

Me. Friedman received a Bachelor's degree in Business Administration from Temple University and a 

Master's degree in Business Adrninistration frorn Fairleigh Dickinson University. In 1979-1980, Mr. 

Friedrnan was selected as a Princeton Fellow in Public Affairs and spent a year in residence at Princeton 

University's Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Studies. 

In 2002, Mr. Friedman was named by the Comptroller General of the United States to serve as a member 

of the Advisory Council on Government Auditing Standards. In addition, he led the development of the 

"Federal Audit Manual," for the first time providing universal guidelines for conducting Federal financial 

audits. 

From 2005 to 2008, Mr. Friedman served as Vice Chair of the President's Council on Integrity and 

Efficiency. Mr. Friedman has been a guest lecturer on the topics of audit, integrity, government oversight 

and program evaluation. In addition, Mr. Friedman is a member of several professional organizations, 

and has served in leadership positions in the Association of Government Accountants and the Institute of 

Internal Audilors. Mr. Friedman has also been active in a number of community and philanthropic 

organizations. 

During his Federal career, Me. Friedman has received numerous awards, including the Department of 

Energy's Meritorious Service Award, the Meritorious Presidential Rank Award, and the Presidential Rank 

Award for Distinguished Executive. 
101 

Statement of 

Hon. Daniel B. Poneman 

Deputy Secretary 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

U.S. House of Representatives 

February 28, 2013 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

the invitation to appear before you today to provide the subcommittee details on the actions 

the Department has taken or will take to strengthen the security of the nuclear weapons 

complex in the wake of the July 2012 Y-12 incident. We appreciate the interest and 

engagement of this Committee and recognize the important oversight role that you fulfill. We 

also share the Committee's commitment to assure that all of our offices and operations are 

delivering on our mission safely and securely- from Washington, DC, to California, from every 

naval reactor to every warhead, from production to clean-up, from deterrence to 

nonproliferation. 

Introduction 

Since its creation in 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has served as a 

separately-organized entity within the US. Department of Energy, entrusted with the execution 

of our national nuclear security missions. Living up to the challenging demands of executing 

our mission safely, securely, and in a fiscally responsible manner requires daily management 

through strong, effective, and efficient relationships with our Management and Operating 

(M&O) contractors. 

The protection of all Department of Energy (DOE) people and assets - our federal and 

contractor employees, technology, and physical assets, including both nuclear and non-nuclear 

facilities and other resources - is of integral importance to our mission. The Secretary and I 

know that, and understand our responsibilities to that mission, in its entirety. Indeed, we have 

reflected our commitment through our Management Principles, which provide that: 

• We will treat our people as our greatest asset; 

• We will pursue our mission in a manner that is safe, secure, legally and ethically sound, 

and fiscally responsible; and 

• We will succeed only through teamwork and continuous improvement. 

1 
102 

The Secretary has expressed a consistent, unwavering commitment to maintain safe and secure 

work environments for all Federal and contractor employees. In that spirit, we are determined 

to assure that the Department's and contractors' operations do not adversely affect the health, 

safety, or security of workers, the surrounding communities, Of the Nation. 

DOE's mission includes diverse operations, involving a variety of nuclear materials and 

processes. We recognize our unique obligations as a self-regulated agency to establish and 

meet exacting standards for nuclear safety and security, to maintain robust nuclear safety 

performance, and to provide rigorous and trustworthy oversight and enforcement of those 

nuclear safety and security standards. We must also maintain a safety and security culture that 

values and supports those standards, and assures that individuals can freely step forward to 

voice their concerns related to our safe execution of our mission. Indeed, we encourage them 

to do so. Only through these actions can we provide adequate protection of our workers, the 

public, and the environment, while sustaining the public trust and confidence crucial to our 

ability to fulfill the mission. 

To achieve our mission, DOE must strive to excel simultaneously as a self-regulator, as an 

owner, and as an operator of the facilities in our national security complex. Each of these roles 

is vital and must be executed with integrity. The July 2012 incident at Y-12, as the Secretary 

and I have repeatedly emphasized, was unacceptable, and we have taken and will continue to 

take steps not only to identify and correct issues at that site, but across the DOE complex. I will 

address the Department's response to the incident in more detail later in this testimony. 

Roles and Responsibilities for Nuclear Security within DOE 

The Secretary and I bear ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety and security at DOE facilities. 

Under our direction, line managers have the authority and the responsibility for establishing, 

achieving, and maintaining stringent performance expectations and requirements among all 

Federal and contractor employees, at DOE labs and other facilities. 

The Department's Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), in consultation with line 

management, is responsible for the development of DOE nuclear safety and security policy, 

Federal Rules, Orders, and the associated standards and guidance, as well as for reviewing 

safety and security issues complex-wide. HSS also conducts independent oversight and 

regulatory enforcement that is independent from line management. HSS oversight has 

expanded the scope and variety of performance testing methods utilized to assess the 

readiness of DOE and NNSA site protection systems against a defined spectrum of threats and 

adversary capabilities Performance testing methodologies include no-notice and limited notice 

inspections to obtain a more realistic assessment of site response capabilities and readiness 

performance. 

The Department's approach to nuclear safety and security is founded on a demanding set of 

standards that capture knowledge and experience in designing, constructing, operating, 

2 
103 

deactivating, decommissioning, and overseeing nuclear facilities and operations. DOE applies 

validated national and international standards to the maximum extent possible, because these 

standards reflect broad input from a large and diverse group of experts. As our management 

principles state: "We will apply validated standards and rigorous peer review." 

Our management principles also require that we "manage risk in fulfilling our mission." This is 

essential to a robust safety and security culture, as demonstrated by the 2010 Deepwater 

Horizon oil spill, which vividly demonstrated the inadequacy of a mere "check-the-box" 

mentality by regulated entities when it comes to smart decision-making in a complex and 

hazardous operational environment. Since DOE expects scrupulous compliance with its 

requirements, managers and workers must recognize and embrace their personal 

accountability to meet safety standards, while avoiding a tendency for rote compliance with 

requirements. In some cases, it may be necessary to raise a hand and ask if another approach 

could offer a smarter way to assure safety. This questioning attitude must be encouraged. 

Finally, the Secretary and I are also dedicated to strengthening contract and project 

management. Indeed, we cannot succeed in advancing our goals for the Department if we fall 

short in this effort. And, as we all know, safety and security are integral to effective contract 

management. Indeed, safety and security are key performance standards and elements of 

every contract, and extensive oversight is required to ensure stewardship as well as legal and 

regulatory requirements are met. When we have a safety or security problem, we must fix it, 

which may lead to increased costs and delays. So building safety and security into the fabric of 

our programs and our projects from the start and continuously monitoring adherence to safety 

standards is not just the right thing to do from a moral perspective, and not just the necessary 

thing to according to our governing laws and regulations, but it is also the smart thing to do, as 

stewards of our responsibilities to the Nation and its taxpayers. 

Response to Y-12 Incursion Incident 

On Saturday, July 28,2012, at 4:30AM three individuals trespassed onto the Y-12 National 

Security Complex and defaced a building at NNSA's Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee. 

This incursion and inadequate response to it demonstrated a deeply flawed security culture and 

equally flawed execution of security procedures at y-12. In response to the incident, we acted 

swiftly to identify and address the problems it revealed. 

Since the Y-12 incursion, several major actions have taken place to improve security: 

Federal and Contractor Management Changes 

New senior Federal and contractor management personnel were brought in to take charge of 

Site and Headquarters organizations, to transform our approach to security. Of the Federal 

personnel, a highly-experienced individual was appointed to serve as the new Chief of Defense 

3 
104 

Nuclear Security and to develop overall policy; two Federal office directors experienced in 

security matters were appointed to implement the new policies. Of the contractor 

management personnel, a new M&O Site Manager and the top security official were appointed 

by the contractor to implement the vital security transformation. 

IG Inquiry into Y-12 Security Breach 

The Department and NNSA have been working diligently to implement the recommendations of 

the August 2012 IG report, including verifications that all critical security equipment at Y-12 has 

been repaired and is operational. 

Protective Force Contract Terminated, New M&O Contractor Selected 

WSl's protective force contract was terminated and a new M&O contactor has been selected to 

manage the Y-12 site, providing an opportunity for new leadership and to improve Y-12's 

security culture and management. On January 8,2013, the NNSA awarded a contract worth $23 

billion over 10 years to Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS) for the combined management of 

the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee and the Pantex Plant in Texas, with an option 

for phase-in of Tritium Operations performed at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The 

award is currently under an automatic stay while being protested_at the GAO. Combining 

contracts and site offices will allow us to improve performance and operate as an integrated 

enterprise. 

HSS Y-12 Security Inspection 

HSS conducted an independent security inspection of y-12 security operations, which included 

rigorous force-on-force performance testing as well as no-notice and short-notice limited scope 

performance testing activities as directed by the Secretary. The final report of inspection 

results was completed and briefed to senior management on September 28. The Y-12 

inspection results were also briefed to Congressional staff. HSS will be conducting a follow-up 

review in April to examine the status of implementation of corrective actions. 

Extent of Condition Reviews 

At the direction of the Secretary, the Department's Chief of Health, Safety and Security also 

conducted extent of condition reviews at all of the DOE and NNSA Category I Special Nuclear 

Material (SNM) sites in collaboration with DOE and NNSA Program Offices. These reviews 

assessed the current security posture, specifically to determine whether the systemic issues 

identified at Y-12 were present at other sites, so that any necessary steps could be taken to 

cure any such defects. HSS completed its review in December 2012. The results were briefed to 

DOE leadership and Congressional staff. 

Comprehensive Independent Oversight Security Inspections of all Category I Sites 

4 
105 

The Secretary also directed HSS to conduct assessments of all Category I sites across the DOE 

complex, to identify any systemic security issues. These deep dives are being conducted by the 

HSS Independent Oversight organization, and include the HSS enhanced program of 

performance testing program, evaluation of force-on-force exercises, no-notice security testing, 

and comprehensive security inspections at all Category I sites by October 2013. HSS has 

completed security inspections at Y-12, Oak Ridge National laboratory and the Hanford Site. 

Results of these inspections have been briefed to DOE leadership and Congressional staff. The 

remaining security Inspections will include the Savannah River Site (field work completed 

February 21), Pantex Plant, Idaho National laboratory, Office of Secure Transportation, the 

Nevada National Security Site, and los Alamos National laboratory. 

Independent Expert Panel Review of Y-12 

Secretary Chu requested three former senior executives from Federal agencies and the private 

sector to conduct a strategic review of the entire DOE security architecture with a particular 

emphasis on Y-12. These executives included President of the Carnegie Foundation and former 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Richard Meserve, former Lockheed Martin CEO 

Norman Augustine, and retired Air Force Major General Donald Alston. Each one provided 

thoughtful advice on the DOE's nuclear security structure, specifically all Category I nuclear 

facilities. Their words of advice and ideas are current being considered to improve security at Y12 and across the nuclear enterprise. 

Brigadier General Sandra Finan's Review 

On August 14, 2012, then NNSA Administrator Tom 0' Agostino commissioned a Security Task 

Force led by Brigadier General Sandra Finan to analyze the then-current federal NNSA security 

organizational structure and security oversight model, and to recommend possible 

improvements. 

Over the course of several months, Gen Finan and the members of the Task Force conducted a 

thorough review of NNSA security operations at headquarters and in the field. 

Organizational Improvements 

Prior to the Y-12 incursion, the Headquarters NNSA security organization, the Office of Defense 

Nuclear Security (NA-70), served as a "Functional Manager" for the security mission, while the 

line authority flowed from the Secretary to other NNSA Administrators and other organizations. 

General Finan recommended for strategic-level policy guidance, requirements determination, 

and performance assessment to be under the jurisdiction of the Chief, Defense Nuclear Security 

(NA-70). NNSA's Office of the Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations (NA-OO) 

would provide the operational accountability for NNSA's security organization. Operational 

5 
106 

implementation and standardization of operations across the security program occurs at the 

NA-OO level. 

The existence of a single point through which the field reports and is held accountable is the 

way the NNSA will assure the consistent and effective implementation of security policy. This is 

a change from the approach the NNSA has taken-where each field office had greater latitude 

in implementing policies and requirements for its site. 

Additionally, Gen. Finan made recommendations to eliminate the conflict between DOE 

Security Orders and NNSA NAPs. Specifically, NNSA should use DOE Security Orders. DOE has a 

specialized security policy function that produces its orders. Rather than attempt to duplicate 

this function, DOE orders would provide direction while the NAP process would provide 

guidance and clarify information in the orders as appropriate, but not reduce requirements. 

Changing the Assessment Model 

Regarding NNSA's security oversight model, Gen. Finan found that at the time ofthe Y-12 

incursion NNSA did not have an adequate security performance assessment process or 

capability. The systems-based assessment model that was employed was ineffective for 

security. NNSA lacked a clear and consistent performance baseline for security program 

implementation and the assessment model was biased against criticism. 

To directly address problems with the assessment model, NNSA has set about implementing a 

three-tiered approach to assessing security throughout the NNSA. This approach includes: 1) 

an initial assessment performed by the contractor at the site, 2) an assessment of the 

contractor's performance carried out by the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security at DOE 

Headquarters (NA-70), and 3) independent oversight by the Office of Health, Safety and 

Security. And, of course, apart from this three-tiered assessment and inspection regimen, we 

expect Federal site personnel to perform quality assurance activities on a routine basis as an 

integral part of their line management responsibilities. 

The Secretary and I are pleased that the NNSA has responded to Gen Finan's recommendations 

seriously and is on a course to implement effective security improvements. 

The series of personnel and management changes I have described today were made to provide 

effective security at the site and across the DOE complex. We are also working to carry out the 

structural and cultural changes required to secure all CAT 0/1 nuclear materials at this and all 

other DOE and NNSA facilities. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the security of our Nation's nuclear material and technology Is a central 

responsibility of the Department, in support of the President and in defense of the Nation. We 

must remain vigilant against error and complacency and have zero tolerance for security 

6 
107 

breaches at our Nation's most sensitive nuclearfacilities. The incident at Y-12 was 

unacceptable, and it served as an important wake-up call for our entire complex. As a result, 

the Department is carefully reviewing security at all of our NNSA sites - as well as all of the 

recommendations of the HSS security review teams, Brigadier General Finan, DOE IG, and 

independent reviews provided by the distinguished panel of military and private sector experts 

with a view to taking all those steps that are needed to protect this Nation's most sensitive 

materials and technologies. The Department is taking aggressive actions to ensure the 

reliability of our nuclear security programs across the entire DOE enterprise, and will continue 

to do so. 

We accept the responsibility that we have inherited from the generations of Americans going 

back to the Manhattan Project to assure the safe and secure stewardship of our nuclear 

enterprise in order to deter aggression, defend our freedom, and support our allies. 

In that effort, the Department looks forward to working with the Committee to ensure the 

security of the nation's nuclear materials. I would be pleased to answer any questions from 

members of the Subcommittee. 

7 
108 

DANIEL B. PONEMAN 

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY 

Daniel B. Poneman was nominated by President Obama to be Deputy 

Secretary of Energy on April 20, 2009, and was confirmed by the 

United States Senate on May 18, 2009. Under the leadership of 

Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, Mr. Poneman also serves as Chief 

Operating Officer of the Department. 

Mr. Poneman first joined the Department of Energy in 1989 as a White 

House Fellow. The next year he joined the National Security Council 

staff as Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control. 

From 1993 through 1996, Mr. Poneman served as Special Assistant to 

the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export 

Controls at the National Security Council. His responsibilities included 

the development and implementation of U.S. policy in such areas as 

peaceful nuclear cooperation, missile technology, space-launch activities, sanctions determinations, 

chemical and biological arms control efforts, and conventional arms transfer policy. During this time, he 

also participated in negotiations and consultations with governments in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin 

America, and the former Soviet Union. 

After leaving the White House, Mr. Poneman served as a member of the Commission to Assess the 

Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and 

a number of other federal advisory panels. 

Prior to assuming his responsibilities as Deputy Secretary, Me. Poneman served as a principal of The 

Scowcroft Group for eight years, providing strategic advice to corporations on a wide variety of 

international projects and transactions. Between tours of government service he practiced law for nine 

years in Washington, D.C. - first as an associate at Covington & Burling, later as a partner at Hogan & 

Hartson - assisting clients in regulatory, policy and transactional matters, international arbitration, 

commercial real estate financing, export controls, and sanctions and trade policy. 

Mr. Poneman received A.B. and J.D. degrees with honors from Harvard University and an M.Litt. in 

Politics from Oxford University. He has published widely on national security issues and is the author of 

Nuclear Power in the Developing World and Argentina: Democracy on Trial. His third book, Going Critical: 

The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (coauthored with Joel Wit and Robert Gallucci), received the 2005 

Douglas Dillon Award for Distinguished Writing on American Diplomacy. Mr. Poneman is a member of the 

Council of Foreign Relations. 

Mr. Poneman lives in Virginia with his wife, Susan, and their three children. 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 28, 2013 

(111) 

DOE Verbal Shortcuts and Acronyms 

The following acronyms and shortcuts are used at DOE to quickly identil'y people and offices: 

People: 

S-I: Secretary of Energy 

S-2 or DS: Deputy Secretary of Energy 

ADS: Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy 

S-3: 

S-4: 

Under Secretary (sometimes refened to as Under Secretary of Energy) 

Under Secretary for Science 

NA-l: 

U/S: 

Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, and Administrator for NNSA 

Under Secretary abbreviation 

Dash Is: Assistant Secretaries/ Program Element Heads (For example, FE-J is the Assistant 

Secretary of Fossil Energy.) Dash J s can also be PSOs or Program Secretarial 

Officers. Dash I s are generally political appointees except for PMAs and LM, and 

several staff and support offices (CIO, HG, HSS, ED and MA). 

PDAS: 

DAS: 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (generally, the most senior career employee) 

Deputy Assistant Secretary (generally, a senior career employee) 

PAS: President Appointed/Senate 

Confirmed Program Offices! Administrations: 

EERE: Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 

Energy 

FE: Office of Fossil Energy 

NE: Office of Nuclear Energy 

OE: Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 

Reliability 

IE: Office ofIndian Energy Policy and Programs 

ARP A-E: Advanced Research Projects AgencyEnergy 

PMAs: Power Marketing Administrations 

ElA: Energy Information Administration 

LPO: Loan Programs Office 

SC: Office of Science 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration 

EM: Office of Environmental Management 

LM: Office of Legacy Management 

Staff and Support Offices 

CFO: Chief Financial Officer 

CHCO: Chief Human Capital Officer 

CIO: Chief Information Officer 

CI: Congressional and Intergovernmental 

Affairs 

ED: Economic Impact and Diversity 

GC: General Counsel 

HSS: Health, Safety and Security 

HG: Hearings and Appeals 

IG: Inspector General 

IN: Intelligence and Counterintelligence 

MA: Management 

PI: Policy and International Affairs 

PA: Public Affairs 
112 

NNSA KEY PERSONNEL 

The following individuals are the Presidentially-appointed, Senate Confirmed NNSA 

personnel 

• Neile Miller, Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator 

• Neile Miller, Principal Deputy Administrator 

• Donald Cook, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs 

• Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

• Admiral John Richardson (USN), Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors 

The following individuals are the Senior Executive Service personnel that lead mission and 

mission support functions: 

• Michael Lempke, Associate Principal Deputy Administrator and Associate 

Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations (NA-OO) 

• Robert Raines, Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management 

(NA-APM) 

• Joseph Krol Jr., Associate Administrator for the Office of Emergency Operations 

(NA-40) 

• Dimitri F. Kusnezov (Acting), Associate Administrator for Information 

Management & CIO (NA-IM) 

• Bruce Diamond, General Counsel (NA-GC) 

• Clarence T. Bishop, Associate Administrator for External Affairs (NA-EA) 

• Dr. Steven Aoki, Associate Administrator for Counterterrorism and 

Counterproliferation (NA-80) 

• Steve Asher (Acting), Associate Administrator for the Office of Defense Nuclear 

Security (NA-70) 

• Don Nichols, Associate Administrator for Safety and Health (NA-SH) 

• Cindy Lersten, Associate Administrator for Management and Budget (NA-MB) 

• Steve Ho, Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation (NA-PR&A) 
Office of the 

Undtl'Secl'.etal'Y fOl' 

N udt'al' Security 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Sl"-{;l'ftlary 

SecretalY 

Deputy Secretary* 

Ol1ice of theUnderSecretary fOl' 

Science 

Office of the 

Undel'Secl'ctal'r 

AndR.e-..."We.:EneTgy 

((II' 

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for Elertridty Delffiryand 

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for Defellse 

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NA10 

Assoc. Admin. 

for Emergency 

Operations 

NA40 

c« Dual Hatt-ed Position 

Office of Science and POliCf Chief of Staff 

Mission 

Deputy Admin. 

for Detense 

Nucle",' 

Nonproliferation 

NA20 

I Assoc. Admin. 

for Defense 

Nuclear Security 

& Chief, Dele""" I Nuclear Security 

NA70 

Associate Prindpal Deputy 

Administrator" 

Deputy Admin. II Director for for Naval Program Reactors Review and 

Analysis 

NA30 II NA-PR&A 

Assoc. Admin. Assoc. Admin. 

& Deputy Under for Infrastructure 

Secretery for & Operations' Counterterrorism 

NA- NA-OO 

80 

Office of Civil Rights 

Mission Support 

Associate Office of Ass

Admin. General Ad

for External Counsel for Ac

Affairs & 

NA- NA- Mana

EA GC NA

Associate Associate Ass

Admin. for Admin. for Adm

Management & Information Safety 

Budget Mgmt&OO and 

Defen"

NA- NA- Sa

MB 1M N
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 28, 2013 

(117) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. PONEMAN. The average gross wages and fringe benefits for a guard or Protective Force member at Y–12 is $88,000. Actual take home pay will vary by individual 

based upon payroll deductions and hours worked. [See page 30.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. PONEMAN. Please find attached an organization chart of both organizations. 

We’ve also included the names of the key NNSA leadership team. [See page 26.] 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on pages 

111–114.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 28, 2013 

(121) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. General Alston, you recognized human capital limitations as a contributing factor to the event. What can Congress do, if anything, to enhance human 

capital at NNSA as it pertains to security? 

General ALSTON. Recognizing that the July 2012 Y–12 security failure had more 

to do with ineffective oversight and a culture that readily accepted security deficiencies rather than human capital weaknesses, it’s my view that NNSA and DOE 

did not assign sufficient value to security expertise when it made staffing decisions. 

As a result, there is no ready pipeline of leaders with appropriate security expertise. 

This condition is exacerbated by personnel practices that did not circulate security 

leaders between the HQ and the sites. 

The quality of experience and expertise across our national nuclear enterprise has 

been an area of increasing concern, perhaps since the end of the Cold War. The Congress in the 1997 and 1998 National Defense Authorization Acts established a Commission on ‘‘Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise,’’ led by ADM 

(ret) Hank Chiles. ADM Chiles led a similar Defense Science Board effort in 2008. 

Neither of these efforts highlighted nuclear physical security expertise as a focus 

area, but they emphasize the overall importance of expertise throughout the nuclear 

enterprise. All other things being equal, I personally would be inclined to hire someone who has secured nuclear materials before I would hire one without that background. The size of our nuclear enterprise continues to expose a keen personnel vulnerability across all disciplines that should be driving focused human capital development plans. The benefits include good daily operations, strong crisis management 

competencies at upper levels and a self-sustaining community of experts. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Alston, do you, Mr. Augustine, and Dr. Meserve believe the 

confused lines of responsibility and authority for security are just within NNSA, or 

do they extend to security and leadership organizations within DOE as well? 

a. You are your fellow reviewers have suggested that security operations with 

DOE and NNSA need to be reorganized in order to re-align authority and responsibility. What guidelines should be followed in aligning and assigning authority and 

responsibility? Is it your sense that these guidelines are being followed? 

General ALSTON. The confused lines of responsibility and authority for security at 

the time of our project were within the contractor relationships at the sites, NNSA 

and DOE. 

a. Match authority and responsibility at the right level. 

—For example, at Y–12, the site Maintenance and Operations contractor was responsible for security infrastructure, such as security camera maintenance, while 

the security contractor was responsible for providing ready protective forces. This 

split responsibility for security tools and security pros contributed to the atmosphere 

that tolerated enduring infrastructure deficiencies. 

—Additionally, empower the NNSA rep overseeing site security with sufficient authority to hold him/her accountable appropriately for local performance failures, as 

necessary. 

—Finally, establish who is accountable at the headquarters level for day-to-day 

security operations. Who is accountable to track and eliminate security deficiencies? 

Who is accountable for security system developmental and operational testing? To 

name just a few critical elements we had trouble resolving during our study. 

Scrub department governance and eliminate inadequate, conflicting and redundant sources of security policy.—For example, securing Category 1 material at SRS 

should require the same measures as securing Category 1 material at Y–12. 

Establish clear organizational lines from the field through the senior levels at the 

headquarters that not only enable the two points above, but also focus on ensuring 

effective 2-way communication throughout the organization. 

I do not have a sense whether or not these guidelines are part of DOE/NNSA security initiatives. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Alston, your letter to Secretary Chu says ‘‘there is a perception that corporate security policy is being written from inspection results.’’ Mr. Augustine noted that inspections and assessments inappropriately focus on compliance 

with standards, and not on security effectiveness or performance. He concluded that 
122 

‘‘what is needed is not more inspections but better inspections.’’ Do you agree with 

Mr. Augustine on this point? 

a. To what extent do you believe that oversight activities should also be standardized and/or centrally directed? 

b. Would you please compare and contrast how the Department of Defense conducts inspections and writes security policy with how DOE and NNSA do? 

c. How should oversight of security operations be conducted? How would you modify the DOE/NNSA inspection and oversight approach to make it better? 

General ALSTON. I absolutely agree with Mr. Augustine. Well-focused inspections, 

at smart intervals, consistently and appropriately evaluating compliance and performance against clearly established standards provide both local leadership and 

NNSA and DOE ‘‘snapshot’’ indicators of site competency. As a part of a comprehensive set of indicators that include daily performance metrics, resourcing levels, and 

several more elements to complete the readiness picture, a sound inspection process 

is vital. 

a. Independent oversight of activities involving nuclear materials is essential due 

to the extraordinary safety, security and geopolitical nature of nuclear weapons and 

related components. High standards are established and their compliance must be 

verified. The most senior accountable overseer must have the means to assure subordinate elements are in compliance with standards and can perform critical aspects 

of the mission. Therefore, the Secretary of Energy requires an independent inspection apparatus. The NNSA Administrator also needs to ensure compliance with 

these same high standards. Whether or not the Administrator of this semi-autonomous agency requires his/her own independent inspection apparatus should be evaluated. 

Common standards must be applied in a common way in the field and must be 

inspected in a common way by the inspection team. This has the benefit of enabling 

senior leaders to calibrate compliance, preparedness and overall competency through 

inspection results they can have confidence in. Additionally, consistent inspections 

should serve the purpose of reinforcing universal expectations by field elements that 

clear standards will be evaluated in consistent ways. Without consistency in evaluation, trust can break down between the HQ and the field and sites will fear the next 

inspection will be less about standards and more about inspection team whim. Unjustified policy revisions can also creep into the process as a result of poorly organized and executed inspections. 

b. The DoD depends both on the Services and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to conduct inspections. The vast majority of nuclear expertise is created at the 

operating unit level and from this initial development, the substantial oversight demand signal is generated by Inspector General teams at every nuclear Major Command in the AF (that would be 5 AF IG teams, plus the AF Inspection Agency), 

plus, the Services feed nuclear expertise to DTRA and Combatant Commander inspection organizations (small though they may be). I lack personal experience to discuss Navy processes, so I’ll stick to the AF. Nuclear-related policy is written at the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense level by functional experts and that policy is applied to the AF at the Air Staff level by the AF functional experts: personnelists, 

manpower, intelligence, operations, logistics, supply, security, medical, etc. Functional experts at both the Air Staff and the Major Command level establish what 

should be inspected and go so far as to write the checklists that are issued to the 

inspection teams. The AF performs a variety of inspections that affect nuclearequipped units, but the most relevant nuclear-related inspections include the Nuclear Surety Inspection and the Operational Readiness Inspection. Both types have 

compliance and performance-based elements. Additionally, subordinate units have 

self-inspection processes, local exercises, written and oral tests. Strategic Command 

also conducts major large scale exercises. 

Our relatively short duration study of security across DOE did not afford us the 

opportunity to examine DOE and NNSA policy formulation or inspections in great 

detail. We did have difficulty understanding how these processes worked in practice. 

We noticed security policy being written both inside and outside NNSA, suggesting 

a need to validate the appropriateness of multiple security governance tracks, especially where the result potentially drove different security applications in the field 

at different locations.

The record shows the DOE had inspected Y–12 just prior to the July 2012 incident and despite extensive documented evidence of an imminent train wreck, Y–12 

got good grades. Clearly DOE was not looking at the right things, or lacked sufficient security competency to recognize the existing failure conditions. Beyond IGtype inspections, system readiness/acceptance testing is also relevant to this question. As Mr. Augustine said when discussing operational testing of security systems, 

‘‘. . . tests have too often addressed the question, ‘Does the hardware or practice meet 
123 

the design criteria rather than is it operationally effective?’ Standards are often procedural rather than performance-oriented, and stress testing has been lacking.’’ 

c. Scrub governance to validate Department and Agency requirements and eliminate conflicting or inadequate guidance. Then, ensure productive alignment of authority and responsibility to produce policy and ultimately oversee effective current 

operations and prepare for tomorrow’s effective operations. These two steps will help 

set the conditions for a value-added inspection process that can produce dependable 

results for local and headquarters awareness and action, as appropriate. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Alston, in your letter to Secretary Chu, you note that 

metrics are an important complement to inspections as part of a comprehensive 

oversight program (Dr. Meserve made the same point). Reviews of the Y–12 incident 

have found that very few performance metrics were tracked by contractors and 

NNSA. What high-level metrics should we be tracking as Members of Congress to 

ensure that the security program is operating effectively? 

a. What are the most important metrics for senior officials to be tracking to assurance robust security performance? 

b. In addition, how can NNSA leadership ensure that ‘‘quality metrics’’ are developed and used by Federal staff and contractors to conduct oversight? 

c. How many metrics is too many—at what do the important ones get lost in the 

noise? 

General ALSTON. a. All are related to understanding risk and being able to competently accept risk up the chain. Metrics could include: 

Resource limitations driving non-standard activities. (personnel shortages driving 

overtime; parts availability driving prolonged outages of security equipment and 

extended implementation of compensatory measures) 

Safety incidents. Number, quality, trends. 

Security incidents. Number, quality, trends. 

Progress on security system modifications or upgrades. 

Inspection results. 

Inspection deficiency follow-up/resolution. 

b. I think the metrics are chosen by identifying those governance requirements 

that spell ‘mission failure’ if ever breached. Additionally, metrics should be collaboratively identified throughout the chain of command. Authentic desire for site input 

goes a long way towards achieving corporate buy in to these important measurements. 

c. Good question. I think some metrics are very relevant to the NNSA Administrator, and at the same time, more detailed subordinate metrics might be more appropriate at the local level. It’s important to get the right information to the person 

accountable to fix the problem. In addition to just pushing data up the chain, it is 

perhaps more important for this content to drive interaction up and down the chain 

to reinforce constant leadership commitment to security, and for site participants to 

take that leadership commitment evidence to all the personnel on site. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Alston, your letter indicates serious problems with the security culture at NNSA and DOE, and that many of these problems have existed for 

decades. 

a. Can we change the security culture without some sort of fundamental changes? 

Is it possible to shift the culture using only incremental changes? 

b. Culture changes are extremely difficult and often take a long time—what immediate-term actions should we be taking to begin this needed culture shift? 

c. You recommend federalizing the security forces. Do you think that would a 

large enough change to shift the culture? 

General ALSTON. a. In my experience, when culture change is needed, incremental 

adjustments will either fail to achieve the required change or will not drive change 

at the necessary speed. 

b. If the need for culture change is legitimized, dramatic action is often a catalyst 

for changing culture. A change in leadership, a clear articulation of the vision and 

the need for the change, sometimes a major re-organization are all relevant considerations. Key to setting conditions for change is to reinforce the value of security 

in NNSA and DOE and that is achieved in large part with accountability. Overcommunicate the standards and expected performance levels and consistently enforce them. Mr. Augustine identifies 7 ingredients to successful culture change on 

page 4 of his 6 December 2012 letter to Dr. Chu. 

c. No, federalizing the NNSA protective forces alone will not achieve the necessary 

culture change. Without the proper alignment of authority and responsibility up and 

down the chain between the sites and the HQ and without an effective means to 

ensure all members of NNSA and DOE understand their individual roles in security, all the necessary pieces will not be in place and the conditions will not have 

been set. However, federalizing the protective forces not only makes operational 
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sense, but it would be a clear expression of intent and institutional commitment 

that, in my view, would be worth the cost in the long run. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Alston, you and Mr. Augustine and Dr. Meserve seem to 

have read the many reports and independent reviews of DOE security that have 

been conducted previously. Your letter to Secretary Chu calls it ‘‘the considerable 

body of work that has been done on this subject over the past decade.’’ In particular, 

you mention the review done by Admiral Mies in April 2005. In my opening statement, I mentioned a few others—but there are many, many more. 

How do your findings and recommendations compare with those contained in all 

of these previous reports? Do you feel the findings and recommendations in the previous reports have been acted upon and addressed? 

General ALSTON. It is my view that many of the past reports contain observations 

and recommendations that also seemed relevant during the time of my study. In my 

opinion, the broadest security examination was led by ADM (ret) Mies and for that 

reason I encouraged the Secretary of Energy to critically re-evaluate DOE/NNSA 

documented resolution of that report’s set of recommendations. Though I did not 

audit all the relevant reports in response to this QFR, I did review the Mies report 

again. I have included below some of the Mies recommendations that echoed with 

what I was observing at the time of my study. I suspect DOE/NNSA has taken relevant action in response, but given what I observed, continued vigilance is required. 

Some still-resonating Mies recommendations: 

• ‘‘Continue to promote greater collaboration and team building within NNSA 

with the goal of an enterprise approach to security. Support the Chiles panel 

recommendations on improved career development, assignment rotation training, professional qualification and certification, etc. • Make an unequivocal commitment to upgrade the quality, relevance, and ownership of security training programs and professional certification. • Emphasize a balance of compliance and performance objectives designed to 

incentivize and embed security improvement throughout NNSA, as part of an 

enterprise approach to security. • Create a stronger climate of trust in the security program. Differentiate honest 

human security errors from malicious, grossly negligent ones. • Adopt a more proactive approach to security through stronger accountability. • Conduct an independent staffing assessment of NNSA relative to DOE. Rebalance staffing and expertise commensurate with the significance of the national 

security assets NNSA manages. • Give greater autonomy and authority to the NNSA Administrator to oversee the 

elements of the security process, from policy formulation to implementation and 

oversight, which directly affect security of the NNSA complex. • Implement the recommendations of the Chiles report to improve the federal security workforce, including developing and executing a comprehensive human 

capital management program; improving the training, qualifications, and stature of the NNSA security workforce; reengaging in national markets to hire security professionals; instituting a long-term practice of security staff rotation; 

identifying options for accelerating the security clearance process; improving security information flow; revising the NNSA Safeguards and Security Strategic 

Plan; and providing specific budget support for and tracking the progress of 

these recommendations. 

• Continue to elevate security program visibility and importance through initiatives such as the June 2004 organizational realignment, to ensure security is 

commensurate with other line management responsibilities. 

• Have NNSA headquarters assume greater responsibility for day-to-day supervision and oversight of site activities to promote an enterprise-wide approach 

to security, more consistent interpretation of security policy, and more standardized and coherent implementation. The new Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security should be assigned responsibility for day-to-day security 

oversight. Responsibility for implementation needs to reside at all levels. 

• Establish formal mechanisms to enable DOE/NNSA to regularly collaborate 

with DoD (and other appropriate federal agencies) on security policy issues, lessons learned, best practices, technological improvements, tactics, and procedures as recommended by a previous study. 

• Promote greater reliance on continuing security self-assessment programs to 

better inculcate security as every individual’s responsibility and integral to mission. 

• Consider changing the annual survey and self-assessment program to a yearround program of in-depth assessments in specific areas. 

• Formulate an NNSA-wide strategic security plan, similar in level of detail and 

content to DOE’s, to create a unifying security roadmap for the NNSA enter-
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prise. Use this plan as a cornerstone for the creation of other interdependent 

enterprise wide plans, such as special nuclear material consolidation, infrastructure recapitalization, technology investment, information systems modernization, and the foundation for individual security discipline plans (physical, cyber, 

personnel, and material control and accountability). • Establish effective, formal forums to: promote greater DOE/NNSA-to-DOD, 

DOE-to-NNSA, headquarters-to-site, and site-to-site collaboration between security policymakers and policy implementers, promote more consistent interpretation and application of security policy, foster adoption of best practices, help formulate a more coherent, NNSA-wide security plan, consider making peer review 

an inherent element of security policy formulation and implementation. • Review and streamline local site compliance-based quick fixes to ensure security 

oversight is appropriately focused on performance objectives. • Provide greater centralized clarification and interpretation of security policy to 

promote more consistent and standardized implementation. Consider repromulgation of a security standards and criteria manual. • Consider conducting random testing of the PF throughout the year in both firearms and physical fitness. This testing will encourage officers to maintain 

weapons skills and physical fitness levels year-round and will give management 

a more realistic picture of the overall PF’s capabilities. • Direct site offices to regularly check the false or nuisance alarm rates from the 

CAS and compare them with the credit taken in the VAs to ensure the analysis 

accurately reflects field conditions. Establish a method to properly record and 

document the false or nuisance alarm rate and ensure proper training for CAS 

PF personnel. • Install modern computer alarm equipment that has an automated alarm tracking system to replace antiquated systems. • Establish a more rigorous process within DOE/NNSA headquarters to thoroughly review initial incident reports; monitor the inquiry progress; review final 

reports for adequacy of the inquiry, corrective actions, and analysis of underlying causes; and keep senior DOE/NNSA leadership appropriately advised. • Establish a more formal and disciplined process at sites to track security incident corrective actions to completion. Consider requiring site management to include findings and corrective action plans in a site-level corrective action tracking process involving senior line management to ensure corrective actions are 

adequate and complete. • Ensure reviews are conducted to execute continuous improvement. • As also recommended by the Chiles report, establish a dedicated and more effective formalized process within NNSA headquarters to disseminate incident lessons learned to the NNSA community. • Consider publishing a quarterly lessons-learned message for all DOE/NNSA 

sites, with procedures for ad hoc promulgation of urgent lessons learned. 

• Develop more meaningful security metrics that accurately measure the nature, 

frequency, and significance of incidents; the underlying root causes; and the 

timeliness of reporting, investigation, and corrective action development. Periodically provide these metrics to senior headquarters and site leadership, as 

well as appropriate security officials, to promote greater awareness of security 

performance and concerns. 

• Consider a reasonable standardization of site security system architecture, design, and implementation, including the security upgrades in progress. NNSA 

site oversight and headquarters should be involved in each critical decision 

stage of security upgrade projects. Project rationale and justification should be 

scrutinized and compared with complex-wide needs and overall direction. This 

would optimize the use of security up-grade funding and present a clear direction for security strategy. 

• Develop, with urgency, a more robust, integrated DOE/NNSA-wide process to 

provide accountability and follow-up on security findings and recommendations.’’ 

Mr. ROGERS. If previous studies have repeatedly noted the same problems—for instance, confused lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability—why have 

they not been addressed? Why have prior attempts to implement change at NNSA 

failed? What should Congress do to ensure these issues are addressed once and for 

all? 

General ALSTON. Some in DOE and NNSA have pointed to the transitory nature 

and frequency of leadership change and a lack of continuity of priorities during 

these transitions as causal. It is my view that in the current DOE culture, ‘‘safety,’’ 

‘‘security,’’ ‘‘science (labs),’’ and ‘‘mission (production sites)’’ share a common, finite 

tradespace and compete with each other for emphasis and resources. If there is in-
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sufficient individual security expertise at the senior levels of NNSA and DOE, and 

no common appreciation for the value of security across senior leadership—except 

in crisis—security concerns will find inconsistent support and ultimately weak follow through. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Finan, your report indicates serious problems with the security culture at NNSA, and that many of these problems have existed for decades. 

a. Can we change the security culture without some sort of fundamental changes? 

Is it possible to shift the culture using only incremental changes? 

b. Culture changes are extremely difficult and often take a long time—what immediate-term actions should we be taking to begin this needed culture shift? 

General FINAN. a. NNSA leadership must take bold and enduring actions. Fundamental change is required within the NNSA organizational structure and in its assessment model. This, in and of itself, will not necessarily drive a change in culture. 

In conjunction with implementing the new structure and model, a deliberate campaign should be initiated to emphasize the importance of the security mission in 

strategic plans, mission statements, policy documents, and other expressions of 

management intent. Security must be clearly integrated with other mission elements and appropriately recognized as essential to overall NNSA mission success. 

It is possible to shift culture with incremental changes. However, those incremental changes would have to be a part of a well-planned, larger campaign designed 

specifically to re-shape the organization and its culture. A shift in culture is not 

likely if change is implemented at the margins of the issues and it does not address 

core faults such as the confusing and ill-defined roles and responsibilities within the 

NNSA federal organizational structure. 

b. A deliberate campaign should be initiated to emphasize the importance of the 

security mission in strategic plans, mission statements, policy documents, and other 

expressions of management intent. Security must be clearly integrated with other 

mission elements and appropriately recognized as essential to overall NNSA mission 

success. Additionally, NNSA needs to build and execute a Security Road Map that 

consolidates recommendations from previous reports, articulates a clear vision of 

where the security program is going, and charts a path forward. Document the path 

in a roadmap that is signed by the NNSA Administrator and follow up with action 

plans that have clear ownership, and status updates. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Finan, you have argued that security requirements need to 

be better specified (for example, your report recommends that NNSA ‘‘develop and 

issue specific standards against which security operations are to perform and the 

criteria by which they will be evaluated.’’). 

What standards, criteria, and metrics do you suggest? What metrics should senior 

leaders pay special attention to in order to ensure robust security effectiveness? 

How many metrics is too many—at what do the important ones get lost in the 

noise? 

General FINAN. DOE had detailed standards and criteria for security operations. 

The last iteration of that document is a good baseline to start from. It was issued 

under the title ‘‘Guide for Implementation of Safeguards and Security Directives 

(Short Title: Safeguards and Security Standards and Criteria)’’ on 26 November 

1993. An example of a standard and associated criterion is listed below: 

Standard 

Alarm Systems Testing and Maintenance: The facility conducts operability tests 

of the basic alarm components at least once every seven days, and performs required and necessary maintenance on the systems. 

Criteria 

1. Personnel testing, maintaining, or servicing alarms have access authorizations 

consistent with the highest classification levels being protected, unless such testing 

and maintenance is performed as bench services away from the protected location 

or is performed under the supervision of an appropriately cleared and knowledgeable custodian of the alarm-protected location. 

2. Alarms bench tested or maintained by uncleared personnel away from the protected location are inspected and tested prior to installation. 

3. At least once a week, the basic alarm component is tested by simulated intrusion of the alarmed area or of the protected space of an alarmed object. (Opening 

an alarmed portal in a manner that would cause an alarm is an adequate weekly 

test.) Alarms caused by the opening and closing of areas by operating personnel in 

the normal performance of their activities are acceptable tests when documented as 

tests. 

4. False and nuisance alarm rate records are maintained and results are analyzed 

to determine alarm system performance. 
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5. Corrective maintenance is initiated within 72 hours of indication of failure. 

Compensatory measures are initiated immediately to provide equivalent detection 

capability when any part of the detection system is out of service and are continued 

until maintenance is complete. 

For Metrics, NA–70 has is working some detailed metrics in their new Mission 

Essential Task List that will be useful in managing the protective force and should 

roll up to higher level metrics that can be used by senior leaders. A basic metric 

framework could include the major categories of System Performance, Operational 

Performance, Modernization, Support Services, and Predictive Indicators. System 

performance could include metrics such as False and Nuisance alarm rates, camera 

status, sensor status, etc. Operational Performance could focus on protective force 

training status, evaluation results, exercise performance and depth, etc. Modernization could measure the status of the security systems by monitoring the age of the 

significant sub-systems. Support Services could measure contract status, standardization of procedures and documentation across the NNSA complex, etc. The Predictive Indicators metric could focus on early alerting of leadership to potential 

issues. For example, funding status for training could indicate future proficiency; 

leadership security experience levels could indicate the quality of future performance and decisions, etc. These indicators would be made up of increasing levels of 

detail that are used by each level of management to manage security. Establishing 

the right level and number of metrics is difficult. A small number of high level 

metrics with the ability to drill down to an appropriate level to see causes and contributing factors is essential. The key is a structured process with defined business 

rules that are adhered to by all participants. 

Mr. ROGERS. To what extent do you believe that oversight activities should also 

be standardized and/or centrally directed? Will more inspections necessarily equate 

to more effective oversight? How should oversight of security operations be conducted? 

General FINAN. There is a role for standardized, centrally directed oversight as 

well as for individualized, tailored evaluation. At the tactical level, oversight activities should be tailored and flexible based on needs and specific performance. As the 

level of overseeing organization rises, the level of standardization and centralization 

should rise correspondingly. For example, at the tactical level, a security supervisor 

would want to see and evaluate the specific actions of the team members that work 

for him/her. Based on the supervisors knowledge of threats, skill levels, training, 

and site specifics, evaluation must be tailored for the specific situation. At an operational level, evaluators must see standardization of procedures and accomplishment of objectives. These evaluations would be more standardized and controlled by 

a central authority. At the strategic level oversight should focus on the larger context of fulfilling mission requirements. Again, this type of evaluation should be centrally directed as it is looking for performance across the enterprise. 

More inspections will not equate to better performance and will not necessarily 

equate to effective oversight. While inspections can drive performance, they do not 

ensure performance. A comprehensive system of oversight is needed. 

Our report proposed strengthening the role of Federal security assessment within 

NNSA without diminishing the legitimate need for contractors to maintain their 

own self-assessment capabilities or HSS to provide Independent Oversight. We 

called for a three-tiered assessment process. 

Contractor self-assessment is the first tier in the overall assessment process. The 

primary audience for the contractor self-assessments should be the contractor security managers themselves, but the self-assessments should follow a consistent, program-wide format, and be made available for review at all higher levels of management. Contractors should be required to identify, report, and resolve security 

issues—sanctions should come when a higher level assessment uncovers problems 

that the contractor self-assessments fail to identify or properly address. Even when 

an issue is readily resolved and corrective actions are immediate, a finding should 

be issued and the corrective action recorded. Failure to do so inevitably hides potential negative trends. Contractor self-assessments should involve active performance 

testing rather than simply relying on work observation and document review—effective security performance can only be evaluated through testing. On site Federal security personnel should actively participate in this process as quality assurance for 

the federal government. 

The fundamental purpose of Federal security performance assessment is to ensure 

that requirements are properly implemented. Therefore, the primary Federal assessment organization should ultimately report to the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, who is responsible for requirements. This provides independence not only from 

the contractors, but also from the tactical-level Federal field staff whose necessary 

day-to-day interaction with contractor managers and staff risks loss of objectivity. 
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This enables the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security to better ensure effective implementation of NNSA security programs. Additionally, it provides feedback on performance to the operational and tactical levels. 

These Federal security assessments should include performance testing of all critical elements. The assessors should issue clear findings which are to be tracked and 

closed in a program-wide corrective action management system. Federal assessors 

should also look closely at the contractor self-assessment process; ‘‘failures to identify’’ by the contractor self-assessment element should automatically rise to the level 

of significant findings. 

The final tier of the assessment model should explicitly rely upon the services of 

an independent security oversight function, currently provided by HSS. NNSA 

should arrange for a regular process of comprehensive inspections. The oversight 

function should be encouraged to issue strong findings for matters of potential concern to the NNSA Administrator and the Secretary of Energy, and should routinely 

evaluate the performance of contractor self-assessments and the Federal assessment 

program. 

Mr. ROGERS. How do we ensure robust security oversight that is not overly burdensome? 

General FINAN. Much of the ‘‘burden’’ of oversight is caused by excessive paperwork associated with evaluating compliance. The current security assessment process in NNSA is paper-based and is heavily dependent on field office and contractor 

reporting. It does not include independent observation or validation of site security 

implementation from NNSA. As a result, NNSA is unable to validate the implementation of security policies or contractor performance of assigned missions. Large volumes of paperwork are generated each quarter in which it is nearly impossible to 

discern trends or significant deficiencies. 

In the area of security, oversight must be about performance. Therefore, oversight 

should see actual performance in the form of real world activity or exercises. Some 

paperwork should be reviewed, such as training records, but that paper work should 

already exist and not be generated solely for the purpose of outside oversight. Specific standards against which security operations are to perform and the criteria by 

which they will be evaluated must be codified. This will ensure security professionals know what is expected and how they will be evaluated. By eliminating paperwork generated solely for the purpose of oversight and adhering to a known set 

of standards and criteria, security oversight should not be burdensome. 

We should also resist the notion that strong performance-based standards and criteria and an equally strong insistence on stringent performance assessment and 

oversight inherently constitutes an excessive burden on contractors and the field. 

Part of the cultural challenge lies in overcoming the tendency on the part of contractors and their field level federal counterparts to assert that their local priorities and 

perspectives must take precedence over comprehensive and coherent, centrally-driven security program direction. A good system must take into account special local 

circumstances. However, NNSA’s longstanding tradition has been the assertion that 

‘‘the field always knows best,’’ and that Headquarters should simply stay out of 

their business. Upon close examination, many complaints about ‘‘excessively burdensome HQ security oversight’’ are revealed as exercises in ‘‘turf protection’’. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Finan, your report is clearly indicating frustration when it 

says ‘‘the most striking result of this review falls in the area of culture sustainment. 

It quickly became evident that the Task Force findings closely resemble those presented in numerous prior reports such as the 2005 Mies Report and the 2004 Chiles 

Report.’’ Why haven’t DOE and NNSA been able to address these long-standing, 

well-documented problems? 

a. What do you recommend that we in Congress do to ensure they are actually 

addressed this time? 

General FINAN. DOE and NNSA have not been able to attack core issues. As a 

result, they make marginal change around the periphery of the issue, check the box 

showing they have taken action, and move on to other things. Security human capital development is a good example. Security professionals in NNSA do not have a 

defined career path. They do not have a program for their development, and they 

largely see their careers with the federal government as dead ends. This issue has 

been repeatedly identified. As a result NNSA has taken action. They implemented 

a rudimentary requirement for security professionals to get some minimal training 

and the started a program where they brought in young leaders as a part of the 

leadership development program. With this in place, it was assumed that they had 

taken care of the Human Capital issues identified in the 2004/2005 time frame. Unfortunately, this action did not create a career path; it did not develop security professionals; it did bring in people with little or no security expertise or necessarily 

even an interest in security; and it did not change the belief that there was not any-
129 

where to progress to in security. It nibbled at the margins of a core issue . . . the 

fact that there was no identifiable, repeatable, or executable career path for federal 

security professionals. 

a. Ensure that NNSA builds and executes a Security Road Map that consolidates 

recommendations, articulates a clear vision of where the security program is going, 

and charts a path forward. Document the path in a roadmap that is signed by the 

NNSA Administrator and follow up with action plans that have clear ownership, including regular status updates. Solutions must be enduring and will require leadership dedication. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Finan, you recognized human capital limitations as a contributing factor to the event, including weak staff capabilities to assess contractor 

performance. What can Congress do, if anything, to enhance human capital at 

NNSA as it pertains to security? 

General FINAN. NNSA must develop a comprehensive plan for recruiting, developing, and retaining qualified security experts. NNSA needs the right federal security professionals in the right places. Individual leaders, and collectively the entire 

staff, must possess an appropriate skill and experience base to provide effective security program execution. Congress can specifically help by ensuring that NNSA has 

the ability to hire the appropriate federal security staff, both in terms of numbers 

and pay scale. Currently, NNSA relies heavily on support service contractors. This 

is partly due to limitations (perceived or real) on funding and hiring federal personnel. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Finan, your task force was directed to study organizational 

issues within NNSA. Your tasking did not include assessing organizational issues 

within the broader DOE system. In the course of your investigation, did you become 

aware of any organizational problems related to security in the broader DOE organization, or are these problems located solely within NNSA? 

a. Do you believe the security policy-making and oversight roles and responsibilities between DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security and NNSA are clearly 

defined and understood? 

General FINAN. We did find evidence of similar confusion related to ambiguous 

lines of authority and lack of standardization in executing the security mission. As 

in NNSA, we found wide variations in how the federal staffs executed their oversight roles at the various sites. 

a. I do not. The Task Force identified that there is no clearly articulated or consistently implemented NNSA security policy process. A major concern is the supplanting of DOE Security Orders with generic and less restrictive NNSA policies 

(NAPs). Additionally, the Task Force noted a desire on the part of some NA–70 senior managers to maximize separation from DOE HSS policies and activities. Within 

NA–70, policy and guidance are issued through a variety of formal and informal 

mechanisms with erratic distribution. The Task Force identified that some Federal 

field organizations are inconsistent in their acceptance and application of NA–70 

issued policies. Finally, NA–70 policy and guidance tend to be vague resulting in 

widely differing interpretations by field personnel. This has resulted in additional 

confusion in the field as to which policies actually apply to them. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Finan, your report seems to indicate that DOE and NNSA 

were overly focused on paperwork, and missed the warning signs that indicated a 

problem at Y–12. Why such focus on paperwork? How were they missing the warning signs? 

a. How would you change the assessment, inspection, and oversight process to ensure the warning signs are noticed, and security performance is assured? 

General FINAN. Misinterpretation, and/or misapplication of the DOE Safety and 

Security Reform Plan, dated March 16, 2010, resulted in a weakened Federal security assessment program. In particular, this document stated: ‘‘Security Performance: Contractors are provided the flexibility to tailor and implement security programs in light of their situation and to develop corresponding risk- and performance-based protection strategies without excessive Federal oversight or overly-prescriptive Departmental requirements.’’ This guidance was further expanded upon 

and eventually articulated in NAP–21, Transformation Governance and Oversight 

Initiative. The belief arose that ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ precluded Federal security staff 

from conducting performance-based assessments of contractors. As a result, most 

Federal assessment was based on paperwork generated by the contractor. The paperwork was voluminous and non-standard. There were no consistent business rules 

on how to report areas of concern. The result was a mass of paper that made it 

nearly impossible to discern issues. 

This paper-based system of assessment, without sufficient performance 

verification, is inadequate for effective evaluation of security operations. Much of the 

‘‘burden’’ of oversight is caused by excessive paperwork associated with evaluating 
130 

compliance. Large volumes of paperwork are generated each quarter in which it is 

nearly impossible to discern trends or significant deficiencies. This, combined with 

a lack of NNSA independent observation or validation of site security implementation resulted in an inability to validate the implementation of security policies or 

contractor performance of assigned missions. 

a. The Task Force proposed an assessment model that strengthens the role of Federal security assessment within NNSA without diminishing the legitimate need for 

contractors to maintain their own self-assessment capabilities. 

The contractor self-assessment process is the first tier in the overall assessment 

process. The primary audience for the contractor self-assessments should be the contractor security managers themselves, but the self-assessments should follow a consistent, program-wide format, and be made available for review at all higher levels 

of management. Contractors should be required to identify, report, and resolve security issues—sanctions should come when a higher level assessment uncovers problems that the contractor self-assessments fail to identify or properly address. Even 

when an issue is readily resolved and corrective actions are immediate, a finding 

should be issued and the corrective action recorded. Failure to do so inevitably hides 

potential negative trends. Contractor self-assessments should involve active performance testing rather than simply relying on work observation and document review—effective security performance can only be evaluated through testing. 

The fundamental purpose of Federal security performance assessment is to ensure 

that requirements are properly implemented. Therefore, the primary Federal assessment organization should ultimately report to the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, who is responsible for requirements. This provides independence not only from 

the contractors, but also from the tactical-level Federal field staff whose necessary 

day-to-day interaction with contractor managers and staff risks loss of objectivity. 

This enables the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security to better ensure effective implementation of NNSA security programs. Additionally, it provides feedback on performance to the operational and tactical levels. 

These Federal security assessments should include performance testing of all critical elements. The assessors should issue clear findings which are to be tracked and 

closed in a program-wide corrective action management system. Federal assessors 

should also look closely at the contractor self-assessment process; ‘‘failures to identify’’ by the contractor self-assessment element should automatically rise to the level 

of significant findings. 

The final tier of the assessment model should explicitly rely upon the services of 

an independent security oversight function, currently provided by HSS. NNSA 

should arrange for a regular process of comprehensive inspections. The oversight 

function should be encouraged to issue strong findings for matters of potential concern to the NNSA Administrator and the Secretary of Energy, and should routinely 

evaluate the performance of contractor self-assessments and the Federal assessment 

program. 

This performance assessment model assumes a common requirements base that 

is employed at all levels and across the NNSA security program. While some allowance may be made for site-specific issues, the fundamental elements of this requirements base should be an appropriately integrated system of DOE policies, NNSA 

implementation directives, and field operational guidance. The requirements base 

should be reflected in approved documents such as site Safeguards and Security 

Plans. Specific performance requirements should be articulated in detailed performance standards and criteria supported by a commonly understood and utilized performance testing process. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Friedman, your report recommends that NNSA ‘‘perform periodic in-depth reviews of contractor’s security performance using a risk-based approach.’’ Does NNSA not do this now? 

a. How does NNSA and DOE use risk analysis in its assessments of security? 

b. Do we have a rigorous means of assessing, managing, and balancing security 

risks, costs, and mission needs? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. At the time of our review, there were two levels of Federal contractor security performance assessments at the Y–12 National Security Complex. 

These were performed by the Department’s Office of Health, Safety and Security 

(HSS) and the NNSA Production Office (NPO). 

HSS performed limited scope security assessments on a periodic basis. During the 

review, we did not specifically review HSS’s methodology for determining what sites/ 

areas to assess or the frequency of the assessments. However, HSS has publically 

acknowledged that its review regime has been limited in recent years. The Department has stated that, as a result of the Y–12 matter, a more robust security performance assessment strategy will be implemented. 
131 

NPO stated that it performed periodic reviews of the contractor’s security performance using a risk-based approach. However, as part of our work at Y–12, we 

interviewed the NPO personnel responsible for the reviews and examined NPO’s 

periodic assessment reports. In our opinion, the reviews could not be considered ‘‘indepth’’ since they consisted mainly of reviewing contractor-prepared documentation 

and/or ‘‘shadowing’’ the contractor’s self-assessments rather than conducting independent security performance testing. 

a. The results of our review at Y–12, which catalogued what we described as multiple-system failures, reflects our view of the quality of risk assessment methodologies employed by NNSA/DOE, at least as they applied to that facility at that time. 

Beyond our published analysis, we did not specifically evaluate NNSA/DOE’s use of 

risk analysis to plan their security assessments. Respectfully, responsible Department officials may be able to provide a complete answer to this question. 

b. Our review focused on the circumstances directly pertaining to the incident at 

Y–12, thus we did not evaluate the overall NNSA/DOE security posture. To the extent the problems identified at Y–12 as part of our review and by other subsequent 

reviews reflect the status of security throughout the complex, there is reason for 

concern. Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, we’ve heard differing opinions on how DOE and 

NNSA’s protective forces should be structured. Do you believe federalization of the 

protective forces is an appropriate path forward? What are the benefits, risks, and 

costs of the various models for the protective forces? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Federalization of the protective force was considered extensively in 

security reviews by Mr. Meserve, Mr. Alston and Mr. Augustine following the Y– 

12 security incident as well as many others over the years. DOE believes this topic 

is worthy of continued dialogue within the Department and with Congress, but is 

not prepared to offer a formal opinion at this time. 

Some of the issues for further consideration include how a Federal force would 

integrate with on-site Management and Operating (M&O) contractor leadership, the 

potential for complex-wide labor disputes or strikes, and the budgetary impact on 

the Government. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, in General Alston’s letter to Secretary Chu, he 

says ‘‘there is a perception that corporate security policy is being written from inspection results.’’ Mr. Augustine noted in his letter that inspections and assessments inappropriately focus on compliance with standards, and not on security effectiveness or performance, concluding that ‘‘what is needed is not more inspections 

but better inspections.’’ Do you agree? If so, how will DOE address this concern? 

a. What is being done to make inspections more effective at assuring robust security performance? 

Mr. PONEMAN. The Department appreciates receiving these observations from 

General Alston and Mr. Augustine. Inspections of nuclear facilities performed by 

HSS not only focus on compliance with established DOE policies, but also on security effectiveness and emphasize testing of performance. I agree that the quality of 

inspections is very important in addition to frequency. Since the Y–12 security incident we have directed HSS to enhance its inspections to include more limited-notice 

and no-notice testing of the protective forces and security systems in order to ensure 

their readiness to respond to security incidents. As you know, we have also directed 

HSS to conduct extent-of-condition reviews at all Category I special nuclear facilities 

and to complete comprehensive inspections at each of these facilities by October 

2013. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, several witnesses from the first panel indicated 

in their reports that the governance reforms initiated by Secretary Chu and Administrator D’Agostino were misinterpreted or misapplied by Federal staff, which was 

a contributing factor to the Y–12 incident. Do you agree? [Question #16, for crossreference.] 

Mr. PONEMAN. NNSA’s governance reforms were structured to improve the Line 

Oversight of its contractor operations. Effective Line Oversight uses several different sources of information to ensure accurate and objective understanding of conditions and performance. Those sources include federal line management assessments, federal independent assessment and data from the Contractor’s ‘‘Contractor 

Assurance System (CAS)’’. A CAS is a primary tool used by Contractor Management 

to measure, improve, and demonstrate performance and ensure that mission objectives and contract requirements are achieved. CAS is the same as basic concepts of 

successful industry quality management systems such as International Standards 

Organization (ISO) 9000/9001. 

A robust and effectively functioning CAS provides transparency and builds trust 

between NNSA and its contractors and helps to ensure alignment across the NNSA 

Enterprise to accomplish and address mission needs. For example, comparing data 
132 

developed through the CAS to data developed by federal assessments allows NNSA 

to ensure that the M&O contractor has effective quality management programs in 

place. With effective and transparent contractor assurance systems, NNSA can focus 

the deployment of our federal oversight workforce on high risk areas, e.g. nuclear 

safety, security, and cyber security. 

NNSA has recently completed a review of the current policy on reviewing CAS 

and Line Oversight processes in light of the lessons learned from the early reviews 

and the Y–12 performance failure. The review has identified needed changes to the 

processes so future reviews will ensure performance requirements are being met 

and that the objectives and expectations for NNSA governance are effectively communicated and adhered to across the complex. 

These changes will be consistent with the revised DOE Order 226.1B, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy, which requires that the Heads of 

the Field Elements approve the initial contractor assurance system description; review and assess the effectiveness of the Contractor Assurance Systems (CAS); and 

establish performance expectations and communicate same to contractors through 

formal contract mechanisms. This is a continuation of the requirements contained 

in the predecessor DOE order 226.1A, dated July 31, 2007. That order also contains 

contractor requirements for a CAS. Additionally, DOE Order 227.1, Independent 

Oversight Program, issued August 30, 2011, requires that the contractor’s corrective 

action to address a security weaknesses identified during an Independent Oversight 

inspection be approved by the DOE. This is a continuation of the requirement that 

was contained in the predecessor order, DOE Order 470.2B, Independent Oversight 

and Performance Assurance Program, dated October 31, 2002. A key aspect of our 

strengthened process is the establishment of a central line organization, the Office 

of Infrastructure and Operations, (NA–00) and a clear focus on oversight at three 

distinct, but mutually supportive, levels within NNSA. As before, the M&O contractors are responsible and accountable for their performance at the floor level where 

their employees perform work—this is what we call the ‘‘tactical’’ level of oversight. 

The Office of Infrastructure and Operation provides the federal line-management or 

‘‘operational’’ oversight. In this regard, NA–00 leverages the combined capabilities 

of its offices through the complex to ensure that oversight is performed by both the 

federal staff closest to, and most knowledgeable of, a specific site’s operations but 

also federal personnel responsible for similar activities at other locations who can 

provide additional objectivity because they have relevant experience but a different 

perspective. NNSA also provides oversight by subject matter experts who are independent of the NN–00 line organization. Offices such as security (NA–70) and safety 

(NA–SH) provide strategic oversight and performance data to the most senior NNSA 

leaders from a perspective outside the pressures and influences that can affect the 

line organization. 

Based on these refinements and improved clarity, as well as the added reliability 

of the structured levels of oversight, NNSA will work to ensure that our oversight 

and performance expectations are clear, well executed, and not misinterpreted. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, DOE’s 2010 Safety and Security Reform Plan 

advocated for a performance-focus and the removal of ‘‘excessive’’ Federal oversight. 

Do you still stand behind the plan’s core tenets? 

a. As Deputy Secretary, how will you ensure that NNSA and DOE conduct rigorous and effective—but not burdensome—oversight of security at NNSA’s facilities? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Over the past two years the Department undertook an effort to assess the effectiveness of all safety and security directives with the goal of reducing 

redundancy, duplication and inconsistencies. The result is a set of directives that 

is more streamlined, allows DOE program offices and contractors greater flexibility 

in implementing Departmental requirements, without sacrificing the level of protection of worker health, safety and security. The directives reform effort was not a 

contributing factor to the security failure at Y–12. None of the studies conducted 

so far (either by General Alston, Mr. Meserve, Mr. Augustine, General Finan, or the 

Inspector General) have pointed to the Department’s revised directives. For instance, the revised DOE Order 226.1B, Implementation of Department of Energy 

Oversight Policy, requires that the Heads of the Field Elements approve the initial 

contractor assurance system description; review and assess the effectiveness of the 

Contractor Assurance Systems (CAS); and establish performance expectations and 

communicate same to contractors through formal contract mechanisms. The order 

also contains contractor requirements for a CAS. This is a continuation of the requirements contained in the predecessor DOE order 226.1A, dated July 31, 2007. 

a. We will continue to ensure that NNSA and DOE perform rigorous and effective 

oversight of security and strive to improve that oversight, in ways that minimize 

the impact to mission execution. 
133 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, nearly every external review in the past decade 

has indicated serious problems with the security culture at NNSA and DOE. Culture changes are extremely difficult and often take a long time. What immediateterm actions should we be taking to begin this needed culture shift? What is your 

long-term plan to instill a new security culture? [Question #18, for cross-reference.] 

Mr. PONEMAN. a. We recognize the need for a positive culture change. Immediateterm actions within the NNSA included the hiring of four senior Federal personnel 

to transform our approach to security. A highly-experienced individual with over 30 

years of Nuclear Security experience in the Department of Defense was appointed 

to serve as the new Chief of Defense Nuclear Security; two new Senior Advisors experienced in security matters will serve under the Chief to develop overall policy 

and ensure the adequacy of its implementation through assessments. In addition, 

a highly experienced individual was brought into NA–00, the Office of Infrastructure 

and Operations, to provide high level operational experience to facilitate more consistent and high quality oversight of the operational security program. These individuals are charged with changing the culture of the security community. 

Recognizing a need to continue improvement in the NNSA Safety Culture, the 

NNSA Administrator established the NNSA’s Safety Culture Working Group 

(SCWG) on December 3, 2012, to identify and direct specific actions to improve the 

safety culture in NNSA. The SCWG quickly determined that it was appropriate, and 

more descriptive, to address the overall NNSA performance culture, which includes 

security performance. Everyone within the NNSA directly impacts our performance 

culture, regardless of role or function; therefore, everyone has a role in improving 

our overall performance culture. 

The SCWG is conducting a comprehensive assessment of the NNSA culture, will 

analyze the data collected through extensive reviews of NNSA personnel and recommend corrective actions. The SCWG has authority to direct actions necessary to 

monitor and improve culture throughout NNSA. 

As indicated in Geral Finan’s review, after HSS security inspections revealed security flaws dating back to the early 200s, these flaws are now getting HSS followup attention. We recognize that true lasting cultural change is the hardest type of 

change to implement. NNSA senior leadership is united and engaged not only in acknowledging the need for change but in actively supporting that change. The lessons 

learned the hard way from our experience at Y–12 have served as an undeniable 

wake up call for us to set clear expectations for performance, adherence to standards and attention to detail across the NNSA enterprise. 

b. First and foremost, we acknowledge the need to improve and to face facts about 

performance and culture head on. Our near-term actions set the stage for success 

in the long term. By bringing in several high quality experts with significant experience in nuclear weapons security we have begun to set the example of supreme professionalism in our leadership. We have implemented all recommendations of the 

Finan Report which, over time, will drive clarity not only into the chain of command 

but into the overall process by which we establish expectations across the enterprise. 

The new assessment model implemented by NA–70, our Chief of Defense Nuclear 

Security organization, will drive consistency of implementation in requirements and 

ensure adherence to high standards across the NNSA enterprise through frequent 

and detailed formal assessments at our sites by independent internal NNSA security professionals. 

These actions, supported by strong central leadership and unflinching focus will 

serve to increase the professionalism of the NNSA Headquarters security professionals, make more information available to the Administrator and hit the culture 

of complacency that led to our Y–12 failure directly. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, the first witness panel pointed out that most of 

their findings and recommendations are not new—that they are strikingly similar 

to those made by many external reviews over the past decades. We have stacks and 

stacks of reports going back 15 or 20 years—since before NNSA was created—describing the same exact problems. [Question #19, for cross-reference.] 

a. Please list the various external reports and reviews of security and general 

management/oversight problems at DOE and NNSA that you have used (and will 

use) to understand the problems and history behind them. 

b. Why are these long-standing, well-documented problems not getting fixed? 

c. What assurances can you provide that they are now getting fixed? How will we 

know they are effective? 

d. Will the Obama Administration come forward with a package of reforms that 

will finally address the root causes of these problems in both security and general 

management at DOE? 
134 

Mr. PONEMAN. In addition to the external security reviews by Mr. Meserve, Mr. 

Alston and Mr. Augustine and General Finan review of NNSA security following the 

Y–12 incident, a number of external reports and reviews of DOE/NNSA security and 

general management/oversight since NNSA’s creation. They included: 

1) Federal Advisory Committee for the Nuclear Command and Control System 

Comprehensive Review (Admiral Mies Report), December 3, 2009 

2) Strengthening NNSA Security Expertise, an Independent Analysis (Chiles Report), March 2004 

3) Science and Security in the Twenty First Centure: A Report for the Secretary 

of Energy on the Department of Energy Laboratories (Hamre Report), February 

2002 

4) Science and Security in the Service of the Nation: A Review of the Security 

(Baker/Hamilton Report), September 2000 

The Department takes the recommendations of internal and external security experts seriously, and implements their findings and recommendations as appropriate 

to address systemic problems. A top priority for the Department is improving the 

management and oversight of the Department’s nuclear security mission. 

As evidenced by the Y–12 security breach, there are existing challenges in the nuclear security complex that needed to be addressed, some that demonstrated the 

need for a deep cultural change. Many of the external reports commented about the 

organization and management weaknesses, such as a lack of clear accountability, 

roles and responsibility, and authority. NNSA has taken on the challenge stemming 

from the proper line management security by implementing a key recommendation 

in General Finan’s review, making the security of the entire nuclear complex more 

secure and streamlined. 

Prior to the Y–12 incursion, the Headquarters NNSA security organization, the 

Office of Defense Nuclear Security (NA–70), served as a ‘‘Functional Manager’’ for 

the security mission, while the line authority flowed from the Secretary to other 

NNSA Administrators and other organizations. General Finan recommended for 

strategic-level policy guidance, requirements determination, and performance assessment to be under the jurisdiction of the Chief, Defense Nuclear Security (NA– 

70). 

A separate office, NNSA’ s Office of the Associate Administrator for Infrastructure 

and Operations (NA–00) would then provide the operational accountability for 

NNSA’s security organization. Operational implementation and standardization of 

operations across the security program occurs at the NA–00 level. 

The existence of a single point through which the field reports and is held accountable is the way the NNSA will assure the consistent and effective implementation of security policy. This is a change from the approach the NNSA has takenwhere each field office had greater latitude in implementing policies and requirements for its site. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, in his letter to Secretary Chu, Dr. Meserve 

notes that he and his fellow reviewers ‘‘had some difficulty in obtaining a clear organization chart that defines the structure for security oversight within DOE.’’ He 

noted that issues within this problem within NNSA were going to be addressed by 

General Finan’s effort, but that ‘‘a broader examination of DOE’s internal management of security should be undertaken in order to streamline and simplify the structure.’’ Are you going to undertake this effort to streamline and simplify DOE’s management structure for security? What steps will you take and when? What can Congress do to support these efforts? 

a. Are the recommendations made by General Finan on simplifying structure 

within NNSA being implemented? 

b. How is creation of a new office that will have security responsibilities (NA–00), 

while maintaining or increasing the size of other offices with security responsibilities, ‘‘simplifying’’ the structure? 

c. Will you clarify and document the roles and authorities of NA–70, NA–00, 

DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security, site offices, senior officials, and other 

parties? When will this happen? How will it be documented and communicated to 

all stakeholders? 

d. What steps are you taking to minimize conflicting policies and directions provided by NNSA headquarters, DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security, and 

other Federal officials to field staff and contractors? 

Mr. PONEMAN. a. NNSA is implementing recommendations made by General 

Finan following her thorough review of the federal NNSA security organizational 

structure and security oversight model. 

b. General Finan offered recommendations to established and ensure a clear and 

strong path of line management authority, responsibility, and accountability for security operations within the NNSA. NNSA’s Office of the Associate Administrator 
135 

for Infrastructure and Operations (NA–00) would provide the operational accountability for NNSA’s security organization, while the Chief, Defense Nuclear Security 

(NA–70) provides strategic-level policy guidance, requirements determination, and 

performance assessment. 

c. The Department’s Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), in consultation 

with line management, is responsible for the development of DOE nuclear safety 

and security policy, Federal Rules, Orders, and the associated standards and guidance, as well as for reviewing safety and security issues complex-wide. HSS also 

conducts independent oversight and regulatory enforcement that is independent 

from line management. HSS oversight has expanded the scope and variety of performance testing methods utilized to assess the readiness of DOE and NNSA site 

protection systems against a defined spectrum of threats and adversary capabilities 

Performance testing methodologies include no-notice and limited notice inspections 

to obtain a more realistic assessment of site response capabilities and readiness performance. 

d. To directly address problems with the assessment model, NNSA has set about 

implementing a three-tiered approach to assessing security throughout the NNSA. 

This approach includes: 1) an initial assessment performed by the contractor at the 

site, 2) an assessment of the contractor’s performance carried out by the Chief of 

Defense Nuclear Security at DOE Headquarters (NA–70), and 3) independent oversight by the Office of Health, Safety and Security. And, of course, apart from this 

three-tiered assessment and inspection regimen, we expect Federal site personnel to 

perform quality assurance activities on a routine basis as an integral part of their 

line management responsibilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, in the 1990s we had a string of major security 

problems at DOE Defense Programs, which then ran the nuclear weapons complex. 

In 1999, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board called DOE ‘‘security 

at its worst’’ and a ‘‘dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself.’’ Congress created NNSA in an effort to address these exact concerns. 

But on February 22 the DOE Chief Security Officer, Glenn Podonsky, was quoted 

telling a reporter that the nuclear enterprise ‘‘wasn’t working badly’’ in the 1990s 

before NNSA was formed, and that we should just abolish NNSA and go back to 

having everything in DOE. 

a. Do you agree with Mr. Podonsky that the nuclear enterprise ‘‘wasn’t working 

badly’’ in the 1990s? 

b. Do you agree with Mr. Podonsky that NNSA should be dissolved and folded 

back into DOE? Are Mr. Podonsky’s views the position of the Department of Energy? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I discussed Mr. Podonsky’s remarks with him. His comments were 

not accurately reflected in the news article you are referencing, and he made clear 

at the time that the remarks were not made on behalf of DOE. He merely remarked 

on the restructuring options that an external review panel may consider and the 

feasibility of those options. As you know, the Administration has made no proposal 

to dissolve the NNSA or to return to any previous organizational model. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, are you aware that DOE’s Office of Health, 

Safety, and Security conducted an independent oversight inspection of Y–12’s physical security systems in May 2012—just two months before the security breach? 

a. When did you become aware of this inspection and its results? 

b. Do you believe this inspection of Y–12’s physical security systems should have 

found the many problems—such as inoperative cameras, unacceptably high false 

alarm rates, inappropriate delegation of cognizant security authority, etc.—that 

were subsequently found to have contributed to the breach? 

c. How effective are these independent inspections if they can’t catch and correct 

these glaring problems? 

Mr. PONEMAN. The report from May 2012 was not a full security inspection, nor 

was this report approved through the formal HSS review process. Official HSS reports go through an exhaustive peer-review process led by a Quality Review Board 

and are approved by all levels of HSS senior management including approval by the 

Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer. The May 2012 report was never considered by a Quality Review Board panel and was not reviewed or approved by HSS 

senior management. The individual who wrote it and submitted it to the site, (without a signature nor on DOE letterhead) has received a formal reprimand for his 

misrepresentation and was removed from any leadership role for failing to follow 

important protocols and misrepresenting the nature of the product. 

A security inspection by HSS would have revealed many of the problems at Y– 

12—as did the most recent full inspection in 2008–2009. This unsanctioned report 

was the product of an assistance visit requested by the site to focus on some very 

narrow issues. This unapproved memo in no way could be interpreted as a valida-
136 

tion that everything was OK with security at Y–12. Neither HSS senior management nor I were aware of the document until it was identified during a search for 

Y–12 related documents requested by Congress. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, how long has DOE’s Chief Security Officer, Mr. 

Glenn Podonsky, been employed by the Department of Energy? How long has he 

held senior positions in the Department that have to do with security oversight and/ 

or security policy? 

a. Given his previous positions and tenure, do you believe Mr. Podonsky should 

have been aware of external reviews of DOE security from the 2000s (Such as the 

Commission on Science and Security in 2002 and the Mies Task Force in 2005)? 

b. As the Chief Security Officer for the Department, do you believe it is Mr. 

Podonsky’s responsibility to ensure that problems identified by previous external reviews of security are corrected? 

c. Do you believe the problems identified by previous reviews, such as ‘‘lack of 

clear accountability, excessive bureaucracy, organizational stovepipes, lack of collaboration, and unwieldy, cumbersome processes, ’’ as identified by Admiral Rich 

Mies in 2005 and many others before him, have been addressed? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Mr. Podonsky has served in DOE for approximately 29 years, in 

a number of senior positions involving security evaluations, independent oversight, 

and performance assurance. He has been relied upon by DOE leaders and Congressional oversight committees through those years due to his experience and expertise 

in DOE nuclear security matters. It is important to understand the security role of 

the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) which is headed by Mr. Podonsky. 

HSS is a staff office reporting directly to me and the Secretary. HSS leads the development of Departmental security policies, and provides us with unvarnished assessments of DOE program and facility security performance. Those assessments are 

performed independently of the line management which holds responsibility for 

managing security at our sites and facilities. However because HSS is independent 

of line management within the programs, it does not have authority to direct the 

Federal or contractor security officials at each site; it is up to these parties to take 

actions in response to HSS findings. HSS ideally plays a role in helping the programs implement security recommendations, and follow-up to ensure that those recommendations are adequately addressed. Over his career Mr. Podonsky has been 

well aware of the various internal and external studies that have been done on DOE 

security, and he has been involved at a senior level alongside previous Secretaries 

and Deputy Secretaries and the DOE program office line management, in determining the most appropriate response to each study. 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Poneman, do you still have confidence in Mr. Podonsky as 

the Department’s Chief Security Officer? Do you intend to hold him or his office accountable for failing to identify the myriad security problems at Y–12 just two 

months prior to the incident, or for failing to correct the long-standing security problems at DOE? 

Mr. PONEMAN. We see HSS as an important source of the solution. All of us in 

the DOE security community—from the Secretary and me to program office and site 

management in both headquarters and the field, including HSS, have an obligation 

to improve security performance and we are taking bold steps to ensure that the 

special nuclear materials of the DOE are adequately protected. For all of us who 

have not been removed from the line management of security following the incident, 

it is our sole duty to ensure that we have learned from the incident and quickly 

and effectively implemented corrective actions. HSS has been a key contributor to 

that effort. Since the Y–12 incident, HSS has led a successful extent-of-condition review of all DOE facilities which hold Category I special nuclear materials, and is 

now in the process of executing exhaustive inspections at each of these sites, to include enhanced force-on- force testing of our protective forces, as directed by the Secretary. 

Mr. ROGERS. Administrator Miller, all of the studies the committee is aware have 

been conducted after the Y–12 incident have been finalized except the ‘‘Special Review Team’’ report conducted by NA–70. Initially, the committee was told that this 

assessment was expected to ‘‘contribute to the wider effort to identify root causes, 

develop conclusions, and outline recommendations’’ for security improvements at Y– 

12 and in other agency facilities. However, although the team’s work apparently 

concluded in September, it’s been five months and the report has not yet been finalized. What is the reason for this delay? 

a. Have NNSA and DOE decided to discount the review because it was conducted 

by an organization whose oversight practices contributed to the incident? If that’s 

the case, then why was the HSS review not similarly discounted, given that HSS 

gave the physical security system at Y–12 a clean bill of health just two months 
137 

prior to the incident? Or is it that senior NNSA or DOE officials disagree with the 

recommendations and conclusions that the SRT report draws? 

Ms. MILLER. As soon as the Special Review Team (SRT) returned from Tennessee, 

they shared their insights and findings with the Chief, Defense Nuclear Security 

(CONS) who took immediate action to resolve the issues cited. One of his actions 

was the immediate sharing of lessons learned with field offices as well as the five 

page summary of the issues found at Y–12 for use in assessing and improving their 

processes. That summary was also provided to the House Armed Services Committee. Additionally, in January 2013, a draft version of the Y–12 Special Review 

Team report was provided to the House Armed Services Committee; however, the 

‘‘Assessment of NNSA Federal Organization and Oversight of Security Operations’’ 

study was well underway and was yielding important recommendations. That report 

has since been completed and published, and was provided to the House Armed 

Services Committee staffers in December 2012. 

a. We value the information provided in the SRT report, and many of their observations focused on the larger National Nuclear Security Administration security 

program, and are applicable to all of our operations. It is also important to note that 

the May 2012 HSS Site Assistance Visit report that you cite as giving the physical 

security system at Y–12 ‘‘a clean bill of health,’’ did not represent a full security 

inspection of Y–12, but only examined a few site specific issues HSS was asked to 

help assess. 

Mr. ROGERS. Administrator Miller, how is NNSA handling the conflicting recommendations generated from the various post-Y–12 incident studies? For instance, 

the DOE–HSS and Finan reports recommend conducting more hands-on oversight 

of security, while Mr. Augustine and two external members of the SRT panel caution specifically against this. [Question #22, for cross-reference.] 

a. As the Acting Administrator, how will you ensure that NNSA and DOE conduct 

rigorous and effective—but not burdensome—oversight of security at NNSA’s facilities? 

Ms. MILLER. NNSA leadership implemented several processes and procedures to 

improve security throughout the enterprise and ensure a consistent standard for security operations. The Office of Defense Nuclear Security (NA–70) has been realigned to focus on policy development, strategic planning, and independent performance assessments of security activities. The Office of Infrastructure and Operations (NA–00), comprised of the NNSA Field Offices will develop an internal performance review culture that will supplement the local field offices. These performance reviews will be staffed by field office employees from other sites and be specifically integrated with other audit and surveillance plans to minimize operational impacts. To elaborate, I have revised our processes so that NNSA will rely on a threetiered assessment model that will focus on performance and outcomes (not just process) at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The contractor self-assessment 

process continues as a ‘‘tactical level’’ first tier in the overall assessment process. 

The Office of Infrastructure and Operations, drawing on NNSA federal resources 

from across the complex, will provide ‘‘operational level’’ oversight to ensure consistent and effective performance from a line management perspective. Finally, the 

‘‘strategic’’ oversight is conducted by NA–70/CDNS. An internal independent Federal 

assessment organization, which reports directly to the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, and will ensure requirements are properly implemented by going to the field, 

with minimal notice, and assessing security readiness, operations, and implementation. A final tier of the assessment model completely separate from NNSA is currently provided by the Office of Health, Safety and Security. 

a. As described in the response to Q22 [above], NNSA will employ a system of 

tactical, operational, and strategic oversight. 

Mr. ROGERS. Administrator Miller, we’ve heard differing opinions on how DOE 

and NNSA’s protective forces should be structured. Do you believe federalization of 

the protective forces is an appropriate path forward? What are the benefits, risks, 

and costs of the various models for the protective forces? 

Ms. MILLER. I defer to the Deputy Secretary of Energy’s response. [See page 131.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Acting Administrator Miller, do you believe NNSA has a rigorous 

means of assessing, managing, and balancing security risks, costs, and mission 

needs? If so, please describe this process. 

Ms. MILLER. Yes I do. NNSA leadership has implemented several processes and 

procedures to improve security throughout the enterprise and ensure a consistent 

standard for security operations. 

We realigned security resource execution to the Office of Infrastructure and Operations (NA–00) in alignment with its operational authority across all NNSA sites. 

• NA–00 is assuming operational control over security implementation across the 

Nuclear Security Enterprise. 
138 

• Specifically, NA–00 will ensure: 

• standardization of security procedures across the field locations; • provide operational assistance; and • serve as a conduit for operational concerns to the DNS staff. 

Additionally, the Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) mission was reinvigorated to 

focus on policy development, strategic planning, and performance assessments of 

field-led activities. 

For example, as NNSA Acting Administrator, I recently dispatched the new Acting Chief of DNS, travelling with a team of security professionals, to visit every 

NNSA site during his first 50 days in office, executing limited and no-notice assessments of their security readiness, operations, and program implementation. These 

site visits are the first step in what will become an enduring mission focus. NNSA 

is committed to change our culture of how we assess security so that we are less 

reliant on reports written by others and more focused on our own real time assessments with a ‘‘boots on-the-ground’’ approach. 

Mr. ROGERS. Acting Administrator Miller, how much has the response and aftermath to the Y–12 incident cost? How is NNSA paying for these costs? Do you expect 

security costs to increase dramatically at Y–12 and/or across the enterprise in Fiscal 

Year 2014 and beyond? 

Ms. MILLER. The costs incurred for immediate corrective actions in FY 2012 were 

approximately $13,680K. Approximately $2,984K of this amount were indirect costs 

funded from organizational overhead pools. Approximately $10,696K were paid for 

directly from the Field Security (FS–20) account, but managed within the funding 

already allocated to the site prior to the event. Total costs will depend on NNSA 

approval of the specific baseline increases and non- recurring project/procurements 

proposed by the site. For FY13 and beyond, these are still being carefully vetted by 

subject matter experts and senior decision makers and will be subject to the results 

of a new vulnerability analysis. DNS expects there may be some minor increases 

in the recurring level of effort, but most corrective actions have been and will be 

largely one-time costs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Administrator Miller, several witnesses from the first panel indicated in their reports that the governance reforms initiated by Secretary Chu and 

Administrator D’Agostino were misinterpreted or misapplied by Federal staff, which 

was a contributing factor to the Y–12 incident. Do you agree? 

Ms. MILLER. Please see the answer the Deputy Secretary gave in response to 

question #16. [See page 131.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Administrator Miller, NNSA has created the ‘‘NA–00’’ organization 

to manage the site offices. It will also have a role in overseeing security at NNSA 

facilities. How will this new organization fit into the many other organizations with 

security responsibilities, including NA–70, DOE–HSS, and the site offices? Are you 

confident that this extra office will resolve these long-standing problems with security organization, policy, and oversight? Are you at all concerned that this additional 

office will simply complicate an already too-complicated structure? 

Ms. MILLER. First and foremost, it is important to clarify that NA–00 is not actually an additional layer or office. It is the combination of all NNSA Site Offices into 

a single operational entity. So, rather than have eight independent operational level 

entities, each establishing standards and procedures and setting expectations locally, the NA–00 organization will fulfill those functions on an enterprise basis. The 

Office of Infrastructure and Operations (NA–00), with enterprise operational responsibilities will drive consistent implementation of requirements across the Nuclear 

Security Enterprise. 

Specifically, NA–00 will: 

• ensure consistent implementation of security policies while allowing for purposeful differences; 

• deliver high quality engaged and active oversight of security operations; 

• provide operational assistance between field offices; and 

• serve as a conduit for operational concerns to the Defense Nuclear Security 

staff. 

Establishment of NA–00 will allow the Office of Defense Nuclear Security (NA– 

70) to focus on policy development, strategic planning, and perform independent assessments of security activities. Yes, I am confident that this new organization 

structure will resolve the long-standing problems with security organization, policy, 

and oversight 

No, I do not believe this new organizational structure will cause any confusion. 

These organizational changes will result in clearer roles, responsibilities, and authorities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Acting Administrator Miller, nearly every external review in the past 

decade has indicated serious problems with the security culture at NNSA and DOE. 
139 

Culture changes are extremely difficult and often take a long time-what immediateterm actions should we be taking to begin this needed culture shift? What is your 

long-term plan to instill a new security culture? What is your plan to attract the 

kinds of experts and knowledge-base that are needed to perform effective oversight? 

Ms. MILLER. Please see the Deputy Secretary’s answer to question #18. [See page 

133.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. General Alston, do NNSA contractors have too little independent 

oversight, or too much? 

General ALSTON. There was poor quality oversight of the contractor providing security at Y–12. The ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ signal from the HQ, together with insufficient and inadequate performance-based assessments contributed to poor oversight 

conditions. Other sites’ security operations, however, performed satisfactorily, in 

spite of ‘hands off’ atmospherics. The quality of the oversight is one several key ingredients to effective performance. 

Mr. COOPER. Do you believe that the incident is the result of overly burdensome 

security requirements, as some have claimed? 

General ALSTON. I saw no evidence to substantiate overly burdensome security requirements as causal or even contributing to the incident. The NNSA ‘‘eyes on, 

hands off’’ signal contributed to a lack of sufficient oversight that empowered too 

much local discretion at Y12 that resulted in additional and unjustifiable mission 

risk. 

Mr. COOPER. What should be done at the contract level to increase accountability 

and liability for failures? Should the government be able to seek damages for nonperformance? Should criminal liability be an option? 

General ALSTON. I don’t feel qualified to comment on or suggest specific contracting options to ensure proper security performance because the duration of the 

project was short and the direction from the Secretary of Energy did not lead me 

in that direction. I personally wouldn’t prefer to secure nuclear materials with contractors. But if DOE and NNSA continue to purchase protective services, governance 

requirements and accountability needs to be squared away with the government 

overseers first. 

Mr. COOPER. General Finan, do you think that NNSA has gone too far in delegating responsibility for making security decisions to its contractors? 

General FINAN. Yes, in some cases. There was no clear policy guidance on what 

could be delegated or how the delegations would be implemented. NAP- 70.2, Physical Protection, has allowed for varied interpretations of what can and cannot be delegated. There was no standardized process for the delegation of CSA from the Chief 

of Defense Nuclear Security to the Federal security managers. Further delegation 

of CSA to the security contractor was inconsistently exercised and in some cases inappropriate. As a result, the contractor was sometimes allowed to approve security 

plans and procedures without effective Federal oversight or approval. 

Mr. COOPER. General Finan, do NNSA contractors have too little independent 

oversight, or too much? 

General FINAN. NNSA contractors do not have the right kind of oversight. Much 

of the ‘‘burden’’ of oversight is caused by excessive paperwork associated with evaluating compliance. The current security assessment process in NNSA is paper-based 

and is heavily dependent on field office and contractor reporting. Large volumes of 

paperwork are generated each quarter in which it is nearly impossible to discern 

trends or significant deficiencies. 

In the area of security, oversight must be about performance. Therefore, oversight 

should see actual performance in the form of real world activity or exercises. Some 

paperwork should be reviewed, such as training records, but that paper work should 

already exist and not be generated solely for the purpose of outside oversight. Specific standards against which security operations are to perform and the criteria by 

which they will be evaluated must be codified. This will ensure security contractors 

know what is expected and how they will be evaluated. By eliminating paperwork 

generated solely for the purpose of oversight and adhering to a known set of standards and criteria, security oversight should not be burdensome. 

Mr. COOPER. Do you believe that the incident is the result of overly burdensome 

security requirements, as some have claimed? 

General FINAN. No. A lack of clearly defined security requirements contributed to 

the incident. There is no clearly established requirements-driven baseline to govern 

the implementation of the NNSA security program. Rather, the NA–70 approach deliberately departed from key DOE Security Orders and established a less restrictive 
140 

security policy framework through the NAPs without resolving the different performance measurement expectations between the two policies. The lack of clearly 

defined performance requirements resulted in inconsistent and incomplete security 

program implementation. A performance baseline, set forth in detailed standards 

and criteria, is the keystone of an effective security program. Precisely articulated 

standards and criteria further provide an objective foundation for performance assessment. Currently, NNSA does not have the standards or criteria necessary to effectively measure security program performance. The Task Force noted that the lack 

of standards and criteria has been coupled with the widespread notion that contractors must only be told ‘‘what’’ the mission is, not ‘‘how’’ the mission is to be accomplished. Therefore, security tasks are not necessarily performed in a manner consistent with NNSA security requirements. 

We should also resist the notion that strong performance-based standards and criteria and an equally strong insistence on stringent performance assessment and 

oversight inherently constitutes an excessive burden on contractors and the field. 

Part of the cultural challenge lies in overcoming the tendency on the part of contractors and their field level federal counterparts to assert that their local priorities and 

perspectives must take precedence over comprehensive and coherent, centrally-driven security program direction. A good system must take into account special local 

circumstances. However, NNSA’s longstanding tradition has been the assertion that 

‘‘the field always knows best,’’ and that Headquarters should simply stay out of 

their business. Upon close examination, many complaints about ‘‘excessively burdensome HQ security oversight’’ are revealed as exercises in ‘‘turf protection’’. 

Mr. COOPER. What should be done at the contract level to increase accountability 

and liability for failures? Should the government be able to seek damages for nonperformance? Should criminal liability be an option? 

General FINAN. This is largely an issue for contracting. It is important that responsibilities and authorities are properly aligned. Each organization needs to have 

clearly defined responsibilities. With each of these responsibilities, the appropriate 

authority must be accorded. With responsibility and authority in alignment, individual and organizational accountability is established. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Friedman, do you think that NNSA has gone too far in delegating responsibility for making security decisions to its contractors? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Given the structure of NNSA (specifically, the number of contractor versus Federal personnel), extensive responsibility for security decisions has 

been delegated to contractors. This having been said, we found that Federal oversight of the contractors and their security decisions was inadequate. At Y–12 the 

lack of local Federal involvement in technical security issues and NNSA’s ‘‘eyes on, 

hands off’’ policy were troubling, suggesting to us that the relationship between contractor responsibility and Federal responsibility for site security was out of balance. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Friedman, do NNSA contractors have too little independent 

oversight, or too much? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In my opinion, NNSA contractors have too little independent oversight. Local Federal oversight had employed an ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ approach, with 

limited independent performance testing/assessment. In recent years the number 

and scope of reviews by HSS has also been reduced. 

Mr. COOPER. Do you believe that the incident is the result of overly burdensome 

security requirements, as some have claimed? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. Our reviews of security across the complex have not revealed 

examples of what we considered to be overly burdensome security requirements. 

Rather, we found that the incident at Y–12 resulted from multiple system failures 

on several levels. For example, we identified troubling displays of ineptitude in responding to alarms, failures to maintain critical security equipment, over-reliance 

on compensatory measures, misunderstanding of security protocols, poor communications, and weaknesses in contract and resource management. So-called burdensome security requirements were not part of the sequence of events at Y–12. 

Mr. COOPER. What should be done at the contract level to increase accountability 

and liability for failures? Should the government be able to seek damages for nonperformance? Should criminal liability be an option? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. To increase accountability and liability for failures at the contract 

level, performance measures should be added to each contractor’s Performance Evaluation Plan to incorporate security into each mission element. Such action would 

hopefully prevent contractors from earning full performance fees unless security is: 

(1) integrated into day-to-day processes and, (2) found to be effective and efficient 

by external reviewers. While the fee structure provides an incentive for excellence 

in contractor performance in the security arena, the NNSA/DOE should not be reluctant to terminate contracts for poor performance. That may be an extreme meas-
141 

ure for some, but when national security interests are at stake, it is a step which 

needs to be available to, and exercised by, Federal managers. 

Mr. COOPER. Secretary Poneman, are lessons from the deficiencies in security 

oversight being applied to safety oversight? How? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes. Where we see opportunities for improvement identified in our 

response to the Y–12 security incident which can also be employed to improve our 

oversight of safety, we will seek to do so. A fundamental failure in the Y–12 incident 

was the inadequate flow of information about underlying security problems up 

through the management chain. Under the leadership of the Office of Health, Safety 

and Security (HSS), over the past year a number of independent assessments have 

identified deficiencies in safety culture at several DOE projects, sites and programs. 

We know now that we must do a better job in creating an environment where employees at all levels feel motivated to identify deficiencies in both safety and security, and feel confident that they can bring those problems forward without retaliation and to work with management to develop appropriate solutions. This, too, is 

a very high priority for our leadership team. 

Mr. COOPER. Secretary Poneman, what was the cost of overtime to avoid delays 

due to Y–12 being shut down? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Following the security incident in July 2012, operations activities 

at Y–12 were shut down from July 30 to August 14, 2012, for a total of 10 days. 

This shutdown impacted a number of operations activities, including Category 1 and 

2 Special Nuclear Materials Operations. Restart of these activities were phased back 

in on August 15, 2012; overtime costs of about $34,000 were incurred in order to 

get the work back on schedule. 

Mr. COOPER. Secretary Poneman, B&W got nearly 60% of its award fee in 

FY2012. The security failure at Y–12 only cost them $12 million in un-earned fee. 

[Question #42, for cross-reference.] 

• What should be done at the contract level to increase accountability and liability for failures? Should the government be able to seek damages for non-performance and be able to impose fines? 

• Should criminal liability be an option to improve the incentives for performance 

and the contractor culture? 

• Other than docking Babcock & Wilcox’s award fee for security, is NNSA attempting to get back part of the more than $150 million that was spent on security, given non performance? 

Mr. PONEMAN. The contract, along with existing Federal and DOE Acquisition 

Regulations, have sufficient terms and conditions to hold contractors accountable 

and liable for performance failures. Additionally, given the unprecedented nature of 

this failure, the Department is reviewing our existing regulatory authorities to determine if these need to be expanded to cover the security of special nuclear materials. 

The Department possesses statutory and regulatory authority to impose civil penalties. In addition, I believe adequate and sufficient criminal laws are already in 

place. Federal criminal law involving fraud, conflict of interest, bribery or gratuity 

violations and false claims are currently applicable, as appropriate, to contractors. 

In addition, contractors must ensure that no false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements are made to a Federal agency under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 

The Department is in the process of reviewing the matter and will enforce its 

rights under the contract to hold Babcock & Wilcox Y12 accountable for its deficient 

work, including withholding payment of costs if appropriate. 

Mr. COOPER. Secretary Poneman, nearly every external review in the past decade 

has indicated serious problems with the security culture at NNSA and DOE. Culture changes are extremely difficult and often take a long time—what immediateterm actions should we be taking to begin this needed culture shift? 

• What is your long-term plan to instill a new security culture? 

• What is your plan to attract the kinds of experts and knowledge-base that are 

needed to perform effective oversight? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Please see Deputy Secretary Poneman’s response to question 18 for 

an answer to the first bullet. [See page 133.] The answer to the second bullet is provided by Deputy Secretary Poneman’s response to question 19. [See pages 133–134.] 

Mr. COOPER. Secretary Poneman, how are you ensuring that Federal oversight 

performs site vulnerability analyses that look at the systemic impact and the broader implications of individual security decisions? [Question #46, for cross-reference.] 

Mr. PONEMAN. The current vulnerability analysis (VA) process is driven at the 

site level. While this ensures results that are highly tailored to individual site-specific parameters, it can also produce widely divergent approaches to security across 

the NNSA. 
142 

This issue was recognized in General Finan’s Report ‘‘Assessment of NNSA Federal Organization and Oversight of Security Operations.’’ The report was the main 

driver for the establishment of the Office of Security Operations (NA–00–30) within 

the larger NA–00 Office of the Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations. Consistent with the recommendations of the Finan Report, NA–00–30 will 

be the centralized security function for NNSA that ensures line management authority, responsibility, and accountability for the security program within the 

NNSA. 

In its role as the centralized security function, NA–00–30 will establish a new 

centralized VA process that employs a core team of VA experts teamed with site 

subject matter experts to produce site-specific analyses while gaining consistency 

across the Enterprise, identifying systemic issues and broader implications, and ensuring greater transparency and justification for Field Security (FS–20) budget requests. 

Mr. COOPER. Acting Administrator Miller, are lessons from the deficiencies in security oversight being applied to safety oversight? How? 

Ms. MILLER. Yes. Lessons learned from the Y12 security incident are being applied to safety oversight. The organizational changes and revised oversight approach 

for security are also being implemented for safety. In addition, NNSA is working 

aggressively to evaluate and improve its safety culture across all sites. Although 

this effort began before the Y12 event, strengthening NNSA’s safety conscious work 

environment will help ensure contractor and Federal personnel are encouraged and 

motivated to identify and seek resolution of safety issues and to raise these issues 

up through the management chain. One of the more significant lessons learned in 

the Y–12 incident was that known, significant issues with security were not being 

raised from subject matter experts up through the NNSA management chain. 

Mr. COOPER. Acting Administrator Miller, what was the cost of overtime to avoid 

delays due to Y–12 being shut down? 

Ms. MILLER. Following the security incident in July 2012, operations activities at 

Y–12 were shut down from July 30 to August 14, 2012, for a total of 10 days. This 

shutdown impacted a number of operations activities, including Category 1 and 2 

Special Nuclear Materials Operations. Restart of these activities were phased back 

in on August 15, 2012; overtime costs of about $34,000 were incurred in order to 

get the work back on schedule. 

Mr. COOPER. Acting Administrator Miller, B&W got nearly 60% of its award fee in FY2012. The security failure at Y–12 only cost them $12 million in un-earned 

fee. • What should be done at the contract level to increase accountability and liability for failures? Should the government be able to seek damages for non-performance and be able to impose fines? • Should criminal liability be an option to improve the incentives for performance 

and the contractor culture? 

• Other than docking Babcock & Wilcox’s award fee for security, is NNSA attempting to get back part of the more than $150 million that was spent on security, given non-performance? 

Ms. MILLER. Please see Deputy Secretary Poneman’s response to question 42. [See 

page 141.] 

Mr. COOPER. Acting Administrator Miller, nearly every external review in the 

past decade has indicated serious problems with the security culture at NNSA and 

DOE. Culture changes are extremely difficult and often take a long time—what immediate-term actions should we be taking to begin this needed culture shift? 

• What is your long-term plan to instill a new security culture? 

• What is your plan to attract the kinds of experts and knowledge-base that are 

needed to perform effective oversight? 

Ms. MILLER. For response to the first part of the question on security culture, 

please see response to question 18. [See page 133.] 

In addition to our overall efforts to improve the NNSA performance culture, we 

are taking additional actions to specifically address security. We have recruited new 

leaders for both the Office of Defense Nuclear Security (NA–70) and the office of 

security within the Office of Infrastructure and Operations (NA–00). Those leaders 

come to us from outside the Department of Energy and bring vast and varied sets 

of skills and experience from their careers in the Department of Defense nuclear 

community. 

Besides the infusion of new leadership, we are encouraging a questioning attitude 

from the people that perform the work day-to-day at the sites. While it is easy to 

fall into routines that contribute to the effect of not being able to see the forest for 

the trees, encouraging employees to question the status quo also promotes ownership and understanding of the security processes. 
143 

Another thing we plan to incorporate into the NA–00 performance assurance process is the use of security professionals from across the complex to augment our assessments. This provides several advantages; it allows security professionals from 

other sites to participate in the evaluation process removing the mystique, takes advantage of and recognizes the professionals at the other sites, and encourages the 

sharing of best practices. All of these contribute to instilling a new security culture. 

Additionally, NA–70 will focus on policy development, strategic planning, and performance assessments of field activities. 

Using small assessment teams of security experts with minimal advanced notice 

to the sites, NA–70 will assess security readiness, operations and program implementation of both the Federal and contractor security elements. These assessments 

will be short in duration but repetitive throughout the year. 

This new assessment approach will require additional oversight personnel. NA– 

70 is working to recruit additional Federal senior security specialists. These individuals will augment the current Federal senior security specialists to allow for the 

execution of a rigorous assessment program. 

We are working with our Human Capital community in an effort to target recruitment of oversight personnel toward communities that are rich in the basic skill sets 

germane to the mission. Specifically, we are looking to tap into the pool of resources 

which have previously served an oversight and/or assessment role in support of the 

National nuclear security mission. 

Mr. COOPER. Acting Administrator Miller, how are you ensuring that Federal 

oversight performs site vulnerability analyses that look at the systemic impact and 

the broader implications of individual security decisions? 

Ms. MILLER. Please see Deputy Secretary Poneman’s response to question 46. [See 

page 141.] 

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