United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 95-20724

Summary Calendar.

Daniel Joseph LUKEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Wayne SCOTT, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Dec. 21, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Daniel Joseph Luken appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court dismissing

as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 his claim that his confinement in administrative segregation

violates his due process rights. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I.

On April 25, 1995, Luken filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wayne Scott and

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Luken alleged that Scott willfully maintained false

information in Luken's prison file c o ncerning Luken's membership in a prison gang, the Aryan

Brotherhood; that on the basis of that information, Luken was confined in administrative segregation;

and, that because of his custody status, he has been unable to accrue additional good-time credits to

accelerate his eligibility for parole.

On June 8, 1995, the district court ordered Luken to furnish a mor e definite statem ent of

facts. Responding to the court's order, Luken conceded that he received a hearing within ten days

after being placed in admi nist rat ive segregation; that he was afforded the opportunity to make a

statement at the hearing; and, that a classification review board reviewed his status every ninety days.

In its order dismissing Luken's complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the district

court concluded that Luken had failed to demonstrate that he had a constitutionally cognizable libertyinterest in his custody status. In addition, the district court held that, even if he did possess such a

interest, Luken had received all the process due him. This timely appeal followed.

II.

This case is not about the deprivation of good-time credits previously earned by Luken. C f.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); G otcher v. Wood, 66

F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.1995). Rather, Luken contends that the m er e opportunity to earn

good-time cr edit s co nstitutes a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to trigger the

protection of the Due Process Clause. We disagree.

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the Supreme

Court held that a prisoner's liberty interest is "generally limit ed to freedom from restraint which, while

not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due

Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." I d. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2295, 132 L.Ed.2d at 430

(citations omitted). The Court held that the prisoner's "discipline in segregated confinement did not

present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty

interest." I

d. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2295, 132 L.Ed.2d at 431. S andin establishes that Luken's

admin ist rat ive segregation, without more, does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally

cognizable liberty interest. S ee also Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir.1995)

(holding that no liberty interest is implicated by placement in administrative segregation); G othcher,

66 F.3d at 1101 (remanding for determination whether placement in disciplinary segregation imposed

"atypical and significant" hardship on prisoner sufficient to create liberty interest).

Luken responds that the effect of his custodial status has been to reduce his opportuni ty for

earning good-time credits that could lead to a shortened time in prison, which is a constitutionally

protected liberty interest. In S andin, the Court rejected a simi lar argument, noti ng that Conner's

confinement in disciplinary segregation would not "inevit ably" affect the duration of his sentence since

the d ecisio n t o release a prisoner on parole "rests on a myriad of considerations." I d. at ----, 115

S.Ct. at 2302, 132 L.Ed.2d at 431-32. Indeed, the Court concluded that the possibility that Conner'sconfinement in disciplinary segregation would affect when he was ultimately released from prison "is

simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause." Id. at ----,

115 S.Ct. at 2302, 132 L.Ed.2d at 432.

The loss of the opportunity to earn good-time credits, which might lead to earlier parole, is

a collateral consequence of Luken's custodial status. Yet, such speculative, collateral consequences

of prison administrative decisions do not creat e co nst it utionally protected liberty interests. S ee

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2540 n. 8, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (noting

that possible effect on

paro le decision does not create liberty interest in confinement in particular

prison). Any of a host of administrative or disciplinary decisions made by prison authorities might

somehow affect the timing of a prisoner's release, but such effects have never been held to confer a

constitutionally protected liberty interest upon a prisoner such that the prison authorities must comply

with the Constitutional requirements of due process. For example, in B ulger v. United States Bureau

of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir.1995), we held that the loss of a prison job did not implicate the

prisoner's liberty interest even though the prisoner lost the abilit y to automatically accrue good-time

credits as a consequence.

Finally, even if Luken possessed a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his custodial

status, we are not persuaded t hat Luken has been afforded constitutionally insufficient process.

Alt ho ugh Luken contends that his prison file contains false information regarding his gang

membership, Luken points to no denial of procedure for demonstrating the falsity of this information.

Indeed, Luken concedes that he received a hearing within ten days of being placed in administrative

segregation, Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that prisoner received

due process where informal review occurs within reasonable time after placement in administrative

segregation), and his custodial status is reviewed every ninety days.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Luken's complaint as f rivolous

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

AFFIRMED.