U.S. MARINE CORPS MOUNTAIN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER, 1951-2001 Steele l Moffett
Cover: A striking image of a Marine small

unit in cold weather clothing and equipment snowshoeing up a slope at the training

center.

(Photo by C. Robert Lee, courtesy of author)
The U.S. Marine Corps

Mountain Warfare Training Center

1951-2001

by

Major General Orlo K. Steele, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Lieutenant Colonel Michael I. Moffett,

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington D.C.

2011
ii

Other Volumes in the Marine Corps Base and

Training Center History Series

Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps, 1978

U.S. Marines at Twentynine Palms, California, 1989

PCN 106 0000 7600
iii

Foreword

The following account represents a significant look at a half century of U.S. Marine Corps effort in the

Sierra Nevada mountain range of California. This has been and is still the location of the Corps cold weather

and mountain training facility. Over time the needs and demands for Marines and units prepared to operate

under these conditions waxed and waned with the real world requirements of deployed forces. This was reflected in the realities of conflicts in the Korean Peninsula, the Cold War’s northern and southern flanks, and

in the current Global War in Terrorism fight in Afghanistan and elsewhere. While the future is often uncertain,

this firm look at the past is useful to show how previous challenges have prompted creative and innovative

responses. This is as much a story of evolution as an institution. 

The primary author, Major General Orlo K. “O.K.” Steele took on this project based on personal experience

as a mountain leader instructor, and unit commander. His purpose was to document the 1951 through 2001

story to demonstrate the continued relevance of mountain and cold weather training at Bridgeport and Pickel

Meadow. A native of Oakland, California, General Steele’s Marine Corps’ active career spanned the years 1955

through 1990. As an infantry officer he served with distinction at every level from platoon, battalion, regiment,

amphibious unit, amphibious brigade, division through expeditionary force. Other tours of duty included Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego; the Mountain Warfare Training Center; Marine Detachment, USS America

(CVA 66); NROTC officer instructor Dartmouth College; Marine Barracks Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C.; and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. He is a graduate of Stanford University, Marine

Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the National War College.

Since retirement he has been active on advisory boards, mentoring, and with this project which he conceived,

resourced, and executed.

The coauthor Lieutenant Colonel Michael I. “Mike” Moffett took part in this effort as a member of the

History Division’s Field History Branch. He assisted in the review and revision of the entire manuscript and

authored the sidebars and final chapter. A New Hampshire native, he served as a regular and reserve infantry

officer at the platoon, company, and battalion level. His service also included his attendance at the mountain

leader winter course at the Mountain Warfare Training Center. Lieutenant Colonel Moffett’s other significant

duties have been with the Marine Enlisted Commissioning Program Preparatory Course, as well as serving a

field historian tour in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of the University of New Hampshire and Plymouth State

University. Mr. Ken Williams’s editing and design branch prepared the manuscript for publication with editing

by Ms Wanda Renfrow and layout by Mr. W. Stephen Hill.

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History
iv
Preface

In mid-April 2000, I put a telephone call into the late Colonel John W. Ripley who was a longstanding

friend and a former messmate from our days together in the 2d Marine Division. John had just recently been

appointed to be the Director, Historical Division at Headquarters Marine Corps. After congratulating him on

his new duties, I mentioned to him that during the previous month I had been to the Marine Corps Mountain

Warfare Training Center (MWTC) to observe a Marine air-ground task force exercise conducted by 65 students

from Colonel John A. Keenan’s Expeditionary Warfare School. That trip reminded me that in September 2001,

MWTC would celebrate its 50th Anniversary. “Shouldn’t the History Division commemorate the event by publishing an historical monograph?” I asked. “Perhaps we can do that,” John agreed. The following week I followed that call up with an e-mail suggesting to John that as soon as he had selected an author for the MWTC

project to please let me know, as I would be happy to provide some photographs and background material

that I held from the mid 1960s. 

After six months of silence I telephoned John again. “How is the MWTC project progressing?” I asked. “It

hasn’t begun yet,” he responded, “too many other priorities.” “Listen,” John said to me, “you are probably as

familiar with the training center as anyone; why don’t you write it?” “Let me think about it and I will get back

to you,” I told him as I rang off.

John’s instincts were close to the mark. I had always considered Pickel Meadow to be a special place.

During my 35 years of active duty, the training center had either directly, or indirectly touched my life at practically every rank. I had first walked into that meadow as a private first class in February 1956 for 10-days of

cold weather indoctrination. Then, I returned as a first lieutenant in December 1960 as a student in the Escape,

Evasion, and Survival School. In January 1963, I reported there for duty as a captain and for the next two

years served as the senior instructor-guide of the Mountain Leadership School. I took command of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines as a major in May 1973, two weeks later we deployed to Bridgeport for a month of summer

mountain training while the base was still in a caretaker status. I had served as the 1st Marine Division’s

training officer as a lieutenant colonel when in 1975 we started the first winter mountain operations training

course for a rifle company of the 7th Marines. As a colonel in Policies Plans and Operations at Headquarters

U.S. Marine Corps in 1981, I was present at the decision briefing given to General Robert H. Barrow as he

pondered on what the fate of MWTC should be. Finally, as a major general I was privileged to command the

2d Marine Division from 1987 to 1989 when MWTC played a pivotal role in preparing our Marines and sailors

for the most likely contingency operation that was then facing the division: the prospect of fighting a winter

campaign in north Norway. 

After I had considered the matter, I telephoned John and told him that I would be happy to take a stab at

authoring the monograph. However to do so, I would need some financial assistance to help underwrite my

out-of-pocket expenses for research at both the Washington Navy Yard historical library and the Marine Corps

University archives at Quantico. John said that he would speak to Lieutenant General George R. Christmas to

see whether the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation might be willing to provide a small grant for that purpose. 

It so happened that Ron Christmas and I had a longstanding relationship that dated back to 1963, at what

was then the Cold Weather Training Center. At the time, Ron was a student second lieutenant from the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion. I on the other hand had just arrived for a two-year tour of duty at Bridgeport, when

we were put into the same six-man team of students in the February Winter Mountain Leadership Course.

Thus for the next four weeks, the two of us and our four other teammates shared an improvised parachute

shelter at 9,000 feet elevation, while trying to master the techniques of day and night cross-country skiing

with a 50-pound pack strapped to our backs. Fortunately, General Christmas did indeed approve the request

for a grant. Therefore, I am very grateful to Ron, Susan Hodges and the Heritage Foundation Executive Committee for providing the financial assistance that I needed for my initial research trips. I am also grateful to

them for their extreme patience during the nine years that it has taken me to complete this project. 

After drafting an outline and developing a working bibliography, I devoted the first 10 days of February

v
2001 and an additional five days in July researching primary source documents at the Historical Division’s

Navy Yard library and at the Gray Research Center archives at Quantico. I am indebted to Chief Historian

Charles D. Melson, Dr. David B. Crist; Mr. Robert Aquilina, the assistant head of the Reference Branch at the

History Division; History Division Executive Assistant Cynthia Meyer; and to Ms. Kerry A. Strong, the director

of the Gray Research Center Archives, and her staff. 

Unfailingly, each person managed to ferret out all of my special requests, thereby enabling me to acquire

copies of most of the official source documents that are cited and referenced throughout this work. I also

benefited greatly from the many articles that appeared in Leatherneck magazine on CWTC and MWTC over

the past half century, which my good friend Colonel Walter G. Ford, kindly compiled and sent to me.

It was during that first research period that I also realized it would speed things up if I had an assistant to

help me go through the vast amount of material on cold-weather operations that was held in the Breckenridge

library at Quantico. I therefore turned to another friend and former Marine Barracks, Washington D.C., messmate, Colonel John R. Allen. At that time, John was the commanding officer at The Basic School. I asked

Colonel Allen whether he might have a second lieutenant who was in a temporary “holding pattern” who

could be made available on a part-time basis to carry out specific research tasks at Quantico over the next

several months? The next morning, Second Lieutenant Sean J. Schickle reported to me for temporary duty at

Breckenridge library. Sean was a graduate of Illinois State University and had just been commissioned three

months prior, after spending eight years in the Marine Corps Reserve as a combat engineer. Further, I learned,

he was not scheduled to start The Basic School until May. Sean immediately demonstrated a keen interest in

the project and I wasted no time in putting him to work. During the following month, Colonel John Keenan

also kindly added Lieutenant Schickle to his manifest of students who were being flown out to Bridgeport for

the annual Expeditionary Warfare School Mountain Marine air-ground task force operation. While together at

Bridgeport, Sean and I were able to screen documents held locally, and among other things, spend four hours

audio taping the personal recollections of the legendary retired Master Gunnery Sergeant John Marjanov. I

have good reason to be very grateful to Sean for all of his contributions to this monograph and especially for

his invaluable research into many of the official reports used in Chapters 4 and 5. I trust the commanding

knowledge and appreciation that Sean acquired for cold weather and mountain operations during those early

months of 2001 still stand him in good stead today. 

On 6 September 2001, the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Center celebrated its 50th Anniversary with a

ceremony and open house at the training center. Several hundred people were in attendance, including a

number of former Marines who had served tours of duty there. By this time, I had the first three chapters in

draft form, and was gleaning through the material I intended to use in the fourth. Therefore, I was glad to accept Colonel James M. Thomas’s invitation to be one of the guest speakers and to make a few brief remarks

describing what conditions must have been like for those Leathernecks who served at Pickel Meadow during

its first year. Following the ceremony, I had the good fortune to meet Mr. and Mrs. Harold Haberman of

Denver Colorado. Staff Sergeant Haberman had been among those first pioneers to serve in the Cold Weather

Battalion during 1951-1952. After exchanging cards, Harold promised to send me some photographs he had

taken during his first winter at Bridgeport. When I saw the photos I was elated. Readers will see why in Chapters 3 and 4. They portray the severe blizzard conditions that repeatedly swept across the Sierra’s that year,

far better than any narrative could possibly describe them. 

During the course of writing this history, my co-author and I have done our utmost to reach out and learn

the personal stories of those who had either served at MWTC, or who had undergone training there. To my

former S-3 officer at MWTC, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Deptula, Retired go special thanks for enabling me

to conduct personal interviews with Colonels Walter Moore and Richard Johnson whose insights on how the

Cold Weather Battalion first came into being proved invaluable. We are equally indebted to First Sergeant

Carl. H. Raue Jr.; Major Anthony F. Milavic; Gunnery Sergeant Henry Vozka; and Major James N. A. Goldsworthy

OBE, Royal Marines; Colonel Jeffery W. Bearor; and Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., for the wealth of material, personal accounts and photographs, which they have so generously provided for inclusion to this

history. 

This project received assistance from many retired Marines and other persons living in the nearby communities to MWTC. Included among this list are: Bob Peters, owner of the Bridgeport Inn who helped research

records held at the Mono County Courthouse and articles from the Bridgeport Chronicle-Union; Gunnery Sergeant Coy D. Ziglar, also of Bridgeport; Gunnery Sergeant Eugene L. Ewing and former Corporal William A.

vi
“Bing” Blood, both of Carson City, Nevada; Captain Wiley M. Clapp Jr. of Minden, Nevada, Rita Richardson,

widow of the late Lieutenant Colonel Rodney C. Richardson, also of Minden; Gunnery Sergeant Richard N.

Denhoff of Gardnerville, Nevada; Mr. Eric M. Williams, Archaeologist for the Bridgeport Ranger District Office,

Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest; and Mr. Kent Stoddard, President of the Mono County Historical Society,

at Bridgeport, California.

Valuable insights were also gained through either telephone or audio taping interviews with former commanding officers at MWTC. Personal recollections were taken from the late Brigadier General Donald M.

Schmuck; Colonel Glen E. Martin; Mrs. Darlene Guy, widow to the late Colonel John Guy; Colonel William

H. Osgood; Colonel John F. Stennick,, and Colonel Raymond L. Polak. Additionally, since the onset of writing

this history, all the commanding officers at MWTC and their staffs have been very helpful by providing photographs and meeting the authors requests for copies of written documents. In this regard, the assistance rendered by Colonel Norman L. Cooling, who commanded MWTC from 2008 to June 2010 was particularly

noteworthy. 

Others who gave personal accounts of their experiences at MWTC as either instructors or students were:

Lieutenant General Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr.; Colonel Warren H. Wiedhahn, Jr.; Colonel Gerald H. Turley;

Colonel James “Jim” Knapp; Sergeant-Major William J. Conley, and former Marine Corporal John Schneider.

One unforgettable telephone interview was conducted in 2003. It was with the late General Robert H. Barrow,

27th Commandant of the Marine Corps, who patiently explained the reasoning behind his critical decision in

1981 to not only keep MWTC open, but to commit substantial Marine Corps resources to ensure its future and

its usefulness for decades to come. 

Our thanks also go to General Carl E. Mundy Jr., 30th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General

Harry Jenkins, Jr., Colonel Richard Johnson, Major Anthony F. Milavic, Gunnery Sergeant Hank Vozka, Gunnery

Sergeant Coy D. Ziglar, Colonel William H. “Bill” Osgood, Colonel John F. Stennick, Mr. Bob Peters, Colonel

Jeffery W. Bearor and Chief Historian Charles D. “Chuck” Melson for taking the time to read over drafts of the

chapters as they unfolded and for making valuable suggestions for change. 

When conducting research in Washington D.C., and Quantico, I frequently enjoyed the hospitality of my

longstanding friend and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for six years, the Honorable Stephen M. Duncan. Steve not only provided me lodging from time to time during my trips east, but also managed to stiffen

my backbone to ensure I stayed with this project to its bitter end.

Writing this history has taken far longer than I ever anticipated at the outset. Although during the first year

I made reasonably good progress, following the attacks of 11 September, I became increasingly engaged in

doing consulting work for the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies. By midyear 2008, drafts had only been written through Chapter 8. I was grateful therefore, when during the summer

of that year Chuck Melson contacted me with the very welcome news that a Reserve Lieutenant Colonel by

the name of Michael I. “Mike” Moffett had been assigned to the staff at the History Division (which by now

had moved to Quantico) and was interested in working on the MWTC project. Chuck was well aware that I

had been seeking a collaborator from the Reserves for over three years. Thus after learning Colonel Moffett’s

background and his many other professional qualifications, I immediately said yes. That September, Mike

Moffett and I were able to spend a day together in New England going over the draft manuscript. Thereafter,

the two of us devised a plan for a division of labor, which would take advantage of our respective strengths

and knowledge on the subject matter. Mike, we decided, would edit all of the earlier drafts and write the final

chapter detailing the 1990s, plus the Epilogue; meanwhile I would concentrate on completing Chapters 10

and 11. I cannot sing the praises of Mike’s skill and commitment to this project loudly enough. It has been a

joy for me to work side-by side with him over the past several years and to have his steadfast support and

have the benefit of his keen eye for clarity. I would also be remiss not to add that had he not appeared on

the scene when he did, it is very questionable whether this particular monograph would have ever seen the

light of day.

Finally, both my co-author and I wish to thank Colonel Rod Andrews, and a History Division colleague

who from February through May 2010, served as pinch hitter for Mike Moffett while he was performing duty

in Afghanistan. When not in uniform, Rod is a Professor of History at Clemson University and is a published

author of several historical books pertaining to the American civil war. As a certified “historian,” Rod not only

managed to keep this project on track during Mike’s absence, but rendered invaluable professional assistance

by polishing the manuscript, clarifying its endnotes and serving as this monograph’s chief editor.

vii
This monograph is dedicated to all the Marine, Navy, and civilian personnel and their families who have

served at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, whose legacy for training excellence has lasted

for six decades. For their extraordinary resolve and commitment to molding Marine Corps MWTC into one of

the foremost and highly valued combat training centers of our Corps. Especially to the memory of:

Brigadier General Donald M. “Buck” Schmuck (1915-2004)

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P. Averill (1919-1994)

Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Wawrzyniak (1927-1995)

Captain Charles H. Clipper (1917-2004)

Sergeant Major Richard R. “Big Red” Ebert (1922-2002)

Master Gunnery Sergeant John Marjanov (1923-2002)

Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Robeson IV (1947-1990)

Lieutenant Colonel Rodney C. Richardson (1952-2006)

Colonel John W. Guy (1933-2008)

Colonel William H. Osgood (1938-2011). 

Orlo K. Steele

Major General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

viii
Introduction

This is the story of the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center. MCMWTC was established due to

lessons learned from the legendary Chosin Reservoir Campaign in North Korea during the winter of 1950-

1951. Experiences there showed a pressing need for a training program to prepare Marines for the rigors of

harsh winter combat. What started as a basic cold-weather indoctrination program for the replacement drafts

bound for Korea evolved over time into a year-round training facility that is one-of-a-kind for the entire Department of Defense. During its 60-year history the MWTC evolved into what is today the best venue for the

USMC to develop individual confidence and leadership skills for the Marines that train there. I was stationed

there as an instructor-guide in the early 1960s, and would returned as a regimental commander and later as

the Commanding General, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

The reason for MWTC’s extraordinary reputation is its physical environment. The base camp is situated in

Pickel Meadow, at an elevation of 6,800 feet on the eastern slope of California’s Sierra Nevada Range. The

training area includes peaks that rise from 9,000 to over 11,000 feet in elevation. During the winter months

snow depths can exceed 10 feet in the canyons and can be as deep as 25 feet in the Sonora Pass. All mountain

passes remain closed until late spring, which limits the base camp to only one access road. Temperatures vary

from bitter cold in the in the winter months to warm during the day and freezing at night in the spring. During

the spring thaw the West Walker River can be raging torrent and a deadly threat to Marines attempting to

cross it. 

Training at the MWTC can be a high risk endeavor that requires all personnel to be thoroughly schooled

in mountaineering skills, tactics and survival techniques. A long list of superb mountain leaders, many in the

mold of stalwarts like Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P. Averill, Captain Stanley Wawrzyniak and Lieutenant Vincent

R. Lee, provided a talented instructor cadre that was extremely demanding. High altitude, cross-compartment

maneuvering with standard loads requires maximum efforts from Marines. The end result of this training is a

high level of self-confidence to operate in a challenging climate or rough terrain. There is no other USMC

training environment that requires so much endurance and perseverance.

MWTC’s continued existence can be attributed to the foresight and perseverance of several legendary

Marines who recognized its potential and who refused to let it be closed. Generals Oliver P. Smith, Lemuel

C. Shepherd, Jr., Louis H. Wilson Jr., Robert H. Barrow, and other great leaders all knew the value of MWTC

and supported it despite the difficulties associated with maintaining the remote facilities. It was through their

leadership that the MWTC survived over the years, despite being in a cadre status during the Vietnam War. In

the ensuing years MWTC’s training syllabus would evolve and feature many new options for units and individuals. Studies were conducted at Headquarters Marine Corps to determine the optimum size of the permanent staff as well as an adequate infrastructure. Continuous improvements enabled MWTC to meet new Cold

War requirements, including contingencies on NATO’s northern flank.

The 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade (4th MAB) began to focus on exercises in Norway in the late 1970s.

These exercises identified major deficiencies in USMC Arctic capabilities. Much had to be learned if the Marine

units were to be able to live and fight in that part of the world on a proficiency level comparable to that of

Royal Marine, Canadian and Norwegian counterparts. The issue was not the desire of the individual Marine,

but the fact that he had not been properly trained or equipped to operate 24-hours a day in the harsh winter

climate found in the mountains of northern Norway. Attempts were made to improve winter training at places

like Fort Drum in New York or Camp Ripley in Minnesota, where cold temperatures and snow could be found

during the winter months. The problem in both places was that neither replicated the mountainous environment found in Norway above the Arctic Circle. 

The 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade continued to participate in winter exercises in northern Norway

throughout the 1980s. However, many of the same problems regarding training and equipment continued to

persist. It was not until 1984 that the training workup began to change in preparation for regular winter exercises on NATO’s northern flank. The key to that change was the requirement to get the assigned infantry

ix
battalion, the attachments and the regimental headquarters (2d Marines) to MWTC for a specifically designed

30 day winter warfare training package in January of the exercise year. This was followed be a MAGTF exercise

where all elements came together at either Fort Drum in New York or Fort McCoy in Wisconsin. Following

that the 4th MAB would deploy to Norway for exercises with its NATO counterparts. The fundamental training

package at MWTC, carried out by its instructors along with liaison officers from 3 Commando Brigade, Royal

Marines and the Norwegian Army, was what finally resolved the training issues. By the time that a MAGTF arrived in Norway for the 1985 pre-exercise workup, the Marines had spent more time in the field then their

Norwegian counterparts, and were maneuvering over the snow on skis during all hours of the day and night.

That, coupled with the exceptional aviation capabilities of Marine helicopter units in the mountains and fjords,

provided mobility that no one else could match. The key to this success in the years that followed was the

training that continued to be received at the Mountain Warfare Training Center.

It was during this period that significant improvements were made in the clothing and equipment that was

issued to units getting ready for the annual winter exercises in Norway. In a visit to the units in the field

during Cold Winter 85 the Commandant, General Paul X. Kelley, was quick to see many of the equipment

problems that the Marines were dealing with in the Arctic. Upon his return to Washington, steps were taken

to rapidly replace much of the Korean War vintage clothing and equipment that had been around for years.

Subsequent deployments to the MWTC and Norway saw Marine units with some of the best gear that was

available. Much of it had been tested and evaluated in exercises at Pickel Meadow.

With the end of the Cold War there was less emphasis on cold-weather training and exercises as new contingencies developed that changed the focus of the Marine Corps. Operations in Southwest Asia during the

1990s and through the first decade of the 21st century have required a different emphasis on tactics and techniques that has carried over into current operations in Afghanistan. During this period the Mountain Warfare

Training Center has shifted its training packages to meet new requirements. Very difficult and challenging

training in the mountainous environment is now coupled with relevant, contemporary counterinsurgency scenarios. 

Marines are still required to give their all in order to be successful in the mountains. Individuals and units

that complete MWTC training acquire the same confidence and ability as previous generations of Marines. It

is a tribute to the professionalism of the Marines stationed at this superb facility that they continue to demand

the most out of those who train in that environment.

Harry W. Jenkins, Jr.

Major General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

x
Table of Contents

Foreword.................................................................................................................................................................iii

Preface......................................................................................................................................................................v

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ix

Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................................................xi

Chapter 1: The Sierra Nevada Range .....................................................................................................................1

The Mountains ...........................................................................................................................................1

The Indians ................................................................................................................................................2

Colonizers and Trappers ...........................................................................................................................3

Fremont and the Lost Cannon ..................................................................................................................4

Emigrants and Argonauts ..........................................................................................................................6

Chapter 2: U.S. Marine Corps Cold Weather Experience and Doctrine Prior to 1950.......................................11

Introduction..............................................................................................................................................11

Special Duty in the Bering Sea ...............................................................................................................11

Expedition to Iceland ..............................................................................................................................12

Between World War II and Korea...........................................................................................................16

Chapter 3: The Marines Arrive..............................................................................................................................19

Korean War Backdrop .............................................................................................................................19

“All personnel . . . would be thoroughly indoctrinated”.......................................................................19

“Take what action is necessary to establish a suitable training site”....................................................23

Activation of the Cold Weather Battalion...............................................................................................26

Chapter 4: Cold Weather Battalion’s First Year....................................................................................................29

“We’ve got to get ‘em tougher to survive” .............................................................................................29

The Winter of 1951-1952 .........................................................................................................................32

Chapter 5: Making Improvements, 1952-1956 .....................................................................................................37

Introduction..............................................................................................................................................37

Facilities....................................................................................................................................................37

Organization for Training........................................................................................................................38

Cold-Weather Clothing Equipment .........................................................................................................38

Command Relationships..........................................................................................................................39

Building a Camp, 1952 ............................................................................................................................40

Cease-Fire in Korea .................................................................................................................................43

Chapter 6: Expanding the Mission, 1957-1958.....................................................................................................47

Introduction..............................................................................................................................................47

Changes to Command Relationships ......................................................................................................48

Organization for Meeting the New Training Mission.............................................................................51

Evasion, Escape, and Survival Course ....................................................................................................52

Mountain Leadership Course ..................................................................................................................52

Unit Training ............................................................................................................................................56

Chapter 7: Winners Never Quit, 1958-1961 .........................................................................................................61

Introduction..............................................................................................................................................61

xi
“Zum Gipfel”.............................................................................................................................................61

1960 Winter Olympic Games ..................................................................................................................66

A Change in the Watch............................................................................................................................67

Chapter 8: Mountain Men, 1962-1965 ..................................................................................................................71

Marines Who Proved a Match for the Mountains ..................................................................................71

Shifts in the Wind ....................................................................................................................................76

Chapter 9: In the Doldrums, 1966-1979 ...............................................................................................................85

Vietnam War Backdrop............................................................................................................................85

MWTC on the Slippery Slope..................................................................................................................85

Deactivation and Caretaker Status ..........................................................................................................88

Use it or Lose it!.......................................................................................................................................89

Reactivation of the Mountain Warfare Training Center .........................................................................94

Chapter 10: NATO’s Northern Flank: A New Imperative, 1979-1983 .................................................................97

Strategic Background: From Benign Neglect to Heightened Awareness..............................................97

Costs and Risks of the New Initiative.....................................................................................................98

1981: Year of Decision...........................................................................................................................100

Laying the Foundation for Improvements............................................................................................105

Chapter 11: Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990...............................................................................................107

Rebuilding MWTC and Expanding its Capabilities ..............................................................................107

Improvements in Cold-Weather Clothing and Equipment ..................................................................113

Land Prepositioning in Norway ............................................................................................................117

Picking up the Pace in Operations and Modernization of the Training Center.................................118

Reaching the High Water Mark .............................................................................................................123

Chapter 12: The 1990s: A Post-Cold War World ................................................................................................127

Introduction............................................................................................................................................127

Continuing Operations while dealing with Future Uncertainties........................................................127

Demonstrating MWTC value During Peacetime ..................................................................................133

Golden Anniversary...............................................................................................................................135

Epilogue.............................................................................................................................................................135

Strategic Backdrop.................................................................................................................................137

Mountain Warfare Training Center Shifts with the Tides of War ........................................................137

Debates over Deployment.....................................................................................................................138

A Strategic Vision for Mountain Warfare Training Center’s Second Half-Century..............................140

Notes .................................................................................................................................................................143

Appendix A: Lineage and Honors, 1951-2001...................................................................................................149

Appendix B: List of Commanding Officers, 1951 to Present............................................................................151

Appendix C: List of Sergeant Majors, 1958 to Present......................................................................................153

Appendix D: Department of Agriculture and Navy Joint Policy......................................................................155

Index .................................................................................................................................................................162

xii
Bring me men to match my mountains,

Bring me men to match my plains,

Men with empires in their purpose,

And new eras in their brains.

-Sam Foss

The Mountains

The Sierra Nevada is one of the great mountain

ranges of the world. Its land mass almost equals that

of the Swiss, French, and Italian Alps combined. Its

southern boundary rises out of California’s Mojave

Desert. From there, it extends 400 miles in a general

northwesterly direction to a point near the 40th Parallel. The highest peaks are located in the southern

portion. Popularly known as the “High Sierras,” geologists believe this part of the range is still undergoing growth and further uplifting even today.1

From its crowning peak, Mount Whitney (14,496

feet), the highest mountain within the borders of

the continental United States, the chain gradually

slopes downward as it proceeds north. Sixty miles

beyond the Lake Tahoe Basin, the elevation at the

crest is only 8,000 feet. Standing at this vantage

point, one can see the Sierras begin to fade away

and merge with the volcanic lava flows of Mount

Lassen and the Cascade Range.

The width of the range varies from 50 to 80

miles. Because of the barrier created by this formidable mass of land, much of the rain and snow falls

on the western side, leaving the eastern face relatively dry and the land beyond it a desert. This eastern side of the Sierra rises sharply out of the Owens

River valley and Nevada’s Great Basin at a gradient

in excess of 25 degrees. Near the summit, the face

becomes even more precipitous, until it reaches an

escarpment of peaks that are almost vertical. Therefore, eastern vistas of the range can be strikingly

alpine. In contrast, the western side of the divide

appears deceptively gentle. It has an average tilt of

only two or three degrees. Yet it is that long, largely

tree-covered western side, deeply packed with winter snow and carved by a series of deep rivers that

forms the vast watershed making California’s central

valley the giant agricultural producer that it is.

How was the Sierra Nevada formed, and why did

it develop here? In the words of Mary Hill, a senior

geologist with the California Division of Mines and

Geology, “No one as yet knows.”2 The range is too

complex and the forces of nature too turbulent to

go beyond the realm of theoretical speculation, despite 150 years of scientific study. Nevertheless,

through analysis of rock formations, geologists are

able to provide a general reconstruction of the phenomenon that first created these mountains, as well

as a description of the likely forces that altered them

many times over throughout their geologic history. 

Told briefly, the Sierra chronology begins some

210 million years ago when the entire area lay beneath the sea. During the ensuing 130 million years

of the Mesozoic Era, bodies of molten granite, deep

within the earth, began to cool into rock. As the last

of the granite cooled, gold and other metals were

left in veins and fissures. Meanwhile, the oceanic

Farallon plate moved north, dipping under the

lighter North American plate, and was simultaneously crushed and obliterated by the enormous Pacific plate to the west. It was this geological

convulsion that uplifted the Sierra Nevada above the

waters of the sea. Over the next 50 million years

(first half of the Tertiary Period) the sea receded; the

climate became almost tropical, and lagoons and

rain forests covered the lands to the west. Although

the range was still being uplifted, the forces of erosion began tearing the rock from the mountainsides

depositing the debris into the sea and forming the

foundation of what was to become the great central

valley of California. Altogether, geologists estimate

that more than nine vertical miles of rock was worn

away in the space of 25 million years, leaving the

crest at not much more than 3,000 feet high. The

last half of the Tertiary period was marked by “the

days of fire.” Beginning about 30 million years ago,

the shifting tectonic plates spawned repeated

episodes of volcanism, throwing a blanket of hot

ash over the northern Sierra and obliterating the rest

of the range with mudflows of lava. Sometime after

that, probably in the last 15 million years, the Sierra

was uplifted to about its present height and tilted

decidedly to the west. Just how rapid was this rise

and whether it is continuing today, is still a matter

of scientific debate.3 Sometime thereafter, the earth

grew colder, causing great glaciers to descend over

much of North America. Within the Sierra, local glaciers waxed and waned several times during this

great ice age, sculpturing its peaks and gouging out

new valleys and waterways. Then, about 25,000

years ago, the earth’s climate began to warm again.

The great ice cap receded and the seas rose. But

Chapter 1

The Sierra Nevada Range

1
before Asia and America could become completely

severed, man began to cross to the New World over

the Siberian bridge to what we now call Alaska.

Much later, some of these nomadic people would

move south to permanently settle under the shadow

of the Sierras.

The Indians

The ancestors of our Native Americans probably

wandered into the Sierra region several thousand

years BC. By the time of Columbus, these aboriginal

hunters and gatherers had become increasingly

more clannish. As a result, distinct differences in

culture, religion, and language developed between

the various tribal groups. It is estimated that at between 100 and 135 separate tribes lived in what is

now California prior to European settlement.4 Chiefs

usually headed these groups, and the culture was

largely shaped by the means and methods of gathering food.

Two historic Indian cultures populated the western slopes of the Sierra divide. In the northern sector were the Maidu; to the south and west of the

Yosemite Valley, lived the Miwok.5 Later, white men

would simply lump these two groups and their

neighbors into a non-existent “tribe” they called

“Digger.” This unfortunate name came from the fact

these native people used digging sticks to harvest bulbs

and tubers.

Likewise, the eastern foot

of the range was also inhabited by two distinctly different

Indian cultures. The smaller

of the two were the Washo.*

Probably numbering no more

than 5,000, the Washo laid

claim to the land from Honey

Lake in the north, to the

Walker River in the south.

Also inhabiting the Great

Basin to the east and south of

the Washo, were the neighboring tribes of the people

called Paiutes, meaning those

who lived on desert land, but

always near water.6

Each of these tribes tended

to follow strict codes of behavior in order to keep their

separate cultural identities.

Although normally not aggressive, wars, or punitive

raids were common when a

perceived offence was committed, or when a neighbor

encroached on ancestral

lands. Despite these occasional disputes, one common

trait tended to link all of these

people together: their nomadic character forced them

to harmonize their lives with

the pulses and rhythms of the

seasons. This was vital to

their survival.

2 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

* This is the historic name of this

tribe; the modern name is “Washoe.”
The Sierra Nevada Range 3

In the late spring, as winter stores came close to

exhaustion and with the danger of starvation a real

possibility, individual tribal families or villages

would start to forage upslope from both east and

west. There was nothing casual or unplanned about

these movements. Indeed, exploiting the environment to its fullest required careful planning and an

extraordinary knowledge of the plants, animals, climate, and soils of the area. This annual event resulted in the creation of a well-defined network of

east-west trails that crisscrossed their way to the various encampment sites. The summer months were

spent at the higher elevations, taking advantage of

not only the cooler climate, but also the abundance

of fish and game. Summer and early fall also provided the opportunity to barter with tribes from the

opposite side of the divide.* Western tribes, for example, hauled extra supplies of acorns or tubers for

this purpose, while those from the east brought

highly prized flint and obsidian that lay in considerable quantities on the eastern slope. When the

aspen leaves started to turn from green to yellow,

it was the signal to start the long descent back to

the lower elevations. En route, the men continued

to hunt while the women harvested the pine nuts

needed for winter stores and grasses and used in

the weaving of fine baskets. Winter was the season

for improving shelters, mending clothes, fashioning

new weapons, and preparing for the cycle to begin

anew as soon as the snow left the ground. Such

was the pastoral existence that the tribes of the Sierras knew and followed for thousands of years in almost complete isolation, until their customary life

was abruptly disrupted in the middle of the 19th

century.

Colonizers and Trappers

In 1540, the Spanish navigator Hernando de

Alacron became the first European explorer to set

foot in what is today California. Two years later,

Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo, commanding two vessels,

put in at San Diego Bay and claimed Alta (Upper)

California for the Spanish Crown. However, it

would take another 230 years before the next European would gaze upon the Sierra Nevada. The

first tentative steps toward unlocking the mysteries

of the California interior did not begin until 1769.

On 1 July of that year, Don Gaspar de Portolá and

Father Junipero Serra arrived in San Diego Bay to

implement the Viceroy of Mexico’s plan to colonize

* Numerous petroglyphs carved into the granite rocks can be

found throughout the Sierra at the higher elevations. Anthropologists believe these carvings may have marked boundaries,

or perhaps indicated sites where the various tribal groups might

have come together to trade goods.

Upper California. Their commission directed them

to build a series of missions and pueblos, supported

by several military garrisons, (presidios) along the

California coastline.* Over the next half century, a

total of 21 missions would eventually be established, with one of the last being located a few

miles north of San Francisco Bay.7

In 1772, one of Father Serra’s missionaries, Fray

Juan Crespi, climbed to a viewpoint near the recently discovered bay. Looking toward the eastern

horizon, Crespi recorded in his diary: “We made out

that these three arms or three large rivers were

formed by a very large river, a league in width at

least, which descended from some high mountains

to the southeast, very far distant.”8 Four years later,

the Franciscan missionary, Pedro Font, also gazed

upon these same “high mountains” and recorded it

in his journal and, a year later, on a map he had

drawn. Fray Font awarded them the simple Spanish

name: “Sierra Nevada,” or “snow covered mountains.” It was a name that would endure.

During the ensuing half-century, however, these

lofty peaks in the distance were practically ignored.

Unlike their conquistador ancestors, the latter-day

colonizers seemed perfectly content to stay close to

the coastal plain. With the exception of one minor

foray led by Ensign Gabriel Moraga to the lower

reaches of the Merced River in 1806, the early Californians made no serious effort either to explore

the Sierra Nevada, or determine what treasures

might lay beyond. Consequently, the first recorded

penetration of the range by white men was conducted by a party of American trappers under the

leadership of Jedediah S. Smith.

Coming from the Mississippi River to California

in 1826, Smith and his party bypassed the Sierra

completely on the way west, entering Alta California by a southern route through the Mojave Desert.

Four years earlier, Mexico had successfully achieved

its independence from Spanish rule. The Mexican

Governor at San Diego, apparently suspicious of

Smith’s intentions, ordered him and his party to return forthwith to U.S. territory. In order to take the

most direct route back to his base of operations at

the Great Salt Lake, Smith then led his party up the

central valley for several hundred miles. In May of

1827, the party made two attempts to cross what

Smith referred to as “Mount Joseph.” But deep

snow in the high passes beat back both of these efforts. On the third try, probably following a water-

* These settlements were to thwart any encroachment by the

Russian and English fur trading companies that had established

posts in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest; the Russians and

English may have been contemplating others posts further

south.
course that was later to be named the Stanislaus

River, the party finally succeeded in reaching the

crest after eight days of tough trail breaking through

snowdrifts of four to six feet. Just exactly where this

party may have made its eastern descent into the

Great Basin has never been established. However,

based on later accounts, presumably they emerged

somewhere in the vicinity of the present day

Bridgeport Valley.9

The next group to test its mettle against the

Sierra, and the first to cross from east to west, was

led by another well-known American trapper and

mountain man. His name is Joseph R. Walker. Leading a contingent of 50 mounted men in search of

beaver, the Walker party bivouacked on 10 October,

1833 at the edge of a lake that had a high saline

content. The Paiute Indians, living near these waters, called this lake and the surrounding region

Mono, which in their language meant “beautiful.”

As the party was very low on supplies, Walker decided to cross the mountains and reprovision in California, rather than to retrace his route back along

the Humboldt River where he had encountered

many hostile Indians. Ascending the east branch of

a river that was later to take his name, Walker and

his party slowly started up the rocky mountainside,

somewhere near today’s town of Bridgeport.* Unknowingly, three weeks of tough, arduous travel,

early winter storms, near starvation and outbreaks

of mutiny lay ahead of them before the party would

finally descend to the western foothills and the

warmer climates. Fortunately, Zenas Leonard, who

was a clerk and a member of the party, has left us

with an excellent journal that provides graphic details of this grim crossing. From its accurate descriptions of the terrain, it is not only possible to track

the route of the Walker party, but also reasonably

conclude that they were probably the first white

men to lay eyes on two of nature’’s great wonders:

the giant sequoia trees and Yosemite Valley.10

Fremont and the Lost Cannon 

In spite of all the tests and trials that each of these

first two trans-Sierra expeditions encountered, neither

one can begin to compare with the appalling conditions experienced by the so-called Party of Exploration in the winter of 1844. The leader of this

expedition was the flamboyant John C. Fremont, a

lieutenant in the United States Topographical Engineers and son-in-law of the influential Missouri Senator Thomas H. Benton. Having already been extolled

in the American press as the “Pathfinder,” Fremont

4 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of Fort Jackson, Savannah, Georgia

A mountain howitzer and carriage of the type left

by Fremont’s party in the Sierra Nevada. Iron work

from the carriage has been located by the National

Park Service.

was on his second mapping survey of the western

frontier. His 39-man detachment included a second

topographical engineer named Charles Pruess, two

Delaware Indians and the three famous scouts:

Thomas “Broken Hand” Fitzpatrick, Alexis Godey,

and Christopher “Kit” Carson. Also included in the detachment were three artillerists and a brass, 12 pound

mountain field howitzer, dragged behind two mules.

Designed by the French for their colonial war in the

Atlas Mountains of Algeria, Fremont later praised the

piece for being “well adapted to its purpose.”11*

Departing Saint Louis in May of 1843, the exploring

party spent the remainder of the year carrying out its

primary task of mapping all of the Oregon Trail and

much of the Great Salt Lake. Then, for reasons that

are still unclear, Fremont decided to head south from

Oregon into the Great Basin. On 14 January 1844, he

camped on the shore of a body of water that he

named Pyramid Lake. Here his tired men rested and

gorged themselves on native cutthroat trout. After exploring southward for another 10 days in search of

the fabled Buenaventura River (probably while on the

eastern slope of the Sweetwater Mountains), Fremont

suddenly announced to his now flagging troops that

it was his intention to cross the snow-covered mountains, and resupply at Sutter’s Fort in the Sacramento

Valley.

From those who have carefully studied Fremont’s

journal and the diaries kept by others in the party,

most agree on the general trace of the expedition as

it moved next through the Bridgeport Valley,** then

* Author Frank Wedertz believes Walker may have ascended either Bloody Canyon or Virginia Canyon following established Indian trails.

* Fremont requisitioned this howitzer from the post ordnance

officer at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. What may have motivated

him to add artillery to an exploration party, supposedly engaged

in scientific study, is still open to speculation by historians; some

assert that it was probably the result of an impulsive decision. 

** At the time this valley was simply referred to as “Big Meadow.”
The Sierra Nevada Range 5

north above Devil’s Gate Pass and down the eastern

side of the canyon, eventually crossing the present

day West Walker River. However, during the three

days it took to make this difficult traverse, (27-29 January,) it appears that Fremont was lost. Moreover, because of the steep terrain and miserable weather, the

expedition was frequently divided into three echelons: Fremont and Fitzpatrick scouting ahead, a main

body under Pruess, and the heavier, slower trains

pulling up the rear. Consequently, there are a number

of different theories as to the likely location of each

of these divisions when Fremont was finally notified

on the morning of the 29th that the howitzer was at

an impasse on a very steep hill and could not be

moved. Later, Fremont wrote:

The other division of the party did not come in

to-night, but encamped in the upper meadow,

and arrived the next morning. They had not

succeeded in getting the howitzer beyond the

place mentioned, and where it had been left by

Mr. Preuss, in obedience to my orders; and, in

anticipation of the snowbanks and snowfields

still ahead, foreseeing the inevitable detention

to which it would subject us, I reluctantly determined to leave it there for the time. We left it

to the great sorrow of the whole party.12

Where this cannon, along with its 500 pounds of

powder and shot may have been abandoned, or perhaps even disassembled and cached, is a mystery that

has tantalized searchers to this day. Most believe the

howitzer’s’ final resting place is somewhere on the

east side of the West Walker River on the high ground

to the north of Burcham Flat. Others are convinced

that its location is on the river’s’ west side, most likely

in the vicinity of Mill Creek Canyon, or higher up in

Grouse Meadow. A few even claim its location to be

closer to Sonora Pass, but buried under tons of talus

rock. To be sure, there have been the usual rumors

and claims of past sightings by Indians and others.

Hence, one would think these leads would have

given some identifiable clue as to the location of the

piece. Yet, for over a century and a half, this legendary lost howitzer has continued to defy numerous

recovery efforts made by amateur and professional

treasurer -hunters alike. According to, author Ernest

Lewis’s assertion that the Fremont cannon represents

“one of the last unfound artifacts of the early western

history of the United States,” holds true to this day..13*

While Fremont may have lamented the loss of the

* According to Mr. Eric M. Williams, Archaeologist at the Bridgeport Ranger District Office, an assemblage of forged iron parts

(trunnion plate) and three iron tires were recovered by a team

under the direction of the U.S. Forest Service “within 50 miles

of Bridgeport” in 2006. These artifacts are on display at the

Bridgeport ‘District Ranger’ Office and are believed to be the remains of the gun carriage of the Fremont Cannon. Search efforts

to locate the yet unfound barrel continue as of June 2010.
howitzer, it is unlikely that

anyone else in the party truly

felt the “great sorrow” that he

would have his readers believe, especially the three artillerymen who had already

manhandled the piece through

3,900 miles of trackless terrain.

Just getting themselves and

their animals across 70 miles of

snow-packed peaks in freezing

weather must have seemed

daunting enough, even without the burdensome task of

hauling half a ton of cannon,

carriage and ammunition. But

despite any fears or misgivings

the men must have had about

the ordeal that lay ahead of

them, when Fremont boldly

began his ascent up the east

wall on 2 February, not a man

failed to follow him. Later,

coming upon several friendly

Indians, the older of the two

braves tried to dissuade Fremont from attempting such a

hopeless enterprise: “Rock

upon rock–snow upon snow”

the Indian warned; “even if

you get over the snow, you

will not be able to get down

from the mountain.”14 But the

intrepid Pathfinder was not to

be deterred, so on they

pressed. Scouting ahead on

snowshoes, Fremont, Carson

and Fitzpatrick managed to reach a summit peak on

14 February. From there, they could look down into

the Sacramento Valley and see Mount Diablo in the

far distance.* While this sight must have been encouraging to the entire party, two more brutal weeks of

freezing nights and hazardous trail breaking through

deep snowdrifts still lay ahead of them. Miraculously,

the perilous descent down treacherous canyons and

icy slopes cost no loss of life to either men or animals,

except for the mules that were killed for subsistence.

Finally, the exhausted and starving party reached the

valley floor. Having faced the insurmountable odds

that were against them, they had won. Thereafter, and

6 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

exactly one month from the day that he began his ascent up the eastern ridge, the indomitable Fremont

was able to lead his tattered detachment of iron men

through the gates of Sutter’s Fort, and into the pages

of history.15

Emigrants and Argonauts

Not far behind these trappers and explorers

came the emigrants. In the early 1840s, most of

these pioneer families directed their trains toward

the Oregon Territory. A few parties, however, either

by design or through ignorance, struck out directly

for California. An example of the latter is the Bidwell-Bartleson party. Having followed different

routes from Kansas Territory through the Humboldt

Sink, the two parties eventually came together at

the eastern base of the Sierra along the Walker

River. By this time both parties had already aban-

* On 14 February from a similar vantage point, both Fremont

and Pruess were able to look down on a large mountain lake,

which Fremont named “Lake Bonpland” in honor of the French

botanist. To the Washoe Indians it was “Lake of the Sky.” Later

it would take the name “Tahoe.”
doned their wagons and were carrying what food

and possessions they had left on pack mules. Fortunately, it was still early autumn of 1841. This

meant snow in the high passes would be at its lowest level. Taking advantage of the fair weather, the

two groups lost no time in hauling and pushing

their animals and themselves up the mountain

slopes, staying on the north side of the Walker

River. Once on the summit, they followed a stream

running west, which proved to be the headwaters

of the Stanislaus River. But even the western side

of the divide proved extremely rough going. In

forcing passages up and down the steep canyons

the last of their few oxen either died, or had to be

slaughtered along the way. Despite all the hardship

they encountered daily, these half-clad, shoeless,

yet undaunted pioneers managed to straggle out of

the wilderness and into the central valley on 1 November 1841. Thus, with no map or early trailblazer

to guide them, this group became the first American

emigrants to travel overland and cross the Sierra Nevada into California.16 That everyone in the party

had survived was something of a miracle.

What began as a dribble of emigrant trains to

California in the early 1840s, soon developed into

a steady stream over the next decade. Frequently,

former trappers and mountain men guided these

caravans through the western expanse. In the

process, many different crossing

sites over the Sierra were investigated and tried. Improvisation while

negotiating granite headwalls was

often the key to success. Of special

interest to this history is the route

pioneered by the Trahern Party.*

Moving west in the spring of 1853,

the party attacked the Sierra from

Leavitt Meadows and formed the

first oxen train over Sonora Pass.

According to one account: “The ascent to the crest was torture.” Wagons were pushed, pulled, lifted with

rope and block and tackle anchored

to trees and rock up and down the

steep granite crest. As many as six

oxen were hitched behind wagons

to act as brakes”.17 Eventually, some

of these routes became established

over time, while others proved too

hazardous and were given up. Even

passes traversed with relative ease

by a succession of trains could still

be deadly fatal if the party was not sufficiently

strong, or had miscalculated the affects of weather.

Such was the calamity that befell the tragic Donner

Party in the winter of 1846. 

After the two-year war with Mexico ended with

the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which

ceded to the United States the vast expanse of land

west from Texas and north to Oregon, the number

of emigrants heading west increased significantly.

Initially, the responsibility for administering these

new territories was placed in the hands of the U.S.

Army. But just about the time the Army was coming

to grips with its new responsibilities, as well as protecting the rising flow of emigrants, word began to

circulate about a gold strike in the North Fork of

the American River. Colonel Richard B. Mason,

Commander of the California Department, accompanied by his Adjutant, Lieutenant William T. Sherman, then traveled to Sutter’s Fort to see for

themselves whether the rumors were true. After witnessing operations in the gold fields and being impressed by what he saw, Colonel Mason lost no

time in filing an official report of his findings to

President James K. Polk. Furthermore, he sent along

230 ounces of gold to Secretary of War James

Buchanan, just to verify the astonishing events that

were taking place in California. In giving his own

judgment as to the potential size of the discovery,

The Sierra Nevada Range 7

* Some sources also refer to this group as the

“Cherokee,” and the Trahern-Duckwell Party.
Mason reported: “I have no hesitation in saying

there is more gold in the country drained by the

Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers than will pay the

cost of the war with Mexico a hundred times

over.”18 The Mason report in turn became the

essence of the message that President Polk delivered to the second session of the 30th Congress on

5 December 1848. The President’s official endorsement of the discovery of a rich bonanza in California was received with unrestrained enthusiasm

wherever it was published. In effect, this message

became the starting pistol that set in motion the

largest migration of people ever to take place on

the continent of North America. 

How many people participated in this rush to

California for riches? The exact numbers can never

be known. But author Irving Stone estimates that

during 1849 and 1850, more than 100,000 people

traveled the overland route alone, while tens of

thousands more had come via the sea.19 By 1852,

upwards of 90,000 prospectors could be found concentrated in a rectangle 20 miles wide and 60 miles

long, while many more thousands fanned out over

the entire western slope in search of new claims.

In the process, these modern Jasons gutted the

mountains of their golden wealth, denuded the

forests, and almost exterminated the wild things of

the land and the air. The Indians were simply overwhelmed by this chaotic surge of humanity on their

8 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

land. Either they adapted to this new reality, or

were pushed aside as their ancient trails were rapidly transformed into permanent routes used by

packers and teamsters to bring supplies to the

growing number of remote mining camps. Also, it

was not uncommon for some of these camps to

change practically overnight into cities in excess of

5,000 inhabitants whenever word got out about the

discovery of a new, rich ore body. Usually, this explosion of people would drive the cost of food and

equipment to astronomical levels. But once the

“pay dirt” was gone, or if some new bonanza was

discovered elsewhere, the town might just as

quickly become deserted and left to slip back to its

previous obscurity.

Then in 1859, about the time the placer mining

on the western slope was coming to an end,* vast

deposits of gold and silver were discovered on the

eastern side of the Sierra in the vicinity of what is

today Virginia City, Nevada. Later, this body of ore

was to take the name Comstock Lode. As the news

of this discovery spread, miners who had been

working the western streams quickly packed their

equipment and began an exodus in reverse of the

way many had come when traveling west in the

1850. In some cases, new passes were opened and

old routes improved as thousands came over the

mountains to prospect for gold in the dry diggings

located along the eastern base of the Sierra. Dan

De Quille, who became famous as a journalist with

the Territorial Enterprise in Virginia City, describes

this latest migration best: 

Miners and men of all classes and trades

and professions flocked over the Sierras, in

the spring of 1860. At first they came on foot,

driving donkeys or other pack-animals before

them, or on horseback, riding where they

could and leading their horses where the

snow was soft; but soon sleighs and stages

were started and in some shape floundered

through with their passengers. Saddle trains

for passengers were started, however, before

vehicles of any kind began to run, and the

snow passed over was in many places from

30 to 60 feet in depth.20

Although most of the excitement centered on the

Washoe, Eagle, and Carson Valleys, a small number

of miners began to stake claims further south in the

region of the Walker River and Mono Lake. It was

* Placer mining was the search for granulated gold, or nuggets

that were found in the streams and ancient alluvial rivers. This

method usually employed simple equipment such as pans,

sluices, and crude cradles. Hard-rock mining for lode gold and

hydraulic operations continued well into the next century.

Public domain

John C. Fremont, American general and explorer.
The Sierra Nevada Range 9

not long thereafter that two small settlements

sprang up: Dogtown and Monoville. Within a year,

rich gold and silver deposits were also located in

the outlying areas, resulting in the establishment of

towns at Bodie, Masonic, and Aurora.21 The rising

population on the east side of the Sierra divide

meant that two imperatives had to be met if these

new communities were to prosper: The first need

was for wagon routes over the mountains that

could bring enough food products from the central

valley to sustain people through the winter months;

the second called for a political entity that would

protect the claims of the miners and bring law and

order to the newfound settlements. The latter goal

was to be fulfilled first.

On 24 April 1861, the creation of Mono County,

made up from portions of its several neighboring

counties, was approved by an act of the California

Legislature and was enacted into law on 10 May of

the same year. The seat of justice was set at Aurora.

But on 2 March, 1861, an Act of Congress established the Territory of Nevada. Moving swifter than

his California counterpart, the new territorial governor, James W. Nye, also claimed Aurora as one of

the election districts, and Esmeralda as one of nine

counties making up the Territory. The ensuing dispute over the county seat of government and the

state in which it was located was not resolved for

three years. Finally, the matter was settled when a

new survey of the state borders found Aurora to be

just inside the Nevada line. As a consequence, in

1864, the magistrate and other county officials

moved the seat of government to Bridgeport, in

Mono County, taking the county records with

them.22

The second goal of establishing trans-Sierra

wagon routes would take a bit longer, but not

much. By the early 1860, three separate wagon and

stagecoach routes were in operation. The northern

route came out of Nevada City on the western slope

and crossed the Sierra at Henness Pass. The central

route originated at Hangtown,* crossed the Sierra in

the vicinity of Carson Pass, and dropped into the

eastern basin at the old Mormon Station of Genoa.

The southern route connected the town of Sonora

in the west to Aurora in the east. This route generally followed the trace of the former Indian and emigrant trails along the course of the Stanislaus River

to Kennedy Meadows and over Sonora Pass. Eventually, stage stops along this route would be established at Strawberry Flat on the western slope and

at Leavitt Meadows and Fales Hot Springs on the

eastern side. It goes without saying that winter

travel over all three routes could be problematic,

and therefore was either limited to animal or man

packing, or closed down altogether. Most of the

roads were constructed under state franchises, and

developed by stock companies that were allowed

to charge tolls to recoup their construction and

maintenance costs. During boom times the road

companies and teamsters prospered. But once the

ore bodies withered and the mines began to fail,

these ventures too, would become busted.

Thus, about the same time that the opening battles of the American civil war were being waged in

the east, the Sierra Nevada was gradually being

tamed. Towns and industries were springing up

daily on both its slopes. The land was coming

under cultivation, or being turned into cattle and

sheep ranches to feed the growing number of miners, teamsters, loggers, mill workers, and their families. More and more wagon and stage routes were

under construction to connect these new towns and

centers of activity. Moreover, outside the towns of

Omaha, in the Nebraska Territory, and Sacramento,

California, the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific

were also beginning to lay track for what was to

become the first transcontinental railroad. Within a

decade the two rail lines would be joined, thereby

cutting the normal travel time to California from five

months to 10 days. Not unlike Jonathan Swift’s

mythical Gulliver, the ties of civilization were

slowly, but similarly, binding up the mighty Sierra

Nevada Range.

According to Mono County records, a German

immigrant by the name of Francis (Frank) Pickle arrived in the county from San Francisco and purchased several mining properties in late 1862.23 In

the following year (1863) Pickle took possession of

160-360 acres of land 18 miles north of Bridgeport,

situated between Leavitt Meadows and the Hot

Springs where Samuel Fales would soon come to

operate his stage station. Here, on the north side of

the West Walker River, just above the flood plain

along Silver Creek, he built a cabin, made other improvements and started to mine and run livestock

consisting of two horses, 21 cows and six hogs.24

In late 1870, Frank Pickle was found shot dead in

his cabin. Although Mr. Kent Stoddard, president

and curator of the Mono County Historical Society

Museum, believes that the local authorities had a

strong suspicion of who had committed the crime,

Pickle’s assailant was never brought to trial. Nevertheless, as things turned out, this luckless prospector and pioneer stockman would not be forgotten

completely. For it wasn’t long after his death that

people started referring to the valley as either:

* This historic mining camp later changed its name to Placerville. Pickle or Pickel Meadow. The latter spelling seemed
to stick, at least long enough for the next mapmaker

to come along and bless the location officially. Ironically, because of a war that would break out on

the Asian continent 80 years later, the same Pickel

Meadow would also become a very familiar name

and place to thousands of U.S. Marines.

10 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
11

Chapter 2

U.S. Marine Corps Cold Weather

Experience and Doctrine Prior to 1950

Again in nineteen forty-one,

We sailed a north’ard course,

And found beneath the midnight sun,

The Viking and the Norse.

The Iceland girls were slim and fair,

And fair the Iceland scenes,

And the Army found in landing there,

The United States Marines.

-Unofficial verse of the Marines’ Hymn, circa 1942

Introduction

“To the average Marine officer the problems and

experiences of field operations in very cold climes is

purely hearsay. Marines are, by and large, warm

weather fighters. In all our battles since World War I,

khaki or cotton dungarees have been satisfactory uniforms and the problems of keeping warm and dry

while living in the field have not been very great.

Now we can no longer base our thinking or planning

on the assumption that we will carry on future operations under warm suns in tropical or semi-tropical

areas.” So wrote Major Michael S. Hall in his article

“Cold Weather Combat Clothing,” which appeared in

the May 1948 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. In

his article, Major Hall was making the point that, if it

became necessary to fight in a cold climate, commanders were going to face unique problems that

only a handful of Marines had encountered in the

past three decades. Therefore, he argued that “all our

troops need to be thoroughly indoctrinated in the

wear and maintenance of the present kit of coldweather clothing,” and also become aware of its

shortcomings.25

Major Hall’s prescient comments were close to the

mark. For the previous 30 years the vast majority of

U.S. Marine expeditionary forces had been committed

to the tropical zones of either the Caribbean or the

Pacific Ocean areas. True, during the middle of World

War II, Marine planners had looked to an invasion of

Japan and the conduct of field operations in colder

temperate areas. In anticipation of this requirement,

the Quartermaster General of the Marine Corps had

developed the M1943 cold-weather uniform. But the

war had ended before either this clothing or the

Marines themselves could be put to the test of a

large-scale combat field operation in a northern climate. Therefore, compared to the U.S. Army, which

had conducted recent winter campaigns in the Aleutians and in northern Europe, Marine Corps doctrine

and the experience level of its troops for operating

in cold-weather was indeed limited. Nevertheless,

there had been a few episodes in its history from

which the Corps could claim practical lessons learned

for maintaining its fighting efficiency in cold climates. 

Special Duty in the Bering Sea

The first instance of any sizable number of

Marines being dispatched to “far off northern lands”

occurred in the last decade of the 19th century. During the late 1880s and early 1890s the question of

sealing rights in the Bering Sea became a significant

diplomatic problem between Great Britain and the

United States. In June 1891, as a first step toward resolving this dispute, both governments agreed to a

suspension of all commercial sealing in those waters

for a period of one year. Immediately after the parties

signed the agreement, a joint Anglo-American naval

force was hurriedly dispatched to the Aleutian Islands

to prevent the compact from being violated. 

A combined force of U.S. Marines consisting of

five officers and 113 enlisted men supported the efforts of the American naval squadron. By today’s

standards this number would hardly be called “sizable,” but in 1891 that figure represented over five

percent of the Corps’ entire strength. The majority of

Marines who participated in the operation served

with ships’ detachments on board the four American

ships making up the squadron. In addition, a separate guard detachment of three Marine officers and

40 enlisted from the Mare Island Navy Yard was also

embarked aboard the SS Alki, a merchantman that

had been converted to support the combined fleet as

a prison and depot ship. Both this ship and its Marine

guard detachment steamed out of San Francisco Bay

having only three days and nights to prepare for the

expedition. Commanding the Marine guard force

(and the senior Marine officer present) was the veteran Captain Henry C. Cochrane.

The joint force cruised the foggy Aleutian Islands

from June through October, searching the sloops of

the Canadian and American sealers, seizing those that

failed to heed the joint proclamation to “depart these

waters.” Meanwhile, the SS Alki was either on station

at the almost barren anchorage across from Dutch

Harbor on Unalaska Island, or it was engaged in

transporting captured sloops and their crews to the
U.S. magistrate located at the territorial seat of government in Sitka.

Although this joint operation was largely conducted during the months of summer, weather conditions were far from ideal. Indeed, old hands who

have lived in the Aleutians like to remark that “it’s a

good year when summer falls on a Sunday.”26 But despite the cold and frequent gale winds, Cochrane

would brook no idleness from his Marines. To him

there was always work to be done and new skills to

be learned. Thus marksmanship, signaling, bayonet

drill, and crewing small boats were all part of the

daily routine, no matter how inclement the weather.

Besides, prior to departing from Mare Island, the

strict commander had been granted authority by the

Commandant himself to purchase special sets of foul

weather clothing for his men. This purchase alone

cost $56.50. To not put this special gear to use in bad

weather would have been a waste, and for the thrifty

Cochrane, “waste” was a sin that was second only to

idleness. “Throughout our absence,” he later wrote

in his report to the Commandant, “drills and instructions were unremitting. I am thankful to report the

detachment at full strength and all well, and to be

able to say, that its conduct has been most creditable.”27

Expedition to Iceland

A half-century later in the late spring of 1941,

Britain stood alone in preventing a Nazi conquest of

all Western Europe. Seriously concerned for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, especially if Great

Britain was invaded or suddenly collapsed, U.S. Army

and Navy planners began to hastily draft a number

of contingency plans. Among them was a plan to employ U.S. Army and Marine forces for the purpose of

seizing and defending the Azores, the Vichy French

colony of Martinique, or both. To give added strength

to General Holland M. Smith’s 1st Marine Division,

based on the east coast, Headquarters Marine Corps

ordered the 6th Marine Regiment to be detached

from its parent and newly formed 2d Marine Division,

and proceed by naval transport to the eastern

seaboard. On 31 May 1941, the convoy with the 6th

Marines (Reinforced) got underway from San Diego

harbor and headed for the Panama Canal.

While the convoy bearing the embarked 6th Regiment steamed south, the war situation in the North

Atlantic began to look more threatening.*

 As a result,

12 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to accede to

Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s earlier request for

sending American troops to Iceland to free up some

of the British forces garrisoned there, provided the

Icelanders invited an American occupation force to

their island. The Army-Navy Board then quickly put

together a plan that called for the immediate formation of a provisional Marine brigade as the lead element of a larger U.S. commitment. Using the

reinforced 6th Marine Regiment as its nucleus, augmented by the 5th Defense Battalion from Parris Island, South Carolina, and a sprinkling of combat

support units from the east coast, the brigade formed

at the Charleston Navy Yard. Thereafter, or as soon

as the U.S. Army was able to organize an infantry division of regulars, it too would follow on to Iceland

and relieve the Marines in place. 

President Roosevelt approved the plan on 5 June

and directed his Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral

Harold R. Stark, to have the brigade ready to sail in

15 days’ time. On 15 June, the 6th Marines (Reinforced) arrived in Charleston Harbor. On the following day the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) was

formally activated under Brigadier General John

Marston. Following five days of hectic dockside

loading, on 22 June 1941, the new brigade consisting of 4,095 Marines, steamed out of Charleston harbor to join the impressive array of warships that

were there to escort them to the North Atlantic.28

Oddly enough, it had been exactly 50 years to the

day since Cochrane and his Marines had shoved off

from San Francisco Bay aboard the SS Alki, similarly

bound for expeditionary duty near the Arctic Circle

and likewise, severely strained by the short-notice

orders.*

On 1 July 1941, Iceland finally accepted the

agreement proposed by the British government that

formally invited U.S. troops to occupy and defend

its national boundaries. Under the terms agreed

upon, the United States pledged to withdraw its

troops promptly on the coming of peace, to recognize the complete independence and sovereignty

of the Icelanders, and not to interfere in the internal

affairs of the island.29 On 7 July, following a brief

layover in Newfoundland awaiting the Icelanders’

invitation, the convoy arrived at Iceland and anchored in Reykjavik Harbor. Within a week the

Marines had off-loaded their supplies and equipment, largely by man-handling from small craft over

a narrow beach, and had moved into the dispersed

camps of Nissen huts that the British forces had

turned over to them.

* 22 June 1941 was also the day Hitler launched his invasion

against the Soviet Union. 

* The German battleship Bismarck and cruiser Prinz Eugen had

two weeks earlier been raiding in the shipping lanes around Iceland, before a British naval force was able to corner Bismarck

and sink her on 27 May. Also, the sinking of the American merchantman Robin Moor by a German U-boat on 21 May angered

the president and probably strengthened his view of the strategic

importance of keeping Iceland out of German hands.
U.S. Marine Corps Cold Weather Experience and Doctrine Prior to 1950 13

Command relations between Major General

Henry O. Curtis, the senior British commander, and

General Marston were cordial from the outset. On

paper, General Marston’s designated superior was

the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, D.C.

But his standing orders did authorize him to coordinate his operations with the British “by the

method of mutual cooperation.”30 By agreement, the

6th Marines were given the mission as the garrisons’

mobile defense column. This was considered an important task, for it was assumed that any attempt by

the Germans to seize the island would likely be preCourtesy of Col James A. Donovan 

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade passes in review before British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill in Iceland on 16 August 1941.

Marine standing in front of Nissen huts in Iceland, 1941. Note the fur cap with Marine Corps emblem and the

“Polar Bear” shoulder insignia which had been adopted from the British 79th Division by the 1st Provisional

Marine Brigade.

Courtesy of Col James A. Donovan
ceded by a thrust of airborne forces. When General

Curtis suggested that the Marines wear the British

79th Division “Polar Bear” shoulder patch, General

Marston readily agreed. “The British complied with

our requests and we complied with theirs. It was as

simple as that,” wrote General Marston in his first

report back to Major General Commandant Thomas

Holcomb.31

First priority of work for the Marines went to

building, or improving field fortifications and defensive positions within their assigned sectors of defense. The long daylight hours and fair weather also

gave commanders the opportunity to devote time

toward the second priority of conducting conditioning marches, small arms firing, and tactical field exercises over the rugged Icelandic terrain. But as the

summer waned and the available daylight hours

began to diminish, more of the brigade’s time was

given over to preparing for winter. Moreover on 22

September, in compliance with an executive order

signed by President Roosevelt, the chain-of-command of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade shifted

formally from the naval establishment to that of the

U.S. Army and the War Department. Thereafter,

General Marston reported to Major General Charles

H. Bonesteel, USA, who had just arrived and was

now the senior U.S. officer present. Under General

Bonesteel’s orders, the Leathernecks assumed the

additional task of erecting Nissen huts, in anticipation of a U.S. Army division that was under orders

to deploy to Iceland in the spring.

Back in May, when the 6th Marine Regiment (Reinforced) was at Camp Elliot and received its orders

from Headquarters Marine Corps to proceed to the

eastern United States, the message gave no hint as

to the regiment’s mission or its destination. Most of

the officers thought the destination would be either

Guantanamo or Martinique; a few believed it might

be the Azores. Consequently, the commanding officer of the regiment, Colonel Leo D. Hermle, was

in a quandary about what uniforms he should order

his men to bring. Ultimately, he decided that each

Marine would take his complete kit of summer and

winter uniforms. As arctic winds began to blow

over Iceland in 1941, Colonel Hermle’s men were

likely quite grateful for his having made that decision. Although the green kersey dress uniform was

tailored too tight to permit a true layering system,

nevertheless it, along with the winter overcoat, provided reasonably good protection up through the

month of October, until the arctic winds began to

increase in velocity. With temperatures falling, Ma14 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Colonel Leo D. Hermle, commanding officer of 6th Marine Regiment, Iceland, 1941-1942.

Courtesy of Col James A. Donovan 
U.S. Marine Corps Cold Weather Experience and Doctrine Prior to 1950 15

rine officers in Iceland soon learned that it was possible to fare a bit better than their men, as they had

access to the British Quartermaster stores where

they could buy quality trench coats, boots, wool

shirts, and other items.

Until 1943, the Marine Corps had no winter field

service combat uniform other than its winter service

greens, including the overcoat in the same heavy

wool worn since World War I. According to Colonel

James A. Donovan, Jr., who served with the 1st Provisional Brigade, the one distinctive item of Marine

Corps uniform issue, which was also the most popular with the troops, was the fur cap with the Marine emblem on the front. The cap had a green

crown and thick, brown fur trim and earflaps that

provided good protection as the winds rose and the

chill factor dropped. Its origins had come from

Marines who had served in North China.32 In addition, prior to sailing from Charleston, the brigade

staff had scoured the Marine Corps supply system

for whatever special winter clothing it had on hand

and could be furnished. Therefore as winter deepened, Marines were issued a variety of items, including 20-year old-mustard-colored wool shirts,

which had been in use during the “banana wars”;

woolen underwear; heavy-wool socks; rubber galoshes; and even some sheepskin-lined canvas coats

that had been purchased from Sears Roebuck and

Company and other civilian sources just before the

brigade sailed. 

Second Lieutenant William K. Jones served as a

company officer with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine 

on Iceland. With the onset of winter, he later recalled: “Daylight slowly diminished from almost 24

hours a day to about six. The wind seemed to blow

constantly, with gusts up to 70 and 100 miles an

hour, necessitating lifelines between huts and mess

halls.”33 Under these extreme cold conditions, the

bits and pieces of field-combat clothing that were

issued to the Marines for service in Iceland were

deemed far from satisfactory. Even at the squad

level there was no standard uniform for outside

wear. Often, when the wind chill dropped near

zero, outdoor troop activities had to be restricted to

essential security and maintenance duties.

So the Iceland Marines carried on, warm enough,

and without experiencing any serious trench foot

or frostbite problems. But mainly that was because

the bulk of the German Army was already bogged

down in one winter campaign in the Soviet Union

and German commanders were likely reticent about

a second, cold-weather front. Had Adolf Hitler not

turned east in 1941 and the Marine brigade been

called upon to fight and live in the field for an extended period in that cold bleak place, the number

of casualties from cold injuries alone would have

likely been very high. The Marine leadership did

not fail to recognize this obvious lesson. As relieving U.S. Army units began to arrive in late February,

the cold-weather combat clothing that had been issued to the soldiers impressed the Marines, especially the olive-drab parkas with the alpaca linings.

Courtesy of Col James A. Donovan

A squad of Marines from 6th Marine Regiment training in Iceland, during the winter of 1941-1942.
In his after-action report, General Marston urged

that the Marine Corps also adopt a similar uniform

suitable for combat in cold climates.

During February and March, the Marine brigade

was incrementally relieved in place and returned to

the United States and its former duty stations. From

there, its Marines either shipped out to the South

Pacific or remained stateside as cadres for the new

units being formed. The brigade headquarters

landed at New York on 25 March at which time the

1st Marine Brigade (Provisional), was officially disbanded. How much strategic value this Marine deployment remains questionable.*

 But that is not of

import to this particular history. What is significant

is the fact that a number of the Corps’ future leaders

likely benefited from the unique experience of

learning first hand the challenges associated with

operations in a cold, unforgiving climate. Among

that group was the commanding officer of the 1st

Battalion, 6th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver P.

Smith. Nine years later, this same officer would be

commanding the 1st Marine Division in North

16 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of Col James A. Donovan 

A 6th Marine platoon in Iceland in late 1941. Most of these Marines display the Polar Bear patch insignia with

Nissen huts are in background.

Korea under very similar conditions of extreme

cold.

Between World War II and Korea

Between 1945 and 1950, the Marine Corps’ exposure to the conduct of operations in cold climates

turned out to be few and far between. The III Marine Amphibious Corps (largely constituted by the

1st and 6th Marine Divisions) did gain some practical experience during the winter of 1945–1946

when it served as a buffer between Chiang-Kaishek’s National forces and the Chinese Communist

Army in Manchuria. However, most of the force was

garrisoned in population and communication centers where it could carry out its primary mission of

keeping the road, rail, and port facilities open to

commerce. Inasmuch as the Communist armies

chose not to interfere at this time, the Marines did

little in the way of large-scale field maneuvers or

combat operations. Therefore, the M1943 coldweather uniforms that were issued to the Marines

received only a partial test of their adequacy and

serviceability. By 1947, the number of Marines serving in North China had been scaled down to less

than 3,000, most of whom were stationed at Tsingtao. Two years later, the last Marine unit was withdrawn from the Chinese mainland.

Other duty stations where Marines found them-

* Col Robert D. Heinl believed that “the 1st Provisional Marine

Brigade’s arrival tipped the scales and saved Iceland” (See Heinl,

Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962,

2d ed. (Baltimore, MD.: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co.,

1991), p. 312. 
U.S. Marine Corps Cold Weather Experience and Doctrine Prior to 1950 17

selves contending with the rigors of a frigid climate

in the post World War II years included the Corps’

security forces in the Territory of Alaska. In 1939,

the U.S. Navy established a naval air station along

the northeastern shores of Kodiak Island. Soon

thereafter, a Marine barracks was activated to provide security and form the nucleus of a ground defense force. After the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor, Marine strength of the outpost grew to six

officers and 265 enlisted men, but by the end of the

war the barracks had returned to its normal staffing

of four officers and 100 enlisted Marines. Although

located in the so-called “Banana Belt” of Alaska,

temperatures of 10 degrees below zero were not

uncommon during the winter months. The annual

training syllabus for the Marines in those years traditionally included a weeklong field maneuver on

Afognak Island. Small groups of Marines also

trained with the U.S. Army Arctic Survival School in

Fairbanks. Thus Marines who had completed a twoyear Alaskan tour of duty at this northern outpost

could therefore rightly claim a degree of proficiency

in winter survival and cold-weather warfighting

techniques.

Another security detachment where a Marine

could gain an appreciation for the challenges of

cold-weather operations was at the Marine Barracks, Adak. Located in the remote western half of

the Aleutian chain at the U.S. Naval Station, the Marine Corps established its first security detachment

there in 1943. During the post-war years the Marine

guard force normally numbered five officers and

about 125 enlisted Marines. Basic missions included

providing security for the naval station and becoming the backbone of the base ground defense force

during emergencies or high threat alerts. The island’s fierce winds, damp climate, treeless terrain,

and frequent earthquakes were conducive toward

instilling confidence in the individual Marine that

he could not only survive in such a harsh climate,

but with knowledge and extra effort, remain combat effective.

As relations between the Soviet Union and the

United States deteriorated in the late 1940s, both the

U.S. Navy and its Marine land arm began to take

closer looks at their collective capabilities for conducting combat operations in a northern zone. During November and December 1948, the latest

version of the Marine Corps’ landing vehicle track

(LVT), underwent a major operational evaluation at

the U.S. Navy Arctic Test Station, Point Barrow,

Alaska. Marine Corps Headquarters also initiated exOfficers of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 1941. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver P. Smith is seated in the front row, fifth

from left, and Second Lieutenant William K. Jones is standing in second row, far right, both became Marine

general officers.

Courtesy of Col James A. Donovan 
perimental testing of the helicopter in cold-weather

operations off Newfoundland about this time. Then,

in February 1949, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

(CinCPacFlt) conducted a 10-day fleet amphibious

exercise on Kodiak Island named MICOWEX 49A.

Regimental Landing Team 7 (RLT 7) from the 1st

Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California,

formed the nucleus of the 3d Marine Brigade. The

commander landing force (CLF) and commander of

the brigade was Brigadier General Harry B. “Harry

the Horse” Liversedge.34 

One of the landing force objectives was to evaluate the adequacy of the M1943 cold-weather uniform, under field conditions with temperatures in

the +10 to –10 degree range. The M1943 winter uniform closely resembled the U.S. Army pattern and

was based on the same “layering” principle, with a

variety of garments worn one over the other. This

included a jacket, trousers, pile cap, gloves, and the

leather and rubber shoe-pacs. The latter had a rubber sole, 7/8 inch heel, a steel shank, leather top,

and felt insoles and was worn with two pairs of

heavy wool socks. A second objective was to test a

new backpack system for the winter uniform that

was then under development by the Quartermaster

General of the Marine Corps. Because of the weight

and bulk of the cold-weather kit, this consisted of

a large waterproofed bag (popularly referred to as

a “willie peter” bag), which could then be affixed

to a wooden pack board. 

In the 3d Marine Brigade post-exercise report,

General Liversedge confirmed what a number of organizations and units had been reporting for several

years: The M1943 cold-weather uniform had several

problems that needed to be remedied. First and

foremost were the serious deficiencies found with

the shoe-pacs footwear. Many troops complained

that the shoe-pacs lack of ankle support made

marching difficult. This footwear also caused feet

to sweat, which allowed the moisture to freeze inside during periods of inactivity. Thus it was concluded that a combat boot that could prevent frozen

feet and trench foot should be developed. Other reported shortcomings of the winter uniform included

the weight of the cold-weather combat load (110

18 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

pounds); the bulky parka that tended to restrict

movement of the combat Marine; and the issued

glove, which offered only fair protection. In the latter case, the addition of a mitten shell with a trigger

finger was recommended.35 For man packing the

heavier loads during operations ashore, the combination pack board and willie peter (WP) bag

proved to be superior to the 1941 Marine Corps

pack system. However, its lack of belt suspenders

and its bulkiness made it unsatisfactory for climbing

up and down cargo nets during the ship-to-shore

phase.

In terms of doctrine, the Marine Corps had issued no special publications, handbooks, or standing operating procedures pertaining to

cold-weather operations prior to 1950.* Instead, except for operations involving the amphibian tractor,

it relied on the technical and field manuals published by the U.S. Army. Fortunately, these were of

good quality and covered a range of climatic conditions from the cold/wet to the arctic. More importantly, they were current. Basic principles were

based on the practical experiences and bitter lessons that soldiers had learned during months of

tough winter campaigning in the Aleutians and

northern Europe less than five years before. Also, a

major contributor to the U.S. Army’s level of experience and doctrinal publications came directly from

its 10th Mountain Division. This highly acclaimed

division had trained intensively for two years at

Camp Hale, Colorado. Moreover, it had participated

in the Aleutians campaign with one regimental

combat team, and had undergone almost a year of

combat operations in the mountains of northern

Italy before the Nazi government of Germany collapsed in May of 1945. 

With the total active duty strength of the U.S. Marine Corps falling to 75,000, this is where things

stood regarding USMC cold-weather operations on

25 June 1950 when the North Korean People’s

Army crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded South

Korea. 

* Indeed, the Guidebook for Marines did not mention the topic

of cold-weather indoctrination and training until it was published

in the 1954 printing.
I am enthusiastic about the location selected for

your cold-weather training and am confident that

our replacements will be well fitted for a winter

campaign, if they have to fight one.

-Commandant Clifton B. Cates to Major General

O.P. Smith, 25 September 1951

Korean War Backdrop

The strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula

during the first six months of the war was dynamic

and dramatic. From 25 June through 31 December

1950, the military fortunes of the U.N. and communist forces shifted widely back and forth, with each

side enjoying stunning victories as well as catastrophic defeats. Scores of histories and chronicles

have since been published that document in minute

detail, and at every level of command, just how

those battles ebbed and flowed. Therefore, it is unnecessary to review them in detail here.

It should be recalled, however, that on 5 October, after the successful amphibious assault at Inchon, several weeks of hard fighting followed for

the recapture of Seoul. The 1st Marine Division,

supported by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, then reembarked for a second amphibious assault on

Korea’s northeast coast. The designated amphibious

objective area was Wonsan Harbor. The objective

of this second sea-borne assault was to cut off the

North Korean land forces that were in headlong retreat north along the coast. But the Marine landing

at Wonsan was delayed for several weeks when the

advance force discovered communist mines blocking the harbor entrance. Although Major General

Oliver P. Smith fumed offshore, there was nothing

that he or his division staff could do to speed up

the mine clearing operation.*

 Thus, it was not until

26 October that commander, Amphibious Task

Force finally gave the signal to “Land the Landing

Force.” By this time, the Republic of Korea’s 3d and

Capital Divisions had already occupied Wonsan,

thereby permitting the Marines to come ashore unopposed.

On 24 October, General Douglas MacArthur issued the directive that removed all remaining restrictions on the movement of American troops

toward the Yalu River. Eighth Army and X Corps

were therefore “authorized to use any and all

19

Chapter 3

The Marines Arrive

ground forces as necessary to secure all of North

Korea.”36 Thus, in spite of the crisp fall weather that

had descended over the northern peninsula, there

was still a sense of optimism in the air as the 1st

Marine Division and the 7th U.S. Army Division, the

two major components of Major General Edward

M. Almond’s X Corps, made preparations for what

everyone hoped would be the final knockout blow.

Then, on 3 November, northeast of the port of

Hungnam, the 1st Marine Division encountered its

first opposition from Chinese Communist Forces.

Several days of fierce fighting in the vicinity of

Sudong ensued. On the fourth day, what was left

of the 124th Division, Chinese People’s Army, suddenly broke contact and disappeared into the

mountains.37 Following this encounter, sets of

M1943 cold-weather clothing were quickly issued

to Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg’s 7th Marine Regiment, as it resumed the lead of the 1st Marine Division’s final northwestern push to the Chosin

Reservoir and to the banks of the Yalu River.

“All personnel . . .would be thoroughly

indoctrinated . . .”

About the same time that cold-weather clothing

and equipment was being issued to the 1st Marine

Division in North Korea, the Commandant of the

Marine Corps History Division

Major General Oliver P. Smith (in helmet), Commanding General, 1st Marine Division talking with

Major General Edward D. Almond, X Corps commander, in Korea, 1950.

* Five U.S. Navy minesweepers were lost or damaged during

these clearing operations.
Marine Corps General Clifton B. Cates sent a letter

on the subject of guidance for cold-weather training

to the Commanding General, Marine Barracks*

Camp Pendleton, California. This directive, dated 9

November 1950, established the requirement “that

all personnel scheduled to arrive in the Korean area

prior to 1 May 1951 would be thoroughly indoctrinated in the measures of living and operating in

snow and extreme cold prior to overseas movement.” Further, “a minimum of eight (8) hours

would be allotted to this training and that a schedule of cold-weather training would be submitted to

Headquarters Marine Corps prior to 25 November

1950 for approval.”38

The tasking letter must have been immediately

passed for action to Brigadier General Merrill B.

Twining, the Commanding General, Training and

Replacement Command, then a subordinate command under Camp Pendleton. For on 12 November,

it was this officer who responded to General Cates

by submitting a proposal for a cold-weather training

syllabus which included a three and one-half day

practical field exercise. “This training,” General

Twining went on to say, “would be conducted in

20 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Marine Corps History Division

As commanding general of Training and Replacement Command, Brigadier General Merrill Twining

was responsible for conduct of training and preparing of all Marine replacement troops headed to

Korea, 1950-1951.

the Big Bear Region of the San Bernadino Range,

about 75 miles from Camp Pendleton.”39 On 11 December, the same day the rear guard of the 1st Marine Division was fighting its way back into the

perimeter at Hungnam, the Commandant approved

the proposed training syllabus, including the three

and one-half day field exercise. 

In theory, establishing a syllabus for a ColdWeather Indoctrination-Training Program should

not have been difficult in 1950. The planners had

only to refer to the appropriate U.S. Army Field

Manual on cold-weather operations, select those

subjects that they believed were essential, and staying within the limits of the time allowed, organize

the subjects into a coherent program of instruction.

But the field manual assumed that all the necessary

resources would be on hand and readily available

for use by the trainers. Unfortunately, this was not

the case. The Staging and Replacement Command 

soon found that many of the basic requirements

needed to put the program into being were in

scarce supply. As a result, those first few hectic

months of providing cold-weather indoctrination to

the mix of units and replacements bound for Korea

proved to be a more challenging task than anyone

anticipated. This was especially true for the cadre

of relatively inexperienced instructors who were

called upon to implement the plan. One can infer

from their reports that the trainers continually struggled with all the unforeseen problems that typically

befall an untested training program that has been

hastily conceived. 

The scarcity of qualified instructors was a challenge during that first year. Another problem was

related to the Big Bear training site itself. Soon after

the program got underway, General Twining paid

an unexpected visit to the former Big Bear Civilian

Conservation Corps facility where the training unit

had set up its base camp. It was a Sunday morning

and Twining knew an 800-man training increment

was scheduled to arrive that afternoon. What he

saw did not please him. The camp was a shambles.

Also, the instructors he talked to were disorganized

and, in his mind, utterly unready to receive the

training unit that would soon be arriving. Furthermore, no one could locate the Reserve officer-incharge, or any of his officers. Apparently, they had

gone off on liberty the day before and had yet to

return. Unquestionably, the unprofessional scene

that was before him and the base camp’s proximity

to the holiday atmosphere of the Big Bear winter

resort area did not please him. This was not what

General Twining had envisaged when he had told

his superiors that this training would approximate

conditions similar to those found in North Korea.

* Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton was designated as a “Barracks” from its activation date on 25 September 1942, until it was

re-designated as a Marine Corps Base on 1 September 1953.
The Marines Arrive 21

Immediately, he directed his aide to call Captain

Walter Moore at his Camp Pendleton quarters and

inform him that a staff car would soon arrive to pick

him up and deliver him to Big Bear. As of that moment, Captain Moore was now the officer-in-charge

of the field-training portion of the cold-weather indoctrination program.40 Known to his friends as

“Mu Mu,” this veteran Marine of 10 years, who had

earned a battlefield commission during World War

II, would prove to be the right man for the job.

Before receiving these unexpected orders, Captain Moore had been assigned to the 6th Replacement Draft at the Training and Replacement

Command. The 6th Draft was then undergoing its

final staging preparations before shipping out to

Korea. Apparently, however, the commanding general was aware of Captain Moore’s unique past experience and qualifications for winter warfare. In

1947-1948, Moore had served as an exchange officer with the U.S. Army at Fort Carson and at Camp

Hale, Colorado. Here he was assigned to the 1st

Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, the last remaining

remnant of the U.S. Army’s famed 10th Mountain

Division. After going through the summer rock

climbing and winter ski courses at Camp Hale, Captain Moore proved to be such an apt military mountaineer that his battalion commander entrusted him

with command of Company A for the balance of

his 16-month exchange tour. Therefore, General

Twining must have reasoned, Captain Moore was

the only officer within his immediate reach who

possessed the experience and skills to put his floundering Cold Weather Indoctrination Program back

on track. Consequently, the captain’s name was removed from the rolls of the 6th Replacement Draft

and he was informed that his orders to Korea

would be delayed until late in the next spring. 

After that first increment of troops had completed its field training, the new officer-in-charge

scouted around other nearby forest reserves in

search of an alternate site to the one at Big Bear.

Eventually, he settled on a more remote location

known as Black Mountain in the San Jacinto Mountains, five miles above the town of Idyllwild. Meanwhile, after ridding himself of most of the

incompetent members of the training group and replacing them with known leaders, some with whom

had served with him in the 3d Raider Battalion in

the Pacific, Captain Moore gradually managed to

improve the quality of the instruction and the practicality of the training to the point where the Black

Mountain field exercises did, in fact, closely resemble conditions that one could expect to fight and

live under in Korea.41 By early spring, however,

even the San Jacinto site became less satisfactory

due to the lack of deep snow and cold temperatures at the lower elevations. By late March, troop

indoctrination in cold-weather operations was limited to the basic eight hours of classroom instruction, followed by a five-day field exercise in the

Case Springs maneuver area at Camp Pendleton. 

As the first winter training season came to a

close, the planners and trainers met at Camp

Pendleton to take stock of what had and what had

not been accomplished. Even with all its shortcomings, this first effort was not viewed as a total failure. Thousands of Marines who were now serving

at the frontlines in Korea had at least been provided

a sense of the climatic conditions in which they

were now living and fighting. Moreover, in the

process of overcoming the many problems that surfaced, valuable lessons had been learned by the

staff of instructors. Nevertheless, they agreed, a

number of the features of the program still had to

be remedied before the Cold Weather Indoctrination Program resumed in the following fall.42

Whether the program would or should continue

was never discussed. The leadership at both Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps and at Camp Pendleton

had acknowledged the need for cold-weather training. First, the war in Korea was beginning to look

more like a long-term military commitment. Second,

and perhaps even the greater imperative, were the

Courtesy of Leatherneck

Captain Walter “Mu Mu” Moore, circa 1950. Moore,

a World War II veteran, became the first officer-incharge of the field training portion of the cold

weather indoctrination program. He organized the

Marine Corps' earliest cold-weather training programs at Big Bear and later in the San Jacinto

Mountains, California, in the winter of 1950-1951.
casualty figures that had been reported after the

Chosin Reservoir breakout. Of the 7,313 non-battle

casualties reported by the 1st Marine Division during the period of 26 October to 15 December 1950,

most had been attributed to frostbite and other

types of cold injuries suffered in the 0 to –35 degree

weather.43 This was a discomfiting revelation for an

organization that boasted of its readiness and ability

to fight in every “clime and place.” Clearly, the need

for a Cold Weather Indoctrination Program would

be around for some time to come. Therefore, longterm solutions were needed. 

Proponents for enhancing the practical field application phase of the program received a boost on 12

May, when the Marine Corps transferred Major General Oliver P. Smith from command of the 1st Marine

Division in Korea to serve as Commanding General

of Camp Pendleton, as well as Commanding General,

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Troops. No general officer

serving in the Marine Corps at the time could claim a

greater appreciation for the adverse effects that extreme cold could have on combat operations. General Smith’s personal interest in strengthening the

program was soon to prove beneficial.

22 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of Leatherneck

A Marine rifleman undergoing training at the San Jacinto Mountains site.

Radio jeeps at the San Jacinto training site, early spring 1951. There was a relative lack of snow for coldweather training purposes.

Courtesy of Leatherneck
The Marines Arrive 23

“Take what action is necessary to establish

a suitable training site”

During the late spring and early summer of 1951,

General Twining, with the full support of General

Smith, dispatched reconnaissance parties to locate

a new winter training site that might be used by the

Marine Corps on either a temporary or long-term

basis. The two generals sought a site that would

provide isolation, mountainous terrain with suitable

maneuver areas, low winter temperatures with sufficient snow levels to enable the proper indoctrination of troops to living under cold-weather field

conditions, and a suitable campsite for the logistic

and administrative support of both the permanent

personnel and those who would be undergoing instruction. 

In mid-June the reconnaissance parties returned

to Camp Pendleton and reported their findings.

Several locations were identified as meeting most

of the General Twining’s criteria for suitability. On

15 June 1951, General Twining sent a letter to

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps in which he outlined his plan for the conduct of cold-weather training for replacements during 1951 and 1952.44 He

proposed three new site locations for the conduct

of this training. Responding with a speed letter to

the Commanding General, Camp Pendleton, dated

7 July, the Commandant approved the recommendations that had been submitted on 15 June and directed the following:

a. Commence extended cold-weather training for a period of a week to 10 days in the

early fall of 1951 as soon as weather conditions permit.

b. Take what action is necessary to establish a suitable training site in one of the locations suggested by CG Tra&Repl Comd ltr of

15 June 1951. This Headquarters will render

any assistance required.45

In a subsequent letter addressed to the Commandant dated 31 July 1951, General Twining notified

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps that that he was

recommending the Wheeler area in northern California as the new cold-weather-training site.* The

Wheeler Guard Station and Wheeler Mountain are

located about six miles to the Southeast of Pickel

Meadow on Highway 395. Further, he expected

training to commence with the 14th Replacement

Draft on, or about 18 September, with an estimated

monthly training load of 2,800 trainees.46 Then, in

mid-August, the Commanding General of the Training and Replacement Command sent a follow-up to

his previous letter to the Commandant. In this letter

he referred to the new training site at a place called

“Pickel Meadow.”* He described an area located

about 90 miles southwest of Reno, Nevada, and better than 400 miles north of Camp Pendleton, and

explained that it offered the type of terrain and the

weather conditions for the desired training. What

he might have added was that the site was also located at the 38th Parallel, exactly the same latitude

where the U.N. forces were then locked in combat

with the Communists on the Korean Peninsula.

According to one eyewitness account, it was

sometime in early June 1951 when the Pickel

Meadow area was first surveyed as a potential site

for Marine cold-weather training. The leader of the

reconnaissance party was Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Hubbard, who for the previous year had

been serving in the G-3 Section of the Staging and

Replacement Command. This officer was intimately

familiar with the program that had been established

by Captain Moore the previous year and therefore

had a keen appreciation for the type of terrain and

cold-weather environment needed to make the field

application phase realistic and meaningful. Accompanying Colonel Hubbard was First Lieutenant

Richard M. Johnson. Lieutenant Johnson had served

in Korea as a rifle platoon commander in Company

D of Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise’s 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, during the Chosin Reservoir

campaign. During mid-morning of 27 November,

Lieutenant Johnson’s platoon was in the point, and

he was wounded at Yudam Ni when the Chinese

began their first major offensive. It was on this day

that the advance of the 1st Marine Division was

halted. After participating in the breakout from the

Chosin Reservoir and upon his rotation back to the

United States in April, Lieutenant Johnson was assigned to the Staging and Replacement Command

at Camp Pendleton. There, he was given duties as

a cold-weather training instructor and later as the

Aggressor Platoon leader. 

Years later Johnson could not recall if he and

Colonel Hubbard had just happened upon Pickel

Meadow or whether the local forest rangers from

the district office in Bridgeport directed them there.

However, inasmuch as either a temporary, or longterm, land use permit would eventually have to be

approved by that agency of the government, Johnson believed it likely that Colonel Hubbard would

* The author was unable to determine whether this was an early

reference name for what became the Pickel Meadow site, or if

was a separate candidate site that was then under consideration.

* The incorrect use of “Pickle,” vice “Pickel,” occurs frequently

in early correspondence and message traffic between HQMC and

the commands at Camp Pendleton.
have, at the very least, consulted with the local

rangers before walking the ground of any prospective site. Regardless of whether this reconnaissance

party happened upon or was shown the landscape

surrounding Pickel Meadow, Johnson does remember that they were quite impressed by the surrounding terrain. 

Physically, this region of the eastern Sierra had

not changed much since Frank Pickel built his log

cabin above the West Walker River in the early

1860s. What had once been a rough mule and

wagon trail over Sonora Pass was now a two-lane

paved highway, California 108. Additionally, three

miles to the west near Leavitt Meadows, there was

now a small commercial fishing lodge and pack station. But the state of California did not maintain

Highway 108 as an all-weather highway. Therefore,

the road was customarily closed to vehicular traffic

after the first snowfall in late October or early November and did not reopen until May. This, in

essence, turned Pickel Meadow into a virtual culde-sac for six months of the year, providing all the

isolation from civilian distractions that the Marines

had been seeking.

As to the rest of the commanding general’s guidance, the valley floor, which was at the 6,800-foot

level, seemed to offer ample space for a logistics

24 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of Marine Corps University Archive

USMC Mountain Warfare Training Center Pickel

Meadow Master Plan.

base to support both the permanent personnel and

the Marines under instruction. From here, the

mountains rose to over 11,000 feet, with the mountainsides dotted with large stands of pine, fir, and

aspen trees. Interspersed among the forests were

lush alpine meadows and tracts of open scrub sage,

making it ideal for the maneuver of small infantry

units. Most importantly, it appeared that the snow

and extreme cold weather conditions at the higher

elevations had not varied since John C. Fremont

first recorded them in February of 1844. Colonel

Johnson clearly remembered verifying this when he

and Colonel Hubbard stopped for a sandwich at the

Leavitt Meadows Lodge. The proprietor was a man

who introduced himself as “Shorty.” In addition to

running the pack station and fishing lodge, he also

sold groceries to the campers and cut hair on the

side. After lunch, Colonel Hubbard asked what the

winters were like in the area. 

“Oh, they are awful,” responded Shorty. “The

drifts around here get to be 20 feet deep and the

temperatures at night fall between minus 5-20 degrees. Even the snowshoe rabbits can’t survive the

winters up here.”*

“And what do you do in the winter?” pursued the

Colonel. 

“Look at those sticks holding up the shutters,”

replied the proprietor, pointing to his store windows. “Well, when the first snowflake falls, I knock

those sticks down and start buttoning this place up

right away. Then I hightail it south out of here until

the next spring.” 

Smiles broke out on the faces of the two Marine

officers as they listened to Shorty’s descriptions of

the severe winter conditions. Hearing him rattle on

about the prevailing freezing temperatures, both officers likely nodded and thought to themselves “Eureka! We have found it.”47

After weighing all the advantages and disadvantages between the several prospective sites that the

reconnaissance teams had reported, the only issue

that may have given the Commanding Generals

some pause before selecting Pickel Meadow as the

most suitable area was the distance. Traveling by

way of U.S. Highway 395, the new site was separated from Camp Pendleton by over 450 miles. Furthermore, ground transportation ferrying troops to

and from the site would have to cross three passes

over 7,500 feet in elevation, the last being the 8,000-

foot Conway Summit, just to the south of the town

* Just to the northwest in neighboring Calaveras County, the

town of Tamarack averages more 37 feet of snow a year and

holds the U.S., record for having the greatest depth of snow on

the ground at any one time (not counting snowdrifts): 451

inches, nearly 37 1⁄2 feet.
The Marines Arrive 25

of Bridgeport. This could be problematic from December through March for those drafts who had to

complete their training, yet return in time to meet

firm sailing dates for Korea. Despite these risks and

the logistical challenges, the area at Pickel Meadow

seemed to have so many other advantages in its

favor that ultimately it did become the recommended winter training site of both Generals Smith

and Twining. After announcing this decision, an immediate request was sent to the 12th Naval District

Headquarters asking that command begin negotiations with the U.S. Forest Service for a temporary

land use permit.

Except for a few small parcels held in private

hands, the vast majority of Pickel Meadow and the

surrounding terrain were all within the boundaries

of the Toiyabe National Forest. What President

Theodore Roosevelt had first set aside in 1907 as a

small National Reserve, by 1950 had grown to over

three million acres, making the Toiyabe the largest

National Forest outside of Alaska.48 The administrative headquarters for this vast tract of land was located in Reno, Nevada, with a District headquarters

17 miles to the south in Bridgeport, California.

While the Real Estate Division, Public Works Office,

12th Naval District worked with the local supervisor

and district offices of the U.S. Forest Service to craft

a temporary use permit, in Washington D.C. a

higher level team from Headquarters U.S. Marine

Corps and the Department of Navy opened negotiations with the Department of Agriculture with a request for a more permanent lease agreement. Fortunately, both the Department of Agriculture and

the U.S. Forest Service were very helpful and cooperative. Before the last day of August, the Marines

had been granted the temporary use of over 60,000

acres of the Toiyabe National Forest with the promise that a more permanent joint policy agreement

between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary

of Agriculture would be concluded within the next

six months. Therefore, at least one of the long-term

solutions to a vexing problem was now well on the

way to being resolved.

As the negotiators worked out the final details

for the use permits and the amount of terrain that

would be involved, it became obvious to the citizens of Mono County that something significant was

about to happen in their community. On August

17th, the Bridgeport Chronicle-Union told its readers: 

Bridgeport was abuzz last week with Marine

Corps members who reportedly were in the area

to make preliminary plans for a winter camp

near Wheeler Ranger Station. Convoys of motorized equipment and personnel went through

Inyo-Mono early last week, and were camped

near Bridgeport. Further details of the proposed

camp will be made in a later edition, if forthcoming from Marine Corps headquarters.49

Map by W. Stephen Hill
Activation of the Cold Weather Battalion

On 25 August 1951, the Commanding General,

Training and Replacement Command, with Staging

Regiment serving as its parent organization, activated the Cold Weather Training Battalion at Camp

Pendleton.50* Shortly thereafter, the same officer

who made the initial Pickel Meadow site survey,

Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Hubbard, was appointed as the battalion’s first commanding officer.

The 32-year-old Georgian had not served in Korea.

But he did come with three years of wartime experience in the South Pacific during World War II.

Serving initially as a company commander and then

executive officer of a parachute battalion, at age 25,

he was wounded in action as a major while commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, during the

recapture of Guam. He later

recovered in time to participate in the Iwo Jima campaign. His post-war years

included a tour of duty at the

University of California to

study the Chinese language at

Quantico, Virginia, where he

was assigned first as a student

and then as an instructor at

the Amphibious Warfare

School. During his 10 years of

active service, the colonel

26 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of Mr. Bob Peters

Photograph of town of Bridgeport, California, early 20th century.

had gained a reputation for being a tough taskmaster with a firm belief in the value of realistic field

training.51

As Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard saw it, his mission was now threefold. First, he had to construct a

temporary base camp at Pickel Meadow to provide

housing, mess, and work spaces for the “permanent

personnel” who would be assigned to his battalion.

Second, he needed to organize and prepare his unit

for the task of either training or supporting the

training of the eight replacement drafts that were

scheduled to undergo cold-weather indoctrination

during the forthcoming winter months. The third

task would be to supervise the conduct of each of

those drafts through seven days of practical application and tactical field exercises. Time was of the

A winter view of the main street, Highway 395, of Bridgeport, California, in the

1940s. The Bridgeport Hotel is currently the Bridgeport Inn.

Courtesy of Mr. Bob Peters

* On 11 September, the word

“Training” was dropped and the organization was redesignated as:

Cold Weather Battalion.
The Marines Arrive 27

essence if he were to accomplish this mission before 18 September and the arrival of the 14th Replacement Draft.*

On 30 August, an advance working party of 40

Marines arrived at Pickel Meadow to start erecting

the battalion’s temporary base camp. Corporal John

J. Schneider, a small arms weapons repairman who

was scheduled to depart for Korea in December

with the 16th Replacement Draft, was assigned temporary additional duty to this first contingent of

Marines. “The valley was absolutely bare,” Schneider related a half a century later. “We went right to

work setting up the first two strong-backed pyramidal tents.” 

The first was located on the south side of Highway 108, later to be called the “Guard Shack.” The

second pyramidal tent erected was situated on

higher ground among a grove of aspen trees on the

east bank of Silver Creek. This tent was to be the

living and work quarters for the commanding officer. During the remainder of his temporary additional duty, Corporal Schneider was assigned duties

in the field mess hall, sleeping at night under the

stars. By the time he left to return to Camp Pendleton, the valley floor on the north side of Highway

108 was filled with an imposing array of strongbacked pyramidal and general purpose tents to

house the hundreds of instructors, aggressors, and

Courtesy of author

Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Hubbard, Commanding Officer, Cold Weather Battalion, 1951-

1952.

service and support personnel who were beginning

to arrive for duty with the Cold Weather Battalion.52

Construction on two large wooden frame buildings

was also underway. One was used for the maintenance and repair of equipment while the other

stored the battalion’s organizational supplies. As the

camp was nearing completion in late September

through mid-October, it was not uncommon to see

flights of Marine Corsair fighter-bombers from the

El Toro air station, flying overhead at tree top level

as the pilots made practice strafing runs on the recently established tent camp. 

At a 4 September commanders conference

hosted at Camp Pendleton by the Commanding

General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, (FMFPac) it

was the consensus view of the attending flag officers that the Cold Weather Indoctrination Program

being afforded for the replacement drafts would

also be beneficial to units of FMFPac Troops and

the recently reconstituted 3d Marine Brigade, now

commanded by Brigadier General Lewis B. “Chesty”

Puller. Accordingly, staffs of the various commands

involved began working out the details to implement the plan. Ultimately, it was decided that the

Cold Weather Battalion would be augmented with

six officers and 134 enlisted Marines who would be

assigned temporary additional duty from FMFPac

Troops from November through April of the following year. Most of these personnel would be integrated into the various sections of the Cold Weather

Battalion, except for a separate Aggressor Platoon

Strong-back pyramidal tents constructed at valley

floor of Pickel Meadow, October 1951.

Courtesy of Harold F. Haberman

* The 14th Draft did not actually arrive until 22 September.
and a small training section. The latter would work

under the direction of the FMFPac Troops ColdWeather Training Officer, Lieutenant Colonel

George G. Ryffel. Overall responsibility for training

both the replacement drafts and the FMFPac

Troops, however, would remain under Lieutenant

Colonel Hubbard, the commanding officer of the

Cold Weather Battalion.53

On 22 September 1951, the first training increment of the 14th Replacement Draft arrived by bus

and by nightfall had set up a bivouac site among

the sage brush, one half mile to the west of the Cold

Weather Battalion’s base camp. While the Aspen

trees were turning yellow and there was a hint of

28 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

fall in the air, as yet, no new snow had fallen in the

Sierras, even at the higher elevations. Nor had Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard received the full complement of 53 officers and 730 enlisted men that had

been promised to him to flesh out his battalion.

Nevertheless, the essential ingredients had come together and the stage was set.54 The U.S Marine

Corps’ first Cold Weather Battalion was now open

for business at Pickel Meadow.

Courtesy of Harold F. Haberman

The tent camp under construction, October 1951.

Concerning the two wooden buildings on left, one

was used for storage of the battalion’s organizational supplies and the other for maintenance and

repair of heavy equipment.

Corsair fighter aircraft from Marine Corps Air Station El Toro conduct simulated strafing runs over

the Pickel Meadow base camp under construction,

October, 1951. Pictured is one of two wooden buildings built at the time.

Courtesy of Harold F. Haberman
This is the Law of the Yukon, that only

The Strong shall thrive;

That surely the Weak shall perish, and

Only the Fit survive.

-Robert Service

“We’ve got to get ‘em tougher to survive”

Throughout the Korean War, the responsibility

for organizing and processing each replacement

draft for embarkation to the Far East was assigned

to the commanding officer of the Staging Regiment

of the Training and Replacement Command. The

Training and Replacement Command was located

at the northern end of Camp Pendleton at Camp

San Onofre. At that time it was commonly referred

to as Tent Camp #2. Each month a numbered draft

would be scheduled well in advance to depart on

a certain day by sea transport from either the San

Diego or the Long Beach naval bases. The drafts

varied in size, but at the height of the conflict they

normally numbered between 1,800–2,500 Marines.

It should also be remembered that these drafts were

made up of individual replacements, not organized

units. Therefore, each was a mix of every occupational specialty and rank, running from private to

major. During pre-deployment training the replacements were loosely organized into numbered battalions, each comprised of four or more provisional

rifle companies of about 250 men each. Four platoons comprised a company, with each platoon

made up of four rifle squads. Because assignments

to a replacement unit were done randomly, it was

a rare instance when more than two or three men

might even be acquainted before being thrown together in the same platoon. The four platoon commanders assigned to these provisional “lash-ups”

were usually newly commissioned second lieutenants, fresh from The Basic School at Quantico.

Before starting the cold-weather indoctrination

phase of their training, every Marine in a company

would draw a complete set of cold-weather clothing. As each man signed for his gear, the supply

clerks would remind him of the cost of each item

and that the total kit came to $126.13. Marines were

expected to account for their gear or expect a pay

checkage. The clothing issue was customarily followed by four hours of classroom instruction on

such subjects as the principles of the cold-weather

uniform layering system, cold injuries, individual

29

Chapter 4

Cold Weather Battalion’s First Year

mobility in deep snow and the rudiments of providing shelter and heat.55 Throughout this instruction the acronym “COLD” was used to stress the

main points for keeping oneself combat effective in

a frigid climate: “C” for keeping clothes clean; “O”

for avoid overheating; “L” for wearing layers, and

“D” for keeping dry, which even the instructors had

to concede was a challenge in the sometimes sleety

conditions. 

At about 0230 the following morning, the troops

would form up at a designated assembly area, staggering in the dark under their 85-pound loads of

cold-weather uniforms and equipment. Each man

would also be carrying a sack lunch consisting of

two bologna sandwiches and an apple, which he

had drawn from the mess hall that morning. After a

roll call, the companies would climb onto the waiting Pacific Greyhound or Continental Trailways

busses and start out on their 10-hour journey for

Bridgeport. The route took them north along U.S.

Highway 395, with one stop for “head call” at an

abandoned airstrip near the town of Lone Pine.

Sometime after mid-day, the training units would

arrive at Pickel Meadow and debark on the west

end of the valley. Once there a team of instructors

from Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard’s Cold Weather

Battalion would meet them. After being given a

brief chance to get themselves sorted out on the

ground, the troops would then start the first of their

seven days of practical field maneuvers by trudging

up the slopes to their first night’s bivouac site at

Tactical Area #1. Meanwhile, those provisional comMarines from the Korean War 15th Draft debarking

from busses upon arrival at Pickel Meadow, November 1951.

Courtesy of author
panies that had completed their week of field training would be loaded onto the same busses on the

east end of the valley. The luxury of being in a

heated bus was a welcome change after being exposed for seven days to snow, wind and bone chilling cold. Usually, becoming warm again would

have an immediate somniferous affect on the exhausted Marines. As a result, most of them would

already be in a sound sleep before reaching the

town of Bridgeport on their way back to Camp

Pendleton. 

It did not take long for the word to get around

Tent Camp #2 that the training conducted at Pickel

Meadow was distinctly different from any of the

other standard processing activity at the Staging and

Replacement Command. “Listen to what the instructors tell you and take it seriously,” returning Marines

would caution their buddies who had yet to go

through the program. “It’s tough up there!” For

many combat commanders who were veterans of

the Korean Conflict, the new Cold Weather Indoctrination Program was spot on. Certainly this rigorous training and the demands it placed squarely on

the shoulders of the individual Marine were consistent with the philosophy of Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller,

one of the most highly decorated Marine ever, and

a recent veteran of the Chosin Campaign. When

Puller returned to the United States from Korea he

told reporters that “We’ve got to get our people

tougher to survive. Throw all these girls out of

camp. Get rid of the ice cream and candy. Get some

pride in ‘em–that’s what we need now most of all,

pride.”56

Snow came early to the Sierra Nevada in the fall

of 1951. By mid-October, the higher peaks were already blanketed under deep drifts. Even down at

the Cold Weather Battalion’s base camp at the

6,800-foot level, the accumulation was enough to

make plowing and snow removal part of the daily

routine. By this time, it was now also routine for

the citizens of Bridgeport to look out on Highway

395 and observe a convoy of vehicles loaded with

hundreds of Marines as they passed through the

town enroute either to or from Pickel Meadow. An

article appearing on the front page of the Bridgeport Chronicle–Union dated 28 October 1951 informed its readers of what was taking place at the

nearby Marine training camp:

After careful inspection of all available training areas in California, the Pickle Meadow [sic]

site was selected by veteran Marine Corps Officers as the location offering altitude, sub-zero

weather and deep snow equal to the mountainous sections of Korea.

During a rugged training period the Marines

toughen their bodies and develop confidence

in themselves and their cold-weather equipment constantly watched by a highly trained

instructor staff, many of whom are former ski

experts, mountain climbers or veterans of Korean fighting. The trainees live in the field

under simulated combat conditions. 

Other instructors make up an enemy

guerilla force, which adds realism to combat

problems. These white clad raiders strike at

the trainees supply lines, attempt to steal his

weapons and raid his headquarters. In this

manner, mistakes which might mean death or

defeat in combat are vividly pointed out and

eliminated.

30 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of author

The 15th Draft marching to higher elevations to begin cold-weather training at Pickel Meadow, November 1951. 
Cold Weather Battalion’s First Year 31

Highly essential for surviving in the subzero cold, the Marine learns to keep his body

warm and his fingers and feet free from frostbite. As some of our recruit Marines have

never even seen snow and are sometimes apprehensive at the prospects of living in it, said

the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel

Donald B. Hubbard, this training shows the individual that we have means to overcome the

rigors of winter warfare and how to use what

nature offers to keep warm. He gains confidence in himself, his equipment and his fellow

Marines.57

In his official after-action report, Lieutenant

Colonel Hubbard expanded on this same theme by

describing the metamorphosis that each training

company went through during its seven-day cycle

of cold-weather indoctrination: 

For the most part, the trainees were completely inexperienced in cold-weather and extreme wintertime conditions, or had never

participated in a military operation under such

conditions, although some may have been natives of harsh climatic regions. Upon arrival at

Pickel Meadows, [sic] the trainees were ominously silent, reluctant to leave the busses,

and hesitant to enter the bleak expanse of

white wilderness. After several orientation lectures, demonstrations, and periods of application on care and use of equipment, clothing,

shelter, food and water, and after direct contact with those weather characteristics, the silence gave way to a more jovial, but not

particularly carefree approach. Upon completion of the field exercise and upon learning

that movement through snow and cold at

high altitudes was not only a possibility, but

a practicality; the trainee attitude became one

of confidence and at times cockiness. Invaluable lessons in leadership were learned by officers and noncommissioned officers in the

discovery of the amount and intensity of command supervision necessary to move troops

through snow, cold, wind, and blizzard conditions, yet maintain a sense of combat readiness.58

Keeping the training companies from becoming

too lax or carefree was the task of Lieutenant

Richard “Dick” W. Johnson and his 70-man Aggressor Platoon. Operating from their own self-contained base camps that were hidden away at the

higher elevations, Lieutenant Johnson’s white camouflaged squads would lie in wait along routes of

march between the various night tactical bivouac

positions and then swoop down on the stragglers

of a company in column at the most inopportune

moment. But the situations the aggressors most relished for launching their assaults were between

midnight and the first daylight hours, or during a

blizzard when visibility was severely reduced.

Should unit commanders fail to post adequate security, or if their Marines were slow in getting out

of their sleeping bags and into their fighting positions when the alarm was raised, they usually paid

the price as the aggressors, firing blank ammunition, came charging through the company perimeter on skis or snowshoes knocking down shelters

and carrying off captured weapons as they withdrew. 

Despite living and operating in arctic conditions

for long stretches, morale among the Aggressor Platoon stayed consistently high. Recalling those days

a half-century later, Johnson attributed the high

morale of the platoon to several factors. “First and

foremost we had a great cook,” recalled Johnson.

He loved the isolation of the field and had

a knack turning our rather drab rations into a

delicious meal. His ‘deer burgers’ were a particular favorite. Most of the troops were young

privates and privates first class, right out of

Colonel Lewis B. Puller in 1950 while commanding

officer, 1st Marine Regiment in Korea.

Marine Corps History Division
boot camp. Fortunately, I had some fine noncommissioned officers to lead them, some of

whom had already been to Korea. Then,

whenever we might have a break in the

schedule, I would make arrangements to get

the troops to Reno for a night or two of liberty. When they returned, we would sober

them up and off we’d go again.

Johnson recalled that the Navy corpsman was

the only one who had any previous experience on

skis. “But we got to the point where we could get

around on them pretty well.”59

The Winter of 1951-1952

If the lack of snow and the absence of extreme

cold vexed the Marine cold-weather trainers during

1950-1951, the opposite was the case in the winter

of 1951-1952. From December through late March,

currents of frigid air that streamed down from the

Pacific Northwest collided continuously with warm

winds coming from the south. This created tempest

winds which erupted into a series of blizzards that

blew directly over the Sierra Nevada range. Each

storm was followed by periods of extreme low temperatures. According to Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard’s official after-activity report, on 1 January the

mercury dropped to –39 degrees Fahrenheit at his

lower base camp. By the time the April thaw finally

arrived, the local population had already declared

it the worst winter to strike the region since 1891.

32 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

The Southern Pacific Railroad’s streamliner City of

San Francisco became snow bound and marooned

as it tried to cross over Donner Pass in the middle

of a particularly devastating storm. Emergency food

supplies for the passengers had to be airdropped

by helicopters during the 10 days it took for snowplowing engines to relieve the stranded passenger

train. Air Force National Guard C-119 “Flying Box

Car” cargo planes were likewise kept busy through

much of that winter and into early spring, air-dropping bales of hay to the many herds of stranded

livestock that had become isolated and were in danger of starving.

Marines who went through that first winter at

Pickel Meadow remember the harsh circumstances.

The resident Cold Weather Battalion as well as the

inexperienced 23,213 trainees who were there for

only one week of indoctrination training suffered

greatly in the fierce winter conditions. 

One trainee was Lieutenant James Brady, future

author and columnist. Writing 40 years later, Brady

could vividly remember being at “the cold-weather

training camp up near Tahoe where we had two

feet of snow in October and the thin air burned our

lungs.”60

Before that harsh winter commenced, Staff Sergeant Harold F. Haberman, a Cold Weather Battalion Marine, drew his set of cold weather-clothing

from the Training and Replacement Command on

Courtesy of Col Richard M. Johnson

Cold Weather trainees setting up two-man shelter

half tents while undergoing instruction at Pickel

Meadow, early 1950s.

A fire team moving out on patrol as “aggressors”

from their base camp, sometime in 1951-1952.

Courtesy of Col Richard M. Johnson
Cold Weather Battalion’s First Year 33

5 September, and was soon on his way in his 1937

Chevrolet to join the Cold Weather Training Battalion. Upon reporting, he was assigned to work in

the Battalion S-4 Section. Throughout his tour of

duty with the Cold Weather Battalion, September

1951-April 1952, Staff Sergeant Haberman recorded

what was going on around him by taking black and

white photographs with his personal camera. Looking at an October snapshot, one can see how the

snow blanketed the ground at the lower base camp.

By November it has risen to waist deep. Photographs taken in December and January showed

even deeper drifts, burying vehicles and equipment.

By late January, the snowfall had become so heavy

that the state of California snowplow crews were

unable to keep Highway 395 open and the base became completely isolated for almost a week. As

food and supply stores begin to run low, Staff Sergeant Haberman’s camera caught the C-119 cargo

planes that were parachuting critically needed supplies to the 1,500 Marines, who for a time, were

completely cut off and snowbound.61

While this was going on, the numbers of

stranded Marines at Pickel Meadow had troubling

repercussions with regard to sailing schedules for

the outgoing drafts. On 29 January 1952, Major

General O. P. Smith wrote a letter from his headquarters at Camp Pendleton to the newly installed

20th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General

Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. General Smith provided a

personal assessment of the situation and the action

that was being taken to overcome the “few complications” that the winter storms were causing:

Dear Lem:

You have already been advised by dispatch

of the completion of cold-weather training for

the 17th Replacement Draft. California’s worst

winter in several years presented a few complications. U.S. Highway 395 from Bishop to

Pickel Meadows [sic] (cold-weather camp) has

been closed for most of January. Normally this

route is kept open all winter. When snow first

caused closing of the road we had over 2,300

trainees (draft and FMF) in the camp. Then the

highway people were able to open the road

Courtesy of Col Richard M. Johnson

The aggressors in hide position observing a provisional training company, sometime in 1951-1952.

Aggressors open fire on advancing cold weather trainees.

Courtesy of Col Richard M. Johnson
long enough for us to get out 1,500 trainees.

Then snow blocked the road again. While 800

trainees remained in camp snowbound, we

sent two other increments (approximately 800

in each increment) to Bishop where they were

bivouacked in a National Forest area and were

given an abbreviated cold-weather training

course. Finally, the state highway people

opened up the road from Pickel Meadow to

Nevada and we sent buses around to bring the

remaining trainees from Pickel Meadow to Fallon, Nevada, from where El Toro planes airlifted them to Pendleton and El Toro. By 26

January all trainees (those from Bishop and

those from Pickel Meadow) had returned to

Pendleton. The permanent detachment remains at Pickel Meadow. During all this period

it was necessary to evacuate only three men

from Pickel Meadow (one appendectomy and

two with respiratory trouble.) These went out

through the Nevada side. There were ample

rations and stove oil. 

34 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Roads permitting we will send personnel of

the 18th Draft into Pickel Meadow. If roads go

out we will train at Bishop. While the Sierras

are in the grip of winter we are reconnoitering

for an alternate site for a cold-weather camp

if training is continued next year. Possibly we

can find a site where we can get snow and

cold weather, but where the chances of the

road being blocked are minimized.62

If General Smith held out some glimmer of hope

that the worst was over and that winter would gradually start to loosen its grip on the Sierras, he was

soon to be disappointed. Throughout February and

March, severe storms continued to lash the Sierra

Nevada. In March, Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard reported one blizzard that “deposited approximately

five feet of new snow in a 24-hour period.”63 Again,

snow-removal equipment and crews fell hopelessly

behind, necessitating a repeat of Highway 395

being temporarily closed. However, by this time alternate routes through western Nevada had been

Courtesy of Mr. Harold F. Haberman

Deep snow covers the Pickel Meadow base camp,

January 1952. Members of the Cold Weather Battalion lived in tents throughout the winter.

Courtesy of Mr. Harold F. Haberman

A C-119 Flying Boxcar aircraft supplies Pickel

Meadow base camp with critically needed fuel, oil,

and rations in January 1952. Air resupply was necessary because winter conditions had halted rail

traffic in the region.

Cold Weather Battalion mess hall goes up in flames,

January 1952.

Courtesy of Mr. Harold F. Haberman The burning mess hall was doused by pushing snow

onto the fire with a snowplow, January 1952.

Courtesy of Mr. Harold F. Haberman
Cold Weather Battalion’s First Year 35

established, which allowed most of the troop-laden

bus convoys to get in and out of Pickel Meadow. 

But the severe weather was not the only complication to test the staffs at Camp Pendleton that were

trying to keep the flow of troops and supplies to

the Cold Weather Battalion on schedule. In January,

in the midst of one of the worst storms of the year,

the Bridgeport mess hall burned to the ground. The

structure itself was simply a large tent over a skeleton metal frame. Thus it could be quickly rebuilt.

However, the galley equipment was a complete loss

and it took time to replace it all. According to Staff

Sergeant Haberman, the source of the fire was

never established.65 Here again, his trusty camera

One of the officers assigned to that mid-January

training increment and who was precluded from

reaching Pickel Meadow was a Korean bound second lieutenant by the name of Bernard E. Trainor.

In a series of articles entitled: On Going to War, the

first of which appeared in the April, 1996 issue of

the Marine Corps Gazette, Trainor, by then a retired

lieutenant general, provided a humorous personal

account of the abbreviated cold-weather training

he received outside of the town of Bishop. The

reader will note that Lieutenant General Trainor’s

version differs somewhat from what General Smith

had reported to the Commandant.

“The winter of 1951-1952 was particularly bad

in the high Sierras; lots of snow. The Chicago Limited*

 on its way to San Francisco became snowbound for days in the Donner Pass and had to be

resupplied by helicopter. It made the pages of Life

magazine. All this by the way of introduction to the

fact we never made it to Pickel Meadow. The

busses were halted by the state police at Bishop,

California, and the drivers told the highway was

closed further north due to snow. Their advice was

to turn around and go home. This put the little fat

major in charge of the convoy in a state of near

panic. He argued to the troopers that his wards

were on their way to Korea and the Commandant

had mandated that they go through cold-weather

training first. As anyone who has ever tried to

argue with a state policeman knows, the major’s

efforts got him nowhere. The police outranked the

Commandant in California and they absolutely

mandated that ‘you shall not pass.’ We were delighted with their firmness. We had no burning desire to go to Pickle Meadow. After all, our days

along the Chopawamsic qualified us for nasty

weather. Besides, an unscheduled return to Pendleton probably meant liberty call. 

Poor Major ‘No-Name’ of course saw things differently. He just couldn’t return to garrison with

troops unqualified for winter warfare because of

winter conditions. Think of the shame. Besides, it

would throw the whole Marine Corps and its well

greased replacement system out of sync. I will say

this for him, he may have been a staff pouge with

a dirty belt and unshined brass, but he was a dedicated Marine with a sense of mission and a knack

for the famous field expedient. If Mohammed

could not go to the mountain, he would bring the

mountain to Mohammed. He blew a whistle and

ordered everyone out of the busses. For the next

three days and nights we tromped through the

snow in the hills above Bishop, pretending we

were in Korea, while the major set up his command post in a local motel. At the end of our

trekking we piled into the buses and headed back

to Pendleton. Upon arrival, noncommissioned officers were seated at portable tables stacked with

our officer qualification record books. As we debussed and identified ourselves by name, an entry

was stamped into our officer qualification records,

‘Certified: Winter Warfare Qualified.’ ”64

Bernard E. Trainor

* Gen Trainor mistakenly identified the name of the train; it was

The City of San Francisco.
managed to record the blazing scene of bulldozers

pushing piles of snow to extinguish the flames and

contain the fire.

A second complication that caused more serious

consequences occurred in March. This involved the

Pacific Greyhound Lines and Continental Trailways

being forced to cease charter operations because of

a labor strike against both bus lines. After the strike

began, new charters were given over to the Trona

Stage and Tanner Greyline to make the long trip between Camp Pendleton and Pickel Meadow. Unfortunately, the aging vehicles of each line were near

the end of their service lives. Consequently, a number of the training increments were stranded along

Highway 395 waiting for replacement busses to

come and transport these Marines on to their destination.66 Unable to cope with this unsatisfactory

service without risking further disruptions to the

draft sailing dates, the leadership at Camp Pendleton

reluctantly decided to cancel the cold-weather training at Pickel Meadow that had been scheduled for

the 20th and 21st Drafts. 

On 17 March, the Cold Weather Battalion concluded training and out posted the last increment of

the 19th Replacement Draft. This was the last of the

overseas drafts to receive the complete package of

cold-weather indoctrination training that winter.

However, by using its organic military transportation,

Fleet Marine Force Units were able to hold to their

original schedules. Therefore, cold-weather training

for Brigadier General Puller’s 3d Brigade and for

Force Troops Pacific did not end until 6 April. By the

middle of the month, the Cold Weather Battalion

with its FMF augmenters began to drawdown to return to Camp Pendleton to rejoin their parent organizations. On 19 May 1952, the Cold Weather Battalion

began shifting its headquarters back to Camp

Pendleton, leaving only a small detachment to guard

the camp and to police the various bivouac sites,

once the snow had left the ground. On 28 May 1952,

the unit was redesignated as Headquarters Company, Cold Weather Battalion, Marine Barracks,

Camp Pendleton, California. 

Thus, the first year of the Cold Weather Training

Battalion at Pickel Meadow came to a close. It had

been a busy nine months. Despite its hasty formation

and the primitive conditions associated with living

under canvas through one of the worst winters ever

to hit northern California, the organization had accomplished its mission and had shown that it could

deal with adversity. Moreover, only a handful of

minor frostbite cases were reported during the entire

training season. It was unfortunate that the bus strike

36 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

had prevented the 20th and 21st Replacement Drafts

from taking advantage of this training experience. As

Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard pointed out in his afteractivity report: 

Despite the deep snow and the extra burden it placed on vehicles and unsuitable snowremoval equipment, it was never a serious

threat or impediment to training. The weather,

as well as the terrain, proved ideal for the indoctrination of cold, moisture, chill winds, blizzards and rapid temperature changes. Snow

depths varying from two feet to 10 feet and

drifting up to 30 feet produced ideal variety for

troop movements, affording solid crust, breakable crust and shoulder-high powder snow.67

The Cold Weather Battalion had realized its purpose. No less than 23,213 Marines and sailors received indoctrination training that winter. Elliot W.

Chassey, a member of the 15th Replacement Draft

that sailed for Korea in December 1951, later recalled

that “The training was the hardest, most demanding

we ever went through, but it did a lot to save

lives.”68

If General O. P. Smith directed his staff to search

for an alternate site for the next year’s Cold Weather

Indoctrination Program, as he had so indicated to

the Commandant, there is no record of it. Perhaps

two factors might have dissuaded him from doing

so. First, despite the disruptions and problems encountered from snow blocked highways and a bus

strike, all the reports he received pertaining to the

ideal winter conditions and the expansive areas

open for troop maneuver were absolutely glowing

in their praise for the existing camp. Second, “Joint

Policy between the Department of the Navy and the

Department of Agriculture Relating to the Use of National Forest Lands for Defense Purposes” was

agreed upon and had been formally approved by

Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball and Secretary

of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan on 19 February.

(See appendix D) Under the terms of this agreement,

the Department of Agriculture granted to the Navy

Department at no cost, exclusive use of 40 acres for

the base camp and joint use of over 60,000 acres of

Toiyabe National Forest lands so long as it was determined that the lands are “essential for the defense

effort.”69 Opening new negotiations for land use

elsewhere may not have resulted in such a favorable

outcome for the Marine Corps. Therefore, General

Smith apparently reasoned that it was better to let

things stand as they were and to press on with the

plans for improving the existing site. 
No Marine training was ever tougher or more

practical for the purpose.

-Colonel Robert D. Heinl Jr.

Introduction

Throughout the winter and spring of 1951-1952,

Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Hubbard, commanding officer, Cold Weather Battalion and his counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel George G. Ryffel,

officer-in-charge of the Pickel Meadow Detachment

of Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, submitted numerous recommendations to their respective

superiors at Camp Pendleton. Most of this correspondence was aimed at improving the future of

cold-weather training and operations at the new

site. The two officers seemed to concur on most

matters. Their final reports were submitted within

10 days of one another and as one reads through

them, it becomes readily apparent that the two reports had been closely coordinated. The majority of

the recommendations originated by the two commanders suggests that their most pressing priorities

fell under one of the four following areas: facilities,

organization for training, cold-weather clothing and

equipment, and command relationships.

Facilities

A Cold Weather Battalion Staff Study, signed by

Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard on 13 March 1952, begins with several assumptions. Among them are

“that cold-weather training will be continued on an

annual basis in the Pickel Meadow area near

Bridgeport, California” and “that cold-weather training will recommence in September of each year and

conclude each annual training period in May of the

following year.” This staff study then went on to

make the case for constructing a permanent camp

one-fourth mile east of the present tent camp with

barracks, heads and office “buildings to consist of

insulated Quonset type construction with concrete

decks, while maintenance and utilities building to

be of frame type construction to fit utilities required.” The stated preference for Quonset construction was because “of fire security in high winds

and the shorter time and ease of construction by

Marine engineer units.” A table of organization that

proposed a permanent Cold Weather Battalion of

approximately 53 officers and 730 Marine and navy

enlisted men, accompanied the staff study.70

In his final report to the commanding general,

Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lieutenant

Colonel Ryffel echoed the same need for the immediate construction of a permanent camp. “The living

conditions and facilities offered to permanent personnel are not adequate nor up to minimum standards for permanent duty . . . . It is considered a

necessity that all quarters, offices, and facilities

37

Chapter 5

Making Improvements, 1952-1956

The Cold Weather Battalion base camp at Pickel Meadow in the summer of 1952 before the construction of a

more permanent facility that year. Highway 108 runs horizontally through the middle of the picture and the

West Walker River is in the background.

Courtesy of MWTC
move out of tentage and into Quonset-type construction.” But he also made it quite clear that this

condition pertained to the permanent personnel

only. Facilities for those under instruction, he

stressed in a succeeding page, “should remain at a

minimum level in order to provide a hardship of

conditions and to develop self-reliance and improvisation.”71

Organization for Training

Neither Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard nor Lieutenant Colonel Ryffel spared much criticism of the

preliminary Cold Weather Indoctrination Program

conducted by the Staging Regiment at Camp

Pendleton. In their view, the program was lackluster. It was too short, lacked substance, and what

was being imparted to the troops was often “inconsistent with the principles being taught by the instructors of the Cold Weather Battalion.” Moreover,

regimental supply had made no effort to size the

cold-weather clothing to the man as it was being issued. Therefore, wholesale exchanges in boots,

gloves and outer garments between the men of

each training increment had to be made after they

had arrived at Pickel Meadow. 

Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard proposed that each

replacement draft training company be given an opportunity to make a half-day conditioning march in

cold-weather uniforms to ensure proper fit. This

was to be followed by an overnight bivouac at

Camp Pendleton, prior to departing for Pickel

Meadow.72 Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Ryffel recommended that “the introductory lectures at Camp

Pendleton be given under the control of FMFPac

Troops (vice Staging Regiment) to insure a complete and accurate coverage.” In addition, Ryffel

recommended, “prior to the movement to Pickel

Meadow, provisional infantry units be given a field

training phase at Camp Pendleton of approximately

two days in which a bivouac is established and elementary small unit tactics is practiced.”73 The recommendations of both officers were subsequently

adopted. 

Cold-Weather Clothing and Equipment

Notwithstanding the local problem associated

with ill-fitting cold-weather uniforms, significant improvements were made to the cold-weather clothing and equipment kit for the individual Marine

during 1951-1952. What became known as the

M1951 cold-weather clothing system came into general service in mid-1952. It replaced the bulky,

overly restrictive parka, thereby reducing the total

weight of the kit somewhat. Otherwise, it was

based on the same “layering” principle as before,

and included a loose-fitting white undershirt and

drawers, half-wool long underwear, wool shirt and

trousers, a standard Marine wool sweater and a field

jacket with liner that was water repellent. A parka

and over trousers could be added for exceptionally

frigid weather.

But unquestionably, the greatest single advancement in the cold-weather uniform was made in the

footwear. Up until November 1951, the M1944

Shoe-Pacs continued as the standard boot of issue.

Over time, the sub-standard Shoe-Pacs, which accounted for many of the frostbite injuries suffered

during the Chosin Reservoir campaign, was replaced with what was briefly known as the “Bristolite” boot, produced by the Hood Rubber Company.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard, these

early models also “proved too inflexible and caused

chafing.”74 However, by February 1952, Major Vernon D. Boyd, the Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps

project officer and a representative from the Hood

Rubber Company were back at Pickel Meadow to

test and evaluate a new model of the insulated rubber boots. This model boot proved highly successful and was immediately adopted for use and

designated as the M1952 “1952 boot, insulated rubber.”75 Dubbed the “Mickey Mouse” boot by the

troops, this thermal boot used the vapor barrier

principle of airspace trapped between inner and

outer layers of wool pile insulation, both of which

were completely sealed off by rubber from any contact with moisture. Furthermore, as the insulated

rubber boot replaced the Shoe-Pacs among the infantry units of the 1st Marine Division in Korea, it

was noted that the absence of a steel shank in the

new boot also reduced foot injuries from exploding

land mines. 

With respect to equipment improvements, both

Hubbard and Ryffel agreed with everything that had

been said before about the inadequacy of the 1941

Marine Corps Pack System in cold-weather operations. Throughout the year, trainees and instructors

alike at Pickel Meadow conducted comparison tests

between the U.S. Army’s mountain rucksacks versus

the waterproof bag, lashed to a wooden pack

frame, in order to determine which was best suited

to carry the cold-weather load. Both officers faithfully reported their troops’ conviction that the rucksack was the superior load-bearing system for

movement in the mountains and in deep snow.76

Nevertheless, the pack frame with waterproof bag

soon became the accepted standard for use in the

Marine Corps and it would be another 30 years before the rucksack eventually replaced this system.

Finally, Hubbard pointed out, while the new coldweather uniform was an improvement, there was

still insufficient insulation between the sleeping bag

38 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Making Improvements, 1952–1956 39

and the snow. The poncho, he said, simply did not

serve well and forestry restrictions prevented using

branches and shrubbery for this purpose. “Therefore,” he recommended, “that some consideration

be given to the possibility of providing coldweather trainees and personnel with air mattresses.”77 By the following year, air mattresses had

indeed become part of the cold-weather equipment

list, despite some grumbling from “old timers” that

this was clear proof that the Corps was becoming

soft.

Command Relationships

Back in August and September of 1951, the Cold

Weather Battalion had been hastily drawn up and

thrown together. Then, time was of the essence.

The battalion had to be formed quickly in order to

meet the scheduled arrival of the 14th Replacement

Draft. Some Marines filled billets under permanent

orders, while others were assigned from parent organizations on a temporary additional duty (TAD)

basis for an unspecified period. Still others were

carried as augmenters, such as the majority of Lieutenant Colonel Ryffel’s detachment from Force

Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. The result was

an administrative nightmare. Individual members of

the battalion flowed in and then were recalled at

the whim of the parent organization back at Camp

Pendleton. In some cases, both officer and enlisted

personnel who were assigned turned out to be

completely unsuited for the duty and their orders

were terminated for the good of the command. According to Colonel Hubbard, these temporary additional duty personnel, as well as those from Fleet

Marine Force (FMF) units, also “suffered from lack

of interest by their parent unit which retained their

service record books; thus creating an arrangement

that left much to be desired in pay, testing, fitness

reporting and markings.”78

With respect to the complexities of coordinating

daily requirements with activities outside his established chain-of-command, Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard had even more to say: 

The Cold Weather Battalion worked with

the following activities during the past training

period: Air FMFPac, FMFPac Troops, Dept of

Pacific, Depot of Supplies San Francisco and

Barstow Annex, 12th Naval District, Marine

Barracks, Hawthorne, Nevada, Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton, Training and Replacement Command and Staging Regiment.

Because of the large number that this battalion

necessarily dealt with, and because of the

number of echelons in the chain-of-command,

it was often difficult to retain a clear-cut concept of command policy and often difficult to

obtain decisions without delay. In view of the

distance from Camp Pendleton and the large

number of Marine Corps and Naval activities

that this Battalion by its very nature will necessarily deal with, every consideration should

be given to establishing as much autonomy as

is practical.* 79

In his report, Lieutenant Colonel Ryffel addressed the same issue in almost identical terms: 

A five months view of the command relationship of the Cold Weather Battalion as it

concerned logistical support, administrative

matters, and operational control leads me to

believe that a much more effective and efficient relationship could be put into effect. The

Cold Weather Battalion, in effect, dealt directly

with three separate staffs in its chain-of-command, besides coordinating with FMFPac

Troops and its subordinate units, and the

Depot of Supplies at San Francisco and

Barstow. As a result, decision and responsibility was sometimes a nebulous thing, and

other times an all hands act. In view of the

distance from Camp Pendleton and the necessity for on-the-spot decisions with respect to

training and weather, and in view of the personnel and facilities that suffer from being a

part of so far distant a command as Camp

Pendleton, it is believed that the Cold Weather

Battalion should have as much command autonomy as possible, even to the extent of being

a separate command patterned after a Marine

Barracks.* 80

What Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard was likely

seeking with this quest for “greater autonomy,” was

to remove his battalion from the administrative and

operational control of Camp Pendleton altogether.

In essence, his 13 March 1952 Staff Study suggests

exactly that in the fourth and final assumption:

“That the Cold Weather Battalion will be under the

Department of the Pacific for administrative and logistical control, and under the Commandant of the

Marine Corps for operational control.”81 While it is

doubtful that Major General Oliver P. Smith was

willing to recommend such a drastic change, he

was likely sympathetic to the notion of streamlining.

This he did by eliminating the two layers that had

previously existed between himself and the commanding officer of the Cold Weather Battalion. For

in his final report of 26 May 1952, Lieutenant

Colonel Hubbard closes by noting: “The transfer of

* Emphasis by the author.
this battalion on 19 May 1952 to Marine Barracks,

Camp Pendleton—was definitely a step in the right

direction.”* 82

Building a Camp, 1952

While not all of Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard’s

many recommendations for improving the status of

the Cold Weather Battalion bore fruit, some did receive prompt response. From the standpoint of troop

morale, the most significant was the construction of

semi-permanent facilities for living and workspaces at

Pickel Meadow. Because of the lack of a permanent

lease agreement and the need for speed, the commanding general, Camp Pendleton approved Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard’s recommendation that

construction be of a “temporary nature” consisting

largely of Quonset and Butler type structures. This

task was assigned to the 7th Engineer Battalion, Force

Troops, Pacific. With a completion deadline set for

mid-October, the 7th Engineers lost no time in laying

out the rudiments of a new camp. By late May, as

soon as the last of the winter snow had left the floor

of the valley, construction crews were already at work

bulldozing the hillside to the east of the tent camp and

beginning to pour the concrete slabs that would serve

as foundations or hardstands for most of the buildings. 

Throughout the summer of 1952, construction continued at a fast pace. Before the winter season set in

54 Quonset huts and 12 Butler buildings were erected,

plumbed and wired for electricity. In addition, several

40 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

frame structures were constructed, one of which was

to serve as the stables for pack animals. Individual

Quonsets were largely used for officer, staff noncommissioned officer and sergeant and below billeting

spaces and heads. Multiple Quonsets of two or more

huts were extensively modified to serve various purposes. For example, the battalion headquarters and

the medical facility both consisted of six huts; the staff

noncommissioned officer’s club two huts; the recreation building three huts; and the commanding officer’s quarters two huts. Butler buildings were erected

to house the mess hall and commissary, motor transport and heavy equipment shops, supply warehouses,

fire house and one that was to serve as the post exchange, theater and “slop chute” or club for corporals

and below. Four 75 kilowatt diesel generators supplied electrical power.83 Water was piped directly out

of Silver Creek through two 10,000-gallon storage

tanks. This system only worked marginally well and

in 1956, $294,000 would ultimately be appropriated

by Congress to build a dam across Silver Creek to supply fresh water for the camp and for the installation

of a sewage system.84

Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard did not remain as the

commanding officer, Cold Weather Battalion, long

enough to witness his new camp’s completion. In the

summer of 1952 he received orders directing him to

report for classified assignment with the Central Intelligence Agency and on 22 September 1952, command

of the Cold Weather Battalion passed to Lieutenant

Colonel Donald M. Schmuck. Schmuck, widely known

as “Buck,” had a reputation for being a tough, resourceful officer who brought with him much combat

experience, gained the from the country’s two previous wars. Commissioned in 1938 after graduating from

the University of Colorado, this highly decorated officer had served in a number of command billets

throughout the Pacific, including battery commander

in the 2d Defense Battalion; rifle company commander in the 3d Marines; and as an infantry battalion

commander in the 4th Marine Division. In Korea, he

had commanded the 1st Battalion of Colonel Puller’s

1st Marine Regiment throughout the intensive combat

periods of Inchon, Seoul and at the Chosin Reservoir

campaign. Prior to Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck’s assignment to the Cold Weather Battalion, he had been

serving in Hawaii as the assistant G-3 at Headquarters,

Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific.*85

* The lineage certificate for the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare

Training Center gives the redesignation date for transferring the

Cold Weather Battalion directly under Camp Pendleton as 28

May 1952.

Courtesy of MWTC

New Quonset huts constructed at Pickel Meadow

base camp, July 1952.

* During a personal phone intvw, the author asked BGen

Schmuck whether he had requested to be assigned as the commanding officer, Cold Weather Battalion inasmuch as he had

been reared in Colorado and had also commanded a battalion

during the withdraw from the Chosin Reservoir. “Hell no,” he

replied, “I was very happy to be in Hawaii. It was Puller and

Shepherd who had conspired to send me there.”
Making Improvements, 1952–1956 41

The day that Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck took

command, the Cold Weather Battalion numbered

approximately 350 officers and enlisted men. By

now most of the battalion was comprised of veterans from Korea. Doubtless then, with temperatures

falling, they must have been a happy group when

orders finally came down to abandon their pyramidal tents in favor of the more luxurious billeting afforded by the newly constructed Quonset huts.

A few months earlier, on 28 June 1952, President

Harry S. Truman signed what became Public Law

416, 82d Congress. Under its provisions, Congress

authorized the Marine Corps to “be so organized as

to include not less than three combat divisions and

three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic

therein.”*

In anticipation of this legislation, on 7 January

1952, the 3d Marine Brigade at Camp Pendleton had

been reconstituted as the 3d Marine Division. By

fall, the division was up to full strength. Meanwhile

on the Korean Peninsula, the 1st Marine Division

was entering its third year of continuous combat

operations. Its earlier participation in Operations

“Killer” and “Ripper” in the eastern sector of the Korean Peninsula had helped to blunt massive Chinese counteroffensives in the spring of 1951 and

1952. Subsequent to these operations, the 1st Marine Division was shifted 180 miles to the west

where it occupied a battered ridgeline known as

“The Hook,” which overlooked crossing sites on the

Imjin River. After fighting a series of vicious struggles to hold this vital ground throughout October,

the division began to settle in for another dreary

winter campaign. By now however, the number of

noncombat casualties reported by division surgeons

due to frostbite or to other types of cold injuries

had been virtually eliminated. Clearly, the combination of the improved vapor barrier boot, the fielding of the 1951 cold-weather clothing kit, and the

insistence by the Commandant that all ground combat replacements undergo the Cold Weather Indoctrination Program prior to shipping out for Korea,

was paying off. 

As the winter approached, the Cold Weather Battalion resumed its seasonal cycle of providing practical cold-weather field indoctrination training to

over 1,000 Korea bound Marines each week. By this

time, most of the logistical and administrative problems that had previously frustrated the trainers had

now been ironed out. Thus, the second training

year at Pickel Meadow started well and ran

smoothly throughout most of the winter and spring.

Moreover, the bus strike that had caused major disruptions to movement schedules in the previous

year had also been resolved, thereby allowing the

more reliable Greyhound and Continental lines to

resume their charter services. And, although a foot

of new snow did manage to fall in Summit Meadow

just in time to greet the first training increment of

the year, the winter of 1952-1953 would be remembered as mild, compared to what the Sierra Nevada

had experienced the year before.

The instructors’ banter of this being but a “mild”

Courtesy of MWTC 

Marines of 7th Engineer Battalion, Force Troops Pacific, construct Quonset huts at Pickel Meadow base camp,

October, 1952.

* U.S Code, Title 10, Chap 503, Sec 5013. 
winter compared to the last provided little solace

to the new crop of replacements that were encountering their first taste of living in extreme cold. Sergeant Major Maurice J. Jacques, was an infantry

squad leader in the 26th Replacement Draft and

was among those who underwent his first coldweather indoctrination at Pickel Meadow that October. Later, he wrote:

Most of our instructors were veterans of

Korea and knew what would be expected of

us there, so they made our training as realistic

and demanding as possible. They wanted us to

learn not only how to survive in the cold but

how to be successful in cold-weather combat.

Even Mother Nature lent her helping hand toward realism—the cold clear weather we had

found when we first arrived had changed by

late on our second day, and it began to snow

heavily. Marines were posted to brush the

snow off our shelter halves to keep them from

collapsing, but by the time the snowstorm had

passed, nearly a foot of wet snow blanketed

the ground.

The three day war of company-level tactics

was not designed to see who could win and

who could lose, but what it also revealed, an

even more important issue—who could be

42 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. “Buck” Schmuck,

commanding officer of Cold Weather Battalion, cuts

the cake during the Marine Corps birthday celebration inside the battalion mess hall, November 1953.

Courtesy of MWTC

trusted not to fall asleep on post, who exhibited

common sense and leadership, and, of course,

who among us was selfish and could not be

trusted. These were all part of the lessons

learned while we were training under conditions made much more difficult by the cold

weather. We learned how demanding it was to

survive in the cold while moving steadily

through snow and carrying heavy packs. As a

team, we learned to overcome such difficulties,

and those lessons would help us through the

most trying times because they were the hard

lessons that we would take into combat. I cannot ever recall being as cold as I had been

while I was at Pickel Meadow [sic]. 86

February brought an end to the training of replacement personnel headed to the Far East for Fiscal Year 1952-1953. In March, the Cold Weather

Battalion hosted winter field exercises for two battalion landing teams from the 3d Marine Division at

Camp Pendleton. In addition, some 800 selected key

officer and enlisted personnel from Fleet Marine

Force, Atlantic and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific were

sent through a special five day Cold-Weather Indoctrination Program, bringing the total number of

Marines trained at Pickel Meadow during the Fiscal

Year to approximately 15,000.87

With the winter training season over, Lieutenant

Colonel Schmuck turned his attention toward improving the living conditions and recreational opportunities for his Marines who were required to live

year round in this remote, austere camp. Years later

he could still recall that he wasn’t getting much assistance from the staff at Camp Pendleton. His efforts to obtain Marine Corps busses for liberty runs

to Carson City and Reno, for example, or to have

saddle horses brought up for riding in the summer

months were either ignored or rebuffed. “Then,” he

said, 

one morning in the spring of 1953, who

should drive up to my headquarters building

completely unexpected and unannounced, but

General Lemuel Shepherd, the Commandant

of the Marine Corps, accompanied by his Chief

of Staff, Colonel Victor H. Krulak. They spent

several hours with me while I showed them

around the camp before they departed for

Camp Pendleton. I don’t know what words the

Commandant might have had with the commanding general at Camp Pendleton; but

thereafter, I started getting regular telephone

calls from the staff wanting to know what I

needed and how could their office be of service to the Cold Weather Battalion.88
Making Improvements, 1952–1956 43

Cease-Fire in Korea

Finally, after months of drawn out negotiations

between the U.N. Command and the People’s Republic of North Korea, often punctuated by periods

of intense combat, at 2200, 27 July 1953, all firing

along the main line of resistance ceased. In the

months that followed, the truce remained an uneasy

one, even as both sides went through the process

of exchanging prisoners of war. For the 1st Marine

Division, this would mean remaining in Korea for

18 more months. Meanwhile, in August, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had ordered the deployment of the

3d Marine Division to Japan as a strategic reserve,

in the event fighting should again break out on the

Korean Peninsula. 

On 27 March 1954, Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck

was transferred to Headquarters, Marine Corps,

where he was assigned as the Head of Operations

and Training Branch, G-3 Section. Relieving him as

the new commanding officer of the Cold Weather

Battalion was Colonel Clayton O. Totman. Colonel

Totman was no stranger to living and operating in

cold climates. Reared in Massachusetts, he had attained a bachelor of science degree in forestry at

the University of Maine before being commissioned

a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps in 1935.

Shortly before and after the outbreak of World War

II, he had also seen service at the naval air stations

at both Sitka and Kodiak, Alaska, before being assigned to the 2d Marine Division in time for the

A month later, a young Marine by the name of

Martin Russ also underwent cold-weather indoctrination training at the High Sierra camp. Within five

years he published his first book, describing his experience: 

“This area is breath-taking, literally and figuratively, for the air is rarefied. The mountain streams

yield the sweetest water I’ve ever tasted and the

coldest, for there are large fields of snow about.

Within several days we have climbed a semicircle

of mountains with Pickel Meadow [sic] below us.

We have been attacked at least twice a day by a

group of ‘aggressors’ who are Marines permanently

stationed here. Most of them are Korean veterans,

and some of them speak a few words of Chinese,

which they yell during their charges. The other night

one of them yelled, ‘Tluman is a bassard!’ Their tactics are along Red Army lines, their charges preceded by whistles, yells, gongs and bugles. We all

use blank cartridges, of course, and are very brave.

The worst thing that could happen would be to get

captured by the aggressors; they are rough on prisoners. Two nights ago, while on guard duty, I

caught an infiltrator crawling toward our camp. I

chased him for a full minute, thinking what I would

do to him when I caught him, but he got away.”89

Martin Russ

Courtesy of MWTC

The main gate, Cold Weather Battalion, in the 1950s. This was the original entrance to the base.
Mariana and Okinawa campaigns. In Korea during

1952-1953, he commanded the West Coast Island

Defense Unit, under U.N. Naval Forces Command.90

Although hostilities in Korea had ceased, there

was no immediate reduction to the tempo of training taking place at Marine Corps Base, Camp

Pendleton, or its Cold Weather Battalion in the High

Sierras. Indeed, with two Marine divisions now deployed to the Far East, the flow of replacements

needed for Asia and the two Marine barracks in

Alaska nearly doubled. According to Marine Corps

records, in Fiscal Year 1953-1954, nearly 32,000 replacements were processed through Camp Pendleton that year, with 16,534 receiving instruction at

the Cold Weather Battalion.91 Nevertheless, by the

time the 1st Marine Division was finally rotated

back to Camp Pendleton in January 1955, it was becoming increasingly clear that the era of the Korean

War was about to end, and the new Marine Corps

theme of maintaining a “balanced force-in-readiness” was at hand. Summing up the former period,

one Marine historian, Colonel Robert D. Heinl, concluded that: 

Marine Corps Schools, Camp Pendleton,

and El Toro, carried the burden of training for

the war—the Schools for training out junior

officers, and Pendleton and El Toro for

44 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

preparing and processing the steady flow of

replacements for the Far East. By the end of

the war, 60 percent of the Corps had traveled

that path and fought in Korea. Conspicuous

in Pendleton’s cycle was the ordeal of coldweather training, which all ranks below

colonel had to undergo at Pickel Meadow [sic]

in the snow-girt High Sierras; no Marine training was ever tougher or more practical for the

purpose.92

On 17 July 1955, Lieutenant Colonel Sidney F.

Jenkins replaced Colonel Clayton O. Totman and

became the fourth, and last officer to command

what was called the Cold Weather Battalion at

Bridgeport, California. Training individual replacements for cold-weather operations remained the

primary mission of the battalion. Still, it was evident

that the Marine Corps was beginning to think in

terms of using the excellent training afforded at

Pickel Meadow for purposes other than just coldweather operations. In his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1956 the

Commandant noted that 15,000 Marines had completed cold–weather training during the year. “Replacements intended for Alaska and the Far East,

and some tactical, formed the major portion of the

student load.” Furthermore, he went on to state that

“The site of this training is potentially useful for

year-round training in mountain warfare and survival. This matter is being studied.” In another section of this same report, the Commandant provided

a second clue as to what may be afoot with respect

to the future of Pickel Meadow when he advised

the Secretary that “Temporary trailers are being procured for the Cold Weather Training Battalion at

Bridgeport, California to meet family housing

needs.”93

In 1956, the provisional rifle companies that

were dispatched to Pickel Meadow for cold-weather

indoctrination training were not exclusively made

up of overseas replacements. Mixed in with them,

were also the winter graduates from Camp Pendleton’s Infantry Training School at Camp San Onofre.

Members of those provisional companies that underwent training in mid February of that year will

never forget being treated to the unusual sight of

Marine Corsairs once again flying over the valley at

tree-top level, followed by command detonated explosions on some distant ridgeline. Nor will they

forget observing a Marine unit trudging single file

down a road dressed in 1950 cold-weather garb, including Shoe-Pacs, while large wind machines

caused billowing snow to be blown into their oncoming grizzled faces. Hollywood, the trainees

Courtesy of Col Richard M. Johnson

A Marine from Aggressor Platoon climbs aboard

tracked vehicle for “liberty run,” in the 1950s.
Making Improvements, 1952–1956 45

were told, had come to Pickel Meadow to film a

motion picture called Hold Back the Night.

*

The film was an adaptation of Pat Frank’s novel

about a rifle company, portrayed as Company E, 2d

Battalion, 7th Marines, which was tasked to serve

as flank security to the 1st Division during the withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir to Hungnam.

John Payne played the starring role as the Reserve

company commander recalled to active duty during

the Korean War, with former Marine Chuck Connors in the supporting role of the company gunnery

sergeant. The picture was produced by Allied Artists

and was originally scheduled to be filmed in February of 1955, but because of technical problems,

was postponed until the following year. The Marine

Corps cooperated fully in the production of the

film. Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise, who had

commanded the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, at the

Chosin Reservoir, was assigned by the Corps to be

the technical advisor. In addition to making the

Pickel Meadow training area available to the film

makers for 30 days, 200 troops were also furnished

by the 3d 4.5 Rocket Battery of Force Troops FMF

Pacific, and trainees from MCB, Camp Pendleton.

The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing provided Sikorsky

HO3 Dragonfly helicopters along with ChanceVought F4U Corsair aircraft.94

In a later critique of this picture, Dr. Lawrence

Suid, a military historian and author of several

books relating to film productions about the military, ironically noted that “although filmed in snow

and low winter temperatures, Hold Back the Night

simply lacked the feel of the bitter weather the

Marines had experienced in Korea and that Retreat,

Hell had managed to recreate on the “painted hills”

of Camp Pendleton. Moreover, it failed to provide

any real sense of the actual desperation that the retreating Marines had felt, perhaps because the war

in Korea had been over for three years by the time

Hold Back the Night appeared in 1956.”95

Another addition to the Pickel Meadow training

site, and perhaps a subtle indication of the Corps’

interest in its year-round use was the establishment

of “Camp Cloudburst.” One mile to the west of the

main camp, just off Highway 108, was a three-acre

flat that overlooked the West Walker River. Having

been trained as a forester, Lieutenant Colonel Totman must have reasoned, why not develop this into

an encampment that would offer personnel of all

services and their families the opportunity for an inexpensive camping experience in the High Sierras?

The commanding general, Camp Pendleton lost no

time in endorsing Totman’s plan. Thus in the summer of 1955, this novel recreational facility was

opened with 10 hard-backed pyramidal tents, each

furnished with oil stoves and iron bunks. Operating

under the Special Services Section from 1 May to 1

October, the facility soon became so popular that

over the next two years the number of individual

tents was doubled to 20 over the next two years.96

Although morale and welfare funds had been

made available for creating and operating an enlisted club, noncommissioned officers’ club and

staff noncommissioned officer’s club, no similar facility had been planned for the commissioned officers assigned to this remote post. Therefore, the

* The author was then a PFC and a member of one of the provisional rifle companies that witnessed some of the filming of

this picture.

Courtesy of Dr. Lawrence H. Suid

A still photograph taken at Pickel Meadow in February 1956 during filming of Hold Back the Night.

An HRS helicopter is in the background.

Movie stars of Hold Back the Night were John Payne

depicting a rifle company commander and Chuck

Conners, a former Marine, as the company gunnery

sergeant.

Courtesy of Dr. Lawrence H. Suid
officers decided, it was high time to take matters

into their own hands and build a club themselves.

During 1954-1955, with the help of the Seabees, but

largely through their own labor during off-duty

hours, they erected a frame, one story “L” shaped

clubhouse in an aspen grove on the east bank of

Silver Creek just below the commanding officer’s

quarters. The outside was stained and the interior

finished with wood walls of knotty pine. A local

mason was contracted to build a large rock fireplace

in the center of the main hall. Adjacent to the main

hall was a bar and grill for beverages and light

meals. This opened on to a large outdoor porch offering a beautiful view of the surrounding mountains and valley below. Directly below the porch,

Rainbow and Brook trout were kept stocked in a

pond that was constantly fed with fresh water from

a diversionary stream taken from Silver Creek. The

set-up allowed this club to offer a fare of grilled

trout caught only minutes before by the members

themselves.97

By the summer of 1956, it had become evident

that the name Cold Weather Battalion was no longer

appropriate if the mission of the organization was

to be broadened. Therefore, on 15 September 1956,

the organization at Pickel Meadow became officially

known as the Cold Weather Training Center

(CWTC), Bridgeport, California.98

46 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
A Force-in-Readiness Means a Force Ready to Face

all Types of Terrain and Climate.

-Description of a Traditional Marine Corps Mission

Introduction

The notion of using Pickel Meadow for summer

training as well as for winter operations was not a

new concept that suddenly came up in 1956. As

early as 17 May 1952, Lieutenant Colonel George

G. Ryffel, the officer-in-charge of the detachment of

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, troops that had augmented the Cold Weather Battalion advised in his

after-action report that “the use of the Pickel

Meadow area for training in mountain warfare during the summer months for battalion landing teams

is believed to be practical and desirable. The advantages of the available terrain and the existing

camp facilities seem to offer a made-to-order situation for such a training program.”99 Over the next

few years, succeeding commanders of the Cold

Weather Training Battalion would make similar

pleas for expanding the mission beyond just preparing replacements for cold-weather operations. None

of these recommendations received serious consideration until the mid-1950s, when the newly formulated national security strategy for containing the

47

Chapter 6

Expanding the Mission, 1957–1958

An aerial view of the Cold-Weather Training Center in early 1957. The lower base camp has the pyramidal

tents for housing training units; there are eight HRS helicopters in landing field in lower right to the left of

highway indicating more than ground training was conducted. To the left of the helicopters are three Quonset

huts that served as classroom and billeting spaces for the Mountain Leadership Course. The base stables were

located directly behind Quonset huts.

Courtesy of MWTC
Sino-Soviet Bloc came into being. The deployment

of the Corps’ Fleet Marine Forces following the Korean Armistice reflected the new strategy. Most of

the 3d Marine Division, teamed with the 1st Marine

Aircraft Wing was to be permanently stationed in

Okinawa and Japan providing the United States

with a strong expeditionary force ready to quickly

reinforce U.N. Forces in Korea in the event hostilities should break out again. The 1st Marine Brigade,

comprised of a reinforced infantry regiment from

the 3d Division and a Marine air group from the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing, constituted a reserve in the

Central Pacific. The 1st Marine Division was now

back home at Camp Pendleton, teamed with the 3d

Marine Aircraft Wing at El Toro. On the East Coast,

the 2d Marine Division and the 2d Marine Aircraft

Wing had resumed the earlier mission of providing

ready combat forces afloat for deployment to the

Atlantic, Caribbean and Mediterranean regions. The

emergent naval doctrine of providing a balance fleet

of air, surface and landing forces to project U.S.

power and influence at flash points throughout the

littorals of the globe was coming of age. For the

embarked Marines and for those who were deployed forward, this implied being ready and able

to fight in any clime or place during any season of

the year. 

The enormous training implications of this naval

doctrine carried new imperatives for the Marine

Corps. The prevalence of severe climate and difficult terrain in many of the potential areas of operation where Marine amphibious forces might be

employed was obvious to strategic planners. No

one understood this better than Colonel Donald M.

“Buck” Schmuck, the former commander of the

Bridgeport training facility. From 1954 until 1957,

following his tour in the Sierra Nevadas, Colonel

Schmuck served in the G-3 Division at Headquarters, Marine Corps as the Head of the Operations

and Training Branch.100 Thus in the spring of 1956,

he was in a key position and likely played a major

role in persuading the newly installed Commandant, General Randolph McC. Pate. To initiate a

study of the Pickel Meadow site in order to seriously examine its potential use for year-round training in mountain warfare and survival. 

Using the impetus of the study, which was approved by the Commandant, the Head of the Operations and Training Section at Headquarters

Marine Corps thus lost no time in taking a second

step. Schmuck directed Lieutenant Colonel Sidney

F. Jenkins, the Commanding Officer at ColdWeather Training Center (CWTC), to establish two

new pilot training courses as a matter of priority.101

The first was to be a Mountain Leadership Course

designed for the small unit infantry leader in the

rank of sergeant through company grade officer. A

separate syllabus to conform to both the winter as

well as summer months would be established. The

second was a formal course in escape, evasion and

survival aimed primarily at Marine aviators and air

crewmen up to the rank of lieutenant colonel, but

might include ground reconnaissance personnel

and others who might find themselves behind

enemy lines. The G-3 also made it clear that he expected both courses to be ready to accept students

starting in early 1957; yet, he went on to declare

that “CWTC should not expect any additional funding, nor an increase to its current table of organization in meeting this commitment.” In other words,

keep these courses austere and basic. In order to

pay for the personnel and training costs of the new

all year program, General Pate had also approved

the recommendation of his G-3 to discontinue the

Cold Weather Indoctrination Program for replacement drafts to the 3d Marine Division at the end of

the winter season in March of 1957. This decision

would not only free up thousands of instructor duty

hours, but also result in an annual savings of

$373,000 in training dollars. The G-3 planners correctly estimated this would more than underwrite a

more diverse year round program.102

Of the two pilot courses, escape, evasion, and

survival perhaps warranted the greatest priority. On

17 August 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 

had signed the Executive Order establishing for the

first time a Code of Conduct to guide U.S. servicemen who may become war prisoners. The code,

devised as a means of fighting Communist “brainwashing” tactics, had been drafted by the Secretary

of Defense’s 10-man Advisory Commission which

had studied the treatment of U.S. prisoners of war

held by their Chinese and North Korean captors

during the war in Korea. The Executive Order noted

that every serviceman was “expected to measure up

to the [code’s] standards.” It pledged: “that every

man liable to capture shall be provided with specific training and instructions designed to better

equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him and shall be fully instructed as to

the behavior and obligations expected of him.”103

Changes to Command Relationships

Up until the summer of 1956, the Cold Weather

Training Battalion had been regarded as little more

than an extension of Camp Pendleton. However, as

the Marine Corps began to recognize a long-term

need for its mountain outpost, then in the process

of being renamed the Marine Corps Cold Weather

Training Center, Headquarters Marine Corps started

48 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Expanding the Mission, 1957–1958 49

to take a more direct role in solving the camp’s

problems as well as shaping its future. While Camp

Pendleton would continue to serve as the next

higher administrative headquarters, henceforth, in

matters of training, the center would come under

the direct supervision of the G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps. For logistical support, instead of submitting requests for supplies and equipment through

Camp Pendleton, the Marine Corps Supply Center,

Barstow would now become the direct source for

the bulk of the center’s supplies and for providing

fourth and fifth echelon maintenance of its equipment. And, in an effort to reduce the almost 100

percent annual turnover of personnel, which the organization had suffered for the past several years,

beginning on 15 August 1956, the Personnel Department at Headquarters assumed responsibility

and control for making all personnel replacement

assignments to the training center. Eventually, this

action stopped the hemorrhaging of proficient instructors and those assigned to key support and

maintenance billets, thereby giving the training center greater stability for staffing its personnel. Furthermore, as early as 6 March 1957, Headquarters,

Marine Corps had published a new table of organization for the CWTC. This table of organization

called for a headquarters and two companies: a

headquarters company and a service company—the

latter largely comprised of occupational specialties

in motor transport, maintenance, supply, food service, and heavy equipment. To meet its new missions, the Center was authorized a total strength of

31 officers and 405 enlisted men. A medical officer

and dental officer, plus 12 corpsmen and one dental

technician were authorized separately from the allowance prescribed from the Naval Dispensary and

Dental Clinic, Camp Pendleton.104

Between the two new courses of instruction he

had been tasked to develop, Lieutenant Colonel

Jenkins likely had a personal interest in the syllabus

of the Escape, Evasion, and Survival Course. Raised

in northern California, Jenkins had received his

commission as a second lieutenant in the Marine

Corps on 1 July 1939. One year later found him

serving as a rifle platoon commander with the 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines, in Shanghai, China. Subsequently, he was still with this regiment as a first

lieutenant during its gallant defense of Corregidor

in the Philippines Islands when war broke out in

the Pacific. After that island fortress capitulated to

the Japanese Army on 6 May 1942, Lieutenant Jenkins was interned at the Philippine Military Prison

Courtesy of MWTC 

A winter scene of commanding officer’s quarters at the Cold Weather Training Center in 1957.
50 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of MWTC

A 12th Naval District public works map of the proposed training center site showing land usage in 1957.
Expanding the Mission, 1957–1958 51

Camp #1. Consequently, he himself endured over

three years as a prisoner of war before being liberated at Jinsin, Korea on 7 September 1945.105

Although Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins can be

credited with laying the groundwork for the new

year-round program at CWTC, his transfer to a new

duty station on 30 March 1957 meant that refinements to the program would have to be left to his

successor, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Gentleman. The new commanding officer accepted this

challenge with aggressiveness and flair while demanding meticulous, detailed planning from his

staff. Commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1940,

Lieutenant Colonel Gentleman had seen combat as

a young officer at Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian, and

Guam during World War II. He had also seen service in the Korean campaign, commanding the 1st

Battalion, 5th Marines, in 1951-1952. Thus, he too

could claim personal experience and a keen appreciation for warfare conducted in severe climates and

difficult terrain. 

Since the signing of the original agreement between the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary

of the Navy in February 1952, the 64,000 acres that

was initially allotted for Marine Corps use by the

U.S. Forest Service had by 1957, almost doubled in

size. Relations between the local forest ranger at

Bridgeport and the Forest Supervisor’s Office in

Reno, Nevada and each of the succeeding commanders at the Pickel Meadow training site had remained consistently close and cordial. Through

special use permits negotiated by the Real Estate

Division, Public Works Office, 12th Naval District

during the previous five years, over 102,000 acres

of the Toiyabe National Forest were now open to

CWTC at no cost. These permits included the right

to construct certain roads, “which are in the interest

of both the Marine Corps, for training, and the Forest Service, for land management and fire protection.” (See appendix D) The exclusive use permit

that covered the land in the immediate vicinity of

the camp area had also been enlarged from 40 to

200 acres. Although the use of explosives was prohibited, as was the firing of any weapon larger than

the service rifle, practical restrictions on use of this

vast tract of land were few, amounting to the same

restrictions found on most Marine Corps bases. California Fish and Game authorities interpreted State

game laws as: “not applicable to survival training.”106 In addition, 20 miles to the south of Pickel

Meadow lay the Saw Tooth Ridge/Twin Lakes region. Here, the ridges’ serrated granite peaks rose

almost vertically to elevations over 12,000 feet

above sea level. Abutting the eastern escarpment

were local glaciers with moats and crevasses that

made it comparable to any alpine terrain in the

world. Consequently, when Lieutenant Colonel

Jenkins was directed to establish the Mountain

Leadership Course, he requested that students and

instructor and guides of this course be granted temporary access into this area for the purpose of

teaching snow and ice climbing exercises and crevasse rescue techniques. The U.S. Forest Service

quickly granted this request.

It was a CMC Letter of Instruction to the commanding officer, CWTC that ultimately codified and

established the new training program to be conducted at CWTC as follows:

(a) Cold Weather training indoctrination in season.

(b) M76 Amphibious Cargo Carrier crew training in

season.

(c) Evasion, Escape, and Survival training throughout the year.

(d) Mountain leadership training throughout the

year.

(e) Reserve Unit training as directed,

(f) To provide specialized instruction and technical

advice and assistance to FMF or Reserve Units as

may be required while such units are in training at

CWTC.

Collateral missions included:

(a) Develop, for approval, tactics and techniques

incident to the conduct of operations in extreme

cold and snow, in mountains, and in the techniques

of escape and survival.

(b) Testing equipment and material required in

these operations.107

Organization for Meeting the New

Training Mission

Following the last cold-weather indoctrination

course conducted for replacements in 1957, the S3 Operations and Training Section at CWTC was reorganized into four sections:

(a) Headquarters Section consisting of the S-3, his

assistance and administrative personnel to provide

supervision, coordination and administrative support for its subordinate groups.

(b) Evasion, Escape, and Survival Section responsible for preparing, reviewing and conducting formal classroom and practical field instruction to 13

classes of 45 students annually, each of a two-week

duration, in the technique of Evasion, Escape and

Survival.

(c) Mountain Leadership Section responsible for

preparing, reviewing and conducting formal classroom and practical field instruction of 16 classes of

25 students annually, each of a three week duration, in the techniques of leading troops at high al-
titudes over steep mountainous and snow-covered

terrain.

(d) Unit Training Section responsible for preparing, reviewing and annually conducting basic instruction relating to mountain and cold-weather

operations to eight FMF battalions, five Organized

Reserve units, and five cold-weather indoctrination

classes of 110 students of company-grade officers

and noncommissioned officers from the FMF and

Reserves, for a duration of six days.

(e) Otter Training Section formed a fifth training

section, but did not fall under the S-3. The Motor

Transport Section provided instructors for this

course. However, the S-3 was responsible for the

content of the syllabus, reviewing lessons plans,

and the generally quality of the course. Five classes

of 36 students, for a six-day duration were scheduled annually for FMF and Reserve enlisted Marines

on the operation and maintenance of the Amphibious Cargo Carrier M76 “Otter.” At the time, the M76

was the only over-snow vehicle available to the Marine Corps and 16 of these vehicles were assigned

to CWTC.*

Evasion, Escape, and Survival Course 

The U.S. Air Force had been conducting formal

training in evasion, escape and survival at its Stead

Air Force Base, located some 15 miles north of Reno

since the early 1950s. Thus the original cadre of Marine escape, evasion, and survival instructors, consisting of two officers and 11 staff noncommissioned

officers and noncommissioned officers, were sent to

Stead Air Force Base to undergo training in its instructor’s course. From this experience and through

an intensive and thorough study of all available publications on escape and evasion, much valuable information was gained for developing a similar

program of instruction for the Marine Corps. This included a two-day prisoner of war compound exercise, which realistically simulated the harsh

treatment, the interrogation techniques and political

indoctrination the Chinese and North Korean military

had used against American prisoners during the Korean War. Unlike the Stead Air Force Base model,

however, which conducted its compound exercise

at the end of the course, the Marines reversed the

procedure by subjecting students to the compound

exercise at the very beginning. This “shock treatment” at the outset enabled students to reflect on

their own mistakes when the time came for the classroom instruction to impart to the students how they

52 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

could and should have organized themselves to resist and withstand their captors’ efforts more effectively. The second half of the course was largely

devoted to survival, evasion and field craft improvisation techniques, culminating in a four-day practical

field exercise in survival and evasion.

The first pilot course commenced in late 1956.

During the first year of its existence, the Escape, Evasion and Survival Camp was located four miles east

of the main camp near the Sonora junction with

Highway 395. It consisted of a prisoner compound

and four Quonset huts: two for billeting, one for a

classroom, and one as a storage and office space.

However, the disadvantages of this site soon became

apparent. Therefore, to reduce the logistics needed

to support the operation, the first task that was assigned to the detachment of the Navy Construction

Battalion that reported to CWTC the following spring

involved relocating the prisoner of war compound

to the flats on the west side of the main camp off

Highway 108, and reconstructing the two billeting,

classroom, and office and storage huts adjacent to

the Mountain Leadership Course near the base stables. The complete outfitting of the Escape, Evasion,

and Survival Training Course was accomplished at a

cost of $8,882. This included the purchasing of live

rabbits and poultry that were issued to student teams

for the field survival phase. Initially, the dark brown

Soviet-style uniforms that were used during the prisoner compound exercise came from the “hand-medown” uniforms that Captain Robert F. Eggers, the

officer-in-charge of the Escape, Evasion, and Survival

Course, had managed to scrounge from the Air Force

through his counterpart at Stead. Students for the Escape, Evasion, and Survival Course arrived from FMF

commands throughout the Marine Corps and the Organized Reserve, except for those stationed in the

Far East. Customarily, the classes would be assembled on one coast or the other and flown by military

air transport to the Naval Air Station at Fallon, Nevada. There, they would be met by a CWTC bus that

two hours later would deliver them to Pickel

Meadow. Alternatively, a few might arrive via the

Reno airport on individual travel orders.108

Mountain Leadership Course

Similar to the escape evasion, and survival instructors who had gone to Stead Air Force Base for

assistance, the original cadre of Mountain Leadership instructor-guides also went outside the Marine

Corps in search of help and expertise. In this instance, they turned to the U.S. Army Mountain and

Cold Weather Training Command at Camp Hale,

Colorado. First Lieutenant Edward C. Goodman,

who had been appointed senior instructor, along

* The term over-snow vehicle is a misnomer. This heavy tracked

vehicle would flounder in deep snow. It was primarily used to

keep the roads to the extended training sites open by packing

the snow after each new snowfall.
Expanding the Mission, 1957–1958 53

Courtesy of MWTC

“The Capture:” Initial phase of the Prisoner of War Compound Exercise as conducted by the Evasion, Escape,

and Survival Training Course, Marine Corps Cold Weather Training Center, Bridgeport, California. Students

are herded from this point where they had been ambushed a few moments before to the compound.

“The People’s Pool:” At the compound, recalcitrant

leaders are segregated and given coercive treatment

in an effort to achieve cooperation of the group. The

entire group is forced to witness this treatment

which results in a feeling of dread and anxiety in

the minds of many. 

Courtesy of MWTC

with Lieutenants Billy B. Buck, Joseph P. S. Brown,

Robert A. Utter and Ralph V. Walker, Jr., who were

assigned to the training course as assistants, spent

almost two weeks at Camp Hale going over its program of instruction, receiving instruction in mountaineering techniques and examining equipment

lists, lesson plans, training films and the Camp’s

large reference library of military and civilian mountaineering publications. Later, a three-man Army

training team from Camp Hale spent two weeks at

CWTC honing the climbing skills of the five officers

and 14 enlisted instructors of the Mountain Leadership Course and the two officers and 24 enlisted instructors who had been assigned to the Unit

Training Section. This team was made up of a

highly qualified Army officer and two civilians,

Hans Wagner and Knut Smith, who were recognized authorities on training military mountaineers.

The general objective of the Summer Mountain

Leadership Training Course was to “train the

trainer.” That is to say, to provide at least two to

three highly skilled military mountaineers in every

Marine rifle and reconnaissance company within

the FMF. The concept being that graduates would
be qualified to: (1) instruct their units in the “basics”

of military mountaineering techniques such as rock

climbing, rappelling and the construction of rope

installations upon returning to their home stations,

and (2) in combat, lead an assault climb against a

cliff face that the opposing force might believe is

impassable and therefore leave it lightly, or even

undefended; and, by anchoring a number of fixed

ropes from the top, thereby enable the entire assault force to scale the heights and perhaps outflank

the enemy defenses.* The training objectives for

graduates of the Winter Mountain Leadership Training Course was similar in scope, but with a few differences. In this instance, a graduate’s primary task

may be to assist his commander in restoring the

mobility of the unit back to one or two miles per

hour, when moving through deep snow in mountainous terrain. This might be accomplished

through instruction on the use of snowshoes or

54 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of MWTC

A view from the watchtower showing the interior of the compound, the tin huts and condition of the “prisoners.”

This compound is modeled after those used by North Korean and Chinese Communists in the Korean War. A

rigorous 30 hours in this compound shows the student what life as a prisoner of war would probably be like.

cross-country skis. Also, he could become an advisor to the commander in such field craft as route

selection, construction of improvised shelters during survival situations, organization for trail breaking, crossing snow bridges and avalanche control.

Ideally, any Marine designated as a unit mountain

leader would be a graduate of both the summer and

winter courses. But only in a few rare instances was

this goal ever achieved.109

Separate syllabi for both the winter and summer

courses were quickly drafted, keeping the above

training objectives in mind and acknowledging the

20-training day limitation. Training schedules were

written, instructors were assigned to subjects and a

host of administrative details were firmed up. Fortunately, the field manuals of the U.S. Army pertaining to mountain operations, military operations in

snow-covered terrain, and arctic operations were

current and soundly based on the first-hand knowledge and practical lessons learned by the U.S.

Army’s famed 10th Mountain Division. Moreover,

appendices to these manuals provided detailed

* During the closing days of World War II, the 10th U.S. Mountain

Division successfully carried out such an assault at night against

German defenders of the Gothic Line in northern Italy.
Expanding the Mission, 1957–1958 55

guidance for structuring training programs. Therefore, all that was needed to turn any reasonably

dexterous, physically fit infantryman into a skillful

military mountaineer was to put them into action.

Easing the chore of course development was the

wide selection of nearby choice training locations.

For the winter course, looking for areas in which

to instruct students in snowshoes, downhill and

cross-country skiing, skijoring etc., was never difficult. Grouse Meadow, Silver Creek or Wolf Creek,

where small bivouac sites, consisting of one or two

Jamesway temporary shelters had been established,

could serve this purpose during most of the winter

season. In light snow years, the instructors need

only take their students to the higher elevations on

the Finley Mine Road, or even to the 11,000-foot

summit of White Mountain. For the summer course,

four miles to the west of the main camp across

Highway 108 from Leavitt Meadows was a massive

outcrop of solid granodiorite rock. At the topmost

tier of the outcrop, a glaciated cliff face rose almost

300 feet high and was approximately 1,200 feet

across. This area was considered ideal. It afforded

every type of terrain needed to instruct mountaineering techniques from simple balance climbing

and rappelling, up to and including severely difficult two and three party climbing on Mountaineering Classification 5 routes that required the use of

direct aids. Behind the cliff face was the Brownie

Creek area, where vertical 80-foot cliffs of slate rock

offered unique challenges for constructing rope installations, such as vertical hauling lines. Furthermore, sites for teaching rope bridges, stream

crossing techniques and building suspension traverse lines across the fast moving West Walker River

were also plentiful in this area. And, as for practical

application in the techniques of ascending and descending glaciers and crevasse rescue, instructors

could teach all these subjects on the steep, high altitude slopes of Horse Creek, under the shadow of

the Saw Tooth Ridge in the Twin Lakes area, 14

miles to the southwest of Bridgeport.110

The mountain leadership school itself was located in the lower base camp in the vicinity of the

base stables. It consisted of four Quonset huts: two

for billeting students, one for a classroom and one

for the storage of ropes and special equipment issued to the students. The equipage needed to open

the course called for 30 individual sets of such special items as nylon climbing ropes, thousands of

feet of various dimensions of manila rope, rucksacks, crampons, ice axes, different types and sizes

of snap links, pitons, piton hammers, military skis

with different bindings and hitches to permit downhill as well as cross-country movement, ski boots,

Courtesy of MWTC

Communists kept prisoners in solitary confinement

for months and even years to aid in breaking the

prisoner down by interrogation. Students subjected

to such confinements in training reported that experiencing a taste of it made them more confident

of their ability to resist interrogation in an actual

situation. 

The interrogator is attempting to create an attitude

of gratitude in the subject by offering cigarettes and

food, and thereby achieve his cooperation. No trick

is too dirty or mean if the interrogator achieves his

objective; getting the subject to talk.

Courtesy of MWTC
akio, sleds and five-man mountain shelters. The initial outlay for starting the course in 1957 came to

$17,431.111

In August 1956, 25 junior officers and staff noncommissioned officers from the 1st Marine Division

attended the pilot summer mountain leadership

course conducted at CWTC. 112 By the following

year, when the course became fully established, the

majority of quotas to the Mountain Leadership

School alternately went to either the 1st Marine Division or the 2d Marine Division. The students from

Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton would customarily arrive by military air via Naval Air Station Fallon and thence by bus or truck to CWTC. A

sprinkling of reservists, who were granted quotas,

usually arrived under individual travel orders. 

Unit Training 

Unit Training was the largest of the three training

sections that was supervised by the S-3. In 1957, it

consisted of two elements with one officer and

about a dozen instructor and guides assigned to

each. To ensure uniformity and consistency of instruction throughout the center, in order to become

an instructor-guide of the Unit Training Section, one

had to first graduate from both the summer and

winter Mountain Leadership Training Courses. 

One element of the section was responsible for

the liaison and the instruction provided to the eight

FMF battalions from the 1st Marine Division, which

were at that time deploying from Camp Pendleton

to CWTC for two-week periods of training and field

exercises under both summer and winter conditions. Depending on the season of the year, this element normally provided the initial five days of

basic instruction on such subjects as shelter and

heat, cold-weather medicine, backpacking, oversnow movement, stream crossing survival, animal

packing, rock climbing and rappelling. Thereafter,

the instructor-guides would remain with the battalion as advisors during the organization’s field exercise phase. The second element provided similar

56 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of 1stSgt Carl H. Raue

A Mountain Leaders Course practice knot tying in 1957. Before graduating, students were required to tie 28

different knots blindfolded. Technical Sergeant Carl H. Raue Jr., third from left, is instructing students.
Expanding the Mission, 1957–1958 57

blocks of basic training to the five Reserve companies that were scheduled during the summer

months and for the five Cold Weather Indoctrination Classes scheduled for the winter months. The

latter course consisted of six days of living in the

field and was largely comprised of company-grade

officers and staff noncommissioned officers from all

Marine Corps commands inside the United States.

In addition to the two elements above, a 50-man

Aggressor Platoon to oppose students and add realism during field exercises, plus serve as prison

guards for the escape, evasion and survival compound exercises, was also assigned to the Unit

Training Section.113

Camps for the unit training courses were in several locations. The main cantonment was established on the flats to the north of the small grass

landing strip. Here some 70 strong-backed pyramidal tents had been erected for student and unit billeting, together with several strong-backed general

purpose tents that served as mess tents, heads, and

as the shelter for a portable shower unit. In addition, smaller camps were established at the Silver

Creek Meadow and Upper Wolf Creek bivouac

sites. During duty hours the base theater could

serve as an indoor classroom for the larger classes,

but for the most part, the instructor-guides from unit

training conducted their classes and demonstrations

at informal outdoor training areas, regardless of

weather conditions.

Perhaps a few instructors at this time might have

regarded the specialized escape, evasion, and survival, and the Mountain Leadership Courses as

being more glamorous than the programs provided

Courtesy of 1stSgt Carl H. Raue Jr.

Students in the Mountain Leader Course practices

the body rappel technique in the Leavitt training

area in the late 1950s. This technique was the safest

means of descending a cliff face.

Three student mountain leaders learn techniques for crossing a glacier aided by ice axes and crampons at the

Sawtooth Ridge Area in the late 1950s.

Courtesy of 1stSgt Carl H. Raue Jr.
by the Unit Training Section. In reality, nothing

could have been further from the truth. Each succeeding commanding officer and his respective S-3

at CWTC had come to appreciate that whenever the

justification for continuing CWTC was questioned,

it was always the total number of input and output

of trainees that counted with Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. At the end of FY 1957, Lieutenant

Colonel Gentleman could still rightly make the

claim that over 11,000 Marines had undergone instruction at CWTC, even while his organization

made the transition to year-round training. But it

was largely the substantive courses under the cognizance of the Unit Training Section that allowed

those numbers to be achieved.

In the fall of 1957, General Randolph McC. Pate,

Commandant of the Marine Corps, accompanied by

Major General Reginald H. Ridgley Jr., Commanding

General, Camp Pendleton, made a formal visit to

CWTC to get a first-hand look at the effectiveness

of the new training programs being offered at

CWTC. All indications suggest that from what he

saw during the demonstrations and heard during

the command brief, General Pate was favorably impressed by the efforts of the staff and the progress

being made at the training center.

Among the numerous agenda items Lieutenant

Colonel Gentleman briefed to the Commandant was

the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s plan to deploy a helicopter squadron for a week in each quarter of Fiscal Year 1958 “in order to obtain experience in high

altitude operations and to determine aircraft lift capabilities and limitations at this altitude.” On a less

positive note, he also presented CMC with a complete update on the issue of a proposed dam on the

West Walker River. In 1955, the Commandant was

briefed that the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of Interior had completed a reconnaissance report that indicated favorable cost/benefit

ratios might be achieved if a dam were constructed

across the West Walker River. Two possible project

sites had been recommended. The primary was located on the Hoye Canyon area near Wellington,

Nevada. The alternate was a dam at the narrows of

58 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of 1stSgt Carl H. Raue Jr.

Unit training instructors give classes in snowshoeing in the Silver Creek area to members of a Marine infantry

battalion in the late 1950s. Vehicles in the background are M76 Otters.
Expanding the Mission, 1957–1958 59

the eastern entrance of Pickel Meadow, one mile to

the east of the CWTC main gate. According to local

officials of the Bureau of Reclamation, a feasibility

study of the project was in progress that should be

completed by 1959. Depending on the results and

the succeeding authorization and appropriation of

funds by the Congress, it was possible that construction at one of the two proposed sites could

commence as early as 1964. But, Gentleman went

on to stress, given the local hostility to the project,

it was unlikely that any construction could begin

before 1966. Nevertheless, should the project go

forward at Pickel Meadow, the present main camp

would be under water, thereby necessitating a relocation of the main camp upslope to the vicinity

of Tactical Area #2. Gentleman’s report estimated

the cost of rebuilding a permanent camp at this location at 18 million dollars.114

When the Commandant returned to Washington

D.C., with a favorable report on the solid progress

he had witnessed in the Sierra Nevada Mountains,

not everyone on his staff at headquarters shared his

enthusiasm. Indeed there were those, particularly

in the Personnel Department, who seriously quesCourtesy of MWTC

An honor guard comprised of the Cold Weather Training Center Aggressor Platoon and Headquarters personnel

fall-in while in front of headquarters before rendering honors to Commandant of the Marine Corps General

Randolph McC. Pate in the autumn of 1957.

General Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant of the

Marine Corps; Major General Reginald H. Ridgely,

Jr., Commanding General, Marine Corps Base,

Camp Pendleton, and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Gentleman, Commanding Officer, ColdWeather Training Center, during the Commandant's visit.

Courtesy of MWTC
tioned whether the current manpower levies and

monetary expenditures were worth the limited results. As a consequence of the critical commentaries

that continued to be voiced, at the end of 1957 a

decision was made at Headquarters U.S. Marine

Corps to assign an evaluation team to pay a visit to

the Sierras in order to determine whether the training center held realistic potential to provide any

truly significant value to the future of the Corps’ war

fighting capabilities.

60 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of MWTC

General Randolph McC. Pate, casts for trout at the officers club pool during visit to the training center. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Gentleman appears left of General Pate.
As long as I was commanding officer there, the

major effort would be to keep the Center alive for

generations of Marines yet to come.115

-Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P. Averill

Introduction

The evaluation team that went out to Cold

Weather Training Center (CWTC) at the end of 1957

to assess its future value to the Marine Corps returned to Washington and briefed the Commandant

on its findings and recommendations. It was a jarring

report. The concluding recommendation of the team

strongly urged that the center be reduced to a caretaker status and that all organized training there be

immediately suspended. When the Commandant

asked General Ridgely, the Commanding General,

Camp Pendleton for his views on the matter, this veteran, who had himself been a prisoner of war of the

Japanese Army during World War II, let it be known

that he was unalterably opposed to the contents and

the final recommendation of the report. Echoing a

statement that he had made earlier General Ridgely

stated that “had Marines received such training, the

outcome of operations in Nicaragua, in World War

II, and in Korea would have been quite different;

that this is the type of training that Marines need to

meet the variety of conditions they are likely to

face.”116 To further counter the negative findings,

General Ridgely directed Lieutenant Colonel Gentleman to send him the most recent post-course student

evaluation reports in order that the Commandant

could read for himself the glowing comments that

young officers and staff noncommissioned officers

were making regarding the effectiveness of the training they had received at CWTC. In the end, General

Pate did decide in favor of keeping the training center open at the same tempo and level of operations.

But it was with the provision that there be a 45 percent cut in the training center’s personnel staffing.

Gone would be such luxuries as the security guard

force, the Aggressor Platoon, and the inordinately

large complement of officers and staff noncommissioned officers who were assigned to instructor duties. Henceforth, the revised table of organization

would reduce the authorized strength of the training

center to 18 Marine officers and 235 enlisted. The

size of the Navy component of medical, dental and

chaplain personnel would remain unchanged.117

These personnel cuts had already been imple61

Chapter 7

Winners Never Quit, 1958–1961

mented when Lieutenant Colonel Gentleman was

ordered to report to Paris, France as a student in

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense College. He departed on 6 July 1958, leaving

his executive officer, Major Richard F. Dyer, temporarily in command. 

In the late afternoon of 1 August, the new

prospective commanding officer of CWTC, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P. Averill, arrived along with

his wife, three school-aged children, and their Saint

Bernard dog “Samson,” and moved into their new

quarters.* Major Curtis James, the CWTC operations

and training officer, had previously served with

Averill in the late 1940s. Therefore, he had already

forewarned the troops on what they could expect.

However, it was not until the morning formation of

3 August that all hands got a good look at this wiry,

5 feet and 6 inches lieutenant colonel who had

been sent out to lead them. The adjutant, Captain

Charles H. Clipper, read the appointing and assumption of command orders. The traditional passing of the training center’s standard followed, while

every man in ranks eyed their new commander

closely, searching for clues as to what “the old man”

might have in store for them. It was not in Averill’s

nature to keep his troops guessing very long.

“Zum Gipfel”

Lieutenant Colonel Averill spent his first month

in command acclimatizing to the high altitude, observing the various courses of instruction and taking

increasingly strenuous physical conditioning workouts while he waited for a leg injury, suffered in a

parachute jump at Fort Benning, to heal completely.

On 17 September, he enrolled himself as a student

in the Summer Mountain Leadership Class 3-59. He

later explained:

For several reasons I had wanted to train

in that class–first, I had no formal training in

mountaineering and wanted it; second, during

* The quarters, the only set on the post, were essentially two

Quonset huts butted together to form a “T.” The head of the “T”

contained the kitchen, dining and living room, which boasted a

very large rock fireplace and picture window that looked out on

the surrounding mountains and valley below. At the leg of the

“T” were the bathroom and bedrooms. Heating was provided by

a propane heater and from a fire in the fireplace. In 1964 a second set of quarters was erected below the commanding officer’s

quarters and designated for the surgeon assigned to the training

center.
my time in the Corps I never had asked a Marine to do anything that I could not do; and

third, I had perceived that we would need to

cross train as quickly as possible a number of

permanent personnel-cooks, mess men, maintenance men, drivers and mechanics, in

mountain and winter warfare specialties.

There was no slack in the line to take up,

manpower wise. It was bowstring taut already.120

Once having completed the summer rock-climbing course, which in his own words he did “passably well,” the new commanding officer next

instituted changes to the daily routine of the training

center, and to the formal courses of instruction that

became the pattern for the next two years during

both winter and summer. Averill later remembered:

With the loss of the Aggressor Platoon,

troops from the mess force, the maintenance

section, motor transport, and the headquarters

sections constituted the enemy forces for the

compound exercise and field problems. At

times there would be no one in the main

camp except a communications watch, the officer of the day, the gate sentries, a generator

crew and a skeleton mess force. Everyone else

was in the boondocks. My family saw little of

me during the summer and fall for I, too, was

a part of the training force, participating in

mountain leadership demonstrations as a

guide/rappeller for cliff evacuation and long

rappeller—200–feet–during the climbing

demonstrations. I also acted as an enemy soldier of the defense force on White Mountain,

humping an A-4 light machine gun to the

11,000-foot crest of the mountain and remaining there to run opposition against the students as they attempted to seize a portion of

the heights.121

In order to prepare himself and his troops to be

physically able to undertake these additional duties,

Lieutenant Colonel Averill next launched his command into an intensive physical fitness program.

Each morning between 0600 and 0700 regardless of

the weather, all hands not on an essential watch, or

engaged in student instruction in the field, mustered

in front of the headquarters building in sweat

clothes and combat boots for calisthenics, or “cali62 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P. Averill was born

and raised in Maine, where he attended high

school and spent one year at the University of

Maine. With war clouds on the horizon, he enlisted

in the Marine Corps on 11 August 1941 and underwent recruit training at Parris Island, South Carolina. After completing parachute training at Naval

Air Station Lakehurst, New Jersey as a corporal, he

was sent to Quantico, Virginia to attend a Special

Reserve Officers Class and on 16 December 1942

was commissioned a second lieutenant. From there

he joined the 2d Parachute Battalion on New Caledonia. He saw his first combat as a rifle platoon

commander in the raid on Choiseul. After the Parachute Regiment was disbanded in 1944, he became

the executive officer of Company H, 3d Battalion,

26th Marines, 5th Marine Division. During the assault on Iwo Jima, Lieutenant Averill was seriously

wounded by machine gun fire and was evacuated

to the Army hospital on Guam. He was awarded

the Silver Star and Purple Heart medals for his actions on Iwo Jima and after recuperating from his

wounds, rejoined the 26th Marines and participated

in the occupation of Japan. Subsequent tours of

duty included one as a naval air observer in the 2d

Marine Division, company commander in the 6th

Marine Regiment and another as a student at the

Amphibious Warfare School, Junior Course. In February 1951, Captain Averill was assigned as the Operations Officer (S-3), 2d Battalion, 5th Marines;

promoted to major he became the S-3 of the 5th

Marines, where his service won him the Legion of

Merit with Combat “V.” In the mid 1950s, he served

as a tactics instructor at the Amphibious Warfare

School and as the S-3 and executive officer of the

3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Prior to coming to the

CWTC, Lieutenant Colonel Averill had spent two

years at Fort Benning, Georgia as the liaison officer

with the Infantry Board (ConArc Board #3) from

the Marine Corps Landing Force Development

Center at Quantico.118

According to Averill’s own account, it was Captain Paul X. Kelley who had made several jumps

with him at Fort Benning and who was then an assistant to the director of personnel, who first proposed his name as a candidate to take command

of CWTC. “In later years,” wrote Averill, “I would

thank Paul X. Kelley more than once for his recommendation to the director of personnel. I loved

Bridgeport.”119

Gerald P. Averill
Winners Never Quit, 1958–1961 63

hoopies” as the troops referred to them. Once

warmed up, Averill and his sergeant major led the

troops for a run along Highway 108. Initially, the

runs were four miles round trip; as the months went

by, the runs were extended to the junction at Highway 395 for a total distance of 10 miles. These runs

made at just below seven

thousand feet of altitude

caused a number of Marines,

especially the new arrivals

who were not acclimatized or

used to such a strenuous

regime, to vomit their last

meal along the way.* Added

to the morning workouts,

were monthly nights conditioning marches with full

packs and weapons for all

permanent personnel. The

length of these marches varied between 12 to 15 miles

and was always led by the

commanding officer and his

sergeant major, first James M.

Courtesy of MWTC

The staff of the Cold Weather Training Center in 1959. Standing in front of headquarters building in the center

front is commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P. Averill and his officers. Marines on the left are the enlisted

staff of the Mountain Leadership Course, while the Marines on right are the enlisted staff of Unit Training Course.

“Jim” Westerman and later William J. “Bill” Conley.

Moreover, because everyone might be assigned to

stand a watch during the 48-72 hours escape evasion and survival prisoner of war compound exercise, Lieutenant Colonel Averill established the

policy that all newly arrived to permanently asMarine Corps Birthday celebration at the center in November 1959. Commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Averill stands third from right. Second from right

is the sergeant major, Sergeant Major William Conley.

Courtesy of MWTC

* Old timers who were stationed at

CWTC at the time can still recall waiting for their stomachs to settle after

the morning run and then after 1000,

slipping down to the mess hall where

sympathetic cooks would prepare a

late breakfast for them. This late meal

became know as “Calihoopie Chow.”
signed Marines, regardless of rank, were required

to go through the first week of instruction at the

next scheduled escape evasion and survival class.

This included the prisoner of war compound exercise and classroom instruction on prisoner of war

conduct and resistance techniques to interrogation

and indoctrination. The aim was to ensure that anyone playing the future role of a camp guard, for example, would understand the objectives of the

exercise and thereby reduce the potential for abusive treatment of the students.122 This policy stayed

in effect until the prisoner of war compound exercise was significantly modified in 1964 at the direction of Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps.

Shortly after Lieutenant Colonel Averill had taken

command, a sign, in Marine Corps colors of red and

gold, appeared in front of the training center headquarters building. It read: “Winners never quit—

Quitters never win,” succinctly suggesting the

expected standard of all who reported to Pickel

Meadow for either duty or training. Convinced that

all the various courses presented there were absolutely invaluable, the commander of the training

center wanted to encourage anyone who may have

been of faint heart or mind not to let this golden

opportunity for self-examination slip by. He later

wrote: “To be there pitted against the stresses of nature and the physical and psychological contrivances of man, could not fail to produce a better

warrior, a better balanced Marine—an experience

immensely profitable to the man and to the

64 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Corps.”123 By this time, the troops and students

alike had given the new commander the sobriquet:

“Old Iron Balls.” If this nickname fazed him, he

never showed it. Indeed, if anything it probably encouraged him to make each of the training packages even more realistic and strenuous. Within a

year of his arrival, CWTC had taken on a reputation

for offering the most practical, yet physically challenging courses available in the Marine Corps. In

each course of instruction, leadership by example

became the watchword, placing constant pressure

on the individual Marine to reach well beyond his

comfort level and self-imposed physical limitations.

For example, graduates of the Army Ranger Course

would often remark in their course evaluations that

they had found the Mountain Leadership Course far

more challenging and arduous than what they had

experienced at Fort Benning.124

One feature of the Escape, Evasion, and Survival

Course that Averill disliked was the location of the

POW Compound that had been constructed a short

distance from the course classroom area. He would

later recall, “There were always curious people

Courtesy of Capt John F. Baltes

Lieutenant Colonel Averill led by example as Cold

Weather Training Center commanding officer. Here

he prepares to demonstrate a seat-hip rappel at Leavitt Training Area in the summer of 1959.

Captain Charles Clipper, longtime adjutant of Cold

Weather Training Center, stands in front of headquarters. The motto on the sign was introduced by

Lieutenant Colonel Averill.

Courtesy of Leatherneck
Winners Never Quit, 1958–1961 65

poking about, prying into things that did not concern them—a bad situation for the instructors, even

worse for the students.”125 Funding for construction

of a new compound had been appropriated, but

had not been released by Camp Pendleton. After

concerns about abuse were made by the G-3 of the

1st Marine Division after witnessing students undergoing the prisoner of war compound exercise, Lieutenant Colonel Averill was able to convince General

Ridgely to have those funds released early. Consequently, in the spring of 1959, the 7th Engineer Battalion was allowed to move the prisoner of war

compound and its outbuildings to a new location.

The site that had been selected was close to one of

the former Aggressor Platoon’s field campsites in an

aspen grove several miles to the east of Tactical

Area #2. Also, by damming up the stream that ran

alongside the enclosure, the engineers were able to

create an added feature. This was a small pond that

thousands of students hereafter would come to

know as “The People’s Pool.”

In making improvements to the Mountain Leadership and Unit Training Course curriculums, Lieutenant Colonel Averill insisted that not only the

individual techniques of skiing, or mountain climbing be taught, but that equal attention be given to

their tactical military applications when fighting as

small unit teams. “Why don’t we climb with

weapons and equipment?” Averill would ask the

course instructor and guides. “Wouldn’t we do so

in combat?”126 As a result, such classes as night

climbing assaults against defended positions were

added to the mountain leadership syllabus, and the

course culminating with a pre-dawn assault on the

rocky crest of White Mountain. 

The consequences of these and many other practical improvements that Averill and his staff of instructors were to bring to the training center were

significant. At the close of the first year of operating

at the reduced strength, the center had not only

raised the bar on the quality of its training, but had

exceeded the number of trainees established by

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps.* For his part, the

Commandant had kept his promise and funded the

center for another year, leaving in place the same

stipulations on manpower. 

During Lieutenant Colonel Averill’s second year

at the training center the pace he set for the command never slackened. Once the summer routine

was underway it became customary for the Mountain Leadership and Escape, Evasion, and Survival

Courses to graduate a class on a Saturday and receive the next incoming class on the following

Monday. The Unit Training Section was kept

equally busy furnishing instruction to the regular

and Reserve battalions, which were clamoring to

get away from their home stations and take advantage of the unique terrain. It was also during his

second year that Averill decided to test the mettle

of about 45 of his Marines by leading them on a

weeklong hike. The route he laid out was from the

main gate, north along Highway 395 to Carson City,

Nevada and back—a distance of some 150 miles.

Starting off early on a Monday morning with helmets, marching packs and weapons, Sergeant Major

Conley remembered that each succeeding day became hotter. By the time the column reached Carson City on the third day and started its return

south, badly blistered feet had caused the evacuation of over half of the number who had set out.

By the fourth day, the number of hikers had been

reduced to the commanding officer, Sergeant-Major

Conley and a half a dozen other Marines before

even the hard driving Averill decided it was time to

halt the hike and call for a truck to take the remnants of his column back to the training center.127

As it had done in previous years, in October of

1959, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion deployed

from Camp Pendleton to CWTC for the entire

month. Supporting the reconnaissance battalion

was an aviation detachment from the 3d MAW, consisting of a number of Sikorsky UH-34 Seahorse helicopters and two Cessna OF-2 observation aircraft

* Base training figures for that year reported: EE&S 585; MLC

400; CWI 550; FMF Battalions under Unit Training 6,400; for a

grand total of slightly under 8,000 for the year.

Marine Corps History Division 

A VMO-6 aircraft flying over Pickel Meadow. While

acting as an aerial observer in such an aircraft flying near Sardine Lake, Captain Ernest C. Cheatham

Jr.’s military career nearly came to an end when the

aircraft stalled and crashed in the vicinity of Finley

Mine Road.
from Marine Observation Squadron 6. The aircraft

not only provided troop lifts, but also was used as

platforms for high altitude parachute jumps. On 13

October, Company B was in the process of preparing for a mounted road reconnaissance exercise toward Sonora Pass, using secondary and tertiary

roads. Before launching the exercise, the Company

B commander, Captain Ernest C. Cheatham Jr., was

scheduled to make an aerial route reconnaissance

flight in one of the aircraft with himself as the observer. After completing the flight pre-briefing, one

of the pilots handed Captain Cheatham his hard hat

and said: “Here, you had better replace your soft

cap with this.” Shortly thereafter, the flight took off

from the small grass strip, and then circled over

Pickel Meadow to gain altitude before heading west

toward Sonora Pass. Unfortunately, while flying

near Sardine Lake, the pilot found himself too low

inside a box canyon. Attempting to maneuver out

of the canyon the engine stalled and the plane immediately started into a downward dive. Within seconds it had crashed into some trees and was upside

down on the north side of Highway 108 in the

vicinity of the Finley Mine Road. When Captain

Cheatham became conscious, he managed to extricate himself from the observer seat and lower himself to the ground. In removing the helmet that had

been loaned to him, he noticed that it was almost

66 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

split in half. Unaware that both his legs were broken, Captain Cheatham then proceeded to unstrap

the unconscious pilot and to drag him out of the

cockpit and away from the wreckage. By this time

as he was regaining consciousness, the pilot suddenly remembered that he had failed to cut the

switch to the fuel tank. This meant that the plane

might explode into flames at any moment. Captain

Cheatham thus dragged himself back to the wreckage a second time to turn off the fuel switch. Then,

moving the pilot and himself some distance away

to a clearing, Captain Cheatham spread out his

parachute and laid down to await the rescue team

that he was sure would soon be on its way. First to

arrive on the scene was the company gunnery sergeant, accompanied by Captain Warren Wiedhahn,

Jr. The two had come by jeep from the base camp

via the Finley Mine Road, thereby beating the main

rescue party that had proceeded up Highway 108.

Captain Wiedhahn had only recently joined the battalion and was yet unassigned. As he and the pilot

were being bundled into the ambulance and made

ready for the trip to the Reno hospital, all that the

dazed Captain Cheatham could remember in his

half conscious state was Warren Wiedhahn cheerfully telling him: “don’t worry Ernie, I’ll take your

company for you.” And this he did.128

1960 Winter Olympic Games

The following January found the training center

tasked with a new and unusual challenge—provide

support for the 1960 Winter Olympic Games. Years

earlier, the small ski resort known as Squaw Valley,

which lay midway between the town of Truckee,

California and Lake Tahoe, had entered the international competition for hosting the 1960 winter

games. Its selection by the Olympic Committee,

however, caught everyone off guard and caused the

state of California to launch a massive public works

program to build an Olympic Village at the site

along with a new highway infrastructure over the

Sierra Nevada Mountains to handle the expected

surge in traffic. Traditionally, snow slopes used in

Olympic ski competition are constantly packed and

groomed by skiers, not machines. Thus the U.S.

Olympic Committee had submitted a request to the

Commandant of the Marine Corps asking that the

Corps furnish a detachment of Marine skiers to support the 1960 Winter Games. The Commandant approved the request and directed the commanding

officer, CWTC to serve as his executive agent and

on-site representative. 

The guidance received from Headquarters U.S.

Marine Corps made it clear to Lieutenant Colonel

Averill that the Olympic games would take priority

Lieutenant General Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr. as

Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower.

Marine Corps Photo
Winners Never Quit, 1958–1961 67

over all other activities at the training center. Accordingly, several of the formal training courses

were virtually suspended during January and February while a composite unit of approximately 45

Marines representing the very best skiers from the

training center, augmented by troops from the 1st

Marine Division was formed under officers and

noncommissioned officers from the Mountain Leadership and Unit Training Sections. After being

clothed and equipped and long hours of reviewing

the techniques of sidestepping, herringbone, and

sideslipping, the unit deployed to Squaw Valley.

There, the Marines moved into an expeditionary

camp of strong-backed pyramidal and general purpose tents that had been established near the

Olympic Village. Working under the supervision of

the ski-patrol, the unit could be seen daily packing

and repacking the ski runs until the Games ended

in February.* 129

A Change in the Watch

In the spring of 1960, it was common knowledge

at CWTC that Lieutenant Colonel Averill was making it known to his superiors and to the director of

personnel at Headquarters U.S Marine Corps that

he was very interested in extending his tour at the

training center for a third year. However, for whatever reasons, Major General Alan Shapley, the Commanding General, Camp Pendleton, did not concur

in this request. The table of organization authorized

a colonel to command the training center. Therefore, perhaps he believed this was a good time to

assign one. General Shapley’s nomination to the director of personnel was his base G-3, Glen E. Martin, who had recently been promoted to the rank

of colonel. As a captain, Averill had served as Lieutenant Colonel Martin’s S-3 in 1951 when the latter

commanded the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, in Korea.

Once he learned that this officer, for whom he had

great respect, had been nominated as his replacement, Averill gave up his lobbying efforts to extend

his tour and made plans to depart in June. Despite

his disappointment in not being allowed to remain

for an additional year, in just 22 months Lieutenant

Colonel Averill had managed to turn the reputation

of the training center from something of questionable value, into one of the premier training facilities

of the Marine Corps. As he was to write in his autobiography, “The land itself, with all of its desolate

spaciousness, its pristine loveliness, its terrible loneliness, became a part of me, the yearning to remain

with it was a twisting, burning pain in my gut.

Being kind of king of the mountain made other assignments commonplace and drab. I had glimpsed

Shangri-la.”130

Raised in Iowa, Colonel Martin received a bachelor of arts in economics from Colorado College in

Colorado Springs in 1941. That same year he enlisted in the Marine Corps and received his commission in August 1941. As a platoon commander

and later company commander during World War

II, he participated in a number of the major amphibious landing operations in the Pacific Theater,

earning the Navy Cross in the Marshall Islands.

Other awards included two Silver Stars and two

Bronze Stars. At the end of World War II he left active duty, but remained in the Organized Reserve.

At the outbreak of the Korean conflict he was recalled to active duty and sailed with the 1st Replacement Draft. Having arrived at Kimpo Airfield

during the fight to recapture Seoul, Major Martin assumed command of Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. He continued to serve in that

capacity throughout the Chosin Reservoir campaign, during which he earned his third Silver Star

and third Bronze Star medals. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in January 1951, he assumed command of the 2d Battalion just in time to lead it in

Operations Killer and Ripper during General Ridgeway’s counteroffensive to regain the 38th Parallel.

For his final three months in Korea, he served as

the assistant operations officers (G-3A) of the 1st

Marine Division. After accepting a regular commission, his subsequent tours included duty at Marine

Corps Schools, Quantico, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa, as G-2 and G-5 at Air FMFPac, El Toro and as the commanding officer, 1st

* The U.S. Marine Band was also on hand to participate in the

opening ceremonies of these winter games.

Photo by William Brier, courtesy of author

Marines from the Cold Weather Training Center

and Camp Pendleton make the daily run down the

ski slopes to pack the snow for the Winter Olympic

Games. The best skiers were used for this under the

supervision of the local ski-patrol..
Battalion, 7th Marines, at Camp Pendleton.131

Lieutenant Colonel Averill and his family had already departed by the time Colonel Martin assumed

command on 1 July. Shortly thereafter, he and his

wife Virginia and their two boys and two girls, ages

13, 11, 9, and 7 respectively, moved into the Quonset quarters that would be their home for the next

two years. In 1957, as a Lieutenant Colonel serving

in the Plans Division at Air FMFPac, Colonel Martin

had wrangled a quota to attend the U.S. Army sixweek Cold Weather Indoctrination Course at Fort

Greely, Alaska. It was there, he said, “that I had become reasonably proficient in cross-country skiing.”

However, the new commander could claim no experience in military mountaineering. Consequently,

like his predecessor, Colonel Martin enrolled himself as a student in the next scheduled Mountain

Leadership Course. 132

Marines who served at Pickel Meadow during

the tenures of Lieutenant Colonel Averill and

Colonel Martin fondly remember both officers as

superb leaders; nevertheless, many acknowledge

that their personalities and leadership styles were

quite different. Where the former was dynamic, aggressive, and naturally prone to being combative,

the latter came across as soft-spoken, reflective, and

68 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of 1stSgt Carl H. Raue Jr.

Marines from center participated in recovery of the

bodies of two civilian mountain climbers killed in a

fall in the Montgomery Peaks Ridge area, Mono

County, May 1959. Lieutenant Colonel Averill personally supervised the effort and the seven instructorguides were temporarily deputized by the Mono

County Sheriff for this purpose.

unpretentious. Yet by their own unique ways and

actions, both commanders inspired in their subordinates a high sense of duty and confidence that

the training being conducted at Pickel Meadow was

very meaningful to the individual Marine and therefore important to the overall health and well-being

of the Corps. One must recall that these were challenging years. Both the U.S. Army’s and Marine

Corps’ conventional forces and budgets had been

declining ever since the Eisenhower Administration

had adopted nuclear deterrence as its primary national defense strategy. Economy measures had already caused the Marine Corps to cadre several of

its infantry battalions and when Colonel Martin arrived at CWTC he was greeted with the news that

his table of organization had been further reduced

by 45 enlisted positions. This brought the total

strength down to 180 and meant that all hands

would be required to wear several “hats” and participate in the training programs in addition to fulfilling their primary duties.133

Another issue that Colonel Martin had to confront soon after he arrived involved compliance

with the California Game and Fish laws. Contrary

to the earlier policy of allowing the escape, evasion,

and survival students to trap small game and to fish

out of season, the attorney general of the state of

California ruled this practice to be illegal. A letter

signed by the attorney general to this effect was received at the command a month before Colonel

Martin assumed his duties there. General Shapley

cautioned his new commander at CWTC “not to

turn a blind eye to the attorney general’s ruling in

the hope of not getting caught.” After conferring

with the local agent of the Fish and Game Commission, Colonel Martin made several trips to Sacramento to plead a case for making a change to the

law incident to formal survival training. California

State Senator Jones, who was then chairman of the

Forestry Sub-committee was sympathetic to Colonel

Martin’s arguments and agreed to hold a hearing on

the issue.

As a result of Colonel Martin’s testimony at this

hearing, the law was changed, thereby permitting

the escape, evasion and survival students to have

survival fishing rights year round. “Money was so

tight then,” recalled the colonel. He added that

whenever he had to travel to Sacramento he and

his driver would depart at 0300 that he would pay

for the driver’s lunch from his own pocket and that

they’d start back for the base after 1600. “I would

have liked to have stayed overnight, but we had no

per diem funds to speak of in those days.”134

This change to the California Fish and Game Law

not only benefited the Marine survival course, but
Winners Never Quit, 1958–1961 69

also the survival program at Stead Air Force Base,

which had been suffering under the same proscription. Impressed by what the Marines had achieved,

the commanding officer of Stead Air Force Base and

several key staff members paid a visit to CWTC to

express their thanks to Colonel Martin and to look

over the Marine Escape, Evasion, and Survival

Course. One of the outcomes of the good relations

that followed between the two commands was

Stead’s gift of additional sets of Soviet-style uniforms for use in the Marine POW Compound exercise. “Some uniforms were used,” recalled Colonel

Martin, “but most of them were brand new.” 

Up until the time Colonel Martin assumed command, it had been the practice of the Mountain

Leadership Winter Course to issue students a ski

boot that had been designed for use by the U.S.

Army’s 10th Mountain Division. This was a stiff,

square-toed, low-cut boot of brown leather. But

BGen Lewis W. “Lou” Walt, assistant division commander of the1st Marine Division, at left; and Col

Glen E. Martin, commanding officer of the Cold

Weather Training Center, at right, during a prisoner

of war compound exercise in 1961. Both officers are

wearing the dark brown Soviet-style uniforms that

were used by the school staff. Courtesy of MWTC since the standard footwear for all Marines in any

future conflict in snow-covered terrain would be

the insulated “Mickey Mouse” boot, the new commanding officer directed that students learn their

over-snow techniques using this boot. With minor

modifications to the hitches of the Northland skis

and the addition of Arlberg straps wrapped tightly

above the ankles of the boots, sufficient control in

downhill ski techniques could be achieved. Thus

the new order soon became standard practice.

Other than this modest change, Colonel Martin

made no alterations to the curricula of the formal

courses or their training practices. Instead, he

turned his attention toward improving the cost effectiveness of the base and its habitability standards

for both permanent personnel and students. In the

summer of 1960, the 7th Engineers constructed a

wood frame head and shower facility with heated

flooring in the schools area for students undergoing

instruction in the Escape, Evasion, and Survival and

Mountain Leadership Courses. The students and instructors regarded this facility as a major improvement over the outdoor heads and expeditionary

tent shower unit that had been used during the previous four years. 

In 1961, at the end of Colonel Martin’s first year

of duty at the training center, Lieutenant Colonel

Nathaniel H. Carver reported for duty as his executive officer. Carver was a 1302 engineer officer.

Courtesy of Leatherneck

Improvised field-expedient pack made by a student

in the Escape, Evasion, and Survival Course during

the evasion phase of the course, early 1960s.
Thus to him fell the task of implementing one of

Colonel Martin’s most ambitious undertakings: the

conversion of the training center to commercial

power. Since its earliest days, electrical power for

the base was furnished by four 75-kilowatt, and

later four 100-kilowatt generators, with two of these

on line operating at 10-day intervals with the other

two. In addition to a heavy consumption of fuel,

the power plant required four men rotating the

watch around the clock. Earlier attempts to convert

the base to commercial power several years before

had been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, Colonel Martin was eager to try again. After encouraging nearby

ranchers and property owners to join in on this venture and after several trips to Los Angeles, Colonel

Carver eventually succeeded in negotiating a contract with Southern California Edison to extend its

power services to the training center. The project

was started in 1962 and conversion to commercial

power was completed the following year.135

Another legacy left by Colonel Martin was the introduction of the Thiokol Snowcats (commonly

called Trackmasters) to the training center. Since the

1940s the only vehicle in use by the Marine Corps

in snow-covered terrain was the Pontiac M-76 Otter

Amphibious Cargo Carrier. Because of its weight,

however, this tracked vehicle was fit for crossing

through marshes, or marginal terrain, than it was

for traversing deep snow. Unplowed roads with

snow over 18 inches would usually cause the vehicle to founder and lose its traction. Therefore, in

order to keep the roads open to the training areas

70 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

at the higher elevations, it became standing operating procedure to run the Otters day and night during snowstorms just to keep the new snow packed

down. Needless to say, this inefficient use was

costly in terms of both driver hours and fuel. Moreover, Colonel Martin later recalled, “by the end of

every winter we found that we were blowing out

two or three transmissions every year. At the time,

the Barstow Supply Center was charging us $18,000

just to replace one transmission. I tried to get them

to reduce that price since we were the only user of

the vehicle, but they would not go along with it.

About that time, I found that we could purchase a

new Thiokol Trackmaster for $10,000.”136 Colonel

Martin directed that two of the Thiokol Trackmasters be purchased for trial and evaluation. These vehicles arrived in December 1962. Capable of

traversing steep slopes over snow-covered terrain

while carrying up to 11 troops inside (with skis and

packs lashed to the top) these two test vehicles

quickly proved their worth. Both the Winter Mountain Leadership and Unit Training Courses were

now able to extend the range of student bivouac

sites to the highest slopes where the best snow conditions could be found. Further, their road speeds

of up to 25 miles per hour also made this widetracked vehicle ideally suited for skijoring up to two

squad-sized infantry units. As a result, the Otters

were phased out and the Trackmaster fleet was increased to 10 vehicles over the next several

years.137

Courtesy of MWTC

An M76 Otter struggles, belly-up, in deep snow at

the center in the early 1960s.

Ski troops skijoring behind Thiokol Trackmaster in

1963. This oversnow vehicle extended the capabilities of the Mountain Leadership and Unit Training

sections to reach higher elevations. It could reach of

15-25 miles per hour in deep snow.

Courtesy of MWTC
We aren’t no thin red ‘eroes, Nor we aren’t no blackguards too,

But single men in barricks, Most remarkable like you,

An’ if sometimes our conduck, Isn’t all your

fancy paints,

Why, single men in barricks, Don’t grow into

plaster saints.

–Rudyard Kipling

Marines Who Proved a Match for the Mountains

By the early 1960s, thanks to a series of several

exceptionally qualified and energetic commanding

officers and in response to the needs of the Marine

Corps to be a force in readiness in “every clime and

place,” CWTC had earned a reputation for offering

some of the most challenging and sought after training programs in the Corps. To many of those who

had served there, the training center had clearly

demonstrated its value. True, the Personnel Department at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps did continue to challenge the cost effectiveness of some

training programs and did continue to send out

evaluation teams from time-to-time to determine

whether this or that course could not be shortened

or done away with altogether. However, after witnessing the training being conducted and reading

the student post graduation comments, invariably

these teams would come back with reports essentially declaring that the Marine Corps should continue this vital training. One such favorable report

even resulted in the CWTC table of organization receiving a slight increase in its enlisted strength.* 

However, it was not just the commanders who

convinced visitors of the viability of the training

center. Equally impressive was the dedication, professionalism, and enthusiasm of the Marines and the

Navy personnel that made up the command. Regardless of their assignment, whether instructional,

service, or support, most seemed convinced that

what they were doing was vitally important to the

Corps. Throughout these years, Headquarters U.S.

Marine Corps listed CWTC as a “hardship post.”

This was especially true for those with wives and

young children. For the husband, service at the

training center might well be viewed as an “opera71

Chapter 8

Mountain Men, 1962–1965

tors” dream; but for his spouse, isolated and living

in an eight by 20-foot trailer it could become a

nightmare if the marriage was not a solid one. Even

the bachelor officers and staff noncommissioned officers affectionately referred to the Post as “Fort

Bleak” and the masthead of the post newspaper

carried the name Last Outpost. Yet its permanent

complement above the rank of corporal was consistently made up largely of volunteers who had

submitted written requests to be assigned there.

Moreover, many were serving extended tours of

duty, or had returned for a second tour. While it is

impossible to list all of those who may have left

their mark on the training center during this era,

this monograph seeks to document the contributions of influential Marines who later became consequential figures. 

Among the officers, perhaps the one who could

claim the longest continuous service at Pickel

Meadow was Captain Charles H. Clipper. He reported for duty at CWTC as the S-1 and adjutant

under Lieutenant Colonel Gentleman in 1958. Capt

Clipper continued to hold that billet until 1964. He

made his home in Reno, Nevada and thus for six

years he would embark on the base liberty bus at

0500 in Reno and disembark after 1900 every working day of the week. Captain Clipper also became

a very popular figure among many prominent citizens and hotel and casino owners in the Reno area,

always ensuring that a large contingent of Marines

would be on hand to support the local Red Cross

blood drives and other events. During Charlie Clipper’s tenure, it was customary for the Mapes, Riverside, or some other large casino or hotel to host the

CWTC Marine Birthday Ball at no cost, other than

for individual drinks.*

Captain Stanley “Ski” Wawrzyniak was serving as

the provost marshal at the Subic Bay Naval Base,

Philippine Islands, in 1959 when he requested and

received orders to CWTC. Initially, he became the

S-3 under Lieutenant Colonel Averill. Colonel Martin

later made him the officer-in-charge of the Unit

Training Section and subsequently, senior instructor

-guide of the Mountain Leadership Course. At his

own request his additional duty was the base mess

officer. Even before reporting to CWTC, this five

feet and six inches barrel-chested captain had al-

* In 1963 the authorized strength at CWTC was raised to 17 Marine officers, 207 enlisted Marines, three Navy Officers (a chaplain was now added,) 13 Navy enlisted, and five civilians (figures

extracted from the S-3 portion of a 1963 MWTC command brief

in possession of the author).

* Capt Clipper later retired as a realtor in Reno. Unfortunately,

he died in 2002 before the author could interview him in person. 
ready earned a Corps-wide reputation for being one

of the most fearless, toughest and inspiring combat

leaders to have come out of the Korean War. During

his two-year extended tour on the Korean Peninsula, he went from staff sergeant to master sergeant,

and while serving with the 2d Battalion, 5th

Marines, was awarded two Navy Crosses, (the first

while under Colonel Martin, the second coming

from his actions during the following year was

down-graded from a recommendation for the Congressional Medal of Honor) a Silver Star, and three

Purple Hearts. In Vietnam he went on to earn two

Bronze Stars and his fourth Purple Heart. 

Humorous Captain Wawrzyniak stories continued to reverberate through Pickel Meadow long

after this colorful and unique leader had departed

for duty at Quantico in 1961. One story that was related for years to come told of the incident when

he was going through the Mountain Leadership

Course as a student in the summer of 1960. The

class was undergoing ice climbing and crevasse rescue techniques on a glacier beneath the Saw Tooth

Ridge. As Wawrzyniak took his ordered practice fall,

his student-climbing partner who was suppose to

arrest his fall came out of his belay position. As a

result, he slid headlong into the blue ice of the

open crevasse. Fortunately, he landed on a sunken

connecting snow bridge, thereby preventing what

surely would have been a fatal fall. Even so, after

72 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of MWTC

Living quarters of Cold Weather Training Center permanent personnel, who often affectionately referred to the

post as "Fort Bleak."

he was retrieved, Wawrzyniak was found to have

suffered a broken sternum and was in deep pain.

The corpsman who was with the class wanted to

administer morphine and have the captain littered

back to Twin Lakes. But characteristically, he refused both.138 Those readers who have trekked out

of Horse Creek Canyon can appreciate what a jarring experience that can be, even when one is at

Training center staff stretched out on the fireplace

at the Cold Weather Training Center Staff Noncommissioned Officers Club, around 1964.

Courtesy of Leatherneck
Mountain Men, 1962–1965 73

the top of his form. But at his insistence, Wawrzyniak managed to slowly struggle down those steep

talus slopes under his own power, aided only by

the shoulders of the strapping instructor and guide,

Corporal Roger Shelton. Upon reaching the parking

lot at Twin Lakes, only then did this iron man finally

let go and collapse.

Lieutenant Wiley M. Clapp Jr., served with the

Escape, Evasion, and Survival Course from July

1959 to November 1961 and was the officer-incharge of the section during the summer and fall of

1960. During his tenure, Lieutenant Clapp managed

to add more and more realism to the course of instruction that he and others had inherited from their

predecessor, Captain Robert F. “Bob” Eggers. As a

result, the Escape, Evasion, and Survival Course offered one of the most practical and useful learning

experiences then offered by any formal Marine

Corps school of the time. Writing as one of those

who went through the course during Lieutenant

Clapp’s tenure, can anyone ever forget his masterful

presentation on The Code of Conduct Later, Wiley

would credit a Gunnery Sergeant John C. Sheridan,

an early instructor in the Escape, Evasion, and Survival Section, for first developing the powerful message it carried.139 Nevertheless, in the history of the

school, no one ever quite perfected this lecture to

the same degree, or delivered it with more passion

and belief than did Wiley Clapp. 

First Lieutenant Vincent R. Lee requested assignment to CWTC after completing an unaccompanied

overseas tour as an infantry officer in the 3d Marine

Division. His request was granted and in the late

spring of 1962 he reported for duty and was assigned to the Mountain Leadership Section as an instructor-guide under Captain John B. Morris. Reared

in Westchester County, New York, Lieutenant Lee

had developed an early enthusiasm for rock climbing in the Hudson River valley, an avocation that

he continued to pursue while an undergraduate at

Princeton University. During his two years at

CWTC, Lieutenant Lee became known for his willingness to share the new techniques he had learned

as a civilian mountaineer with his fellow instructors.

Over time he skillfully modernized the syllabus of

the Mountain Leadership Course by introducing the

latest climbing techniques and lightweight equipment that he believed would have equal application

in military mountaineering. As a result of his singular efforts, the standing operating procedures for the

From 1959 through 1961, Captain “Ski” served

as operations officer, senior instructor of the unit

training section, and as the additional duty mess

officer during his several years at the Mountain

Warfare Training Center. But most significantly, he

ran the Mountain Leadership Course as senior instructor and guide. There are many “Ski” stories

that Pickel Meadow old-timers love to share at reunions, but the “Ski’s” official record needs no embellishments.

From Gary, West Virginia, Stanley Wawrzyniak

enlisted in the U.S. Navy during World War II at

Buffalo, New York, serving as a boilermaker third

class. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps in 1946.

When the Korean War began, he was a staff sergeant with 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and landed at

Inchon with the 1st Marine Division. During two

separate tours in Korea, he was wounded three

times, which included a six-week stint on the USS

Consolation (AH 15). He was decorated with the

Silver Star and two Navy Crosses and promoted to

the rank of master sergeant when the conflict

ended. Encouraged by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph McCall Pate,

Wawrzyniak was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1953. After serving throughout the United

States and the Far East, Major Wawrzyniak served

in Vietnam in 1966-1967 with 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines, earning two Bronze Star Medals and another Purple Heart. He retired as a lieutenant

colonel and died in 1995. After Ski’s death, stories

circulated of his countless adventures, which involved everything from stealing a jeep to breaking

his back in a glacial crevasse.

Major Tony Milavic circulated many of these in

a narrative of exploits including those at Bridgeport. Occasionally, some Marines sought to step

away from the challenges of the demanding Mountain Leaders Course that then Captain Wawrzyniak

supervised. One sergeant tried to quit while in

agony as a group climbed the 11,321-foot White

Mountain. Ski would not let him quit, and tied a

rope around him to literally pull him within a few

feet of the summit. After untying the rope, the wayward sergeant fell back down the slope. Wawrzyniak turned to Milavic and gave him the rope,

saying “Go bring that ungrateful b****** back up

here!” According to Milavic, “Ski did not try to

move mountains; he moved Marines and conquered mountains.”140

Stanley Wawrzyniak
Mountain Leadership Course were completely revamped and modeled along the lines he suggested,

culminating in a challenging five-day alpine counterguerrilla exercise in the rugged Saw Tooth Ridge

area. 

Similar to the officer community, there were several legendary characters among the enlisted ranks

that are also deserving of special mention. One

should not forget the contributions of Staff Sergeant

Carl E. “Pappy” Scheer in the area of service and

support. This dedicated Marine spent nine years at

the training center as the noncommissioned officerin-charge of the heavy equipment section. Another

notable character was Gunnery Sergeant John Marjanov, who reported for his first tour of duty at the

training center in 1964 and was also assigned as

heavy equipment chief until his transfer to Vietnam

in 1966. As a staff sergeant in Korea, John Marjanov

was for a time attached to a contingent of British

and Canadian Forces. For his actions and services,

he was awarded the British Empire Medal (BEM) at

a formal ceremony at the British Embassy in Washington D.C. in July 1955.141 Consequently, his fellow

staff noncommissioned officers at the training center

never referred to him to as anything but “Sir John.”

Remarkable figures among the Mountain Leadership Section included Staff Sergeant Theodore E.

“Boone” Neal, Gunnery Sergeant William R. “Bill”

Lightfoot, and Gunnery Sergeant Lonnie “Moose”

74 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Henderson. Staff Sergeant Neal was reared in Colorado and spent his youth on ranches breaking

horses before enlisting in the Marine Corps. His first

tour of duty at CWTC started in 1957. As a corporal,

he ran the base stables and taught animal packing

for the Mountain Leadership and Unit Training

Courses. Following a tour in the 1st Marine Division, Staff Sergeant Neal returned for a second tour

at CWTC in 1962 and was assigned to the Mountain

Leadership section. “No one could ‘read’ or had a

better sense for the mountains than Boone Neal,”

said Gunnery Sergeant Ronald “Ron” Burtsell, unit

chief of the Mountain Leadership section. Bill Lightfoot joined the Mountain Operations Group as a

staff sergeant in 1958 under Lieutenant James V.

“Jim” Knapp. During his last two years at the training center until his transfer to the 1st Marine Division in late 1963, he served as the chief of the

Mountain Leadership Section. One could count on

Bill Lightfoot to be levelheaded and consistent, and

to run things “by the book.” The six feet five inches

“Moose” Henderson was raised on a tobacco farm Courtesy of MWTC

Staff Sergeant Anthony F. Milavic, an instructor of

the Escape, Evasion, and Survival Course, poses in

Soviet-style uniform used in the Prisoner of War

Compound Exercise in the summer of 1961.

A Marine prepares to use a three rope bridge to

safely cross the Walker River at the stream crossing

site near Leavitt Lodge. He is supervised by two legendary training instructors in the white helmets; Sgt

Hank Vozka on the left and Capt Stan Wawrzyniak

on the right.

Courtesy of MWTC
Mountain Men, 1962–1965 75

in southern Virginia. Before joining the Marine

Corps, he went to Africa where he worked as a

tracker and white hunter for a safari company. In

1963, he was an instructor at the 1st Marine Division’s Counterinsurgency School at Camp Pendleton. The newly appointed senior instructor-guide of

the Mountain Leadership section was a student in

the course and was so impressed by Henderson’s

instructor abilities and knowledge of the subject

matter that he induced him to ask for an immediate

transfer to CWTC. Henderson joined the Mountain

Leadership Section three months later and went on

to become one of its ablest instructor-guides.

Perhaps the enlisted instructor in the Escape Evasion, and Survival Course who consistently left the

most lasting impression on his students during this

era was Staff Sergeant Anthony F. Milavic. Before

reporting to CWTC in 1960, he served a two-year

tour of duty with the 1st Marine Air Wing at

Iwakuni, Japan. There he studied Japanese and became a belted instructor in a particular form of martial arts known as Wadoo Ryu Karate. These

courses, combined with his serious study of the interrogation and political indoctrination techniques

used by the Chinese Communist Forces in Korea,

aided him in becoming an instructor of the highest

quality. During the prisoner of war compound exercise, Staff Sergeant Milavic often played the role

of the empathetic and “understanding” indoctrination officer. Normally, the students undergoing the

exercise would be absolutely tight-lipped under interrogation. Then, around 0200 while in an entirely

different setting, invariably the smooth-talking Anthony Milavic dressed in civilian attire would all too

easily seduce members of the class into talking on

a host of seemingly harmless subjects, thereby causing them to unwittingly break the precepts of the

Code of Conduct. This became a valuable learning

lesson during the classroom instruction that followed. Two other highly esteemed instruc-torguides who left their mark with the Escape,

Evasion, and Survival Section were Staff Sergeant

Eugene L. “Gene” Ewing and the section chief,

Gunnery Sergeant Raymond A. Montoya. Both

served at the training center between 1962 and

1964.

Typical among the many able and dedicated instructor-guides who served in the Unit Training Section was Corporal Henry Vozka. The lean, five feet

and 10 inches bachelor corporal had completed

three years in the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions before reporting for duty at the training center in April

“Gerry” Turley’s account of the only escape from

the enemy prisoner compound:

“Inside the compound there were several steel

sheds in which we gathered to get out of the chilly

weather. The shed I was in was near the south

(downhill) side wire. I observed the guards routine

for several hours, and then felt that if an escape

went early and quickly, it would probably be more

successful than later during our confinement.

So we slowly began moving the shed closer to

the fence, and after about two hours it was within

four feet of the eight-foot fence. The lowest side

of the shed (about five feet high) faced the inside

of the compound. The high side, which was almost

seven feet high, faced the barbed wire fence.

We noticed the guard in the one tower was having problems with his EE-8 telephone, and he was

bending over pulling up a new phone on a rope.

I had earlier told a big strong Marine of my idea to

run and leap on someone’s back to get onto the

shed’s roof, and from there, to just keep moving

toward the wire. While the guard was distracted,

the big Marine quickly assumed a leaning position

against the shed. I stepped back about 20 feet, and

ran as fast as I could, and putting one foot on his

back I leveraged myself up onto the roof. Never

stopping, I then made a wild leap from the shed

up over the fence. It all happened so fast that not

one of the cadre was even aware that I had escaped. 

Once over the fence, I landed in some brush,

headed down the hill for about 100 yards, and then

turned to the west for another 200 yards, and then

began to climb back around and above the POW

camp. I concealed myself and then just sat there

and watched the cadre scramble when they discovered someone was missing.

I remained out about four hours and then voluntarily returned to the compound. The cadre people were not pleased, but they treated me fairly.

All in all it was a good day, and the training experience proved valuable many times over.”142

In reality, the instructors considered this the perfect escape from the compound exercise of the escape and evasion school; it was organized, all

students participated and the escapee got away before a guard could react. In their collective memory, this was the first for the course.143

Gerald H. Turley
1959. Raised in Michigan and therefore no stranger

to cold-weather, the likable Vozka quickly adapted

to life at CWTC. After completing all of the courses

of instruction and receiving a promotion to acting

sergeant, Vozka acquired a Keeshond puppy, which

he named Hondo. The two became inseparable.

Until his transfer in October 1962, on off-duty

weekends Vozka and Hondo would often be seen

bivouacked together along Silver or Wolf Creeks

while his hut mates were off to Reno on the base

liberty bus. One former instructor and guide who

served at CWTC during the same time wrote the following account which characterizes Sergeant

Vozka’s outlook toward his duties:

In 1960, I was stationed at the Marine

Corps Cold Weather training center, Bridgeport, California when those in the infantry

field were authorized “proficiency pay.” For

the center, it amounted to a three-month increase in pay of $30.00 a month on a rotating

basis for one or two of the instructor and

guides in each of the three sections: Escape,

Evasion and Survival, Mountain Leadership

and Unit Training. The first to receive this pay

in the Unit Training Section was Sergeant

Henry Vozka. At the time, a sergeant’s base

pay was about $150.00 a month and $30.00

amounted to a significant increase in pay. 

During that summer of 1960, Sergeant Vozka and

his section were preparing for a class on river crossing for a unit from Camp Pendleton. In the process,

Vozka tied one end of a two-rope bridge to a tree

on the bank of the West Walker River. Unfortunately, there were two trees there and the one

Vozka picked was not the favorite of Master Sergeant Chad J. Palmer, the noncommissioned officer-in-charge of the Unit Training Section. This

resulted in the “Top” giving Vozka some “corrective

guidance.” Well, the other members of the section

who were witnesses to the event took pleasure in

razzing Vozka by asking: “How could someone on

proficiency pay screw-up like that?” This chiding

continued into the unit training billeting Hut 4018

that night. The next morning, Vozka confronted the

center’s disbursing officer and said: “Sir, I’m returning this ‘pro-pay’ and I want you to stop paying it

to me.” The disbursing office looked at the $30.00

in cash on his counter and replied: “Sergeant Vozka,

I can’t take it back. You have the money and its

yours.” “Lieutenant, I don’t want it and I won’t take

it back,” said Vozka as he promptly walked out of

the disbursing office. On returning to the Unit

Training Section, he announced, “I am no longer

on ‘pro-pay,’ so get off my ass! Stunned speechless,

76 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

his fellow Marines did just that.144

There were certainly a number of extraordinary

enlisted Marines who served at Mountain Warfare

Training Center during this period of time whose

personal mettle proved every bit as hard as the

granite peaks that surrounded the meadow. But in

terms of sheer colorfulness, few, if any, could quite

measure up to the legendary Richard R. “Big Red”

Ebert, Jr., he strapping six feet and four inches tall,

220 pounds, red-thatched Ebert entered the Marine

Corps before World War II. He had fought in several

Pacific campaigns, including Iwo Jima, and later in

Korea as an artilleryman. “Perhaps this was the reason for his booming voice,” Sergeant Major Daniel

J. “Dan” Flynn wrote of him.* In 1964, “Red Ebert”

arrived at CWTC and relieved Sergeant Major Harry

A. Stoneburner as the training center sergeant

major. One staff noncommissioned officer who at

the time was serving at the training center remembers: “He was the original hard case. He snarled

rather than spoke and his mere presence could generate an aura of fear in everyone in the room, from

master sergeant to private.” There was no room for

anything but superb performance in Sergeant Major

Ebert’s book and even senior staff noncommissioned officers who admired the hell out of him

would tend to give him a wide berth when they

saw him making his daily inspection rounds of the

training center. Although tough, he could also show

a softer side by simply giving a good counseling

session to any Marine for whatever errant behavior,

and then reach right down to pull him back up and

send him on his way–the right way. “Red” was a

bachelor who lived in the staff noncommissioned

officers quarters. However, only a few of his fellow

staff noncommissioned officers were aware that

whenever he was in garrison, he would retire to his

room and place a nightly telephone call to his widowed mother. 145

Shifts in the Wind

In the early 1960s the strategic focus in the western Pacific began to slip away from the Korean

Peninsula toward Southeast Asia and the civil war

that had been re-ignited between the two Vietnams.

During March of 1961 the battle lines spread to the

Plans de Jars causing a temporary crisis in Laos. In

order to help stem the flow of the increasing number of Viet Cong who were infiltrating from North

Vietnam, in October, President John F. Kennedy, Jr.

* In the 1955 motion picture Battle Cry, it is not an actor, but rather

“Red” Ebert who is the bearded figure standing on the beach at

Guadalcanal who in a gravelly voice, contemptuously welcomes

Van Heflin’s battalion as it wades ashore with the words: “Well, if

it ain’t da pogey-bait Sixth finally coming to the war.”
Mountain Men, 1962–1965 77

authorized the Military Assistance Advisory Group

in the Republic of Vietnam be increased from 600

military advisors to 15,000; shortly thereafter, this

number would rise to 18,000. In 1962, the Marine

Corps Gazette devoted each of its 12 issues to

counter-guerilla warfare. Later “counterinsurgency”

eventually became the term of choice. Later in the

year, Headquarters Marine Corps issued guidance

directing that 25 percent of all classroom and field

training within the Fleet Marine Forces would be

devoted to unconventional warfare or counterinsurgency Operations. During December of 1962, Major

Kenneth J. “Ken” Skipper, the CWTC S-3 briefed

Colonel Nathaniel H. Carver and the staff on several

changes to training center’s formal schools program

for the next calendar year:

(1) The Escape, Evasion, and Survival Section

would conduct its normal load of 20 courses of 12

training days each. The anticipated total load of students would number about 760, including those

newly arrived CWTC personnel who would attend

the first week of escape, evasion and survival in-

“Zig” Ziglar retired as a gunnery sergeant in

1967, after a 20-year career which included a stint

with the China Marines. While he served in many

billets in many places, but his favorite duty station

was the Mountain Warfare Training Center in

Bridgeport, California:

“The years I spent at Pickel Meadow with

Colonel Gerald P. Averill and Colonel Glen E. Martin were the highlights of my career,” claimed

Ziglar, who is also known as Zig.

Fifty years after checking into MWTC, Zig still

recalled Colonel Averill’s eight-mile runs.

“I lost almost 30 pounds during my first month

up there!” said Ziglar. “When Colonel Martin came

in, we went back to three-mile runs.

Zig was also known as the “Game Warden.”

“Colonel Martin appointed me base Game Warden after I shot four sage hens by mistake,” recalled Zig. “I thought they were quail! The colonel

called me a poacher and said that as Game Warden

I’d have to learn what animals and birds were on

base, and which were protected.”

Zig took his Game Warden duties seriously. He

once gave the base chaplain a citation for shooting

a doe. The chaplain coughed up a fine of $125,

which went to Navy Relief.

“I remember another time when the commanding officer needed three Christmas trees to send

down to Camp Pendleton, El Toro, and Barstow,”

said Zig. “We went up into the mountains and

found three good ones and cut them down. Later

we learned we’d only taken the tops of the trees,

as the snow was 10 feet deep where we made the

cuts!.”

Ziglar fell in love with more than the mountains

above Pickel Meadow. In 1963, he married a

“Bridgeport girl” as the local village hosted its firstever Marine/military wedding.

Zig and Darlene returned to Bridgeport after he

retired and in 1968 they opened a main street business location, which over the years included a

laundry-mat, sporting goods store, and boutique.

The former Marine also got into local politics.

Zig was elected as a county supervisor in 1976, and

he reestablished mutually beneficial ties to the recently re-opened base.

“We had a deputy sheriff get hurt out in the

boondocks, and Colonel George A. Knudson responded right away to my request for help,” said

Zig. “He sent men right away and we got the guy

out.”

Circa 1978 there was an incident in Bridgeport

village when a Marine on liberty made suggestive

or threatening comments to a local girl. A complaint was filed and the situation began to receive

publicity.

Soon thereafter, the Camp Pendleton Base Commander, the 1st Marine Division Commanding General, and several colonels arrived in town to

demonstrate command interest.

Zig went to the meeting as county supervisor,

and recalls the commanding general making a

light-hearted comment about being nervous

around politicians.

“Well, I’m a retired Gunny and I get nervous

around generals,” responded Zig. The room filled

with laughter and the situation was satisfactorily

addressed.

Zig could have postponed his retirement.

“Colonel Martin was talking to me back in ‘67

and said I was up for first sergeant, if I stayed in,”

recalled Zig. “I said the only way I wouldn't retire

is if I could get orders back up to Pickel Meadow.

There was no billet so I retired. But I loved Bridgeport.”

As of 2009, Coy and Darlene Ziglar were still living in that house they built in 1968 in beautiful,

downtown Bridgeport. 

Coy D. Ziglar
struction. However, in order to comply with the latest JCS Pub-1 term, escape, evasion, and survival

would henceforth be referred to as survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE).

(2) The Training Branch at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps had directed that the name of the Mountain Leadership Course be changed to Mountain

Operations Course. Furthermore, it had approved

the recommendations of the training center that the

course be extended from three weeks’ duration to

four, in order that both classroom instruction and a

96-hour counter-guerrilla exercise could be integrated into the course syllabus. A total of 10 classes

would be conducted, three winters and seven summers for a total of about 310 students. This would

include newly arrived CWTC instructor-guides, as

well as four officers from the Korean Marine Corps

and about eight officers and staff noncommissioned

officers from the Chilean Marine Corps.*

(3) The Unit Training Section was expected to host

78 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

about 7,000 trainees during the year between its 10-

day winter indoctrination courses, hosting five infantry battalions from the 1st Marine Division and

provide two weeks of training to five rifle companies of the Organized Reserve during the summer.

During May 1963, Major Edwin A. Deptula reported from Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego 

and replaced Major Skipper as the training center

S-3. Major Deptula had earned a Silver Star and Purple Heart as a rifle platoon commander in the 5th

Marine Regiment during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Within a week after reporting to his new

duty station, the major enrolled himself in the

Mountain Operations Course that was just getting

underway.146

In July of the same year, a reception was held at

the base officer’s club to welcome the new commanding officer, Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr.,

and his wife Catherine to the training center. Like

his S-3, Colonel Wilkinson had transferred from Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego where he

served as a battalion commander in the Recruit

Training Regiment and as the G-2/Depot Inspector.

The 46-year old Wilkinson was born and raised in

Illinois. He had graduated from the University of

Michigan in 1941 and received his commission as a

second lieutenant in the Marine Corps in April 1942.

Lieutenant Wilkinson served his first five months of

active duty as a White House Aide to President Roosevelt, followed by four months of training with the

British Royal Commandos at Rosneath, Scotland.

From early 1944 until Japan’s surrender in September in 1945, he served in the Pacific theater as the

commanding officer of the detachment aboard the

USS Bataan (CVL 29), participating in combat operations off Okinawa and the Japanese home islands. During the Korean conflict Lieutenant

Colonel Wilkinson earned the Bronze Star Medal

with Combat “V” and the Army Commendation

Medal for his meritorious service as commanding

officer, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, and later

as a negotiator with the U.N. Military Armistice

Commission at Panmunjom, Korea. Following his

service as an instructor at Quantico, in 1958, he was

appointed as Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps and served in that capacity

for two years, earning his second Army Commendation Medal before receiving orders to the Marine

Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego.147

The energetic and outgoing new commander lost

no time in further promoting good relations with

the local community. Calling at the Forest Service

Office in Bridgeport, he assured the district ranger

that the provisions of the joint use agreement would

Courtesy of MWTC

An improvised shelter constructed by students during the Evasion Survival Field Exercise. Shelters are

constructed using native materials, ponchos, and

parachutes. Camouflage is important since they are

operating in enemy territory.

* About 1961, it became the practice to send Republic of Korea

Marine Officers who had graduated from The Basic School during the winter to the Winter Mountain Leadership Course before

returning home. The Chilean Marine Corps, which had the responsibility for garrisoning Chile’s disputed borders with Argentina in the harsh climate of Tierra de Fuego had also

requested quotas for its junior officers to attend the Winter

Mountain Leadership Course upon graduation from The Basic

School, and for its staff noncommissioned officers graduates

from the Drill Instructor School at MCRD, San Diego. These requests were granted and administered through the bi-lateral Military Assistance Program agreements between Chile, Republic of

Korea and the United States. 
Mountain Men, 1962–1965 79

continue to be scrupulously observed and respected. He promised further that the Marines stationed at CWTC stood ready to augment the

Toiyabe National Forest fire-fighting crews if the

need should arise. Likewise, he told the county supervisors and the sheriff of Mono County that while

he was in command, they could continue to count

on the training center to immediately furnish experienced search and rescue teams for civilians who

became lost, injured, or were killed during climbing

accidents within Mono County.*

During that summer, Colonel Wilkinson personally welcomed two distinguished visitors to the

training center. The first was the 22d Commandant

of the Marine Corps, General David M. Shoup, who

arrived in July. In the morning, General Shoup received a briefing by the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Carver, on the current status of the

dam that had been proposed by the Department of

Interior across the West Walker River back in 1956.

Lieutenant Colonel Carver pointed out that the local

ranchers and property owners still remained

strongly aligned against the project. “Frankly,” he

opined, “it is highly unlikely that a dam will ever

be constructed across the West Walker.” After receiving additional briefings from the S-3 and the

three officers-in-charge of the formal schools, the

Commandant was taken to the Leavitt Meadows

training site where he met the members of the

Mountain Operations Course and witnessed a

demonstration of the summer mountaineering techniques taught in the course.148

Soon after Labor Day, Under Secretary of the

Navy Paul B. Fay Jr., became the second distinguished official to visit the training center that year.

Reared in San Francisco and a pre-war graduate of

Stanford University, Paul Fay received his commission in the U.S. Navy as a line officer in 1942. During the Solomon Islands campaign he and John F.

Kennedy Jr., were fellow PT-boat skippers in the

* Over the years it had become common practice for local officials to call upon Marine Search and Rescue Teams upwards of

10 to 12 times each year. Most of the incidents happened during

the summer months, but occasionally they might involve a winter search for a missing cross-country skier. If the task involved

the recovery of a mountaineer who was known to have fallen

from a great height, the officer-in-charge of the team would be

“deputized” by the local sheriff before setting out, in order that

the victim could be officially pronounced dead once the body

had been located. Invariably, the instructor-guides who participated always learned new lessons and gained valuable experience from these rescue missions. 

Courtesy of MWTC

The Mountain Leadership Course included fixed rope installations. This picture shows a student crossing the

West Walker River using a suspension traverse system in the early 1960s.
same squadron. “The friendship between the boyish-looking, lanky Kennedy and the energetic, funloving Fay was immediate, and, after the war,

ripened into a warm and deep relationship.”149 The

still youthful-appearing and spirited Under Secretary

enthusiastically praised all that he saw and heard

during his daylong tour of the center. After witnessing the afternoon rock climbing demonstration,

however, the Secretary did express some disappointment at not being allowed to ride down the

200 foot “slide for life.”

Within days of taking command, Colonel Wilkinson eagerly applied himself to learning all aspects

of the various training programs being conducted

at CWTC. He soon became an active participant in

the monthly summer rock-climbing demonstrations,

underwent training as a student in the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Course, personally

took part in the graduation exercises of all formal

schools and also took a keen interest in the instruction given at FMF and Reserve unit training and

80 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

bivouac sites. As the new commander’s appreciation for the broad range of summer military mountaineering skills and survival techniques grew, the

more convinced he became that the old 1956 designated name Cold Weather Training Center was

outdated. The colonel therefore proposed through

the chain-of-command that the name be re-titled

Mountain Warfare Training Center. This recommendation was quickly approved. On 1 November

1963, the Post was officially re-designated Marine

Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California.150

The winter of 1963-1964 turned out to be light

in terms of accumulated snowfall. As a result, the

Mountain Operations and Unit Training Sections

were forced to maintain their respective training

bivouac sites at locations above the 9,000-foot level.

However, the mild winter conditions did give the

7th Engineer detachment that deployed from Camp

Pendleton that year the benefit of getting an early

start on the construction of Colonel Wilkinson’s

next building priority: an indoor gym. Recognizing

that the base offered little in the way of recreational

activities for the unmarried Marines and sailors during the long winter nights, he had plans drawn up

for a Butler building that would house indoor courts

for basketball and volleyball, a weight-lifting room,

and a head and shower facility. The new gym was

located uphill from the enlisted barracks area and

was open for business before summer ended. He

also directed that the engineers install a round

stained glass window above the altar in the Quonset hut that served as the base chapel. The window

was a gift and depicted the image of Saint Bernard,

the patron saint of mountaineers.*

During mid summer of 1964, Colonel A. J. S.

Crockett, OBE, the senior Royal Marine colonel assigned to the Defence Staff at the British Embassy

in Washington D.C. made an official tour of the

major U.S. Marine Corps installations located in the

western United States. His itinerary included a twoday visit to MWTC. On the second day, while

Colonel Wilkinson and his Royal Marine guest observed students of the Mountain Operations Course

practicing two-party climbs under the watchful eyes

of their instructor and guides, Colonel Crockett

turned to his host and said something to the effect:

“although equipment and techniques might vary

slightly, it appears to me that your mountaineering

program very closely parallels what we teach our

Marines at the Assault Climbing Wing at Lympstone

during the summer and in Scotland during the winter. Would you be interested in establishing an ofCourtesy of author

Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson Jr., Commanding Officer, Cold Weather Training Center, jumps from a

cliff face to demonstrate the suspension traverse at

Demonstration Rock, Leavitt Training Area in the

summer of 1963.

* Today, this same window can still be seen in the beautiful base

chapel that overlooks the meadow.
Mountain Men, 1962–1965 81

ficer exchange program between our two schools?”

Being a graduate of the World War II Commando

Course himself, Colonel Wilkinson unhesitatingly

agreed and said: he thought it was “a splendid idea

that would be beneficial to both our Corps.” “Done

then,” replied the Royal Marine Colonel. “But I believe if I was the one to initiate our little scheme

through the Commander, British Navy Staff at our

embassy in Washington, our proposal may stand a

chance of getting to our respective Commandant’s

for a decision faster, then if you were to do so.”

Colonel Wilkinson also agreed to this suggestion.151

Within two months, the captain selected by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps to be the first officer to

represent the U.S Marine Corps under this new exchange program that was slated to start in January

1965, was enrolled as a student in the Mountain

Operations summer course.*

It was also in 1964 when Major General Robert

E. Cushman Jr., Director of Training at Headquarters

U.S. Marine Corps issued a directive that caught all

ranks at MWTC, including the commanding officer

by complete surprise. Effective immediately, the directive said, students at Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Courses would no longer undergo prisoner of war compound exercises in the

present format, whereby students were treated as if

they were actual prisoners of war. Instead, students

Courtesy of Leatherneck

A Quonset hut served as the base chapel; Colonel Wilkinson arranged that a stained-glass window be installed

into the rear wall of the hut above the altar.

The stained-glass window in the base chapel depicts

Saint Bernard, the patron saint of the mountaineer.

Courtesy of Leatherneck

* Unfortunately, this officer, although a qualified parachutist, suffered from acrophobia and therefore was administratively

dropped from the course at its midpoint. Headquarters, Marine

Corps subsequently selected Capt George Douse for this assignment.
would be walked through the compound while instructors would explain and point out the type of

treatment they might have to endure should they

ever become a prisoner of war, but such treatment

could only be described and not physically applied

against them.152 When this directive was published,

instructors and former students alike believed the

new policy was a mistake. Even new students to

the course sometimes felt “cheated” for not having

the chance to test their own stamina under stress.

Notwithstanding their deep disappointment and belief that the effectiveness of the training had been

severely diminished, there was nothing the instructor-guides of the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and

Escape and Mountain Operations Courses could do,

but comply and make the best of it. Shortly after issuing this directive, Major General Cushman became the Commanding General, Camp Pendleton

and made a personal visit to the training center before the summer programs had ended for the year. 

On the day following the 10 November 1964 Ma82 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

rine Birthday Ball in Reno, a heavy storm lashed the

Sierra Nevada Mountains bringing three-to four-foot

drifts on the valley floor at Pickel Meadow. A promise of good snow conditions was in the air as instructor-guides packed away climbing gear and

once again started practicing their downhill and

cross-country ski techniques. In early December

Major Deptula, the S-3, predicted that over 8,500

Marines would undergo training at MWTC in1965.

But by now, Captain James P. “Jim” Sheehan, First

Lieutenant Richard R. “Dick” Mannila, and their unit

chief, Gunnery Sergeant Bernard G. Goddard, who

collectively headed up the Unit Training Section,

had become veteran instructor-guides. Captain

William S. “Bill” Moriarty, who was relatively new

to the training center, had already relieved Captain

George A. Knudson as the officer-in charge of the

Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Section

and was anxious to get started. The senior instructor

and guide of the Mountain Operations Section had

just been transferred, but Captain Robert A. “Bob”

Courtesy of author

Major General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton with his

staff, and Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., Commanding Officer, Cold Weather Training Center, on General

Cushman’s left, observe rock-climbing at the Leavitt Training Area in September 1964. The Marine in summer

dress is Marine Barracks, Hawthorne, Nevada, commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Lewis R. Webb.
Mountain Men, 1962–1965 83

Johnson, a graduate of the

course, was slated to arrive

and would soon take over

those duties. In the meantime,

First Lieutenant Douglas W.

“Doug” Gow and the unit

chief, Gunnery Sergeant

Ronald L. Burtsell, were more

than capable of leading this

highly experienced team of

instructor and guides, whose

adopted motto for the course

was “Zum Gipfel” (To the

Top).*

 Moreover, the added

week of instruction in counterinsurgency subjects to the

Mountain Operations syllabus

had by this time been perfected and proven to be a

good fit with the overall objectives of the course. A U.S.

Air Force colonel from the

Counterinsurgency Coordination Office of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff arrived at Mountain

Warfare Training Center in

October 1964 to get a first-hand look at the final

field exercise conducted in the Twin Lakes region.

The colonel’s report concluded that the exercise

was one of the most realistic and demanding scenarios that he had ever witnessed. By now, Navy

SEALS (sea, air, land) team members had also been

added to the list of students enrolling in the summer

Mountain Operation’s courses. And the Navy was

requesting more quotas for its SEAL teams during

the1965 training year. 

As the 1965 winter courses were getting underway, two new bachelor officers reported for duty

at the training center. The first to arrive in mid January was the first Royal Marine to be formally appointed as an exchange to MWTC. His name was

Captain James N.A. Goldsworthy. Jim Goldsworthy

had been born to coffee planter parents in Kenya

in 1936 where he spent his early years. After completing school in England, he was given a commission as a second lieutenant in the Royal Marines in

1955. While still undergoing training, he served in

the Cliff Assault Troop, 42 Commando, during the

Anglo-French combined assault to seize the Suez

Canal. Upon completion of his training in 1958, he

was assigned to the 45 Commando as a platoon

leader where he served until 1960. He spent one

year at the Recruit Depot, Royal Marines, and then

was assigned as an instructor at the Cliff Assault

Wing, Royal Marine Infantry Training Center. While

there, he had undergone winter training at the Norwegian Army Winter School and also became a

qualified parachutist. Captain Goldsworthy was

serving on HMS Gurkha in the Persian Gulf when

he received his orders to report to the U.S. Marine

Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center.153 Jim

Goldsworthy later recalled that Captain Bill Moriarty

drove him to the training center after meeting him

at the Reno airport. That night, he attended a mess

night at the officers’ club, where General Cushman

was welcomed as the guest of honor. “Thus my timing for getting to know all of the training center officers could not have been more fortuitous,” he

would later remark. The next officer to report for

duty as an instructor was First Lieutenant Harry W.

Jenkins Jr., a native Californian who was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps

in 1960 upon receiving a bachelor’s degree from

* This team included Lts Hugh L. Scott III and Robert L. “Bob”

Gray Jr., SSgts Lonnie “Moose” Henderson and Theodore E.

“Boone” Neal, Sgts William T. “Billie” West, John Spofford, Marvin K. Moore, William E. Hoke, and Cpl T. Trinidad. Lt Gray was

a native of Putney, Vermont and became a competitor on the

U.S. Cross-Country Ski Team; Sgt Hoke was killed in action in

Vietnam while serving with the U.S. Army; Cpl Trinidad was later

awarded the Silver Star Medal for his gallantry in Vietnam. After

completing his tour of duty at MWTC, Lt Gow joined the ranks

of the FBI, where he distinguished himself by eventually becoming its Director of Operations (third highest office within the Bureau) during the 1990s.

Courtesy of author

Instructors staffed the training village of “Alpino” near the headwaters of Cattle

Creek in the Hoover Wilderness Area. The village was used in counterinsurgency training as part of the Mountain Operations syllabus. Students were

trained to cooperate and communicate with indigenous inhabitants. Here “villagers” include, left to right, Staff Sergeant Lonnie Henderson, Gunnery Sergeant Ronald Burtsell, and Staff Sergeant Theodore Neal.
San Jose State College. After completing tours as a

platoon commander in the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, Lieutenant Jenkins was posted to the Marine

Barracks, San Francisco Naval Shipyard, where he

served as the barracks executive officer until joining

the instructor staff at MWTC in late January 1965.

Before the year was out, Captain Goldsworthy and

Lieutenant Jenkins, who served side-by-side in the

Unit Training Section, were to form a lasting friendship that would pay dividends during the conduct

of Marine Corps winter field operations in northern

Norway two decades later. 154

As the winter season of 1965 passed smoothly,

84 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of author

Then Captain O.K. Steele, one of the authors, while

a Mountain Leader Instructor at the MWTC during

this period.

the morale, professionalism and qualifications of its

staff of instructors and support personnel seemed

to have reached its zenith since the activation of the

post nearly 14 years earlier. After going through

years of growing pains, and fears of being misjudged as irrelevant and of little value, it now appeared to those serving at the training center that

there was nothing that could come in the way of

Colonel Averill’s vow to keep the center alive for

generations of Marine’s yet to come. Nothing perhaps, except for the yet unforeseen adverse circumstances of a six-year major military commitment that

the United States would soon undertake in Southeast Asia.

Royal Marine Captain James N. A. Goldsworthy,

while an instructor in the Cliff Assault Wing, Royal

Marine Infantry Training Center, prior to the exchange tour with the U.S. Marines.

Courtesy of Maj James N. A. Goldsworthy, RM
The northern half of Mono County, California,

is the locale for two interesting ghost towns, both

about 20 miles drive from the county seat at

Bridgeport. As ghost towns go they are quite dissimilar. The most famous is Bodie, to the southeast. It

lies dormant in a state of preservation and is visited by tourists, but Bodie will never re-awake. The

other, the Mountain Warfare Training Center at

Pickel Meadows, also is sleeping and is being preserved. But nobody comes to visit.

-Nevada State Journal, 28 July 1968

Vietnam War Backdrop

By early 1965, General Westmoreland’s Military

Advisory Command, Vietnam (MACV) had already

established a number of U.S. installations and air

bases throughout South Vietnam. These airfields

gave the United States the means to provide unlimited helicopter and close air support to South Vietnamese ground forces and their American advisors,

as well as the added capability to launch limited air

strikes against North Vietnam. In February, however,

the Viet Cong succeeded in conducting a strong

ground attack against the American Army helicopter

base at Pleiku causing severe damage to a number

of U.S. aircraft. As a result, General Westmoreland

made a request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that

U.S. ground forces be dispatched to Vietnam for the

purpose of providing ground security for these installations. The JCS concurred with this request and

President Lyndon B. Johnson gave his approval on

25 February. Subsequently on 8 March, the JCS directed the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Forces 

(CinCPac) to start landing the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9th MEB) at Da Nang, South Vietnam. By nightfall, the two reinforced infantry

battalions of the 9th MEB (one battalion landing

team was airlifted from Okinawa) had taken up defensive positions around the Da Nang air base. The

Joint Chief of Staff instructions relayed through

CinCPac to the 9th MEB commander, Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, made it clear that the mission

of the 3,500-man force would be limited to the security of the air base and that “Marines will not, repeat, will not engage in day-to-day actions against

the Viet Cong.”155 In mid-April, the president approved the recommendation of the secretary of defense that two additional battalion landing teams be

sent to the 9th MEB, one to Da Nang and the other

to the airfield at Phu Bai, plus a U.S. Army infantry

division to other parts of Vietnam. 

As the year progressed, General Westmoreland

continued to propose additional U.S. ground deployments to Vietnam. As a consequence, between

the end of March and the beginning of July—a period of only three months—the force levels climbed

incrementally from 33,000 to a new presidential approved force level of 180,000. At the same time,

President Johnson also decided to relax any restrictions on the use of these forces and to “move from

the mission of base security to the mission of active

combat in whatever way seems wise to General

Westmoreland.”156 “Search and destroy” would soon

become the strategy for American forces in Vietnam. 

MWTC on the Slippery Slope

On 6 June 1965, Colonel Frank Wilkinson passed

the MWTC organizational colors to his Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lester V. “Swede” Swenson

and departed for Vietnam. Until this time, the increase in the force levels being dispatched to Vietnam had not caused a significant reduction to either

the student loads or the FMF infantry battalions reporting to MWTC for training. But now, lead elements of the 1st Marine Division were also starting

to deploy toward the expeditionary airfield under

construction at Chu Lai; therefore, it would not be

long before the entire division would join with the

3d Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

as a part of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III

MAF) in the I Corps Tactical Area of Operations.

In mid August, the III MAF headquarters was

alerted to an impending attack against the Chu Lai

air base by the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. Major General Lewis W. “Lou” Walt, the Commanding General

of III MAF, decided to take the fight to the enemy

before they could move to their assault positions.

On 16 August, III MAF launched Operation Starlite,

which consisted of a coordinated regimental-size attack from the sea and by air. This was one of the

first major engagements for the Marines since the

Korean War. For six days the two sides battled at

close quarters until the enemy withdrew from the

field. Operation Starlite proved to be merely a sample of the intensity and scope of the many combat

operations that lay ahead. 

On 7 June, Lieutenant Colonel Swenson’s first

day in command, MWTC suffered one of its worst

and most unfortunate training accidents. During the

afternoon, a rifle company from the 1st Battalion,

85

Chapter 9

In the Doldrums, 1966–1979
25th Marines, which was there for two weeks of Reserve annual training, was undergoing practical application in stream-crossing techniques. The site

was on the West Walker River, just below the Leavitt

Flat public campground. While crossing a one-rope

bridge, using the “commando crawl” technique,

Staff Sergeant John F. Kilfoyle lost his balance and

fell into the fast moving water. The instructor-guide

from the Special Training Unit, who was assigned

downstream as the safety swimmer for the exercise

and was roped up, immediately dove into the water

to pull the floating staff sergeant to shore. About

the same time, First Lieutenant Richard L. Straehl,

one of the company officers who was standing on

the bank, also jumped into the stream to assist. In

the ensuing confusion, the safety swimmer became

overpowered by the floundering of both men. As a

result, both reservists missed catching the downstream safety rope. Before anyone could get a second line to them, they were swept away by the

current and drowned in the churning white waters

and whirlpools of the narrow gorge that lay several

hundred yards downstream. Two years earlier in

the late spring of 1963, three enlisted Marines who

were in an off-duty status from the MWTC Motor

Transport Section had drowned in the same stretch

of water on a Sunday afternoon while attempting

to shoot the rapids using 6x6 truck tire inner tubes

that they had lashed together. Weeks of searching

for their remains in the gorge and along the banks

of the river proved futile. It was not until several

months later that their bodies surfaced and were

discovered by fishermen in the meadow below.157

Similarly, it was nine weeks later before a fisherman

reported finding the remains of Staff Sergeant Kilfoyle. His body was recovered on 30 July 1965. The

body of Lieutenant Straehl was not recovered until

27 August.158

On 16 July, while the investigation and search

for the two drowned Marines was still going on,

Lieutenant Colonel Swenson relinquished his temporary command of the training center to Colonel

John B. Bristow. John Bristow was a veteran of over

23 years of active Marine Corps service and was the

G-3 at Headquarters, FMFLant when he received orders to take command of MWTC. The 45-year old

commander had been born in Shanghai, China and

had entered the Marine Corps in March of 1942 after

graduating from Colgate University. During World

War II, he served as an artillery officer in the 10th

Marines during the assaults on Tarawa, Saipan and

Tinian. Following the war, he was assigned to attend an 18-month Chinese Language Course at the

University of California. After graduating from the

course in 1946, Captain Bristow was ordered to

North China where he became the intelligence of86 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy Leatherneck

A Reserve Marine practices stream-crossing techniques near the Leavitt Meadows Campground. The “commando

crawl” technique depicted here on a one-rope bridge was the technique being attempted by Staff Sergeant Kilfoyle when he and First Lieutenant Straehl lost their lives.
In the Doldrums, 1966–1979 87

ficer (S-2) for the 4th Marine Regiment and later

served as the assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the

Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific. During the

closing campaigns of the Korean War, Major Bristow served as the executive officer of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines until June 1953, when he was

assigned duties as the Marine liaison officer on the

U.N. Peace Commission in Korea. Subsequent tours

of duty before reporting to Headquarters, FMFLant,

included two assignments to Formosa as an advisor

to the Chinese Marine Corps, assistant director for

recruiting with the 4th Marine Corps District, three

years with the 2d Marine Division as Commanding

Officer, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines; Executive Officer,

2d Marines; and finally commanding the regiment.159

Like his predecessors, Colonel Bristow took a

keen interest in the welfare of his troops and in the

unique training courses that the training center provided. During his first six months, the trailers that

had served for the last eight years as enlisted family

housing outside of Walker in Antelope Valley, were

replaced with 40 three-bedroom mobile homes procured from the U.S. Air Force. A platoon from the

Naval Construction Battalion, Port Hueneme, California made other improvements to the Antelope

Valley Housing area including the addition of a

10,000-gallon liquid propane storage tank, which

gave sufficient fuel storage capacity to last the winter season, and the installation of a master television

antenna. 

However, with the 1st Marine Division now fully

deployed to Southeast Asia, Colonel Bristow must

have foreseen that it would not be long before he

was presiding over a command with diminishing

prospects for the future. With the exception of the

Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Course,

which trained 153 officers and 236 enlisted during

the last six months of 1965, student loads for the

other course programs were clearly on a downward

spiral. For the same period, five summer Mountain

Operations Courses had graduated only 33 officers

and 82 enlisted, who for the most part came from

the east coast, or the Reserves.* Similarly, the Special

Training Unit could claim it had provided training

for only 48 officers and 836 enlisted, a fraction of its

normal summer training load. Most of the seats

were filled by units of the Marine Corps Reserve.160

On 10 November that year, the command celebrated the Marine Corps Birthday with a traditional

grand ball at the Mapes Hotel in Reno, Nevada.

Nevada’s Lieutenant Governor (and future Governor and U.S. Senator) Paul Laxalt was the Guest of

Honor. Shortly thereafter, the notification from

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps that many had

been dreading arrived in the form of CMC ltr

AO3CLO-mek, dated 27 November 1965. This

placed MWTC in a temporary reduced manning status. In addition, it directed the “cancellation of

Mountain Operations, Cold Weather Indoctrination

and Reserve Training Courses. All facilities to support this training are to be placed in a standby status and prepared to resume operations on short

notice.”161

No one was more disappointed with this sudden

turn of events than Captain Jim Goldsworthy, the

* The number of students in the September class was made up

of three officers and five enlisted. 

Courtesy of Maj James N. A. Goldsworthy, RM. 

Captain James Goldsworthy, Royal Marines, while

serving as an exchange officer at the Mountain

Warfare Training Center in 1965. Goldsworthy

later supervised the Survival, Escape, Resistance to

Interrogation, and Evasion course at Marine Corps

Base, Camp Pendleton.
Royal Marine exchange officer. Several of the RM

mountaineering techniques he had introduced in

both the summer and winter courses had been

widely accepted by his fellow instructor and guides

in Mountain Operations and the Unit Training Sections. Colonel Bristow was so impressed with the

techniques that Captain Goldsworthy had introduced that he directed they be adopted for use and

incorporated into the MWTC standing operating

procedures. During the previous May, Captain

Goldsworthy had written to his superiors, requesting that his one-year of exchange duty be extended

six months. 

“My main reason for this request,” he explained,

“is that having arrived in the middle of a winter season and being due to leave in the middle of the next

one, I will not have had sufficient continuity to be

of real value to the training center. I am particularly

keen to have a full winter season here because I

have gained the interest of the staff in certain Norwegian techniques, which I learned on the White

Shod Course, and which the colonel intends to

adopt next year. Having gained the interest, I would

very much like to see and assist in putting them to

the test in practice.” 

This request for an extension received the blessing of Colonel Crockett in the British Embassy and

was approved by Royal Marine headquarters in London.162 But with the cancellation of the 1966 winter

courses, this extension was of little value. Colonel

Bristow therefore, made every effort to assist his exchange officer in becoming usefully employed. On

19 January, Captain Goldsworthy departed MWTC

and on the next day, reported to Staging Battalion

at Camp Pendleton. Here, for the next six months,

he was tasked with the organization and supervision

of a three-day survival, escape, resistance, evasion

training program for troops preparing for duty in

Vietnam. 

In February, 1966, CMC ltr AO1E/bjf of 24 February 1966, published T/O A7670, reducing the manning level of MWTC to seven Marine officers, 89

Marine enlisted, one Navy officer, and three Navy

enlisted. The survival escape, resistance evasion program would continue to be the only course offered

by the center. Ironically, the Air Force had recently

announced that Stead Air Force Base in Reno, Nevada, would close in June, with the base exchange

and commissary remaining open only through April.

Giving that the training center was brought down to

its new manning level, Major John E. Lorzing, the S4, also assumed duties as the executive officer. Captain Bill Moriarty, the senior instructor and guide of

the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Section, assumed the additional duty as the MWTC S-3. 

On 10 October 1966, Colonel Bristow bade

farewell to his few officers and enlisted Marines

who remained and turned the command over to his

Executive Officer, Major John E. Lorzing. A small,

but spirited group from the training center celebrated the Marine Corps Birthday on 10 November

that year at the Sahara Tahoe Hotel at Stateline, Nevada. But as everyone suspected, this would be the

last birthday celebrated by the training center for

some years to come. At the close of the year, MWTC

reported that 579 officer and enlisted Marines had

successfully graduated from the Survival Evasion,

Resistance, and Escape Program.163

Deactivation and Caretaker Status

From January through mid-August 1967, 348 students completed the Survival, Evasion, Resistance,

and Escape course. In addition, from 21 January

through 3 February, the training center provided ski

indoctrination training to 230 Marines from Company K, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, 2d Marine Division, which was preparing for a winter exercise in

northern Norway. Company B, 2d Reconnaissance

Battalion, also received two weeks of mountaineering training during May of that year.164 However,

with the troop levels in Vietnam approaching the

half-million mark, these represented merely the last

gasps and vestiges of a command that had once

processed over 23,000 trainees in a single year. But

as the Commandant of the Marine Corps would

soon claim: “Today, there are only three categories

of Marines: those who are in Vietnam; those who

have just returned from Vietnam, and those who are

going to Vietnam.”165

The official date that the training center was

placed in a “cadre status” is not recorded. However,

it can be surmised from the final MWTC command

chronology report that the decision was probably

made in August of 1967. This report, which coincides with the official MWTC closure date of 10 October 1967, describes the flurry and nature of

activity during the command’s final six weeks of operations:

Caretaker unit strength has been established as one Marine officer, two Marine

SNCOs and two civilian employees.

A steady reduction in personnel has occurred since 1 September 1967 due to command being placed in a caretaker status.

Strength has been reduced to zero. Caretaker

personnel will be carried on the rolls of Headquarters Company, Service Battalion, Headquarters Regiment, Camp Pendleton,

California Correspondence and S&C files have

been transferred to Camp Pendleton. Post Of88 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
In the Doldrums, 1966–1979 89

fice has been deactivated. Publications will be

retrained at the training center.

Quonset huts have been secured for a period of inactivity. They are denuded of furnishings. Heat is secured.

Many items of food preparation equipment

have been removed from the mess hall and

sent to Camp Pendleton. Operational rations

augmented with fresh milk and coffee was fed

from 25 September to 10 October. 

All field wire and field telephones were removed. Switchboard and autovon line are secured. Service is now restricted to one

commercial line. 

Organizational, plant account, special services and property belonging to the Central

Service Agency has been returned to Camp

Pendleton, with few exceptions. Mountain

Operational equipment has been retained.

Transfer of cold-weather equipment and

clothing is pending and may be sent to Fleet

Marine Force, Atlantic.166

Although the red and gold sign at the main gate

still read “Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training

Center,” the entrance would remain barred and

locked while the center gradually drifted into five

years of inactivity and neglect. During this period,

a caretaker unit of 4 to 5 Marines from the base

maintenance organization at Camp Pendleton

would be the only permanent Marine Corps presence at MWTC for the next nine years.

Use it or Lose it!

By April 1969, over 550,000 American troops had

been committed to the defense of the Republic of

Vietnam. This included 80,000 Marines then assigned under the III MAF. In July of that year, President Richard M. Nixon announced a change to the

policies of the previous six years. In keeping with

the president’s new doctrine, U.S. ground combat

forces would begin to disengage and gradually turn

over responsibility for defense of the various battlefronts to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

Among the media and in military circles this became known as the “Vietnamization Program.” By

early 1971, almost all U.S. Marines had departed

Vietnam and returned to their permanent bases in

Okinawa, Hawaii, or California. The last Marine infantry battalion to withdraw from Da Nang enclave

was the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, which returned

to Camp Pendleton on 26 March 1971. By the middle of the year, only two U.S. Marine units remained

in Vietnam: the Marine Advisory Unit and a Detachment of the 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company,

which together numbered less than 250 officers and

men.167

In the immediate aftermath of its return to Camp

Pendleton, the 1st Marine Division soon became

but a shadow of its former self; in reality, it was a

division in name only. For the next 18 months,

under the command of Major General Ross T.

Dwyer, Regimental Landing Team 7 (RLT-7) was the

only organization that was maintained at a C-2 level

of combat readiness and capable of deployment.

These were the days when recruiting and standards

under the all-volunteer force had dropped to their

lowest level and racial tension, discipline problems,

and drug use occupied much of the attention of

every unit and organizational leader throughout the

Corps. In addition, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps

had rightly given priority for manning to the 2d and

3d Marine Divisions using the rationale that those

were the two divisions that would have to deploy

first to the next likely threat. As a result, the 1st and

5th Marine Regiments and the 1st Division’s separate battalions were either largely burdened with

conducting three-month on-the-job training courses

for individual Marines in approximately 15 military

occupational specialties (MOSs). Those Marines

Courtesy of Leatherneck

Staff Sergeant George Taylor, one of four Marines

assigned as caretakers of the training center in

1974, makes regular checks on the MWTC water

supply point.
were then shipped out to Okinawa or made up “reduced manning battalions/units” with a limited

table of organization strength just barely capable of

maintaining their organizational equipment. 

With the exception of the local Reserve unit in

Reno, Nevada, MWTC had remained virtually unused since mid-1967. Then in 1972, the 1st Marine

Division Training Exercise and Employment Plan

called for the conduct of a summer joint air-mobility

exercise. Using Military Airlift Command (MAC)

transport aircraft, the plan envisioned that personnel and equipment of one Marine infantry battalion

would be airlifted by MAC. Therefore, the division

G-3 likely reasoned that rather than remain at Naval

Air Station Fallon, why not have the battalion transported to Bridgeport by busses with its rolling stock

in trace? This would allow the battalion five days

of field training at MWTC. The Commanding General, Camp Pendleton, who for some time had been

fielding inquiries from the District Ranger’s Office 

in Bridgeport concerning the Marine Corps’ intentions for resuming operations at the training center,

was pleased to approve the plan, but with the

caveat that no base services would be available to

the using battalion. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,

under the command of Major John I. Hopkins, was

selected to be the airlifted battalion and therefore

became the first FMF organization to return to

MWTC since its deactivation five years earlier. Although the training time at MWTC was judged by

the troops as “too abbreviated,” the exercise was

nonetheless considered worthwhile. Therefore, division planners scheduled three identical exercises

for the summer of 1973, but would allow 21 training

days at Pickel Meadow for each battalion. Marine

Corps Base, Camp Pendleton approved the use of

the training center for these exercises, but again reminded the division planners that no support services would be available.168

During the early spring of 1973, the personnel

situation for the 1st Marine Division improved. The

G-1 briefed that by 1 May the division would have

sufficient strength to man six infantry battalions

with their accompanying combat support and combat service support units. As a result, Brigadier General Adolph G. Schwenk, the division commander,

directed that the 2d and 3d Battalions of each of his

infantry regiments (1st, 5th and 7th) be brought up

to strength, (less one rifle company)* while the 1st

Battalions of each regiment would carry on the task

of providing entry level MOS skill training. Shortly

thereafter, Major General Kenneth J. Houghton,

who in 1950-1951 had earned his first Silver Star

and Bronze Star Medals with the Reconnaissance

Company in Korea, assumed command of the 1st

90 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Marine Division. During the closing days of May,

the newly reactivated 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, became the second FMF battalion to be airlifted to

Naval Air Station Fallon and thence transported by

bus to MWTC with its organizational vehicles following in trace. Because this was to be extended

three-week “bare bones” deployment, the battalion

was reinforced with a logistic support unit (LSU)

from the division’s combat service support battalions, which included a truck detachment, an expeditionary shower unit, ration handling and a

refueling unit for trucks and aircraft. Moreover, a

four-plane detachment of Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight

helicopters (on a two-plane rotation between Naval

Air Station Fallon and MWTC) was placed in direct

support for the purpose of providing troop lifts and

emergency medical evacuation to the Naval Hospital located at Naval Air Station Lemoor, California.

The commanding officer of the battalion had previously served a tour of duty as the senior instructor

and guide of the mountain leadership school at

MWTC during the early 1960s. Therefore, in addition to the above logistical support, he also

arranged for eight Marines from the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company who were graduates of the

Summer Mountain Leadership Course to be attached to the battalion to provide instruction in the

basic skills and techniques of military mountaineering. The I Marine Amphibious Force training allowance pool provided sufficient ropes, snap-links,

and other climbing gear for this purpose. For a recently reformed infantry battalion, this extended deployment to MWTC was especially beneficial. Here,

away from all the distractions of Camp Pendleton,

troop leaders could concentrate on “the basics” of

maneuvering in terrain that was completely unfamiliar to them. While the battalion headquarters

used its time to train in the conduct of field command post operations, the three rifle companies

and heavy weapon platoons (81mm mortars and

106mm recoilless rifles) were rotated through fiveday blocks of round-robin training stations at different locales. One station, for example,

concentrated on day and night map reading; a second on patrolling, while the third emphasized offensive and defensive small-unit tactics. The fourth

station, conducted at the Leavitt Training Area, was

a centralized block of instruction under the supervision of the force reconnaissance detachment. At

this station, the troops received practical application

in basic military mountaineering skills such as: balance climbing, knot tying and rope-management,

* Under the table of organization and equipment at the time, the

Marine infantry battalion was comprised of a headquarters and

service company and four rifle companies.
In the Doldrums, 1966–1979 91

rappelling, river crossing and the construction of

rope installations, including one and two-rope

bridges, suspension traverses and vertical hauling

lines. Midway through the deployment, commercial busses were chartered for each company to

make a 36-hour liberty run to Reno as they completed various phases of training.

At the end of the deployment, the commander

of the battalion decided to culminate the exercise

with a 50-mile hike. After coordinating with the District Forest Ranger at Bridgeport, a route was approved that ran from MWTC up the Burcham Flat

road to a lake located at the 9,000-foot summit of

the Sweetwater Range. There, the route meandered

northeasterly into Smith Valley, near the town of

Wellington, Nevada. The owner of a ranch bordering the state highway that ran south out of Wellington was asked beforehand if he would permit 650

Marines to bivouac in one of his fields for four or

five hours, until commercial busses arrived to pick

them up. “Sure,” he replied, “it’s full of rattlesnakes,

but go ahead.” Thus at 0600 on a cool, cloudless

day, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, departed from

the MWTC airfield in a column of companies that

were spaced 15-minutes apart. Eighteen and a half

hours later, the last company arrived intact (there

had been no stragglers) at the bivouac site cheered

on by an equally exhausted battalion commander

and his sergeant major.* As the tired Marines found

and crawled into their pre-staged sleeping bags, rattlesnakes were the furthest things from their minds.

Four hours later, the busses arrived right on time to

transport the foot-sore but proud young Marines to

Naval Air Station Fallon. There they loaded aboard

the same MAC Lockheed C-141 Constellation aircraft that were in the process of flying in the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, for the short flight back to

El Toro.169

During that summer of 1973, the feisty and energetic General Houghton personally visited each

of his three battalions during their deployments to

MWTC. Based on what he witnessed and the enthusiastic reports of the officers and men he spoke

to relative to the value of the training they were receiving at MWTC, he directed his G-3 to schedule

four battalions for the summers of 1974 and 1975,

* The author was the battalion commander; the battalion SgtMaj

was Leland D. “Crow” Crawford who would later become the

SgtMaj of the Marine Corps (1979-1983) under Gen Robert Barrow.

Courtesy of Leatherneck

Marines of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines eat chow at the field mess galley while training at the Mountain Warfare

Training Center in 1974. They set up tents in the lower Pickel Meadow base camp along Highway 108 and

were supported by the logistic support unit.
92 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of Leatherneck

A logistics support unit was sent to support the training at center for the first time in 1974. These service and

support Marines are performing maintenance on a forklift and a truck.

Marines from 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, erect a AN/RC292 antenna during training at MWTC, in 1974.

Courtesy of Leatherneck
In the Doldrums, 1966–1979 93

but with one modification. Instead of each battalion

being burdened with the transportation of expeditionary equipment such as its tactical vehicles, field

ranges, refrigerators, shower units and the like, he

directed that a logistics support unit be formed and

stationed at MWTC from May through October. An

logistic support unit, the general said, would add

mobility for the training units and provide continuity for support activities. This became the pattern of

use at MWTC for the ensuing two years. 

In 1975, the 1st Marine Division, then under the

command of Brigadier General William L. McCulloch, was tasked by Commanding General, Fleet

Marine Force, Pacific, to provide a reinforced rifle

company as the landing force for a naval exercise

that was scheduled to take place in Alaskan waters

during mid-March. The purpose of the exercise was

to demonstrate the U.S. Navy’s capability to protect

the newly constructed oil pipeline and terminal facilities at Prudhoe Bay. 

The 7th Marines designated a rifle company to

conduct the exercise. The commanding general

then gave his division training officer the responsibility of establishing a two-week cold-weather oversnow training program prior to the embarkation of

the company. Volunteers from throughout the division who either had previous military, or civilian ski

experience formed a 12-man enlisted instructor

group. Captain Barry E.C. Fellinger, who had been

an infantryman during the Chosin Reservoir campaign and who was recognized as an extremely

able rifle company commander, was named as the

officer-in-charge of the instructor group. Boxed lesson plans from the former Unit Training ColdWeather Indoctrination Course were obtained from

the files at Camp Pendleton, while skis, snowshoes

and cold-weather uniforms and boots were drawn

from the I Marine Amphibious Force training allowance pool. Traveling by van, the division training officer and instructor group arrived at Pickel

Courtesy of Leatherneck

In addition to logistic support, helicopter detachments also deployed to the center to support infantry battalions

training there. Pictured is a Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion.
Meadow on a Sunday night in February to find the

base camp under two feet of newly fallen snow. A

small instructor base camp was established in the

Quonset huts of the old mountain leadership

school. For the next several days, the composite instructor group polished up their lesson plans and

their own individual techniques for snowshoeing

and cross-country skiing. By the time the 7th

Marines’ rifle company arrived, Captain Fellinger

was ready for them. After a nine-year hiatus, MWTC

was once again available for winter training operations.170

Reactivation of the Mountain Warfare

Training Center 

Although by the mid-1970s 1st Marine Division

had started to make use of MWTC on a more regular basis. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps had yet

to signify to the Department of Agriculture its future

intentions for reopening the training center, or even

when that might be. Meanwhile, the District Forest

Ranger at Bridgeport began placing an increasing

number of restrictions on training by 1st Division

using units. In late May of 1974, for example, an incident occurred in the vicinity of Leavitt Lodge involving two off-duty Marines. Although no official

complaint was filed, local Forest Service officials decided to suspend Marine units from using the Leavitt

Area rock climbing and stream crossing sites for the

remainder of the year. As a result, training in rock

climbing and mountaineering skills had to be shifted

to the much less desirable site located in the vicinity

of Grouse Meadow. The G-3 of the 1st Marine Division officially objected to the suspension order of

the Forest Service and the Leavitt Training Area was

restored as a Marine training site by the time the first

deploying battalion arrived at MWTC in June

1975.171

It was also in June of 1975 that Major General

Charles D. Mize replaced Brigadier General William

94 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Marines of Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Caulfield’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marines met the challenge of moving a

106mm recoilless rifle to the top of the peak at Grouse Meadow in 1975.

Courtesy of MWTC 
In the Doldrums, 1966–1979 95

L. McCulloch as the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. In July of 1950, Lieutenant Mize had

deployed with Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines, and had participated in the fighting at the

Pusan Perimeter with the 1st Marine Brigade. Following the amphibious assault at Inchon, Lieutenant

Mize took command of Company M and was

awarded the Navy Cross for extraordinary valor during the heavy fighting to recapture Seoul. For his

actions during the Chosin Reservoir campaign and

the march out to Hungnam, he was awarded the

Bronze Star with Combat “V.”172 Because of his past

combat experience in Korea, General Mize quickly

recognized not only the value of MWTC as a vital

adjunct to his division’s overall training program,

but especially the readiness of his command to conduct combat operations in snow-covered, mountainous terrain. Based on his initial staff briefings and

first on-site visit, he became persuaded that if the

Marine Corps did not reactivate the training center

in the near future, local Forest Service officials might

initiate steps that would in effect repeal the 1951

land use agreement with the Department of Agriculture. Consequently, reactivation of MWTC became one of his early priorities.

General Mize’s enthusiasm for breathing new life

into the training center was shared by Major General

Carl W. Hoffman, the commanding general of Camp

Pendleton. However, the response Mize received

from the staff at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps for

his reactivation plan was not encouraging. To understand why, one must remember that the mid1970s were difficult years for the Corps. Serious

problems tended to preoccupy the time and energies of the staff at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps.

Racial issues and drug use in the ranks had yet to

be brought under control. Moreover, every major

command was still reporting a backlog in the number of courts-martial cases awaiting trial, not to mention that local confinement facilities were already

filled to the bursting point. General Louis H. Wilson,

Jr., who had become the 26th Commandant of the

Marine Corps on 1 July 1975, had already initiated

several new policies that would raise the existing

recruiting standards significantly, and begin a

process to clean house of repeated offenders

through an “Other Than Honorable” administrative

discharge. However, just how much of these programs might cut into the Marine Corps’ total endstrength was yet unclear. Furthermore, this was a

time when some defense analysts publicly questioned whether the Marine Corps’ amphibious doctrine was any longer relevant against the Soviet

threat to Western Europe. Therefore, some of these

analysts asserted, perhaps the Corps’ configuration

of three divisions and wings was no longer valid

and should be reduced.173 Another factor that may

have contributed to the reluctance of the staff to reopen MWTC at this time was the major effort that

had just been launched by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps to rebuild the Marine Corps Base at

Twentynine Palms, California into a new AirGround Combined Arms Training Center. General

Wilson himself had first conceived this new mission

for the “sleepy” little desert artillery base two years

earlier when he was commanding general, FMFPac.

Now that he was Commandant, Wilson was determined to give the project a full court press to make

it a reality. Within weeks after General Wilson was

sworn in as Commandant, planning was underway

for the construction of an 8,000-foot expeditionary

airfield at Twentynine Palms.174 Realizing the degree

of opposition they faced, Generals Mize and Hoffman decided to counter with an alternate proposal.

If Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps would authorize

the reopening of MWTC, with the exception of a

few key permanent billets, most of the personnel

staffing would be provided by Camp Pendleton and

its tenant organizations through the Fleet Assistance

Program. Moreover, the modest construction improvements and base maintenance would not tap

into Marine Corps Military Construction dollars, but

over the next several budget years, stay within the

bounds and capabilities of west coast Navy and Marine engineer battalions. Under these conditions, the

Commandant granted his consent to reopen MWTC.

For over a decade, the organizational colors of

the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center

had remained rolled in its brown canvas sheaf and

stored in a warehouse at Camp Pendleton. On 10

May 1976, this flag was again finally unfurled and

put on parade at a lightly attended reactivation ceremony.175 Presiding over the ceremony was Lieutenant Colonel George A. Knudson, who had been

appointed as the new commanding officer. Knudson was no stranger to the training center. As a rifle

platoon commander in 1956, he had deployed to

MWTC for a six-week winter field exercise with

Colonel “Buck” Schmuck’s 5th Marine Regiment.

From 1962 to 1964, he had served as the senior instructor-guide of the Escape, Evasion, and Survival

Course and had the additional duty of being the

post exchange officer. 

Lieutenant Colonel Knudson had no illusions

about the enormous challenges that lay before him.

During the decade of deactivation, maintenance of

the plant had of necessity been limited to emergency repairs only. Thus, almost every building required some measure of rehabilitation to make it

either functional or livable again. To put the training
center back in working order, he had been given a

table of organization that called for five Marine officers, 110 enlisted Marines, one Navy officer, and

11 Navy Corpsmen to staff the base medical clinic.

Almost all of these personnel were assigned through

fleet assistance. During the summer months, rotating

engineer units from the Force Engineer Battalion

and Navy Construction Battalion were assigned to

augment the garrison. The Mountain Warfare Training Center-Bridgeport was back in business.

96 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
I personally believe that mountain warfare training, whether it’s conducted in the summer or the

winter, is a vital ingredient for preparing the Marine

for the kind of warfare that you are discussing here

this week. I believe that mountain warfare leadership and mountain warfare skills are cardinal prerequisites to victory. If I had my choice, every

battalion in the 2d Marine Division would go

through Bridgeport every year.

-Keynote address delivered by Major General Alfred M. Gray Jr., Elverum, Norway, 9-12 March 1982

Strategic Backdrop: From Benign Neglect to

Heightened Awareness

During the first two decades of the Cold War in

Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

tended to pay scant attention to its northern flank.

The Soviets simply lacked the capacity to seriously

threaten the combined fleets of the U.S. and its

NATO allies. Although the U.S. Navy, along with

Marine company to battalion-sized landing forces,

did participate in a few combined fleet exercises off

the coast of Norway in the 1960s, these became

smaller in scope as the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet was tasked to devote more and more of

his resources to Southeast Asia rather than dealing

with a growing Soviet Northern Fleet. As Dr. David

B. Crist later wrote in a carefully researched strategic background paper for the Marine Corps Historical Division,*

By the 1970s, the Soviets had built up a

considerable military presence in the Kola

Peninsula providing them an offensive capability to threaten NATO and the U.S. Navy.

Two motorized rifle divisions were permanently positioned on the Norwegian border,

with 10 other divisions designated as reinforcements. In addition, an airborne division

and two specialized brigades, naval infantry

and a special forces (Spetsnaz) had been

added to the Soviet forces and appeared to be

positioned to strike quickly and capture Norway’s northern airfields. Further, the Soviet

Northern Fleet Air Force alone had over 400

aircraft, with an additional 450 air defense and

tactical aircraft. Even more alarming for NATO

was the rapid growth of Soviet northern naval

forces. From 1965-1980, they nearly doubled

97

Chapter 10

NATO’s Northern Flank:

A New Imperative, 1979–1983

with over 130 attack submarines and 80 major

warships. The number of ballistic missile submarines rose from 18 to 39 by 1980 and comprised nearly two-thirds of the Soviet ballistic

missile fleet.176

As a result of this growing Soviet military threat,

NATO and U.S. planners began an extensive reexamination in the mid-1970s of their respective

strategic plans for defending Norway and, at the

same time, maintaining the integrity of NATO’s increasingly vulnerable northern flank. The large air

bases at Bodo and Orland in central Norway

housed all of Norway’s fighter aircraft and thus

were critical to NATO’s air defense scheme. Moreover, military planners viewed anti-submarine aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters, that were

based in northern Norway at Bardufoss and Tromso

as vital for attacking Soviet submarines of the Northern Fleet.

If the Soviets could successfully seize these airfields, their Backfire Bombers would then be capable of bombarding the British Isles, thereby putting

them in position to cut the sea-lanes through which

90 percent of the U.S. reinforcements to NATO’s

central front would pass. It would also allow the

Soviets to push their air umbrella well west toward

the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK)

gap. This in turn could drive NATO naval forces out

of the Norwegian Sea, giving the Soviet fleet unhindered access to the North Atlantic. Conversely, if

NATO could maintain control of the northern airfields, this would not only ensure the safety of the

main sea lines of communications to Germany, but

would permit NATO forces to press forward toward

the Soviet home bases and keep them bottled up

inside the Barents Sea. In short, strategic planners

concluded, “the war in Europe may not be won in

the northern flank, but it could be lost there.”177

NATO’s concern for its northern flank coincided

with the U.S. Navy’s internal reexamination of its

own post-Vietnam global strategy. Over time this

led to the development of what in the early 1980s

would become known as the forward maritime

strategy. In essence, this was an aggressive war

strategy which entailed advancing on the Soviets

using submarines and carrier strike forces. This new

strategy was designed to engage the enemy fleet as
close to its home bases as possible, bottle it up, and

destroy its offensive capability. Thus, the Soviet

build-up of naval and land forces on the Kola

Peninsula offered a very plausible scenario upon,

which to test and evaluate both the merits and risks

of forward maritime strategy. As the Navy began to

reassess the threat to the northern flank in the mid

1970s, Marine Corps planners at FMFLant and in

Plans and Operations at Headquarters Marine Corps

likewise began to study how the Marine Corps

could best support the plans of their Navy counterparts to contain the Soviets on the northern flank.

Two areas in the north seemed to hold the most

promise. One was northern Norway where Marines

could secure valuable airfields. From these, Marine

Corps, Air Force, and Navy aircraft could operate as

if from a land-based aircraft carrier. The other possible area for employing Marines lay in Denmark’s

Jutland Peninsula. The narrows constricted by

marshes north of the Kiel Canal offered a highly defensible position where Marine reinforcements

could provide a secure enclave for NATO air bases,

which could either strike at the Soviet Baltic Fleet

or threaten the exposed flank of ground forces

pushing across the north German plain. In 1975,

Major General Philip D. Shutler, the Deputy Commanding General, FMFLant, headed up a Navy/Marine Corps briefing team that was designed to

convince NATO officials of the capabilities of Marine air-ground task forces in the north and to persuade them to employ such a force in exercises

being scheduled for the following year. The briefings met warm reception from NATO officials and

especially from the government of Norway, which

had been lobbying the Pentagon for this type of reinforcement for several years. 

In the autumn of 1976, the stage was set for the

largest Marine Corps deployment to Europe since

World War I. Six thousand Marines of the 4th Marine

Amphibious Brigade (4th MAB), commanded by

Brigadier General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., embarked

aboard Navy shipping in North Carolina and

headed for two exercise areas that would test the

flexible employment and reinforcement capability

of projecting a Marine brigade from the sea within

the North European Command. On 21 September,

air and ground elements of the brigade conducted

an amphibious assault with the Royal Marines in

central Norway as part of a large naval exercise with

the code name Teamwork 76. After back loading

from Norway, the 4th MAB headed for Denmark

where it participated in a second and much larger

exercise known as Bonded Item. The flexibility and

air-ground combat capabilities of the 4th MAB

pleasantly surprised many NATO observers. With

98 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

their foot now firmly in the door, the Marines immediately began planning additional exercises in

northern Europe in 1977 and 1978.178

Costs and Risks of the New Initiative

Between the two possible employment areas, the

Jutland Peninsula and northern Norway, the latter,

despite its difficult tactical environment, seemed to

Marine planners to offer the most promise and flexibility for Marine air-ground task forces, provided

the troops could learn to operate and maneuver in

deep snow. This would take time. Post-exercise reports and the evaluations that followed each major

exercise in the late 1970s pointed to major deficiencies in this respect. The most serious were attributed to the U.S. Marine Corps’ lack of experience

in operating in cold weather. In comparison to their

Norwegian and Royal Marine counterparts, who

were adept at moving their battalions through deep

snow on skis, supported by superior over-snow vehicles, U.S. Marine infantry units proved to be far

less mobile on the ground. The root causes seemed

to be a lack of training and continuity in personnel

and the overburdening of the troops with the excessively heavy Korean War—vintage clothing and

equipment. Moreover, both proved completely inadequate for the Norwegian winter climate and terrain. As a result, in March 1977, the staff at

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps began to take a serious look at what future investments would have

to be made in the 1979 Program Objectives Memoranda to improve the cold-weather capabilities of

Marine forces.179

Part of the training problem was the lack of a

suitable east coast cold-weather training site where

the 4th MAB could conduct predeployment training

under terrain and climate conditions that would approximate the rigors of a Norwegian winter. The

closest it could come up with was the old World

War I National Guard facility at Camp Drum near

Plattsburg, New York. Unfortunately, Drum* is located on relatively flat ground and while in some

years it can be inundated with snow, in others,

snowfall may be lacking. This was the case for several of the 4th MAB work-up exercises in the late

1970s. For the 1979-1980 Operation Anorak Express

in Norway, the pattern for preparing the force was

modified. In this instance, the 36th Marine Amphibious Unit (36th MAU), the exercising Marine force,

underwent three weeks of cold-weather training at

MWTC, 30 November-20 December 1979. Operation Workup, an amphibious landing on Cape Cod,

Massachusetts, followed this training prior to the

36th MAU’s deployment to Norway in February

* Redesignated Fort Drum in the 1980s.
NATO’s Northern Flank: A New Imperative, 1979–1983 99

1980. While evaluators of the exercise could point

to some improvement in the mobility of the U.S.

Marine contingent, the list of deficiencies in Marine

capabilities to operate in deep snow still made it

obvious that a significant amount of further work

and investment was necessary.180

With the commitment of a Marine air-ground

task force to reinforce NATO’s northern flank (focusing on northern Norway) now a reality, the staff

at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps began to recognize that, until then, exploration of the impact of

cold weather on the individual Marine, his weapons

systems, and supporting equipment had thus far

tended to be piecemeal, isolated, and sporadic. Perhaps no one at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps appreciated this shortcoming more than the

Commandant of the Marine Corps himself. General

Robert H. Barrow had replaced General Wilson and

was sworn in as the 27th Commandant on 1 July

1979. As a captain, General Barrow had served as

the company commander of Company A in Colonel

Chesty Puller’s 1st Marine Regiment during the recapture of Seoul. His company had also successfully defended the pass at Koto-ri earning him the

Navy Cross during the 1st Marine Division’s retreat

from the Chosin Reservoir in December of 1950.

From that first-hand experience, the Commandant

was keenly aware of the adverse affects that extreme cold could play on small unit combat effectiveness, if troops are inadequately trained, clothed

and equipped. Further, as the commanding general

of FMFLant from 1976 to 1978, the exercises of the

4th MAB had given him a unique vantage point

from which to study the risks thoroughly, if the

Corps did not approach this new mission carefully

and deliberately.

As the Assistant Commandant, it is therefore

likely that he endorsed the staff view that what was

needed was a total overview of cold-weather operations through the mid-range (five year) period. As

a consequence, in 1979 Northrop Services Inc., was

commissioned to conduct a study to accomplish the

following tasks:

(1) Determine and evaluate the capability

of a MAGTF to conduct landing force operations during a cold-weather amphibious assault and during subsequent operations

ashore; (2) Identify landing force deficiencies

in doctrine, tactics, techniques, training, and

equipment during a cold-weather amphibious

assault, including naval support systems directly involved with ship-to-shore movement;

(3) Define individual Marine and MAGTF system requirements to overcome deficiencies;

(4) Provide concepts of operation and techniques, along with concepts of training, which

are technologically available; (5) Determine

the financial impact of any force structure and

equipment program changes.181

A draft of the Northrop Study was routed for

comment to Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps staff

during August of 1980. After considering mission

assignments in either northern Korea or Norway,

the study concluded with a number of findings and

recommendations, a few extractions of which are

listed below. First, the study stated that the Marine

Corps has the inherent capability to conduct an amphibious assault in dry-cold conditions* (temperatures +20 to –5 degrees F) and in snow depths to

20 inches, provided supplementary training programs are established; the Marine Corps has the inherent capability to conduct limited amphibious

assaults in intense-cold conditions (temperature –

5 to –25 degrees F) and in an area of snow depth

in excess of 20 inches. If snow depths of 20 inches

are anticipated, a lightweight all-terrain vehicle and

skis for helicopters will be needed. The Marine

Corps does not require a capability to conduct winter warfare operations under extreme-cold conditions* (temperature range –25 to –65 degrees F) in

fulfillment of probable assigned missions. Accordingly, the Marine Corps should prepare and promulgate a policy document for guidance of all

activities, setting forth levels of cold stress for development, training and acquisition programs.**

Second, the study observed that “the most pressing cold-weather problem facing the Marine Corps”

was its effort to develop and maintain a satisfactory

state of training readiness for cold-weather operations within the FMF. Present facilities and training

programs are inadequate to keep Marines fully

trained, conditioned and acclimatized to function

effectively under the most severe conditions of

weather, terrain and enemy action. Establishment

of a brigade-sized, dedicated cold-weather force in

II Marine Amphibious Force would enhance the

Marine Corps’ ability to maintain a high degree of

readiness for cold-weather operations. 

Third, the study’s authors noted the “excessive

weight” of cold-weather equipment, clothing, and

supplies, which added to the normal load of

weapons and ammunition that the infantryman is

required to carry and man haul on sleds reduces

* Italic by the author.

** The Marine Corps later adopted this finding. In effect, it not

only narrowed the scope of training programs, but literally saved

millions of dollars when it came time to procure new sets of

cold-weather clothing and equipment. 
his effectiveness in combat and greatly increases the

possibility of cold injury and defeat. There is no

simple solution to this problem. It is recommended

that a comprehensive program be initiated to develop a holistic approach directed toward increasing the mobility and the combat effectiveness of

small infantry units engaged in winter warfare. 

Finally, the report offered “a plan for implementation of the recommendations. Initial actions were

selected on the basis of affordability in the current

budget period and are based on the premise that

training and infantry mobility are the most urgent

deficiencies* to be addressed.” 182

A second initiative taken by Headquarters U.S.

Marine Corps soon after Commandant Barrow took

office was to direct the Commanding General,

Camp Pendleton to request Western Division of the

Naval Facilities Engineering Command to prepare

a master plan for the purpose of providing “a comprehensive guide for the development of the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center.” The

scope of the plan was to include a review of existing facilities against the newly established basic facility requirements as well as identification of critical

facility deficiencies that need correction to ensure

mission accomplishment and a planning base for

long-range management of the center. 

With respect to basic facility requirement, the

Master Plan noted Commandant’s direction that for

planning purposes, “personnel loading [would] be

based on a 260-man permanent party consisting of

11 Marine officers, 217 Marine enlisted men, two

Navy officers, 20 Navy enlisted men, and 10 civilians. Also included is a peak load 1,785-man training party, consisting of one 650-man unit, one

1,000-man unit, and 135 individual students.”183

After completing a preliminary assessment and

coordinating its activities with officials at the Forest

Ranger Station at Bridgeport, the Western Division

team developed three alternative courses of action

(1) take no action/minimum maintenance policy,

(2) construct permanent facilities at both the permanent and training camp areas, and (3) Construct

permanent facilities at the permanent camp only.

Ultimately, the Master Plan that was developed recommended pursuing the second course of action

on the basis that it would produce a functionally

more efficient MWTC. It would also create a more

visually aesthetic order while providing a greater

protection to the surrounding environment. Noting

that training activities and facilities must continue to

function with the minimum of interference from the

redevelopment, the plan went on to lay out a four100 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

phased plan (Phase 1 FY 1984 through Phase 4 FY

1986) for the demolition of existing buildings as replacement facilities were completed and became

available for use. The cost for the entire project in

1983 Military Construction dollars, which did not include demolition of existing buildings, landscaping,

construction contingency costs of five percent, or

solar heating was estimated to be $22,351,000.*184

1981: Year of Decision

A third document that was instrumental in pushing the future use of the MWTC to the forefront was

an action paper that was also routed in August of

1980 by Brigadier General Americo A. Sardo, the

director of Training, to all of the Deputy Chiefs of

Staff at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. This document was entitled: Marine Corps Mountain Warfare

Training Center, 1985, Training and Development

Concept Paper. The purpose of the paper was: “to

state the need for a Marine Corps Mountain Warfare

Center, define its optimum capabilities, identify resources required, and outline a program to achieve

the MWTC of 1985.” Each addressee was requested

to review the contents of the concept paper and

provide appropriate comments, recommendations

and their concurrence or nonconcurrence, before

going forward to the Commandant.185

After making a compelling case for the need of

such a training facility, especially in light of the Marine Corps’ upcoming commitment to NATO’s

northern flank, the paper went on to address the

comparative financial costs of using Camp Drum

vice MWTC:

Exercise Empire Glacier 1978 and Exercise

Alpine Warrior in 1979 cost FMFLant 1.1M and

672K respectively. In both exercises base operating costs of over 200K were paid to Camp

Drum. The first exercise was inundated with

snow and the second suffered from a lack of

it. It is estimated by the Reserve Training Section of Training Division, Headquarters U.S.

Marine Corps that at least $2.00 per day for

each member of a unit is paid for base operating costs during actual time of departure

(ATD) at Camp Drum or Camp Ripley. FY 78

costs for a two-week actual time of departure

(ATD) of 142 men at Camp Drum included

$20,000 just to open and operate the camp.

Using a $2.00 day estimate, an average load

of 848 and a permanent staff of 131, it would

cost 632K in base operating costs to operate

* Italic by the author.

* It should also be noted that the scope of the draft master plan

did not include the construction of quarters for married personnel other than for the commanding officer and his family. 
NATO’s Northern Flank: A New Imperative, 1979–1983 101

a year round facility at Camp Drum. The current Operations and Maintenance Marine

Corps (OMMC) for Bridgeport is 683K. These

figures are only presented for comparison as

Camp Drum does not provide a mountain environment nor as long and dependable a period of winter conditions.186

Drawing from inputs obviously submitted by

Colonel John W. Guy and his staff at the Mountain

Warfare Training Center, the concept paper went on

to visualize in detail what new missions and functions MWTC would be capable of providing by

1985 if certain investments were made. This included establishing a sizable equipment allowance

pool, and doubling its 7 November 1979 table of

organization to 11 Marine officers and 217 Marine

enlisted, two Navy officers and 20 Navy enlisted,

and 10 civilian positions over a three year period.

Military Construction costs were based on the Draft

Master Plan that was still being refined by Western

Division of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. By this time final cost figures in the Master

Plan included provisions for the construction of

family housing and carried a revised total estimate

of 25 million dollars. 

By making these investments, the concept paper

concluded, the MWTC of 1985 would provide to the

Marine Corps:

1. An instructor cadre which will train over 10,000

Marines on site and provide mobile training team

support throughout the Marine Corps.

2. A pool of knowledge and experience in coldweather and mountain operations and logistics.

3. A facility to assist in the development doctrine,

tactics and techniques related to cold-weather and

mountain warfare. 

4. A facility at which the research and testing of

cold-weather and mountain clothing, equipment

and medicine may be conducted.

5. A yearly product of at least:

Four battalions trained in winter mountain operations.

Five battalions trained in summer mountain operations.

Two Reserve battalions trained in mountain operations.

6. Through formal schools, 540 Marines trained to

take an active role in the instruction of their own

battalions in cold-weather and mountain operations

and in mountain survival.187

After the MWTC Concept Paper had been staffed,

the director of Training made his refinements and

then forwarded it to the Commandant. In midMarch 1981, the staff secretary placed the Concept

Paper on the Commandant’s schedule for a “decision brief.”* Colonel Francis “Frank” Riney, General

Sardo’s Deputy, gave the brief in the Commandant’s

conference room that was adjacent to his office. In

addition to General Barrow, among those present

were his Assistant Commandant, General Kenneth

McLennan, the Chief of Staff and all the deputy

Chiefs of Staff, or their representatives. General Barrow listened to the one-hour briefing attentively,

without raising questions, or making any comment.

Following the brief the Commandant sat back in his

chair, brought the fingertips of his hands together

and started around the table soliciting the opinions

of his generals. 

The deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower made

the opening comment. First, he argued strongly

against the MWTC initiative, seriously doubting

whether the Marine Corps even needed such a facility; secondly, he objected to its high cost in manpower, money, and materials. As the comments

proceeded around the table, Colonel Riney became

increasingly disheartened as others expressed similar doubts. Several even recommended that the

project should not only be pursued, but that the

MWTC base should be abandoned at once. Only

the Plans, Policies and Operations Department and

* The Director of Training, BGen Sardo suffered a severe heart

attack in the latter half of 1980; as a result, the “decision brief”

was put on hold for several months. Gen Sardo was still recuperating when the briefing was presented to CMC in March. 

Courtesy of Leatherneck

Colonel John W. Guy, Commanding Officer, Mountain Warfare Training Center from March 1978 to

May 1981, presents an award to one of the training

center Marines. Colonel Guy is in the center of the

picture and at right is First Sergeant Lloyd G.

Daniels, the acting sergeant major.
a few others made statements strongly in support

of the training division’s proposal. After going completely around the table, General Barrow turned to

the Assistant Commandant and said: “What do you

think Ken?” General McLennan proceeded to make

a succinct, yet compelling argument for why the

Marine Corps could ill afford to give up this valuable training capability, especially with the Corps’

growing commitment to the reinforcement of northern Norway. Throughout the briefing and the comments of his generals, Commandant Barrow never

said a word. Nor did his face or demeanor ever betray how he personally would come down on the

issue. For whatever reasons, he had obviously decided to withhold his final decision until later and

simply concluded the meeting by standing up and,

after looking at his generals in the eye, announcing:

“Whatever we may ultimately decide to do gentlemen, we shall never allow our people to be housed

in trailers again.”188

On 2 May 1981, Lieutenant Colonel (colonel Select) William H. Osgood relieved Colonel John Guy

as the commanding officer of MWTC. Like his two

immediate predecessors, the newly installed commanding officer was very familiar with MWTC and

its unique mission. A native Californian, Bill Osgood graduated from the College of the Pacific and

in 1960 was commissioned a second lieutenant in

the Marine Corps via the Platoon Leaders Class program. After completing The Basic School in 1961,

he was appointed as an infantry officer and saw

service with the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. In the

closing months of 1964, he attended Motor Transport Officer’s School at Camp Lejeune and was

given the additional military occupation specialty

of 3502. In April 1965, he was assigned to MWTC

as its motor transport officer. Frequently however,

he augmented the Unit Training and the Mountain

Leadership Sections whenever an additional instructor and guide was needed. He was transferred

from MWTC on 1 March 1967 and later found himself as a rifle company commander in the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, as part of the special landing

force. Over the next three years, he continued to

serve with that battalion in various capacities until

his transfer from Vietnam to the United States in

December of 1970. For his actions under fire in

Vietnam, Captain Osgood was awarded the Silver

Star and Bronze Star, with Combat “V”. During the

ensuing years, numerous command and staff assignments followed, including instructor duties at

the U.S. Naval Academy, a tour at the Manpower

Department, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, a

student at the Air War College, and a short tour

with the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing at El Toro, Cali102 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

fornia, before his transfer to the training center.*

Very shortly after assuming command, Lieutenant

Colonel Osgood was notified that the Commandant

of the Marine Corps, accompanied by Mrs. Barrow

and the sergeant major of the Marine Corps, Leland

D. Crawford, would pay a visit to the training center

within the next few days. Rather than exposing the

Commandant to one more rather standard command briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Osgood and his

S-3, Major Edward J. “Ed” Robeson, IV decided that

General Barrow would gain a better perspective of

the base and its activities by walking about and

talking to the troops, or visiting them informally in

the field. “That decision turned out the right one,”

Colonel Osgood would later recall:

In the beginning, the Commandant was noticeably upset by the run-down condition of

the base and its facilities. Nevertheless, as the

day progressed and after meeting with some

of the troops, his mood seemed to improve

and he became more and more animated. The

Marine Corps History Division

General Robert H. Barrow, Commandant of the Marine Corps, made the critical decision to preserve

and modernize the Mountain Warfare Training

Center in 1981.

* It was his PLC classmate and former messmate at MWTC during

the early 1960s, LtCol Harry Jenkins Jr. (then the LtCol ground

monitor at HQMC) who offered Col Osgood the assignment to

be the CO at MWTC.
NATO’s Northern Flank: A New Imperative, 1979–1983 103

highlight of the day came when we drove up

Highway 108, stopping at a granite escarpment just on the west side of Sonora Pass.

There we dismounted from our vehicles to

observe the Mountain Leadership and Unit

Training instructor and guides undergoing refresher rock climbing training before starting

the summer season. The Commandant was

clearly impressed with the instructor and

guides skillful climbing techniques as they negotiated up and down the cliff face. Best of

all, he clearly enjoyed the informal banter

with the instructors when they came down.

There was still quite a bit of snow in the pass

and both he and Mrs. Barrow also seemed to

be completely taken by the majestic alpine

ruggedness of the Sierra Nevada Range.

Throughout the visit, the Commandant made no

mention to his host of what the future might hold

for MWTC. This suggests that he was likely still

mulling over the final decision in his mind. Colonel

Osgood did remember, however, that the Commandant was displeased to learn of the number of married personnel who were residing in the

government quarters at the Naval Ammunition

Depot at Hawthorne, Nevada. “I want you to start

moving your people out of that housing area and

have them relocate to the Highway 395 corridor,”

the Commandant told Osgood, as he climbed into

his sedan to depart. “Furthermore, you are to call

my office weekly to let me know how many families are still living there.” “He means it,” the aide

whispered into Colonel Osgood’s ear, as he passed

to climb into the front seat. By November of that

year, Osgood was happily able to report that the

daily base bus service to and from Reno had been

resumed and that all families had been relocated as

the Commandant had directed.189

It is unclear exactly when General Barrow finally

approved the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare

Training Center, 1985, Training and Development

Concept Paper. However, every indication suggests

that it was probably about mid-May of 1981 after

returning from his visit to the West Coast, which included his stop at MWTC. Coincidentally, it was

also in mid-May that General Barrow designated

Lieutenant General John H. Miller, his deputy Chief

of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, as the

central coordinating authority for all cold-weather

issues from training to procurement.190 The author

later had the opportunity to ask General Barrow

what the principal considerations were that

prompted him to ultimately come down in favor of

the MWTC project? Barrow responded 

I deplored the substandard living conditions that our people had to live in; to me the

place looked more like a “squatter’s camp”

than a Marine base. I also believed that if we

did not make the investment to upgrade the

Pickel Meadow training camp and do it soon,

we would have been forced to give it back to

the Forest Service and thus lose it altogether.

Finally, having been at FMFLant in 1976 and

1977, I had gained some appreciation for the

difficulties and complexities associated with

our commitment to north Norway. I knew

from my own first-hand experience in Korea

that mountain training, summer or winter, requires skills that just cannot either be taught

or learned “by the seat of the pants.”191

Unmentioned by General Barrow as a contributing factor, but nevertheless one that must have been

of some import, was the timing of his decision. The

new Reagan Administration had been in office for

five months. Its campaign pledge to rebuild America’s armed forces, especially its conventional capabilities, had already been demonstrated with the

inclusion of the first set of Maritime Prepositioning

Ships (MPS) for the Marine Corps in the revised FY

1981 Department of Defense Budget, with every indication that more investments would be forthcoming. General Barrow was coming to the end of his

second year as Commandant. Thus his stature

within the defense community was at its peak. SecColonel William Osgood, Commanding Officer,

Mountain Warfare Training Center from 1981 to

1984.

Courtesy of Col William H. Osgood. 
104 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

retary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary

of the Navy John F. Lehman both seemed to

earnestly value his views. When he gave military

advice on a matter they listened, and more often

than not, followed it. Most members of the Senate

and House Armed Services and Appropriation Committees also held him in high regard for his forthrightness and professionalism whenever he was

called to testify before them. It seems likely, therefore, that the Commandant must have also sensed

that there would never be a better time than the

present for the Corps to lay out its case for what he

knew would be a substantial investment of taxpayer

dollars.

Laying the Foundation for Improvements

By the summer of 1981, Lieutenant Colonel Osgood had learned that the Commandant had approved the Master Plan for the rebuilding of the

training center and for doubling the personnel

Courtesy of Col William H. Osgood

Lieutenant Colonel Osgood’s quarters before and after the catastrophic natural gas explosion that destroyed it

on 23 January 1982.
NATO’s Northern Flank: A New Imperative, 1979–1983 105

strength of the command over the next several

years. The Fleet Assistance Program for staffing billets at MWTC, he was told, would cease and would

be assumed by the Manpower Department at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. Other welcome news

included the reauthorization for a permanent training center sergeant major. Thus on 31 August 1981,

Sergeant Major Charles L. Hayman relieved First Sergeant Lloyd G. Daniels who had been serving as

the acting sergeant major since the previous year.

Another bit of good news for the personnel staffing

of the training center came in the form of Color Sergeant Mahon, Royal Marines, who arrived in 1981

from the Royal Marine Commando Mountain and

Arctic Cadre to start a two-year exchange tour at

MWTC. 

As information on the major changes that were

scheduled to take place at Pickel Meadow was circulated, a constant stream of general officers, foreign dignitaries, congressional staffers, budgeters,

and facility engineers began descending on the

base with increasing regularity. On 11 February

1982, Lieutenant Colonel Osgood and his executive

officer attended a meeting at the District Forest

Ranger’s office to jointly approve the final changes

to the MWTC Master Plan and a newly redrafted

Memorandum of Understanding. Although the Master Plan promised that the antiquated facilities at

MWTC would soon be replaced, it came too late to

prevent the accidental destruction of the commanding officer’s residence. On 23 January a propane gas

leak and subsequent explosion totally collapsed the

quarters. Fortunately Lieutenant Colonel and Mrs.

Osgood were away in Southern California when the

explosion occurred. However, Major Matthew J.

“Matt” Heck, the MWTC executive officer, and two

staff noncommissioned officers did suffer minor injuries as they tried to extinguish the flames and salvage some of the Osgoods’ personal property. 192

In February 1982, the Commandant approved

the comprehensive Cold Weather Combat Operations Study that had been prepared by Northrop

Services, Inc. This study made some 40 specific recommendations designed to upgrade Marine Corps

cold-weather combat capabilities and would become the blueprint for procurement and training

changes within the Marine Corps. 

During 9-12 March, the Norwegian Ministry of

Defense hosted a joint cold-weather conference at

its Terningmoen Camp in Elverum, Norway. Among

other things, the purpose of the conference was to

determine courses of action for addressing already

identified cold–weather operational deficiencies

that were of mutual concern to all the parties. Over

100 representatives of major Marine Corps commands, selected U.S. Navy and U.S. Army officers,

various U.S. civilian cold-weather specialists, members of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and the

British and Dutch Royal Marines attended the conference. The meeting was the result of almost a year

of planning by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, the

Marine Corps Development and Education Command, the Office of Naval Research, and Norwegian

authorities. The Marine Corps organized the conference while Norwegian authorities provided the logistical support as well as co-chairmen and

members for each of the four sub-committees.

Major General Alfred M. Gray Jr., the 2d Marine Division, Commanding General, gave the keynote address.193

At the start of the second day, the local garrison

provided a comprehensive field demonstration to

exhibit Norwegian tactics and equipment. During

the mobility portion of demonstration, the Norwegian Army particularly impressed the U.S. Marine

representatives with its over-snow vehicle (BV-202)

that had no difficulty negotiating in 25-30 inches of

snow over hilly terrain.* The remaining two days

Marine Corps History Division

Major General Alfred M. Gray Jr., Commanding

General, 2d Marine Division, believed that training

at the Mountain Warfare Training Center played a

vital role in preparing division units for deployment

to Northern Norway.

* The U.S. marginal terrain vehicle M116 Husky had been tested

at MWTC the previous year and was determined to be unsuitable

as an over snow vehicle. 
was used for committee working sessions during

which more than one hundred agenda items were

discussed by the participants regarding training,

equipment, combat service support, and standards

for battle techniques.194

Lieutenant Colonel Osgood and Major Edward J.

“Ed” Robeson, IV his S-3, briefed the training committee on the MWTC curriculum of courses for coldweather combat operations and what new

capabilities the base would offer under its Five-Year

Training and Development Plan. As a result, the Marine Corps had already decided to shift its pre-deployment training for infantry battalions earmarked

for the northern flank from Camp Ripley in Minnesota to MWTC. Once there, these battalions

would follow the pattern developed by the British

Royal Marines of undergoing two months of intensive cold-weather training prior to departing for the

winter exercise in Norway. Moreover, as Lieutenant

Colonel Osgood could point out, the training center

was already routinely sending its instructors to Nor106 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

way to attend the Allied Officers Training Course in

order to incorporate what they learn into the MWTC

training program. It therefore became the conference position that “the MWTC Five-Year Training

and Development Plan is sound and well conceived

and that an exchange of instructors during the winter months by the MWTC and the Norwegian

School of Infantry and winter warfare would benefit

both schools and their programs.”195

The Marine Corps subsequently adopted a number of important recommendations that were jointly

discussed at this conference. Among them was the

decision to designate 4th MAB as the sole Norway

Brigade in order to facilitate institutional knowledge

and continuity in planning for cold-weather combat

operations. While by 1983 it could be said that the

foundations for meeting the major training deficiencies were well on their way toward solution, the

same could not be said for the clothing and equipment problem. This would take several more years

to resolve. 
The U.S. Marines are no longer just brave Marines

in funny boots. They are true

Arctic warriors.

-Brigadier General Lerheim, Norwegian Army

Fall, 1984

Rebuilding MWTC and Expanding

Its Capabilities

The year major changes started to take place at

MWTC was 1983. Indeed, more initiatives were undertaken that year than in the previous quarter of a

century. At the national political level, 1983 also

marked the second year of the presidency of

Ronald W. Reagan. As the Republican Party had

promised before the 1980 election, the build-up of

the U.S. military’s conventional forces under Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was in full

swing. Funding requests that General Barrow believed he needed to begin rebuilding the training

center went unchallenged by analysts for the 1983

Department of Defense Budget and were approved

with alacrity by the Authorization and Appropriation Committees of the Congress. At the same time,

American foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union

became more strident as the president entered into

a rhetorical war of words with the Kremlin. On

March 8, 1983 at a major speech in Orlando,

Florida, the president bluntly referred to the Soviets

as an “Evil Empire.” Two weeks later, East-West

tensions rose further when the president announced

to an American television audience his plan to

launch a Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly

known as “Star Wars.”196 Later, it would become evident that the president’s real strategic aim was to

rid Eastern Europe of communist domination once

and for all. Should the Soviet bloc make an aggressive military response to Reagan’s efforts to weaken

communism in Eastern Europe, it was likely that sizable Marine and Navy forces would be needed to

quickly bolster NATO’s northern flank.

From 21 February to 9 March 1983, the staff at

MWTC got its first glimpse of a new vehicle that

was then being considered for procurement by the

Marine Corps. It was the General Dynamics LAV25 Light Assault Vehicle. This eight-wheeled, lightly

armored vehicle had a crew of three and space for

four infantrymen in a rear compartment. Its main

armament was a 25mm chain gun, and variants

were being planned that could mount an 81mm, a

M-220 TOW antitank rocket launcher, or a 105mm

howitzer; another variant could serve as a communications vehicle. Its survivability on the battlefield

lay in its great speed of 75 to 80 miles per hour. Vehicles were brought to Pickel Meadow to test their

capability and performance in freezing coldweather and under deep snow conditions. 

From 27 February to 4 March, MWTC also hosted

a new group of trainees. The group consisted of 70

captains who were students at the Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, Virginia. The purpose was

to give these students five days of practical indoctrination training in winter warfare.197 This training

for mid-level officers would be continued and expanded into a winter war game over the next 20

years. 

Throughout the early months of 1983, the MWTC

Command Chronologies reported numerous visitors

who came to the training center. These included (1)

site surveyors for conducting Phase I of the rebuilding of facilities; (2) congressional staff members of

the Senate and House of Representative Military

Construction Committees to receive briefings on the

estimated costs of Phase II of the rebuilding master

plan; (3) technicians to evaluate prototypes of coldweather clothing and equipment that were then undergoing testing and development at the U.S. Army

Laboratory in Natick, Massachusetts; and (4) medical experts who were assisting the staff in developing the syllabus for a new course in

cold-weather medicine for U.S. Navy surgeons and

corpsmen. 

One initiative that had been directed by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps in 1981 and that was essentially completed in June of 1983 turned out to

be a failure. This was the construction of an 8,000-

foot Air Assault Landing Zone just to the north of

Bridgeport along Highway 182 in the Toiyabe National Forest at Sweetwater in Lyons County, Nevada. At the time, it was the practice of the USAF

Air Mobility Command to annually allocate to the

Marine Corps a substantial number of C-130 flight

hours for transporting troops and equipment to various training sites around the country. In order to

build pilot proficiency, flights that flew into, or out

of unimproved dirt strips, were furnished at no cost

to the using unit. Therefore, it was reasoned, if such

a landing site were constructed in close proximity

to the training center, this would provide the means

107

Chapter 11

Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990
for transporting 2d Marine Division battalions to

MWTC for winter and summer mountain training at

very little expense. Air Force planners at Air Mobility Command enthusiastically endorsed the plan, as

did the U.S. Forest Service. In April 1982, Colonel

Osgood and representatives from the Forest Service

briefed the Lyons County Commissioners on the

project.198 This body also gave its approval to pro108 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of Col William H. Osgood

Photograph of new quarters constructed for the commanding officer of the training center in 1983. To William

H. Osgood it looked “more like a fort on the Maginot Line than living quarters.”

Major General Kenneth L. Robinson, Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton and Lieutenant Colonel Osgood observe the pouring of the cornerstone of the a new bachelor enlisted quarters on 11

August 1983.

Courtesy of Col Col William H. Osgood
Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990 109

ceed. Shortly thereafter, in May 1982, a Naval Construction Battalion from Port Hueneme began clearing ground for the airstrip. By the following spring,

Navy engineers declared the work completed and

that the Assault Landing Zone was ready to receive

aircraft. However, the U.S. Air Force team that arrived to inspect the landing zone refused to certify

it because of a small hill mass that was in the flight

path. The Construction Battalion tried to remove

this obstacle but to no avail. Consequently, the project was abandoned and no plane ever touched

down on the air strip.199

On 28 June 1983, during ceremonies at an

Evening Parade at Marine Barracks Washington,

General Robert H. Barrow retired and handed the

Corps’ battle flag to his successor, the 28th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Paul X. Kelley. President Reagan himself presided over the

ceremony. Having served as the Assistant Commandant for the previous two years, General Kelley was

familiar with General Barrow’s vision for rebuilding

MWTC. Over the next four years, he too would use

the influence of his office to ensure that the Master

Plan for rebuilding the base stayed on track.

Before General Kelley was sworn in as the new

Commandant, Colonel and Mrs. Bill Osgood received the welcome news that they could at last vacate their temporary housing in the officer’s club

and move into their new quarters that had just been

completed on the hill above. Although equipped

with new features and appliances, sadly the new

structure had none of the charm and warmth of its

predecessor. Indeed, Colonel Osgood recalled: “it

was so overbuilt and had enough concrete in it that

it looked to him more like a fort on the Maginot

Line than living quarters.200

On 11 August, Major General Kenneth L. Robinson, commanding general of Camp Pendleton was

Topaz Housing Unit in the Coleville area.

Courtesy of MWTC 
on hand at Pickel Meadow to attend the dedication

ceremony and to witness the pouring of the cornerstone for the new bachelor enlisted quarters. Shortly

thereafter, construction was also started on what

would become the new headquarters building for

the training center. Phase I of the Master Plan was

underway. Also by late 1983, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps had given its approval to proceed with

the construction of a permanent family housing

complex for MWTC’s married personnel. To achieve

this purpose a tract of land was purchased in Antelope Valley on the west side of Highway 395, one

mile to the north of the town of Coleville. What

subsequently became known as the Topaz Family

Housing complex was built under a separate contract. By the summer of 1985 its newly completed

dwellings were opened for occupancy to married

Marines and sailors who were reporting for duty at

MWTC. On 10 October, the Topaz Housing complex was officially opened at a dedication ceremony

presided over by Major General Robert E. Haebel,

the Commanding General, Camp Pendleton. During

the ceremony, each street within the complex was

named in memory of eight enlisted Marines who

had been posthumously awarded the Medal of

Honor during the Korean War. 

110 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Beginning in the early 1980s, commanding officers and their respective operations officers at

MWTC gradually began to expand the scope of the

formal courses and practical training opportunities

being offered at Pickel Meadow. This was done not

only to improve the capabilities of units participating in contingency operations in northern Norway,

but also to alleviate the lack of mountain and coldweather experience that was evident throughout

the Fleet Marine Force. By mid-summer 1984, the

Center had all but reached the peak of its increased

capabilities resulting from several new Programs of

Instruction. Future annual training plans now called

for:

• Three reinforced infantry battalions (1,000 troops

each) trained in four weeks of winter mountain operations, one of which could be trained away from

MWTC with a mobile training team.

• One infantry battalion highly trained in winter

mountain operations through two months of training at MWTC January through February.

• One Reserve infantry battalion trained in two

weeks of winter mountain operations at MWTC.

• Four reinforced infantry battalions (1,000 troops

each) trained in four weeks of summer mountain

operations. 

• Two Reserve infantry battalions trained in two

weeks of summer mountain operations.

• Four Winter Mountain Leadership Courses of twoweek duration (Grade B) for 30 students; designed

to enable small unit leaders to serve as assistant instructors for their own battalions upon deployment

to MWTC for winter training. 

• One Winter Mountain Leadership Course of four

weeks duration (Grade A) for 30 students; designed

to qualify small unit leaders (officers, staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) and noncommissioned

officers (NCOs) in winter skills at the “master” level,

thereby permitting them to serve as instructors for

their parent unit. Successful attainment of the Grade

B course served as a prerequisite.

• Six Summer Mountain Leadership Courses of twoweeks duration (Grade B) for 30 students; designed

to enable small unit leaders to serve as assistant instructors for their own battalions upon deployment

to MWTC for summer training. 

• Two Summer Mountain Leadership Courses of

four-weeks duration (Grade A) for 30 students; designed to qualify small unit leaders (officers, SNCOs

and NCOs in summer skills at the “master” level,

thereby permitting them to serve as instructors for

their parent units. Successful attainment of the

Major Edward J. Robeson IV, operations officer at

Mountain Warfare Training Center during the

early 1980s. He played a major role in revitalizing

the winter and summer mountaineering courses offered. 

Courtesy of Leatherneck
Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990 111

Grade B summer course served as a prerequisite.

• Two Senior Officer Winter Planning Courses of

two-weeks duration for 20 field grade officers; designed to enable staff officers to incorporate coldweather and mountain warfare considerations into

tactical planning. 

• Two Winter and two Summer Mountain Survival

Courses of two-weeks duration for 30 students; designed primarily for aircrews and reconnaissance

personnel who may unexpectedly find themselves

in a survival situation in a mountainous or coldweather environment. 

• Two Cold Weather Medicine Courses of twoweeks duration for 40 students; designed to enable

FMF medical personnel to prevent, recognize and

treat cold-weather illnesses and injuries and provide

advice to commanders on the medical aspects of

cold-weather and mountain operations. 

• Mountain Flying Training. In addition to the foregoing, helicopter units could use MWTC and its environs to conduct cold-weather and mountain

“terrain flying” flying exercises either in conjunction

with survival courses for aircrews, or in support of

battalion field exercises.201

This increase in base loading, or training activity,

placed a heavier demand on both the training center’s facilities and its instructor staff. These added

requirements came as no surprise. As early as 1980,

they had been outlined in detail in the training divisions’ original Marine Corps Mountain Warfare

Training Center, 1985, Training and Development

Concept Paper. In 1981, General Barrow had given

his approval to meet these anticipated requirements. As a result, initiatives in the 1983-1984 Headquarters Program Objective Memorandum calling

for the modernization of water, power and sewage

systems, for example, had managed to keep pace

with this expected growth. The personnel strength

lagged behind what had been expected. Albeit the

personnel strength of the base was gradually on the

rise, Camp Pendleton was slow in endorsing the

training center’s request for much needed increases

in its table of organization. By January 1984, it

would still only number 11 Marine officers and 162

Marines and one Royal Marine enlisted, two U.S.

Navy officers and 11 Navy enlisted, and six civilians.

Indeed, it would take another two and a half years

(July 1986) before the new authorized strength

would finally be achieved at 15 Marine officers and

211 Marines and one Royal Marine enlisted, three

U.S. Navy officers, 15 Navy enlisted, and nine civilians.202

On 25 July 1984, Colonel Bill Osgood turned

over the command of MWTC to his successor,

Colonel John I. Hopkins. Colonel Hopkins was a

decorated combat veteran who had served two

tours of duty in Vietnam: first as a battalion advisor

to the Vietnamese Marine Corps in 1965-1966 and

during 1967-1968 as the operations officer in 1st

Battalion, 4th Marines; and later in the 9th Marines.

In the late summer of 1972, as a major he commanded the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine

Division. This had been the first infantry battalion

to return to Pickel Meadow for field training since

its closure in 1967. Prior to assuming command at

MWTC, from August 1982 to June 1984, Hopkins

had served as the Chief of Staff, I Marine Amphibious Force at Camp Pendleton.*

Since the beginning of the combined NATO winter exercises, Royal Marine Commandos had consistently demonstrated a far greater proficiency in

over snow movement than their U.S. Marine counterparts. Furthermore, British forces tended to be

better prepared to withstand the rigors of the harsh

winter climate inside the Arctic Circle. What gave

British troops this edge? The principal reason given

was the almost two months of intensive individual

and collective training in both Scotland and in

North Norway prior to the exercise. In fact, one of

the recommendations that came out of the Joint

Cold Weather Conference conducted in Norway in

March of 1982 urged that U.S. Marine maneuver bat-

* Cols Hopkins and Osgood literally switched assignments, as

the latter immediately became the Chief of Staff at I MAF.

Courtesy of Col William H. Osgood

In January 1984, two former instructor-guides from

the 1960s reunited at Mountain Warfare Training

Center. Lieutenant Colonel William H. Osgood, on

the left, and on the right is Colonel Harry W. Jenkins

Jr., Commanding Officer, 2d Marine Regiment,

while visiting the training center. 
talions adopt a policy that would give them that

same level of pre-deployment training.203 However,

it was not until 1985 that components of the 4th

Marine Amphibious Brigade (4th MAB) actually

began to implement this recommendation into their

annual training plans. In preparation for Operation

Cold Winter 1985, the commanding officer of the

2d Marine Regiment, Colonel Harry Jenkins, Jr.,

himself a former instructor-guide at the training center, had scheduled his reinforced 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, to receive five weeks’ winter mountain operations training at MWTC during January and early

February. Marine Aircraft Group 40, the air component of 4th MAB, likewise sent Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (HMM-266) to MWTC for

most of the same period. Then in early February,

the balance of the 4th MAB, including its artillery,

amphibian tractor company, combat engineers, and

other air and combat service support units deployed from Camp Lejeune to Camp Drum, New

York. Upon completion of its training at MWTC, the

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, and HMM-266 rejoined

the brigade for three more weeks of collective training in cold-weather operations. After conducting a

force-on-force field exercise, the entire 4th MAB

was airlifted to northern Norway. Thus for the first

time, the primary air and ground units did acquire

almost two months of training in cold-weather operations before their deployment to Norway. Post

exercise comments that year confirmed that the

proficiency and readiness of Marine units to conduct combat operations in extreme cold and deep

snow were so dramatically improved that the 4th

MAB made this pattern of pre-deployment training

a standing operating procedure for all future NATO

winter exercises in North Norway.204

It was during this time that another source of assistance for establishing these new procedures

turned out to be none other than Major Jim

Goldsworthy, the Royal Marine exchange officer

who had served with Colonel Jenkins as an instructor at MWTC 20 years earlier. Goldsworthy would

later recall:

In the mid-1980s, I was assigned to the

amphibious planning staff of SACLant* to foster common understanding of cold-weather

operations between our two corps. As the

role of the USMC expanded to include support of north flank operations in time of war,

with annual training and joint exercises with

the Royal Marines and the Norwegian Army

Brigade North, this understanding proved to

112 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

be a very useful contribution to overcoming

problems and establishing common procedures. The bond was strengthened when

Colonel (later Major General) Harry Jenkins,

Jr., a great friend and fellow instructor with

me at MWTC, commanded the BLT deployed

for training in Norway with the 3d Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, commanded

by Brigadier Andy Keeling, also a friend with

whom I had served in 42 Commando in the

Far East. I have no doubt that my time spent

at Pickel Meadow was of value to the USMC

and the Royal Marines both professionally

and personally building a bond of understanding and mutual respect that prevails to

this day.205

Colonel Hopkins’ tenure as commanding officer

at MWTC turned out to be short-lived. Within five

months the new commander was selected for promotion and on 7 May 1985, Colonel Hopkins was

advanced to the rank of brigadier general, with orders to Camp Lejeune to serve as Assistant Division

Commander, 2d Marine Division. His 10 months as

commander at MWTC were not, however, without

their challenges. In May 1985, shortly before

Colonel Hopkins’s departure, MWTC received a

visit and inspection by the Inspector General (IG)

of the Marine Corps. A month prior to the inspection, the command had identified several problem

areas that required higher headquarters’ attention

before the IG’s visit. One issue pertained to an unresolved Memorandum of Understanding between

MWTC and Naval Air Station Fallon involving

search and rescue and medical evacuation support.

Another spoke to the matter of a 20 percent shortfall in the MWTC staffing goals. A third related to

how the Lahotan Water Control District had effectively blocked construction on the new mess hall

because of concerns over contaminated soil found

during the initial excavation. However, it was an interpretation of the Wilderness Act and Forest Service policy by local USFS officials (Reno Supervisor

and the Bridgeport and Carson District Rangers)

that potentially offered the most serious challenge

to the future capabilities of the training center’s

mountain operations program. 

Since the creation of the Mountain Leadership

Course in 1957, instructor-guides had been authorized to use the alpine terrain around Matterhorn

Peak for the summer courses on a joint use basis.

The purpose was to develop individual skills in

mountain walking, snow and ice climbing techniques, and in practical methods of glacier crevasse

rescue. Use was generally limited to 30 students, 12

* Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLant) Headquarters

was located at the U.S. Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia.
Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990 113

instructor-guides for four days, six times a year. Similarly, beginning in March, 1959 at the direction of

Lieutenant Colonel Averill, a team from the Operation and Training Section had pioneered a 60-kilometer cross-country ski and snow shoe trek route

on the western side of the Sierra divide starting at

the upper reaches of Silver Creek at MWTC and

ending on Highway 4 below the town of

Markleville in Alpine County. This trek route was

periodically used, also on a joint use basis, as a

route for a non-tactical ski march during the winter

Mountain Leadership Course. Sometime in the early

1980s, the Matterhorn Peak area was designated the

Hoover Wilderness and later, the area to the north

of MWTC was designated as the Carson-Iceberg

Wilderness. In response to two requests by the

commanding officer of MWTC to use Hoover

Wilderness area for individual mountaineering instruction, both requests were denied by the District

Ranger at Bridgeport. In his letters back to the commanding officer the District Ranger stated: “Contests

such as physical or mental endurance of a man or

animal, foot races, canoe or boat races, competitive

trail rides, survival contests or exercises and other

activities of this nature will not be permitted in

wilderness and primitive areas.”206

In response to Colonel Hopkins’s request for a

permit to gain access to the trek route located in

the Carson-Iceberg Wilderness during the winter

months, this too was similarly denied by the Carson

District Ranger, who stated: “The proposal is clearly

a structured military exercise and is prohibited by

Forest Service policy.”207 Before the Inspector-General Marine Corps’ visit, Colonel Hopkins had already appealed the decisions of both District

Rangers to their supervisor in Reno. However, the

latter refused to reverse the decision rendered by

his two subordinates. Subsequent to the IG’s visit,

a final appeal by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps

to The Honorable John R. Block, secretary of agriculture, also failed to alter the positions taken by

the local U.S. Forest Service Rangers.208 Some type

of alternative to these restrictions would therefore

have to be found, especially to make up the loss of

the Hoover Wilderness area. Resolution of these

and other issues would fall into the lap of Colonel

John F. Stennick, who on 28 June 1985 relieved

Lieutenant Colonel Earnest Van Huss as the training

center’s new commander.

Improvements in Cold-Weather Clothing

and Equipment

By mid 1985, all of the major deficiencies that

had been identified during the March 1982 Joint

Cold Weather Conference in Norway were well on

their way toward resolution. All, that is, save the

clothing and equipment issue. Since the mid-1970s,

mountaineering outfitters such as North Face, MarCourtesy of author

The Matterhorn Peak region had been the site of useful mountaineering training since 1957. In 1985, the U.S.

Forest Service closed the area to military training. It is now known as the Hoover Wilderness Area.
mot, Patagonia, Helle Hansen, and others had been

introducing a host of new lightweight winter garments, sleeping bags load-bearing pack systems,

and mountain tents. Initially, this gear was offered

in limited quantities to a small clientele at high

prices. By 1980, however, these companies were

pushing out from their high-end, technical niche

markets into the mass market. The recreational industry was steadily improving its capability to produce high quality, durable clothing and equipment

114 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of MGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr.

The 2d Marines command post group packing up at Pickel Meadow prior to deploying to Northern Norway in

1985. Regimental commander Colonel Jenkins is second from left wearing a white cap. The Marines have not

yet been issued modern Gore-Tex clothing.

General Paul X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and his aide Lieutenant Colonel Frank Libutti visit

Jenkins's field command post during Exercise Cold Winter in Northern Norway in 1985. Captain James T. Kenney, the headquarters commandant, stands second from left.

Courtesy of MGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr.
Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990 115

using synthetics and new manufacturing processes

at reduced costs. The Gore-Tex Company was at

the center of much of the latest clothing because of

its novel method of producing waterproof breathable lining laminated to many types of outer fabrics.

Nonetheless, when the troops of the 4th MAB flew

off to north Norway to participate in exercise Cold

Winter 1985, their bulky cold-weather clothing

“kits” were still basically the same items that their

Marine counterparts had worn during the Korean

War, with the one exception that most of the

brigade had been outfitted with a set of the new

Courtesy of MGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr.

Marines from 2d Marines training in Northern Norway during Exercise Cold Winter. They are carrying wooden

Northland skis.

Marines of 1st Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment skijoring behind a BV-206 in Northern Norway during Exercise

Cold Winter.

Courtesy of MGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr.
Gore-Tex outer jacket and

trouser shells.209

In August 1985, Captain Jeffrey W. “Jeff” Bearor was in

the process of transferring to

MCB Quantico, after completing a two-year tour as an exchange officer with the Royal

Marines. Between his four

weeks as a student in the Winter Mountain Leadership

Course at MWTC in 1982, and

the two winters he deployed

with 45 Commando inside the

Arctic Circle, Bearor had accrued a total of seven months

of valuable experience in the

previous three years operating

under conditions of extreme

cold. Little did he realize that

it was this experience that would soon become the

pretext for his next three-year assignment. When he

reported to the G-1 at Quantico, Captain Bearor already had in hand orders slating him to be an instructor at The Basic School. A quarter of a century later,

Bearor could still vividly recall the day he reported

for duty at Quantico:

Despite my protests, the G-1 seemed determined to assign me to the Development Center,

a place I had never heard of. I politely excused

myself, told her I was not checking in, and that

I would return tomorrow. I proceeded to call

everyone I knew to find out what the Development Center was and what it was I was

going to do there. What I found out was that

the Director, Brigadier General Robert F. “Bob”

Milligan, was looking for a company-grade officer with cold-weather experience to take over

the mountain and cold-weather project that had

been languishing since the retirement of the

previous billet holder six months before. So,

very shortly I found myself the Cold Weather

Combat Clothing and Equipment officer at the

Development Center. Brigadier General Milligan had been the commanding officer of 2d

Marine Regiment* and had first-hand knowledge of the woeful state of our cold-weather

clothing and equipment inventory. He wanted

it fixed, now.210

What Bearor found was a nascent program still

struggling to get off the ground. With the Army’s

help, it had produced prototypes of first-generation

116 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

extreme cold-weather clothing based on synthetic

materials, for operational tests and evaluation. This

included outer garments of waterproof Gore-Tex fabrics. But that, as Bearor, remembers, was just about

the extent of the entire program.

Over the next three years, Bearor would spend

much of his time at MWTC gathering information and

using members of the training centers schools to test

and evaluate clothing and equipment. The insights

he gained from these visits, along with the personal

contacts he made with members of the 2d Marine

Regiment and the 4th MAB staff proved invaluable as

the clothing and equipment program was sped up

and expanded. In addition, the Development Center

started to host regular conferences and coordination

meetings at MWTC with representatives of the U.S.

Army operating forces from Alaska, the Army Natick

Laboratory, and Special Operations Forces. Canadian,

British, Dutch, and Norwegian representatives were

also frequent participants at these meetings. “The

more we learned the better our efforts to improve the

Marines’ individual kit, which now included the

water repellent Nomex underwear,” remembers

Bearor. Moreover, the Marine Forces Atlantic commanders, Lieutenant Generals Alfred M. “Al” Gray Jr.,

and Ernest T. “Ernie” Cook, 4th MAB commanders

Brigadier Generals Carl Mundy Jr., and Matthew P.

“Matt” Caulfield, and 2d Marine Regiment commanders Colonels Harry W. Jenkins Jr., and Michael J.

“Mike” Byron were all intensely engaged and supportive in moving the cold-weather and equipment

program forward as rapidly as possible. “Through

these combined efforts,” said Bearor, “we improved

every piece of cold-weather clothing in the Corps inventory while at the same time taking 35 pounds off

Courtesy of MGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr.

An M198 155mm howitzer of 1st Battalion, 10th Marines emplaced for firing

during Exercise Cold Winter. White camouflage netting used in winter terrain

to conceal the howitzer from enemy aircraft and chains on the tires.

* May 1982-May 1983
Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990 117

the back of the individual Marine.”211

Efforts to equip Marine forces, as well as clothe

them, also proved successful. For several years, Marine ground forces had wanted a tracked vehicle,

such as the Swedish built Volvo BV-202 and its successor the BV-206, to enhance moving troops and

supplies in deep snow. These were the vehicles that

were commonly used by the Norwegian and British

combat formations during winter exercises in northern Norway. Before Fiscal Year 1985 funds ran out,

the Marine Corps was able to make an initial purchase of what would later become hundreds of BV

206s. The vast majority of these vehicles were

stored with the prepositioned stocks of equipment

being placed in central Norway; but approximately

20 were also directly delivered to MWTC in the

early months of 1986. Once there, they replaced the

aging Thiokol snow-cats and were put into use of

driver training and to support both the formal

schools and winter mountain operations training.

Other equipment improvements included a new

metal cross-country ski to replace the old 1943,

high-maintenance Northland hickory skis; and an

entirely new load-bearing system of lightweight

packs of the latest design. Thus by the time Bearor

left the Development Center in 1988, all of this new

cold-weather clothing and equipment was in the

process of being stocked in the Marine Corps’ three

Marine expeditionary forces training allowance

pools, with priority going to II MEF.212

Land Prepositioning in Norway

Up until Exercise Cold Winter 1985, the 4th MAB

had arrived in Norway by traditional amphibious

shipping. For years planners on both side of the Atlantic had been acutely aware of the major flaw of

this plan. In the event of hostilities with the Soviet

Bloc, by the time the Marine reinforcing formations

arrived, the enemy might have already seized control of the strategic northern airfields. If, however,

they could arrive by aircraft instead, with most of

their heavy equipment and ammunition already

pre-staged, they could rapidly reinforce Norway,

eliminate the need for scarce amphibious shipping,

and realize an 80 percent reduction in the amount

of airlift required. 

As early as 1976, the Norwegian government had

begun pushing for negotiations on the prepositioning of equipment in Norway. But it would take five

years of give and take discussions as to where these

stocks would be located and whether “all-weather”

Marine aircraft would be included in the task organization before an agreement could be worked out.

Under the working terms of reference, the government of Norway was adamant that the Marine

brigade’s equipment should be stored in the vicinity

of Trondheim. The fact that this was some 400 miles

south of the brigade’s expected area of employment

became a major sticking point for Marine planners.

Reluctantly however, the Marine Corps finally accepted this location and on 16 January 1981 at a

ceremony in the Pentagon, representatives of both

nations signed a draft Memorandum of Understanding Governing Pre-stockages and Reinforcement of

Norway. 213

In October 1982, the storage agreement was

completed, providing for 30 days of supplies and

enough equipment for a Marine brigade of up to

13,000 troops and 155 aircraft—now designated the

Norway Airlanded Marine amphibious brigade. In

describing the principal features of pre-positioned

stocks in Norway, Dr. Crist has noted: 

The equipment was tailor made for operating in the confines of north Norway. No

tanks were included, but it did have an artillery battalion, engineer equipment, and

Swedish-built over-the-snow vehicles, and a

large number of infantry antitank weapons.

All the equipment needed to fight, except the

men and communications gear, would be

ready and waiting in climatically controlled

caves, hollowed out into the sides of a mountain. The first of the equipment began arriving

in November and was placed in old World

War II German bunkers until the first pre-positioning facility could be completed in

1985.214

The plan for airlifting the brigade was simple in

theory, but difficult in execution. It involved deploying the Marines by chartered aircraft to airfields

in north Norway, while Norwegian “Ro/Ro” (roll on,

roll off) ships ferried the brigade’s heavy equipment

and ammunition from Trondheim, north through

the Norwegian Leeds to the vicinity of Bardafuss.

Once men and equipment were married up, they

would be incrementally employed north and east

to their battle positions. The plan, however, was

fraught with a host of “what ifs,” any one of which

carried the potential for throwing the entire scheme

into a logistical nightmare. 

Therefore, a number of steps were taken to ensure that there would be a smooth logistical flow

between an arriving Marine combat formation and

the equipment earmarked for its use. For example,

the climate-controlled caves where the preloaded

vehicles were permanently stored were especially

designed to allow easy access to a specific organization’s equipment, no matter when that unit may

arrive. Moreover, the Center for Naval Analysis was
contracted to develop a detailed model for the

movement of the air-landed Marine amphibious

brigade from arrival to the movement of its combat

positions. Two years in the making, the model examined every aspect of movement from aircraft offload rates, how long it would take to move to

assembly areas, to even where hot food would be

provided to the troops along the route. This model

was rigorously tested beginning with the first exercise using prepositioned equipment in February

1985, and was further refined and updated during

exercises over the next several years.215

In the meantime, by the mid-1980s, U.S. Atlantic

Fleet’s forward maritime strategy of aggressively deploying carrier strike forces off the coast of Norway

had also become a reality. As a major component

of this strategy, Marine air-ground task forces from

II MAF were now participating annually in two

major combined exercises on NATO’s northern

flank. In September the 4th MAB would deploy in

ships and conduct amphibious operations, usually

in central Norway. Then in late February and early

March the Norway air-landed Marine amphibious

brigade (also 4th MAB and later 4th MEB) would

take part in an AFNorth combined winter exercise,

usually conducted in the north. Therefore, to add a

little more weight and strength to the growing U.S.

Marine Corps commitment to the region, beginning

in 1985 the commander of Allied Forces North was

happy to accept a permanently assigned U.S. Marine brigadier general to his NATO headquarters at

Kolsas, outside of Oslo. The first Marine officer to

hold this billet (Assistant Chief of Staff Operations)

was the former Commanding General, 4th MAB,

Brigadier General H. Norman Smith. His successor

was Brigadier General Jarvis D. Lynch Jr., who

served in the same billet from February 1986 to July

1987.216

Picking up the Pace in Operations and

Modernization of the Training Center

Colonel John F. Stennick was born and raised in

northern Oregon. He graduated from Oregon State

University with a bachelor of science degree in

wildlife management and was commissioned a second lieutenant in December of 1962. He was designated an infantry officer after graduating from The

Basic School in July 1963. During the ensuing 22

years before taking command at MWTC, he served

two tours of duty in the Republic of Vietnam (was

seriously wounded in action during his first tour in

1965) and had held a number of important command

and staff assignments within the 2d and 3d Marine

Divisions; at Marine Corps Development and Education Command , Quantico, Virginia; and at MCB,

Twentynine Palms California. Prior to coming to the

training center he was the Head, Manpower Control

Branch at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps.217

118 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy of Col John F. Stennick

Colonel John Stennick, Commanding Officer, Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1985-1988, on one of the

several snowmobiles used at the time.
Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990 119

Even before assuming command at the training

center, Colonel Stennick recognized that one of his

first tasks was to heal the strained relationships that

had been widening between the Mountain Warfare

Training Center and the District Ranger’s Office in

Bridgeport. Later, he would remark: 

As I took command at MWTC, I made it

clear that I had a deep and abiding appreciation for the alpine environment and intended

to do right by it. Major General Robert Haebel

(who was CG, MCB, Camp Pendleton and in

attendance at the change of command ceremony) picked up on my remarks and subsequently backed me on funding for a full-time

U.S. Forest Ranger to serve on the MWTC staff,

paid for by the U.S. Marine Corps. This

arrangement rapidly turned the cool attitude of

the District Forest Ranger one hundred and

eighty degrees into a supportive partner. To

further improve this relationship, we volunteered Marine Corps assets to benefit the area

by developing a “joint trash exercise” to include helicopter lifts from wilderness areas to

remove old mining equipment that otherwise

could not be reached without leaving a footprint in the delicate alpine meadows. An early

snow in September of 1985 gave the Pickel

Meadow cadre some real live survival training

with 9-foot drifts of snow and won over the

Forest Service when we removed junk that had

been a blight for years in the adjoining wilderness area.218

Courtesy of MWTC

Mules purchased in 1985 by Colonel Stennick and entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Earnest Van Huss, the center

executive officer. Special saddles were acquired that were suitable for mounting mortars and heavy machine

guns assigned to a Marine weapons company. Select Marines received special training in packing the mules.

The second initiative taken by the new base commander was the purchase of four mules and a bell

mare for the purpose of reintroducing animal packing into the syllabus at MWTC. This project was entrusted to Colonel Stennick’s executive officer,

Lieutenant Colonel Earnest A. “Ernie” Van Huss, who

was a horseman. The stable located in the flat was

remodeled to accommodate the stock and special

saddles, upon which to mount the mortars and

heavy machine guns of a infantry weapons company

were fabricated. Also, a small cadre of permanently

assigned Marines from the training center was sent

to Jackson Hole, Wyoming to receive instruction in

animal packing at a professional packing school. A

third initiative was the establishment of a course in

which to train snipers in the techniques of high altitude shooting. The course was conducted in the

vicinity of Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot. 

With the base table of organization now up to

strength, the first quarter of calendar year 1986 found

the training center operating at full capacity. From

early January to late February, MWTC hosted two

winter Mountain Operation Courses for two infantry

battalions of the 2d Marine Division, plus the tactical

headquarters of Colonel Harry Jenkins’s 2d Marine

Regiment as part of their advance training for Exercise Anchor Express 1986 in Norway.* In addition,

two other Mountain Operation Courses were conducted for two infantry battalions of the 1st Marine

* This NATO winter exercise ended up being cut short after an

avalanche tragically killed a squad of ski troops from Norway’s

Brigade North. 
Division; three Mountain Leaders Courses; four ColdWeather Survival Courses; five Cold Weather Medical

Courses; a Field Grade Planning Course (a 10-day

orientation course for 75 officers from the Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, Virginia) and a series of rotating helicopter support detachments.219

As 1986 turned into spring and summer, MWTC

personnel continue to provide the Mono County

Sheriff’s with a ready-made capability for emergency

search and rescue operations. In May of that year

some 60 Marines and Navy corpsmen assisted the

Sheriff’s department and the California Highway Patrol when a chartered bus returning from a Nevada

gambling casino lost control heading south on Highway 395 and plunged into the fast moving waters of

the West Walker River. During the next month, Staff

Sergeant Kern from the Mountain Leaders Course

and Petty Officer Richards from the Mountain Medicine Course were sent to Alaska to join a team of 14

U.S. Army Rangers for an ascent of Mount McKinley.

Funded by the U.S. Army, the purpose of the climb

was to determine the requirements for developing a

high altitude rescue capability. The peak was successfully scaled and the team returned safely.

With respect to modernization of base facilities,

1986 saw the completion of the headquarters building, the fire station, the maintenance/communication

120 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

electronics shop, the bachelor officers’ quarters, two

water storage tanks, and finally, after the Western Division, Naval Engineering Facilities Command had

corrected a number of design flaws, the bachelor enlisted quarters. Once the bachelor enlisted quarters

was opened for occupancy, demolition of the Quonset huts that had housed bachelor-enlisted personnel

for the past 35 years began. This allowed excavation

to begin on the multi-purpose training facility/post

exchange complex building. Similar to the case with

the bachelor enlisted quarter, construction of the

new mess hall building had also fallen behind schedule because of initial “over building” flaws in its design. Therefore, it would be a year before this facility

would open. Conversion of the former officer’s club

(Pickel Lodge) into distinguished visitor quarters and

special events reception room, a project started by

Colonel Hopkins, was also completed in 1986. 

During 1987 the operational tempo at Pickel

Meadow continued at the same hectic pace as the

previous year. Before the year would close, over

13,000 passengers would be transported and 886

tons of cargo hauled to the base in support of the

training center’s missions.220 In contrast to previous

years, however, Colonel Michael J. “Mike” Byron’s

2d Marines tactical headquarters group and the two

reinforced infantry battalions from the 2d Marine Division who came for pre-deployment winter mountain operations training in January and February

arrived completely outfitted in the new light-weight

Gortex/Nomex winter clothing uniforms drawn from

the II MAF training allowance pool. By the following

year, these uniforms would be stocked in the training

allowance pool in each of the three Marine amphibious forces. The Sierra snow-pack that year was comCourtesy MWTC

Marine sniper training at the Sniper Range near

Hawthorne, Nevada in the 1980s.

Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, training in

Operation Anchor Express, 1986, conducted at

Brostabotn, Norway. Troops at this point were completely outfitted with Gore-Tex clothing and metal

skis.

Courtesy of MGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr.
Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990 121

paratively lighter than normal. As a result, winter

mountain operations training and the other MWTC

courses of instruction had to be conducted at the

higher elevations. Furthermore, because of the reactivation of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division at

Fort Drum, New York in 1986, the 4th MAB, now

commanded by Brigadier General Matthew Caulfield,

shifted its last phase of winter pre-deployment training to the Army National Guard installation at Fort

McCoy, Wisconsin before being air-lifted to Norway. 

In March, Colonel Stennick was on hand to observe the 4th MAB’s combined winter exercise in

northern Norway. He returned to Oslo in the latter

part of June to brief the Joint U.S. Norwegian ColdWeather Conference on MWTC’s current status and

capabilities and returned just in time to host a visit

to the training center by Major General Henry Beverly, Royal Marines. 

Shortly after the Beverly visit, tragedy struck. At

the end of June, Mountain Leaders Class 1-87 was

nearing the end of its training program. Because the

previous winter was unusually dry, the instructor

staff determined that it was infeasible to do snow

and ice climbing training at any of the usual locations close to the training center. Therefore, a oneday excursion to Mount Whitney was organized to

allow this routine training and, at the same time, afford the students the opportunity to ascend the highest peak in the lower 48 States. Thus during the

predawn hours of July 1, 1987, some 38 students

from the Summer Mountain Leader’s Class boarded

a base bus for the drive to the trail head west of Lone

Pine, California. The 22-mile one-day trek up and

down the windswept 14,000-plus foot peak proved

as challenging a test as the students had been led to

believe. The peak was successfully summited, however, and all students and instructors made it back

to the trailhead before dark. Kurtis P. “Kurt” Wheeler,

one of several NROTC Midshipmen who was a student in the class, relates what happened next: 

The entire class of junior officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and NROTC midshipmen boarded the bus at dusk and most fell

asleep immediately after such a long grueling

day. The instructors boarded a 12-passenger

van and began to lead the way down the

switched-backed mountain road. Like most of

my classmates, I leaned forward onto the daypack on my lap and prepared to get some

shut-eye. Just minutes into the trip I recall hearing the bus driver express alarm. He seemed

to be attempting to pump the brakes. We were

noticeably accelerating down the mountain

Courtesy of MGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr.

For Operation Anchor Express, 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade was flown to Norway. All major end items and

equipment including BV-206s, amphibian tractors, artillery, trucks, and tentage had been prepositioned in

caves in the vicinity of Narvik, Norway.
and soon shot past the van in front of us. The

driver struggled valiantly to keep the bus under

control but it was clearly a losing battle. We

seemed to be shifting to two wheels with each

gut-wrenching curve on the S-shaped mountain road. Gravity won out and I can vividly recall seeing the world turn on its side as the

swath of desert lit up by the headlights shifted

before us. Time seemed to slow down as we

veered off the road and rotated 90 degrees.

There was incredible violence as we hit the

rocky desert ground. The side of the bus

opened up like a tin can and the windows immediately smashed. I can still feel the sensation

of the sand, rocks and broken glass rushing

past my head and hands. In a few seconds it

was over. The bus lay still and it was totally

silent. No one screamed or cried out. The next

hour was a blur as instructors (who had been

safe in the van) and able bodied classmates

worked to evacuate the wounded from the

bus. Someone contacted emergency services

and the area soon swarmed with rescue personnel. 

Of the 38 students who were on the bus, two

were killed, 19 were hospitalized and eight, including Midshipman Wheeler, miraculously walked away

with virtually no injuries. The remainder were treated

and released. Twenty-two years after the accident,

Wheeler would still painfully remember it as “a tragic

end to what I still consider one of the best months

of my life-in the beautiful Sierra Nevada Mountains.”221

In the spring of 1987, the mess hall was officially

dedicated and began serving permanent personnel,

students and battalions there for field training. This

permitted the old mess hall to be demolished and allowed construction to begin on the new

medical/dental clinic. Construction was also begun

on a new motor transport building and a new ski lift

located at the higher elevations of upper Wolf Creek

Canyon. 

In addition to meeting the demands of a full

schedule and overseeing the flurry of activity taking

place at the training center, at the request of Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Colonel Stennick was

also tasked to send a field-grade officer to Chile to

observe Chilean Marines conduct mountain operations in the Andes. An added request asked that he

send a cadre of noncommissioned officers to Columbia to instruct Drug Enforcement Agents in mountaineering skills.222

In the summer of 1988, the training center underwent a number of personnel changes. On 1 July,

Colonel Stennick turned over the reins of command

to his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel William

Healy, and proceeded to his next duty station at

Camp Pendleton. It had been a busy three years

122 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy MWTC

Aerial photo of the modernized Mountain Warfare Training Center in 1986. At the far right, the new bachelor

enlisted quarters are almost ready for occupancy. The headquarters building and the bachelor officer quarters

at the top of the picture have been completed.
Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990 123

and much had been accomplished. During the last

months of his tenure the new ski lift had become

operational in time for use by the 2d Marine Division battalions, which came for winter mountain

operations training in January and February 1988.

The training facility post exchange complex and the

new Medical and Dental building were both completed and accepted for occupancy on 12 April and

an addition was being made to the commanding officer’s quarters. The contract for Milcon Project P954 Chapel and Recreation Center was in the

process of being awarded. When these two structures were completed in the next year, it would

mean that the Master Plan had been essentially built

out. In addition to an exchange of Commanders,

Major James “Jim” Snell, the S-3, also departed on 1

July. His relief was Major Rodney C. “Rod” Richardson, who reported to the training center after completing a two-year exchange tour with the Royal

Marines. During July, General Alfred M. Gray Jr.,

29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, paid a visit

to the training center. Everything he saw from training programs to people to the new base facilities

impressed him. The Commandant praised the

MWTC staff for all of its efforts, but in particular for

substantially improving the capability of Marine

forces to fight and win under arctic conditions.223

Reaching the High Water Mark

Colonel Phillip E. Tucker assumed command of

the MWTC on 18 August 1988. An Alabambian by

birth, he graduated from the Virginia Military Institute with honors in 1964 and accepted a regular

commission in the Marine Corps. As a lieutenant

colonel, Tucker had served for a year in the Republic of Korea (ROK) as the emergency action officer

with the ROK U.S. Joint Forces Command. After

graduating from the National War College in 1985,

he served three years in Hawaii. Prior to being assigned to MWTC, Tucker was the Fleet Marine Officer, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor.224

Also in the summer of 1988 at another ceremony,

this one at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Colonel

John W. Ripley relieved Colonel Mike Byron and

assumed command of the 2d Marine Regiment. Ripley was a recognized combat leader who had distinguished himself by almost single-handedly

destroying the bridge at Dong Ha during the North

Vietnamese Army Easter Offensive in the Republic

of Vietnam, thereby stopping an enemy tank attack.

Ripley had also served a two-year exchange tour

with the Royal Marines. The experience had given

Marines of the 2d Marine Regiment are being instructed in downhill ski techniques at the new ski lift constructed

in upper Wolf Creek Canyon. The ski lift was completed in January 1988.

Courtesy MWTC
him a keen appreciation for conducting combat operations in deep snow and extreme cold. By now,

though, Ripley was not the only cold-weather warrior in the regiment. For the past year it had been

the policy of the 2d Marine Division to purposely

staff battalions of the 2d Marines with officers and

staff noncommissioned officers who had extensive

experience in cold-weather operations. This included anyone who was a former instructor, a graduate of a Mountain Leadership Course at MWTC, an

exchange officer with the Royal Marines, or anyone

who could claim down-hill or cross-country ski ex124 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy MWTC

Marines training at Pickel Meadow, late 1980s, outfitted with the new Gore-Tex clothing and tentage.

perience. As early as December, therefore, the

troops who were scheduled to deploy to north Norway as part of Ripley’s regiment in March, could already be seen practicing their cross-country ski

techniques on roller blades with ski poles around

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina's broad avenues.

225

On 4 February 1989, Ripley’s tactical headquarters group and his 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, completed their four weeks of cold-weather training at

Pickel Meadow and returned to Camp Lejeune for

a week of rest. Meanwhile, Brigadier General

Matthew P. Caulfield’s 4th MEB* was in the process

of deploying to Fort McCoy, Wisconsin for Exercise

Alpine Warrior. One Reserve infantry battalion had

already arrived at McCoy and was undergoing

cross-country ski and snowshoe training administered by a mobile training team of instructors from

MWTC. As each major component of the MEB arrived from Camp Lejeune or Cherry Point, it was

quickly integrated into an air-ground brigade, eventually numbering some 9,000 Marines and sailors.

After two more weeks of unit training, Alpine Warrior concluded with a three-day force-on-force tactical field exercise. The Tactical Exercise Control

Group then conducted a rigorous critique, emphasizing both shortcomings and strengths that were

observed. On the 25th of February, the troops

began embarking aircraft for the flight to Norway.226

Among the U.S. observers who were on hand

during the opening phase of Exercise Cold Winter

* In 1988 CMC Al Gray directed that the word “Expeditionary”

vice “Amphibious” be reinstituted when referring to Marine airground forces.

Colonel John W. Ripley, here in Vietnam, was also

a veteran of service in Northern Europe. His regiment used the MWTC to prepare for assignment to

Norway. Marine Corps History Division
Ascending New Heights, 1984-1990 125

89 in Norway was Lieutenant General Carl Mundy

Jr., a former commander of both the 2d Marines and

the 4th MEB and now the Assistant Chief of Staff,

Plans and Operations at Headquarters U.S. Marine

Corps. Accompanying him on the same plane was

the Commanding General, 2d Marine Division. Witnessing the components of the 4th MEB arrived by

air and quickly marry up with pre-staged equipment and then move off toward their battle positions was an impressive sight. Well outfitted in their

new winter uniforms and lightweight equipment,

the troops looked fit and eager to give a good account of themselves as they prepared to take on the

British and Norwegian units playing the role of the

opposing force. While comparing notes during their

flight back to Washington, both generals were of

the same opinion that with respect to the Norwegian contingency, everything had at last seemed to

come together. They also agreed that most, if not

all, of the major deficiencies that had severely reduced the mobility and combat effectiveness of U.S.

Marine forces to operate in deep snow and extreme

cold over the past decade, had either been solved

or close to resolution.227

The remainder of 1989 would prove to be another banner year at the training center. In addition

to the instruction provided by the mobile unit training team at Fort McCoy, almost 11,000 Marines underwent training at MWTC. In April, HQMC

approved a request to add an additional 15 Hägglunds BV-206 vehicles to the training center’s inventory, with a projected delivery date of September

1990. For FY-1990, Congress authorized 2.3 million

dollars for minor repair and improvements of the

base; sufficient funds for 33 additional houses to be

constructed at the Topaz base housing facility, and

eight million dollars for FY 1991 for billeting students and battalions at the lower base camp. And

in August, construction was begun on a new equipment support facility, also located in the lower base

camp.228

During May of 1989 an eight-man team from

MWTC traveled to Denali Park in Alaska to make

an ascent of Mount McKinley’s 20,320-foot peak.

This was the first Marine sponsored assault led by

the S-3, Major Rodney “Rod” Richardson.* “Our mission involved testing some of the new clothing and

equipment that had been developed for use in extreme cold-weather,” recalled Denhoff 20 years

later. “We also tested medications like Diamox,

which was supposed to help fight high altitude

cerebral edema.”229

U.S. Army aircraft from Fort Wainwright flew the

team to the 14,000-foot level, where the U.S. Army

had established a camp to conduct tests and experiments. After spending several days acclimatizing,

the party began its ascent to higher elevations.

However, Richardson and Varmette soon contracted

acute mountain sickness and were forced to retreat

back to the Army base camp at 14,000 feet.** The

six remaining members of the party then moved to

17,200 feet to stage for an assault on the summit.

Once there, a storm kept them tent-bound at that

level for several days before they could proceed

and reach the summit. When the team descended

back to the14,000-foot base camp, they were asked

to help recover the bodies of three British climbers

who had fallen to their death.230

In November of 1989, the Berlin Wall, one of the

major symbols of the Cold War, came crashing

down. Thereafter, the U.S.S.R. began to disintegrate

from within. Ironically, these events took place just

as Marine capabilities to wage a successful campaign in north Norway were reaching their peak.

Then in August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. As a result, a substantial number of NATO and U.S. forces

were shifted to the Persian Gulf to conduct Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As a conseMarine training with M249 5.56mm squad automatic weapon in the small-arms range at Wolf

Creek Canyon, late 1980s.

Courtesy MWTC

* The team included Capts Thomas M. “Tom” Varmette and Timothy C. “Tim” Wells, Lt Gregg McAninch, MC, USN, Royal Marine

Color Sgt Martin Wilkin, SSgts Alejandro G. Bello and Richard

N. Denhoff, and Sgt Wesley D. Clark. (Col Wells would later return to MWTC as its commanding officer 2005-2006).

** In June of the following year (1990) Maj Richardson led a second assault on McKinley accompanied by MWTC members: Capt

Fargrave, and Sgts Sommers and Estes. The team successfully

reached the peak and returned safely.
quence, exercises at MWTC and Norway were suspended for the coming year.

Dr. Crist’s paper concluded with the following

observation: 

While the entire debate over the defense

of NATO’s northern flank may be reduced to

a footnote of the Cold War, it provided some

126 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

lasting effects on the Marine Corps. It established

the Marines as the premier

service within the DOD in

cold-weather operations,

providing invaluable training for all the armed forces

in an area where few had

looked since the early

1950s. In a purely parochial view, the Marines obtained an entire brigade’s

worth of equipment over

and above what was required in the Fleet

Marines; with the funding

provided by supplemental

appropriations. This does not include the additional money obtained to purchase new

Gortex and other cold-weather clothing, replacing those designed three decades earlier. 

The use of the Marines in northern Europe

provided valuable lessons on how the Marine

Corps can be used to support the fleet in the

littorals. By using the Marines to secure airfields, which served to supplement carrier aircraft, while not a new concept, added a new

dimension to how NATO could fight the Soviets in confined waters of the Norwegian Sea.

The ability to alter the organization of the marine amphibious brigade, was instrumental in

supporting the naval campaign, be it against

the Soviet fleet or attacking the flank of the

Soviet Army in Germany. For the Marine

Corps specifically, deployments to Norway offered the chance to find solutions to problem

the other were slow in seeing. In the process

this afforded the opportunity for the Marine

Corps to, once again, provide an example of

its ability to innovate and adapt to changing

defense concerns.231

Although the U.S. Marines would continue to exercise in Norway with small-size forces up through

the early 1990s, these were of lesser imperative and

urgency than those of the previous decade. As the

Marine Corps moved on to other more pressing

contingencies in the 1990s, so too would the leaders at MWTC have to examine what new tasks and

missions might now come their way.

Courtesy MWTC

Swedish-built Hägglunds BV-206, an extremely useful over-snow vehicle for

moving troops and supplies. The Mountain Warfare Training Center acquired

a handful of these in 1986, and an additional 15 in 1990.

At right, Major Rodney Richardson, MWTC Operations Officer, 1988-1990.

Courtesy MWTC
The influence of mountains on the conduct of war

is very great; the subject, therefore, is very

important for study.

-Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book V

Introduction

Ever since Hannibal led his Carthaginian army

over the Alps to invade the heart of the Roman Empire in 218 BC, generals have sought to overcome

or to exploit mountainous terrain in pursuit of military victory. The tactical and logistical considerations for mountain warfare have evolved over

time—and continue to evolve. But many of the solutions to the challenges associated with mountain

operations remain timeless. Hannibal, for example,

utilized 37 war elephants to great effect. Today’s

Marines train with pack mules at the Marine Corps

Mountain Warfare Training Center. In fact, the

March 2009 Marine Corps Gazette featured a Marine

and a Bridgeport pack mule on its cover. Despite

some of the timeless aspects of mountain warfare,

however, the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center spent much of the 1990s trying to define

its continued relevance and continued mission in

the immediate post-Cold War era. The Mountain

Warfare Training Center (MWTC) had its origins in

the early days of the Cold War, and had thrived and

grown in its demonstrated ability to prepare

Marines for combat against Communist aggression

in Korea and operations on NATO’s (North Atlantic

Treaty Organization) northern flank in Norway. The

fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, marked the

end of that defining conflict, and left the U.S. military as well as the MWTC adjusting to a new world

order.

Operation Desert Storm, another defining event

for the U.S. military, demonstrated the continued

utility of the Marine aircraft group task force. However, following an overwhelming victory in the first

Persian Gulf Conflict, the United States accelerated

a drawdown of its military forces that affected every

branch of military service—and every base, including Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center,

Bridgeport. Still, it would take a while for American

and NATO planners to redirect their focus from a

threat that had been greatly diminished. For example, the Marine Mountain Warfare Training Center

provided a mobile training team to support Operation Battle Griffin in March of 1991—a NATO operation in northern Norway that focused on how to

counter an invasion of that Scandinavian country

by Soviet forces above the Arctic Circle. Marine

Corps—and MWTC—support for NATO operations

in Norway would continue for several more years,

despite the reduced threat in that potential theater

of operations.

Continuing Operations While Dealing with

Future Uncertainties

With the Pentagon cutting budgets and personnel while also eliminating bases, the Marine Corps

had to contend with the Defense Base Closure and

Realignment Commission. Eventually, a number of

Marine facilities and bases would be closed, including major installations such as the air station at El

Toro, California. Even though 1991 marked the 40th

Anniversary of the MWTC at Pickel Meadow, the

Corps would have to spend considerable time

throughout the 1990s making the case as to why

the Bridgeport base was still needed. 

In the meantime, mountain and cold-weather

training would continue. With the preponderance

of Marine forces having been deployed with two

Marine expeditionary forces during Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, much unit training

had been cancelled at Pickel Meadow during 1990-

1991. With the return of these units to the United

States, however, activity at MWTC increased. Regular unit training resumed and specialized courses

were again filled with students. As the training

tempo increased, the dining facility served over

270,000 meals in 1992. The 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, and 2d Marine Division headquarters element arrived on 11 January 1993 to spend over a

month in pre-deployment cold-weather training in

preparation for Operation Battle Griffin in Norway

in March. Not only Marines, but service members

from other branches and other countries would

journey to northern California and make the final

four-mile drive up Route 108 to the mile-high Pickel

Meadow base camp and its unique training opportunities. In August 1991, for example, U.S. Navy

SEALs arrived at Pickel Meadow for specialized

training. In October 1995, 30 French Legionnaires

arrived for two weeks of mountain training, which

continued a Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center tradition of hosting military training for

foreign service members.232

High-level officers exhibited an interest in the

127

Chapter 12

The 1990s: A Post-Cold War World
base. In July 1991, Major General J. Michael Myatt 

(commander of 1st Marine Division in Operation

Desert Storm) conducted a Commander’s Conference at MWTC. The base additionally hosted numerous visits from assorted very important persons,

including General Carl Mundy, Commandant of the

Marine Corps, on 18 October 1993. The following

month, the base hosted Vice Air Marshal Dodworth

of the British Royal Marines and Commander Paranhos of the Brazilian Marine Corps.233

Pickel Meadow continued also to serve as a focal

point for the gathering and dissemination of knowledge on cold-weather and mountain warfare. Some

of this involved research—in January and February

1992, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, spent six weeks testing new field gear, including the North Face Tent,

extended wear gloves, the Minnesota sled, ski

march boots, and the vector pack. In October, four

MWTC survival instructors attended the Canadian

Forces Survival Training School at Edmonton, Alberta. In June 1994, Marine Corps Mountain Warfare

Training Center sent a six-member Mount McKinley

expedition team to Alaska. This group of instructors

would be testing new equipment and techniques

on the 20,000 foot plus mountain also known as

Denali, North America’s highest peak. Three members would successfully summit the mountain on 23

June. These were typical examples of how Pickel

Meadow personnel might be deployed—anywhere

from Norway to Alaska—in the interest of professional development in the areas of cold-weather or

mountain warfare training. The base also continued

its longstanding tradition of providing considerable

support and a military presence at community functions. MWTC provided color guards, mule teams,

and static displays at no less than 21 civic events

during 1993.234

A succession of able base commanders and dedicated staff continued to oversee infrastructure improvements and challenging training at MWTC. On

128 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Courtesy MWTC

Small parties of Mountain Warfare Training Center personnel often made Mount McKinley expeditions in the

1980s and 1990s. From left to right are Lieutenant Commander Sitler, USN (MC); Captain Malay; Staff Sergeant

Miller, and Sergeant Lamar at the summit in 1992.
The 1990s: A Post-Cold War World 129

31 July 1991, Colonel Russell W. Schumacher Jr., assumed command of the base from Colonel Phillip

E. Tucker. After three years of supervising training

and growth of the base, Schumacher turned command over to Colonel Raymond L. “Skip” Polak in

June 1994.235 Infrastructure improvements continued through 1995. The mess hall repair project was

completed in April, which provided upgrades to the

facility at a final cost of $447,000. Construction of

the Project 9-797 Training Billeting Support Facilities

was completed on 9 August at a final cost of $10,

027,000. This project added 91,484 square feet of

facility space to Marine Warfare Training Center—a

75 percent increase.236

On 9 July 1996 Colonel Polak turned the command over to Colonel Paul W. O’Toole Jr. (Two

days later three Marines were struck by lightning

on the mountaintop known as 9494.237 A successful

medical evacuation operation rescued all three, but

the incident was another reminder of the hazards

of training in the mountain environment—even in

the summer.) Under Colonel O’Toole’s watch, infrastructure and base activities expanded. For example, the year 1996 was a busy time for religious

activities at MWTC. A base chapel had earlier been

constructed to replace the original structure. This

building matched the design of most of the newer

buildings, as the older structures and Quonset huts

which marked the older camp gradually disappeared. On 4 February, Catholic mass was reinstated at the chapel. From 12-13 September the

chapel held the first base-wide Relationship Enhancement Program for married personnel. Then,

on 24 December, the annual Christmas Eve Ecumenical Candlelight Service provided the base with

a spiritual glow.238

In 1997, Colonel O’Toole and base personnel

had to make some short-term adjustments when

sections of Highway 395 were destroyed by flooding—cutting off MWTC from points north.239 This

was yet another reminder about the fragility of manmade structures in that harsh, mountain environment. Air operations remained integral to base

operations as they had been since its first 1951-1952

winter when transport planes dropped food and

supplies to Marines cut off in Pickel Meadow by extraordinary snowfall. In 1997, Helicopter Marine

Medium 466 deployed to Bridgeport to provide CH46 helicopter support for winter mountain operations from 27 January through 24 March. The CH-46

unit included Captain Sarah M. Deal, the Marine

Corps first female naval aviator.240

Trapper Ted’s Full Moon Saloon was completely

painted and decorated.241 While the new facility

lacked the informal, rustic charm of its predecessor,

which was built by Marines and still stands above

the base fishing hole, the current club features

panoramic views of mountain vistas that are unmatched by any other U.S. Marine Corps club. The

facility provided quality service for Pickel Meadow

patrons, even though not recognized as the Marine

Corps Best Small Club for several years running.

At the end of 1998, the MWTC personnel report

featured 13 Marine officers and 207 enlisted, as well

as five naval officers and 17 enlisted sailors. These

numbers were generally consistent with staffing levels throughout most of the decade. Seventeen Navy

Achievement Medals were awarded during the

course of the year and there was only one court

martial.242

The medical clinic continued to upgrade its facility and assigned naval personnel continued professional education on and off base during the

course of the year. The clinic specialized in treating

the injuries and conditions peculiar to a mountainous environment. For example, nine patient casualties were treated in January 1998. All were the

result of severe cold and exposure.243 The Command Education Program also continued to grow

as classes were established on base and other

courses were made available via the internet. The

Mountain Warfare Training Center established academic affiliations with Barstow College and Central

Texas College.244 The base exchange continued to

provide service to the MWTC community, and in

addition to special monthly sales also sponsored a

fishing sale, a garden and outdoor sale, a physical

training sale, a sportsman’s sale, and a toy sale.245

Demonstrating MWTC Value During Peacetime

Despite all the good things happening on board

Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, its

leaders were very much aware of base realignment

and closure (BRAC) and the need to raise awareness about the value of the base. One of the commanders attuned to this issue was Colonel Polak,

who served as base commander from 1994 to 1996.

A graduate of the University of Wisconsin, Polak

was no stranger to cold weather. He later served as

commanding officer at Marine Barracks, Adak,

Alaska. Earlier he had also served as an artillery officer during the Vietnam conflict.

Polak was serving as an instructor at the Command and Staff School in Quantico, Virginia, when

he received a telephone call from his monitor,

Colonel James T. Conway (later the 34th Marine

Corps Commandant.) “Have I got a deal for you,”

said Conway to Polak.246 “Colonel Conway told me

about the CO’s position at Bridgeport,” recalled

Polak. “I’d been up there to go hunting in the 80s
with John Stennick [MWTC commanding officer

from 1985-1988]. I was intrigued.”247 Polak remembered, “It was a quiet time, post-Desert Storm. We

worked on a five-year plan, put in streetlights, did

barracks improvements, upgraded sewage treatment, and improved the roads. We also developed

a ‘Search and Rescue’ capability to help civilian authorities when required. We helped save some hikers, including a guy who broke his back.”248

Polak connected well with local neighbors and

ranchers and also spent considerable time mollifying Forest Service officials, with whom good relations were a priority, as MWTC-Bridgeport operates

on leased Forest Service land. Although live fire has

always been a challenge to arrange for Mountain

Warfare Training Center personnel, Polak did set up

a winter live fire “range” in Sonora Pass, featuring

a snowmobile towing a target across a 100 meter

kill zone. And yet despite all these positive developments, Polak was always quite aware of BRAC

and its possible implications for MWTC. “We knew

we needed to make a case for the base,” said Polak.

“While the Korean scenario has always been with

us, with the reduction of the Norway threat, people

were asking reasonable questions as to whether we

needed to invest in Bridgeport.” Polak felt that there

was intangible value to training at a base like Pickel

Meadow. “It’s a great place for leadership assessment,” he explained. “You learn about yourself and

you learn about leadership. The cold, the mountains, and the altitude all combine to create real

physical and emotional stress that can’t be replicated elsewhere.”249

The challenge for Polak and his successors,

Colonel O’Toole and Colonel Robert W. Strahan—

at least until 2001—was to make the case for the

base’s existence, so that the excellent training occurring there could continue, both for U.S. Marines

and for their allies. As an example of this training,

on 8 January 1997, the Winter Mountain Leaders

Course convened with 56 students. Included in the

class were six U.S. Army Special Forces personnel.

The group also included five foreigners—two noncommissioned officers from France, two noncommissioned officers from formerly Communist

Croatia, and one officer from Kyrgyzstan. The presence of the latter—coming from a former Soviet

Union Republic—was a reminder that the Cold War

was indeed over.250

A second course followed the one that convened

in January. Other MWTC courses of instruction offered in 1997 included four cold-weather survival

courses, five cold-weather medicine courses, three

mountain survival courses, four wilderness medicine courses, two summer mountain leader courses,

130 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

The wartime origins of the Mountain Warfare

Training Center come full circle with the deployement of Marines as part of Operation Enduring

Freedom in Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel Mike

Moffett, co-author, was present as a field historian

documenting the centers continued value in training Marines for harsh climates.

Courtesy of author

one winter and one summer instructor qualification

course. This menu of specialized Cold Weather and

Mountain Warfare Courses is typical of what was

offered at MWTC throughout the 1990s. Additionally, very important persons and foreign visitors

continued to come to review the Pickel Meadow

experience. On 3 March, a company from the Canadian Army’s Princess Patricia’s Battalion arrived for

a three week training package. (Five years later this

unit would later serve alongside American forces in

Afghanistan.) On 17 June, the commanding officer

of the 12th Austrian Mountain Regiment, Colonel

Steinwender toured MWTC.251

Colonel Strahan took over commanding officer

duties from Colonel O’Toole on 25 August 1999,

and he too, along with his staff, gave serious

thought to how Marine Corps Mountain Warfare

Training Center could best serve the interests of the

Marine Corps. In a March 2001 article in the Marine

Corps Gazette, Strahan both outlined his thinking

and invited input from others around the Corps.

Strahan first reiterated MWTC’s mission statement:
The 1990s: A Post-Cold War World 131

“To prepare Marines and sailors to develop doctrine

and to test equipment for MAGTF operations in

mountainous and cold-weather environments.”252

Strahan and his staff believed that the means to accomplishing this mission included unit training, individual training, mobile training teams, equipment

evaluation, and authorship of doctrinal publications.

In terms of unit training, Strahan noted that, traditionally, seven Active and two Reserve battalions

trained at Pickel Meadow every year. He invited his

readers, however, to ask what kinds of units should

train there, and at what point in their “life cycle” or

“training, exercise, and employment plan.” He suggested his own answers, of course, and also demanded consideration of what the purpose of

MWTC training actually was:

Is it MAGTF operations in a mountainous/cold-weather environment? Is it unit cohesion training in a stressful environment? Is

it small unit leadership? “Is it adventure training (skiing and mountain climbing)? We think

it should be MAGTF operations, with the

other things being natural byproducts of the

environment.253

As part of accomplishing this mission, Colonel

Strahan described the desired progress of unit training, including “the neglected skill [of] logistics training in mountains and cold weather . . . We need to

be more realistic about moving rolling stock, casualties, ammo, water, and chow by using organic

equipment [in such environments].”254 In terms of

individual training, which Strahan considered a

“supporting attack” to the primary mission, he advertised the Mountain Leader’s Course, the Staff Officer Cold Weather Orientation Course, Wilderness

Cold Weather Medicine Course, and the Survival

Course. Other “supporting attacks” included the

training of mobile training teams which could subsequently train units that did not or could not deploy to Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training

Center as well as the evaluation of equipment for

the Warfighting Laboratory or the Marine Corps Systems Command. Another supporting effort was the

six publications in the Marine Corps Warfighting

Publications 3-35 series authored by MWTC. Strahan stressed that those operating forces that deployed to cold-weather exercises and to the

mountains of Korea played or should play, a vital

Courtesy of author

Retired Major General Harry Jenkins Jr., Colonel John Guy, and Major General Orlo K. Steele, at the 50th Anniversary Celebration at the Mountain Warfare Training Center on 6 September 2001.
132 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Throughout its first half century, the Mountain

Warfare Training Center could usually claim more

than its fair share of certified Marine “characters”

serving among its ranks. Arguably however, perhaps none was quite as colorful, or became more

legendary than did the unconventional and rather

irascible Master Gunnery Sergeant John Marjanov.

John was born and raised in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. His formal schooling did not go beyond

the 8th grade. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1944

and served in a SeaBee Construction Battalion in

the Pacific and Shanghai, China until his discharge

in May of 1946. Thereafter, he immediately enlisted

in the U.S. Army Air Corps; following his discharge

from the Air Corps in July of 1949, he enlisted in

the Marine Corps and after completing recruit training at Parris Island, Marjanov started a 25-year career a Marine combat engineer. 

John was a staff sergeant in a replacement draft

preparing for duty in Korea in 1952 when he first

underwent training at Pickel Meadow under the

Cold Weather Battalion. In 1953, while assigned to

the 1st Shore Party Battalion, 1st Marine Division

in Korea, John was a dozer operator in support of

British Commonwealth Forces when he was nominated to receive the British Empire Medal. This

award was presented to him at the British Embassy

in Washington D.C., in 1955. Although knighthood

was never part of this award, nevertheless, from

that point on, to his fellow staff noncommissioned

officers he was always: “Sir John.”

John was a bachelor gunnery sergeant serving

with the 7th Engineer Battalion at Camp Pendleton

in 1964 when he submitted a personnel request to

be assigned to MWTC. This was granted and in December he became the chief of the heavy equipment section. In June of 1966, as the training center

began its drawdown toward caretaker status, Marjanov was transferred to Republic of Vietnam

where he served continuously for the next two

years. For his meritorious service as Operations

Chief of the 1st Engineer Battalion and subsequently as equipment chief with the 7th Engineer

Battalion, Master Sergeant Marjanov was awarded

the Navy Commendation Medal with Combat “V.”

Master Gunnery Sergeant Marjanov was serving

at Camp Pendleton when he retired on 30 September 1974 after more than 30 years of active military

service. Soon thereafter, he was hired by the California Department of Transportation as a heavy

John Marjanov

equipment repairman and assigned to work on

Highway 395 corridor in the vicinity of Bridgeport,

California. It was then that John took up residence

at the dormant training center by simply parking

his trailer behind the staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) Club Quonset hut. After the training

center was reactivated in 1976, one of the base

commanders attempted to have John and his trailer

evicted. But Sergeant Major Leland D. Crawford,

Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps at the time interceded in John’s behalf and the trailer stayed put.

Crawford also paved the way for John to apply for

one of the civilian maintenance positions when it

became available in the late 1970s. 

As facilities at MWTC were modernized and

training programs expanded in the 1980s, “Top”

Marjanov’s service and value to the training center

rose steadily. Unofficially, he became the continuity between what was best about the old ways and

how to weave them into the new. When there was

a problem, Sir John would have a practical solution

Courtesy MWTC
The 1990s: A Post-Cold War World 133

role in providing “essential feedback to the publication review process.”255 Indeed, Strahan, noted,

MWTC was “a clearinghouse for mountain/coldweather issues,” not only within the Marine Corps

but also with the U.S. Army and allies such as Argentina, Canada, and the United Kingdom.256 Strahan concluded that “we think the MWTC is an

interesting laboratory for training and thinking

about combat readiness because it operates at the

confluence of individual training, unit, training, doctrinal development, and equipment evaluation.”

Rarely, he noted, does one “see all those things intersect in a cross-functional way at the unit level . .

. As one of the premier training centers in the Marine Corps, we want our evolution to be guided by

the genuine needs of the Operating Forces. We look

forward to hearing your ideas.”257

Golden Anniversary

On Thursday, 6 September 2001, Colonel James

M. Thomas, who on 10 August had just relieved

Colonel Strahan as the commanding officer of MWTC,

welcomed numerous dignitaries, special guests, former Marines and their families to Pickel Meadow to

participate in the training center’s 50th Anniversary

celebration and open house.

Some of the guests and visitors had trained at the

MWTC years before—in some cases decades earlier.

Those who had not been to Bridgeport for many

years remarked that while in the terrain hadn’t

changed much, the infrastructure sure had. “Where

did all the tents go?” was an oft-heard refrain.258 Many

former Marines, particularly from the early 1950s, had

never seen the base bereft of snow.

Several static displays were set up on the parade

deck, which included winter operations clothing and

equipment, stables operations, a communications display, and some of the specialized vehicles peculiar

to a place like Pickel Meadow. The fitness center was

open so that visitors could see the climbing wall and

the climbing gear. Inside the multipurpose building

were displays on survival operations and historical

photographs. There was also a movie presentation.259

The open house ran from 1000 to 1400 hours. The

anniversary ceremony itself commenced at 1100

hours. Speakers included: Col James M. Thomas;

Major General Thomas S. Jones, Commanding General, Training and Education Command; Major General David F. Bice, Commanding General, Camp

Pendleton; and Major General Orlo K. Steele, (Retired), a former staff officer and mountain leader at

Pickel Meadow.260

The speakers reflected on the beauty of the base,

as well as its history, as approximately 400 guests and

visitors listened. It was noted that the base had been

in a cadre status for nine years (1967-1976) and that

while the country was at peace, there was a still need

for what the Mountain Warfare Training Center had

to offer. Reminiscences were shared, both poignant

and humorous. When the ceremonies were completed, attendees mingled, or went to the mess hall.261

It was 6 September 2001. Five days later, on 11

September, the world would change and things

would never be the same again. As had been the case

50 years earlier, Marines would soon be preparing to

fight in a remote Asian land with forbidding mountains and extreme temperatures. Now, instead of

Korea, the thoughts of those who would train at

Pickel Meadow would focus on a different place—

Afghanistan.

for fixing it. A typical story described how one of

the Thiokol Trackmasters had become stuck in a

snow-covered pass at the higher elevations and the

rescue vehicle that was sent to snake it out ended

up slipping into a ravine. It became questionable

whether both vehicles could be salvaged. John appeared on the scene and through an improvised

and intricate system of blocks, tackles and pulleys,

he managed to extricate both vehicles. 

Active participation in three wars and a host of

overseas deployments to the Far East had given

Master Gunnery Sergeant Marjanov more lessons

in practical leadership skills than most people ever

gain in a lifetime. Marjanov was kind and decent

to everyone; his most enjoyable off-duty past time

was cracking a few cans of beer and swapping

tales with the young troops. Nightly, Sir John

would “hold court” sitting in his old barber’s chair

down at the Motor Pool, or later at the heavy

equipment repair facility at the lower base camp,

answering their questions about this and that and

regaling them on what it was like to “soldier” in

the old Corps. Without ever claiming it, to the

thousands of Marines and sailors who served at

MWTC during the last two decades of the 20th century, officer and enlisted alike, retired Master Gunnery Sergeant John Marjanov was the esteemed

patriarch and conscience of the command.

In October 1995, Colonel Ray Polak, the Commanding Officer, MWTC presented Master Gunnery

Sergeant Marjanov with an award commemorating

his 50 years of federal service.
134 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Our realistic training and education system will

prepare Marines for complex conditions and to

counter the unexpected. Our noncommissioned

and junior officers will be prepared for greater responsibility in an increasingly complex environment while potentially operating in a

decentralized manner.

-General James T. Conway

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Strategic Backdrop

In less than 30 days following the September 11,

2001 attacks on the United States, President Bush

ordered General Tommy Franks, the commander at

U.S. Central Command, to launch combat operations to eradicate the Taliban regime in Afghanistan

and to destroy Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda

network. Operation Enduring Freedom relied heavily on Afghan opposition forces known as the

Northern Alliance, with substantial support from

U.S. airpower, special operation forces and unconventional warfare Central Intelligence Agency operatives.262

By the middle of November, Taliban’s forces had

been driven from most of Afghanistan’s larger cities.

At the same time, stationed in the Arabian Sea were

two Navy amphibious ready groups with the 15th

and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Units (15th and

26th MEUs) with approximately 4,400 combat-ready

Marines. This naval task force, designated TF 58,

was under the operational control of the naval component commander of Central Command and was

commanded by Brigadier General James N. Mattis,

who thus became the first Marine to command a

naval task force in combat. As the situation on the

ground became more fluid, General Franks decided

it was time to deploy this brigade-size force of

Marines. On 25 November, traveling over 400 nautical miles using its sea-based helicopters, elements

of the 15th MEU flew in to seize a landing strip in

Afghanistan that became known as Forward Operating Base Rhino. This stunning display of flexibility

and operational reach was later followed up with

the 26th MEU’s seizure of Kandahar Airfield on 14

December.263 By the end of December the remnants

of the Taliban army that had managed to escape entrapment, along with the al-Qaeda fighters, had

been pushed back toward the Tora Bora redoubt

and other strongholds near the Pakistan border.

Operation Enduring Freedom highlighted the relevance of the Mountain Warfare Training Center in

ways unseen since the Korean War in the 1950s and

the Norway contingency of the 1980s. 

Five days after combat operations began in

Afghanistan, a San Diego Union Tribune story published on 12 October 2001, carried the headline:

“Marines . . . hone their mountaineering skills at a

Marine Corps training center in the Eastern Sierras.”264 The article went on to list the various venues

where U.S. armed forces conducted mountain combat training. It described training operations at

Pickel Meadow and how the terrain approximated

that found in Afghanistan, with 11,000-foot peaks

and restricted lines of communication.

The same issue of the Union Tribune also ran a

feature story specific to the Mountain Warfare Training Center. A battalion from the 6th Marine Regiment from Camp Lejeune was training at Pickel

Meadow and the article included quotes from several troops from the battalion. 

“This would be very good training for a workup

to Afghanistan,” said Corporal Brandon J. Beardsley. 

Colonel Jim Thomas was quoted as well:

“Since the activities of September 11th, it’s a

revalidation of what we’ve been doing here for 50

years,” said the MWTC commanding officer.265

An Associated Press story datelined: “Bridgeport,

Calif.” Appeared in the Tahoe Daily Tribune on 16

October and described how Marines at Pickel

Meadow were training hard at high altitude while

thinking of Afghanistan. 

“If called to go there for whatever reason, I’d go,

no problem at all,” said Sergeant Alan Quartararo,

26, as he prepared to slide upside-down along a

100-foot rope strung more than 60 feet above the

West Walker River.266

In December of 2001, Outside Magazine sent its

“reconnaissance agent,” Mark Jenkins to take a look

at what the Marine Corps was doing “to condition

its troops to fight in extreme environments like

Afghanistan.” The columnist spent his first several

days at the training center observing students in the

Winter Mountain Leader’s Course and an infantry

battalion undergoing practical field exercises. Jenkins was escorted at various times by the S-3, Major

Craig Kozeniesky, Captains Mike Andretta, Clinton

135

Epilogue

Cold Weather and Mountain Operations

in the 21st Century
Culp, Justin Anderson and Royal Marine Color Sergeant Steven Tooby. Jenkins’s subsequent comments lauded the training environment and the

scope and quality of the instruction. In his article,

Jenkins noted that:

Every year approximately 10,000 Marines

undergo training at MWTC. By comparison,

the Army Northern Warfare Training Center in

Fort Wainwright, Alaska, sees fewer than 500

servicemen annually, and the Army National

Guard Mountain Warfare School, in Jerhico,

Vermont, trains several hundred soldiers, National Guardsmen reservists each year. The

Army’s 10th Mountain Division, despite its

name and history has not trained units in

mountaineering, avalanche work, or coldweather survival since World War II.267

Jenkins went on to relate his MWTC observations

directly to Afghanistan, by stating: “Among the

members of the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary

Units deployed near Kandahar in late November

were a number of mountain leaders and assault

climbers who have received advanced training at

the MWTC, while hundreds of other Marines who

were sent to Afghanistan have also been trained at

the Center.”268

Jenkins followed up his visit to the MWTC by accompanying Major Kozeniesky, the Mountain

Leader’s instructor staff, and some 60 Marines to the

“Texas Range” at the Fort Greely Military Reservation in central Alaska. Forty of the Marines were

graduates of the advanced Winter Mountain Leaders

Course and were ranked “Tier Two,” or experienced mountain men. Twenty were graduates of

the basic Winter Mountain Leader’s Course and

were identified as “Tier One” beginners. All aspired

to become instructors at MWTC and were there to

pass the Instructor’s Qualification Course. Jenkins

shadowed this group and the Mountain Leader

Course instructors through seven days and nights

of maneuvering in deep snow, patrolling, executing

tactical problems and bivouacking in bone-chilling

cold temperatures that seldom rose above–15 degrees.269 In the end, Jenkins summarized his total

time with the Marines by writing:

With all the talk of fighting in extreme environments like Afghanistan, I wanted to explore the connection between military

challenge and the outdoor world. Worried

about the combat readiness of these backcountry warriors, instead I found chiseled soldiers hiking 3,000 feet up a mountain fully

loaded with state-of-the-art equipment. They

have a sense of duty and honor that is rarely

this intense in the civilian world. It was gratifying to see that some people still hold these

things in high esteem. 270

On 3 December 2001, the commanding general

at Marine Combat Development Command hosted

a one-day Quantico seminar of “Graybeards” to examine the special warfighting capabilities that the

Corps might contribute to the campaign taking

place in Afghanistan. Former Assistant Secretary of

Defense Francis J. “Bing” West chaired the seminar.

Participating were a number of former civilian defense policy-makers and retired Marine senior officers including Lieutenant Generals Bernard E.

“Mick” Trainor, and Norman H. “Norm” Smith and

Major Generals Ray L. Smith and Orlo K. Steele.

Also invited to attend the seminar was a former S3 at MWTC, retired Lieutenant Colonel Rodney C.

“Rod” Richardson. Over the previous several years,

Richardson had been engaged in guiding climbing

expeditions into the Hindu Kush out of Peshawar,

Pakistan. Among the proposed recommendations

that the group briefed to the commanding general

was Richardson’s concept for creating a companysized unit which would include a score of six to

eight man high altitude strike teams (HASTs). This

concept, which had been previously blessed by

Colonel James M. “Jim” Thomas at MWTC, envisioned that the high altitude strike team unit be organized, trained and specially equipped at

Bridgeport, deployed in-theater for acclimatization

training and then employed in a fashion similar to

the “Stingray” operations that were used in Vietnam.

A weekly rotation of several teams to the 14,000-

15,000 thousand foot elevations would seek to interdict al-Qaeda and the Taliban lines of

communications between Pakistan and Afghanistan

by directing fire from drones and attack aircraft

against identifiable targets. The commanding general strongly endorsed the concept and asked that

West, Smith, Steele and Richardson brief the plan to

Lieutenant General Emil “Buck” Bedard, the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps early the next morning.

After hearing the briefing, Bedard said he believed

the concept had merit. However, he went on to

share that “We just received word that the Marines

will be pulled out of Afghanistan in the next few

weeks.”271

The Mountain Warfare Training Center stood

ready to play an increased role in the post 9/11

schemes of things, particularly with regard to

preparing forces slated for deployment to

Afghanistan. But by early 2002, the initial keen in136 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Epilogue 137

terest in mountain operations had begun to fade.

Several factors caused this to happen. First, the

rapid collapse of the Taliban had reduced the need

for major combat formations to be dispatched to

Afghanistan. Second, Secretary of Defense Donald

H. Rumsfeld and other Department of Defense policy-makers had embraced a doctrine that emphasized lightness and mobility, while minimizing the

number of troops assigned to the area of operations. U.S. Central Command planners were cautioned to hold the force numbers to a level deemed

necessary to keep the Taliban at bay and to provide

security for Afghanistan’s fledging national government, led by Hamid Karzai, but no more than that.

Thus the pressure from the Pentagon to minimize

the number of American “boots on the ground” in

the Afghan theater was significant.272 And third, as

hostilities in Afghanistan started to scale down, the

Bush Administration almost immediately began to

shift its focus to Iraq and the Saddam Hussein

regime.

Mountain Warfare Training Center Shifts

with the Tides of War

By mid 2002, it was clear that the next phase of

the Bush Administration’s “War on Global Terrorism” would focus on establishing a U.S. presence

into the heart of its Middle East antagonists. This

new endeavor would require enormous resources.

I MEF, based at Camp Pendleton, was earmarked to

provide the backbone of the Marine forces that

would be initially committed, if the decision was

made to invade Iraq. Consequently, the spotlight

that had briefly shined on Pickel Meadow as being

the prime training venue for future operations

swung south to the desert training base at Marine

Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine

Palms. 

Pickel Meadow’s venerable old warrior, Master

Gunnery Sergeant John Marjanov, however, did not

live to witness these events. In the spring of 2002,

John became seriously ill. Upon hearing of his condition, former commanding officer, Colonel Russell

W. “Russ” Schumacher, Jr., immediately drove down

from Moscow, Idaho to visit “Sir John” at his bedside. Colonel John Stennick likewise came from

Oregon to spend time with his crusty old friend. On

24 May, 2002, John died quietly in his sleep. 

Many of John’s new, as well as his friends of

longstanding were on hand at the base chapel memorial service to bid their legendary hero farewell.

Former base commander, Colonel Raymond L.

“Skip” Polak gave the eulogy.273

The long anticipated invasion of Iraq, code

named Operation Iraqi Freedom, was launched in

March 2003. Within 30 days the Iraqi army had

ceased to be an effective fighting force, Saddam

Hussein was in hiding and Coalition forces occupied Baghdad. Colonel Joel G. Schwankl replaced

Colonel Thomas and assumed command of MWTC

on 17 July 2003. Immediately, the new commander

was confronted with units and individuals canceling

scheduled training at Pickel Meadow. The situation

was similar to what had occurred during Operation

Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-1991. The

2003 Command Chronology showed that the mess

hall reported a total of 126,207 meals served during

the year,274 down from 301,344 meals served during

the previous year.275 But there were no indications

that any caretaker status was ever seriously considered for the MWTC, as had occurred during the war

in Vietnam. 

Combat operations and the casualty figures from

the Iraq Theater would dominate the news for the

next several years. Not all Marine combat forces

however, were destined to deploy to Iraq. From

2003 onwards the troop levels of U.S. and NATO

forces in Afghanistan were slowly increased beyond

the limits once envisioned by Secretary Rumsfeld.

Therefore, battalion landing teams from both the 2d

and 3d Marine Divisions soon became part of the

mix of U.S. forces being rotated to Afghanistan for

six-month deployments. As a result, training in

mountain operations once again began to take on

a higher priority for battalions that perhaps might

find themselves headed for Operation Enduring

Freedom. Consequently the training tempo at

MWTC during 2004 gradually began to rise once

again.276

From 8-10 June 2004, the training center hosted

a Joint Conference on Warfighting in Afghanistan.

Over 85 military officers and civilians attended.

Many who were present had just completed recent

tours of duty in support of Operation Enduring

Freedom (OEF). Although U.S. Army and Marine

Corps representatives dominated the conference, all

of the military services were represented with the

exception of the Coast Guard. The purpose of the

conference was to serve as a clearinghouse for

“lessons learned” from those who had recently been

in direct contact with the Taliban militants that were

attempting to reclaim control of the Afghan rural

countryside. What worked and what didn’t work?

What were the best practices in tactics? What was

the most effective weaponry in the high mountains?

What clothing and equipment was valued? These

were the types of questions that the presenters

shared with one another that ultimately would be

summarized in a conference report. One of the presenters from the Marine Corps, for example, was a
rifle company commander from a battalion in the

2d Marine Division, whose company had been routinely in contact with the insurgents at elevations

ranging from 10,000 to 12,000 feet. Interestingly,

and perhaps prophetically, at the close of the conference there was strong consensus among those

participating that the United States would likely still

be engaged in Afghanistan, long after our forces

had been withdrawn from Iraq.277

Throughout the midyears of the first decade, the

insurgencies and violence taking place in both Iraq

and Afghanistan intensified. Like its Army counterparts, Marine regular and reserve air-ground forces

became increasingly stretched thin. Consequently,

turnaround times between unit deployments to one

theater or another were shortened. This meant less

time at home bases for these organizations to recuperate and rebuild their personnel strength and

combat readiness before making their next deployment. Furthermore, division and wing tactical exercise employment plans (TEEPs) were constantly

being altered to meet unexpected contingencies.

Thus, an organization that may have devoted a

month of its work-up time to training in the desert

at Twentynine Palms in anticipation of its deployment to Iraq might be informed on short notice that

it was now headed for Afghanistan. Or in some

cases, the situation might be the reverse. 

The challenge that confronted Battalion Landing

Team 1/6 was a prime example. During 2004, it

conducted combat operations in Afghanistan in

support of OEF. Between 1 April and 10 July, it was

credited with killing over 100 enemy fighters, capturing over 131 more, and for conducting over

$300,000 worth of civil affairs activities.278 However,

BLT 1/6 had only been formed for three weeks before it was deployed overseas. Thus, it did not have

the customary six months in which to integrate its

attachments, send its Marines to special courses of

instruction and accomplish the desired ramp-up

training at either Pickel Meadow or Twentynine

Palms. Ultimately, the organization managed to

adapt to its surroundings and overcome this handicap. But its after-action report stressed that predeployment training at the MWTC would have

proven very desirable and beneficial.279

Colonel Schwankl’s tour as commanding officer

ended on 15 July 2005. The training centers’ executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robb Etnyre would

serve as the acting commander until the arrival of

Colonel Timothy C. Wells on 1 September. Soon

after Wells arrived the Base Realignment and Closure Commission issued its final report and recommendations to the secretary of defense. The

Commission had been sitting throughout the year,

considering what military bases nationwide were

no longer of value and should be closed or reduced. The Commission found the Marine Corps

Mountain Warfare Training Center as offering “nationally recognized training for high desert, mountainous operations” and recommended that it be

retained.280

Colonel Timothy C. “Tim” Wells was no stranger

to MWTC and its core training programs. As a captain during the mid 1980s he had served a two-year

tour of duty as an instructor-guide in the Mountain

Leaders Course. Therefore, he could recall the special relationship that had evolved during those years

between MWTC, the 2d Marine Division, its 2d Marine Regiment and the 4th MEB in preparing troops

to meet the rigors of a winter Norway campaign.

Reflecting on this previous experience, he quickly

recognized that the same level of coherency and

consistency that had proven so successful during

the decade of the 1980s, was seriously lacking with

respect to pre-deployment training for battalions, or

regimental headquarter elements being sent to fight

in Afghanistan. Accordingly, in October 2005,

Colonel Wells drafted a concept paper proposing a

new Notional USMC Order of Battle for Cold

Weather/Mountain Operations with a special focus

on Afghanistan. Specifically, Wells recommended

the 4th MEB based at Camp Lejeune be designated

the principal coordinator and force provider, with

the 3d Marines, based at Kaneohe, Hawaii fulfilling

the role the 2d Marines had assumed for the Norwegian contingencies of the 1980s. In addition to

other forms of training support, he proposed that

“MWTC would provide small teams (6-18 Marines)

to augment 3d Marines or 4th MEB capabilities as

required. The MWTC teams would be assigned reconnaissance recon and search and rescue missions

at high altitudes (above 14,000 feet) and in extreme

weather conditions where advance climbing, survival or mobility skills were needed.”281

However, Colonel Wells elected to retire in mid2006. Therefore, implementation of the foregoing

concept, or developing other ways of how MWTC

might best support the Operation Enduring Freedom effort was left to his successor, Colonel David

B. Hall. Colonel Hall assumed command of the

training center on 14 August 2006.

Debates over Deployments

The balance of forces between Iraq and

Afghanistan became a campaign issue even before

the 2008 national elections when Senator Barack

Obama accused the Bush administration of having

left the Operation Enduring Freedom campaign unfinished from the very outset. Senator Barak H.

138 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Epilogue 139

Obama claimed that the war in Iraq “allowed us to

neglect the situation in Afghanistan. We know . . .

that al-Qaeda is hiding in the hills between

Afghanistan and Pakistan. And because we have

taken our eye off the ball, they are stronger now

than any time since 2001.”282

Lessons from Afghanistan

U.S. Marine Corps History Division field historian

Lieutenant Colonel David Benhoff visited

Afghanistan in 2009 and interviewed numerous

Marines about lessons learned.

Interviewee: Palazzo

Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Palazzo, was the mentor to the commanding officer of the 2d Brigade,

201st Corps, Afghan National Army: “I think one

thing the Marine Corps needs to look at is the predeployment training program. Twentynine Palms is

probably not the right venue for embedded training

teams coming to this part of Afghanistan. There is

no desert. There is no flat, drivable land in this area.

It’s all mountains. And we did about four days at

Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport.

Honestly, that’s where we need to do the whole

pre-deployment training. We did four days at

Bridgeport and 21 days at Twentynine Palms. It

probably should have been reversed. Twentynine

Palms is great for the live-fire aspect, which we really can’t do in Okinawa. We’re very limited as far

as especially crew-served live-fire training, but

Bridgeport, humping those mountains, learning that

terrain, learning the restrictions that are placed on

you because of that terrain was more instrumental

than the 21 days we spent at Twentynine Palms. I

know part of—we brought this up while we were

there. Part of the problem is that there is no structure really to support that at Mountain Warfare

Training Center, but if this is the way of the future

for the Marine Corps in the next five to 10 years,

then probably something needs to be done to make

it supportable, because that’s where we should

train.”

Interviewee: Sanchez

Lieutenant Colonel Eleazar O. Sanchez was the

3d Brigade senior adviser with the Afghan National

Army. He also lauded the Bridgeport pre-deployment training experience: “Bridgeport was probably

the best training we had during the entire pre-deployment training portion. It was extremely tough,

because one day we were in Hawaii and then

within 24 hours we were up at altitude. And then in

less than 48 hours we were 10,000 feet up in the

mountains, where every day was about 15 hours a

day and you’re humping all day, setting up ambushes, going on patrols, doing those kinds of

things. But, you know what? The Marines loved it,

though, because it not only challenged them physically, it challenged them mentally. I think for the

mental toughness aspect of it, that was probably the

most valuable lesson we learned . . . if I could do it

all over again, if there was something that I could

recommend for the future Marine teams, is to conduct training up in the mountains, . . . if I could recommend [training] to the Marine Corps embedded

training teams that are coming here, especially in

the mountainous regions, Bridgeport is the place to

do it.”

Interviewee: Wester

Lieutenant Colonel Sean D. Wester was the officer-in-charge of Embedded Training Team 6-4,

which operated in the mountains of northeast

Afghanistan. He concurred with regard to the value

of Bridgeport: “There’s probably still some debate

out there, about training at Bridgeport, California, at

Mountain Warfare Training Center, versus going to

Twentynine Palms. We did a mixture of both. We

spent a little over seven days initially at Bridgeport.

I think we should have spent more time there. I

think the split between the two is good, but the

value of Bridgeport was that we were immediately

thrust into a mountainous environment. We went

from Okinawa’s near-sea level environment to an

environment where the elevation was 6,000 feet and

higher. We were in great physical shape and we discovered immediately that 6,000 feet and above robs

all of it from you . . . That week at Bridgeport, as

painful as it was for the team, was the thing that

began to cement us. I mean, we were coming together before then, but going through the grueling

physical aspects of marching, land navving, conducting tactical operations, tactical exercises, in the

mountains at Bridgeport . . . When we made it

through that week at Bridgeport, when we got to

Twentynine Palms, it was a piece of cake, because

the bonding and cementing process happened

there, under that sharp physical slap in the face of

Bridgeport. So I would say working, conducting

training in a place like Bridgeport, at elevation, up

and down mountains and doing the small unit leadership things in that rugged terrain, absolutely essential, absolutely.”
A resurgent Taliban did result in a growing commitment of American forces in support of Operation

Enduring Freedom. By 1 June 2008, according to

Department of Defense figures, the United States

had 48,250 troops stationed in Afghanistan–37,700

active component and 10,550 National Guard or Reserves.283 One month after taking office, President

Barak H. Obama followed up on his campaign

pledge by ordering an additional 17,000 U.S. troops

to the Afghan theater in support of OEF.284 In December of 2009, the President would commit 30,000

more American troops to Afghanistan. These developments caused some to ponder whether MWTC

again assuming greater responsibility for readying

and conditioning Marine forces for counterinsurgency operations in a harsh climate and steep

mountainous terrain. But most of the Marine units

would be deployed in Afghanistan’s Regional Command South, in the flat desert of Helmand Province.

On 1 July 2008, Colonel Norman L. Cooling took

command of the training center. A graduate of the

U.S. Naval Academy, he had been born and raised

in Texas. Cooling began his Marine career as a rifle

platoon commander in the 2d Marine Division in

1987. As a lieutenant colonel, he commanded the

3d Battalion, 3d Marines, leading his infantrymen

through two separate six-month overseas deployments, one in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan.

Based on those recent experiences, Cooling came

to his new command with a clear view of just what

skills offered at the training center needed greater

attention, and conversely, which were of a lesser

value and therefore should be de-emphasized.

Furthermore, six days after Cooling assumed

command, the Commandant of the Marine Corps,

General James Conway paid a visit to the MWTC.

Cooling later recalled that the Commandant: “directed me to develop an alternative block IV (battalion to regimental headquarters sized) mission

rehearsal exercise in the event that the then emerging operations in Afghanistan positioned the in

complex, mountainous terrain.”285 Following

through on groundwork inherited from his predecessor and guidance he received from both Commandant and the Training and Education

Command, Colonel Cooling immediately challenged his staff to develop a new strategic vision

for MWTC.

A Strategic Vision for MWTC’s Second

Half-Century

In November of 2008, Colonel Cooling and his

staff completed their recommendations for Mountain Warfare Training Center’s future. The centerpiece of their new concept involved a new

capability for MAGTF organizations to greatly expand the scope of their Operation Enduring Freedom pre-deployment training by not being confined

to the Pickel Meadow maneuver area. Instead,

under a revised scheme of operations, using units

would be able to extend the distances of their exercises to the surrounding environs as well. The

stated goal of the command now became “to ensure

that each of the Center’s formal schools courses and

its unit training programs impart MAGTF units and

their leaders with the skills to fight and win in complex terrain.”286 The fundamental challenge of

mountain warfare, their document emphasized, is

that all operations are conducted in highly complex

terrain-similar in some respects to urban warfare.

Rapidly changing and extreme weather conditions

only added to the challenge.287

Before reaching this conclusion, the MWTC staff

had conducted an extensive review of after-action

reports and operational analyses from Operation

Enduring Freedom. Their review highlighted how

complex mountainous terrain affects planning and

execution within each of the six functions of war

fighting: maneuver, fires, intelligence, command

and control, logistics and force protection. They acknowledged that applying the lessons learned associated with each function to the unique dynamics

associated with every potential area of operations

presented a daunting challenge for the trainers. For

example, aside from Afghanistan, the Marine Corps

Intelligence Activity Mid-Range Threat Estimate had

identified 19 other states or locales of particular interest, which featured mountainous terrain to some

degree.288 Nonetheless, they believed that given the

right resources, there was enough flexibility in the

training programs inherent to the MWTC that most

of these challenges could be met successfully using

all the local terrain that could be made available. 

As Cooling and his staffed looked ahead to the

next step, it now became an “operational imperative” to leverage the strengths of greater Bridgeport

as a training venue, while at the same time seeking

ways to mitigate its two historic weaknesses: land

management constraints that inhibit combined arms

live fire training and a shortfall in training enablers

such as training allowance pools and exercise control groups for the conduct of major air-ground exercises. The term “greater Bridgeport” rightly

implied that some aspects of a Marine air-ground

task force exercise would be conducted away from

Pickel Meadow proper with its restricted fire limitations. Nonetheless, by taking advantage of the

Hawthorne Army Depot and the Naval Air Station

in Fallon Nevada, together with the Bureau of Land

Management, private land owners and U.S. Forest

140 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Epilogue 141

Service corridor that lay in between, these appendages cumulatively created a highly desirable

and relevant venue for both maneuver and combined-fire Marine air-ground task force exercises.*

In order to convert this vision into reality,

Colonel Cooling and his staff initiated action to

achieve the following six objectives to:

1. Enhance and expand access to ranges and

training areas

2. Enhance range control capabilities

3. Enhance exercise support capabilities

4. Acquire new targets and training systems

5. Develop installation facilities and infrastructure

6. Establish a Marine air-ground task force training range as part of MWTC.289

As a result of its efforts, the MWTC experienced

a 238 percent increase in training throughput between fiscal years 2008 and 2009. By the following

year the base was operating at full capacity, training

just under 14,000 troops. Meanwhile, all of the formal school courses had been adjusted from the old

cold war templates to new programs of instruction

based on the current situation and operations taking

place in Afghanistan. Having also forged a special

relationship with the Marine Special Operations

Command located at Camp Lejeune, troops from

that command also began arriving in greater numbers then ever before.290

As of May 2010, it was too early to tell whether

all these initiatives could be fully implemented. As

already noted, since its founding, the fortunes of

the Mountain Warfare Training Center have ebbed

and flowed, depending on which threat was most

pressing at the time. Nevertheless, the 2010 Department of Defense announcement that declared that

U.S. troop strengths in Afghanistan would exceed

those of Iraq suggested that the MWTC will continue to be a very active place and operating at full

capacity for at least the near term.291

Finally, if there is any validity to the axiom “past

is prologue,” then one can assume it is likely that

there are Marines, yet unborn, who will one day arrive at Pickel Meadow as either individual students,

or part of a battalion and find themselves trudging

uphill under arms with a full pack to bivouac sites

such as Grouse Meadow, or at the upper reaches

of Silver and Wolf Creeks. Doubtless, they too will

contend with adversity and experience the unexpected and just like their predecessors, learn by

doing just what it takes to successfully fight and survive in a mountain/cold-weather campaign. Since

that summer day in 1951 when Lieutenant Colonel

Donald B. “Don” Hubbard and First Lieutenant

Richard M. Johnson first surveyed Pickel Meadow

as a potential training area and had the “Eureka”

moment described in Chapter 3, over 500,000

troops have undergone some form of instruction at

Bridgeport and have found themselves doing exactly the same. It should also be noted, that the

half-million figure does not represent just U.S.

Marines. Included therein are: U.S. Navy Seals, U.S.

Army Special Forces, Marines from the Republic of

South Korea, Marines from Chile, British Royal

Marines, Dutch Marines from The Netherlands,

Canadian Army and other military officers from a

number of allied nations. And, with very few exceptions, each one of those half-million troops has,

in some fashion, benefited from the experience. 

Major General Thomas S. Jones, the former commanding general, training and education command,

and one who has had wide, personal experience in

leading troops through a number of mountain and

cold-weather operations, perhaps explained the real

value of MWTC best, and implicitly the reason it

should be preserved for generations of Marines to

come, when he told columnist Mark Jenkins:

Training in a cold mountainous environment is the closest thing we have to approximating the stress a soldier undergoes in

combat. If a Marine can learn to fight in the

cold of the mountains, he can fight anywheredesert, jungle, anywhere. Yet the reverse is

not necessarily true. Severe cold and rugged

terrain forces soldiers to work together, to

share and eventually overcome incredible adversity. It builds cohesiveness. You can’t simulate humping a 70-pound pack to 11,000

feet. You can’t simulate climbing and skiing.

You can’t simulate cold. You can’t simulate

fear. You have to experience these things—

experience them and learn from them. That’s

how to make a soldier. Even if we never

fought another day in the cold or the mountains, we would still train there because it

teaches Marines how to handle extreme conditions. That is the real power of the Mountain

Warfare Training Center, and the brass knows

it.292

* The first series conducted in 2009 became known as Exercise

Mountain Warrior. In June 2010 the base played host to a MEBsized exercise named Exercise Javelin Thrust, which evolved into

the largest maneuver of Marine combat forces in the history of

the training center.
142 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Chapter 1

1. Mary Hill, Geology of the Sierra Nevada (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 169-

70.

2. Ibid., p. 162

3. Ibid., pp. 172-77

4. T.H. Watkins, California: An Illustrated History

(New York: American West Publishing Co., 1973),

p. 30.

5. Eugene L. Conrotto, Miwok Means People

(Fresno, CA: Valley Publishers, 1973), p. 4.

6. Ruth Herman, The Paiutes of Pyramid Lake: A

Narrative Concerning a Western Nevada Indian

Tribe (San Jose, CA: Harlan Young Press, 1972), p.

169

7. Phil Townsend Hanna, California Through Four

Centuries (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935), pp.

4, 10.

8. Robert L. Reid, ed., A Treasury of the Sierra Nevada (Berkeley, CA: Wilderness Press, 1983), p. 2.

9. Frank S. Wedertz, Mono Diggings (Bishop, CA:

Chalfant Press, 1978), p. 13.

10. Reid, ed., pp. 18-24.

11. Ernest Lewis, The Fremont Cannon: High Up

and Far Back, (Western Trails Press, 1981).

12. John C. Fremont, The Exploring Expedition to

the Rocky Mountains, Oregon, and California (Buffalo, NY: Derby, Orton, and Mulligan, Publishers,

1853), p. 321.

13. Lewis, The Fremont Cannon, p. 13.

14. Irving Stone, Men to Match My Mountains (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. 46.

15. Ibid., p. 47.

16. Wedertz, Mono Diggings, pp. 21-22.

17. Ibid., p. 23.

18. J. S. Holliday, The World Rushed In: The California Gold Rush Experience (New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1981), pp. 39, 48.

19. Stone, Men to Match My Mountains, p. 131.

20. Dan De Quille, The Big Bonanza (New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 76.

21. Ella M. Cain, The Story of Early Mono County

(San Francisco: Fearon Publishers, 1961), pp. 4-9.

22. Ibid., pp. 10-14.

23. Mining Books D, 1861-1862, pp. 457, 512 and

578, Mono County Recorders Office, Bridgeport,

California.

24. Assessor book entries for 1863, p. 46; Aug1867,

p. 162; 1869, p. 144, Mono County Assessor’s Office, Bridgeport, California.

Chapter 2

25. Maj M.S. Hall, “Cold Weather Combat Clothing,”

Marine Corps Gazette May48, p. 56.

26. Murray Morgan, Bridge to Russia (New York: E.P.

Dutton Co., 1947), p. 47.

27. Maj Orlo K. Steele, “For Special Duty in Bering

Sea,” USMC Command and Staff College Individual

Research Paper, 1972, MCU Archives, Quantico, Va.,

p. 50.

28. Col James A. Donovan, Outpost in the North Atlantic: Marines in the Defense of Iceland (Washington,

D.C.:Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1992), pp. 6-7

29. Bailey, Thomas A. and Ryan, Paul B. “Hilter vs.

Roosevelt The Undeclared Naval War” p. 156.

30. Donovan, Outpost in the North Atlantic, p. 10.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., p. 25

33. LtGen William K. Jones, A Brief History of the 6th

Marines (Washington, D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC,

1987), p. 44.

34. “CinCPacFlt Exercise MICOWEX 49A,” 1949, Box

1 (labeled “Cold Weather Operations, 1949-1977”),

Studies and Reports, MCU Archives, Quantico, Va.

35. “Observers Report, Exercise MICOWEX 49A,” Kodiak, Alaska, Feb49, Box 46 (labeled “Exercises”),

Studies and Reports, MCU Archives, Quantico, Va.

Chapter 3

36. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: American in Korea,

1950-1953 (New York: First Anchor Books, 1989), p.

363.

37. Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, vol. III (Washington, D.C.: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1957), p. 119.

38. CMC letter AO-3-SNA, 9Nov50 to CG, Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton, Cold Weather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

39. CG, Tra&Repl Comd ltr 5942 of 12Nov50 to CMC,

Cold Weather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

40. Col Walter “Mu Mu” Moore intvw with MajGen

O.K. Steele, 26Feb02, hereafter Moore intvw.

41. MSgt G.E. Burlage, “Cold Weather Training,”

Leatherneck (Apr51), pp. 15-16.

42. Moore intvw.

43. BGen E.H. Simmons, Frozen Chosin: U.S. Marines

143

Notes
at the Changjin Reservoir (Washington, D.C.:

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 2002), p. 122.

44. CG, Tra&Repl Comd ltr 18492 of 15Jun51, ColdWeather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va.

45. CMC spdltr AO-3-jb of 7Jul51 to CG Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton, Cold Weather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

46. CG Tra&Repl Comd ltr to CMC of 31Jul51, ColdWeather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va.

47. Col Richard Johnson intvw with MajGen O.K.

Steele, 11Apr02, hereafter Johnson intvw.

48. Bridgeport District Forest Ranger Office, “Toiyabe

National Forest Fact Sheet, 1907-Present.”

49. Bridgeport Chronicle-Union, 17Aug51.

50. CG, Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton, MSG

250022Z Aug51 to CMC, Cold Weather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

51. Official Marine Corps Biography of Col Donald

B. Hubbard Sr., 25May67, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

52. Mr. John Schneider intvw with MajGen O.K.

Steele 6Sept01, hereafter Schneider intvw.

53. Cold Weather Training Report of Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific Troops 1951-1952,” 17May52, p. 2, Cold

Weather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va.

54. Schneider intvw.

Chapter 4

55. First endorsement by CO, Staging Regiment,

Tra&Repl Comd, Camp Pendleton, on Cold Weather

Battalion, “Activity Report,” ltr ser 970, 26May52, Cold

Weather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va., p. 1.

56. Burke Davis, Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller

(Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1962), p. 348.

57. Bridgeport Chronicle-Union, 28Oct51, Mono

County Public Library.

58. CO, Cold Weather Battalion, “Activity Report,” ltr

to CMC, 26May52, in Cold Weather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va., hereafter,

‘Activity Report,’ 26May52.”

59. Johnson intvw, and Johnson, exchange of e-mails

with MajGen O.K. Steele, 4Oct02.

60. James Brady, The Coldest War (New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1990), p. 7.

61. Mr. Harold Haberman, intvw with MajGen O.K.

Steele, 6Sept01 (at MWTC 50th Anniversary Celebration), hereafter Haberman intvw.

62. MajGen O.P. Smith to CMC, 29Jan52, Personal

Correspondence File of LtGen O.P. Smith, MCU

Archives, Quantico, Va.

63. “Activity Report,” 26May52, p.4.

64. LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, On Going to War: A

Marine Lieutenant’s Korean War Experiences (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1998), p. 4.

65. Haberman intvw.

66. First Endorsement of CO, “Activity Report.”

26May52, p. 2.

67. Ibid., p. 4.

68. Mr. Elliot Chassey to CO, MWTC, Bridgport, California, 23Sept00, in MWTC S-3 Office.

69. See Appendix A, which is Annex “C” of ‘Activity

Report,’ 26May52.”

Chapter 5

70. Enclosure (7) of Staff Study of Continued Training

at Cold Weather Battalion and Development of a Permanent Camp, 13Mar52, in CO, Cold Weather Battalion Activity Report, ltr to CMC of 26May52, Cold

Weather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va,. p. 1 (This report, not the enclosure itself, is hereafter cited as Hubbard Report).

71. Cold Weather Training Report of Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific Troops personnel during 1951-1952,”

17May52, Cold Weather Training File, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va., pp.14, 16 (hereafter Ryffel Report). 

72. Hubbard Report, p. 5.

73. Ryffel Report, p. 15.

74. Hubbard Report, p. 8

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p. 8; Ryffel Report, p. 11.

77. Hubbard Report, p. 8.

78. Ibid., p. 7.

79. Ibid., 8.

80. Ryffel Report, pp. 14-15.

81. Enclosure 7 of Hubbard Report.

82. Hubbard Report, p. 8.

83. Cold Weather Training Center Staff Study,

24Oct57, CWTC Briefing Folder, MCU Archives,

Quantico, Va., pp. 7-9, hereafter CWTC 1957 Staff

Study.

84. CMC Report to the Secretary of the Navy for FY

1956-1957, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va., p. 49.

85. Official Biography of BGen Donald M. Schmuck,

1Nov59, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

86. Maj Bruce Norton and SgtMaj Maurice J. Jacques,

Sergeant Major, U.S. Marines (New York: Ballantine

Books, 1995), pp. 86-87.

87. Head Training Section ltr AO3c-1jv, 27Jan53, to

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, Cold Weather

Training File, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

88. BGen Donald Schmuck intvw with MajGen O.K.

Steele, 1Aug02.

89. Martin Russ, The Last Parallel (New York: Rinehart

& Co., 1957), pp. 23-24.

90. Official Biography of BGen Clayton O. Totman,

14Dec59, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

91. CMC Report to the Secretary of the Navy for FY

144 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Notes 145

1954-1955, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va., p. 17.

92. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 589.

93. CMC Report to the Secretary of the Navy for FY

1955-1956, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va., pp. 63, 64.

94. Hold Back the Night Correspondence File, HD

RefSec, Quantico, Va.

95. Lawrence H. Suid, Guts and Glory: The Making

of the American Military Image in Film (Lexington:

University Press of Kentucky, 2002), pp. 140-41.

96. Jack Lewis, “Camp Cloudburst,” Leatherneck

Oct58, p. 52.

97. Pickel Lodge History, Command and Historical

Summary File, MWTC, Bridgeport, Ca.

98. Lineage of Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-1997,” 31Mar98.

Chapter 6

99. Cold Weather Training of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Troops Personnel During 1951-1952, ColdWeather Training File, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.,

p.14.

100. Official Biography of BGen Donald M. Schmuck,

USMC,1Nov59, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

101. BGen Donald M. Schmuck, phone intvw with

MajGen O.K. Steele, 1Aug02.

102. CWTC 1957 Staff Study.

103. Code of Conduct Executive Order 10631 for

Members of the Armed Forces of the U.S., Federal

Register, 20 FR 6057, 20Aug55.

104. CWTC 1957 Staff Study.

105. Biographic Data Sheet on LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins, n.d., HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

106. CWTC 1957 Staff Study, p. 6.

107. CMC ltr AO-3c-mjr to CO, CWTC, 23Aug57, Cold

Weather Training Correspondence File, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va.

108. CWTC 1957 Staff Study.

109. MSgt Carl H. Raue intvw with MajGen O.K.

Steele, 17Sept03. Raue formerly served as Mountain

Leader Courses Unit Chief.

110. Ibid.

111. CWTC 1957 Staff Study

112. MSgt H.B. Wells, “Rope and Piton,” Leatherneck

Dec57, pp. 17-18.

113. CWTC 1957 Staff Study

114. Annex D to CWTC 1957 Staff Study.

Chapter 7

115. Gerald P. Averill, Mustang: A Combat Marine

(Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1987), pp. 281-82.

116. CWTC 1957 Staff Study, p. 23.

117. Averill, Mustang, pp. 273, 275.

118. “In Memoriam,” obituary of LtCol Gerald P.

Averill, Mestengo (a quarterly newsletter of the Marine Corps Mustang Association) Spring94, p. 14.

119. Averill Mustang, p. 273.

120. Ibid., pp. 275-76.

121. Ibid., p. 281.

122. SgtMaj Bill Conley, intvw with MGen O.K.

Steel, 3May06, hereafter Conley intvw.

123. Averill, Mustang, p. 278.

124. Col James Knapp, intvw with MGen O.K.

Steele, 15Jan07, hereafter Knapp intvw. Knapp was

senior instructor-guide of the Mountain Leadership

Course at CWTC, 1959-1961.

125. Averill, Mustang, p. 278.

126. Ibid., pp. 283.

127. Conley intvw.

128. LtGen Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr. intvw with MGen

O.K. Steele, 12May02; Col Warren Wiedham intvw

with MGen O.K.Steele, 27Feb06, hereafter Wiedham

intvw.

129. Raue intvw, 17Apr06; Wiedham intw, 27Feb06.

130. Averill, Mustang, p. 284

131. Official Biography Col Glen E. Martin,

28Jun68, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

132. Col Glen E. Martin intvw with MGen O.K.

Steele, 1Jul02.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Personal knowledge of the author, who served

at MWTC as senior instructor and guide of the

Mountain Leadership Course, 1963-1964.

Chapter 8

138. Knapp intvw, Col Knapp was present and witnessed this event.

139. Mr. Wiley Clapp intvw with MGen O.K. Steele,

1Jul02.

140. Anthony Milavic, A Ski Story, Washington, DC,

11Jan96, document in possession of the author. For

another detailed description of this unique combat

leader, see “The Life and Times of Stan Wawrzyniak,” Leatherneck (Apr92), pp. 26-31. LtCol Stanley

Wawrzyniak died of a heart attack at his home in

Swansboro, NC, on 26 October 1995, just a few

weeks shy of his 68th birthday. He is interred in the

Veterans Cemetery in Jacksonville, NC.

141. Personal Record File of MGySgt John Marjanov

furnished by Retired Records Section (Pers-313E)

Navy Personnel Command, St. Louis, MO.

142. Col Gerald H. Turley, e-mail to MGen O.K.

Steele, 3May06.

143. Maj Anthony Milavic, e-mail to MGen O.K.

Steele, 11Nov08.

144.Maj Anthony Milavic, A Sea Story, posted on internet 20Mar07.

145. Personal knowledge of the author, who served
at MWTC, 1963-1964.

146. Ibid.

147. Official Biography of Col Frank R. Wilkinson,

Jr., 1969 HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

148. Personal knowledge of the author who was

part of the S-3 briefing team for Gen Shoup and

later participated in the afternoon rock climbing

demonstration.

149. Paul B. Fay, Jr., The Pleasure of His Company,

(Popular Library, 1977), “Foreword” page.

150. Lineage of Marine of Corps Mountain Warfare

Training Center, Bridgeport, CA., 31Mar98.

151. Personal knowledge of the author, who was

standing between the two principals in the Leavitt

Training Area when this conversation took place.

152. Personal knowledge of the author.

153. Article in Last Outpost (MWTC newspaper) vol.

4, no. 3 (11Feb65).

154. Maj James Goldsworthy, OBE, RM, intvw with

MGen O.K. Steele, Jan01; also “Goldsworthy File,”

a collection of written personal written accounts

and document, kindly forwarded to the author by

Maj Goldsworthy on 20Feb01.

Chapter 9

155. Pentagon Paper, vol. 3, p. 236.

156. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked,

Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, published by

the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 1979, p.

373.

157. Personal knowledge of the author who at the

time of this incident was senior instructor and guide

of the Mountain Operations Course and participated

in the search for the three drowned Marines.

158. MWTC Semi-Annual ComdC Rpt for the period

1Jul65-31Dec65 dated 25Jan66, and 9Mar07 personal telephone interview with MajGen Harry Jenkins, Jr., who had been a witness to this incident on

7 June 1964.

159. Official Biography of LtCol John P. Bristow,

Mar64, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va., encl. 1, p.5.

160. MWTC Semi-annual ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec65, HD

RefSec, Quantico, Va., encl. 1, p. 5-encl. (1).

161. Ibid., p. 4

162. Goldsworthy File.

163. MWTC ComdC Rpts, 1Jan-30Jun66, and 1Jul-31

Dec66, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va., p. 1 of each report.

164. MWTC ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun67, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va., p.1

165. Comment made by Gen Wallace Green Jr.,

Commandant of the Marine Corps, in address to the

combined Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) and

Command and Staff College students, Feb67. The

author was in attendance as an AWS student.

166. MWTC Final ComdC Rpt, 10Aug67, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va., pp.1-3.

167. Col Gerald H., Turley, USMCR, The Easter Offensive: The Last American Advisers, Vietnam, 1972

(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), p. 23.

168. CG, MCB Camp Pendleton ltr BT3/JCD/jeg to

CG, 1st Marine Division, 16Feb73, in CWTC 1956-

1963, historical file located at MWTC Bridgeport.

169. Bob Dietrich, “Marines and Airmen Team to

Test Force-in-Readiness,” San Diego Evening-Tribune, 23Jun73.

170. Personal knowledge of the author, who served

as training officer, 1st Marine Division, 1974-1975.

171. CG, 1st Marine Division, ltr 3/OKS/mg 1500 to

CG, Camp Pendleton, 21May75, author’s personal

MWTC file.

172. Official Biography of the late MajGen Charles

D. Mize, revised Aug76, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va.

173. Martin Bikin and Jeffery Record, Where Does

the Marine Corps Go from Here? (Washington, D.C.:

Brookings Institute, 1976).

174. Col Verle E. Ludwig, U.S Marines at Twentynine Palms, California (Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1989), pp. 67-70.

175. U.S. Marine Corps Lineage of Mountain Warfare

Training Center, 1951-1997, 31Mar98.

Chapter 10

176. David B. Crist, Strategic background paper on

NATO’s northern flank, Marine Corps Historical

Center, 1999, in MCHC Archives, p. 3, hereafter Crist

Paper. 

177. Ibid., p. 2.

178. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

179. HQMC Staff Status Report on the Attainment of

Cold Weather Capabilities 1977, located in Box 1,

Cold Weather Operations file, MCU Archives.

180. Northrop Services, Inc., Executive Summary of

Preliminary Report on USMC Cold Weather Combat

Operations Study, Aug80, MCU Archives, sec 2, p.

6.

181. Ibid., p.xvii.

182. Ibid., pp. xviii-xx.

183. Western Division Naval Facilities Engineering

Command, Draft Master Plan for USMC Marine

Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1981, p.

17.

184. Ibid., p. 64.

185. Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, “1985 Training and Development Concept

Paper,” Aug80, HD RefSec, Quantico, Va., p. 1

186. Ibid., p. 5

187. Ibid., p. 19.

188. Personal knowledge of the author, who represented DC/S, Plans, Policies, and Operations at this

146 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Notes 147

briefing.

189. Col William H. Osgood intvw with MajGen

O.K. Steele, 5Jul09.

190. Crist Paper, p. 16.

191. Gen Robert H. Barrow intw with MajGen O.K.

Steele, 5Jun03.

192. MWTC ComdC, Jan82, HD RefSec, Quantico,

Va., encl (1), p. 5.

193. Northrop Services, Inc., Executive Summary of

Final Report on the Conference on Cold Weather

Combat Operations, Jun82, MCU Archives, Quantico, Va., pp. 1-2, 1-3.

194. Ibid., p. 1-4.

195. Ibid., p. 4-10.

Chapter 11

196. Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald

Reagan (New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 472,

475.

197. MWTC ComdC, Feb83, HD RefSec, Quantico,

Va., encl. (1), p. 4.

198. MWTC ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun82, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va., encl (1), p. 4.

199. Col William H. Osgood, intvw with MajGen

O.K. Steele, 30Jul09.

200. Ibid.

201. Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center Courses of Instruction. 1980-1985, MWTC Historical File, S-3 Office, MWTC, Bridgeport,

California.

202. MWTC ComdC, Dec83, encl (1), p. 1; MWTC

ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun86, encl (1), pp. 1-2, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va.

203. Northrop Services, Inc., Training Committee

Report, in Final Report on the Joint Cold Weather

Combat Operations Conference, 8-12 March 1982,

MCU Archives, Quantico, Va., p. 4-12.

204. MajGen Harry Jenkins, Jr., intvw with MajGen

O.K. Steele, 30Oct09, hereafter Jenkins intvw.

205. Goldsworthy File.

206. Bridgeport Ranger District to CO, MWTC,

22Feb84, on file in S-3 Office, MWTC.

207. Carson Ranger District to CO, MWTC, 4Jan84,

on file in S-3 Office, MWTC.

208. MCB, Camp Pendleton Inspector, Memo on

Command Matters/Problem Areas, 10Apr85, on file

at S-3 Office, MWTC.

209. Jenkins intvw.

210. Personal Recollections of SES Jeffrey Bearor,

C/S TECOM, MCCDEC who served as project manager for the acquisition of Cold Weather Clothing

and Equipment at the Development Center 1985-

1988, hereafter Bearor Recollections.

211. Ibid.

212. Ibid.

213. Crist Paper, pp. 19-20.

214. Ibid., p. 20.

215. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

216. MajGen Jarvis Lynch, intvw with MajGen O.K.

Steele, 9Jan10.

217. Official Biography of Col John F. Stennick, undated, furnished to the author on 28Jul09.

218. Personal recollections of Col John F. Stennick,

undated, furnished to the author Jan2010, hereafter

Stennick Recollections.

219. MWTC ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun86, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va., sec. 2, p. 4.

220. MWTC ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec87, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va., sec. 2, p. 4.

221. Personal recollection of LtCol Kurtis P. Wheeler,

submitted to authors in Sept09.

222. Stennick Recollections.

223. MWTC ComdC, 1Jan-31Dec88, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va., encl (1), p.3.

224. Official Biography of Colonel Philip E. Tucker,

MWTC Historical Summary File, Section. E, former

commanding officers.

225. Personal knowledge of the author, who was

CG, 2dMarDiv, 1987-1989.

226. Ibid.

227. Ibid.

228. MWTC ComdC, 1Jan-31Dec89, HD RefSec,

Quantico, Va., encl (1), p. 5.

229. Personal recollections of GySgt Richard Denhoff, furnished to authors Sept09; “Conquering

McKinley—Testimony of Strength,” Camp Pendleton Scout, 22Nov89.

230. Ibid.

231. Crist Paper, 35.

Chapter 12

232. MWTC ComdC, 1991, p. 9; MWTC ComdC,

1992, p. 5; MWTC ComdC, 1993, p. 4; MWTC

ComdC, 1995, p. 7.

233. MWTC ComdC, 1993, p. 14.

234. Ibid., pp. 4, 14; MWTC ComdC, 1994, p. 4.

235. MWTC ComdC, 1994 p. 4.

236. MWTC ComdC, 1995, p. 7.

237. MWTC ComdC, 1996, p. 22.

238. Ibid., p. 24.

239. MWTC, ComdC, 1997, p. 31.

240. Ibid., p. 13.

241. Ibid., p. 28.

242. MWTC, ComdC, 1998, p. 4.

243. Ibid., p. 18.

244. Ibid., p. 20.

245. Ibid., p. 22.

246. Col Raymond L. “Skip” Polak, intvw, 9Jan09,

Tape DSS_FLDA, hereafter Polak intvw.

247. Polak intvw.
248. Polak intvw.

249. Polak intvw.

250. MWTC, ComdC 1997, p. 7.

251. Ibid., pp. 9, 32, 33.

252. Col Robert W. Strahan, “What Good is the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center?” Marine Corps Gazette (March 2001), p. 23.

253. Ibid. 

254. Ibid., 25.

255. Ibid., 25.

256. Ibid., 26.

257. Ibid.

258. Polak intvw.

259. MWTC 50th Anniversary Program, 6Sept01.

260. Ibid.

261. MWTC ComdC, 2001, Narrative summary, p. 1.

Epilogue

262. Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, “U.S. Marines in

Iraq, 2003 Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, History

Division, U.S. Marine Corps Washington D.C. 2007,

p.1.

263. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

264. Gidget Fuentes, “Harsh Weather, Rugged Terrain Will Challenge Troops,” San Diego Tribune,

12Oct01, p. A5.

265. Jeanette Steele, “High Mettle: Mountain War

Games Offer Marines Taste of Afghanistan Terrain,” San Diego Tribune, 12Oct01.

266. Brendan Riley, Associated Press Writer, “Sierra

Troops Preparing for Mountain Battle,” Tahoe

Daily Tribune, 16Oct01, p.1A.

267. Mark Jenkins, “Winter to the Corps,” Outside

Magazine, Feb02, p. 66.

268. Ibid.

269. Ibid., pp. 65, 68-69, 96.

270. Ibid., p. 11.

271. Personal knowledge of author O.K. Steele

who participated in this seminar and the briefing

for LtGen Emil Bedard.

272. Personal knowledge of author Michael I. Moffett, who served with the CentCom J3 (operations)

branch, 2001-2002.

273. Polak intvw.

274. MWTC ComdC for CY 2003, p. 4

275. MWTC ComdC for CY 2002, p. 4.

276. MWTC ComdC for CY 2004, p .4.

277. Personal knowledge of author O.K. Steele

who was invited by the CO, MWTC to sit in and

observe this conference. 

278. “Ready to Fight” Marine Corps Gazette,

Nov04, p. 14.

279. Ibid., p.16.

280. Personal knowledge of author O.K. Steele,

who served on Governor Schwarzenegger’s California council on base support and retention from

4 November 2004 to 17 November 2005.

281. Col Timothy Wells, Concept Paper on USMC

Order of Battle for Cold Weather Mountain Operations dated 6 October 2005 held in MWTC S-3 office.

282. Senator Barak Obama, AFL/CIO Democratic

Presidential Candidate Forum, Chicago, IL,

7Aug07.

283. JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse,

U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Congressional Research

Service, Library of Congress, 15 July 2008.

284. David S. Cloud and Mike Allen, “Obama Shifts

Focus to Afghanistan,” www.politico.com 17Feb09.

285. Col Norman L. Cooling e-mail messages to

LtCol Michael I. Moffett dated 6Feb10.

286. Command and Staff, MWTC, “A Training Complex for Complex Training,” Marine Corps Gazette,

Mar09, p. 56.

287. Col Norman L. Cooling, Strategic Vision and

Commanders Planning Guidance for Mountain

Warfare Training Center, November 2008, p. 1.

288. Ibid., p. 6.

289. Ibid., p. 15.

290. Col Norman L. Cooling e-mail message to

LtCol Michael I. Moffett dated 6Feb10.

291. Figures reported on the PBS News Hour by

Jim Lehr on 23 May 2010.

292. Mark Jenkins, “Winter to the Corps,” Outside

Magazine, Feb02, pp. 66-67.

148 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
149

Appendix A

Lineage and Honors, 1951-2001
150 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
151

Appendix B

Chronological List of Commanding Officers

1951 to Present

Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Hubbard 30 August 1951–24 August 1952

Major Roger D. Peterson (Acting) 25 August 1952–21 September 1952

Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck 22 September 1952–26 March 1954 

Colonel Clayton O. Totman 27 March 1954–16 July 1955

Lieutenant Colonel Sidney F. Jenkins 17 July 1955–30 March 1957

Lieutenant Colonel Keigler E. Flake 

(Acting) 31 March 1957–2 June 1957

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Gentleman 3 June 1957–6 July 1958

Major Richard F. Dyer (Acting) 7 July 1958–2 August 1958

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P. Averill 3 August 1958–30 June 1960

Colonel Glen E. Martin 1 July 1960–6 June 1962

Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel H. Carver 7 June 1962–10 July 1963

Colonel Frank R. Wilkerson Jr. 11 July 1963–6 June 1965

Lieutenant Colonel Lester V. Swenson 7 June 1965–15 July 1965

(Acting)

Colonel John B. Bristow 16 July 1965–10 October 1966

Major John E. Lorzing 11 October 1966–10 October 1967

Lieutenant Colonel George A. Knudson 10 May 1976–28 March 1978

Lieutenant Colonel John W. Guy 29 March 1978–1 May 1981

Colonel William H. Osgood 2 May 1981–24 July 1984

Colonel John I. Hopkins 25 July 1984–7 May 1985

Lieutenant Colonel Earnest A. Van Huss 8 May 1985–27 June 1985

(Acting) 

Colonel John F. Stennick 28 June 1985–1 July 1988

Lieutenant Colonel William E. Healy 2 July 1988–17 August 1988

(Acting)
Colonel Phillip E. Tucker 18 August 1988 – 31 July 1991

Colonel Russell W. Schumacher Jr. 1 August 1991 – 31 May 1994

Colonel Raymond L. Polak 1 June 1994 – 8 July 1996

Colonel Paul W. O’Toole Jr. 9 July 1996 – 25 August 1999

Colonel Robert W. Strahan 26 August 1999 – 10 August 2001

Colonel James M. Thomas 11 August 2001 – 17 July 2003

Colonel Joel G. Schwankl 18 July 2003 – 15 July 2005

Lieutenant Colonel William Etnyre Jr. 16 July 2005 – 1 September 2005

(Acting)

Colonel Timothy C. Wells 1 September 2005 – 13 August 2006

Colonel David B. Hall 14 August 2006 – 1 July 2008

Colonel Norman L. Cooling 2 July 2008 – 11 June 2010

Colonel Phillip W. Chandler 12 June 2010 – Present

152 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Sergeant Major James Westerman 1958–1959

Sergeant Major William J. Conley 1959–1961

Sergeant Major Harry A. Stoneburner 1961–1964

Sergeant Major Richard R. “Big Red” Ebert, Jr. 1964–1966

First Sergeant Lloyd G. Daniels (Acting) 1 May 1980–31 July 1981

Sergeant Major Charles L. Hayman 1 August 1981–3 April 1984

Sergeant Major Edward O’Leary 13 June 1984–10 February 1988

Sergeant Major Ronald S. Newman 11 February 1988–23 February 1990

Sergeant Major Henry S. David Jr. 24 February 1990–11 September 1992

Sergeant Major Raymond W. Jones 12 September 1992–31 August 1994

Gunnery Sergeant George A. Welsh Jr. 1 September 1994–17 January 1995

(Acting)

Sergeant Major Richard F. Boyler 18 January 1995–22 May 1998

Sergeant Major Harold D. Bressler Jr. 23 May 1998–27 June 2000

Sergeant Major Johnny D. Matlock 28 June 2000–3 August 2003

Sergeant Major Daniel J. Fierle 4 August 2003–12 May 2006

Sergeant Major Michael W. Redmyer 13 May 2006–18 November 2008

Sergeant Major Douglas E. Power 19 November 2008–Present

153

Appendix C

Chronological List of Sergeant Majors

1958 to Present
154 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
155

Appendix D

Department of the Agriculture

and Navy Joint Policy
156 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Appendix D 157
158 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
Afghanistan, 130, 134-141

2d Brigade, 201st Corps, Afghan National

Army, 139

Aggressor Platoon, 23, 27, 31, 44, 57, 59, 61-62, 65

Aircraft types

Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight, 90

Cessna OF-2, 65

Constellation, C141, 91

Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion, 93

Sikorsky HO3, Dragonfly, 45

Sikorsky UH-34 Seahorse, 65

Air Force Commands and Units

Air Force, 52, 83, 87-88, 98, 108-109

Air Force National Guard C-119, 32-33

Air Mobility Command, 107-108

Stead Air Force Base, 52, 69, 88

Alacron, de Hernando, 3

Almond, Major General Edward M., USA, 19

Anderson, Justin, 136

Andretta, Captain Mike, 135

al-Qaeda, 136-135, 139

Alexis, Godey, 4

Aleutian Islands, 11-12, 17-18

Alta, California, 3

Army Commands and Units

7th U.S. Army Division, 19

Eighth Army, 19

10th Mountain Division, 18, 21, 54, 69,

121, 136

X Corps, 19

38th Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion, 21

Rangers, 120

Special Forces, 130, 141

Army Field Manual, 20

Army Laboratory, Natick Massachusetts, 107

Army Schools and Training Centers

Arctic Survival School, 17

National Guard Mountain Warfare School,

136

Averill, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P., 61-68, 71,

77, 84, 113

Azores, 12, 14

Barrow, General Robert H., 91, 99-104, 107, 109,

111

Barstow Supply Center, 49, 70

Beardsley, Corporal Brandon J., 135

Bearor, Captain Jeffrey W., 116-117

Bedard, Lieutenant Colonel Emil “Buck,” 136

Bello, Staff Sergeant Alejandro G., 125

Benhoff, Lieutenant Colonel David, 139

Benton, Senator Thomas H., 4

Beverly, Major General Henry, 121

Bice, Major General David F., 133

Big Bear Civilian Conservation Corps, 20

Black Mountain, 21

Block, Honorable John R., 113

Bonesteel, Major General Charles H., USA, 14

Boyd Major Vernon D., 38

Brady, Lieutenant James, 32

Brannan, Charles F., 36

Bridgeport, California 25-26, 37, 44, 46, 53, 76-77,

80, 132, 139

Bridgeport Chronicle-Union, 25, 30

Bristow, Colonel John B., 86-88; major, 87; captain, 86

British 79th Division, 13-14

British Royal Marines

3d Commando Brigade, 112

Brown, Lieutenant Joseph P.S., 53

Buchanan, Secretary of War James, 7

Buck, Lieutenant Billy B., 53

Burcham Flat, 5, 91

Bureau of Land Management, 140

Burtsell, Gunnery Sergeant Ronald L. “Ron,” 74, 83

Bush, President George W., 135, 137-138

Byron, Colonel Michael J., 116, 120, 123

Cabrillo, Juan Rodriguez, 3

California Fish and Game Law, 68

Camps

Drum, 98, 100-101, 112, 121

Elliot, 14

Hale, 18, 21, 52-53

Lejeune, 56, 102, 112, 123-124, 135, 138,

141

Pendleton, 18, 20-24, 26-27, 29-30, 33, 34-

42, 44-45, 48-49, 56, 58-59, 61, 65, 67-68, 75-77,

80, 82, 87-90, 93, 95, 100, 108-111, 119, 122, 132-

133, 137

Ripley, 100, 106

San Onofre, 29, 44

Carson, Christopher “Kit,” 4, 6

159

Index
160 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Carson Pass, 9

Carver, Colonel Nathaniel H., 69-70, 77, 79

Cascade Range, 1

Cates, General Clifton B., 19-20

Caulfield, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew P. “Matt,”

94, 116, 121, 124

Chassey, Elliot W., 36

Cheatham, Captain Ernest C., Jr., 65-66

Chinese Communist Forces, 16, 19, 75

Chinese People’s Army

124th Division, 19

Churchill, Prime Minister Winston S., 12-13

City of San Francisco, 32, 35

Clapp, Lieutenant Wiley M. Jr., 73

Clark, Sergeant Wesley D., 125

Clipper, Captain Charles H., 61, 64, 67, 71

Cochrane, Captain Henry C., 11-12

Cold Weather Battalion, 26-30, 32-44, 46-47, 132

Cold-Weather Indoctrination Program, 21, 22, 27,

30, 36, 38, 41, 42, 48, 

Cold Weather Training Battalion, 26, 33, 36, 47-48

Cold Weather Training Center, 46-49, 53, 59, 61,

63-64, 67, 69, 72, 76, 80, 82

Cook, Ernest T., 116

Cooling, Colonel Norman L., 140-141

Conley, Sergeant Major William J., 63, 65 

Connors, Chuck, 45

Conway, Colonel James T., 129, 135, 140

Crawford, Sergeant Major Leland D. “Crow,” 91,

102, 132

Crespi, Juan Fray, 3

Crist, Dr. David B., 97, 117, 126

Crockett, Colonel A. J. S., RM, 80, 88

Culp, Clinton, 136

Curtis, Major General Henry O., 13-14

Curtis, Major James, 61

Cushman, Major General Robert E., Jr. 81-83

Da Nang, 85, 89

Daniels, First Sergeant Lloyd G., 101, 105

Deal, Captain Sarah M., 129

Denhoff, Richard N., 125

Department of Agriculture, 25, 36, 94-95

Department of Interior

Bureau of Reclamation, 58-59, 79

Deptula, Major Edwin A., 78, 82

Devil’s Gate Pass, 5

Donovan, Colonel James A., Jr., 13-17

Donner Pass, 32, 35

Douse, Captain George, 81

Dwyer, Major General Ross T., 89

Dyer, Major Richard F., 61

Ebert, Sergeant Major Richard R. “Big Red,” Jr., 76

Eggers, Captain Robert F., 52, 73

Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 48, 68

Escape, Evasion, and Survival (EE&S) Course, 48-

49, 52, 57, 64-65, 69, 73-74, 95

Estes, Sergeant, 125

Etnyre, Lieutenant Colonel William “Robb,” Jr., 138

Ewing, Staff Sergeant Eugene “Gene” L., 74-75

Exercises

Alpine Warrior, 100, 124

Anchor Express 1986, 119-121

Cold Winter 1985, 89, 112, 114-117, 124

Empire Glacier 1978, 100

Javelin Thrust, 141

MICOWEX 49A, 18

Mountain Warrior, 141

Teamwork 76, 98

Fales Hot Springs, 9

Fales, Samuel, 9

Fargrave, Captain, 125

Fay, Paul B., Jr. USN, 79-80

Fellinger, Captain Barry E.C., 93-94

Fitzpatrick, Thomas “Broken Hand,” 4-6

Flynn, Sergeant Major Daniel J., “Dan,” 76

Font, Pedro, 3

Forts

Benning, Georgia, 61-62, 64

Carson, Colorado, 21

Greely, Alaska, 68, 136

McCoy, Wisconsin, 121, 124-125

Wainwright, Alaska, 125, 136

40th Parallel, 1

Forward Operating Base Rhino, 135

Franks, General Tommy, USA, 135

Fremont, John C., 4-6, 8, 24

Gentleman, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W., 51,

58-59, 60-61, 71

Goddard, Gunnery Sergeant Bernard G., 82

Godey, Alexis, 4

Goodman, First Lieutenant Edward C., 52

Goldsworthy, Captain James N.A., RM, 83-84, 88;

Major, 87, 112

Gow, First Lieutenant Douglas W. “Doug,” 83

Gray, Major General Alfred M., Jr., 97-98, 105, 116,

123, 124

Gray, Robert L. “Bob,” Jr., 83

Great Basin, 1, 2, 4

Grouse Meadow, 5, 55, 94, 141

Guantanamo, 14

Guy, Colonel John W., 101-102, 131

Haberman, Staff Sergeant Harold F., 27-28, 32-35
Index 161

Haebel, Major General Robert E., 110

Hall, Colonel David B., 138

Hall, Major Michael S., 11

Hayman, Sergeant Major Charles L., 105

Heck, Major Matthew J. “Matt,” 105

Heinl, Colonel Robert D., 16, 37, 44

Henderson, Gunnery Sergeant Lonnie, “Moose,”

74-75, 83

Henness Pass, 9

Hermle, Colonel Leo D., 14

High altitude strike teams (HASTs), 136

Highway 4, 113

Highway 108, 24, 27, 37, 45, 52, 55, 63, 66, 91,

103

Highway 182, 107

Highway 395, 23-24, 26, 29, 30, 33-34, 36, 52, 63,

65, 103, 110, 120, 129, 132

Hill, Mary, 1

Hitler, Adolf, 12, 15

Hoffman, Major General Carl W., 95

Hoke, Sergeant William E., 83

Holcomb, Major General Thomas, 14

Hoover Wilderness Area, 83, 113

Hopkins, Colonel John I., 90, 111-113, 120

Horse Creek Canyon, 72

Houghton, Major General Kenneth L., 90-91

Hoye Canyon, 58

Hubbard, Colonel Donald B., 23-24, 26-29, 31-32,

34, 36-40, 141

Humboldt River, 4

Imjin River, 41

Indians, groups

Maidu, 2

Miwok, 2

Paiute, 2, 4

Washo, 2; see also Washoe, 6, 8

Jacques, Sergeant Major Maurice J., 42

Jenkins, First Lieutenant Harry W. Jr., 83-84, 102;

Colonel, 111-112, 115-116, 119; Major General,

114-116, 120-121, 131,

Jenkins, Lieutenant Colonel Sidney F., 44, 48-49,

51

Jenkins, Mark, 135-136, 141

Johnson, First Lieutenant Richard, W. “Dick,” 23-

24, 31-32, 141

Johnson, President Lyndon B., 85

Jones, Major General Thomas S., 133, 141

Jones, Second Lieutenant William K., 15, 17

Kandahar Airfield, 135-136

Karch, Brigadier General Frederick J., 85

Karzai, Hamid, 137

Keeling, Brigadier Andy, RM, 112

Kelley, Captain Paul X., 62; general, 109, 114

Kennedy, President John F., Jr., 76, 79-80

Kennedy Meadows, 9

Kern, Staff Sergeant, 120

Kiel Canal, 98

Kilfoyle, Staff Sergeant John F., 86

Kimball, Secretary of the Navy Dan A., 36

Knapp, Lieutenant James V. “Jim,” 74

Knudson, Captain George A., 77, 82, 95

Kodiak Island, 17-18

Kola Peninsula, 97-98

Korean Peninsula, 19, 23, 41, 43, 72, 76

Kozeniesky, Major Craig, 135-136

Krulak, Colonel Victor H., 42

Laden, Osama bin, 135

Lake Bonpland, 6

Lake Tahoe Basin, 1

Lamar, Sergeant, 128

Last Outpost, 71

Laxalt, Paul, 87

Leavitt Meadows, 7, 9, 24, 55, 79, 86

Lee, First Lieutenant Vincent R., 73

Lehman, Secretary of the Navy John F., 104

Leonard, Zenas, 4

Lewis, Ernest, 5

Life magazine, 35

Lightfoot, Gunnery Sergeant William R. “Bill,” 74

Litzenberg, Colonel Homer L., 19

Liversedge, Brigadier General Harry B., 18

Lorzing, Major John E., 88

Louis, Saint, 4

Lynch, Brigadier General Jarvis D., Jr., 118

McAninch, Lieutenant Gregg, 125

MacArthur, General Douglas, USA, 19

McCulloch, Brigadier General William L., 93-94

McLennan, General Kenneth, 101-102

Mahon, Color Sergeant, RM, 105

Mannila, First Lieutenant Richard R., 82

Marine Barracks

Adak, Alaska, 17, 44, 129

Pendleton, California, 20, 36, 39-40

Hawthorne, Nevada, 39, 82, 103

San Francisco Naval Shipyard, California,

84

Washington, D.C., 109

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California, 28,

127

Marine Corps Bases and Depots

Recruit Depot, San Diego, 78
162 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Supply Center, Barstow, 49, 70

Twentynine Palms, California, 95

Marine Corps Commands and Units

Air-Ground Task Forces

Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 42, 99, 103

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; Western Pacific; Troops, 22, 27, 28, 39, 42, 47, 87, 93

I Marine Amphibious Force, 90, 93, 111

II Marine Amphibious Force, 99

III Marine Amphibious Force, 16, 85

1st Marine Brigade 12, 16, 48, 95

1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 13-14

3d Marine Brigade, 18, 36, 27, 41, 139

4th Marine Amphibious Brigade, 98-99,

106, 112, 115-116, 117-118, 121

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 85

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 135-136

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 135-136

36th Marine Amphibious Unit, 98

Air

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 19, 48, 75, 85

2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 48

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 45, 48, 58, 102

Marine Aircraft Group 40, 112

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266

(HMM-266), 112

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 566

(HMM-466), 129

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6),

66

Ground

1st Marine Division, 12, 16, 18-20, 22-23,

38, 41, 43-44, 48, 56, 65, 67, 73-75, 77-78, 85, 87,

89-90, 93-95, 99, 102, 111, 128, 132

2d Marine Division, 12,43, 48, 56, 62, 87-

88, 97, 105, 108, 112, 119-120, 123-125, 127, 138,

140

3d Marine Division, 41-43, 48, 75, 84-85,

89, 102, 118, 137

4th Marine Division, 40

1st Marine Regiment, 31, 40, 99

2d Battalion, 1st Marines, 87, 89-91

3d Battalion, 1st Marines, 91-92

2d Marine Regiment, 111-112, 114-116, 119-120,

123-125, 138

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 87, 112

3d Battalion, 2d Marines, 88, 128

3d Marine Regiment, 40, 73, 138, 140

3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 73, 140

4th Marine Regiment, 87

1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 111

2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 49

5th Marine Regiment, 78, 89, 95

1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 51

2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 23, 45, 62, 67,

72-73

3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 95

6th Marine Regiment, 12-13, 14-17, 62, 127, 135

1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 16

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 127

7th Marine Regiment, 45, 68, 90, 93-94, 111

1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 67

2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 45, 90, 111

9th Marine Regiment, 26, 111

3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 26

1st Battalion, 10th Marines, 116

2d Battalion, 23d Marines, 102

1st Battalion, 25th Marines, 85

3d Battalion, 26th Marines, 62

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 78

1st Engineer Battalion, 132

1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 65, 91

1st Shore Party Battalion, 132

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 89

1st Force Reconnaissance Company, 90

2d Defense Battalion, 40

2d Parachute Battalion, 62

2d Reconnaissance Battalion, 88

3d 4.5 Rocket Battery, Force Troops, FMF Pacific,

45

3d Raider Battalion, 21

5th Defense Battalion, 12

7th Engineer Battalion, 40-41, 65, 132

Force Engineer Battalion, 96

Parachute Regiment, 62

Regimental Landing Team 7 (RLT-7), 18, 89

Special Operations Command, 141

1st Replacement Draft, 67

6th Replacement Draft, 21, 27

14th Replacement Draft, 23, 27-28, 39

15th Replacement Draft, 29, 36

17th Replacement Draft, 33

19th Replacement Draft, 36

20th Replacement Draft, 36

21st Replacement Drafts, 36

26th Replacement Draft, 42

Marine Corps Gazette, 11, 35, 77, 127, 130

Marine Corps Schools and Training Center

Amphibious Warfare School, 26, 62, 107,

120

Command and Staff School, 129

Development and Education Command; 
Index 163

Training and Education Command, 105,

118, 133

Infantry Training School, 44

Landing Force Development Center, 62

Staging Battalion, 88

Staging Regiment, 26, 29, 38-39

Staging and Replacement Command, 20,

23, 30

Training and Replacement Command, 20-

21, 23, 26, 29, 32, 39

Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center,

40, 80, 83, 89, 95, 100, 103, 111, 127-131, 133, 138

Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), 103

Marjanov, Gunnery Sergeant John, 74, 132-133,

137

Marston, Brigadier General John, 12-14, 16

Martin, Colonel Glen E., 67-72, 77

Mattis, Brigadier General James N., 135

Mason, Colonel Richard B., 7-8

Milavic, Staff Sergeant Anthony F., 73-75

Military Airlift Command, 90

Military Assistance Advisory Group, 67, 77

Mill Creek Canyon, 5

Miller, Lieutenant General John H., 103

Miller, Staff Sergeant, 128

Milligan, Brigadier General Robert F., 116

Mize, Major General Charles D., 94; Lieutenant, 95

Mojave Desert, 1, 3

Mono County, 9, 25, 68, 79, 85, 120

Mono Lake, 9

Montoya, Gunnery Sergeant Raymond A., 75

Moor, Robin, 12

Moore, Captain Walter “Mu Mu,” 21, 23

Moore, Marvin K., 83

Moraga, Ensign Gabriel, 3

Morris, Captain John B., 73

Moriarty, Captain William S., 82-83, 88

Mountains

Diablo, 6

Joseph, 3

Lassen, 1

Matterhorn Peak, 112-113

Whitney, 1, 121

Mountain Leader’s/Leadership Course, 47-48, 51-

54, 56-57, 63-65, 68-74, 78-79, 90, 110, 112-113, ,

116, 120, 124, 130-131, 136, 138

Mountain Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 24, 40, 73, 76-77, 80, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 94-96,

100-103, 105, 110-111, 118-119, 122, 126-133, 135-

141, 

Mundy, Brigadier General Carl Jr., 116, 125, 128

Myatt, Major General J. Michael, 128

Navy Commands and Units

Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, 97

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Forces, 85

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 18

Naval Air Station at Fallon, Nevada, 52,

56, 90-91, 112, 140

Naval Air Station Lakehurst, New Jersey,

62

Naval Air Station Lemoor, California, 90

Navy Arctic Test Station, Point Barrow, 17

Naval Construction Battalion, Port Hueneme, California, 87, 109

Naval Dispensary and Dental Clinic,

Camp Pendleton, 49

Naval Engineering Facilities Command,

120

Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, 123

Seabees, 46

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

(SACLant), 112

12th Naval District, 25, 39, 50-51

Neal, Staff Sergeant Theodore E. “Boone,” 74, 83

Nixon, President Richard M., 89

Norway Air-Landed Marine Amphibious Brigade,

117

Nye, James W., 9

Obama, Senator Barak H., 138; president, 140

Operations

Anorak Express, 98

Battle Griffin, 127

Cold Winter 1985, 112, 115, 117

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 125, 127,

137

Enduring Freedom, 130, 135, 137-138,

140, 146

Starlite, 85

Workup, 98

Killer, 41, 67

Ripper, 41, 67

Osgood, Lieutenant Colonel William H., 102-103,

104-106, 108; Colonel, 103-104, 108-109, 111

O’Toole, Colonel Paul W. Jr., 129-130

Palazzo, Lieutenant Colonel Louis J., 139

Palmer, Master Sergeant Chad J., 76

Payne, John, 45

Pate, General Randolph, McC., 48, 58-59, 60-61, 73

Pickle, Francis, “Frank,” 9

Pickel Meadow, 23-38, 40-48, 51-52, 59, 64-66, 68,

71-73, 77, 82, 85, 90-91, 103, 105, 107, 110-112,

114, 119-120, 124, 127-135, 137-138, 140-141

Polak, Colonel Raymond L., 129-130, 137
164 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001

Polk, President James K., 7-8

Portolá, Don Gaspar de, 3

Prudhoe Bay, 93

Pruess, Charles, 4-6

Puller, Brigadier General Lewis B. “Chesty,” 27,

30-31, 36, 40, 99

Pyramid Lake, 4

Quartararo, Sergeant Alan, 135

Quille, De Dan, 8

Raue, Technical Sergeant Carl H. Jr., 56-58, 68

Reagan, President Ronald W., 103, 107, 109

Reno, Nevada, 23, 25, 32, 42, 51-52, 66, 71, 76, 82-

83, 87-88, 90-91, 103, 112-113

Reykjavik Harbor, 12

Richards, Petty Officer, 120

Richardson, Major Rodney C. “Rod,” 123, 125-126,

136

Ridgely, Major General Reginald H., Jr., 59, 61, 65

Riney, Colonel Francis “Frank,” 101

Ripley, Colonel John W., 123-124

Robeson, Major Edward J., IV, 102, 106, 110

Robinson, Major General Kenneth L., 108-109

Roise, Lieutenant Colonel Harold S., 23, 45

Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 12, 14, 78

Roosevelt, President Theodore, 25

Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Donald H., 137

Russ, Martin, 43

Ryffel, Lieutenant Colonel George G., 28, 37-39,

47

San Bernadino Range, 20

Sanchez, Lieutenant Colonel Eleazar O., 139

San Diego, California, 3, 12, 29

San Jacinto Mountains, 21, 22

Sardo, Brigadier General Americo A., 100-101

Saw Tooth Ridge 51, 55, 72, 74

Scheer, Staff Sergeant Carl E. “Pappy,” 74

Schmuck, Lieutenant Colonel Donald M., 40-43,

48, 95

Schneider, Corporal John J., 27

Schumacher, Colonel Russell W. Jr., 129, 137

Schwankl, Colonel Joel G., 129,137-138

Schwenk, Brigadier General Adolph G., 90

Scott, Lieutenant Hugh L. III, 83

Serra, Junipero, 3

Shanghai, China, 49, 86, 132

Sheehan, Captain James P., 82

Sherman, Lieutenant William T., 7

Sheridan, Gunnery Sergeant John C., 73

Shepherd, General Lemuel C., Jr., 33, 40, 42

Ships

Alki, 11-12

Bataan (CVL 29), 78

Bismarck, 12

Consolation (AH 15), 73

Gurkha, 83

Prinz Eugen, 12

Shoup, General David M., 79

Sierra Nevada, 1, 3-4, 7, 9, 30, 32, 34, 41, 48

Sitler, Lieutenant Commander, USN (MC), 128

Skipper, Major Kenneth J. “Ken,” 77-78

Smith, Jedediah S., 3

Smith, Knut, 53

Smith, General Holland, M., 12

Smith, Brigadier General Norman H. “Norm,” 118,

136

Smith, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver P., 16-17; Major

General, 19, 22, 39

Smith, Major General Ray L., 136

Snell, Major James “Jim,” 123

Straehl, First Lieutenant Richard L., 86

Strahan, Colonel Robert W., 130-131, 133

Stanislaus River, 4, 7, 9

Shapley, Major General Alan, 67-68

Shutler, Major General Philip D., 98

Sommers, Sergeant, 125

Sonora Pass, 5, 7, 9, 24, 66, 103, 130

Stark, Admiral Harold R., USN, 12

Steele, Captain Orlo K., 84; major general 131,

133, 136

Stennick, Colonel John F., 113, 118-119, 121-122,

130, 137

Stoneburner, Sergeant Major Harry A., 76

Stone, Irving, 8

Strawberry Flat, 9

Subic Bay Naval Base, Philippine Islands, 71

Suid, Lawrence, 45

Summit Meadow, 41

Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE),

78

Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE)

Course, 80-81, 87-88

Sweetwater Range, 91

Swenson, Lieutenant Colonel Lester V. “Swede,”

85-86

Tactical Area #1, 29

Tactical Area #2, 59, 65

Taylor, Staff Sergeant George, 89

Tent Camp #2, 29-30

Territorial Enterprise, 8

The Basic School, 29, 78, 102, 116, 118

“The People’s Pool,” 53, 65

38th Parallel, Korea, 18, 23, 67

Thomas, Col James M. “Jim,” 133, 135-137

Toiyabe National Forest 25, 36, 51, 79, 107
Index 165

Tooby, Color Sergeant Steven, 136

Topaz Family Housing complex, 110

Totman, Clayton O., 43-45

Trahern Party, 7

Trainor, Lieutenant General Bernard E. “Mick,” 35,

136

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1848, 7

Trinidad, Cpl T., 83

Truckee, California, 66

Truman, President Harry S., 41

Tucker, Colonel Phillip E., 123, 129

Turley, Captain Gerald H. “Gerry,” 75

Twin Lakes, 51, 55, 72-73, 83

Twining, Brigadier General Merrill B., 20-21, 23,

25

Utter, Lieutenant Robert A., 53

U.S. Forest Service, 25

Van Huss, Lieutenant Colonel Earnest A. “Ernie,”

113, 119

Varmette, Thomas M. “Tom,” 125

Vehicles

BV-206, 115, 117, 121, 125-126

Light Assault Vehicle 25, 107

Amphibious Cargo Carrier M76 “Otter,”

51-52, 70

Thiokol Trackmaster, 70, 117, 132

Valleys

Antelope, 87, 110

Bridgeport, 4-5

Carson, 8

Eagle, 8

Hudson River, 73

Owens River, 1

Sacramento, 4, 6

Smith, 91

Squaw, 67

Washoe, 8

Yosemite, 2, 4

Vozka, Corporal Henry 75-76

Wagner, Hans, 53

Walker, Joseph R., 4

Walker, Ralph V. Jr., 53

Walker River, 2, 7, 9

Walt, Major General Lewis W. “Lou,” 85

Wawrzyniak, Captain Stanley “Ski,” 71-73

Weapons

M198 155mm howitzer, 116

Gun, chain, 25mm, 107

Mortar, 81mm, 90, 107

Howitzer, 105mm, 107

Rifle, Recoilless, 106mm, 90, 94

Rocket antitank, M-220, 107

Wedertz, Frank, 4

Weinberger, Secretary of Defense Caspar, 104, 107

Wells, Colonel Timothy C., 125, 138

Wester, Lieutenant Colonel Sean D., 139

Westerman, James M. “Jim,” 63

West, Francis J. “Bing,” 136

West, Sergeant William T. “Billie,” 83

West Walker River, 5, 9, 24, 37, 45, 55, 58, 76, 79,

86, 120, 135

Wheeler, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. “Kurt,” 121-

122

White Shod Course, 88

Wiedhahn, Captain Warren Jr., 66

Wilkin, Sergeant Martin, 125

Wilkinson, Colonel Frank R., Jr., 78-82, 85

Wilson, General Louis H., Jr., 95, 99

Wonsan Harbor, 19

Yudam Ni, 23

Ziglar, Gunnery Sergeant Coy D., 77
166 U.S Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, 1951-2001
The Authors

MajGen Orlo K. Steele conceived, researched, and wrote this work based on

some 35 years of U.S. Marine Corps service

and experience. He is retired and lives with

his family in Grass Valley, California, not far

from the Mountain Warfare Training Center.

LtCol Michael I. Moffett represented the

Field History contribution to this effort. He

is retired and lives with his family in New

Hampshire. They are pictured with Marines

at the MWTC.
Cover: A striking image of a Marine small

unit in cold weather clothing and equipment snowshoeing up a slope at the training

center.

(Photo by C. Robert Lee, courtesy of author)