Coversheet Corrected: April 9, 2007 

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-3043 

KAN PLASAI, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

Respondent. 

Kan Plasai, of Dallas, Texas, pro se. 

Steven J. Abelson, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United 

States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him on the brief 

were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director and 

Brian M. Simkin, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Ellyn M. Ponton, 

Attorney, Federal Aviation Administration, of Fort Worth, Texas. 

Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection Board 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2007-3043 

KAN PLASAI, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

Respondent. 

__________________________ 

DECIDED: April 5, 2007 

__________________________ 

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge and DYK, Circuit Judge. 

PER CURIAM. 

Kan Plasai appeals a Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) decision in DA0752-06-0208-I-1 approving a settlement agreement and dismissing the appeal. For 

the reasons discussed below, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) 

removed Ms. Plasai from her position as a Computer Specialist, FG-0334-09, at the 

Flight Standards District Office in Dallas, TX effective September 2, 2005 for misuse of 

her position by accessing confidential management documents without authorization or 

permission. Letter from Steven W. Douglas, FAA, to Kan Plasai, (Sept. 1, 2005). 
Ms. Plasai timely appealed her removal to the Board. Prior to the Board’s consideration 

of the merits of her appeal, Ms. Plasai, represented by counsel, entered into a 

settlement agreement with the FAA on May 10, 2006, which became effective on 

May 15, 2006. 

 Under the settlement agreement, Ms. Plasai agreed inter alia (1) to dismiss her 

appeal with prejudice, (2) to waive all of her claims against the United States, (3) to 

resign from the FAA effective May 15, 2006 and not seek re-employment with the 

Department of Transportation, and (4) to be bound by the terms of the agreement. 

Additionally, Ms. Plasai acknowledged in the agreement that she was represented by 

counsel during the settlement, that she understood the meaning of the agreement, and 

that the agreement was made freely and fairly without any duress or bad faith 

negotiations. 

On May 15, 2006, the parties submitted their written agreement to the Board. 

Plasai v. Dep’t of Transp., No. DA-0752-06-0208-I-1, (M.S.P.B. May 15, 2006) (“Initial 

Decision”). Finding that “the agreement appears lawful on its face, the parties freely 

entered into it, and they understand its terms,” the Administrative Judge (“AJ”) 

dismissed the appeal. Id. at 2. Ms. Plasai petitioned for full board review of the Initial 

Decision, challenging inter alia the voluntariness of the settlement agreement. The full 

board denied the petition on September 20, 2006, on the grounds that there was “no 

new, previously unavailable, evidence and that the administrative judge made no error 

in law or regulation that affects the outcome,” thereby making the Initial Decision final. 

Plasai v. Dep’t of Transp., No. DA-0752-06-0208-I-1, (M.S.P.B. Sept. 20, 2006) (citing 

2007-3043 2
5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d)). Ms. Plasai filed a timely appeal with this court. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

II. DISCUSSION 

 We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported 

by substantial evidence.” Chase-Baker v. Dep’t of Justice, 198 F.3d 843, 845 (Fed. Cir. 

1999) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)). 

 On appeal, Ms. Plasai argues that the settlement agreement should be voided as 

involuntary. Because Ms. Plasai first questioned the voluntariness of the settlement 

agreement in a petition for review by the full board, not during the dismissal proceeding 

with the AJ, she has waived this argument before us. See Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot.

Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“if the party . . . raises an issue for the first time 

in a petition for review by the full Board, this court will not consider the issue.”); see also

Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 

(holding that the issue of the voluntariness of a settlement agreement is waived on 

appeal if not raised before the Board).1 

 However, even if Ms. Plasai had properly raised below the voluntariness of the 

settlement agreement, her argument is unpersuasive. A petitioner challenging the 

validity of a settlement agreement bears a “heavy burden” of proof that the agreement is 

improper. Asberry v. United States Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 

 1

 In her reply brief, Ms. Plasai alleges that her husband raised the issue of 

voluntariness in a May 8, 2006 letter. However, she agreed to the settlement after the 

letter was sent, and there is no evidence that the voluntariness of the settlement 

agreement that she signed was raised before the AJ. 

2007-3043 3
Ms. Plasai has not met this burden. For example, Ms. Plasai alleges that she suffers 

from a mental condition that impaired her judgment and that the AJ coerced her. 

However, these allegations, conclusory and perfunctory at best, do not offset the fact 

that Ms. Plasai was represented by counsel during the settlement agreement and 

before the AJ; signed the agreement after acknowledging it was freely made; and told 

the AJ at the settlement enforcement hearing that she freely entered into and 

understood the terms of the agreement. While we are sympathetic to Ms. Plasai’s 

alleged medical condition, we conclude that the Board did not err in its dismissal of 

Ms. Plasai’s appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

2007-3043 4