United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 16-1588

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Haji Azam

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

City of Columbia Heights

Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

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Submitted: November 17, 2016

Filed: July 31, 2017

[Published]

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Before BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and EBINGER, District Judge. 1

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PER CURIAM. 

For approximately six months, Defendant–Appellee City ofColumbia Heights,

Minnesota (the City), directed its police officers to investigate and strictly sanction

The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for

1

the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
Plaintiff–Appellant Haji Azam, the owner and landlord of several historically

unmanageable rental properties, for violating the City’s municipal code. These

enforcement efforts included entering Azam’s rental buildings, without consent or a

warrant, to look for municipal-code violations and citing Azam for all violations

discovered. Based in part on these violations, the City revoked the rental licenses

authorizing Azam to rent units to tenants. Azam filed an action against the City for

its conduct, alleging, among other claims, the City violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by

subjecting Azam to the deprivation of his rights, privileges, or immunities under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The City filed

a motion for summary judgment, and the district court granted the City summary 2

judgment on all of Azam’s claims.

Azam appeals only the court’s ruling granting summary judgment on Azam’s

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Thus, there are two issues on appeal. First,

whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the City—by

subjecting Azam to the increased enforcement efforts described in greater detail

below—violated Azam’s substantive-due-process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Second, whether there is a genuine dispute of materialfact asto whether

the City—in entering the rental buildings’ common areas, without consent or a

warrant, to look for municipal-code violations—violated Azam’s Fourth Amendment

right to be free from unreasonable governmental searches.

For the following reasons, we affirm the district court. We conclude Azam did

not demonstrate, as a matter of law, the City violated his substantive-due-process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The City’s conduct did not overcome the

high standard required for a substantive-due-process claim—that is, its conduct was

not arbitrary, oppressive, and shocking to the conscience. Also, in viewing the alleged

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District 2

of Minnesota.

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facts in the light most favorable to Azam (as we must do), we conclude there is no

genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the City violated Azam’s Fourth

Amendment rights. Azam did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

common spaces entered by the City’s police officers. Any argument that the police

officers may have physically intruded on constitutionally protected areas by

trespassing in Azam’s buildings to search for incriminating evidence was waived. We

address each claim in turn.

I. Background

We recount the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See

Myers v. Lutsen Mountains Corp., 587 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2009).

From September 2013 to January 2014, the City directed its police officers to

conduct weekly investigations of Azam’s rental buildings. The police officers

allegedly entered Azam’s buildings (even if they were locked), looked for violations

of the City’s municipal ordinances, and cited Azam for any violations they found.

Through these investigations, the City cited Azam numerous times for municipalcode violations, far more frequently than it did for other rental-property ownersin the

city. Based on these citations and the recurring, significant problems at Azam’s

properties, the City revoked Azam’s rental licenses.

During the relevant time period, Azam owned five apartment buildings in

Columbia Heights, Minnesota. These apartment buildings included one 4-unit

building on Pierce Street, two 7-unit buildings on Tyler Street, and two 11-unit

buildings on University Avenue. To lease the units in his buildings to tenants, Azam

acquired and maintained a rental license for each building, as was required by the

Columbia Heights municipal code. See Columbia Heights, Minn., Property

Maintenance Code (Property Code) § 5A.401(A). 

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According to the City, Azam’s rental properties experienced “an inordinate

amount of crime and calls for service” beginning in 2009. In an e-mail dated May 23,

2009, Columbia Heights Police Chief Scott Nadeau notified Police Sergeant Matt

Markham of the City’s complaints regarding Azam’s rental properties. Chief Nadeau

commented that one of Azam’s Tyler Street properties “looks like it continues to be

a problem” and that the City should “start to try and document the insanity on that

property and in the neighborhood for when (not if) we try to pull the license.” From

2009 to 2013, Azam and City officials communicated regarding issues with his

properties in person at least twenty-two times and via phone, e-mail, and letter

numerous other times. According to Columbia Heights Police Captain Lenny Austin,

Azam failed to address the problems at his rental properties and the City “ha[d] not

had other rental properties that ha[d] risen to the level of callsfor service and criminal

activity compared to [Azam’s] properties.”

The Columbia Heights municipal code grants the City various powers to deal

with properties, including rental properties, that violate the City’s housing, nuisance,

and safety ordinances. For example, the Columbia Heights City Council may revoke

a rental license when it determines the rental property does not comply with the

Property Code. Property Code § 5A.408(A)–(B). Also, when two or more rental

licenses of the same property owner have been revoked, the property owner is

ineligible to hold a Columbia Heights rental license for a period of five years, and

thus, any rental license the property owner holds is revoked. Id. § 5A.408(E). The

City also may impose a “nuisance call” fee when the City responds to three or more

nuisance callsregarding the same propertywithin one year. Columbia Heights, Minn.,

Public Health and Safety Code (Safety Code) § 8.804(a). Finally, although not

established in the Columbia Heights municipal code, the City sometimes enters into

a “mitigation plan” with an owner of a rental property experiencing significant

criminal activity. Through a mitigation plan, the City recommends certain actions

intended to alleviate those issues.

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Azam and the City entered into mitigation plans in 2009 for Azam’s Tyler

Street properties and in 2010 for his University Avenue properties. Azam

implemented the mitigation plans’ recommendations. According to Captain Austin,

other rental-property owners who had implemented mitigation plans both lowered the

levels of criminal activity at their properties and maintained those lower levels. But

with Azam’s properties, Captain Austin stated, the mitigation plans helped lower the

amount of criminal activity only initially, before it again increased.

On September 18, 2013, Captain Austin sent a memorandum to the City’s

police officers, notifying them of additional efforts to address problems at Azam’s

buildings. Captain Austin directed the police officersto investigate the buildings each

week and look for municipal-code violations involving “security, safety and health

issues.” Captain Austin later told the officers that if they were unable to enter the

buildings, they should use the buildings’ emergency fire keys to unlock the exterior

doors and enter. The City did not obtain a warrant to search the properties, nor does

it assert it had consent to enter Azam’s buildings or conduct the investigations.

Although the City’s police department conducted this type of investigation at other

properties in the past, the police department had not done so on a weekly basis. The

police department conducted its investigations of Azam’s buildings on a weekly

basis, Captain Austin explained, because no other propertyhad experienced “the level

of calls for service and criminal activity compared to [Azam’s] properties.” Captain

Austin also stated rental-property investigations were customarily handled by the fire

department, rather than the police department.3

From September 15, 2013, through December 22, 2013, the City’s police

officers cited Azam ten times for a total of thirteen violations associated with his

The Property Code provides: “The City Manager and his designated agents 3

shall be the Property Maintenance Enforcement Officer who shall administer and

enforce the provisions of the chapter.” Property Code § 5A.301.

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rental properties. Azam received seven violations for failing to have compliant 3

security doors, two violations for failing to secure laundry-room doors, three

violations for failing to have smoke detectors, and one violation for failing to

promptly remove snow accumulation. Three of the citations, though it is unclear

which, occurred while fire- or police-department personnel were in Azam’s buildings

for emergency or unrelated calls. It appears some of the violations—such as the

violation for failing to remove snow—did not require entry into the interior of the

property. Azam also paid the City for numerous nuisance-call fees.

In January 2014, the City’s fire and police chiefs sent Azam a letter notifying

him the City Council would meet on March 24, 2014, to discuss the problems at his

properties. They also informed Azam they would advise the City Council not to

renew his rental licenses for his University Avenue properties.

The hearing regarding Azam’s University Avenue properties commenced on

March 24, 2014, asscheduled. TheCity’s staff recommended revoking Azam’s rental

licenses for these properties “due to a disproportionate amount of police calls,

criminal activity and nuisance violations at Azam’s properties.” At the end of the

hearing, the City Council revoked Azam’s rental licenses for his University Avenue

properties. The day after the hearing, Captain Austin sent the City’s police officers

a memorandum cancelling the weekly investigations of Azam’s rental properties. 

On April 17, 2014, Azam sold his University Avenue and Tyler Street

properties.

Despite the fact Azam had sold his Tyler Street properties, the City Council

held a hearing regarding those properties and Azam’s Pierce Street property on April

28, 2014. The City’s staff recommended revoking Azam’s rental licenses for these

A Minnesota state court dismissed all of the citations.

3

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properties. At the end of the hearing, the City Council revoked Azam’s rental licenses

for the Tyler Street properties. The City Council then revoked Azam’s remaining

rental license—for his Pierce Street property—pursuant to Property Code section

5A.408(E), because the City Council had revoked at least two of Azam’s rental

licenses and, therefore, he was not eligible to hold a Columbia Heights rental license

for five years. According to the lower court’s findings, Azam’s rental licenses appear

to be the only rental licenses the City Council revoked based upon a “‘[p]ersistent

[and] disproportionate number of police calls, criminal activity,’ and generically titled

‘housing code violations.’”

On June 13, 2014, Azam sold his Pierce Street property. He no longer owns

any property in Columbia Heights, Minnesota.

On March 24, 2014 (the same day as the first City Council hearing on Azam’s

properties), Azam filed a complaint against the City. Azam alleged the City had

violated: 1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by infringing his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights; and 2) the Fair Housing Act and various federal statutes, by infringing his

rights to be free from unlawful discrimination. Azam also requested declaratory

judgment and injunctive relief. The City filed a motion for summary judgment on all

claims, which Azam resisted. The district court concluded there was no genuine

dispute of material fact and Azam failed to produce evidence showing, as a matter of

law, the City: 1) subjected Azam to unlawful discrimination in violation of the Fair

Housing Act and the other federal statutes; 2) invaded a constitutionally protected

area or an area where Azam held a reasonable expectation of privacy in violation of

the Fourth Amendment; or 3) violated Azam’s substantive-due-process rights in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court also denied Azam’s

request for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. 

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Azam timely filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, Azam challenges only the

district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the City on Azam’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Standards of Review

When considering a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden to make this showing. Id. In considering

the sufficiency of the record, we view it “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Myers, 587 F.3d at 893.

III. Discussion

Azam appeals two rulings from the district court’s order. First, Azam

challengesthe district court’s ruling granting the City summary judgment on Azam’s

claim the City violated his substantive-due-process rights through its increased

enforcement efforts against Azam for municipal-code violations. Second, Azam

appeals the district court’s ruling granting the City summary judgment on Azam’s

claim the City violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering the common areas

of his rental properties without a warrant to look for municipal-code violations.

Azam’s claims for alleged constitutional violations are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

which establishes a cause of action against a person who, under color of law, 4

The Supreme Court has held, “Local governing bodies,” including

4

municipalities, “can be sued directly under § 1983 . . . where . . . the action that is

alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

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“subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws.”

A. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Azam claims the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when it,

“under color of law, engaged in a pattern of arbitrary and oppressive police behavior

targeting his properties and holding him liable without notice for the acts of his

tenants with the intent to force him out of business.” Azam argues the district court

erred in dismissing his Fourteenth Amendment claim because a “reasonable jury

could conclude . . . [the City] acted with deliberate indifference to Mr. Azam’s rights,

in a way that was arbitrary and oppressive and shocks the conscience, and that it

should be held liable for its actions.” We must determine whether the district court

properly granted summary judgment on this claim.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized the high burden facing a person who

claims a violation of his or her Fourteenth Amendment rights. To demonstrate the

government violated a person’s substantive-due-process rights, the claimant must

show evidence of “a constitutionally protected property interest and that

[governmental] officials used their power in such an arbitrary and oppressive way that

it ‘shocks the conscience.’” Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 991 (8th 5

Cir. 2001) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998)). In

doing so, the claimant must show “more than that the government decision was

Azam contends the City “never challenged—and the court below never

5

held—[Azam] does not have a constitutionally protected interest in the use of his

properties and the rental licenses for the apartment buildings he owned.” The City

does not dispute this assertion. We therefore assume Azam had a constitutionally

protected property interest.

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arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law.” Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of

Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992). Rather, the allegations must

demonstrate, in part, a “truly irrational” governmental action, such as “attempting to

apply a zoning ordinance only to persons whose names begin with a letter in the first

half of the alphabet.” Id. “The government action must be arbitrary in the

constitutional sense.” Rozman v. City of Columbia Heights, 268 F.3d 588, 593 (8th

Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129

(1992)). “[T]he theory of substantive due process,” we have noted, “is properly

reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases.” Chesterfield Dev. Corp., 963

F.2d at 1105. Such a case must be so abusive as to be “offensive to human dignity.”

See New v. City of Minneapolis, 792 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1986).

This Court’s opinion in Gallagher v. Magner is instructive. 619 F.3d 823 (8th

Cir. 2010). In Gallagher, the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, increased its enforcement

efforts on certain categories of housing. Id. at 829. The city targeted all rental

properties because a city official overseeing housing-code enforcement “favored

owner-occupied housing over rental housing ‘for the sake of the neighborhood.’” Id.

These enforcement effortsincluded “sweep[ing]” rental properties to find and cite for

housing-code violations, citing every violation officials could find at not only rental

properties reported to officials but also all nearby rental properties, and requiring

numerous rental-property owners to undertake expensive renovations of their rental

properties. Id. at 829–30. This Court held, “In light of the uncontested legitimate

goals of enforcing the Housing Code, there is insufficient evidence to reasonably

conclude that this is a ‘truly egregious and extraordinary’ example of government

regulation.” Id. at 840.

Our opinion in Rozman v. City of Columbia Heights also guides our analysis.

268 F.3d 588. In Rozman, the city of Columbia Heights, Minnesota, revoked a

landlord’s rental licenses after he refused to schedule city inspections of his rental

units. Id. at 590. The en banc court held that, even assuming the City had

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misinterpreted the municipal code when revoking the landlord’s rental licenses:

“While the action of the City towards [the landlord] . . . may not have complied with

the provisions of the law as it may ultimately be interpreted, that action certainly did

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation of substantive due process.” Id. at

593.

Here,Azamclaims the City violated his substantive-due-process rights through

its “pattern of arbitrary and oppressive police behavior targeting his properties and

holding him liable without notice for the acts of his tenants with the intent to force

him out of business—eventually succeeding.” In support of this claim, Azam

advances four arguments: 1) the nuisance-call fees were imposed in an arbitrary

manner; 2) the City’s increased enforcement efforts were an oppressive use of its

police power; 3) the City showed deliberate indifference to Azam’s rights; and 4) the

City’s actions shock the conscience. We disagree with these contentions. We

conclude Azam has failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, the City engaged in

arbitrary, oppressive conduct that shocks the conscience.

First, the City did not impose its nuisance-call fees in an arbitrary manner. In

support ofthis claim, Azamcontendsthe City “arbitrarily cho[se] to treat all buildings

the same, whether single-family dwellings or Mr. Azam’s 11-family apartment

buildings” and it “h[eld] Mr. Azam responsible, not only for the actions of his tenants

on his property, but the actions of his tenants when not at Azam’s rental properties,

or even the actions of non-residents on his property.” The municipal ordinance

establishing nuisance-call fees expressly declares the purpose of such fees is to

“protect the public safety, health and welfare and to prevent and abate repeat service

response calls by the city to the same property or location for nuisance service

calls . . . which prevent police or public safety services to other residents of the

city . . . [and] that generate[] extraordinary costs to the city.” Safety Code § 8.801

(emphasis added). By imposing these fees, the City seeks to forgo City officials from

having to repeatedly respond to troublesome properties—regardless of the number of

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units—to address nuisance violations. By imposing these fees, the City was not acting

in an arbitrary manner.

Second, the City’s increased enforcement efforts against Azam were not an

oppressive use of its police power. Azam claims the City intended to and succeeded

in revoking his rental licenses through its enforcement efforts. But the record reflects

approximately four years of housing and safety problems at Azam’s rental properties,

and efforts by the City to remedy these problems. The City alleges it increased its

enforcement efforts at Azam’s rental properties because of the persistent,

disproportionate housing- and safety-code problems at the properties. The City’s

enforcement efforts against Azam were, as the City asserts, “for the legitimate

purpose of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of residential tenants.” For

example, the City pointsto an incident where a handgun wasrecovered from a baby’s

crib as an incident leading “the City to believe more effective measures were

necessary to protect citizens living in Azam’s buildings.” In support of his argument,

Azamhighlightsthe fact that the City’s police officers discontinued their enforcement

efforts at Azam’s rental properties after he sold the rental properties. This, too, the

City explained, stating it “stop[ped] the walkthroughs to provide the new owner an

opportunity to improve conditions at the apartment complexes without additional

enforcement measures.” Even accepting Azam’s assertion the City intended to revoke

his rental licenses, the City’s actions were not an oppressive use of its police power.

Third, Azam has failed to show the City acted with deliberate indifference to

Azam’s constitutional rights. In support of this claim, Azam asserts many of the same

arguments discussed above. This claim fails for the same reasons—the City did not

act in an arbitrary, oppressive manner. Additionally, although a municipality can be

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to adequately train its police officers “where

the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with

whom the police come into contact,” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388

(1989), there is no evidence of such a violation here.

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Fourth, Azam’s claimdoes not overcome the high standard required for the last

element of a substantive-due-process claim—i.e., that the City’s actions shock the

conscience. It does not shock the conscience that the City increased its enforcement

efforts at properties with persistent, significant criminal conduct, nuisance violations,

and Property Code violations; that the City issued nuisance-call fees to Azam after

repeatedly responding to his rental properties for nuisance calls; or that the City cited

Azam for nuisance violations by his tenants or by non-residents at the rental

properties. Simply put, the City’s actions do not shock the conscience.

The government, by oppressively and arbitrarily imposing its police power on

a person, can violate that person’s substantive-due-process rights. See Rochin v.

California, 342 U.S. 165, 209–10 (1952). But the City’s use of its powersto deal with

historically unmanageable properties—even in the manner Azam alleges—does not

rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. We therefore affirmthe district

court’s ruling granting the City summary judgment on Azam’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim.

B. Fourth Amendment Claim

Azam contends the district court erred in dismissing his Fourth Amendment

claim. The district court held the City did not, as a matter of law, violate Azam’s

Fourth Amendment rights, concluding Azam did not have a reasonable expectation

of privacy in the rental properties’ common areas and the City did not intrude on a

constitutionally protected area. The question now before the Court is whether there

is a genuine dispute of material fact asto whether Azam had a reasonable expectation

of privacy that was violated.6

The Supreme Court has also expounded a property-rights paradigm for

6

analyzing whether a Fourth Amendment search occurred. The property-rights

paradigm islargely based on the “trespass test.” Under thistest, a Fourth Amendment

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The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. It provides, in pertinent

part: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” Id. It

is well established the Fourth Amendment protects a person in his home and place 7

of business. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (concluding,

based on the Fourth Amendment’s history, “it is untenable that the ban on warrantless

searches was not intended to shield places of business as well as of residence”); G.M.

Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) (“The respondents do not

contend that business premises are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Such a

proposition could not be defended in light of this Court’s clear holdings to the

contrary.”); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967) (“We hold only that the

basic component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment—that it not be

enforced without a suitable warrant procedure—is applicable in this context, as in

search occurs when the government trespassers or “physically intrud[es] on a

constitutionally protected area.” Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370

(2015) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)).

The district court noted: “The parties did not discuss whether the search intruded on

a constitutionally protected area under” Jones, thus “Azam must rely on the

reasonable expectation of privacy standard.” Because Azam does not put forth any

argument challenging this determination, he has waived appellate review of his

Fourth Amendment claim under the property-rights paradigm. See Chay-Velasquez

v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004).

Azam concedes he never lived in any of the rental properties at issue here. We

7

therefore conclude Azam is not entitled to the Fourth Amendment protections

afforded a person in his or her home. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414

(2013) (“At the [Fourth] Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands‘the right of a man to retreat

into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”

(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).

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others, to business as well asto residential premises.”);see also Michigan v. Clifford,

464 U.S. 287, 291–92 (1984) (“Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases,

the nonconsensual entry and search of property is governed by the warrant

requirement ofthe Fourth . . . Amendment[].” (footnote omitted)); Donovan v. Dewey,

452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against

unreasonable searches applies to administrative inspections of private commercial

property.”).

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as proscribing

unreasonable searchesthat intrude upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000); see United States v. Jones, 565

U.S. 400, 406 (2012); see also United States v. DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d 426, 431 (8th Cir.

2016). Under this test, a party asserting a violation of his or her reasonable

expectation of privacy must show both: 1) “an actual (subjective) expectation of

privacy,” and 2) “that the expectation [is] one thatsociety is prepared to recognize as

‘reasonable.’” DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431 (alteration in original) (quoting Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); accord Bond, 529

U.S. at 338. Based on the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, this Court held a

resident of an apartment building did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in

the common areas, including the hallways, of the building. United States v. Eisler,

567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632,

634–35 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation

of privacy in his storage locker, kept in the basement of his apartment building, that

was accessible to the building’s residents and landlord). Our sister circuits similarly

held, under analogous fact patterns, that no such reasonable expectation of privacy

existed. See, e.g., United States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2011);

United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767–69 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.

Dillard, 438 F.3d 675, 682–83 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.

App’x 915, 922–23 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Miravalles, 280 F.3d 1328,

1331–33 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32–33 (1st Cir.

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1998); United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 1993); United States

v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14–15 (2d Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds

by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).

This Court has not had occasion to determine whether an owner or landlord of

a multi-unit dwelling has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common

areas—including the interior hallways and laundry rooms—of the dwelling. We

conclude Azamdid not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas

of his rental buildings because he did not maintain a subjective expectation of privacy

regarding information in these areas, nor would any such expectation have been

objectively reasonable.

First, Azam did not demonstrate he had a subjective expectation of privacy

regarding information within the common areas of his rental buildings. Although

Azam owned the rental buildings, he has not posited sufficient facts to demonstrate

he had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the common areas of his

buildings. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 & n.4 (1986)

(discussing the alleged facts purportedly evincing a subjective expectation of

privacy); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–12 (1986) (same). The common

areas to these rental buildings were behind doors with locks. But Azam does not

assert he used the locked doors to safeguard certain intimate information from “the

intruding eye . . . [or] the uninvited ear.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 352; cf. McGrane, 746

F.2d at 634–35. Azamtherefore has not demonstrated he had a subjective expectation

of privacy.

Second, even assuming Azamhad a subjective expectation of privacyregarding

information exposed in the common areas of his rental properties, that expectation of

privacy would not have been objectively reasonable. The common areas in each rental

building were accessible and available to that building’s residents, the residents’

guests, any of Azam’s agents, and others legally passing through with an express or

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implicit license (e.g., canvassers, solicitors, mail-carriers, and more). See Florida v.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013). Therefore, any subjective expectation of

privacy regarding information in the common areas that Azam sought to keep

private—relevant here, evidence ofmunicipal-code violations—would not have been

objectively reasonable. Society would not be willing to endorse as objectively

reasonable Azam’s purported privacy interest in the rental buildings’ common areas,

high-traffic areas that, based on the record, Azam did little to protect or oversee. This

Court already concluded a tenant of an apartment building did not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the common areas of the building. See, e.g., McGrane, 746

F.2d at 634–35; Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816. We similarly conclude any subjective

expectation Azam could have demonstrated would not have been objectively

reasonable.

The judgment is affirmed.

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