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THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: TIME FOR 

REFORM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

OF THE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 8, 2009 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Professional Staff Member 

ELYSE F. GREENWALD, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

AMANDA WOOD, Minority Director for Governmental Affairs 

DEVIN F. O’BRIEN, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 


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(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 4 

Senator Burris .................................................................................................. 15 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 26 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 28 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 33 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 35 

Senator Burris .................................................................................................. 36 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 37 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 8, 2009 

Mark L. Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 4 

Gary W. Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .............. 18 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Goldstein, Mark L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39 

Schenkel, Gary W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 58 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Goldstein .................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Schenkel ..................................................................................................... 72 


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(1) 

THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: TIME 

FOR REFORM 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 8, 2009 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD– 

342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, McCaskill, Burris, Collins, 

and Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. The hearing will come to 

order. Thanks to everyone for being here. 

The Federal Protective Service is the agency responsible for safeguarding 9,000 Federal buildings, the hundreds of thousands of 

Federal employees who work in them, and millions of people who 

come in and out of those buildings every year in cities all across 

America. 

Two years ago, Senator Collins, Senator Akaka, Senator 

Voinovich, and I asked the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) to tell us how the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is doing 

its job. The answer GAO gives us today is simply that FPS is not 

doing its job. Most jarring, we will hear today that GAO investigators were able to smuggle liquid bomb-making materials into all of 

the Federal buildings they tested—that was 10—all of them—past 

apparently unsuspecting guards who did not possess the equipment 

to detect it, how they were then able to build real bombs in those 

10 cases in restrooms, and then move throughout the buildings unbeknownst to the guards. 

GAO produced its first response to our request for an investigation of FPS last June, a broad analysis that concluded FPS lacked 

adequate financial and management practices, severely hampering 

its overall mission to keep Federal buildings and employees working within them safe. 

GAO’s second report, this time specifically on the management of 

FPS’s private contractor guard staff, is actually due later this summer. But preliminary conclusions which the Committee received 

and which are being released today were so disturbing to us that 

we decided to air them immediately to accelerate and intensify the 

work of turning the Federal Protective Service agency around. 


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In short, GAO has found that the Federal Protective Service is 

not doing anywhere near enough to make sure that its 13,000 private contract guards, the first line of defense at Federal buildings, 

are qualified and trained for their jobs or are actually doing what 

they were hired to do. FPS contract guards are required to have 

more than 60 hours of training, including training on how to operate metal detectors and X-ray equipment, pretty basic stuff for a 

guard. GAO found that in many cases, guards received no X-ray or 

metal detector training at all. 

The Federal Protective Service also requires guards to maintain 

certain certifications, for example, in cardiopulmonary resuscitation 

(CPR), first aid, firearms, and to provide proof that they have not 

been convicted of domestic violence. But GAO found that 73 percent of FPS contract guards lacked valid certifications in one or 

more of these critical areas. 

The GAO report describes how, after new guards were hired, the 

Federal Protective Service did little to ensure that they complied 

with relevant rules and regulations. For example, FPS did not conduct inspections of guard posts after regular hours, but GAO did 

and discovered guards taking prescription medication while on 

duty and sleeping on an overnight shift. 

In one truly unbelievable case, an inattentive guard allowed a 

baby to pass through an X-ray machine conveyor belt. That guard 

was fired, but he ultimately won a lawsuit against the Federal Protective Service agency because the agency couldn’t document that 

he had received the required training. 

The most shocking affirmation of these troubling findings was 

when GAO investigators were able to smuggle that liquid bombmaking material into 10 high-security Federal buildings around the 

country—10 of 10 tested—all without detection. 

As we approach the eighth anniversary of September 11, 2001, 

and 14 years after the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, it really is outrageously unacceptable that the Federal 

employees working within our Federal buildings and the citizens 

who pass through them are still apparently so utterly exposed to 

potential attack by terrorists or other violent people. 

The fact is that the Federal Protective Service agency has suffered serious budget shortfalls in recent years which forced it to 

limit hiring, training, and overtime and to delay equipment purchases, all of which no doubt contributed to GAO’s findings, but 

frankly don’t explain them or excuse them. 

I know the agency has begun making initial adjustments to close 

the vulnerabilities GAO has documented, but it has a long way to 

go and its leadership and the leadership of the Department of 

Homeland Security in which FPS is located must get there quickly. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you mentioned, 

the Federal Protective Service is a key component of our Nation’s 

security. Every day, FPS officers and the agency’s contract security 

guards protect nearly 9,000 Federal facilities, the people who work 

in them, and the visitors who come to them to access vital government services. Unfortunately, the GAO’s investigation, as well as 


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the recent report by the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General, reveal alarming deficiencies in the Service’s protective operations. 

Indeed, the GAO’s investigation exposed major security failings 

at every single one of the 10 Federal office buildings that it tested. 

At each one of these facilities, GAO investigators were able to enter 

the building with concealed components for a bomb, pass undetected through checkpoints monitored by FPS guards, and proceed 

to assemble these explosive devices. I share the Chairman’s concern that in each case, the GAO was able to carry this penetration 

out. In this post-September 11, 2001, world that we are now living 

in, I cannot fathom how security breaches of this magnitude were 

allowed to occur. 

The GAO also indicates that the FPS has failed to maintain effective oversight of its contract security guards. The GAO has indicated that in various regions, the contract guards had expired certifications, including very basic certifications for weapons, baton 

training, and CPR. We know from previous GAO reports that the 

FPS no longer proactively or routinely patrols Federal facilities to 

detect and prevent criminal and terrorism activities. FPS has also 

reduced hours of operation in many locations and has experienced 

difficulties maintaining security equipment, such as cameras, X-ray 

machines, and magnetometers. 

As a result, government buildings, the Federal employees who 

work in them, and the public who visit them are at risk. We taxpayers are simply not receiving the security we pay for and should 

expect FPS to provide. 

Symptomatic of these challenges, in the State of Maine, a large 

State, there are only two FPS inspectors to cover security at the 

Federal courts and to conduct the necessary inspections at the 24 

ports of entry along the border. It is more than 300 miles from the 

Federal Courthouse in Portland, Maine, to the port of entry in Fort 

Kent, nearly 6 hours in driving time. With so few inspectors, FPS 

lacks the capacity to effectively respond to incidents at the thousands of facilities they are responsible for securing nationwide. 

To address these staffing concerns, last year, I joined then-Senator Hillary Clinton and our Chairman, Senator Lieberman, in 

sponsoring an amendment to increase the number of FPS employees. The need for these trained staff has never been more apparent. 

GAO’s testimony reinforces the findings of an April report by the 

Inspector General (IG). From solicitation and award to contract 

management, the IG found critical failings in the FPS contract 

guard program. The contract guard sleeping at his post that GAO 

found illustrates the problems and the dangers. These findings 

raise a basic question that this Committee has wrestled with before: Should private security contractors be responsible for protecting our Federal facilities? Has the government become overly 

dependent on contractors to guard Federal buildings? 

As we look to improve the Federal Protective Service, we should 

try to strike a better balance between the number of government 

employees and contractors performing this vital protective mission. 

When we do rely on private security contractors, it is imperative 

that the FPS have a sufficient number of well-trained staff to manage these contracts effectively. 


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1The prepared statement of Mr. Goldstein appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

The recommendations of the Inspector General include many 

concrete steps to improve the award of guard contracts and to increase the training and inspections necessary to strengthen their 

performance. As the Chairman indicated, there are so many examples of insufficient training. There are examples where there was 

no training for 5 years in the use of magnetometers and the X-ray 

machines, although, Mr. Chairman, I must say that I don’t think 

it is a matter of training for a guard to realize that a baby should 

not be allowed to go through an X-ray machine. That, to me, shows 

that there are fundamental problems with the system. 

The FPS must take immediate action to adopt the recommendations to pay more attention to GAO’s findings and to remedy these 

serious and startling security failures. Congress, too, should move 

forward with additional measures to help protect these facilities, 

our Federal employees, and the American public, and I look forward to working with the Chairman to accomplish that goal. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Voinovich, because you participated with us in requesting this investigation, would you like to make an opening statement at this time? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. I think the two of you have covered the waterfront. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. Thanks for 

your partnership in this. 

The Senate will begin voting on two amendments around 11 

a.m., so we thought we would ask Mr. Goldstein to testify and then 

we will go through questions. Hopefully, we will get that done before then and then we will go to Mr. Schenkel. 

Mr. Goldstein is Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues for the 

Government Accountability Office. Thank you for your work and we 

welcome your testimony at this time. 

TESTIMONY OF MARK L. GOLDSTEIN,1 DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you very much. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Senator Voinovich. We are pleased to be 

here today to discuss the preliminary findings of our review of the 

Federal Protective Service’s contract security guard program. 

There has not been a large-scale attack on a domestic Federal facility since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 

1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. 

Nevertheless, the recent shooting death of the guard at the U.S. 

Holocaust Museum, though not a Federal facility, demonstrates the 

continued vulnerability of public buildings to domestic terrorist attack. 

Thus, one of the Federal Protective Service’s most critical responsibilities is to effectively manage its guard program so that the 

over one million government employees as well as members of the 


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public who work in and visit the 9,000 Federal facilities each year 

are protected. 

To accomplish its mission of protecting Federal facilities, FPS 

currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,200 full-time 

employees, and about 13,000 guards deployed at approximately 

2,300 of the 9,000 Federal facilities across the country. While FPS 

does not use guards at the remaining 6,700 facilities under its protection, it frequently uses other security countermeasures, such as 

cameras and perimeter lighting, to help protect these facilities. 

In our June 2008 report, we found that FPS faced significant 

challenges in ensuring the quality and timeliness of its building security assessments and in maintaining complete crime statistics. 

We also reported that its risk assessment process was partially 

flawed. FPS uses these tools to determine how to protect Federal 

facilities. 

As of June 2009, FPS’s guard program has cost about $613 million and represents the single largest item in its budget. It is the 

most visible component of FPS’s operations as well as the first public contact when entering a Federal facility. 

In June 2008, we reported that FPS faced several funding and 

operational challenges, including oversight of its guard program, 

that hamper its ability to accomplish its mission of protecting Federal facilities and ensuring the safety of the occupants. We recommended, among other things, that FPS develop and implement 

a strategic approach to better manage its staffing resources, evaluate current and alternative funding mechanisms, and develop appropriate measures to assess performance. To date, FPS has not 

fully implemented these recommendations. 

My testimony today is based on preliminary findings of our ongoing work and addresses. One, the extent to which FPS ensures that 

its guards have the required training and certifications before 

being deployed to a Federal facility; two, the extent to which FPS 

ensures that its guards comply with post orders once they are deployed at Federal facilities; and three, security vulnerabilities we 

identified related to the FPS guard program. 

The summary of my findings are as follows: One, FPS does not 

fully ensure that its guards have the training and certifications required to stand post at Federal facilities. While FPS requires that 

all prospective guards complete about 128 hours of training, including 8 hours of X-ray and magnetometer training, FPS was not providing some of its guards with all of the required training in the 

six regions we visited. For example, in one region, FPS has not provided the required X-ray or magnetometer training to its 1,500 

guards since 2004. 

X-ray training is critical because guards are primarily responsible for using this equipment to monitor and control access points 

at Federal facilities. Insufficient X-ray and magnetometer training 

may have contributed to several incidents in Federal facilities 

where the guards were negligent in carrying out their responsibilities. For example, at a Level IV facility in a major city, an infant 

in a carrier was sent through an X-ray machine when a guard had 

disabled the machine’s safety features and was not paying attention to post duties. FPS fired the guard, who then sued FPS for not 

providing him with the required training. The guard won the suit 


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because FPS could not produce any documentation to show that the 

guard had received the training. In recent discussions, FPS officials 

from that region could not even tell us whether the X-ray machine’s safety features had been repaired. 

We also found that FPS’s primary system, Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System (CERTS), for monitoring 

and verifying whether guards have the training and certification 

required to stand post is not fully reliable. We reviewed training 

and certification data for 663 randomly selected guards in six of 

FPS’s regions and found that because it was not reliable, that we 

also had to use databases maintained by the regions or information 

provided by contractors. We found that 62 percent, or 411 of the 

663 guards who were deployed at a Federal facility had at least one 

expired firearm qualification, background investigation, domestic 

violence declaration, or CPR or first aid training certification that 

was missing. 

More specifically, according to the most recent information from 

one contractor, we found that over 75 percent of the 354 guards at 

a Level IV facility had expired certifications. Based on the contractor information for a third contract, we also found that almost 

40 percent of the 191 guards at that Level IV facility had expired 

domestic violence declarations. Without a domestic violence declaration in place, guards are not permitted to carry a firearm, and 

FPS, of course, does require guards to carry firearms. 

In addition, one of FPS’s contractors allegedly falsified training 

records for its guards, an incident that is currently being litigated. 

FPS became aware of this alleged violation from an employee of the 

contractor, not from its own internal control procedures. 

Our second major finding is that FPS has limited assurance that 

its guards are complying with post orders once they are deployed 

to a Federal facility. FPS does not have specific national guidance 

on when and how guard inspections should be performed. The frequency with which FPS inspects these posts also varied across the 

regions. For example, one region we visited required inspectors to 

complete five guard inspections each month while another region 

did not have any inspection requirements at all. 

We also found that the inspections are typically completed during 

routine business hours and in metropolitan cities where FPS has 

a field office, seldom at night or on weekends. On occasions when 

FPS has conducted post inspections at night, it has often found instances of guards not complying with post orders. For example, at 

a Level IV facility, an armed guard was found asleep at his post 

after taking the pain killer Percocet. 

Similarly, FPS has also found other incidents at Level IV facilities where guards were not in compliance. While a guard should 

have been standing post, he was caught using government computers to manage a private for-profit adult website. At another facility, a guard had either failed to recognize or did not properly Xray a box containing semi-automatic handguns at the loading dock. 

Our third principal finding is that we identified substantial security violations related to FPS’s guard program. With components 

for an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons, GAO investigators passed undetected through access points 

controlled by FPS guards at 10 Level IV facilities in four major citVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:33 Nov 19, 2010 Jkt 051791 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51791.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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ies where we conducted covert tests. Our investigators used publicly available information to identify a type of device that a terrorist could use to cause damage to a Federal facility and threaten 

the safety of Federal workers and the general public. This IED was 

made with two parts, a liquid explosive and a low-yield detonator, 

and included a variety of materials not typically brought into a 

Federal facility by employees or the public. 

Of the 10 Level IV facilities we penetrated, eight were government-owned, two were leased, and they included offices of a U.S. 

Senator and U.S. Representative as well as agencies such as the 

Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Justice. Once our 

investigators passed the access control point, they assembled the 

IED and walked freely around several floors of the facilities and to 

various Executive and Legislative Branch offices with the device in 

a briefcase. 

In response to the security vulnerabilities we identified during 

our covert testing, FPS has recently taken steps to improve oversight of the guard program. Specifically, it has authorized overtime 

to conduct guard post inspections during non-routine business 

hours and is conducting its own penetration tests to identify weaknesses at access control points. 

FPS has conducted limited intrusion testing in the past and has 

experienced difficulties in executing such tests. For example, in 

2008, one FPS region conducted intrusion tests of a Level IV facility and successfully brought a fake bomb into the building through 

a loading area. During the test, however, FPS agents misplaced the 

box containing the fake bomb. It was picked up by a guard who 

took it to the mailroom for processing. 

In March 2009, FPS also issued a policy directive intended to 

standardize inspection requirements across the regions. Implementing these new requirements may be challenging, according to 

FPS management and some of the regional staff to whom we 

talked. We will be reporting more fully on our findings with potential recommendations in September 2009. 

This concludes my oral statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy 

to answer any questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Goldstein. I must 

say that in all the years I have been hearing GAO reports, that is 

about the broadest indictment of an agency of the Federal Government that I have heard and it is not pleasant to hear it. Obviously, 

we are going to try to work together with the agency—as will you, 

I am sure—to improve its performance. 

Senator Collins and I, along with Senator Voinovich and Senator 

Akaka, will be introducing legislation to reauthorize the Federal 

Protective Service, but also to respond to some of the findings of 

your investigation to try to obviously change what exists now, because it is simply unacceptable. 

The indictment is a series of findings. To the extent that you are 

able today, what would you say the problem is here? How could 

this have been allowed to happen at an agency with such critical 

homeland security responsibilities? Is it a failure of management at 

the top level? Is it a failure of supervision at the regional or building level? Is it simply that we are not demanding enough from the 


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private security firms that we are hiring to protect Federal buildings? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it is all of the things 

you have just mentioned. Through the work that we have done last 

year and this year for this Committee, I think we would be able 

to say that FPS is essentially an agency in crisis. Over the last 5 

years, since its transfer from General Services Administration 

(GSA) to Homeland Security, they have not received the resources 

and the staffing that would be required. In fact, they were on a 

downward path until the amendment that Congress passed last 

year. 

There has been inattention at the highest levels of the Department of Homeland Security to the requirements for protecting Federal facilities. Actions by management over the last couple years to 

try to change and improve things have had some success, but in 

large measure have been difficult to achieve. A lack of resources 

has hampered them in not only having enough staff, but in having 

enough ability to improve the technology components of risk mitigation, as well. 

That, combined with what is a relatively antiquated approach to 

securing Federal buildings through our Federal Building Security 

Committee Management System, where all Federal buildings have 

their own committee and help determine what the security levels 

for those buildings ought to be, has not helped create a structured 

and uniform process. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Why don’t you say a little more? That 

gives us a lot to work on, let us put it that way. Talk a little more 

about the last point you made. Why do the local building committees get in the way of efficient and effective security? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. There are three tiers to how Federal buildings 

are protected. There is an Interagency Security Committee that 

promulgates standards that Federal buildings are supposed to 

abide by, but they are not mandatory. You also then have the Federal Protective Service, which uses some of its own funds as well 

as funds provided by tenant agencies to adopt various countermeasures. But the countermeasures need to be approved by Building Security Committees. Every single Federal building, particularly at the Level IV, which is the highest level of security outside 

of the White House and the Capitol, has a Building Security Committee made up of tenants, and usually the largest tenant of that 

building is the chair of that committee. 

The people who are on that committee, frankly, may be good at 

the jobs they have at the Social Security Administrtion or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or whatever else, but they are lay 

people and do not have security backgrounds. So many of the decisions being made about access control and other kinds of security 

decisions, like the kind of countermeasures that could be adopted 

or the funding that would be provided to adopt them, are being 

made by people who, frankly, ought not be making those kinds of 

decisions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you would say that those standards 

should be set nationally and uniformly applied to all the Federal 

buildings? 


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Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We certainly think it is appropriate for the Federal Protective Service and GSA to sit down and figure out whether 

the approach that has been adopted over the years is still applicable. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me go to another part of your testimony and your findings. I take it you do feel that the cuts in funding for the Federal Protective Service are part of the problem here, 

but by no means the whole problem, that this is an agency in crisis. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct, Senator. A lot of the management issues have nothing to do with level of resources per se. Not 

having national guidance and standards for when and how to inspect guards, not having better standards for knowing when 

guards‘ certifications have expired, things like that are not resource-based, in our opinion. I think there has been a lack of attention to this part of the protective requirements of Federal buildings. 

One of the reasons over the years is the Federal Protective Service has also been pulled away from what many perceive as its principal duty, to protect Federal property, to do other kinds of things 

within the Department of Homeland Security—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Such as? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. To work on National Infrastructure Protection 

Plans and that kind of thing. Resource constraints clearly do affect 

the agency. In our last report, we showed that when there were 

major trials in one region that 75 percent of the Federal Protective 

Service workforce was shifted to cover a courthouse and essentially 

left the rest of the region without any protection. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I will say to you that it was our judgment 

in terms of funding—you are right. Last year, we were able to hold 

the Federal Protective Service basically harmless on its funding. 

Our judgment was, based on your ongoing investigation, that 

though resources may be part of the problem, they are not the 

whole problem, and therefore in this budget currently on the floor 

of the Senate, we didn’t push for an increase in funding for the 

Federal Protective Service agency until we solve the management 

problem here. We didn’t want to just throw more money at the 

problem until we had hopefully fixed the agency. 

Let me ask you to talk a little bit more about the failure to police 

the certifications that are required of the guards. I find that very 

troubling, beyond troubling, particularly when you think about expired firearms qualifications and domestic violence problems. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is very troubling, Mr. Chairman. We found in 

examining the system that it is simply a faulty system that FPS 

doesn’t use itself for the most part. And so they end up having to 

try to follow the certification process, because it is FPS at the end 

of the day that is responsible for ensuring that the guards on post 

are qualified to stand there, not the contractors. And so obviously 

those certifications are required for them to do so. 

But the process they use is very paper intensive. You have essentially one person in each region who is responsible for putting information into a system and they are typically very far behind. So 

the system isn’t used and they use their own back-of-the-envelope 

approaches. 


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So when we went to check on the system and found that it 

wasn’t used and isn’t reliable, we then went and pulled files ourselves and then talked to contractors to get the most up-to-date information on individuals, which might not have been—to avoid the 

issue of whether the actual certifications were in place but simply 

hadn’t been recorded, and it turns out that 62 percent of the files 

we looked at had at least one expired certification. 

The problem is, because the system doesn’t work, that in almost 

all cases, FPS relies on the contractor to self-certify at this point 

in time and to simply say that their guards have the certifications, 

when in point of fact they often don’t. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. A final question. I am over my time. Do 

the private security companies have a contractual obligation to certify their employees? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They are required by the State. The States require these certifications to be in place. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So right now, effectively, no one is really 

doing it as comprehensively as it should be done? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. It is far less than comprehensively, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. Senator 

Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Goldstein, I would like to ask you more questions to understand the penetration tests that GAO carried out. First of all, did 

GAO use actual bomb components? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am, we did. We did use actual bomb 

components, but they were at a level that would not actually set 

the bomb off. The concentration was below the trigger point. 

Senator COLLINS. But this isn’t a case where you were smuggling 

in fake bombs. These were actual components for an explosive device? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We brought in all the components that we needed to make a real bomb. 

Senator COLLINS. And are these components readily available? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. They are all available through the 

Internet or through stores. It was under $150 to procure the various components required. 

Senator COLLINS. You see, that information is so disturbing, because it shows how easily a terrorist or a criminal could obtain 

these materials and smuggle them into a building. Is that a fair 

conclusion to reach? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is absolutely correct, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. Are these materials, that are easily mistaken 

for legitimate materials, being brought in by a typical Federal employee? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. One of the concerns we had, Senator, was that 

in a number of the locations, three or four of them, the guards were 

not even looking at the screens that would show the materials 

passing through. So if a guard had been looking, they would have 

seen materials that are ordinarily not brought into a Federal building and should have stopped our investigators and asked, why are 

you bringing these kinds of things into a Federal building? What 

is your purpose? But in really no case did that occur. In only one 


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instance did a guard ask about something that our investigator 

was carrying. A brief explanation. That guard let it go through. 

Senator COLLINS. I bring that information out because it is in 

contrast to the tests that are done by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) periodically at the airport where they will try 

to smuggle through very sophisticated devices that are cleverly concealed. In this case, it sounds to me like GAO did everything but 

put the word ‘‘bomb making materials’’ on the packages that you 

were putting through the X-ray machine. But if no one is looking 

at the screen, it is going to be pretty easy to get materials that are 

clearly suspect through. Is that a fair conclusion? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, Senator, it is. I think if people had been 

paying more attention to the X-ray machines, or if somebody had 

decided to give someone a secondary wanding, or if they had decided to do a random search of someone, they would have found 

these materials. 

Senator COLLINS. How did you choose the facilities? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They were randomly chosen. They were just chosen—our only requirements were that they be a Level IV facility, 

because we wanted to go to the biggest facilities—— 

Senator COLLINS. So that we fully understand this, explain what 

a Level IV facility is. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. There are standards that are just now 

changing. The old Department of Justice standards, which since 

1995, shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing, the Department of 

Justice put out standards that categorized buildings into five levels 

of security, Level I being the lowest, which is a storefront property, 

Level V being buildings like the White House, the Capitol, and 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters. A Level IV building is a building that houses more than 450 Federal employees, has 

major agencies in it that have probably national security or law enforcement responsibilities, and that, might be a likely target. And 

so the security requirements for those buildings are higher than 

they would be for Levels I, II, and III. So we purposely chose Level 

IV buildings. 

Senator COLLINS. For every test? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. For every test, and we purposely chose buildings 

which had agencies like Social Security or IRS in it so that you 

could just go in and didn’t need an appointment. All our investigators did was to show a State driver’s license. They did not show 

government I.D., just regular old identification that any member of 

the public would have to show. 

Senator COLLINS. So you chose facilities that are both bigger facilities, busier facilities where there is going to be a lot of traffic 

in and out. The public will have occasion to visit these facilities. 

There are hundreds of Federal employees working there every day. 

And they are the facilities that have the next to the highest level 

of security, is that accurate? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. And that, too, is disturbing because some Federal offices might be located in a commercial building where the 

Federal office may be the only Federal office there and thus the security may be at a significantly lower level because the building is 

unlikely to be the target of an attack. But that is not what you 


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chose. You chose busy Federal facilities, eight of them Federal 

buildings, two of them leased for Federal space, and with the level 

of security that is second only to the White House and the Capitol, 

the very highest level. And yet in each case, you were able to 

smuggle in actual bomb components and then proceed to assemble 

them, as well? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, Senator. We were able to bring the materials into the building, go to bathrooms—in some cases, bathrooms 

were locked, but Federal employees let us into those bathrooms, 

and then we assembled the materials, usually in under 4 minutes. 

It is a very quick thing to put together. And then we would place 

it in a briefcase and walked around a variety of Federal offices, 

both Legislative and Executive Branch offices in the four cities we 

went to. 

Senator COLLINS. Let me just switch very quickly to the issue of 

the contracts. My reaction was the same as Senator Lieberman’s 

and that is I was wondering why the company that wins the contract isn’t required by the terms of the contract to ensure that all 

of its employees meet all of the certification and training requirements. To your knowledge, is that a contractual requirement? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I am not certain of the answer. I do know that 

FPS has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that people who are 

standing post in a Federal facility have met all the training and 

the certifications required to handle that duty. 

Senator COLLINS. When our staffs looked at these contracts, we 

found that for the most part, they were awarded based on the lowest bid price as opposed to the best value. Best value can help ensure the quality as well as a fair price for the contract. Do you 

think it is a mistake that FPS is using the lowest bidder approach 

as opposed to a best value criteria? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We haven’t looked specifically at that, Senator. 

I think what is more important is for FPS to ensure that in its 

dealings with contractors, they understand that FPS is going to 

take them seriously and has systems in place to be able to ensure 

that these contracts are working as well as they need to be. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. I am going to ask you a series of questions, and if you could keep your answers short, I would appreciate 

it. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Certainly, Senator. 

Senator VOINOVICH. First of all, does FPS today have the capacity to evaluate a building in terms of the location of the building 

and protecting the peripheral area, the technology and the bollards 

type of thing? And then beyond that, do they have the capacity to 

look at a building and ascertain just how much human capital they 

are going to need to secure the place? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. With respect to the building security assessments, we have reported a number of times that there are some 

concerns and challenges with how FPS manages that process. They 

are required to do building security assessments on all the buildings, but in many cases, the individuals are either not fully 

trained—there are too many buildings that have to be done in a 


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certain time period—or there are other duties of the officers that 

get in the way. They are pulled in so many different directions. 

Senator VOINOVICH. In other words, the answer is that they don’t 

have the full capacity to look at a building and ascertain from looking it over the type of human capital they are going to need to secure the building. In other words, I would think that for every 

building, Level IV, for example, you would have a plan, this is 

what we are going to need to secure this building. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I don’t think they do. We have also had concerns 

about their risk assessment process. They don’t have complete 

crime statistics. They don’t, as I mentioned, do everything they 

need to on building security assessments. And their approach to determining a risk assessment process, because it includes the Building Security committees and also doesn’t include having a portfoliowide strategy as opposed to a building-by-building strategy, I think 

gets in the way of effectively and efficiently protecting buildings. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Second, GSA pays for it. Is that a problem? 

In other words, today, for instance, the Capitol Police are out of the 

legislative budget of the U.S. Congress. Now, FPS tenants are 

charged back to GSA. Does that present a problem in terms of 

funding and going forward properly—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Certainly. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Or would they be better off 

being paid for separately? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The tenants actually pay for it out of their—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes, but they are Federal tenants. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure, but it is not GSA so much. It is the tenants. Should it be an appropriation versus a fee-for-service? 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes, that is the question. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have never taken a formal view on that. I 

think there are many reasons that it ought to be done, though, because I do think it does get in the way. 

Senator VOINOVICH. The other question is about contract guards. 

From what I can see, most of these outfits aren’t doing the job that 

they are supposed to be doing. The issue is, it looks to me like they 

don’t have the capacity to determine whether the contract guards 

are doing their work. That is, they don’t have the oversight that 

is necessary to do that. Should we go to what we have here at the 

Capitol with our own police? We have people that work for the Federal Government. Should we farm this out to third parties? I think, 

Senator Collins, you had mentioned the lowest bid. If you get the 

lowest bid, you get the lowest quality. 

I am in one of those buildings. There are hundreds of people in 

there. We put their well-being in the hands of a third-party contractor. Does that make sense? Will we ever be able to get to the 

point where we don’t have the kind of things that you found in 

your investigation by using contractors? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I am not sure that you would ever fully avoid 

those issues, whether it is a contract or a Federal workforce. I 

think whichever kind of workforce is doing that job, they need to 

be much better trained and they need to have gone through the 

kind of background checks and the kind of supervision—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Will that ever happen by hiring private contractors, as we have been doing in the past? 


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Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think it can happen if FPS puts the resources 

to ensuring and overseeing it. When you have many parts of the 

United States where FPS rarely gets to visit the contract workforce 

except for perhaps once a year, I think you are always going to 

have these kinds of problems. But that is indeed the case. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Our best person, and I am going to try and 

find out, has been moved from Cleveland out to Hawaii and I 

would like to know, why are they moving him out? We just don’t 

have the people there to get the job done. It is the same thing all 

over the country. It is just unbelievable to me that this thing has 

gone on for as long as it has. 

The other thing is that they have talked about Risk Assessment 

Management Programs (RAMP). We believe that we need to have 

performance metrics to determine whether people are doing the 

jobs that they are supposed to be doing. This new system is RAMP, 

and now they are saying it won’t be ramped up in 2011. I think 

that is not soon enough, is it? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, we have been concerned about the delays 

in RAMP and we have criticized FPS for not having the kind of 

performance metrics they need to do the job and to be able to put 

together a complete risk assessment approach to the portfolio. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Isn’t there some commercial program that 

they could use that is off the shelf instead of starting from scratch 

and building their own? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have not looked at that, sir. Mr. Schenkel 

may be able to illuminate that. But we have not actually looked at 

the RAMP process itself other than to recognize that there are a 

lot of delays, and in the meantime, things are not getting better. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Let us get back to the contractors again. Do 

you think we would be better off if we got away from hiring contractors and went to our own policing? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Senator, it is a policy decision. I think GAO 

would be uncomfortable making that kind of a recommendation. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you ever think they will have the supervisory people to make sure that we are not getting poor performance from these people? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think they could if they invested the time, the 

resources, and had the right management and staffing structure to 

do it. But it will take a lot more than what they have today. I don’t 

mean specifically in resources, it will take some more resources, 

but it will take a lot more understanding of how to manage a very 

large program. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Is 1,200 people enough? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Probably not, but it is hard to determine how 

many people they need until they have a risk assessment approach 

that allows them to determine how to mitigate risk across the portfolio. Right now, it is budget-driven, it is not risk-driven. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So from what I can see, you would almost 

have to start from scratch. They have to evaluate what they need, 

the number of people and the kind of people, and then if they are 

going to do the contracting out, they are going to have to have people on board that are supervisors to make sure that they don’t get 

the short end on these contracts. 


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Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They need to have the systems and the measures in place that would allow them to determine what their goals 

are, and from those goals, an understanding what the risk is for 

the portfolio to have a human capital model that would help them 

deploy the right resources based on where they have determined 

that the risks ought to be placed. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I am anxious to hear Mr. Schenkel. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. Me, too. 

Senator Burris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Goldstein, I have been around government a long time and 

we have some pretty big buildings in Chicago. I hope that none of 

those tests were done in Chicago. I don’t suppose you can reveal 

where your tests were done, or did you in your testimony reveal 

any of the locations? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. You are right. Unfortunately, I can’t reveal the 

locations in a public meeting, sir. 

Senator BURRIS. OK. But I would like to know privately whether 

or not any of those are in Chicago—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I would be happy to talk to your staff. 

Senator BURRIS [continuing]. Because we have the Sears Tower, 

which is not a Federal building, but is always a target, so that is 

a deep concern. 

Could you confirm for me, Mr. Goldstein, that GAO ran these 

tests and only one of the GAO testers was caught going through 

the detector system with some type of bomb-making materials? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Senator, in all 10 cases, GAO investigators were 

able to get through the metal detectors and the X-ray machines, 

and assemble their bombs. What I was referring to earlier was that 

in only one instance did any guard even ask a question. In all the 

other instances, no one even asked any questions about what was 

being brought in. But the explanation that the investigator gave 

the guard satisfied the guard. The material was put back on the 

X-ray machine and the investigator was allowed to proceed 

unhindered. 

Senator BURRIS. Now, I understand that this would be the normal airport-type security that we go through here in the Dirksen 

Building. There are guards down there and we have to go through 

the metal detectors. I assume that is the same type of apparatus 

that is out in these other buildings—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. They are standard X-ray machines and magnetometers. 

Senator BURRIS. My concern is, I think we are pretty well protected here in the Capitol. I have seen lines wrapping around the 

wall and guards going through bags and pocketbooks very extensively to secure us, and what the GAO indication is, this is not 

happening in our Federal facilities out in the various States and 

communities. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I can’t make a comparison because we didn’t 

look at the Capitol Police, Senator. But clearly, the ability to get 

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detected and walk around is an indication that those buildings are 

not fully secured. That is correct. 

Senator BURRIS. I would like to follow up on what Senator 

Voinovich raised in reference to the ability of FPS to have guards 

that are Federal employees rather than contract employees. Does 

GAO have a position on that, because I am pretty sure the Capitol 

Police are Federal employees. I don’t think they are contract 

guards, are they? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. You are correct, Senator. They are Federal employees. We don’t have a position on whether they ought to be federalized or whether they ought to be private contractors, and frankly, we haven’t made recommendations yet at all because we haven’t 

finished the work. We will issue our report in September. But we 

do feel that regardless of whether they are Federal or contract, the 

training, the certifications, and the kinds of things they are doing, 

both to be placed at posts and then once they are on post, to follow 

post responsibilities, has not been fully adequate. 

Senator BURRIS. Do you know if there have been any tests run 

by GAO on the Capitol itself? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That was not part of this work here. 

Senator BURRIS. It was not part of the study. Interesting. Now, 

in reference to the contractors, who is really responsible for training them? Is it a contractor’s responsibility or a Federal responsibility? Who is responsible? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is a combination, Senator. The contractor is 

responsible for making sure that their people are trained, that they 

get the CPR training and the first aid training. Some of the training is done by FPS, such as the weapons training. All the guards 

are qualified at a range by a FPS officer. So it is a mixture of the 

training that is required. 

Senator BURRIS. OK. It looks to me like we don’t know who actually is doing the training because you said it is a mixture. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, it is a combination. In other words, there 

will be classes that the contractors hold for the guards on basic 

kinds of issues of how to be a guard and that kind of requirements. 

But some of the training has to be done by the Federal Protective 

Service, and that includes the firearms training. No guard is supposed to be able to stand post unless they have been qualified by 

a FPS officer on a range. 

Senator BURRIS. In some of our smaller communities where there 

are Federal facilities, I wonder if there have been any tests in 

small communities. If I was a terrorist—and I don’t want to give 

them any ideas—but if I was a terrorist, I probably wouldn’t try 

Chicago. I would probably try Centralia, Illinois, which is my home 

town, where there are 12,000 people. I wonder what type of training—there is a Federal facility in Centralia—that contractor or 

those guards would have. So did you try any small facilities at all? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I would be happy to talk to your staff and let 

them know exactly where we did go, Senator. 

Senator BURRIS. Please do. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Certainly. 

Senator BURRIS. I would appreciate that. And Senator Collins, 

the terminology we use in State government is generally the lowest 

responsible bidder and that lowest responsible bidder means that 


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the bidder may not be the lowest price, but it has the training and 

the skills and the ability to carry out the assigned contract responsibilities. And so that is what I would hope the FPS would be looking at in terms of the contract that they sign. Or we ought to look 

at requiring all of these guards be Federal employees that would 

go through Federal training processes, even though it might be difficult to do. 

But this is alarming in terms of the times that we are living in 

and the environment in which we are living, that someone who 

wants to make a violent statement could do so—it doesn’t have to 

be an outside terrorist, it could just be a local angry person. We 

have this problem with our judges right now and what is happening with them—we did have the family of one of our Federal 

judges murdered in Chicago. And so something has to be done. 

Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Burris. I totally agree 

with you. I mean, look, we just had a few weeks ago that case 

where the homegrown terrorist who was radicalized here walked 

into an Army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, and killed 

an Army recruiter. Federal buildings are, unfortunately, natural 

targets for anybody who wants to cause us harm because of their 

symbolic value and meaning. 

This is really serious stuff and I appreciate the work that you 

have done, Mr. Goldstein. There is always a risk in going public 

with this, but what we hope is, of course, that going public will 

generate a rapid response, both from FPS, the Department of 

Homeland Security, and Congress. 

It is ironic that we are focusing on this today in the aftermath 

of the deadly incident at the Holocaust Museum here in Washington, which as you mentioned, I guess, is not a traditional Federal facility. But it does receive assistance from the Federal Government. But I have asked my staff—maybe they will work with 

you on it—to just take a look at that, because those guards performed heroically in that crisis, and to take a look at what their 

arrangements are for their security systems and personnel and the 

extent of their certification and management. I know it is one facility, but it may be a standard that we want to try to meet in all 

of our facilities. 

I am going to try to see if we can give Mr. Schenkel an opportunity to give his opening statement before we break to go and 

vote, and then we will come back for questioning. 

Mr. Goldstein, I thank you very much and we will follow your 

work. We look forward to the report later in the summer and we 

want to work with you on the legislative response, which is urgent, 

as well. Thank you. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Schenkel, we will call you to the table 

now, Gary W. Schenkel, Director of the Federal Protective Service, 

and ask you to respond to this very serious indictment of the agency that you head. Please be seated. 


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1The prepared statement of Mr. Schenkel appears in the Appendix on page 58. 

TESTIMONY OF GARY W. SCHENKEL,1 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL 

PROTECTIVE SERVICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 

ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, 

and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for this 

opportunity to appear before you today. Although the Government 

Accountability Office has yet to provide the U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) Federal Protective Service a draft report regarding concerns that have been recently released by the 

GAO, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today and to 

discuss the immediate actions I have put in place to address these 

security concerns in advance of receiving this report. 

As I have testified previously, FPS delivers integrated law enforcement and physical security services to Federal agencies in 

9,000 General Services Administration (GSA) owned and leased facilities throughout the United States and its territories. The FPS 

performs fixed post access control, implements screening functions, 

and provides roving patrols of facility perimeters and communal 

open space. 

FPS is comprised of 1,225 law enforcement and support staff personnel. FPS also utilizes more than 15,000 contract security guards 

employed by private companies to supplement physical security 

services. FPS Law Enforcement Security Officers (LESOs) and 

more aptly termed as inspectors, are uniformed law enforcement officers who possess the full authority and training to perform traditional police functions. 

Currently, FPS has approximately 600 inspectors who are 

trained as physical security experts and provide comprehensive security services, such as facility security assessments and implementation of testing of security measures. FPS conducts nearly 2,500 

facility security assessments every year. In fiscal year 2008, FPS 

responded to 2,571 protests and organized disturbances, made 

1,888 arrests, investigated more than 2,100 accidents, investigated 

1,503 larcenies, processed 248 weapons violations, and prevented 

the intrusion of 669,810 banned items into Federal facilities, with 

significant assistance of contract guards. 

Of the approximately 9,000 buildings protected by the FPS, 1,500 

are categorized as Level III and Level IV, our highest-risk buildings. 

Upon my arrival in 2007, it was apparent FPS was experiencing 

some serious challenges. Since its transfer from the GSA in 2003 

with a full-time equivalent (FTE) workforce of 1,400 spread across 

the country in 11 different regions, FPS needed to focus on becoming a single standardized agency. This required a new operational 

construct as well as developing new business practices. FPS simultaneously faced budget constraints which could have resulted in 

having to reduce the number of FTEs. 

The fiscal year 2008 President’s budget supported approximately 

950 FTE personnel. To avoid having to reduce the number of FTEs, 

FPS sought to realize financial savings in other areas rather than 

cut personnel. Consequently, many programmatic elements, such 


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as training and equipment purchases, had to be rescheduled until 

FPS received sufficient funding. What remained unchanged, however, was FPS’s obligation to protect the 9,000 GSA owned and 

leased facilities, oversee the 15,000 armed security guards, and 

manage over 150 contracts. 

During this period, FPS carefully assessed its organization and 

made difficult decisions based on customer input and expectations. 

This refocusing of effort culminated in a FPS strategic plan that 

shaped our future activities. In particular, FPS focused on standardizing procedures. 

In 2008, the Consolidated Appropriations Act gave FPS needed 

resources by establishing a workforce foundation of no less than 

1,200 Federal FTEs and the authority to raise fees to financially 

support that number. As a result, in March 2008, FPS embarked 

on its first hiring effort in more than 6 years. FPS now has 1,236 

FTEs. This monumental hiring effort presented new challenges in 

addition to implementing the FPS strategic plan to create a standardized operation to provide daily operational support to our customers. The strategic transformation of our workforce to acquire 

the appropriate skills in the appropriate geographic locations will 

continue to be paramount on our task list and will underpin our 

comprehensive mission action plan. 

When GAO presented its alarming oral report to us several 

weeks ago, it caused us all grave concern. We have all worked very 

hard and were taken aback upon receipt of this disturbing news. 

We knew we had challenges ahead of us, and coincidentally, we 

have also noted and initiated corrective actions to address these 

shortcomings. 

Within 3 hours of learning of the lapses of visitor screening procedures, I, along with my senior staff, conducted a conference call 

with the 11 regional directors to brief them on the issues. During 

that call, I instructed the regional directors to immediately increase the number of inspections of protected facilities in their respective regions, to report directly to FPS headquarters specific actions they would take to address and correct contract guard performance issues. 

I promptly issued letters to the regional directors and contract 

guard companies’ customer agencies, FPS employees, and other 

stakeholders that notified them of the following actions that we 

would take to address them and some of the GAO findings. These 

actions included: Establishing a national study group headed by 

two experienced FPS regional directors to examine FPS visitor and 

employee screening procedures; directing FPS regional directors to 

immediately begin to exercise recently established overt and covert 

inspection techniques to assess various elements of employee and 

visitor screening processes; requiring regional directors to institute 

random searches of packages, briefcases, and bags as part of visitor 

and employee screening procedures, and ensure there are posted 

signs alerting those entering the building that they are subject to 

these searches; instructing regional directors to take all necessary 

action to immediately increase its oversight and inspection of contract guards; directing FPS employees and other stakeholders to be 

constantly vigilant, to immediately report poor performance of duties by contract guard force to FPS law enforcement personnel or 


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their supervisors; reminding the contract guard companies that 

substandard performance by contract guards is unacceptable and 

will not be tolerated, and informing them the number of frequency 

of inspection of the guard posts and certifications will increase; 

issuing an information bulletin to all inspectors and security 

guards to provide them with the information about package screening, including examples of disguised items that may not be detected 

by magnetometers or X-ray equipment; contacting all customer 

agencies and asking that they raise their security awareness and 

asking them to review their respective building access procedures 

to ensure they meet their business and security needs; and contacting GSA regional administrators and their offices of security informing them of all of our actions. 

Going forward, we have established Tiger Teams headed by senior FPS regional directors and aggressively attacked the challenge 

of overseeing the contract guard program. Within the next 60 days, 

the FPS will seek to identify training gaps in the contract guard 

force and take immediate steps to close them; increase the frequency and vigilance of the inspections of guard posts and contract 

companies to identify guards with expired certifications and qualifications; establish and develop training schedules to ensure contract guards receive current and adequate training in magnetometer and X-ray screening operations and techniques; and initiate dialogue with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, 

the Transportation Security Administration, to explore and research new technologies as well as training opportunities to assist 

in mission accomplishment. 

FPS realizes the evolving nature of security and has been moving 

forward. We have well over 30 percent of our FTEs involved in various levels of training. We are on our way to becoming a mature, 

experienced, and well-trained organization. The training process requires a full 32 weeks of intense training to become an inspector. 

We have promulgated five new policies that will strengthen the 

contract guard program, ranging from refinement of the contract 

award process to the mandatory frequency of guardpost inspections. We have developed seven financial process standard operational procedures and have begun the necessary training to institutionalize the use of these processes. 

FPS is in the final development stages of the Risk Assessment 

Management Program, which will revolutionize the facility security 

assessment process and negate the need to use the six disparate 

systems currently used by our inspectors. It will provide accurate 

and timely codification of guard training and certification processes 

and post inspections. 

The Computer-Aided Dispatch and Information System will 

standardize reporting procedures, consolidate crime and incident 

reporting, and time-stamp our operations, thus providing accurate, 

defensible data to support future staffing models. 

FPS will award a contract for the post-tracking system, which 

will strengthen the accuracy of post staffing and billing and will 

further reduce the administrative burden on our inspectors, allowing them more time for active patrol and guard oversight. All three 

of these systems will come online in fiscal year 2010. 


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In addition to the technological solutions, we are focused on providing greater training and maturity to our workforce. We are dedicated to our mission, to our profession, and to improving our organization to meet the expectations of this extremely important mission. 

I want to express to you my personal sense of urgency and commitment to the important responsibility I share with the men and 

women of FPS in keeping our Nation safe. I am honored to lead 

the proud and professional men and women of FPS. I can tell you 

that they are dedicated, determined, and committed to developing, 

implementing, and maintaining the highest level of physical security to ensure that facilities that they are charged with protecting 

are secure and their occupants are safe. I am confident that they 

can be relied upon to ensure the FPS will continue to meet the 

challenges of its homeland security mission. 

Thank you again, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member 

Collins, for holding this important oversight hearing. I will be 

pleased to answer any questions you might have at this time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Schenkel. That vote has gone 

off and we will go and vote and come back. 

I just want to very briefly say that from the statement you have 

made—incidentally, we don’t have a report either. I gather you 

were briefed, as we were, on an interim basis and the full report 

will come out later in the summer, hopefully. But I take it at this 

point, from what you are not contesting the factual basis of the 

findings of GAO that were critical of the agency? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. No, Senator, we are not. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And insofar as you have offered excuses 

or explanations, what I heard was that the reduction in the fulltime equivalent staff a few years ago may have contributed to some 

of the criticism that GAO has made this morning, is that correct? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. That is correct, Senator. I take full responsibility. 

I am the Director of the organization. There are some impacting 

factors that I think have made significant differences and I think 

they will come to light during the questioning, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Fine. Senator Collins, do you want to ask 

a question or two or do you want to wait? 

Senator COLLINS. I think I will wait. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK, thanks. 

The Committee will stand in recess. We will get back as soon as 

we can. It won’t be less than 20 minutes. Please stay close at hand. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come back to order. I 

thank you, Mr. Schenkel, and others here for your patience while 

we were over on the Senate floor voting. 

Let me ask you an open-ended question, and you were good 

enough to acknowledge the facts of the GAO report and to list some 

of the things you are doing, which I appreciate, to respond to the 

report. And I understand that you haven’t been there for years, but 

you have been there since, I guess, 2007, so you are in your second 

year. Stepping back so that we may learn, how do you explain to 

yourself how these things were allowed to happen at FPS? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. At FPS in general, or are we specifically talking 

about these security—— 


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Chairman LIEBERMAN. The security guards, correct. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes. It is purely a lack of oversight on our part. 

I think Senator Voinovich mentioned that perhaps starting from 

scratch was the way to go about it. In essence, we have started 

from scratch twice. When I came on board in April 2007, my task 

was to organize 11 police departments into one. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. When you came on, did you know the 

agency was in some difficulty? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Not as much as it turned out to be. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. But as you came on and reviewed 

what was there, you saw some problems, and one, I take it, is very 

important, though not particularly sensational, but it sounds like 

there were 11 fiefdoms, not one uniformly administered national 

organization, is that right? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. That is correct, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. At that time, we fully recognized our challenges 

ahead of us, taking 11 different ways of doing business—I am certainly not saying that was the wrong way to do things, I will just 

say this was a new era that we had to deal with, so consequently 

we had to standardize our efforts, and to do so at a time when we 

were also facing some fairly austere times and had to reduce numbers, we had to concentrate on what our core mission was, and that 

is the protection mission. 

We were fairly distracted in previous years, for a lot of different 

reasons, none of them valid at this point, but we recognized that 

our core mission was to protect Federal facilities and their occupants. So we developed a strategic plan to get us there at the same 

time we were downsizing to a fairly paltry number of people with 

which to do this. So we had to make some very drastic decisions 

as to what we would concentrate on, reprioritize our efforts. 

Subsequent to that, thanks to the 2008 omnibus bill, we were regenerated, if you will, and we were able to embark with our first 

hiring effort in at least 6 years—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And again, those are full-time equivalents, if you will, the people who supervise the contract private security guards. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, Senator. We made a conscious decision to go 

to the LESO, as opposed to trying to carry both inspectors and police officers because of our core mission. We needed the flexibility, 

especially with the downsizing. We needed individuals that could 

do both police officer operations, and the inspection and protection 

mission. 

Getting that rejuvenation, if you will, out of the 2008 omnibus 

bill and then being able to hire has been a tremendous move in the 

right direction. We are at 1,236 today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Twelve-hundred-and-thirty-six full-time 

equivalents? 

Who supervise the 13,000 to 15,000 private security guards? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you think you have overcome that 

sense you found that these were 11 fiefdoms, 11 separate police departments, as you said? 


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Mr. SCHENKEL. When I came here, I made an analogy that we 

were a ship and it takes 38 miles at sea to turn an aircraft carrier. 

I think we are probably on mile six, but we certainly initiated the 

turn. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Because as I listened to both you and the 

GAO’s witness earlier, in the question of the security guards I was 

left with a question in my mind about who is in charge. In other 

words, it seems to me that some of the work done by what I would 

call the supervisors that are working full-time for the Federal Protective Service is the work that normally would be done as part of 

a contract by the security guard company. So I wonder if it is clear 

who is in charge. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. The contracts are written very specifically. 

Whether they are written completely and comprehensively in comparison to our mission, I think bears some scrutiny. We have recognized, fortunately, because we have been involved with the GAO 

for at least the full 2 years that I have been here, they have provided us validation on many of the things that we have recognized 

internally as being an inherent responsibility either for the FPS or 

an inherent responsibility for us to take on that maybe a non-traditional role in the past. 

The training issue, I think, is one of the most prevalent. We are 

responsible for 16 hours of entry-level training of the contract security guards—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So FPS is responsible, not the security 

guard company? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. That is correct, sir. And I think through our findings, and this report certainly validates it, that we need to be much 

more involved, and that is our intent, to take a more active part 

in standardizing the training itself, monitoring the training, and in 

many cases I think we need to actually deliver the training to ensure compliance and to ensure standardization across all 50 States. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Finally, before I yield to Senator Collins, 

one of the ideas under active consideration, as you well know, is 

to take the Federal Protective Service from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, where it is now, and move it into the National 

Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) of the Department of 

Homeland Security, maybe into the Critical Infrastructure Protection division, where it certainly seems by your responsibility you 

better belong. Do you have an opinion on that? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I think that I obviously agree with the new Secretary’s opinion that it does align our mission along with that of 

critical infrastructure protection. I think it will also give us the visibility that I think is necessary for people to recognize that we are 

the security provider and that we do have a level of expertise that 

can only get better. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I agree. Part of what comes out of 

this report today is that this has to not only be your urgent responsibility to change a status quo which is unacceptable, and you acknowledge it is unacceptable, but that there has to be involvement 

from the highest levels of the Department. Mr. Goldstein said that 

earlier, and we are going to do our best to make sure that happens. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Mr. Schenkel, I don’t doubt that you are very troubled by the 

GAO’s findings and I appreciate your accepting responsibility and 

your commitment to reforming the agency. What troubles me most 

is that what GAO found indicates systemic problems. If GAO had 

been successful in smuggling bomb components into one or maybe 

two buildings, it still would have been troubling, especially since 

these are high-risk, high-security buildings. But the fact that GAO 

succeeded each and every time is so troubling and it indicates a 

pervasive, systemic problem. So now that you know this, now that 

you have been briefed, tell me what you believe specifically needs 

to be done. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Senator, I believe that the GAO report and certainly these penetrations have really pointed out an ambiguity, if 

you will, in responsibility. There are standards that are assigned 

to Federal facilities based on the level of risk. There are procedures 

and processes that are followed to protect such buildings based on 

that level of risk. But at that point, it starts to get very ambiguous 

as to who is responsible for actually pinning down the specifics and 

standardize practices, if you will. 

I think that it is our inherent responsibility to not necessarily 

dictate, but certainly provide a baseline for all of the Federal facilities that would prevent something like this, or certainly mitigate 

the possibility of something like this happening again. I think that 

it is a partnership. FPS can’t this alone. FPS needs not only the 

customer agencies, we also need the GSA, who has always been a 

good partner with us. And subsequently, we have established at 

least the baseline, if you will, and submitted this to GSA as a 

standard that would be prolific across all 9,000 buildings. I think 

that is a step in the right direction. 

Senator COLLINS. You are saying that responsibility needs to be 

clarified, but do you need more people, more training, more resources in other ways? We can’t help you solve this problem unless 

we know specifically what you need to correct such egregious security lapses. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Well, Senator, right now, we are coming up with 

some, I think, very aggressive means to address these problems, in 

particular training of our contract security guards, literally going 

back out to retrain them. The reality is, it is this same 600 inspectors that are also responsible for inspecting 9,000 buildings over 

periods of time. It is the same inspectors that respond to high-visibility, high-risk situations such as the terrorist trial that was mentioned earlier in the testimony. 

When we were at 1,400, we only had 7,500 guards to oversee. We 

are now at 1,200 and we have 15,000 guards to oversee. It breaks 

down to about 10 guard posts, which could actually be multiple 

guards, for every one inspector out there. That is if all the inspectors are fully trained, healthy, while on the job. 

Senator COLLINS. So that sounds like you need more people. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. The ratios are much greater now than they were 

in the past and our responsibilities have grown exponentially. 

Senator COLLINS. What about the responsibilities contractually 

that are put on the private security firms? Shouldn’t there be contractual requirements for them to ensure that the certifications are 

current for their employees? 


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Mr. SCHENKEL. Senator, there are contractual requirements, but 

quite simply, you need oversight and you need a means to monitor 

those and measure their success. 

Senator COLLINS. But it sounds like there is no accountability in 

this whole system. These security firms are being paid tens of millions of dollars a year to provide security for vulnerable Federal 

buildings, buildings at which thousands of people work and visit 

each day. Shouldn’t FPS be holding the contractors accountable? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. FPS’s responsibility is to provide the oversight, 

not only on the guards, but on the contract compliance itself, to ensure that they meet the expectations of the contract. The reality is 

that FPS didn’t have anything that is workable to actually measure 

that performance. We have some technologies coming online. I 

know that doesn’t solve the problem today, and there is no excuse 

for what has happened already. I can tell you, though, that we do 

have some standardized technological solutions to that that will 

allow us to provide immediate oversight. We have also promulgated 

several policies in the last several months, but also the reality of 

that is we need to train to the level of proficiency in those policies 

before we can get to where we need to go. 

Senator COLLINS. What worries me about your response is you 

have cited technology in the pipeline or people being trained now, 

it is going to take a while. We have an urgent problem. It isn’t just 

the threat from al-Qaeda terrorists, it is the threat from a domestic 

terrorist, such as the person who killed the guard at the Holocaust 

Museum. The threat is here and present and we know from the 

GAO study—and the GAO study is not the first to identify problems. There was a GAO report in June 2008 that identified serious 

problems. There is the Inspector General’s report of April that 

identified serious problems. We can’t be just working toward solutions. We need to have solutions right now, because every day that 

we don’t, thousands of people working or visiting these buildings 

are potentially at risk. 

I would ask the Chairman to join me in asking you to produce 

in very short order a corrective plan, or a plan of action that tells 

us specifically what you are going to do, how you are going to ensure that the contract employees are living up to the requirements 

for which they are being paid, and also providing us with your 

needs. We are eager to help you get the resources, the training, 

whatever it is that you need to help strengthen the security. I 

think this is urgent enough that you should provide that to this 

Committee within the next couple of weeks. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, Senator Collins. I appreciate it. And 

as I indicated earlier, and, of course, we have been working together on this, we want to actually put in legislation to reauthorize 

the Federal Protective Service and make changes that express the 

urgency that we feel about getting this right. So Senator Collins’ 

request, I join in, which is to let us know within the next week or 

two what you need. 

As I mentioned earlier, for now, we have lost confidence, so we 

haven’t actually advocated for any significant increase in funding 

with the appropriators this year—and Senator Voinovich, who is a 

Member of this Committee, is the Ranking Member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security—because we want 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
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to get the structure right and the management right and then come 

back and try to fund you adequately. But I would urge the same. 

And again, we weren’t going to hold a hearing on this until the 

report came in, but we were so jarred and unsettled by some of the 

preliminary indications in the briefing we got from GAO, we just 

thought we should go public with it and then work with you and 

Secretary Napolitano and our colleagues here to get it right quickly, because this is a vulnerability. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator 

McCaskill, I believe you were next. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman. I appreciate this hearing and I wanted to focus in on the contracting issue. 

It is my understanding that all of these contracts are competitively bid? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And do you have a handle on how many different companies are participating in these bids? Is this several 

large companies or are there lots and lots of smaller companies? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Currently, we have a great number of small businesses, that are involved in the contracting business right now. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How many of your current FPS guards are 

retired law enforcement officers? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I will have to get that for you, ma’am. I don’t 

know. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know in my experience, spending time in 

courthouses, that when I go to the Federal courthouse in Kansas 

City, I see a lot of my old friends from the Kansas City, Missouri, 

Police Department that I used to work with when I was a young 

assistant prosecutor and they do a great job, these former law enforcement officers. They understand what their job is and I think 

they do a terrific job, and so I would be curious to what extent has 

there been any effort to, in fact, use retired law enforcement officers because many of the people who retire from front-line police 

department jobs are relatively young people, because of the nature 

of how young they go into policing and the retirement systems that 

are in place in many communities. Early retirement is not unusual. 

And so I would like to know that. 

And what is the cost to the taxpayer for each contract employee 

in your Department versus each Federal employee, apples-to-apples 

jobs? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Well, there really aren’t any apples-to-apples 

jobs, but the contract security guard, we pay roughly $36 an hour, 

if you will, but that is not what the contract security guard actually 

receives. That includes the overhead from the company. Overall, a 

fully-loaded law enforcement security officer is about $180,000. 

That includes training, equipment, travel, uniforms, everything. A 

contract security guard comes in at between $63,000 and $85,000 

a year. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So it is half the cost? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Roughly. 


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Senator MCCASKILL. OK. I would like you to give that to the 

Committee in writing, if you would, what kind of value are we getting out of contracting versus hiring direct Federal employees. We 

have found in many other instances that once the math is actually 

done, that it is surprisingly close, the two, and I just think there 

has been this enormous explosion of contracting in the Federal 

Government without anyone slowing down and really doing the 

cost-benefit analysis as it relates to the costs. And obviously, we 

have a significant cost here that we have talked about at length, 

and that is the risks when you don’t get people who are required. 

I notice that two-thirds of your budget, about $1 billion, are the 

guards. What is the other third? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. The other third is our costs. Our operations and 

maintenance budget is about $277 million to support 1,225 FTEs. 

Of the $1.3 billion, the rest is either pass-through for contract security guards or other security measures that have to be funded 

through our customer agencies. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So what you are saying is one-third of the 

budget is administrative support for the other two-thirds? Because 

your job is actually guarding, correct? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Our job is to provide the recommended protective 

measures. Our law enforcement mission, our LESOs, our 1,225 

FTEs are supported out of that $277 million. The rest is for countermeasures or supportive countermeasures, that being the contract security guards or equipment that goes along with the security mission. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know that you all have discussed this to 

some extent, but the 1,200 people, their job is just to be supervising 

the contract guards? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. That is not their lone responsibility, Senator. 

That is just part of their responsibility. As part of their facility security assessment and then contract performance oversight, it includes not only the active patrol, which is also tied directly to the 

guard post inspections and oversight. That is a good portion of 

their responsibility. But they are not directed just to oversee the 

guards. That is only a part of their mission. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what is the other part of their mission, 

besides overseeing the guards, if you could? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. That is providing the facility security assessments, occupant emergency plans, training for occupants of buildings, their regular law enforcement missions, arrests, prevention of 

damage to properties, responding to demonstrations—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Tell me about the arrests. I mean, where do 

they have direct line responsibility for arrests? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. On the Federal property. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So when something occurs in a courthouse 

that would require an arrest, they are called by the guards? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. In a courthouse, it is a slightly different situation 

in that the courthouse has U.S. Marshals and Court Security Officers, which are their contract security guards. We only do the perimeters of a courthouse. But, say, in a Federal building in Chicago, if there is an incident on that property or in that Federal 

building, it would be our officers responding and making the arrest. 


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Senator MCCASKILL. And in terms of security, when we wanted 

to open an office on a streetfront, was it your employees that came 

out to look to tell us that we shouldn’t? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. We are obligated to provide the facility security 

assessment, in other words, to tell you the benefits or perhaps the 

problems with opening a Federal facility in a certain location. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And that would be one of those 1,200 people 

that came out to look at the facility that we moved into and give 

a risk assessment as it relates to that facility? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. It is actually only about half of that 1,200. There 

are only about 600 inspectors of the 1,200 FTEs that actually is involved directly with the facility security assessments, the guard 

oversight, and the response. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, it just worries me a little that a third 

of the budget is for 1,200 people and two-thirds of the budget is for 

15,000 people. That seems a little heavy-handed on the 1,200 side. 

I will take a look at the budget, and if you have any additional information you would like to provide as it relates to that budget, I 

haven’t had a chance to drill down into it, but I want to make sure 

that you have adequate personnel. And I have no problem, as the 

Chairman and the Ranking Member said, supporting additional 

funding for the protection of these buildings because I think it is 

needed. Obviously, the GAO study showed how desperately it is 

needed. But I want to make sure that we have a handle on where 

all the money is being spent now. 

Thank you. And by the way, I saw on your resume that you graduated from a college in Missouri, so I wanted to note that. He is 

a smart guy. He wants to get it right. He graduated from 

Lindenwood in St. Charles, correct? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I am impressed. Thank you. Senator 

Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for having this hearing. 

The Federal Protective Service plays a critical role in protecting 

millions of Federal employees across this Nation and I am concerned that we are not doing enough to secure the Federal buildings that house these employees. Last year, my Subcommittee held 

a hearing to examine GAO’s earlier report detailing troubling 

shortfalls in FPS. It was a huge concern over a year ago and it still 

is a concern. That hearing highlighted inadequate funding, staffing, 

training, and equipment, as well as poor oversight of contract security guards. 

In response to a plan to further downsize FPS, Congress acted 

to require FPS to maintain at least 1,200 employees to adjust its 

funding to support that staffing. While some progress has been 

made, it continues to struggle, especially in the area of training 

and contract guard oversight. Some guards are not receiving mandatory training prior to standing post. FPS does not have reliable 


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systems for oversight of contract security guards and there is no 

system in place to verify training certification of guards. 

My question to you, Mr. Schenkel, is about cases and policies of 

oversight exercised. FPS’s 11 different regions sometimes have 11 

different ways of doing things. I understand FPS recently revised 

many policies to increase consistency among the regions, including 

updating post orders and contract monitoring policies. What steps 

have you taken to ensure these new policies are being followed, and 

what training is being provided to FPS and contract guard employees on these new policies? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Senator, that is a very good question because 

that tends to lead to what Senator Collins had asked before. Our 

plan is comprehensive in nature and we realize many of these 

shortcomings and we had to reprioritize again after we received 

this GAO report as to what training was the priority and where it 

should go and who should be delivering it, which we took on immediately. 

As I said, we published seven financial policies and five direct 

contract guard oversight and contract policies within the last 8 

months. However, I am not going to lead you astray and say that 

we are fully versed on these things and train to them. We have to 

train to these. We are in the process of doing that right now. 

In addition to that, we have also formed a policy compliance unit. 

If you will, it is an oversight of the oversight. We have a team that 

we have formed that actually goes out to the respective regions and 

ensures that, first, that these policies are being taught properly 

and utilized properly, and then drilled all the way down to that, 

not only the contract guards, but the Federal Protective Service 

employees are also being held accountable and held accountable for 

compliance with these policies. 

These are all works in progress. I don’t mean by any means to 

lead you to think that we are right there right now. But we have 

taken steps in the right direction to get us there. 

Senator AKAKA. I mentioned about being concerned with the reliability of your systems for oversight of security guards. Do you 

have or are you close to a reliable system? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. We have three systems that will assist us tremendously. Our first and foremost and most important is our Risk 

Assessment Management Program. Right now, we are dependent 

on six different systems, four of which do not belong to us, just to 

provide a facility security assessment. Because of the cumbersomeness of this system that is in place now, if you will, it can take as 

much as 8 to 10 days to do one facility security assessment. This 

new RAMP program will expedite that through defined algorithms 

that will actually provide a solution based on fact for a facility security assessment. 

In addition to that, it will provide the oversight, the necessary 

compliance pieces, the metrics that will be able to track guard force 

performance, guard certifications, and guard compliance. We will 

be able to pull it up just by the individual’s name. The individual 

inspector will be able to pull out his or her laptop, open this up, 

compare the name and badge number to the individual’s training 

record, and it will be right there. This is coming online in fiscal 

year 2010. 


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In addition to that, we have a Computer-Aided Dispatch Information System. Right now, again, as you heard earlier in the testimony, we are dependent on a lot of what I call a stubby pencils 

and paperwork to keep track of many of the things that we do. The 

Computer-Aided Dispatch Information System will computerize 

and combine all of our offense reports, all of our incident reports, 

and will also time-stamp the activities of all of our people, not just 

our inspectors. That will assist us in validating and defending good 

staffing numbers to where we can come to you and say, we need 

X number because we have demonstrated by using these systems 

that, in fact, it takes longer to do a facility security assessment in 

Montana than it may in New York just because of the geographic 

dispersion. 

In addition to that, we also have a post tracking system that is 

coming in 2010. That post tracking system will replace another 

stubby pencil and paper drill. Right now, our inspectors are bogged 

down doing paper copies, ensuring that individual guards are on 

post. This new post tracking system will be an electronic measure 

that will automatically identify and define an individual on post, 

how long he or she has been on post, and take the inspector out 

of that tedious paper drill so he or she can go out there and provide 

more oversight, more training for these guards. 

All of these are coming online in 2010. In reality, it will also take 

us until 2010 to be trained up on these systems, to detect any flaws 

that need to be corrected. It will be a full year, I believe, before we 

are actually incorporated into all of these systems, our inspectors 

are confident in the system, and they are all through their training, because we still have half of our force in entry-level training, 

if you will, to become an inspector. It is a full 32 weeks. Our first 

new hires are just coming to fruition right now as far as their certifications. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. My time has run out, but let me ask 

this question. Given what we have learned here today, what are 

your top three priorities for FPS’s full-time and contract guard 

workforce as the agency moves forward? So you can provide it for 

me in writing, if that is all right. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. We have 

worked together on this, including the initial request that the Committee made for GAO to do this investigation. 

Look, Mr. Schenkel, I know that this has been a tough report for 

you to absorb. This is the first time I have met you, but from all 

I know of your record, you are a devoted public servant. But the 

reality here is, and you said it yourself, this is an unacceptable situation. Periodically, we ask the Secretary of Homeland Security, of 

all the threats to our homeland security, what keeps you up at 

night? What do you worry about? And I am afraid, based on the 

GAO report, the guards of the 9,000 Federal buildings in the country and the people who either work in them or come in and out of 

them now is one of the things that will keep the Committee up at 

night, if you will. 

I know that some of the changes—this is not your fault, but the 

Federal bureaucracy moves slowly, but this is a crisis. I hate to 

hear that you have to wait until next year to implement some of 


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the changes that will make things better. I hope that in responding 

to the request that Senator Collins mentioned and that she and I 

make now to you together, that in the next 2 weeks, you will provide some report to us on immediate steps you are going to continue to take to make the situation better and what suggestions 

you would have for us as we prepare legislation, which we will 

move urgently through to help you improve the management of 

this operation so that next year in the budget cycle, or maybe even 

earlier by way of supplemental, we can provide you additional 

funding once we have the confidence that the management structure is in place to make this situation better. 

I am also going to ask if you will make yourself available, or your 

staff, on a monthly basis to meet with our bipartisan staff, to just 

get reports on what has been happening in the previous month. 

The Comptroller General has a High-Risk List for Federal Government agencies. I think based on today, we are going to put Federal 

Protective Service on our High-Risk List and we want to work with 

you to get it off of that list as quickly as possible. 

Fair or not, the reality is that in 10 of 10 tests that we heard 

about today, GAO with bomb-making equipment was able to get 

into 10 different Federal buildings and assemble the bomb and 

walk around with it and we just can’t have that. I know you agree 

with that, so that is our mission, to raise our guard, because we 

also know that our terrorist enemies are out there every day planning ways to attack us, and unfortunately, Federal buildings are a 

natural, logical target. 

Senator Collins, would you like to make a final statement? 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to 

thank you for so promptly holding this hearing. I want to commend 

the GAO for its investigation and our staff for their work on this 

issue. And I just want to reiterate what you have told Mr. 

Schenkel. This is a crisis. It is simply unacceptable that we have 

such a poor level of security at busy Federal buildings that are obvious targets. I don’t think we can wait to remedy the problems 

that were outlined and that we have discussed in depth today. 

So I look forward to working with you, Mr. Schenkel, as well as 

with the Members of this Committee and the GAO to immediately 

remedy these very serious and alarming gaps in our security. It is 

truly unfathomable that in the world that we are living in today, 

with the lessons of September 11, 2001, still fresh in our minds and 

the most recent incidents that the Chairman mentioned in Arkansas as well as here in Washington, we know the risk is here and 

we simply must provide better security at obvious targets, such as 

Federal buildings. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Just thinking as Senator Collins was talking, this is a 21st Century version of the shoemaker’s children having no shoes. We accept the responsibility through the Department of Homeland Security to protect the American people, and thank God and thank everybody who works in the Department, we have now gone almost 

8 years since September 11, 2001, without another major terrorist 

attack. The ones that we have had have been local and limited, 

usually homegrown, and yet we are not doing the job we should do 

to protect our own Federal buildings. That is unacceptable and I 


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have every confidence that you will work with us to make sure that 

we change that. 

I thank you. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


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