Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

NANCY A. McCASLIN GREGORY F. ZOELLER

McCaslin & McCaslin Attorney General of Indiana

Elkhart, Indiana

AARON J. SPOLARICH

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

A.B., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 20A03-1112-JV-540

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART CIRCUIT COURT 

The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge

The Honorable Deborah A. Domine, Magistrate

Cause No. 20C01-1108-JD-312

May 17, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge
2

Appellant-Petitioner A.B. challenges the trial court’s finding him to be a 

delinquent child based upon the crime of Class A misdemeanor Battery if committed by 

an adult.1 Upon appeal, A.B. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

adjudication. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On March 30, 2011 Elkhart Community Schools bus driver Betty Denman was 

dropping children off near the area of Washington Gardens in Elkhart when she saw a 

group of people arguing. Apparently A.Be., who was the mother of one of Denman’s 

students, and a certain E.B. were in an argument regarding A.Be.’s testimony against 

E.B. in an unrelated case. As A.Be. approached Denman’s school bus, an individual 

described by Denman to be a young black male with braids in his hair, approached A.Be. 

The male punched A.Be. three times with a closed fist, including on the bridge of her 

nose. This knocked A.Be.’s glasses off and scraped her nose. A.Be. did not personally 

know her attacker but, after receiving tips from others, identified him from a photograph 

on her Facebook account as the person known by the community as “Pimp.” A.B.’s 

Facebook account identifies him both as A.B. and as “Pimp.” A.B.’s date of birth is 

November 27, 1994, and he was sixteen years old at the time of the incident.

On August 1, 2011, the State alleged A.B. to be a delinquent child based upon the 

offense of Class A misdemeanor battery. At the November 4, 2011, fact-finding 

hearing, A.Be. identified A.B. in court as her perpetrator. A.B. testified in his defense, 

claiming on direct examination that he did not hit A.Be., that he did not have braids, and 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(A) (2011).
3

that he had never seen or met E.B. A.B. conceded on cross-examination, however, that 

his nickname was “Pimp,” that he had attended at least two court hearings with E.B., and 

that he would be willing to fight on E.B.’s behalf. 

Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court entered a true finding against 

A.B. based in part on its assessment of his credibility as “zero.” Tr. p. 53. The trial 

court subsequently entered a dispositional order adjudicating A.B. to be a delinquent 

child and placing him in the Elkhart County Juvenile Detention Center. This appeal 

follows.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Upon appeal, A.B. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him to 

be the perpetrator. A.B. claims that he was not in the area on the day A.Be. was injured, 

that he did not see the fight between E.B. and A.Be., and that he did not have braids in 

his hair.

When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support A.B.’s adjudication, 

we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. D.W. v. State, 

903 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. We look only to probative 

evidence supporting the adjudication and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn 

from that evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the 

juvenile was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of 

probative value to support the adjudication, it will not be set aside. Id. The 

uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain an 

adjudication of delinquency on appeal. Id. 
4

A.B.’s argument is based upon his version of the events in question. But the trial 

court did not believe A.B.’s testimony. In fact, it found A.B. totally lacked credibility. 

We will defer to its assessment on this point. Further, the record contains ample evidence 

linking A.B. to A.Be.’s battery. Most significantly, A.Be. identified him to be the 

perpetrator, which is sufficient, by itself, to sustain A.B.’s adjudication. See id. In 

addition, A.B. admitted that he would fight on E.B.’s behalf. At the time of the battery, 

E.B. was fighting with A.Be., creating a situation in which A.B. was admittedly prepared 

to assist E.B. A.B.’s challenge is merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we 

decline to do.

The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

VAIDIK, J., and CRONE, J., concur.