J-S11001-17

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SHILEE DIXSON,

Appellant No. 234 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008633-2011

BEFORE: OLSON, J., RANSOM J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 9, 2017

Appellant, Shilee Dixson, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on January 12, 2015 in the Criminal Division of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County. We affirm.

Following a nonjury trial held on September 29 and 30, 2014, the 

court found Appellant guilty of second-degree murder (count one; 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b)), one count of robbery – inflict serious bodily injury 

(count two; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i)), one count of criminal conspiracy 

(count three; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(c)), and one count of possession of 

firearm by a minor (count four; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6110.1(a)). On January 12, 

2015, the court sentenced Appellant at count one to 30 to 60 years of 

incarceration; at count two to a concurrent sentence of five to ten years’ 
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incarceration; at count three to a concurrent sentence of three to six years’ 

incarceration; and no further penalty at count four. 

The issues in this appeal arise from the following facts, which the trial 

court aptly summarized.

This matter arises out of the shooting death of Malachi Urbini on 

May 8, 2011 while he was being robbed of his I-Pad in an alley in 

McKees Rocks, [Pennsylvania]. During the robbery[,] Urbini was 

shot three times, twice in the back and once in the abdomen. 

One of the bullets that entered his back pierced his heart 

resulting in his death. Based on the investigation conducted by 

Allegheny County homicide detectives, [Appellant] was identified 

as the shooter and a warrant was issued for his arrest. After his 

arrest[,] [Appellant] gave a confession admitting to his 

involvement in the shooting. Prior to trial[, Appellant moved to 

suppress] his confession on the basis that he was under the age 

of 18 at the time of the confession, that he was not permitted to 

speak to his parents or [another] interested adult before waiving 

his Miranda[1]rights[,] and that he did not knowingly and 

voluntarily waive his right to remain silent.

A suppression hearing was held on September 9 and 10, 2014 at 

which the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective 

Patrick Kinavey who testified that[,] on May 10, 2011[,] he and 

his partner went to [Appellant’s] house to arrest him having 

obtained a warrant for his arrest for Urbini’s murder. 

[Appellant’s] mother informed the detectives that [Appellant] 

was not home[. She then called Appellant] and determined that 

he was at [a] T-Station in [downtown] Pittsburgh. [Appellant] 

agreed to wait for the detectives to pick him up. His mother 

described what he was wearing and indicated that he would be 

waiting outside the T-Station. Approximately 15 minutes later, 

at 10:45 a.m.[,] the detectives located [Appellant] and, after 

advising him that they had a warrant for his arrest for criminal 

homicide, he was handcuffed and transported to the detectives’ 

headquarters. After a 10-15 [minute] ride to headquarters, 

[Appellant] was taken to an interview room and shackled to the 

____________________________________________

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 478 (1966).
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floor. The interview room is approximately 8 feet by 10 feet with 

one window. [Appellant] was left alone for approximately 30-45 

minutes. When initially interviewing [Appellant], the detectives 

knew that [Appellant] was only three days shy of his 18th

birthday. [Appellant] was presented with a Rights Warning 

Waiver Form which set forth his Miranda rights which 

[Appellant] read and initialed indicating that he understood his 

rights and that he was willing to speak to the detectives. 

Detective Kinavey indicated that [Appellant] told them that [he] 

had two children, [one] age four and [the other eight] months, 

and that he was in the process of completing the twelfth grade. 

Detective Kinavey testified that [Appellant] did not appear to 

exhibit any confusion or inability to understand why he was [] 

taken into custody or the content of the waiver form that was 

presented to him. Detective Kinavey testified that no promises 

were made to [Appellant] nor was he threatened in anyway. 

Detective Kinavey testified that from the time they spoke with 

[Appellant’s] mother until the time that they picked [Appellant] 

up and started the interview process it was approximately an 

hour and forty-five minutes. Detective Kinavey testified that 

[Appellant] did not ask for an attorney, never asked that the 

questioning be stopped[,] and never asked to speak to a parent 

or adult about waiving his rights or to be present during the 

interview. In addition, there was no [indication] that [Appellant] 

had any type of diminished capacity or any type of health 

problems. After the initial questioning, [Appellant] indicated that 

he was willing to give a recorded statement at which time he 

was transferred to another room and a recorded statement was 

taken beginning at 2:06 p.m. During the statement, which was 

played at the suppression hearing, [Appellant] stated that he 

had [spoken] with Taivon Cunningham on May 7, 2011, who had 

previously sold heroin to the victim in exchange for an I-Pod, 

and that Cunningham told [Appellant] that the victim then 

wanted to exchange his I-Pad for some more heroin. 

Cunningham then gave [Appellant] a handgun and told him to 

meet the victim in the nearby alley and rob him. [Appellant] 

took the gun and proceeded to the alleyway[. When Appellant 

pulled the gun out, the victim grabbed it. At that point, 

Appellant’s] finger slid across the trigger and the gun went off[, 

striking] the victim. [Appellant] then returned to Cunningham’s 

apartment leaving the I-Pad and the gun[. The following day, 

however, Appellant] retrieved the gun and initially hid it but then 

gave it to a relative. [Appellant] stated that he did not intend to 

shoot the victim, thinking that the safety was on, but the gun 
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discharged when the victim grabbed at [it]. During the recorded 

statement, [Appellant] did not sound confused or distressed. 

Detective Kinavey also testified that [Appellant] consented to 

give a buccal swap and consented to a search of his phone and 

that he executed a form evidencing his consent.

On cross[-]examination Detective Kinavey testified that 

[Appellant] did not ask for an opportunity to speak with his 

parents. In addition, although Detective Kinavey did not know 

that [Appellant’s] father had come to the headquarters, he would 

not have allowed [Appellant] to speak with him in any event 

because [Appellant] was so close to the age of 18 and he was in 

custody pursuant to the arrest warrant. Detective Kinavey 

further testified that based on [Appellant’s] age and the other 

background information that they had concerning him and, after 

consulting with the district attorney’s office, it was determined 

that [Appellant] could be interviewed alone.

During the suppression hearing, [the parties] stipulated that 

[Appellant] had one prior involvement in the juvenile system 

related to a theft but there was no evidence that [Appellant] had 

[received Miranda warnings] at the time of that incident. 

[Appellant] presented the testimony of his father, Donnie Lee, 

who testified that upon being made aware that his son was being 

arrested he proceeded to the police station and asked to speak 

to his son. He testified that he was never allowed to see his son 

and only spoke to him as he was being led from the police 

station.

An order was entered on September 15, 2014 denying the 

motion to suppress[. The trial court found that,] under the 

totality of the circumstances[, Appellant] knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. After a nonjury trial held 

on September 29 and 30, 2014, during which [Appellant’s] 

confession was admitted into evidence, [Appellant] was found 

guilty as set forth above[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 6/20/16, at 1-5.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 9, 2015. 

Thereafter, on February 10, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to PA.R.A.P. 
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1925(b). After the trial court extended the filing deadline, Appellant 

preserved the issues he now raises on appeal by including them in his 

concise statement filed on January 19, 2016.

Appellant lists two claims for our consideration:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 

[Appellant’s] motion to suppress on the grounds that 

[Appellant] did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 

waive his Miranda rights or voluntarily give an 

inculpatory statement to the police?

II. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion 

to suppress on the grounds that [Appellant] did not 

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily consent to the 

search of his cell phone?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (complete capitalization omitted).

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial 

motion to suppress evidence. We apply the following standard and scope of 

review to such challenges.

Our standard of review of an order denying a motion to suppress 

evidence is limited to determining whether the findings of fact 

are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. 

Crompton 682 A.2d 286 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. 

Chambers 598 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991). In making this 

determination, this [C]ourt may only consider the evidence of 

the Commonwealth's witnesses, and so much of the witnesses 

for the defendant, as fairly read in the context of the record as a 

whole, which remains uncontradicted. Id. If the evidence 

supports the findings of the trial court, we are bound by such 

findings and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are erroneous. Id.
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Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1240 (Pa. Super. 2015), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 758 A.2d 228, 229 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Appellant’s position is that the evidence adduced at his suppression 

hearing, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, fails to show that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

waived his right to the presence of a parent and/or counsel or that he 

knowingly and intelligently gave incriminating statements in response to 

police interrogation.2 Appellant identifies several circumstances surrounding 

his interrogation to support his claims. Specifically, Appellant notes that, as 

a juvenile, he was: (1) placed in an interrogation room and shackled to the 

floor; (2) asked to sign a waiver of his rights less than an hour after police 

placed him in custody; (3) never told he could have a parent or other 

interested adult present during the interrogation; and, (4) subjected to 

police custody for almost three hours before making a taped statement. 

Appellant’s Brief at 24. Appellant also alleges that the police prevented 

contact with his father at the police station, that he had only one prior 

contact with the juvenile adjudication system and no prior contact with the 

adult criminal justice system, and that he never had Miranda rights 

____________________________________________

2 The argument section of Appellant’s brief does not address his second 

claim alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress information 

obtained from his cellular telephone. Hence, we deem this issue to be 

abandoned and waived. See Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 

1072 (Pa. Super. 2017) (failure to properly develop a claim in appellate brief 

renders an issue waived).
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explained to him previously. Id. at 25. Under these circumstances, 

Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth failed to prove a valid waiver of 

Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence and that the trial court, 

therefore, erred in refusing to suppress his statement to police.

It is well settled that the police must administer Miranda warnings to 

all individuals subjected to custodial interrogation.

It is a fundamental precept of constitutional law that a suspect 

subject to a custodial interrogation by police must be warned 

that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may 

be used against him in court, and that he is entitled to the 

presence of an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. If an 

individual is not advised of those rights prior to a custodial 

interrogation, any evidence obtained through the interrogation is 

inadmissible at trial. In re K.Q.M., 873 A.2d 752, 755 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). The Miranda safeguards are triggered “whenever 

a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or 

its functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 

291, 292 (1980).

Freeman, 128 A.3d at 1240 (parallel citations omitted).

In deciding whether a juvenile voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 

waived his Miranda rights before giving an incriminating statement to 

investigators, we consider the following principles.

Regardless of whether a waiver of Miranda is voluntary, the 

Commonwealth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the waiver is also knowing and intelligent.

Miranda holds that the juvenile may waive effectuation of the 

rights conveyed in the warnings provided the waiver is made 

voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The inquiry has two 

distinct dimensions. First, the relinquishment of the right must 

have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a 

free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or 

deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full 
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awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and 

the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation 

reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 

comprehension may a court properly conclude that Miranda

rights have been waived.

A determination of whether a juvenile knowingly waived his 

Miranda rights and made a voluntary confession is to be based 

on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including 

a consideration of the juvenile's age, experience, 

comprehension, and the presence or absence of an interested 

adult. In examining the totality of circumstances, we also 

consider: (1) the duration and means of an interrogation; (2) 

the defendant's physical and psychological state; (3) the 

conditions attendant to the detention; (4) the attitude of the 

interrogator; and (5) any and all other factors that could drain a 

person's ability to withstand suggestion and coercion. We 

acknowledge that the per se requirement of the presence of an 

interested adult during a police interview of a juvenile is no 

longer required. Nevertheless, it remains one factor in 

determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's waiver of his 

Miranda rights.

In re V.C., 66 A.3d 341, 351 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 80 A.3d 778 (Pa. 2013).

The trial court offered the following rationale in determining that 

Appellant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights 

before confessing to detectives.

In this case, considering the totality of circumstances, it is clear 

that [Appellant] not only voluntarily, but knowingly and 

intelligently, waived his Miranda rights. In fact, other than the 

fact that [Appellant] was three days shy of his 18th birthday, 

there would be no evidence at all on which to base a claim that 

his Miranda rights were not voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently waived. There is absolutely no evidence of any 

coercion or deception on the part of detectives in obtaining the 

waiver. The detectives spoke with [Appellant’s] mother who was 

advised that they had an arrest warrant for her son and she 
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voluntarily made arrangements for his arrest. Shortly 

thereafter[, Appellant] was taken into custody, advised of why 

he [was arrested,] and was promptly transported to the 

detectives’ headquarters. Detective Kinavey testified that they 

arrested [Appellant] at approximately 10:45 a.m. and the 

[w]aiver [f]orm was signed at 12[:00] p.m. During the 

approximate [one] hour and 15 minutes between his arrest and 

the execution of the [w]aiver [f]orm, [Appellant] was 

transported to headquarters and was left alone in the 

interrogation room for approximately 30 minutes. There is no 

evidence that he was coerced, threatened or subject to any 

intimidating actions or activity designed to affect his ability to 

make a voluntary waiver of his rights. The [w]aiver [f]orm 

clearly and explicitly advised him of his right to remain silent, his 

right to an attorney and the fact that he voluntarily consented to 

speak to the detectives. [Appellant] knowingly acknowledged 

these rights and voluntarily gave a recorded statement that was 

taken at approximately 2:06 p.m. and lasted for approximately 

[nine] minutes. Detective Kinavey indicated that [Appellant] 

was given some food and water and was given the opportunity 

to use the bathroom. Although he was shackled to the floor, 

which was standard procedure for a person in custody, there is 

absolutely no evidence to indicate that the duration and means 

of the interrogation was improper or was used to overcome 

[Appellant’s] ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision 

concerning the waiver of his rights. There is no evidence to 

show that there was anything about [Appellant’s] physical or 

psychological state that would affect his ability to make a 

knowing and intelligent waiver. There is no evidence that 

Detective Kinavey intimidated or threatened [Appellant] or 

[conducted the interrogation in any other manner] designed to 

drain [Appellant’s] ability to withstand suggestion and coercion. 

Although [Appellant] was three days shy of his 18th birthday, the 

evidence establishes that he was in the process of completing 

the 12th grade and there was no evidence of any diminished 

intellectual or emotional capacity. Listening to the recorded 

interview, [Appellant] did not express any confusion or 

misunderstanding regarding the questions being put to him nor 

did [he] express any doubt in his responses. [Appellant] used 

the opportunity to give a statement to explain that the gun 

discharged accidentally when the victim grabbed at [it] and that 

[Appellant] didn’t realize that the safety [mechanism was 

disengaged]. Although [Appellant’s] father was present at the 

headquarters and asked to see his son, there is no evidence that 
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[Appellant] asked to see one of his parents or another adult 

because he did not understand the process or the rights that he 

was waiving. Although the age of a minor may be one factor in 

determining the voluntariness of a juvenile’s waiver, there is no 

evidence to support the contention that [Appellant’s] age in this 

case had any influence on the waiver of his Miranda rights. The 

fact that Detective Kinavey acknowledged that even if he knew 

that [Appellant’s] father was present at the headquarters that he 

would not have allowed him to see his son does not, in and of 

itself, indicate either the use of coercion to obtain the waiver or 

that the waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 6/20/16, at 6-8.

We have carefully reviewed the transcript of Appellant’s suppression 

hearing. Based upon our review, we conclude that the record supports the 

trial court’s factual findings and that the court’s rulings are consistent with 

pertinent case law. Because the Commonwealth proved, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that Appellant voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently waived his Miranda rights, we see no reason to disturb the trial 

court’s admission of Appellant’s statement to detectives.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2017