IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

JUDEAU BROWN, 

Defendant Below, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

Plaintiff Below, 

Appellee. 

§ 

§ 

§ No. 560, 2019 

§ 

§ Court Below—Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware 

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 1704012399 (K) 

§ 

§ 

§ 

Submitted: March 30, 2020 

Decided: June 1, 2020 

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,

Justices. 

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 

affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 

(1) The appellant, Judeau Brown, appeals from the Superior Court’s denial 

of his motion for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion to affirm the 

Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Brown’s 

opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm. 

(2) The record reflects that in August 2017, a grand jury indicted Brown 

and two co-defendants for first-degree assault, two counts of first-degree robbery, 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”), home 
2 

invasion, and second-degree conspiracy. The charges arose out of a robbery that 

resulted in three people, including Brown and one of his co-defendants, being 

wounded by gunshots. On May 7, 2018, the day his trial was set to begin, Brown 

pleaded guilty to PFDCF and one count of first-degree robbery. The State agreed to 

dismiss the other charges. The parties agreed on immediate sentencing with the 

following recommended sentence: for first-degree robbery, twenty-five years of 

incarceration, suspended after four years (three of which were minimum mandatory) 

for decreasing levels of supervision; for PFDCF, three years of incarceration, the 

minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. After completing a plea colloquy 

with Brown, the Superior Court sentenced him in accordance with the plea 

agreement. Brown did not file a direct appeal. He did file a motion for sentence 

reduction, which the Superior Court denied in August 2018. 

(3) Brown filed a timely motion for postconviction relief. He contended 

that (i) his counsel revealed to the prosecutor what Brown’s testimony would be at 

trial, and therefore provided ineffective assistance of counsel; (ii) his counsel 

provided ineffective assistance by failing to interview a witness who reported 

hearing someone yell “give me back my weed” and then seeing three men, all armed 

with handguns, run through a nearby door; (iii) his counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to file a motion for sentence reduction; (iv) the State did not or 

could not fulfill certain conditions of the plea agreement; and (v) six months after 
3 

Brown pleaded guilty, Carl Rone, the State firearm examiner who examined a bullet 

and casings related to the incident, pleaded guilty to falsifying work records. 

(4) A Superior Court Commissioner recommended that the court deny 

Brown’s motion for postconviction relief. The Commissioner reasoned, among 

other things, that Brown’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not provide 

a basis for relief because Brown voluntarily pleaded guilty; his counsel’s 

representation was well within the range of reasonableness required by Strickland v. 

Washington;

1

 his counsel’s affidavit stating that he did not reveal Brown’s 

anticipated testimony to the prosecutor was more credible than Brown’s self-serving 

allegation to the contrary; Brown signed the plea agreement and truth-in-sentencing 

forms, recognizing the rights that he was relinquishing by pleading guilty; and 

during his plea colloquy Brown stated that he was satisfied with defense counsel’s 

representation. The Commissioner determined that Brown’s other claims were 

procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3).2

 The 

Commissioner nevertheless addressed those claims on the merits, concluding that (i) 

the State satisfied its agreement to make a referral to the Newark Police Department 

to protect Brown’s residence during an investigation of Brown’s cooperation with a 

 

1

 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

2 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(3) (barring “any ground for relief that was not asserted in the 

proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court,” unless 

the defendant shows “[c]ause for relief from the procedural default” and “[p]rejudice from 

violation of the movant’s rights”).
4 

separate investigation; (ii) the State did not interfere in Brown’s placement at the 

Sussex Correctional Institution (“SCI”), and Brown understood when pleading 

guilty that the court could only give a nonbinding direction to the Department of 

Correction that Brown be placed at SCI; and (iii) Rone’s report was neither 

inculpatory nor exculpatory, and the State therefore had not planned to call him as a 

witness at trial. After de novo review, the Superior Court denied the motion for 

postconviction relief. Brown has appealed to this Court. 

(5) On appeal, Brown has submitted an overlength brief3

 that repeats the 

arguments presented to the Superior Court and presents additional, overlapping 

arguments that reframe those arguments in various ways. To the extent that he raises 

arguments that were not presented to the Superior Court in the first instance, we will 

 

3

 This Court granted, in part, Brown’s request to file an opening brief of up to 150 pages, 

authorizing him to file a fifty-page brief. Brown ignored the extended, fifty-page limit and filed a 

144-page opening brief. After the Chief Deputy Clerk struck that filing, Brown refiled his brief 

with smaller font and closer spacing. Rules 13 and 14 set forth typeface specifications and wordcount limitations for typed briefs that are filed in this Court. DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 13(a)(i); 14(d)(i). 

Rule 14 also provides page-count limitations for “unrepresented parties without access to a word 

processing program.” Id. R. 14(d)(iii) (emphasis added). Brown’s brief, which appears to have 

been prepared using a word processing program, does not comply with the letter or spirit of those 

rules and this Court’s order authorizing Brown to file a fifty-page brief. Although this Court 

frequently affords significant leniency to unrepresented litigants with respect to the form of their 

filings, Brown is cautioned that, should he have occasion to file in this Court in the future, he must 

comply with the applicable rules or risk having the filing rejected. 
5 

not consider those claims on appeal.4

 We review the Superior Court’s denial of 

postconviction relief for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.

5

 

(6) Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) bars claims for postconviction 

relief that were not raised during the proceedings leading to a judgment of conviction 

unless the movant can show cause for the procedural default and prejudice from a 

violation of the movant’s rights.6

 A successful claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel can constitute “cause” under Rule 61(i)(3).7

 But to prevail on such a claim 

within the context of a guilty plea, a movant must show that (i) his counsel’s conduct 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for the alleged errors of counsel, the movant would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.8

 A defendant must make 

concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice to substantiate a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.9

 Although not insurmountable, there is a strong 

presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.10

 

4

 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 8. See also Scott v. State, 2018 WL 3478949, at *2 (Del. July 19, 2018) 

(“Generally, this Court will not consider a claim for postconviction relief that was not considered 

by the Superior Court in the first instance.”). 

5 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 

6

 Del. Super. Ct. R. 61(i)(3). 

7 Fields v. State, 2017 WL 4607424, at * (Del. Oct. 12, 2017). 

8

 Id. 

9 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 

10 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
6 

(7) In this case, Brown’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 

unavailing. First, the Superior Court Commissioner determined that Brown’s 

counsel’s statement that he did not reveal Brown’s anticipated testimony to the 

prosecutor was more credible than Brown’s self-serving allegation to the contrary. 

The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report after a de novo review, and 

our review of the record reveals no basis to reverse that determination. Second, even 

if we were to accept that his counsel acted in a professionally unreasonable manner 

by failing to interview a witness, Brown has failed to demonstrate prejudice, given 

the clear benefit that Brown’s guilty plea provided him.11 Third, the Superior Court 

imposed the sentence recommended in the plea agreement, and Brown filed a motion 

for sentence reduction, which the Superior Court denied. Brown has demonstrated 

no basis to conclude that a motion for sentence reduction filed by counsel would 

have been successful, and Brown therefore is unable to demonstrate either 

ineffectiveness or prejudice based on his claim that his counsel should have filed 

such a motion.12

 

11 See Samans v. State, 2012 WL 1970109 (Del. June 1, 2012) (finding no prejudice from alleged 

inadequate investigation in context of guilty plea with clear benefits). 

12 Cf. State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Del. 2002) (stating that denial of motion for sentence 

reduction is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Brown v. State, 1991 WL 134175, at *2 (Del. July 

1, 1991) (“Brown’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for reduction 

of sentence is equally without merit. Brown was given the minimum mandatory sentence. As a 

result, the trial court was without authority to reduce Brown’s sentence. Thus, even if, arguendo, 

Brown’s counsel was ineffective, the ineffectiveness claim would fail because he suffered no 

prejudice.”). 
7 

(8) The Superior Court also did not err by denying postconviction relief 

based on Brown’s other claims. Review of the plea agreement and the transcript of 

the plea colloquy and sentencing makes clear that Brown understood what the State 

was agreeing to do with respect to protection for his residence pending a cooperation 

investigation, and we find no basis to reverse the Superior Court’s determination that 

the State fulfilled that commitment. Similarly, the record reflects that the court made 

clear to Brown during the plea colloquy that the court could only give a non-binding 

direction that Brown be placed at SCI, and the court did give that direction. Finally, 

with respect to the firearms examiner, by pleading guilty Brown waived his right to 

challenge the evidence against him and to learn of any impeachment evidence.13

(9) Brown’s “Motion for Stay of Execution and Bail Pending Appeal” is 

denied as moot. Brown has also filed a “Motion to Remain Anonymous.” The 

statutes that he cites in support of that motion do not mandate the relief that he seeks 

in the circumstances of this case.14 The motion is therefore denied. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 

GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. The “Motion 

 

13 See Steck v. State, 2015 WL 2357161 (Del. May 15, 2015) (affirming denial of postconviction 

relief in which defendant sought to set aside guilty plea based on “evidence of ongoing corruption 

in the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner”). 14 See 11 Del. C. § 9601 (permitting the Attorney General to provide protective services to 

witnesses); 11 Del. C. § 9403 (precluding law-enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and the 

Department of Correction from disclosing a witness’s residential address, telephone number, or 

place of employment, absent consent or as permitted by a court for good cause shown). 
8 

for Stay of Execution and Bail Pending Appeal” is denied as moot. The “Motion to 

Remain Anonymous” is denied. 

BY THE COURT: 

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 

 Chief Justice