### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

NO. 03-0 5 -00 426 -CV

Te r r y L. Dun n , A ppe lla nt

v . M. Ann Calahan , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 199, 002- B , HO NORAB LE RICKMO RRIS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Up on c on sid e ratio n of a

pp e lla nt Te rr y L

. Dunn ’s mot ion

fo r r e he ari ng , w e ov e rr

ule the mot ion ; ho we ve r, we wi thd ra w our op ini on and jud g me nt da te d Augus t 28, 200 7, and su bs tit ute the fo llo wi ngin i ts p la c e . D un n a pp e a ls f ro m th e su mma

ry jud g me nt r e nd e re d a g a in st h im i n h is suit for tort i o u s i n t er fer ence with contrac t and intentional infliction of emotional distress. I n five issues on appea l, Dunn claims that the trial cour t erre d in g ranting summary judgme nt for appe llee M. Ann Ca laha

n b e c a us e a g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l fa c t e xiste d in

his tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e c a us e of a c tio n a nd in a ll of Ca laha

n’ s a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e s. B e c a

us e we ho ld t

hat Ca laha

n c on c lus ive ly neg ated at least one e lement of Dunn’ s cause of ac tion, we af firm the trial c ourt’s summary jud g me nt.Ac c or din g to a ne ws pa pe r art ic le ma de pa

rt of the su mma

ry jud g me nt r e c or d, the re str oo m in 1 the pa rk wa s und e r s ur

ve ill anc e be c a

us e of nume ro us c omp la int s a bo ut d ru g us e and

le wd ne ss around c hildren. Calaha

n’s re fer ence to this ar

ticle forms the basis of Dunn’s c omplaint ag ainst her. Du ri n g h er

d ep o s i t i o n , C al ah an wa s as k edt h e f o l l o wi n g: 2 Q. Are y ou involved in the selec ti on proce ss of which pa rticular stude nts are a dmi tte d in to t

he e du c a tio n p ro g ra

m? A. Iserve on the Admissions Com mittee, y es, and I also serve on the Tea cher Education Council as a repr esentative of the de partment who makes the fina l decision as to whe ther or n o t t h at person is admitt ed into the Tar leton Te a c he r E du c a tio n Pr og ra m. 2 Bac kgr ound Dunn was a student at the Killeen campus of Tarle ton State University (“Ta rleton”) working toward a

deg ree in elementar

y education. I n April 2000, on his w ay to a student teac hing

a ssi g nme nt at an ele me nta ry sc ho ol, Dunn sto pp e d at a m e n’ s b a thr oo m f a c ili ty in a pu bli c pa rk in Ki lle e n. A m anf

o l l o w e d h i m i n t o t h e r e s t r o o m , t h e t w o h a d s e x, an d t h e y w e r e s u b s e qu e ntl y 1

arr ested and char g ed with public lewdness. Dunn pleade d no contest to the offe nse and w as plac ed on defe rre d adjudication in Aug ust 2000.

On discover

y of the a rre st, Tarleton’s a dminist ration pl ac ed Du nn on probation pending the outcome of

the cr iminal ch ar ges . On e of Calahan’s of ficial duties as the head of the Curriculum and Instruction Depa rtment and member

of the Te ache r Education Council at Tarleton

wa s to a ssi st i n ma

kin g the fi na l dec isi on a s to whe the r a pe rs on wa s to be a dmi tte d o r r e ta ine d in the teac her e ducation depa rtment. Pursuan t t o s t andard proce dures, Cala han re commended that 2 Dunn be re mov e d f

ro m pu bli c sc ho ol c la ssr oo ms a ft e r h is a rr e st.3 I n a ser ies of letter s from September to November 2000, the De an of Educ ation, Joe G ill e sp ie , a g re e d th a t T arl e ton wo uld pr ov ide a “ de fi c ie nc y

pla n” by wh ic h D un n c ou ld o bta in his teache r ce rtification if he secur ed employ ment with a school district or private school as long a s two require ments were met: (1) Dunn must make “ full disclosure” a bout his arre st to his prospective employ er, a

nd (2) the employ er must c onfirm in w riting to T arle ton that D unn had “f ully disclosed” his arr e st. I n mid-J uly 2001, Dunn applied f

or a f ourth g rade t eaching position i n the Temple Independe nt School District (“TI SD”). He wa s interviewe d by Gail L eidy , an ele mentary school principal in the TI SD. TI SD expressed interest in hiring him. T h er ea ft er , Dunn provided Susan Br own, TI SD’s direc tor of human r esourc es, a disk co ntaining a letter that he had wr itten reque sting a

defic iency

plan from Tarleton’s Dean of Education. Although D unn authore d the letter, he aske d Br own to sign it and se nd it to Tarleton. The le tter, w h ich was a ddresse d to Gillespie, reque sted a deficienc y plan and stated that Dunn was to tea ch math to fourth g rade rs at Ray e-A llen Elementar

y School. Howeve r, B rown stated that she wa s not comfortable with the second se ntence of the letter , which stated, “ Mr. Dunn has be en totally forthcomingabout his arr est rec ord and has provided a ll documentation related to his arr est.” Br own further stated that she did not fe el that Dunn “ha d been totally forthcoming about hi s arr est rec ords and pr ovided all documentation related to his arre st.” She testified that she unde rstood the term “ full d i s cl osure” to mean “w hat he wa s

arr ested for , what he w as cha rg ed for , the nature of the a rre st, every

thing that wa s involved,” and that sh e d i d n o t fe el that Dunn had pr ovided full disclosure of his arre st. Although Dunn ha dSimi larly , L eidy testified that she ha d assumed that Dunn mea nt he h ad b ee n caught doing 3 so met hi ng lik e ur inatin g on the sid e of

a bu ild ing , o r p e rh a

ps “ g y ratin g ” in p ub lic wh e re pe op le could see

. 4 disclosed the fa ct of his ar rest to L eidy , he simply

said that it was for “ public lewdness” without further explanation. 3 Be cause the letter tha t Du n n had pre pare d for he r sig nature “ra ise[d] flag s” of

conce rn, B rown plac ed a r efe renc e-c heck c all to the Copperas Cove S ch o o l District Human Resource s Direc t or, who infor med her about a ne wspape r ar

ticle re lated to Dunn’s a

rre st. Brow n ha d h e r a ssi sta

nt fi nd thi s art ic le fr om t

he Web sit e of

the Ki lle e n n e ws pa

pe r a nd pr int a c op y of it. After obtaining a

copy of the a

rticle, B rown init i ated c ontact with Tar leton administrators for the purpose of making further ref ere nce chec ks. When she was unable to contact Gi l l es p i e, wh o wa s o n v ac at i o n , Br o wn wa s re fe rr edt o C al ah an . C al ah an re ca l l edBr o wn as k i n g, “How do I

know t hat what [Dunn] told me i s what really happene d?

. . . How do Iknow if it was full disclosure? ” In response , Calahan r efe rre d to the exis tence of a ne wspape r ar ticle discussing the arr e st—

the same art ic le that B ro wn a lready po ss esse d a s a

re su lt o f h e r c on ve rs a tio n w ith th e h u m an re source s director in Copperas Cove. Cala han testified that she told Brown a bout the newspa per article so that TI SD would have the inf ormation and not be “ blindsided” if a pa rent we re to inquire about whe ther TI SD knew that Dunn’ s arr est had be en re ported in the newspa per. Calahan denied having r ead the article and denie d usi n g t h e word “solicitation” during her c onversation with Brow n. TI SD a lso c onducted a routine cr iminal backg round che ck on Dunn, whic h showed that he had r ece ived def

err ed adjudication for public lewdne ss. Dunn, howeve r, had answ ere d “No”Dunn

a lso su e d T I SD f

or se x disc ri min a tio n a

nd br e a c h o f c on tr a c t. T I SD f ile d a c ounte r- c la im 4 alleg ing that Dunn’s suit was g roundless and w as broug ht in bad faith and f or t he purpose of hara ssment. TI SD and Dunn ente red a n ag ree ment to dismi ss their claims ag ainst eac h other. 5 to a question on his application that aske d if he ha d “eve r bee n convicted o f a fe l o n y or off enses involving mora l turpitude and/or re ceive d probation or de fer red a djudication.” Althoug h Dunn had

a lr e a dy be e n a ssi g ne d a

c la ssr oo m and

pla c e d in pa id t ra ini ng , T I SD u lti ma te ly

de c lin e d to a llo w h im to teach. D unn then sued Calaha n for tortious interfe renc e with contra ct and intentional infliction of e mot ion a l di str e ss. 4

Discussion

We reviewthe district c ourt’s summary judgme nt de novo. ValenceOperating Co.

v . D or se tt , 164 S.W. 3d

65 6, 66 1 ( Te x. 20 05 ); Pr ov ide nt L ife& Ac c ide nt I ns . Co . v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Summary judgme nt is proper when there are no disputed issues of mater ial fac t and t he movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c); Shell Oil Co. v. Khan , 1 3 8 S

. W

. 3 d 2 8 8 , 2 9 1 n . 4 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Kno tt , 128 S.W .3d at 215-16). We view the evide nce in f avor of the nonmovant and indulg e eve ry rea sonable infe renc e and resolve a ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor

. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgm t. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546, 548- 49 (T e x. 19 85 ); Du

po nt Pho tom as k

s, In c . v . S

tra y ho rn , 21 9 S.W. 3d 41 4, 41 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 2006, pet. denied)

.

A d e fe nd ant seek in g s ummary jud g me nt m

us t ne g a te a s a

ma tte r o f l aw at le a st

one e l em en t o f each of the pla intiff’s theorie s of re cover y or plea d and prove as a matter of law

eac h element of

an af firmative de fense

. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Lely Dev . Corp. , 86 S.W .3d 787, 7906

(T ex . A p p . — Au s t i n2 0 0 2 , p et
. d i s m ’d ) ( ci t i n g Centeq Realty v . Siegler , 899 S.W .2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995)). If t h e d ef

en dant establishes his rig ht to summ ary judgme nt, the plaintiff must then raise a fac t issue. Id . When the summary judgme nt doe s not spe cify the g rounds on which it was g rante d, the nonmovant must show that eac h g round alleg ed in the motion is insufficient to support it. Go ss v . B ob by

D. As so c s. , 94 S.W .3d 65, 68 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2002, no pet.). We must af firm the summary

judgme nt if any

of the g rounds asser

ted in the motion are me ritorious. Te x as W or k e rs’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Adv ocates of Texas , 136 S.W .3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2004).

The theor

y of tortious interfe renc e with business relations by a third per son includes two ca

uses of a ction: (1) tortious interfe renc e with exi s t i n g co n t rac ts, and (2) tortious interfe renc e with prospective c ontrac tual relations. Sterner v. M arathon Oil Co. , 767 S.W .2d 686, 68 9 ( Te x. 19 89 ); se e ge ne ra lly , 13 Wil liam V. Dorsane o I I I& Ce cil C. Kuhne I I I , Texas Litigat ion Guide § 205.01[1] (2007). The plaintiff has the bur den of pr oving the essential ele m ents of tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th a

c on tr a c t. T he se e le me nts are : (1 ) t he e xiste nc e of

a c on tr a c t su

bje c t to int e rf e re nc e ; (2) a

wi llf ul a nd int e nti on a l a c t of

int e rf e re nc e ; ( 3) the a c t w a s th e pr oximate c a us e of plaintiff’s da

mag es; and (4) actua l damag e or loss. John Paul Mitche ll Sys. v. Randalls Food Marke ts, Inc. , 1 7 S

. W

. 3 d 7 2 1 , 7 3 0 (T ex . Ap p . — Au s t i n2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Texas Bee f Catt le Co. v. Gree n , 921 S.W .2d 203, 210 (Tex. 1996)). T he ele ments of tortious interfer ence with a prospec tive

c on tr a c t are : ( 1) the re mus t be a “ re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity” that th e pla int if

f w ou ld h a ve e nte re d in to the prospec tive relationship o r co n t ract; (2) an “ independe ntly tortious or wrong ful” a ct by the defe ndant that pre vented the r elationsh i p fr o m o ccurring ; (3) the de fenda nt did such act with a

c on sc iou s d e sir e to p re ve nt the re la tio ns hip fr om o c c ur ri ng , o r k ne w that th e int e rf

e re nc e wa s c e rt a inDunn a lso c on te nd e d th a t he ha d a c on tr a c t w ithTa

rl e ton c on c e rn ingthe de fi c ie nc y pla n w ith 5 wh ic h Ca laha

n in te rf e re d. B e c a

us e in terfe re nc e wi th t

he Ta rl e ton c on tr a c t c ou ld o c c ur

on ly if Calahan’ s actions ca

used TI SD to refuse to e mploy Dunn, thus preve nting the implementation of the de fi c ie nc y

pla n, we dis c us s th e c la ime d int e rf e re nc e wi th the TI SD c on tr a c t f ir st. At va ri ou s ti me s, Dunn re fer s to interfer ence with business relationships, contrac t, and emplo y m en t
. Howeve r, the only relationships subject t o interfe renc e are the contra cts with TI SD and with Tar leton. Appellee consistently

ref ers to interf

ere nce w ith contrac t, as will we.

7 or substantially

cer tain to occur as a r esult of the def endant’ s conduct; and ( 4) the plaintiff suf fer ed actua l harm or damag e as a re s u l t o f the def endant’ s interfe renc e. Johnson v. Bay lor Univ. , 188 S.W .3d 296, 304 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet denie d).

I n his f ir s t is s u e , D u n n c o n te n d s th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d in g r an ti n g summary jud g me nt a g a ins t hi m on

his tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th c on tr a c t c la im. Dunn ’s ple a din g s a lle g e on ly 5 interfe renc e with an e x isting contra ct. I n his pleading s he states that he : was notified by

the Human Resour ces of

fice of De fenda

nt TI SD that Susan C. Brown was a uthorizi ng Gail L iedy

to hire Plaintiff as a te ache r for aca demic y ear

2001-2002. Plaintiff signe d a letter

of commitment with Defe ndant TI SD and in relianc e upon the ag ree ment that Plaintiff was hired , he g ave notice and lef t h i s ex isting employ ment eff ective July

29, 2001.” (Emphasis adde d.) He also alleg es that “Cala han wa s awa

re that he had been e mployed by TI SD.” (Emphasis adde d.) Beca

use we hold that Calahan conclusively neg ated the elements of intentional interfe renc e and causation, we will begin by assuming that a contra ct exist ed and a naly ze the tort of interfe renc e with an e x isting contra ct. See Lely Dev . Corp. , 86 S.W .3d at 787. Recove ry under tortious interf

ere nce wi t h co n t ra ct re qu i re s t h at t h e a l l ege d i n t er fe ring party must be shown to have acted willfully and intentionally

. COC Servs., Ltd. v. CompUSA, Inc

. , 150 S.W .3d 654, 670 (Tex. App.—Dall as 2 0 0 4 , pet. denied) . A willful act involves more than8

simpl e p ar t i ci p ati on in some act with a br eac hing pa rty
. Se e J oh n P au l M

itc he ll S y s. , 17 S.W .3d

a t 73 0. Th e de fe nd ant mus t kn ow ing ly ind uc e on e of the c on tr a c tin g pa

rt ie s to br e a c h it s o bli g a tio ns . Browning-Ferris, Inc. v . Rey na , 8 65 S.W. 2d 92 5, 92 7 (Te x. 19 93 ); J oh n P au l M

itc he ll S y s. , 1 7 S

. W

. 3 d

at 7 3 0 (c i t i n g Davis v. HydPro, I nc. , 832 S.W .2d 137, 139 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1992, writ denied) . There must be some act inter fer ing w ith a contra ct or a ct per suading a p ar t y to a contra ct to brea ch; for e x ample, off eringbetter terms or other incentives. Da v is , 839 S.W .2d at 139. L iability for intentional interf

ere nce may n o t b e b as ed on a simple findingthat the def endant pe rf o r m e d c e rt a i n a c t s ; t h e r e m u s t b e a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f

e n d an t p e r f

o r m e d c e rt a i n a c t s w ith the knowl ed ge o r belief

that interfe renc e with a c ontrac t would result from that contr act. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo Tex., Inc. , 843 S.W .2d 470, 472 (Tex. 1992).

The a ct at issue in this case is the te lephone c onversation betwe e n B r o wn and Calaha

n during which Calaha

n mentioned the new spaper article . Dunn alleg es in his petition that C alaha n

“ ma de it c le ar t

hat sh e be lie ve d that hir ing or re ta ini ng Pla int if f a s a TI SD t e a c he r w ou ld e mba rr a ss both TI SD and Tar leton.” F or evide ntiary support, he re fer s to Brow n’s deposition. I n Br own’s deposition, s h e s a id th a t Ca la h an r e f e r r e d to th e n e w s p a

p e r arti c le a s g iv in g th e ar r e s t d a te
. She stated that Calaha

n did not r ead her the article or provide he r a c opy . I n fac t, Brow n testified that sh e a lr e a dy po sse sse d a c op y of the art ic le a t the tim e sh e and Ca laha n s po ke on

the ph on e . T his is the e nti re ty of the e vid e nc e on wh ic h D un n r e lie s to su

pp or t hi s a sse rt ion

tha t Ca laha n a dv ise d T I SD that hiring Dunn woul d cr ea t e p robl ems; he re fer s to no other evidenc e that Calaha n expressed any opinion t o Br o wn , the only TI SD administrator with whom she had c ontact, conc erningDu

nn a sse rt s th a t Ca laha

n wa s mot ivate d to int e rf

e re wi th h is c on tr a c t be c a us e sh e pe rs on a lly 6 did not think t hat Dunn should teach

. At a depositi on, when a sked whe ther in her profe ssional opinion Dunn should be a tea cher , she said that he should not. Howeve r, at the time of the phone call, Calahan did not know all of the details about the ar rest nor did she e x press a

n opinion to Brown conce rning Dunn’s employ ment. By the t ime of the de position, C alaha n lear ned more details and formed this prof

essional opinion. At o n e point , Dunn eve n admitted that Calahan w as not ac ting ma lic iou sly

bu t in the be st i nte re sts of

Ta rl e ton and the te a c he r e du c a tio n p ro g ra m. 9 Dunn’s employ

ment with TI SD, and our revie w of the re cord f inds no other evidenc e. I n Calahan’ s 6 deposition, she said that she re sponded to Br own’s question about Dunn be cause she thoug ht that Br own should have the information to “avoid be ing blindsi d ed ” by a par ent who mig ht have se en the ar ticle. Calahan herself had not rea d the contents of t he article at that time. She had no pr evious relationship wit h Br own. The r ecor d do es n o t s h o w any further contac t with Brown or

any other TI SD administrator to whom she could have communic a te d a n e g a ti ve re commendation about Dunn. Ba sed on the ev i d en ce in the rec ord, no re asonable fac t finder c ould have conclude d that Calahan perf ormed an act intended to know ingly induce TI SD to brea ch its contract with Dunn, se e J

oh n P au l M

itc he ll S y s. , 17 S.W .3d at 730, or that the c onversat i o n wi th Brow n

wa s d on e wi th t

he kn ow le dg e or

be lief th at it w ou ld i nte rf e re wi th t he B ro wn ’s TI SD c on tr a c t,

se e So uth weste rn Be ll , 843 S.W .2d at 472. Acc ording ly , Calahan c onclusively neg ated the e lement of tortious interfe renc e that re quires a w illful and intentional act. Se e J oh n Pau l Mi tchel l Sy

s. , 17 S.W .3d at 730. I t then beca me Dunn’s bur d en t o raise a fa ct issue. See Lely Dev . Corp. , 86 S.W. 3d

a t 79 0. Dunn

pr od uc e d n o c ounte rv a ili nge vid e nc e tha t Ca laha n o ff e re d T I SD s ome inducem en t t o b re ac h its contract with Dunn or that her r efe renc e to a ne wspape r ar ticle that TI SD alrea dy

had s er v ed as a “negative inducement” for TI SD to breac h the contra ct. Calaha nW e n o t e t h a t D u n n ar g u e s t h a t h e r a i s e d m a t e r i a l f a c t i s s u e s c o n c e r

n i n g t h e sc op e of

“ fu ll 7 dis c los ur e ” of

his arr e st, i.e ., wh e the r he ha d to dis c los e mor e inf or ma tio n th an me re ly

the of fe ns e for whic h he wa s arr ested, a nd that the question conc erningdefe rr ed adjudica tion could be interpre ted as re fer

ring only to defe rre d ad

j u d i cation for felonies a nd offe nse involving mora l turpitude. Howe ver, the basis of his claim ag ainst Calahan is the one phone conve rsation and re fe re nc e to t

he ne ws pa

pe r a rt ic le , n e ith e r o f w hic h a

re a ff e c te d b y the se argume nts
. 10 demonstrated he r entitlement to summary judgme nt, a nd Dunn failed to me et his bur den to ra ise a fac t issue. See id.

Calahan a lso conclusively neg ated the e lement of c ausation. Causation in a tortious interfe renc e ca se is “but for” causation; the t est in whether the ac t was a substantial fa ctor in ca using the injury “without which the harm would not have oc curr ed.” Se e CO C Se rv s. , 150 S.W .3d at 679. Th e f a c to r s g iv e n b y T I SD a s th e c a u s e o f th e d e c is io n n o t to a ll o w D u n n to te a c h w e r e that he did not “fully

disclose” his ar

rest to TI SD and t h at h e l ied on his application whe n he said “ No” in response to the que stion concer ning de fer

red a djudication. Du n n ’s pl eading s alleg e that 7 Calahan’ s interfe renc e ca

used the loss of his job a

nd the associated lost wag es and be nefits. Dunn’s brief a ddresse s t h e el em ent of c ausation in a sing le sentenc e: “B ut for Calaha n’s interfe renc e, Dunn wo uld have re ta ine d h is p os iti on wi th T I SD a

nd Ca laha n’ s a c tio ns c a

us e d TI SD [sic ] ac tio ns . V i ct o r ia Bank &Trust v. Brady , 8 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d 9 3 1 , 9 3 9 ( T e x. 1 9 9 1 )

. ” I n h i s d i s c u s s i o nof thi s

e le me nt, Dunn

pr ov ide s n o s pe c if

ic re c or d r e fe re nc e s th a t w ou ld s ho w a ny c a us a tiv e fa c tor s f

or his injury other than those e nunciated by TI SD, nor do we f

ind such evidenc e in the re cord. B ased on this recor d, no rea sonable fac tfinder could conclude that Calahan’ s actions wer e a substantial fa ctor in causing damag es to Dunn. B eca us e C al ah an conclusively neg ated the c ausation ele ment of tortious interfer ence , see COC Servs., Ltd. , 15 0 S.W. 3d a t 67 9, the burd e n sh if te d to Du nn to r a iseI n other words, contra ry to Dunn’s posi tion, a fact i ssue about whether the contract wa s exi sting 8 or prospe ctive may

exis t. Summ ary

judgme nt is neverthele ss prop er b ec au s e of the neg ation of oth e r e le me nts
. Dunn asserts that the “full disclosure” require d by his “contra ct” f

or the de ficienc y

plan did not 9 specify that he had to disc lose this ne wspape r ar ticle. He se ems to have inter prete d the abse nce of sp e c if ic langua g e a

bo ut t he ne ws pa

pe r a rt ic le a s a

pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t Ca laha n di sc los ingits exis tence . Howeve r, nowhe re in the c orre spondence bet we en Du nn and Ta rleton conc erningthe defic iency

plan is there a

ny discussion of non-disclosure of any information. 11 a fa ct issue, see Lely Dev . Corp. , 86 S.W .3d at 790. He did not do so. According ly , Calahan w as

en t i t l edt o s u m m ary

j u d gm en taga i n s tDu n nb ec au s e s h e n ega t edt h e e x i s t en ce o f a tl ea s to n e e l em ent of plaintiff’s c ause of

action. See id. We h a ve a c c e pte d D unn’s ch ara c te ri zat ion of the c on tr a c t a s e xistin g . Ev e n if 8

we we re to c on sid e r D un n’ s c a us e of a c tio n a s th a t f

or int e rf e re nc e wi th p ro sp e c tiv e bu sin e ss relations, Calahan would still prevail by neg atin g t h e ele ments that the defe ndant’s conduc t was indepe ndently

tortious or wrong ful and that the plaintiff’s dama g e wa s the result of de fenda nt’s act. Johnson , 188 S.W .3d at 304. An “inde pendently tort i o u s ac t ” d o es not mean that plaintiff

mus t be a ble to p ro ve an in de pe nd e nt t or t; the pla int if

f m us t pr ov e that de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t w ou ld be ac tionable under

a re cog nized tort. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Sturges , 52 S.W .3d 711, 726 (T e x. 20 01 ). Ca laha

n a nd B ro wn pr od uc e d e vid e nc e that the ir

ph on e c a ll s imp ly

inv olv e d a

re sp on se by Calahan to B rown’s que stion about h o w t o v er i fy the details of Dunn’ s offe nse; Calahan

me nti on e d to B ro wn a ne ws pa pe r art ic le a

bo ut wh ic h B ro wn a lr e a dy kn e w. Th e re is n o a c tio na ble tor t pr e se nt o r a sse rt ion

ma de that th e c on ve rs a tion was de fa ma tor y or fr a ud ule nt. A r e a so na

ble 9 fac tfinder c ould not conclude that Calahan committ ed a tortious act in her phone ca ll. The ca usation element a lso fail s fo r t he same rea sons as previously discussed. Ther e wa s no evidenc e that12

Calahan’ s acts ca

used dama g e to Dunn and no evidenc e that the c ause of TI SD’s non-re tention of Dunn was ba sed on any

rea sons other than those stated by the district, which we re not re lated to the

conver sation betwee n Br own and Cala han. Dunn also cla imed that Ca l ahan inter fer ed with his contrac t with Tarleton by preve nting the de ficienc y plan from be ing implemen t ed . Howeve r, the implementation of the defic iency

plan depe nded on Dunn’ s secur ing e mplo y m en t
. W e have he ld that Calahan’s a ctions did no t in te rf

e re nc e wi th D un n’ s c on tr a c t; TI SD’ s d e c isi on wa s n ot b a se d o n Ca laha n’ s a c tio ns . Acc ording ly , Calahan did not ca use the ter

mination o f t h e d eficiency plan by preve nting his e mpl oy

me nt.

Conclusion We h old thatCa lah an h as co ncl us iv ely negat ed o ne o r m ore e lem ent s o f D un n’ s c a us e of action for

tortious interfer ence and, thus, was e ntitled to sum mary judgme nt. See Lely Dev . Co. , 86 S.W .3d at 790. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule D unn’s first issue. Be cause we have held that Cala han

wa s e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt as a de fe nd ant wh o co nc lus ive ly ne g ate d o ne or mor e e le me nts of the plaintiff’ s claim, we w ill not address Dunn’s issues conc erningCalahan’ s aff irmative def

enses beca use t hey are not nece ssary to resolve this ca se. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (opinion to be as brie fCalahan als o moved for summar y judgme nt on Dunn’s claim of intentional infliction 10 of emotional di s t re s s . Dunn bring s no issue or ar g ument on appea l conce rning the summary judgme nt ag ainst him on that claim and so waived a ppeal of that claim. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1(e)

. F ur the r, Ca laha

n’ s a c tio n in

dis c los ingthe ne ws pa

pe r a rt ic le do e s n ot r ise to t

he le ve l of

“ e xtre me and outra g eous” c onduct that this tort requires. S e e Tw y man v. Tywman, 855 S.W .2d 619, 62 1 ( T e x. 1 9 9 3 )

. E xtr e m e an d o u t r a g e o u s c o n d u c t i s c o n d

u c t s o o u t r a g e o u s i n c h ar a c te r, a ndso e xtre me in d e g re e , a s to “ g o be y on d a ll po ssi ble bo un ds of de c e nc y , a nd to b e re g ard e d a s atr oc iou s, and utterly

intolerable in a

civiliz ed community .” Id

. (citing Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 46, cmt. d.). 13 as pra cticable while addr essing al l i ssues nec essar y to disposit ion of claim). We affir m the trial 10

c ourt ’s su mma

ry jud g me nt.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med on Motion for Rehea ring Filed: De cembe r 17, 2008