### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ary 14, 200 6

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MIC HAE L JAM ES GR UBB

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty

No. S48, 131 P hylli s H. Miller, Judge

No. E2005-01555-CC A-R3- CD - F iled April 18, 2006

This is a direct a

ppeal a s of rig ht from a c onviction on a jury verdic t for ag g ravated robbe ry

. The Def endant wa s sentence d as a Rang e I , standard offe n d er t o twelve y ear s in the Depa rtment of Cor re c tio n. Onapp e a l, the De fe nd a nt r a ise s f ou r i ssu e s: ( 1) th e tr ial c ou rt e rr e d inov e rr

uli ng his motion to s uppress e vidence obtained during a sea rch of his car, ( 2) the trial c ourt err ed in allowing into evidence the pre liminary hearing te stimonyof a police office r who was dece ased at the time of trial, (3) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to find him g uiltyof ag g ravated robbe ry , and (4) his sentence is ex cessive. We a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.
David W. Tipton, Bristol, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Michael James Grubb.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. Turne r, As sis ta nt Att orne y Ge ne ra l; Gre eley Wells, Dist rict Attorney Gene ral; and William B. Har per, A ssist an t Di s t ri ct Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

F AC TS The c onviction and sentenc e at issue in this ap peal stems fr om the May 11, 2003 arme d robbery of a he alth food store in B ristol, Tennessee . The Defendant, Michae l J ames Gr ubb, was the get -a wa y d river f

or a two- man team that f irst case d and then r obbed the small business and f led

acr oss the state line to Bristol, Virginia, whe re the Def endant wa s eventua lly

arr ested. In October

o f 2 0 0 3
, a S u l l i v a n C o u n t y g r a n d j u r y i n d i c t e dt h e D e f e n d a n to n o n e c o u n to f

a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 402.T h e al t er n at i v e s pel l i n g “ Le eg an ” i s a l s o u s ed i n t h e r ec or d. 1

M s. H e a the r B o w e rs tes tif ie d th a t sh e w a s a b le to giv e a d e sc rip tio n o f t h e ye a r, m a k e a n d m o d e l o f t h e ge t2

a w a y ve h ic le b e c a u se sh e w o rk e d a t a u se d c a r lo t.

O f f i cer B eyer ’ s t est i m o ny ori gi nat ed at a prel i m i nary hearin g and was adm i t t ed i nt o t he reco rd at bo t h t he 3

su p p re ssio n he a rin g a n d the trial.

-2- Th e e vid e nc e in the re c or d b e fo reus sh ow s th a t onthe a ft e rn oo n o f M a y 11
, 20 03 , M s. Jenn if e r L e a g a n, theow ne r o f B ri sto l H e a lthF oo d Sto re , a nd a n e mpl oy e e , Ms. Cle nn ie B ow e rs ,

1

wer e wor king in the store . Acc ording to Ms. L eag an, “a man came in the store with a ski ma sk on, a g un in his hand and coming towards us said ‘I want y our money now.’” Ms. L eag an took out the

c a sh re g ist e r dra we r a nd turne d it ov e r to the ro bb e r. Th e ro bb e r d e ma nd e d th a t Ms . B ow e rs g o to the bac k of the store, and she complied. Whil e in the back, Ms. B ower s dialed 911 and re ported the robbery . The robbe r left with $259.

Ms. L eag an test i fi ed t h at the man who r obbed her was blac k, “six fee t or five f eet e leven inches,” and had a

“medium build.” The r obber was wea ring a dar k colore d T-shirt, brown g loves

a nda bla c k s ki- ma sk . The g un us e d wa s des c ri be d as bla c k an d not a re vo lve r but the kin d “ wi th

a clip.” Severa l day s afte r the robbery , Ms. L eag an was watching T.V. whe n she saw a news re port of a w hite man that had be en appr ehende d as a suspe ct in a rec ent robbery

. Ms. L eag an re cog nized the man, which turned out to be the Def endant, and phoned the police to inf orm them that this man had bee n in her store about t wo hours befor e the robbery

. She reme mbere d him because of a T- shirt he wa s wea

ring which stated “ rea l men don’t nee d direc tions.”

At app ro xima te ly

the sa me t im e th e ro bb e r w a s f le e ing the sc e ne , M s. Cle nn ie B ow e rs ’ daug hter, Ms. He ather

Bow ers, dr ove into the hea lth store parking lot. Ms. Heather Bow ers testified that as she e ntere d the par king lot, she obse rved a car leaving in which the passe ng er, a black male
, was leaned over

on top of the driver , a white male . She further s t ated that she saw the two me n leave in a Chevrolet Cele brity “betwe en ‘84 and ‘86, g ray .” At the motion to suppress, Ms. He ather 2 Bow ers de scribed the driver as having g ray , shoulder-le ng th hair. At the trial, she admitted she wa s not sure of the hair, a nd stated that her initial re port to the police reg arding the driver of the ca r wa s simplythat he wa s a white male

.
Offic ers Craig B ey er and J ames Almany of the B ristol, Tennessee Police Depa rtment

rec eived a n “offi ci al b u l letin from our c entra l dispatch that there had bee n an armed robbe ry .” Of fi c e r Alm a ny te sti fi e d tha t the “ su sp e c t veh ic le wa s blue or g ray in c olo r, Che vy

Ce le brity , w ith a white male and a bla ck male.” Offic er B ey er te stified that h e wa s l o o k ing f or a g ray Chevrolet Celebrity with a white male driver and a black male passeng er, and shortly there afte r obser ved and beg an to follow a “ fade d blue Celebrity .” As Off icer Be y er f ollowed the vehic le, he r adioed c entra l 3 dis patc h to ru n th e ta g nu mbe r. B e fo re the re su lts c a me ba c k, the su sp e c t ha d drive n a c ro ss the state line into Virg inia, and the B ristol, Vi r g in ia Police Depa

rtment was c ontacted. O ffice r Almany joined Offic er B ey er, and both office rs followed the suspect vehic le into Virg inia.-3-

Both Of fice r B ey er and Offic er A lmany testified that when the y fi rs t b ega n to follow the

su sp e c t ve hic le
, on ly on e oc c up a nt, a wh ite ma le drive r, c ou ld be se e n. Ho we ve r, a t so me po int bo th office rs observe d a black male rise from the passeng er seat of the vehicle. Of fice r Almany

testified t h at i t was at this point, and not prior, that the off icer s activate d their blue lig hts. Both offic ers testified that at one point in the pursuit, the De fendant’s car slowed, t he passeng er ex ited and ran off, and the D e f

e n d a n t th e n d r o v e o n

. O f f ic e r B e y e r c o n ti n u e d to f o ll o w th e D e f

e n d a n t, w ho was eventually

stopped by

Bristol, Virginia police . Offic er B ey er te stified that the ca r he ha d pursued

was re g istered to the De fendant. Office r Almany broke off hi s pursuit of the De fendant in an attempt to appre hend the suspec t who fled on foot. Offic er Almany
, who had a K-9 unit with him , g ave a
wa rn ing and th en rel e a se d th e po lic e do g . T his su sp e c t, a bla c k ma le wh o h a d b e e n ridi ng a s a passeng er in the c ar, w as not appre hended.

Offic er Steve Crawf

ord of the B ristol, Vi rgi nia Police Depa rtment was notified the day of the robbe ry

that Bristol, Tennessee Police w ere in pursuit of a vehic le t hat had c rossed into Virg inia. Offic er Cra wf

o rd s o on observe d the Chevrolet pur sued by what he r ecog nized as an unmarke d Bristol, Tennessee Police D epartment vehicle. Offic er Crawf ord joined the pursuit and w itnessed the Def endant r un two stop signs and spe ed throug h a re sidential area. T h e De fendant was subsequently

stopped by

the B ristol, Virg inia Police. The Defendant was a rre sted for f

elony eluding police but was later turned over to Tennesse e law e nforc ement off icer s. Offic er Cra wford ide ntified the Def endant as the driver of the car he pursued, and desc ribed the D efe ndant’s ca r as “ fade d g ray .” He a lso noted that he saw a shopping ba g on the front se at of the D efe ndant’s ca r.

Detec tive J ohnny

Hale of the B ristol, Tennessee Police Depa rtment testified that he inventoried the D efe ndant’s vehic le af ter it was towe d back to Te nnessee and re cover ed a bla ck semi-automatic sty le pistol and a pair of brown g loves, which we re f ound in a white plastic ba g on the front se at. The handg un turned out to be a BB or pellet g un. A black ski-ma sk was re cover ed from under

the front seat. As to the color of the vehicle, D et. Hale stated it “depe nds on what ar ea of the c ar y ou look at. P otentially blue, but it has what would appe ar to be g ray ,” and on another

occa sion he furthe r testified that the c ar a ppear ed either

g ray or blue de pending on the ang le at which it was viewe d.

Detec tive Hale a lso testified t hat when he first met with the Def endant, the D efe ndant was advised of his rig hts, electe d to sign a waiver
, and agr eed to talk with the detec tive. The De fendant initiallyclaimed he did not know anything a bout the robbery , never

had a bla ck male in his ca r that day
, and had not loaned his car to any one else in the past ten day s. The De fendant stated he did not kn ow ho w the ite ms r e c ov e re d f ro m hi s ve hic le ha d ma de the ir way int o h is c ar. De te c tiv e Ha le a lso noted when the Def

endant wa s arr ested a nd interviewe d he was wea ring a T-shirt upon whic h was printed “Rea l men don’t ask for instructions.”

The De fendant filed a motion to s uppress the e vidence rec overe d from his vehicle in March of 2004. Ove r the course of two day s in Dec ember 2004, an evidentiary hearing w as conduc ted on the De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n, a t th e c on c lus ionof wh ic h th e tria l c ou rt

de nie d th e mot ionto s up pr e ss. Severa l day s later the Def endant rece ived a jury trial and was ultim ately found g uiltyof ag g ravated-4-

robbery . After

a sente ncing hearing, the Def endant was sentenc ed as a Rang e I , standard of fende r to twelve y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. The De fendant timelyfiled a moti o n fo r a new trial, which wa s denied, a nd this appeal followe d.

AN AL YSI S On app e a l, the De fe nd a nt ar g ue s tha t the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d inde nying his mot ionto s up pr e ss evidenc e and in a llowing into evidenc e the preliminary hearing te stimonyof a police office r who wa s
no t a va ila ble to t e sti fy

a t tria l. T he De fe nd a nt a lso a sse rt s th a t th e rewa s in su ffi cie nt ev ide nc e to support his conviction and that his sentenc e wa s improperly enhanc ed and the ref

ore e x cessive.

I. M ot ion to Suppr e ss I n his first issue, the Def

endant c laims he was subjec ted to an unlawf ul sear ch in vi olation of his rights under the Fourth A mendment to the United States Consti tution and Article I , Section 7 of t he Tennessee Constit ution. To support this claim the Def endant a rg ues that the police did not have r easona

ble suspicion to stop his vehicle and conduct a war rentless sea

rch be cause the police

wer e instructed to look for a g ray car with two occupants but inst ead pur sued the De fendant’s blue

car when it appe are d to have only one occ upant. T h u s , t h e De fendant asserts, the f acts did not support a re asonable suspicion for st o p p i n g the Def endant’ s vehicle and the re sulting sea rch w as ill e g a l. A c c or din g ly , th e De fe nd a nt c la ims the tria l cou rt e rr e d inde nying his mot ionto s up pr e ss the evidenc e re cover ed fr om his vehicle.
A. Suppression revie w standar d Whe n r e vie wi ng the c or

re c tne ss o f a

tria l c ou rt ’s g rant o r d e nial of a pretria l mo tio n to suppress, an a

ppellate c ourt must uphold the trial court’s finding s of fact “u nless the evidenc e preponde rate s otherwise.” State v. Odo m , 9 2 8 S .W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn.1996). This standar d

rec og nizes that the credibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, and r esolution of confl i ct s i n t h e evide nce a re matters “e ntrusted to the trial judg e as the trier of fac t.” I d. Mo re ov e r, it i s se ttl e d la w that th e part y prev a ili ng a t th e tria l c ou rt is e nti tle d to the str on g e st le g iti mate vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll r e a so na ble inf e re nc e s dr a wn fr om that e vid e nc e , se e State v. Hicks, 55 S

. W.3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001), a nd the def endant ha s the burden of

establishing that the evidenc e contained in the rec ord preponde rate s ag ainst the finding s of fac t mad e b yt h e t ri al court, seeBr aziel v. State, 529 S.W .2d 501, 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)

.
Howeve r, this Court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law . See State v. Randolph, 74 S.W .3d 330, 333 (Tenn. 2002) . The a pplication of the law to the fac ts as found by the tr ia l c ou rt

is a qu e sti on of

la w w hic h a n a

pp e llate c ou rt

re vie ws de no vo . Se e State v. Danie l, 12 S.W. 3d42 0, 42 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0)

. B e c aus e the fa c ts pr e se nte d at the su pp re ssi on he ari ng in this

case are undisputed, only

questions of law a

re be fore this Court. There fore
, our review of the re cord befor e us is purely d e novo. See State v. G onzalez, 52, S .W.3d 90, 94 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).T h e F o u rth A m e n d m e n t t o the U n ited S ta te s C o n stitutio n p ro v id e s a s fo llo w s: 4

U nre aso na b l e se arc he s an d seizu res. T he ri gh t o f t he p eo p l e to b e se cu re in t he i r p erso ns, h ou s es , pa per s , an d ef

fec t s , ag ai n s t un r ea s on abl e s ea r ch es an d s ei zu r es , s h al l n ot be v i ol at ed, and no warrant s shal l i ss ue, but up o n pro b ab l e cause, s up p o rt ed by oath o r af f i rma t i o n, and p a rtic u la rly d e sc rib ing the p la c e to b e se a rc h e d , an d the p e rs o n s o r th ing s to b e se iz e d

.

A rtic le 1 , S e c tio n 7 o f t h e T e n n e sse e C o n stitutio n gu a ra n te e s tha t: t h e peopl e s h al l be s ec u r e i n t h ei r pe r s on s , houses, p aper s a n d pos s es s i on s , f r om

u n r ea s on abl e s ea r ch es a n d s ei zu r es ; a n d t h at g en er al war r an t s , w h er eby a n of f i ce r ma y be

com manded t o s ear ch s us pect ed pl ace s , wi t hout evi dence o f t he f act co mm i t t ed, or t o s ei ze any p ers o n or p ers o ns no t nam ed
, who se offences are not pa rti cul arl y de scr i b ed and

s u ppor t ed by e v i den ce , a r e dan g er ou s t o l i ber t y a n d ou g h t n ot t o be g r an t ed.

T he i nt ent an d purpos e of t he prohi bi t i ons agai ns t unr eas onabl e se ar che s and s ei zur es found i n t he T enn es s ee 5
C ons t i t ut i on ha s been found t o be t he s ame as t hat b ehi nd t he provi s i on f ound i n t he Fourt h Amendm ent t o t he U ni t ed S ta te s C o n stitutio n . S e e S ta te v. S im p so n , 9 6 8 S .W .2 d 7 7 6 , 7 7 9 (T e n n . 1 9 9 8 ).

O ur cour t s ha ve r ecogn i zed t hr ee t y pes of pol i ce- ci t i zen i nt er act i ons : ( 1) a f ul l s cal e st o p a nd ar r es t , wh i ch 6

m ust be s up p o rt ed by pro b ab l e cause, s ee W hren v. U ni t ed Stat es, 51 7 U

. S. 80 6
, 80 9

- 1 0 (19 9 6 ); (2) a bri ef i nvest i gat o ry

s t op, w h i ch mu s t be ba s ed on r ea s on abl e s u s pi ci on s u ppor t ed by s pec i f i c an d a r t i cu l abl e f ac t s , s ee T er r y v

. O h i o, 392 U

. S. 1, 20- 23 ( 19 68 ) ; an d (3) a br i ef pol i ce- ci t i zen enc ount er , whi ch r equi r es no ob j ect i ve j us t i f i cat i on, s ee U ni t ed St at es

v . D ra yto n , 5 3 6 U .S . 1 9 4 , 2 0 1 -0 2 (2 0 0 2 ). S e e a lso D a n ie l, 1 2 S .W .3 d a t 4 2 4

. -5- B. Sea rch and seizure law Both the F ourth Amendment to the United States Constit ution and Article 1, Sec tion 7 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ionpr ohib it “ un re a so na ble se arc he s a ndse izur e s. ” Th e int e nt andpu rp os e 4 be hin d th e se c on sti tut ion a lly pr ote c te d rig hts is to “sa fe g ua rd the priva c y a ndse c urity of ind ivi du a ls ag ainst arbitra

ry invasions of g overnme nt of ficials.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U .S. 523, 528 (1967). As a g ener al rule, w arr antless sea rche s or seizures ar e presumed unre asonable , and any 5

e v i d e n c e d i s c o v e r e d t h e r e b y i s s u b j e c tt o s u p p r e s s i o n u n l e s s t h e S t a t e d e m o n s tr a t e s b y a pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e that the se arc h or se izur e wa s c on du c te d pu rsuan t t o a n arr ow ly define d exception to the warr ant re quirement. See Coolidge v. N ew Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454- 55 (1971); State v. Ga

rcia , 123 S.W .3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2003)

.

I n this case, it is not contested that the De fe n d an t was seized and his c ar w as sea rche d pu rs ua nt t o a n in ve sti g a tory sto p. Th e re fo re , th e prima ry iss ue be fo rethi s Co urt is wh e the r this 6

wa rr a ntl e ss s e izur e a nd su bs e qu e nt se arc h wa s con sti tut ion a lly “ un re a so na ble .” Whil e a

wa rr a nt i s normally require d when a

g overnme nt official intrude s upon the privac y of a c itiz en, ther e ar e seve ral

na rr ow ly de fi ne d e xce pti on s to thi s w arr a nt r e qu ir e me nt. One su c h r e c og nize d e xce pti on e xists when the police make a

brief inve stigatory

stop. See Ter

ry , 392 U.S. at 21; Garc ia, 123 S.W.3d at 34 3. I n o rd e r f

or su c h a wa rr a ntl e ss sei z ure to be de e me d r e a so na ble , th e Un ite s State s Su pr e me Court has held that the de tention m u s t h av e b een ba sed on “r easona ble” suspicion, supported by “spe ci fi c and a

rticulable f

acts” that a criminal offense has bee n committed or is about to be committed. Terry , 392 U.S. 1 at 20-21. See a lso St ate v. B ridg es, 963 S.W.2d 487, 4 92 (Tenn. 1997).-6-

C. R e a so na

blesu sp ic iona na ly sis Det e rmi n ing w hether

rea sonable suspicion existed in a particular stop “is a fa ct-intensive a nd objective a naly sis.” Gar cia, 123 S.W.3d. at 3 4 4

. The likelihood of criminal activity require d for

re a so na ble su sp ic ionis n ot a s g re a t a s th a t r e qu ir e d f or pr ob able caus e an d is “ c on sid e ra bly le ss” than would be ne eded to satisfy a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standard. United States v. Soklow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). See also State v. Keith, 978 S.W .2d 861, 866 (Tenn. 1998). Furthermore
, when e valuating whether a police of

fice r’s re asonable suspicion is supp o rt ed by specific and articula ble fa cts, a c ourt “must consider the totalityof the c ircumstance s.” State v . Hord, 106 S.W. 3d68
, 71 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 02 ). Th is i nq uiry loo ks to s uc h f

a c tor s a s th e pu bli c int e re st

serve d by the seizure, the nature and scope of t he int rusion, and the objective facts on which the law enfor ceme nt office r re lied in light of his experien ce

. See State v. Pulley , 863 S.W .2d 29, 30-31 (T e nn

. 19 93 ). Th e ob

je c tiv e fa c ts o n w hic h a n o ff ic e r r e lie s c a n in c lud e , b ut a reno t li mit e d to , h is or her own observations, information obtained from other officer s or age ncies, off ender s’ patterns of operation, a nd--most cruc ial in this case --information f rom informants. See State v L awson, 929 S.W .2d 406, 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

.

I n th is a pp e a l, the De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e po lic e “ la c ke d s pe c if ic art ic ula

ble fa c ts

nece ssary t o cr eate a re asonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investig atory

stop” of the Def endant’ s vehicle. To support this claim, the Defe ndant ar g ues that bec ause the information provided fr om the citizen informant described two s uspects in a gr ay Chevrolet Celebrity , the police ha d n o re a so na

ble su sp ic ion to pu rs ue the De fe nd a nt’ s b lue Che vr ole t Ce le brity wh ic h th e y

ini tia lly believed to c ontain only

one occ upant.

As stated a

b o v e , w h e ne v alu ati n g w h e th e r a p olice off icer ’s re asonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable facts, a court “must consider the totality of t he circumstance s.” Hord, 106 S.W. 3da t 71 . B a se d o n th e tot a lit y of the c ir c ums ta nc e s, we c on c lud e that th e of fi c e rs ha d a mpl e specific and articulable fa cts upon which to base a re asonable suspicion that the Def endant wa s involved, or had r ece ntly been involved, in c riminal activity . As n o t ed b ythe trial court, the description of the suspects was c ommunicated to the police within minutes of the robbery , and a c ar

“ me e tin g that de sc ri pti on ” wa s o bs e rv e d b y of fi c e rs sh ortly

th ereafter

“ ne ar w he rethe ro bb e ry

is supposed to have ha

ppened.” The pho t o s au t h enticate d at trial by multipl e witnesses support the police off icer s’ testimony

that the Def

endant’ s vehicl e co u l d b e described as e ither g ray or blue, depending u p o n the ang le from whic h it is vi ewe d. The trial c ourt found that the c ar “ looks absolutely

g ray ” fr om the back, but f rom the “side it’s a

bluish-gr ay . I t’s just, itcould be e ither one.” Acc ording to the evidenc e contained in the re cord, the color, make and model of t he suspect’s car

as re ported by

the witness constitu t ed specific fac ts which supported re asonable suspicion to stop the Def endant’ s vehicle.

Ad dit ion a lly , th e e vid e nc e re ve a ls that the po lic e did no t a c tiv a te the ir blu e lig hts , i. e ., did not initi ate their

investigatory stop, until afte r t hey observe d two occupants in the vehicle. As suc h, there was no discr epanc y betwee n the citizen informant’s desc ri p t i o n o f the two suspects a nd the

ve hic le in w hic h th e y

fl e d th e sc e ne a nd the De fe nd a nt’ s veh ic le a nd nu mbe r o f o c c up a nts a t th e tim e the inv e sti g a tory

sto p w a s in iti a te d. Th e re fo re , th e se arc h of the De fe nd a nt’ s v e hic le su bje c t to thi sA s no t ed ab o ve, O f f i cer B eyer ’ s t est i m o ny at t he p rel i m i nary heari ng i m p l i cat ed t he D efend ant i n t he rob b ery 7

a n d e n su ing p o lice p u rs u it.

T hi s Co ur t pre vi ous l y not ed t hat “ [ a] t one t i me, t her e was a t hi r d re qui r ement , t hat t he evi dence not be cr uci al 8

o r devest at i ng. ” Sum m ers , 15 9 S.W

. 3 d at 59 7 n. 4

. H o w e v e r, o u r m o st recent case l aw has “ d i spo sed” o f t hi s t hi rd (c o n tinu e d ...)

-7- investigatory

stop was not unlawful within the pur v i ew o f t h e Te nnessee and United States Constit utiona l p r otections ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s, and the e vidence obtained fr om this search

wa s p ro pe rl y

a dmi tte d at tria l. T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

II. P relim inary Hearing Testim ony of Of fi cer Beyer I n th e De fe nd a nt’ s se c on d is su e on app e a l, h e arg ue s th a t th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d in a llo wi ng int o evidenc e the pre liminary

hearing te stimonyof Off icer Craig Be y er. The Def

endant doe s not deny that Offic er B ey er w as dec ease d at the time of the suppr ession hearing and trial and ther efor e not

a va ila ble to te sti fy in pe rs on

. Th e De fe nd a nt al so do e s not de ny that O ff ic e r B e y e r w a s in de e d c ro sse xami ne d b y

De fe nd a nt’ s c ou ns e l a t the pr e lim ina ry he ari ng

. Ra the r, the De fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t hi s
c o n f r o n t a t i o n r i g h t s h a v e b e e n v i o l a t e d b e c au s e t h e t yp e o f c r o s s

- e xa m i n a t i o n c o n d uc te d a t a pr e lim ina ry he ari ng is d if

fe re nt f ro m th a t c on du c te d at tria l a ndbe c aus e , a c c or din g to the De fe nd a nt, the Tenne ssee Constitution provides a g reater c onfrontation rig ht than that demanded under the United States Constit ution. The State arg ues on appe al t hat the trial c ourt properly admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of Officer Be y er pursuant to Tennesse e Rule of Evide nce 804, w hich allows hea

rsay exceptions for the a dmission of prior stat em en t s o f unavailable witnesses, and 7 further arg ues that t he admissi on of this prior statement did not violate the De fendant’s confr ontation rig hts.

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 801(c) define s hear say as “a statement, other than one made by the dec lara nt while t es t ify ing at the trial or hea ring , offe red in e vidence to prove the truth of the matter a sserte d

. ” Gene rally , “[h] ear say is not admissi ble except as provide d by these rule s or otherwise by

law.” T enn. R. Evid. 802. Offic er B ey er’ s preliminary h ea ri n g t est imony , when prese nted at trial, was hear say

. See Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c) . Howeve r, in limit ed cir cumstance s, prior testimonymay be admissible at trial throug h a hear say exception if the dec lara nt is unavailable a nd if the party

ag ainst whom the testimony is offer ed had an opportunit y and a similar motive to deve lop the testimony

throug h other methods such a s cr o ss-examination. S ee T enn. R. Evid. 804(b)( 1).

I n addition to the ge nera l rule excluding he arsay , criminal def endants are also g uaranteed the ri g ht t o c on fr on t w itn e sse s a g a ins t th e m. Se e U. S. Con st. a me nd

. VI (“ I n a ll c ri min a l pr os e c uti on s, the ac cused sha ll enjoy

the right

. . . to be confronted with the wit nesses a g ainst him . . . .”); Tenn Const. art. I , § 9 (“That in all criminal prosec ution s , t h e ac cused hath the rig ht . . . to meet the witnesses fa ce to f

ace. . . .”). A ccor dingly
, in c ases such as the one at bar in which the prose cution offe red the former

testimon y o f an u n available witness, the State must also establish two pr e re qu isi te s in or de r t o s a tis fy a de fe nd a nt’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht o f c on fr on ta tio n. F ir st, the State must show that the decla

rant is truly unavailable afte r g ood faith ef forts to obtain his presenc e, and second, that the evidenc e carrie s its own indicia of r eliability

. State v. Summers, 159 S.W .3d 586, 8(

. . . con t i n u ed) 8

re q u ire m e n t. Id

. -8- 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). See also State v. Arnold, 719 S.W .2d 543, 548 (Tenn. Cri m

. App. 19 86 ). Withre sp e c t to thela tter r equir e me nt, the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt ha s r e c e ntl y
m an d at ed t h att h e r el i ab i l i t y o f ap ri o r t es t i m o n i al s t at em en ti s es t ab l i s h e d e x c l u s i v el y t h ro u gh

cross-e x amination. See Craw ford v. Washing ton, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).

I n this case, it is undisputed that the decla rant wa s dece ased at the time of the De fendant’s suppression hea

ring and trial, a nd there fore was una vailable to testify in person. As to the sec ond require ment, our supre me court has previously ruled th at t h e former testimony exception to the he ars a y ru le is b a se d o n s uc h a

fi rm fo un datio n that it me e ts the ind ic ia of re lia bil ity re qu ir e me nt. See State v. Causby , 706 S.W .2d 628, 631 (Tenn. 1986) . Nonethele ss, the Def endant a rg ues that he wa s denied his conf

rontation rig ht because (1) Crawf ord v. Washington requires a prior op po rt un ity

to c ro ss- e xami ne thede c larant and“ the pu rp os e of c ro ss- e xami natio n o f a

wi tne ss i n a pre liminary

hearing, w here the issue is only one of pr obable c au s e, is totallysepar ate than the purpose of cross-e x amination wher e the issue is g uilt or innoce nce pr esente d to the ultimate trier of fac t,” and (2) because “the L ang uag e of the Tenne ssee Constitution . . . gra nts an eve n broade r rig ht of c on fr on ta tio n. ” We d isa g re e wi th b otharg ume nts

.
Th e “ pu rp os e of a pr e lim ina ry he ari ng is .

. . to d e te rm ine wh e the r the ree xists pr ob able c aus e to believe that a

crime ha s been c ommitt ed and that the acc used committed the crime.” State v. L ee, 69 3 S. W.2 d 3 61 , 3 63 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 85 ). Th e dif fe re nc e in the stand ardof pro of no twithstanding, the basic purpose of t he preliminary hearing and t he trial a re not “ totally

separ ate” as the De fe nd a nt a

rg ue s, bu t r a the r d e a l w ithpr e c isel y th e same is su e : w he the r o r n ot the a c c us e d is g uiltyof the c rimes for w hich he or she is char g ed. See State v. H owell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that a preliminary hearing testimony of a de clar ant could be introduc ed at tria l

u n d e r t h e f o r m e r t e s t i m o n y e x c e p t i o n b a s e d p r i m ar i l y o n a f i n d i n g t h a t“ a tb o t h t h e [ p r e l i m i n ar y] hearing and the s ubsequent trial, the testimonywas a ddresse d to the same issue of ‘ [w] hether or not the def e n d an t[ ] h a d

c o mmit te d the offe nse’ c harg ed.”) . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the D efe ndant in this case had the opportunity to cross-e x amine Of

fice r B ey er at the preliminary hearing w ith the

sa me mot ive s tha t wou ld ha ve g uid e d his c ro ss- e xami natio n o f the de c larant h a d h e be e n a va ila ble at trial. See State v. B rian Eric McGow en, No. M2004-00109-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2008183, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, Aug . 18, 2005) (holding that the trial court did not err in allowing pr e lim ina ry he ari ng te sti mon y

to b e int ro du c e d at tria l un de r the fo rm e r te sti mon y e xce pti on be c aus e the motive to cross-e x amine the defe ndant was the same at both the preliminary hearing and trial). Thus, Crawf

ord’s c ross-examination require ment was met in this case

.
The De fendant also alleg es that the Tenne ssee Constit ution, whic h g uarantees a rig ht to mee t witnesses “f

aceto fac e,” gr ants a broader rig ht to confr ontation than t he United St ates Constituti on. Howeve r, t he Defendant fails t o cite to any authority to support this proposition. Our supreme court has dec lare d that the same standa rds and c riteria a

pply to both the United Stat es and Te nnessee Con sti tut ion s’ ri g hts of

c on fr on ta tio n. Se e Caus by , 706 S.W. 2da t 63 1. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.W e n ot e t h at bec au s e of t h e u n u s u al l an g u ag e u s ed by t h e D ef en dan t i n h i s appe l l at e br i ef
, t h i s i s s u e cou l d be 9

con s t r u ed as a c l ai m t h at t h e t r i al cou r t er r ed i n e x er ci s i n g i t s di s cr et i on a s a “ t h i r t ee n t h j u r or ” pu r s u an t t o Rul e 33( f) of the T e n n e sse e R u le s o f C rim ina l P ro c e d u re

. A s the S ta te p ro p e rly p o inte d o u t in i ts a p p e llate b rie f, a tr ia l c o u rt’s d et erm i nat i o n a s a “t hi rt eent h juro r” i s no t s ub ject t o ap p el l at e revi ew. See Stat e v. M o at s, 90 6 S.W

. 2 d 43 1
, 43 5 (T enn. 1 9 9 5 ). H o wever, we have i nt erpret ed t he D efend ant ’ s t hi rd i ss ue o n ap p eal t o chal l enge t he l egal s uf f i ci ency o f

t he

e v id e n c e , w h ic h is a c o g n iz a b le c la im fo r a p p e llate re v ie w

. -9- III. Ins uf

fi cient Evidence The De fe ndant also cla ims that “the verdic t of the jury is contrary

to the weig ht of the evidenc e and the ref

ore must be ove rturned.” To support this assertion, the D ef en d ant ar g ues that t h e p ro s ecution presented little direc t evidence linking him to the robbery , essentially only the testimonyof Ms. Heather B ower s. The De fendant notes that this witness cou l d n o t identify the Def endant a s the man she sa w flee ing the scene of t he crime. Thus, the Def endant c oncludes, ba sed

on thefa c ts c on ta ine d in the re c or d, “ the re is no e vid e nc e that thi s D e fe nd a nt w a s p re se nt at th e tim e of the ro bb e ry .” Up on c are fu l exam inatio n o f the arg ume nts c on ta ine d inthe De fe nd a nt’ s a pp e llate brief, w e conc lude he is asse rting that the evidenc e pre sented at his trial was insufficie nt to lead a

rea so n ab le ju r o r to c o n c lu d e b e y o n d a r e a s o n ab le d o u b t th a t h e w a s g u il ty o f th e offe nse of

a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. 9

Tenne ssee Rule of A ppellate Proc edure 13(e) presc ribes that “[f]indings of guilt in criminal actions whether bythe trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evide nce is insuffic ient to support the finding s by

the trier of fac t of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” A convic ted criminal defendant who cha lleng es t he sufficiency of the e vidence on appea l bear s the burden of demonstrating why

the evidenc e is insufficient to support the ve rdict, bec ause a verdic t of g uilt destroy s t he pre sumption of innoce nce and imposes a presumption of g uilt. See State v. Evans, 108 S.W .3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W .3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Tug g le, 639 S .W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . This Court must reje ct a c onvicted criminal defendant’s chall en ge t o the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence if, afte r considering the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, we determine that any rational trier

of fac t c ould ha ve found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt. See J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999).

On app e a l, the State is e nti tle d to thestr on g e st l e g iti ma te vi ew of the e vid e nc e a nda ll

rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces which may be drawn t here from. See Ca rruther s, 35 S.W .3d at 558; H all, 8 S.W .3d at 599. A g uilty verdic t by the trier of fac t acc redits the testimony of the State’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s all c on fl ic ts i n th e e vid e nc e in fa vo r of the pr os e c uti on ’s the ory . Se e State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W

. 2 d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997) . Questions about the cr edibilityof witnesses, the weig ht and value of t he evidence, as well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of fac t, and this Court will not re- weig h or re- evaluate the evidenc e. See Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d at 236; Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 659. No r wi l l this Court subs titute its own infer ence s drawn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those dr awn by the trier of

fact

. See Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d at 236-37; Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 557.A l t houg h n ot r ai s ed on appeal
, we not e t hat whi l e t he D ef endan t was neve r al l ege d t o hav e hi msel f poi nt ed 10

t he hand gun at t he vi ct i m s, hi s cl ear i nvo l vem ent i n the aggravat ed rob b ery t hrough f i rs t casi ng t he st o re and t hen d ri vi ng t he get

- away ve hi cl e r ender ed hi m su bjec t t o convi ct i on for ag gra va t ed r ob bery un der t he t heor y of cr i mi nal

re sp o n sib ili ty. S e e T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 9 -1 1 -4 0 2 ; S ta te v. L e m a c k s, 9 9 6 S .W .2 d 1 6 6 , 1 7 0 -7 1 (T e n n . 1 9 9 9 ).

-10- Ag g ravated robbe ry

is defined in our c riminal code as t h e int entional or knowing theft of property from the pe rson of a nother by violence or

putting the pe rson in fea

r, ac complished with a deadly wea pon or by display of any article used to lead the victim to rea sonably believe it to be a de a dly we apo n. Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -4 02 (a )( 1)

. I n this c a se , two me n rob be d the he a lth food store in the following manner : a white male f irst case d the store; a bla ck male w earing a dark T-shirt and a black ski-mask then entered the store, brandished a handg un rea sonably believed to be a dea dly wea pon and stole cash from the store reg ister; the victims testified that they wer e “sc are d”; the bla c k ma le ran to a

c ar w a iti ng in the pa

rking lot ; a nd the wh ite ma le dr ov e thi s g e t- a way ve hic le fr om the sc e ne of

the c ri me

. Th is ev ide nc e is suf fi c ie nt to es ta

bli sh a ll of the e le me nts of the c ri me of agg ravated robbery

. Howeve r, the De fendant does not challeng e the f act that the vic tims were 10 subjected to a n ag g ravated robbe ry , rathe r he arg ues t hat t he S tate failed to provide sufficient proof of his identity

as a pe rpetrator in the ag g ravated robbe ry , specific ally ref ere ncing the lack of

direc t evidenc e pre sented at trial.

I n th is c a se , a wi tne ss te sti fi e d sh e sa w the De fe nd a nt’ s ve hic le le a ve the sc e ne of the c ri me with a b l ack male passeng er and a white male driver w ho fit the g ener al desc ription of the Def endant. This witness, who works in use d car sales, wa s very

specific about the y ear , make a nd

m o d el o f t h e ge t -a wa y

v eh i cl e a n d p o s i t i v el y

i d e n t i f i e d i tas t h e D ef

en d an t ’s v eh i cl e t h ro u gh photogr aphs submitted at trial.

I n addition to this direc t evidence , the prosec ution presented a very strong case ag ainst the Def endant ba sed on signific ant circ umstantial e vidence

. A victim remember ed that the De fendant

came into the store, looked ar ound, and then lef t the store about two hour s befor e she w as robbe d at g unpoint. The v i ct i m s p ec i fica lly reme mbere d the Def

endant be cause of an unusua l T-shirt he

was we aring at the time which c ontained writing to the ef fec t of “re al men don’t ask for dire ctions.” The De fendant w as we ar i ng this same T-shirt later that same day

when he was a

pprehe nded by po lic e . T he De fe nd a nt, wh o w a s d ri vin g a c ar m a tc hin g the de sc ri pti on of the ve hic le re po rt e d to have be en used in the r obbery , was observed a short time after therobbery in the vi cinity

near wher e the crime took place, and when the police activate d their blue lights, the Def endant f led. A blac k

ma le pa sse ng e r w e ari ng a

da rk T- sh irt w a s se e n e xitin g the De fe nd a nt’ s c ar du ri ng the po lic e pu rs uit

. The c ar in whic h the Def endant was eve ntually

appre hended w as re g istered in his name, and

c on ta ine d a

ha nd g un , br ow n g lov e s a nda bla c k s ki- ma sk

ma tc hin g the de sc ri pti on of tho se us e d in the ag g ravated robbe ry

.

I t is es ta bli sh e d la w that c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e a lon e ma y be su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

a conviction. State v. Thar

pe, 726 S.W.2d 896, 899-900 (Tenn. 1987) . The c ircumstantial evidenc e must be consistent with the guilt of t he ac cused, inc onsistent with innocence, and must ex clude e very other re as o n ab l e theory

except that of g uilt. I d. at 900. Howe ver, de fer ence clea rly lies with theW e n ot e t hat t he l egi s l at ur e has r ece nt l y amended s eve r al provi s i ons of t he C r i mi nal Sent enc i ng R eform Act 11

o f 1 9 8 9 , s a id c h a n g e s b e c o m ing e ff e c tive J u n e 7 , 2 0 0 5 . H o w e v e r, the D e fen d a n t’s cr im e s in th is c a se , as w e ll a s h is

sen t en cing
, p red ate the e f fec t i ve d ate of t he se am en d m en t s. T he refo re, t his case i s no t aff ec t ed b y t he 2 0 0 5 am en d m en t s,

a n d the sta tute s c ited in this o p inio n a re tho se tha t we re in e ff e c t at the ti m e the insta n t cr im e s w e re c o m m itt e d

.

W h i l e we dee m i t u n n ec es s ar y i n t h i s c as e, w e n ot e t h at ou r de n ov o r ev i ew of s en t en ci n g i s s u es r ai s ed on 12 appeal woul d al l ow us t o f i nd addi t i onal en han cement f act ors appl i cabl e i n t he D ef endan t ’ s cas e whi ch wer e not appl i ed b y the trial c o u rt. F o r e x a m p le , i t ap p e a rs fa c to r n in e , th a t th e D e fen d a n t “ha s a p re v io u s h isto ry o f un w ill ing n e ss to

com pl y wi t h t he condi t i ons of a s ent enc e i nv ol vi ng r el eas e i n t he com muni t y ” woul d appl y i n t he D ef endan t ’ s ca s e. See T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 (9 ) (2 0 0 3 ).

-11- j u r y, a s t h e w e i g h t o f c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s a m a t t e r f o r th e j u r y t o d e t e r m i n e

. S t a t e v

. C o u r y, 697 S.W .2d 373, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) . Additionally , whether all other rea sonable theories have be en excluded by

the evidenc e is also a que stion of f act for the jury

. Pruitt v. State, 460 S.W .2d 385, 390-91 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1970). Ba sed on the re cord be fore this Court, we conclude the jury had ample e vidence prese nted to it from which it could prope rly find that the De fendant was one of the two men i nvolved i n the robbery at i ssue i n this case . Acc ording ly , we c onclude the e vidence is sufficient to support the convic tion for ag g ravated robbe ry . This issue is without merit.

IV. Excessive Sente nce I n th e De fe nd a nt’ s f

ina l is su e on app e a l, he c la ims the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in se nte nc ing him to the maxim um sentence available for his ra ng e (twe lve y ear s) base d “solely ” o n his prior criminal

rec ord. To support this assertion, the Defenda nt, in a scant three -sentenc e “arg ument,” states that his se nte nc e wa s e nh a nc e d “ ba se d s ole ly up on his pr e vio us his tory of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns

. . . . Th is

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor wa s n ot sub mit te d to the jury or a dmi tte d b y

the De fe nd a nt. Th e re fo re , B lake ly [v. W ashing ton, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)] precludes the application of s uch fa ctors.” We f ind the Def endant’ s sentenc e was properly enhanc ed and that Blakely v. Washington has no bearing on the Def endant’ s sentence

.

I n this case the Defenda nt was found to be a Rang e I
, standard offende r, and as such he was subject to a rang e of e ight to twelve y ear s for his Class B f elony ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112 ( a)( 2). The pr esumptive sentenc e wa s the minimum in this rang e. See id. § 40-35-210( c) ( 2003). The re cord r efle cts that the trial court increa sed the De fendant’s 11
sentenc e fr om the presumptive eig ht y ear s to twelve y ear s based e ntir el y o n the Def endant’ s extensive prior criminal history . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(2) ( 2003). The r ecor d further

re v e a ls th a t th e D e f

e n d a n t h a d s e v e r a l p r io r

f e lo n y c o n v ic ti o n s , in c lu d in g b u r g la r y , r o b b e r y

a nd multipl e counts o f l arc eny , as we ll as other misdemea nor convic tions for offe nses ra ng ing f rom mul tip le tr a ff

ic of fe ns e s, mis de me a no r the ft , D UI , a ndc ri min a l tr e sp a ss. Th e De fe ndant al so admitted to ille gal drug use and violate d probation on at lea st one occ asion. This court has 12

c on sis te ntl y

he ld that e nh a nc e me nt, e ve n to the ma ximum wi thi n the rang e , is a llo we d b a se d s ole ly on a finding of a previous criminal history . See, e.g ., State v. Ty ler Stout Sm ith, No. M2004-03048- CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL359675 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, Feb. 16, 2006) ; State v. Terry Webb, No. W2003-03046-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2848379 (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, Dec

. 10, 2004); State v. Ronald B. F inch, No. M2002-01050-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21997743 (Tenn. Crim. App.,-12-

Na sh vil le, Au g . 2 2, 20 03 ). Ac c or din g ly , th e tria l c ou rt didno t e rr

in s e nte nc ingthe De fe nd a nt t o twelve y ear s.

The De fendant also claims that his Six th Amendment right t o a trial by jury was impug ned when the trial court made determinations of fac t f or sentenc e enhanceme nt purposes that we re not

su bmitt ed to a

jury , c iti ng B lake ly

v. Was hin g ton , 5 42 U. S. 2 96 (2 00 4) . H ow e ve r, ou r s up re me court has rec ently held that the enhanc ement component of Tenne ssee’ s sentenc ing struc ture doe s not violate a def

endant’ s Six th Amendment rig ht to a trial by jury

. See S tate v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 63 2, 66 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) . O ur su prem e cou rt he ld that T e nn e sse e ’s se nte nc ing str uc tur e “ me re ly require s judge s to consider enhanc ement fa ctors,” and unlike the sentenc ing g uidelines struck down in Blake ly , “does not mandate an incr ease d sentenc e upon a judg e’s f inding of an enh an ce m ent fa c tor .” Go me z, 16 3 S.W. 3d a t 66 0. Th e re fo re , the De fe nd a nt’ s c la im that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in

e nh a nc ing his se nte nc e ba se d o n a fa c tor no t subm itt e d to the jury

fails . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

CO NC LU SION B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g re a so nin g a nd auth oriti e s, the jud g me nt of the tria l c ou rt , a s to bo th conviction and se ntence , is affirme d.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE