UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 03-322
G L EN N H. J AC K S ON , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. R. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued May

19, 2005 Dec ided J uly 1, 2005 ) Kenneth M. Carpenter , o f T op e ka , K ans a s, fo r t he a pp e lla nt.
Re be c c a A he rn Ba ird, w ithwh om Tim S

. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Carolyn F. W ashington , Deputy Assistant G ener al Counsel, all of Washington, D.C., wer e on the br ief for the appe llee.
Be fore HAGEL , L ANCE, and DA VI S, Judges

. HAGEL , Judge : Be fore the Court is Glenn H. J ackson' s appea l f rom a J anuar

y 9, 2003, Boa rd of Veter ans' Appea ls (Boa rd) de cision in which the B oard de nied entitlement to an ef fec tive d a t e e ar l i e r t h a nO c t o b e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 0 , f

o r a g r an to f s e r v i c e c o n n e c t i o n

f o r a l o w - b a c k

d i s a b i l i t y. Record ( R.) at 7. The Court ha s jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a ) to revie w the J anuar

y 2003 Boa

rd dec i s i o n . For

the following rea sons, the Court will affirm the January 9, 2003, Boa

rd dec ision.

I. F AC TS Mr. J ackson serve d on active duty in the U.S. Army

from June 1969 to Dece mber 1970. R. at 10 . O n Se pte mbe r 1 0, 19 96 , h e fi le d a c la im t o r e op e n h is p re vio us ly and fi na lly dis a llo we d c la im fo r s e rv ic e c onne c tio n f

or a low -b a c k d isa

bil ity . R. a t 34 -3 6. A VA re g ion a l of fi c e de nie d his c la im and, in a Nove mber 1998 de cision, the Boa rd did the same. R. at 41-42 , 5 8 -6 5

. After this Court aff irmed the B oard' s decision, Mr. Jackson appea led to t h e U.S. Court of Appe als for the Fe dera l2

Circuit (Fe dera l Circuit), which, in a September 2001 decision, aff irmed the Court's de cision. R. at 67-71, 124-31. Prior to the issuance of

the Feder al C ircuit' s decision, Mr. J ackson, on October 17, 2000, had

su bmi tte d a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e to t he re g ion a l of

fi c e in an a tte mpt to r e op e n h is l ow -b a c k- dis a bil ity claim. R

. at 73-108. Ba sed on that additional evidenc e, the reg ional office , in J une 2001, re opened and g rante d his claim for se rvice connec tion and assig ned that g rant a n eff ective date of Oc tober 18, 2000. R. at 120-22. Mr. J ackson appea led t he reg ional office ' s decision to the B oard, a rguing that the pr op e r e ff

e c tiv e date sh ou ld h ave be e n Se pte mbe r 1 0, 19 96 , th e date on wh ic h h e fi le d h is c la im to reope n. R. at 137-40, 163-67. The B oard, in the de cision now on appe al, denied e ntitlement to an ear lier ef fec tive date. R. at 1-8. Althoug h it acknow l ed ged that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) ( 2002) newand mater ial evidenc e submitted prior to the issuance of an " appellate decision" must b e considered a s having been f iled in connec tion with the claim pending at t he beginningof the a ppeal pe riod, it determined that the phra se "a

ppellate decision" ref

err ed only "to a dec ision of the Boa rd and not to a de cision by . . . the Fe dera l Circuit." R. at 6. There fore , it c oncluded that Mr. J ackson' s additional evidenc e, althoug h submitt ed prior to the issuanc e of the Fe dera l Circuit's Septembe r 2001 dec ision, could not be c on sid e re d a s havin g be e n fi le d in c on jun c tio n w ithMr . Jac ks on ' s Se pte mbe r 1 0, 19 96 , c la im t o reope n. I nstead, it found that his submissi on of additi onal evidence was a second claim t o reope n, dated Oc tober 17, 2000. Id. This appea l followed. On appeal, M r. J ackson argues t hat t he phrase " appellate decision" as used in § 3.156(b) can
me an a de c isi on of the F e de ra l Cir c uit and that the B oa rd ' s int e rp re tatio n is " imp e rm iss ibl e " be c a us e it is "narr ow and r estrictive." Appellant' s Br ief (B r.) at 8. He ac knowledg es that the phra se is not define d in the reg ulation and notes that the Sec reta ry has chose n not to define the phr ase e ach of the four times the re g ulation has bee n amende d sin ce the enac tment of the Ve tera ns' J udicial Review Act, Pub. L

. No. 100-687, § 301, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113-21 (1988). Id. at 7. At oral a rgument, Mr. J ackson c oncede d that "a ppellate de cision" is no t u s ed el sewhe re in title 38, Code of F eder al R egu l at i o n s , t o r e fe r t o a d ec i s i o no f t h e F ed er al C i rc u i t

. T h e S ec re t ary ar gu es t h at t h e B o ar d 's interpre tation is corre ct and that it is the only interpre tation that is consistent with VA' s regulatory framework. Sec reta

ry ' s Br . at 9-12.3 II. AN AL YSI S Se c tio n 3 .1 56 (b ) o f t itl e 38 , Co de of F e de ra l Re g ulatio ns , p ro vid e s: New and m ater ial evidenc e rece ived prior to the ex piration of t he appe al per iod, or prior to the appellate decision if a timely appea l ha s been filed (including evidenc e re ce i v ed p ri or to an a

ppellate de cision and re fer red to the a g ency

of orig inal jurisdiction by

the B oard . . . w ithout consideration in that decision in ac corda nce with the provisions of § 20.1304 of this chapter ), will be consider ed as ha ving be en filed in conne ction with the claim which was pending at the beg inning of the appe al period.
3 8 C

. F

. R

. § 3

. 1 5 6 ( b ) ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; see Meuh l v. W est , 1 3 V e t.A

pp . 1 59 , 1 60 (1 99 9) . T hat la ngua g e , in pe rt ine nt p art , has re ma ine d unc ha ng e d s inc e the re g ulatio n w a s p ro mul g a te d b y the Se c re tary

in 1961. At the time it wa s promulga ted, the only

appea l available w ithin the vetera ns benef its sy stem
was a n appea l to the Boa

rd. See 26 F e d. Re g . 1 56 1, 15 70 -7 1 ( F e b. 24 , 1 96 1) ; se e als o 2 7 Fe d

. R eg. 11 ,8 86 , 11 ,8 87 (D e c . 1 , 1 96 2) . In 1 98 8, wh e n Co ng re ss e na c te d th e Ve te ra ns ' Judic ia l Re vie w A c t, jud ic ia l r e vie w o f B oa

rd de c isi on s by

thi s Co ur t and of thi s Co ur t' s d e c isi on s b y

the F e de ra l Cir c uit be c ame ava ila

ble . Se c tio n 3 .1 56 wa s ame nd e d f our t ime s a ft e r t

he enact men t of

the Ve te ra

ns ' Judic ia l Re vie w A c t, b ut t he ph ra se " a

pp e llate deci si on " wa s n ot d e fi ne d in any of tho se amendments. See 55 Fe d. Reg . 20,144 (May 15, 1990); 5 5 Fe d. Reg . 52,274 (De c. 21, 1990); 58 F e d. Re g . 3 2, 44 2 (June 10 , 1 99 3) ; 66 F e d. Re g . 4 5, 62 0, 45 ,6 30 (Aug . 2 9, 20 01 ). To da y , th e ph ra se "a ppellate de cision" is still not defined in § 3.156(b) or in any other part of title 38, Code of Fe dera l Re g ulatio ns
. What the regulation addre sses and what we mu s t d et ermine is the f ollowing: When an appellant submits evidence reg ardinga pre viously submitt ed claim, how much time may pass bef ore that evidenc e is no long er c onsidered to have bee n filed alongwith the claim? I n the instant case , under Mr . J ackson' s broad inter pretation of the phrase "a

ppellate decision," the time period during wh ic h s ub mitte d ev ide nc e wo uld have be e n co ns ide re d a s h a vin g be e n f ile d in c onne c tio n w ithhis September 1996 claim to r eopen e x tended up until the issuance of the F eder al Circuit' s September 2001 decision. Under the Secre tary ' s more na rrow inter pretation, that period lapsed in Nove mber 1998, when the Boa rd issued its decision denying the claim to reope n. Be cause the cor rec t interpre tation of a re g ulation is a question of law, the Court will review the B oard' s interpre tation of § 3.156(b) de novo. See Lane v . Principi , 3 39 F .3 d 13 31 , 13 39 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 3) ; Hatch v.4

Principi , 18 Vet.App. 527, 531 (2004). Acc ording ly , to the extent that Mr. Jackson would instead have us de fe r t o a

n a sse rt e d V A p oli c y

of int e rp re tin gthe ph ra se " a pp e llate de c isi on " to e nc omp a ss a F eder al Circuit decision, we decline. I n any event, he has provided no pe rsuasi v e ev idence that VA h as e ve r h a d s uc h a

po lic y . A lth ou g h h e c ite s to the c ir c ums tanc e s su rr ound ingthe a

pp e a l in Thayer v. Princ ipi , 15 Vet.App. 204 ( 2001), for that proposition, t here is nothing in the fa cts or history of that case that establishes that VA' s determination of a n ear lier ef

fec tive date wa s dictated by any policy perta ining to the a

pplication of § 3.156(b)

. See Thaye r , 15 Vet

. Ap p
. at 2 0 5 , 207 (spec ifically

decliningto addre ss § 3.156(b)). The starting point in interpre ting a regulation is its langua g e. See O tero-Castro v. Principi , 16 Ve t.A pp . 375 , 380 (2 00 2) (" Th e ba sic pr inc ipl e s th a t a pp ly to c on str uin g statut e s a

pp ly e qu a lly to c on str uin g re g ulatio ns ." ). I f t

he me anin g of

the re g ulatio n is c le a

r f ro m it s la ngua g e , th e n th a t is "th e endof t he m att er." Brown v. Gardner , 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994). At the time that § 3.156(b) wa s promulg ated, the phr ase " appellate decision" could have meant only

a B oard de cision beca

use that wa s the only

appellate d ec i s i on available within the veter ans benefi t s s y s t em at that time. Mr. J ackson a rgues that the mea

ning of that phrase has implicitl y evolved ove r time. Certainly , he is c orre ct that today the phrase "a ppellate de cision" r ead in isolation could properly encompa ss a dec ision of t h e Feder al Circuit. To be sure , the Fe dera l Circuit is an appellate court, a nd i t d o es i s s u e d ecisions. Howe ver, a s the Supreme Court of the United States has held, "[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional possi biliti es but of statutory [or regul ato ry ] con tex t. " Br own , 5 13 U. S. at 11 8. Ac c ord in gly , we wi ll e xami ne § 3 .1 56 (b ) i n it s regulatory

and st atutory context to aid us in shaping the meaningof the phra se " appellate decision." F ir st, we mus t c on si d e r

wh i c h i nt e r p r e tatio n o f t

he ph ra se " a

pp e llate de c isi on " be st f

its wi thi n the VA re g ulatory

scheme

. Se e Ote ro -C

as tro , 16 Vet.App. at 380 (holding that eac h part or se ction of a r egulation "' should be construe d in connec tion with every other part or section so as to produc e
a ha rm on iou s wh ole ' " ) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see als o B ro wn , 513 U.S. at 118 (" There is a presumption that a g iven term is used to mean the same thing throug hout a statute." ). Upon re view, we find that the Secr etar

y uses the phra se consistently throug hout titl e 38 to re fer to a B oard de cision only ; at oral argu ment, Mr. J ackson c oncede d as much. See38 C.F.R. §§ 19.9, 20.401, 20.904, 20.1000, 20.1104-05, 20.1201, 20.1301, 20.1304 (2004). The ref ore, the Secre tary ' s interpre tation would be5

h ar m o n i o u s w i t ht h e r e s to f t i t l e 3 8 w h i l e M r
. J a c k s o n ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o nw o u l d

r e s u l ti nanan o m a l y. Given such a

choice , we se lect the harmonious interpretation. Se e Os te ro -C as tro , 16 Vet.App. at 380. Under ly ing this sele ction is the premise that the Secre tary , awa re of his own regulations, knows that the phra se " appellate decision" is used to me an a Boa rd decision and that if he intended to re fer to more than just a Boa

rd decision, he would have consciously and purpose ly

used a diff

ere nt phrase. For example, 38 C.F.R. § 14.507 (2004) provides that a VA Gene ral Counsel opinion is bindingon V A o f f i c i a l s an d e mp l o ye e s u n l e s s , am o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , i th a s b e e no v e r

r u l e d o r m o d i f i e d b y a
su bs e qu e nt "

judicial decision ." ( Emphasis added)

. Se c on d, we mu st con si de r whic h inte rp re tatio n o f t he ph ra se " a

pp e llate de c isi on " be st f

its within the statutory

scheme

. Under the statutory provision g overning the jurisdiction of the B oard, 38 U.S.C. § 7104(b), " when a claim is disallowed by

the Bo ar d, the claim may not therea fter be reope ned and allowed" unless new and materia l evidenc e is submitt ed to re open it. I t follows that once the Boa

rd disallows a c laim, the Boa rd' s decision is fi n al , and abse nt a disruption of that finality , any

evidenc e subm itted after the B oard' s decision with respe ct to that claim will be considere d to be an attempt to reopen the disallowe d claim based on new and materia l evidenc e. See id. ; Sears v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 244, 248 (2002), a ff 'd , 349 F.3d 1326 ( Fe d. Cir. 2003). Under 38 U. S. C. § 5 1 1 0 ( a ) , " th e e f f e c ti v e d a te o f

anaw ar d

b a s e d o n
. . . a c la im r e o p e n e d a f te r f in al adjudication . . . shall be f ix ed in ac corda

nce w ith the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of rec eipt of application therefor ." I n the instant case , Mr. J ackson submitted new and materia l e vidence in 2000, afte r the B oard had disallowed his cla im for servic e conne ction for a low-bac k disability

and af ter t h e Boa

rd had disallowed his 1996 claim to reope n his service -conne ction claim. Under the principle that follows from sec tion 7104(b), his submissi on constituted a newclaim to reope n, and bec ause that claim led to an awa rd of se rvice connec tion, the effe ctive date of that aw ard w ould be g overne d b y section 5110 and could have been n o ea rl i er tha n 2000. The Sec reta

ry ' s interpre tation of § 3.156(b)

co mp o rt s wi t ht h e s t at u t e, b u tM r. J ac k s o n 's i n t erp re t at i o nd o es n o t

. Un d er M r. J ac k s o n 's interpre tation, § 3.156(b) would oper ate to assig n him an eff ective date in 1996, the y ear in which he submitted his first claim to reopen. A lthough the Secre tary in pr omulgating § 3.156(b) wa s, as Mr. J ackson a sserts, cr eatinga g ener ous regulation, it is plain that the Secr et ar y can be no more6

g e ne ro us tha

n th e statut e a llo ws him to be

. Ac c or din g ly , the ph ra se " a pp e llate de c isi on " c an c le arl y not mean any

thing other

than a de cision of the B oard. I n sum, the meaningof § 3.156(b) , including the phrase "a ppellate decision," is clear f rom its contex t. "Appe llate dec ision," as that phr ase is use d in § 3.156( b), mea ns a dec ision only

of the Boa rd, and a s a re sult, § 3.156(b) pr ovides that the issuance of a B oard de cision closes the pe riod of time duringwhich evidenc e submitt ed afte r the filing of a claim will be considere d as having been filed alongwith that claim. To rea d that phrase as having evolved over tim e would be to re ad it as havin g e vo lve d o ut o f c on te xt an d in c on fl ic t w iththe statut e
. We de c lin e to i nte rp re t § 3 .1 56 (b ) i n such a w ay . There fore , beca use we hold tha t t h e l anguag e of the regulation is clear a nd not amb iguo us , t hat is "th e endof t he m att er." Br own , 513 U.S. at 120. Consequently , when Mr. Jackson submitted additional evidenc e in Octobe r 2 0 0 0 , a lmost two y ear s afte r t he Board denied his September 1996 claim t o reope n, that evidenc e should not have be en considere d as havingbeen f iled in connec tion with the Sept em ber 1996 c laim to reopen. Instead, it should have been considered, as it was, as a new claim t o reope n. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the B oard c orre ctly

deter mined that the prope r ef

fec tive date of

Mr. J ackson' s awa

rd of se rvice

connec tion is i n October

2000. See38 U.S.C. § 5110.

III . C ON CL USI ON On consider ation of the for eg oing, the J anuar y 9, 2003, Boa

rd dec ision is AFFI RMED.