D.C. Freeway Revolt and the Coming of Metro 

Part 7

Getting Construction Underway

Table of Contents 

The Future of NCPC ....................................................................................................................... 2

Before Construction Can Begin ...................................................................................................... 3

Fighting On ..................................................................................................................................... 8

Freeway Consideration (or Not) .................................................................................................... 11

Metro Advances in Congress ........................................................................................................ 15

Considering the Freeways ............................................................................................................. 24

Launching Metro ........................................................................................................................... 25

A Departure and an Arrival ........................................................................................................... 28

The District’s Appropriation Act, 1970 ........................................................................................ 32

Pondering the Bad Options ........................................................................................................... 33

The Three Sisters Bridge Battle .................................................................................................... 35

Before the Hearings ...................................................................................................................... 38

The City Council’s Public Hearings ............................................................................................. 40

Secretary Volpe’s Decision ........................................................................................................... 53

The Washington Plan .................................................................................................................... 59

On Appeal ..................................................................................................................................... 68

Reaction to the Decision on Appeal .............................................................................................. 75

Superhighway-Superhoax ............................................................................................................. 76

Threatening Metro......................................................................................................................... 81

Appropriations Action, 1971 ........................................................................................................ 88

Volpe Before the Subcommittee on Roads ................................................................................... 94

On Trial ......................................................................................................................................... 96

The Road To Somewhere ............................................................................................................ 103

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970....................................................................................... 106

Congressional Action on the 1970 Act ....................................................................................... 112

While Waiting for the 1970 Act .................................................................................................. 113

Broyhill and the 1970 Revenue Act ............................................................................................ 118

Not Quite Finishing The 1970 Act .............................................................................................. 124

Trying to Advance Metro ............................................................................................................ 126

Election Transitions .................................................................................................................... 127

The 1970 Lame Duck Session .................................................................................................... 130

Design Hearing on the Three Sisters Bridge ............................................................................... 138

Approving the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 ...................................................................... 142

Metro Wraps Up 1970 ................................................................................................................ 146

The Metro Revolt Begins ............................................................................................................ 156
Part 7

Getting Construction Underway

The Future of NCPC

On October 9, the Post and Star began following reports about NCPC’s future. Discussions 

about ending NCPC and turning its authority over to city and Federal agencies had begun during 

the Johnson Administration. However, the idea had been dropped reportedly because of 

opposition by President Johnson’s friend, Chairman Rowe. 

Now, the newspapers reported that Chairman Hammer and Executive Director Charles H. 

Conrad had been meeting with presidential assistant Moynihan on the commission’s future. 

Hammer, the Post reported, had been working toward eliminating NCPC, but he would not 

disclose details of the talks with Moynihan other than to say “some recommendations will come 

forth.” The possible dissolution of NCPC was foreshadowed in the city’s request for $100,000 in 

its FY 1970 budget to open a planning office. [Downie, Leonard, Jr., “NCPC Asks White House 

For City Plans Agency,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 9, 1969] 

That same day, Chairman Hammer and James Gibson, chairman of NCPC’s urban renewal and 

housing committee, resigned from NCPC in an exchange of letters to further reorganization 

plans. Hammer, who indicated that the two resigned at the same time to make clear that they 

strongly supported reorganization, said in his letter of resignation that he had been working with 

the White House “to produce a sound reorganization plan”: 

This reorganization process is clearly established and, indeed, it is because of this fact 

that I can with good conscience now step down, knowing that one of our major objectives 

[is] on its way to being realized.

Gibson said the reorganization plans were “gratifying to me.” They emphasized “the growth of 

sincere efforts to identify citizen views and to incorporate them into official policies and 

programs.” 

President Nixon’s letter accepting the resignations indicated that local planning was rightly the 

responsibility of the District government:

In the District, I have advocated a policy of improving the effectiveness of local 

government, in preparation for the day when the District will enjoy full self government. 

A White House spokesman said the reorganization plan, still in the works, probably would 

involve an executive reorganization plan that would be submitted to Congress for 60 days of 

scrutiny. Unless Congress vetoed it, the plan would go into effect at the end of the 60-day 

period. A White House official emphasized that President Nixon was “really interested and 

committed” to the reorganization and, unlike President Johnson, was unlikely to change his 

mind. 

NCPC Vice Chairman G. Franklin Edwards, the Howard University sociologist, became acting 

chairman following Hammer’s departure. [Wright, Christopher, “Two Planners Resign From 
Capital Unit,” The Evening Star, October 9, 1969; Eisen, Jack, “2 Key Members Quit NCPC, 

Praise Reorganization Plan,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 10, 1969; Eisen, 

Jack, “Resignations Freeze City’s Planning Setup,” News Analysis, The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, October 11, 1969] 

Before Construction Can Begin

On October 10, as Head Construction Company prepared to begin work, students from 

Georgetown, George Washington, and American Universities paddled two canoes and two 

rowboats to the Three Sisters Islands. Calling themselves the Student Committee on the 

Transportation Crisis, they unfurled a STOP THE BRIDGE sign and announced their intention to 

spend the night on the islands. [“Assault on Three Sisters,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, October 11, 1969] 

The next day, they had been joined by about 100 protesters of all ages. Bart Hogan, a psychiatrist 

from the District who had paddled a canoe to the islands with his wife and small children, 

explained:

Some of the younger people see it as just destruction of black homes. We see it as part of 

a bigger problem which no one can win. It’s unfortunate that it’s becoming a black-white 

issue. The bridge is going to destroy the things which make Washington a liveable place.

A 21-year old photography student at the Corcoran School of Art, John Thornton, said, “I see the 

bridge as a key link in a freeway system which isn’t a practical or viable way to alleviate the 

District’s traffic problem.” He added, “I’m in favor of occupying the islands until we get 

busted.” One of the organizers of the protest, 23-year graduate student Matt Andrew, agreed that 

they should continue to occupy the site “indefinitely.” [Colen, B. D., “Nearly 100 Bridge Foes 

‘Occupy’ Three Sisters Islands,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 13, 1969] 

On October 13, protesters managed to halt the start of construction – briefly. For 2 hours, they 

prevented workers from loading a crane onto a barge. Protesters also tried to stop installation of 

drainpipes – each 20 feet long and 6 feet in diameter – in a storm sewer outlet by rushing into the 

pipes. A supervisor ordered a crane operator to hook one end of the pipe and lift it to shake the 

protesters out. The operator refused. By 9:15 a.m., NPS police had arrived and, with threats of 

arrest, convinced the protesters to retreat. All the intended work was then completed. [Weil, 

Martin, “Bridge Work Starts,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 14, 1969] 

Excavation off the Virginia shore began the next day despite a 2-hour attempt by protesters to 

halt work. They were joined by Georgetown residents who helped to occupy a construction 

company tug and stand in front of the crane. [“Protest Delays Bridge Work,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, October 15, 1969] 

On October 15, hundreds of protesters – “college age men and women, some with children, many 

from the Georgetown area and many from Georgetown University,” according to the Star—

appeared at the site from different directions. About 150 of them blocked the access road to the 

site, shouting “Stop the bridge, free D.C.” 
When police threatened to arrest them if they did not disperse, they ran onto the construction site, 

sat down, and locked arms while chanting “Power to the people.” The police began arresting 

protesters, while word of the action prompted George Washington University students to march 

along Canal Road to the site even as police raced to cut them off. By the end, 141 protesters, 

mostly students but including ECTC’s Sammie Abbott, had been arrested on disorderly conduct 

charges. [Brandon, Ivan C., “141 Protesters Arrested at Three Sisters Site,” The Washington 

Post, October 16, 1969; Gay, Lance, “Scores Seized In 3 Sisters Bridge Delay,” The Evening 

Star, October 15, 1969] 

The Star dismissed the “demonstrating college students” as acting out of “a youthful yearning to 

confront the police once again in the name of high moral principle.” However, when “the basis 

of protest is as barren as it was in this case,” the editors explained, “the performance forfeits any 

claim to merit.” The most misleading claim, as stated by a spokesman, was that “We don’t want 

our homes bulldozed down to make way for 10 lanes of concrete.” Setting the record straight, 

the editors said the bridge and its interchange “would affect no housing whatever” in the District 

and that the Potomac River Freeway would take “a grand-total maximum of three homes, all 

three, incidentally, in the high-cost category.”

The protesters and anyone else interested in the welfare of the city should also consider that 

construction of the bridge had persuaded Congress to release funds for the start of construction of 

the Metro rail system. “The actual subway construction, however, has not yet begun, and it 

would be a massive disservice to jeopardize that event for a frivolous purpose.” [“Freeway 

Fever,” The Evening Star, October 17, 1969] 

Dozens of police officers arrived on Thursday, October 16, to protect the construction site from 

the protesters who had promised to show up. However, when they failed to arrive, the police 

dispersed at mid-morning and work on the bridge piers continued. During the afternoon, several 

protesters arrived with signs, but did not interfere with the work. They left after 30 minutes. 

[“Police Mass, But Span Foes Fail to Appear,” The Evening Star, October 16, 1969; “SignCarriers Visit Bridge Site,” The Evening Star, October 17, 1969] 

On October 17, Judge Sirica again denied a temporary injunction to halt construction of the 

bridge as requested by the D.C. Federation of Civic Associations. Owens had again argued that 

the city had not complied with the 1893 District law involving public hearings and the width of 

highways. The District responded that the “notwithstanding” clause in Section 23 of the FederalAid Highway Act of 1968 had waived the 1893 law. Owen indicated that the federation would 

appeal Judge Sirica’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals. [“Judge Denies Bid to Block Bridge 

Work,” The Evening Star, October 17, 1969] 

On Sunday, October 19, a crowd appeared at the construction site for a protest rally. Students 

were in the minority in the mixed crowd of white and black, young and old. The Post described 

one element of the protest: 

[The] crowd of blacks and whites stood in the sun on the Washington bank of the 

Potomac and listened to Sammie Abbott of the Emergency Committee on the 

Transportation Crisis tell them “the people of the District are fighting not only the 
highway department, the Congress of the U.S., but the media – particularly the Star and 

the Post – which are not only the handmaidens but the prostitutes.” 

“I for one am prepared to die” in the fight, the publicity director of the ECTC told the 

crowd. 

Abbott seemed to warm to the crowd as the crowd warmed to him. A physically small 

man, he seemed to grow as he almost yelled. “Before another inch of these damn 

freeways gets laid down in the District there’s gonna be flames, there’s gonna be fighting, 

there’s gonna be rebellion! And I for one . . . .” 

He was drowned out by cheers and clapping and raised his fist in salute to the crowd. 

Protesters carried signs with statements such as “Ban the Span,” “Let’s Stop Playing Bridge with 

Natcher,” and “Today the Three Sisters, Tomorrow the Four Horsemen.” 

Dr. Michael Halberstam of the Foxhall Village Citizens Association told the crowd, “This protest 

isn’t the work of a little group of students. They’ve done good work, but Mr. Abbott has done 

good work, and our lawyers have done good work,” as have other adults. (Foxhall Village is an 

affluent community adjacent to Glover-Archbold Park and George Washington University.) 

[Colen, B. D., “Bridge Foes Protest, Plan March Today,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, October 20, 1969] 

The next day, October 20, the protest began with a meeting on the Georgetown University 

campus at 2 p.m. One of the leaders, William Treanor, explained, “We’re not going to protest 

construction of the bridge; we’re going to stop its construction.” The plan was to surround each 

piece of equipment while assuring workmen that they would not be harmed. As they marched 

toward the site they were joined by residents of Foxhall Village and other neighborhoods. They 

chanted “Smash the Bridge” and “Free D.C.” as they marched to the site.

At the site, police blocked the canal towpath in a solid line. Anyone trying to cross the line, the 

police warned, would be arrested. When protesters tried to outflank the line, the police rushed 

them, nightsticks swinging. They tackled and grabbed the protesters, who were yelling 

obscenities and throwing stones at the officers. When the protesters regrouped, the police again 

warned them to disperse. When they did not immediately leave, the police charged again, 

tackling and arresting four demonstrators as the rest ran back up the towpath. They returned to 

the campus at Georgetown University, with some throwing rocks at the police, prompting several 

more arrests.

In all, the police arrested nine protesters, including Treanor, who had continued shouting slogans 

into a bullhorn “until he was tackled and smothered into silence,” as the Post put it.

Dr. Halberstam told reporters that the protesters had planned a peaceful protest without arrests or 

violence. “Until,” he added, “the police gave them an issue by bloodying their heads.” He did 

not support rock throwing, but was more upset with the police “who are supposed to be 

professionals and trained in this sort of thing.” 
Reporters observed Richard Blumenthal of Moynihan’s White House staff, at the scene 

observing the protesters. He declined to comment. He would later tell reporters that he visited 

the site only because of professional curiosity. [Valentine, Paul W., “Police Club Protesters at 

3 Sisters Bridge Site,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 21, 1969; Sclight, 

William, “Nine Arrested In Clashes at Bridge Site,” The Evening Star, October 21, 1969; 

“Nov. 16 Protest March On 3 Sisters Span Set,” The Metro Scene, The Evening Star, October 24, 

1969] 

The construction site was quiet the next day, October 22, but ECTC protesters were present to 

hand out anti-freeway brochures. They promised to be there every work morning. 

[“Demonstrators Fail to Show at Bridge Work Site,” The Evening Star, October 22, 1969] 

The Post, in an editorial, said the student demonstrations initially “looked like good clean fun,” 

with students “able to demonstrate their opposition to the city freeway system under agreeable 

conditions and in pleasant weather.” However, the demonstrations had “taken an ugly turn 

toward the rough-and-tumble confrontations between the students and the Metropolitan Police 

which, if they continue, cannot add much glory to either side”: 

Naturally, the city cannot permit the demonstrators to attain their goal by stopping 

construction which was ordered under way by congressional action. 

The “predominantly white demonstrators” had aligned themselves with inner-city blacks “who, 

they claim, will be displaced by the thousands if the bridge and its cross-town connections are 

built.” The bridge, in their view, was “an illegal link” to their real target which “seems to be the 

north leg of the so-called inner loop which was routed originally on an alignment with Florida 

Avenue and U Street NW and the inner city.” They were not deterred by the city’s shift of the 

link to a K Street tunnel.

Judge Sirica’s ruling denying a temporary injunction was subject to appeal. The students had “a 

perfect right” to raise their concerns, but they should understand that their concerns “cannot be 

resolved by a test of strength along the shores of the Potomac.” They should await the court’s 

verdict and the results of the congressionally ordered study. [“Three Sisters and the Students,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 23, 1969] 

That same day, Deputy Mayor Fletcher announced that the city would hire a private consultant to 

study the route of the North-Central Freeway. This approach would provide an independent 

voice on the routing. According to Dana Wallace, deputy highway director, the alignment that 

had generated many protests was unlikely to be selected. The latest maps indicated the link to 

I-70S would be carried in a tunnel under K Street, NW. It would displace about 175 people, 

compared with 6,000 to 7,000 people along the earlier alignment. 

The study was to be completed in time for decisions to be made before the 18-month deadline of 

February 23, 1970, imposed by Section 23 of the 1968 Act. If the city did not submit 

recommendations by that date, it must begin construction on the earlier alignment. [Green, 

Stephen, “D.C. Acts to meet Freeway Deadline,” The Evening Star, October 23, 1969] 
Amid the protests, court proceedings, and progress on the freeways, WMATA was planning the 

groundbreaking ceremony for Metro construction. WMATA invited President Nixon to 

participate and gave the White House two choices – a ceremony in Judiciary Square or Lafayette 

Park across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House. The ceremony was scheduled for 

December 9 at 3 p.m. in Lafayette Square, as the Post explained:

Plans call for a speakers’ stand directly across from the White House north portico. From 

the stand, the President or his representative will activate an auger that will begin to 

excavate a vent shaft near the southeast corner of the park.

WMATA planned to invite members of the Cabinet, Congress, and Supreme Court, and 

executive branch officials as well as State and local officials and civic leaders from the area.

In making these plans, WMATA was aware that the ceremony was contingent on Congress 

passing the District appropriation act, 1970, with the matching funds included. Chairman 

Natcher had not indicated he was having any doubts, but the activities of his Senate counterpart, 

Chairman Proxmire, were a continuing concern. The WMATA board had written to Chairman 

Proxmire explaining how his idea of cutting the appropriations threatened a collapse of the 

financial structure for Metro. [“Nixon Asked to Assist Metro Groundbreaking,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, October 24, 1969] 

Freeway critics were continuing to explore ways to achieve their goals. At an October 25 press 

conference on the Three Sisters Bridge site, Mrs. Penny Hogan of Foxhall Village, representing a 

Citizen’s Coalition on the Bridge Crisis, announced that she would present a petition to the 

Board of Elections asking that a referendum question on the bridge and freeways be included on 

the November 4 school board election ballot. The petition included more than 2,000 names, 

including Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who lived at 4852 Hutchins Place near 

Canal Road and Foxhall Village. The anti-freeway forces also announced a protest rally at the 

Sylvan Theater on the grounds of the Washington Monument. (The rally would be rained out.) 

The Board of Elections denied the petition. Under its rules, a political party may request 

placement of ballot items on issues affecting the party. However, the school board election was 

nonpartisan, eliminating addition of ballot issues. [“Bridge Opponents Plan New Rally,” The 

Sunday Star, October 26, 1969; “Referendum Denied Foes of Sisters Span,” The Evening Star, 

October 28, 1969] 

Although the Three Sisters Bridge was the main focus of interest, the city’s plans for the South 

Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway were in transition, according to unnamed sources. The new plan 

under consideration called for two tunnels connected by a roofless trench generally along 

Independence Avenue, NW. According to Jack Eisen: 

One tunnel would be beneath the Lincoln Memorial circle, swinging in an arc around the 

west and south sides of the memorial itself. The other tunnel would go beneath the 

northern tip of the Tidal Basin and extend almost to a surface connection with the 

existing Southwest Freeway
The plan is similar to one advanced by the highway department prior to 1966 when the 

planning commission called for a full tunnel. The city’s official thoroughfare plan, 

adopted by the City Council last December, calls for a tunnel. 

Eisen reported that NCPC was reviewing the city’s proposal in closed session, but an opponent 

of the idea leaked the information to reporters. “The critic expressed concern that the road would 

‘split’ the park.” Although NCPC and the District Highway Department refused to confirm or 

deny the concept, they both “expressed distress at the leak.” [Eisen, Jack, “Highway Dept. 

Revises Memorial Tunnel Plan,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 30, 1969; 

“New Plan Urged For South Leg,” The Evening Star, October 30, 1969] 

The day that reports of the South Leg Freeway proposal surfaced, Congress completed work on 

the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1969. The conference report on reconciling differences 

between the House and Senate versions of the bill retained the restriction on the Federal payment 

as Section 803. The appropriated funds ($105 million, plus $5 million for new law enforcement 

programs) would not become available until the President reported to Congress that the city had 

begun work on each of the projects listed in Section 23(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 

1968 or, if not, had been unable to do so because of a court injunction issued in response to a 

petition filed by a person other a city official, agency, department, or instrumentality of the 

United States.

The Senate and House approved the conference report on October 30 without a recorded vote and 

without discussion of Section 803. President Nixon approved the legislation on October 31, 

1969 (P.L. 91-106). [District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1969-Conference Report, 

Congressional Record-Senate, October 30, 1969, pages 32413-32414; Conference Report on 

H.R., 12982, Congressional Record-House, October 30, 1969, pages 32415-32420] 

Fighting On

On October 31, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals denied a preliminary injunction 

to stop construction of the Three Sisters Bridge. The court found that the city had committed 

more than $1.1 million to a construction contract but that no additional contracts were to be 

awarded before Judge Sirica decided the court case within 60 days. The city might “incur 

substantial financial penalties in the event that an injunction is now granted.” Chief 

Judge David L. Bazelon and Judges Carl McGowan and Spottswood W. Robinson III did not 

comment on the merits of the arguments related to the “notwithstanding” clause in Section 23 of 

the 1968 Act. 

Plaintiffs were entitled to a full hearing in District Court, but in the meantime, the city should 

avoid “further contractual commitments” for the bridge. [Lippman, Thomas W., “Court Refuses 

to Halt Bridge,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 1, 1969; “Appeal to Bar 

Bridge Fails in U.S. Court,” The Evening Star, November 1, 1969] 

Bridge opponents were disappointed, but they planned to continue fighting the project. On 

November 1, for example, 10 Halloween witches appeared on Capitol Hill to put a hex on 

Chairman Natcher and a “spell of doom” on the Three Sisters Bridge. “Dressed in flowing black 
robes and black-and-orange hats, all young women,” according to the Star, they displayed a 

wooden model of the bridge. They chanted “A hex on Natcher, a hex on Natcher,” puzzling 

passersby who asked reporters what “Natcher” was:

The witches said they are members of the Women’s International Terrorist Conspiracy 

from Hell (WITCH), an off-shoot of the Women’s Liberation movement. 

Assembling in a semicircle on the steps of the Capitol, the witches jumped up and down, 

waved their arms and proceeded to leap on the wooden bridge model, crushing it. 

After the Capitol ceremony, they left to go to a department store where, they said, they 

would protest “exploitation of the consumer.” 

They did not say how they planned to travel, but reporters saw no sign of any 

broomsticks. [Green, Stephen, “10 Witches Cast Spell on Capitol Hill,” The Evening 

Star, November 1, 1969] 

At 5:15 a.m. on November 2, a blaze was spotted on the bridge construction site. Fire fighters 

found two mobile trailer units on fire from a barrage of Molotov cocktails. The arsonist or 

arsonists broke a lock on a gate in a chain fence surrounding the trailers. Untouched were four 

400-gallon tanks of propane gas adjacent to the most heavily damaged trailer, a 500-gallon tank 

of gasoline 10 feet from the other trailer, and three 50-gallon oil drums. 

The construction supervisor for Head Construction Company, Mendal Wilson, said the fire 

destroyed two outboard motors, four air conditioners, a large radio console, a refrigerator, 

blueprints, records, tools such as ax handles and hammers, and 12 cans of beer. Wilson did not 

expect the fires to delay construction, most of which involved heavy equipment. [“Arson Probed 

in Bridge Site Blaze,” The Evening Star, November 3, 1969] 

Having been denied a place on the school board ballot, a group called D.C. Citizens Referendum 

Committee announced it would place their own ballot boxes in front of all city polling places on 

November 4. In the informal balloting, citizens would be asked to vote “yes” or “no” on: 

Do you favor the construction of the Three Sisters Bridge and its connecting freeway 

system?

Dr. Halberstam, speaking for the committee, said, “We think the people are against the bridge. 

We will work to make Congress see the error it has perpetrated” by ordering the city to build the 

bridge. 

He and other speakers at the press conference disowned the firebombing of the trailers on the 

project site. Some said, however, that they understood the desperation the arsonists must feel. 

[Weil, Martin, “3 Sisters Foes Plan Poll Today,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

November 4, 1969] 

The committee managed to place ballot boxes outside about three-quarters of polling places 

throughout the city except the predominantly African-American wards 7 and 8 east of the 
Anacostia River. Most people who voted in the school board election took time to vote outside 

the polling place on the freeway question. Overall, voters disapproved the freeway system, 9,850 

to 1,819, with opposition overwhelming in the Georgetown area. One voter described in the Post

as an “elderly Georgetown woman,” said, “Good Lord, yes, I want to vote against it.” 

[Valentine, Paul W., “D.C. Voters Oppose Bridge in Poll,” The Washington Post, November 5, 

1969; “84 Pct. Polled in District oppose Three Sisters Span,” The Evening Star, November 5, 

1969] 

NCPC intended to consider the new plan for the South Leg Freeway in public on November 6, 

but the plan was removed from the agenda the day before. District officials requested removal of 

the item after news of the plan had been leaked to reporters the week before. Now, the city 

planned only to describe the plan to NCPC, not seek approval. 

A spokesman for FHWA said the agency had provided an announcement about the South Leg 

Freeway for the White House to release the previous week, but it had not been released. It stated 

that the Department of Transportation and NPS had agreed on the plan. The depressed roadway 

would not “impair the beauty” of the monument area and would “permit development of the area 

in line with long-range plans of the park service.” 

NPS Director Hartzog described the plan as a “compromise . . . we gave up a few things and 

gained a few things.” He would not elaborate on that statement when questioned by reporters. 

As for NPS officials who opposed the plan, he said, “I don’t count hands when I make a 

decision.” [“Planners Delay Action On South leg Freeway,” The Evening Star, November 5, 

1969] 

On November 6, Leonard DeGast, the highway department’s planning and programing chief, 

outlined the new plan for NCPC. Robert J. Lewis described the plan in the Star: 

The District official disclosed that the substitute plan called for two 1,300-foot tunnels, 

one beneath the Lincoln Memorial and the other under the north projection of the Tidal 

basin. 

Another tunnel section would carry the expressway 2,300 feet roughly along the right-ofway of the present Independence Avenue, from 23rd Street to 17th Street.

The main reason for the change, DeGast said, was cost. The new proposal would cost 

$55 million, compared with $95 million to $100 million for the earlier all-tunnel plan. DeGast 

and Colonel Starobin, who was Mayor Washington’s representative on NCPC, said FHWA, 

which was providing the funds, preferred the revised version. 

As Jack Eisen put it, NCPC members “voiced outrage” after DeGast’s presentation. Former 

NPS Director Wirth was especially upset. He said, “If you go ahead with this, you will isolate 

the Tidal Basin and the cherry blossoms and you will commit a national disgrace.” As for the 

cost comparison, he told DeGast: 
I’d like to see the cost figure on the original tunnel under the Tidal Basin. I think you are 

putting in figures that will make an impression, but I don’t think you are giving a proper 

value to the damage you will do to this monumental area. 

Acting Chairman Edward said, “I am deeply concerned that the matter has come back to us” after 

NCPC had insisted in 1966 on the all-tunnel route. Paul Thiry said, “This is a disgrace . . . it is a 

national disgrace.” [Lewis, Robert J., “Plan for South Leg Draws Bitter Fire,” The Evening Star, 

November 7, 1969] 

Freeway Consideration (or Not) 

While appearing before NCPC, DeGast discussed the path of the North Leg Freeway that would 

be one of the outlets for the Three Sisters Bridge. “Not content with only one surprise,” as the 

Star put it, DeGast told NCPC that a study of the North Leg Freeway would give positive 

consideration to a route for the expressway along U Street and Florida Avenue, NW: 

Freeway foes have long contended that this path, which would lead to the displacement of 

many households, has been under serious consideration by the highway department, even 

though department and other city officials denied it.

Mayor Washington, after learning about DeGast’s comments, declared the U Street freeway plan 

dead. The route, Mayor Washington said, would be cited in the study only to meet “the technical 

requirements of the 1968 highway act,” based on the reference in the conference report to the 

U Street corridor indirectly as the originally adopted route: 

We . . . reaffirm in the strongest terms possible . . . that such a route is unacceptable to the 

city. It has been studied and rejected by the City Council, and National Capital Planning 

Commission and the Mayor. A principal reason for the rejection . . . was the relatively 

high displacement of family dwelling units.

The study would consider alternative routes, with public hearings being held before a final 

decision. [Green, Stephen, “Freeway Opponents Fet An Unexpected Assist,” Interpretation, 

The Sunday Star, November 9, 1969; Eisen, Jack, “Mayor Axes U Street Freeway Plan,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, November 9, 1969] 

On November 10, ECTC’s Booker took credit for demise of the U Street freeway corridor at a 

sidewalk press conference outside the Pride office at 16th and U Streets. ECTC, he said, would 

continue to oppose the Three Sisters Bridge and any other routing for the North Leg Freeway, 

including a tunnel under K Street. Further, ECTC was broadening its scope to include urban 

renewal and the suburban-oriented Metro lines. They would “investigate the whole urban 

renewal business in this town,” which he suggested consisted of “efforts of white businessmen to 

get back into the black community.” [“Defeat of Freeway Claimed by Group,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, November 11, 1969; “Front Urges D.C. Riders To Withhold Bus Fares,” 

The Evening Star, November 11, 1969] 

In Baltimore, the Urban Design Concept Team was considering alternatives for routing the sixlane East-West Expressway through historic Fells Point, established in the 1760s along the north 
shore of Baltimore Harbor and the northwest branch of the Patapsco River. Two alternatives 

involved an elevated six-lane expressway, one 30 feet high and the other about 70 feet highway. 

Another alternative involved a “bifurcated” road that would include three lanes below ground, 

and three elevated. The final alternative was a six-lane underground expressway. Opposition to 

any alternative remained strong as The Baltimore Sun reported in article about the Fells Point 

Fun Fest:

All during the afternoon, a borrowed loudspeaker system broadcast “SOS” messages from 

“Radio Free Fells Point.

Taking turns at the microphone, volunteers from the Southeast Council Against the Road 

drummed home their message to city dwellers and suburbanites. The East-West 

expressway is scheduled to come straight through Fells Point, Highlandtown and Canton. 

The expressway would take “230 homes, 900 jobs and thousands of people,” the 

volunteers cried. “We are being politically courted and legally extorted. Sign the 

petitions to stop the road” . . . . 

One volunteer, Miss Barbara Mikulski, ventured the opinion that “the British couldn’t 

take Fells Point, the termites couldn’t take Fells Point and we don’t think the State Roads 

Commission can take Fells Point either.” [Keidel, Janelee, “Expressway Proposals 

Outlined,” The Baltimore Sun, October 26, 1969; Keidel, Janelee, “Thousands Throng To 

Fells Point Fun Fest,” The Baltimore Sun, October 6, 1969] 

Wolf Von Eckardt, the Post’s architecture critic, wrote that the Baltimore concept team “seems 

to have found a way out of much the same freeway dilemma that Washington is in.” District 

highway officials, however, rejected that option. DeGast said, “The Baltimore team hasn’t 

worked out,” even though FHWA had recently extended the team’s contract for 15 months and 

$3.4 million Von Eckardt explained: 

The idea of the design concept team is to use the freeway as a means to redevelop rather 

than maim the neighborhoods it runs through and to do so by employing an interdisciplinary team of architects, sociologists, economists and other urban specialists – in 

addition highway engineers – to plan and design it. 

The idea was initially opposed in Baltimore, but now was helping break “a bitter, 20-year 

deadlock”:

Here and in Baltimore many freeway opponents call the concept team idea just so much 

baloney. It is true it hasn’t stopped the freeway in Baltimore.

But it has made the original Baltimore highway proposal a lot more sensible, acceptable 

and compatible with the social and physical fabric of the study. 

Reaction to the concept in Washington was mixed. As noted, the District Highway Department 

was opposed: 
Mayor Walter Washington reportedly believes such a team should be set up for the new 

study of the North-Central Freeway in Washington which Congress has ordered. 

The team may, for instance, find ways to make Brookland a more viable community, 

strongly linked to Catholic University, rather than have the freeway slice it apart.

City Council Chairman Gilbert Hahn is said to feel however that the North-Central 

Freeway study should be conducted by the D.C. Highway Department without outside 

consultants. 

Joseph M. Axelrod, Chief Highway Engineer in Baltimore, recognized that critics had the right to 

fight the freeways:

“But what if you lose?” he asks his opponents. “Why don’t you hedge your bet by 

helping us do a better job for your neighborhood?” 

It is too early to tell how the freeway opponents will respond to this appeal to 

“realpolitik.” It would obviously be better if all cities had not freeway design teams, paid 

by that one special interest, but transportation design teams that truly balance all modes of 

transportation – rapid transit, moving sidewalks, mini-buses and whatnot – in the interest 

of the city as a whole and under the direction of the mayor . . . . 

Some day we will surely take a rational, systematic approach to our urban environment. 

But the way things are, a good many more miles of concrete will be forced through our 

cities.

We might as well try to design them intelligently as they begin to do in Baltimore where 

the highway engineers have now learned to welcome the help of other experts. This city 

should insist that ours do the same. [Von Eckardt, Wolf, “Baltimore’s Freeway Team,” 

Critique,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 8, 1969] 

Von Eckardt was back the following day to discuss the first National Register of Historic Places, 

released by NPS under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1969. It listed 1,100 historic 

places in the United States that were “not to be destroyed, altered, or maimed by a federal 

government project,” Von Eckardt explained. The places included 44 historic monuments, 

buildings, and other places in the District of Columbia. The Lincoln Memorial, the Chesapeake 

and Ohio Canal, Glover-Archbold Park, and the Georgetown Historic District were on the list:

Just as the National Register of Historic Places 1969 . . . was published, it became known 

that the D.C. Highway Department finds it too expensive to tunnel its six-lane South Leg 

of the Inner Loop Freeway under the Lincoln Memorial and Tidal Basin. Part of it is now 

to be an open trench. 

The Tidal Basin was not on the National Register but “ought to be”: 

The law says the Register buildings and places are to be protected not only from 

destruction and alteration but also from “isolation from or alteration of its surrounding 
environment, or introduction of visual, audible, or atmospheric elements that are out of 

character with the property and its setting.” 

I should think the highway boys will have to find pretty smart lawyers to convince the 

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, which is charged with protecting the 

registered landmarks, that a freeway trench and tunnel within a few feet of the Memorial 

doesn’t isolate, alter or visually, audibly and atmospherically mess up its environment. 

The Council has already successfully kept a freeway from thus maiming the historic 

Vieux Carre in New Orleans. But in voteless Washington, the highway men in Congress 

can always defy the Council and sneak in an amendment to get their way, as they did in 

the case of the Three Sisters Bridge. [Von Eckardt, Wolf, “Historic Omissions From the 

List of Landmarks,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 9, 1969] 

Von Eckardt was especially worried about recent actions by Secretary Volpe around the country. 

“The 10-month-long seesaw battle for the heart and mind of Transportation Secretary John A. 

Volpe seems lost.” In the next few days, he was to announce approval of the North Expressway 

(U.S. 281), in San Antonio that “would pave some 150 acres of Brackenridge and Olmos Park, 

the Alamo Stadium, Incarnate Word College, a zoo, the famous Sunken Garden area, hiking 

trails and other recreation areas.” This was the plan that had prompted Senator Yarborough to 

introduce Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. Moreover, “Just a few 

days ago Volpe decided to sacrifice Overton Park in Memphis, Tenn.” These actions were “a 

clear victory for the militant highway builders, led within the Department of Transportation by 

the uncompromising Frank Turner, the federal highway administrator.”

The problem was that “Volpe is said to be overly susceptible to political pressures”: 

Just where Volpe stands on the Washington freeway fight is unknown. While [Secretary] 

Boyd sided more or less openly with the freeway opponents and the March 1966 report by 

Arthur D. Little, Inc., the renowned systems analysts, who found Washington’s proposed 

freeway system “inconsistent and incompatible with urban transportation needs,” Volpe 

has kept his own counsel in his negotiations with Congressman William H. Natcher 

(D-Ky.) who insists on building the system. 

Approval of the San Antonio freeway raised concerns about District parks and historic places. 

“Now that it is to be routed across the Three Sisters Bridge, Virginia Route 66 [sic] traffic is 

pointed directly at Glover Archbold Park and the area north of it up to the Beltway.” The District 

Highway Department had published a plan showing the traffic turning sharply east along the 

Georgetown Waterfront: 

This obviously makes little sense. And people who have watched freeway politics over 

the last few years predict with some certainty that as soon as the bridge is built, the 

highway militants will start pressuring for a Glover Archbold route . . . . The loss of 

Brackenridge Park and Volpe’s disregard for Section 4 (f) can only encourage them. 
The attorneys fighting in the U.S. Court of Appeals to block the bridge “are optimistic.” They 

think the “notwithstanding” clause in Section 23 of the 1968 Act “seems too murky a clause to 

survive judicial scrutiny.” [Von Eckardt, Wolf, “Paving Our Parks,” Point of View, The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, November 15, 1969] 

Contrary to Von Eckardt’s understanding, Secretary Volpe announced on December 23 that 

based on available information, he could not approve construction of the North Expressway 

through the park. The location would remain under study. He did, however, approve 

construction of segments of the expressway north and south of the park – the section between 

Mulberry and Tuxedo Avenues – that would not affect options for bypassing the park. 

In a Department of Transportation press release announcing the decision, he said, “The principal 

focus of the study will be upon an expressway alignment west of Alamo Stadium and along 

Devine Road”:

I want to make it clear that I have not reached any conclusion. This study is not made to 

provide additional justification for the present proposal. 

It should be a demonstration of what professional engineering could accomplish if in fact 

the Devine Road configuration were the only location available. 

The press release added:

Secretary Volpe said that his decision to approve construction of those portions of the 

North Expressway lying north of Tuxedo Avenue and south of Mulberry Avenue was 

based on several factors, including the decision of his predecessor, Alan S. Boyd, that 

there is no feasible and prudent alternative location for these segments, and that their 

design included all possible planning to minimize harm to affected parkland; the fact that 

the Texas Highway Department had already acquired and cleared substantial amounts of 

necessary right-of-way prior to passage of the Department of Transportation Act; and the 

severe displacement and hardship which a major realignment would cause. 

“San Antonio has waited for the North Expressway too long,” Secretary Volpe said. “I 

feel that construction should begin without needless additional delay on the approved 

portions, while we obtain detailed information on a proper design for the segment of the 

Expressway between Mulberry and Tuxedo Avenues. 

“While we are attempting to expedite this project,” the Secretary said, “we are determined 

to preserve the amenities of San Antonio’s valuable parkland.” 

Metro Advances in Congress

Congress was considering the future of Metro. The National Capital Transportation Act of 1969 

was the vehicle for approving expansion of the bobtail system to 97.7 miles, and the Federal 

share of construction costs. However, for construction to begin, as planned, in December, 

Congress had to appropriate the District’s matching share. Chairman Natcher had agreed to 

appropriate the funds, but the legislative process had to be completed. In addition, the 
Department of Transportation’s appropriation for FY 1970 would include appropriations for the 

Federal two-thirds share of pending Metro costs. 

On November 13, the House Committee on Appropriations approved an appropriation of 

$43,173,000 in Federal funds for the Department of Transportation’s contribution to Metro 

construction. The subcommittee headed by Chairman Edward P. Boland (D-Ma.), approved the 

Department of Transportation’s request for the funds. The committee’s report explains, “The 

Committee believes that the need for a rapid rail transit system for the National Capital area has 

been well established and that because of continuing cost escalation, any further delay would 

jeopardize the construction of the system.” The report added that this amount was to pay twothirds of total cost, with the District responsible for the balance. [Department of Transportation 

and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1970, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 91-642, November 13, 1969, page 31] 

The House Committee on the District of Columbia approved the National Capital Transportation 

Act of 1969 on November 20 to authorize the Federal contribution of $1,147,044,000 (including 

the $100 million previously authorized for the bobtail system) for the 97.7-mile, 86-station Metro 

system. The bill, sponsored by subcommittee Chairman Fuqua, also called for a study, at a cost 

not to exceed $150,000, of extending the system to Dulles International Airport. 

The committee’s report stressed the urgency of the situation: 

The streets and highways of the Nation’s Capital and its suburbs are beset by massive 

traffic congestion during the rush hours . . . . Traffic congestion is extremely serious 

today. It will become appalling in the years ahead, unless we move forward promptly 

with the development of an areawide system of exclusive right-of-way, high-speed, highcapacity rapid rail transit, to supplement the already stupendous interstate highway 

systems channeling traffic to and through the area. 

In addition to authorizing the Federal share, the bill authorized the Commissioner (mayor) of the 

District of Columbia to contract with WMATA for the District’s one-third share of construction 

costs.

WMATA had informed the committee that construction would begin within 75 days after receipt 

of the construction funds. The schedule called for completing the entire 97.7-mile system by the 

end of 1979. 

The report concluded: 

The unique and major Federal interest in Washington and the National Capital region, as 

well as the Federal Government’s direct responsibility for assuring efficiency in the 

conduct of its own business and in preserving the beauty and improving the quality of the 

environment of the National Capital, necessitate a Federal capital contribution toward the 

cost of design and construction of the regional rapid rail transit system, which together 

with the contributions by the local jurisdictions and the issuance of revenue bonds by the 

Authority, will assure completion of the regional transit system . . . .
The actions of the Authority and the efforts of the local jurisdictions have furthered the 

transit program to the point where it is essential that the Congress provide at this time the 

additional authorizations necessary to assure orderly progress toward completion of the 

long-awaited rail rapid rail system. Your committee urges that this legislation receive the 

favorable consideration of the Congress. [National Capital Transportation Act of 1969, 

Committee on the District of Columbia, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st

Session, Report No. 91-677, November 20, 1969, pages 3, 6, 13] 

Elsewhere on Capitol Hill on November 20, Chairman Natcher’s District subcommittee approved 

the appropriation of $40,322,000 for the District’s one-third share of Metro construction: 

Included in this amount is $18,736,000 requested for fiscal year 1969 which the House 

did not consider last June due to the impasse existing on the construction of the Freeway 

System. With the release of Federal funds held in reserve pending the appropriation of 

the District’s share of fiscal year 1969 funds, the appropriations recommended in this bill 

and the Department of Transportation Appropriation Bill, the Authority will have a total 

of $120,967,000 to embark on actual construction of the subway. [District of Columbia 

Appropriation Bill, 1970, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 

91st Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 91-680, November 20, 1969, page 22] 

Jack Eisen wrote that with these two actions by the Committees on the District of Columbia and 

Appropriations, “the final pieces of an intricate legislative jigsaw puzzle began to fall into place, 

virtually assuring metropolitan Washington that it will finally have the rapid transit system that 

has seemed so elusive.” Chairman Natcher had “made good on his agreement” with President 

Nixon and Secretary Volpe to appropriate the matching funds. 

WMATA had begun sending out invitations to officials and others for the December 9 ceremony 

to be held in Lafayette Park with President Nixon throwing an electrical switch to start the 

digging. [Eisen, Jack, “House D.C. Unit Backs 98-Mile Metro Network,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, November 21, 1969] 

On November 24, the House considered the two critical bills for the future of Metro. First was 

the National Capital Transportation Act of 1969, introduced by Chairman Fuqua. He described it 

as “a bill which makes it possible to realize the long-sought objective of a rapid rail transit 

system for the National Capital area; a bill which will provide to the Nation’s Capital – the one 

major Capital in all the world which lacks such a system – a modern, high-speed, transit facility.”

For 20 years, “it can be seen that a long bipartisan congressional-executive effort has steadily 

moved forward the cause of rapid transit for the National Capital region.” He referred to “some 

22 separate, significant congressional acts” that had led to this moment. It was “the fruition of 

the visionary hopes of the Congress, four Presidents, and the citizens of the eight jurisdictions 

making up this great National Capital area, for the building of a rapid transit system in the 

Nation’s Capital.”

The bill was consistent with the bill the Senate had approved on July 8. It approved the 

97.7-mile system at a cost of $2.5 billion. To pay for it, WMATA would issue $835 million in 
revenue bonds. The eight jurisdictions would provide $573.5 million. The Federal share would 

be $1.147 billion making for a 55-45 local-Federal match.

Representative Durwood G. Hall (R-Mo.) asked if Chairman Fuqua thought the estimated cost of 

$2.5 billion would hold. The chairman replied that the committee has carefully examined that 

very question: 

In the projections of the cost they determined by the finest engineering expertise in the 

country what the total cost would be to build this system today. Then they added a 

10-percent contingency fee for items they were unaware of which might develop in 

construction. In addition, they have added a 5 percent compounded annually increasedcost-of-construction escalation. So, with that added to it, then we arrive at the 

$2.5 billion total cost figure. So this has been taken into consideration. 

Representative Broyhill provided a lengthy statement in support of Metro. Among many 

supportive statements, he said, “Mr. Speaker, the case for the approval of this proposed 

legislation is overwhelming.” He concluded, “So, let us get going and get the job done.” 

Representative Gross, the penny-pinching Congressman from Iowa, responded that “we are 

today, with this bill, embarking on another trip into wonderland.” He did not care how many 

subways were built in the District, Maryland, or Virginia. “All I want the people of this area to 

do is spend their own money to build them.” If the system had “such a wonderful, rosy financial 

picture,” it would pay for itself. “Why come to the Federal taxpayers?”

He was certain the system would cost more than $2.5 billion. If anyone on the House floor 

wanted to stake his reputation on that cost estimate, he wished they would do so “now for the 

record, so that he can live with it in the days to come.” Everyone recalled what happened with 

D.C. Stadium, by now renamed Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Stadium. The House was assured 

it would not cost the Federal payers a dime, “but it is costing the Federal taxpayers, and it has 

every day since it was completed and occupied.”

Representative Broyhill replied that they did the best they could to come up with an accurate 

estimate, using the best information available from experts. “We have no way of guaranteeing to 

the gentleman or anyone else that it will cost less or more than we anticipate.”

Representative Harsha, the highway supporter from Ohio, reminded his colleagues that he 

opposed National Capital Transportation Acts in previous years. He was concerned, back then, 

about efforts to curtail the highway program to create passengers for rail rapid transit: 

But since that time these problems have been resolved, and I am firmly convinced that if 

we are going to have an integrated and effective transportation system in the District of 

Columbia . . . then we need this rapid transit system.

He responded to Representative Gross that because of the Federal Government’s impact on the 

local economy, “we have a responsibility as the Federal Government to participate in this 

program.” 
Representative Gross did not agree that taxpayers from around the country had an obligation to 

spend hundreds of millions of dollars for Metro. 

Representative Harsha tried again:

If the Government here is bogged down by inadequate transportation facilities or service, 

then service to the general public over the whole country suffers, and there would be less 

service to all concerned than if there were adequate transportation. That is part of the 

problem. 

Representative Charles A. Vanik (D-Oh.) shared some of Representative Gross’s concern. In 

general, he supported proposals for better public transportation: 

The thing that concerns me about this bill is that the Federal commitment is so large that 

I am afraid it will destroy any real hope of getting any comparable kind of support for 

other mass transit needs in the rest of the country. I feel that this could just become a 

bottomless pit which could usurp incredible Federal revenues to support the system. 

I must confess to the gentleman, I do not think [it] is going to be a profitable operation. 

I must tell the gentleman that I cannot see where the revenues are going to carry the 

anticipated costs of this program. But if it would, it would be contrary to all of the 

experience we have had with transportation systems through the United States. 

I think we have to assume this is going to be a money loser and we will be confronted 

with a deferral and a difficult experience in the repayment.

The thing that concerns me is that in getting into this very multibillion Federal outlay, we 

may be getting ourselves into a situation where we might have to continue to pour more 

work and more bureaucrats into the Washington area in order to support the subway 

system. I think we ought to try to decentralize the bureaucracy and remove from 

Washington the activities that can be carried on more efficiently in other areas.

Representative Broyhill assured Representative Vanik that only 20 percent of Federal employees 

were in the Washington area and that local communities “involved are guaranteeing that these 

revenue bonds will be paid. The cost to the Federal Government would be $1.1 billion, not 

$2.5 billion, and the Federal share was comparable to the Federal share for Federal-aid transit 

projects elsewhere.

Representative Harsha also defended Metro. WMATA “has had the best engineers and the best 

accountants available, and the most experienced people in the transit business estimating the 

amortization of this obligation and how the revenues can be realized.”

Representative Gross asked for confirmation that $41 million had been spent thus far. Chairman 

Fuqua confirmed that amount for preliminary studies and engineering work among other things: 

Mr. Gross. So $41 million has already been expended and not a wheel has moved, not a 

passenger has been transported anywhere, and not a shovelful of dirt has been turned 

toward an operating transit system or anything else. Is that correct? 
Mr. Fuqua. If the gentleman will come up on December 9, we will be happy to let him 

participate in moving some of the first dirt, but there have been some soundings made, 

and there has been some dirt moved. 

Mr. Gross. I thank the gentleman and good night. 

Representative Nelsen told his colleagues that he and former Chairman Whitener, who had been 

defeated in his 1968 reelection bid, had been the authors of the original subway bill for the 

District of Columbia:

I am under no illusion that this will be a system that can be cheaply constructed. On the 

original estimates, I think many of us were well aware of the fact that we probably missed 

the mark by a great deal – and we apparently did underestimate the cost at that time . . . . 

I think we must view everything we do regarding the District of Columbia in a little 

different light than when we deal with any other problem for any other city. This is our 

Federal City, our Nation’s Capital, and I think when we look around, we will have to 

admit there are many areas we have overlooked to which somehow or other more 

attention should have been given. I am proud to see that in many respects some things we 

have done are working out. I hope this transit system works out as well as some of the 

other additions to the District government have worked out. 

He introduced a lengthy statement in support of the bill. He recommended approval of the bill to 

any of his colleagues “who wish to provide a balanced transportation system for the Nation’s 

Capital.”

Representative Hogan, the new Congressman from Prince George’s County, Maryland, spoke 

about the need for Metro, and responded to one of Representative Harsha’s points: 

The distinguished gentleman from Ohio commented that the system was not likely to ever 

show a profit. That may or may not be the case, but we do not require that our freeways 

show a profit, and the rapid rail transit system is as essential for the movement of people 

and goods as is our highway system. We need highways that are adequate to the 

population. We need rapid transit, and we need adequate bus service. No one mode of 

transportation can solve the problems of transportation in Metropolitan Washington. 

Representative Gross introduced an amendment to strike out the provision authorizing a 

$150,000 study of the “feasibility, including preliminary engineering, of extending a transit line 

in the median of the Dulles Airport Road from the vicinity of Virginia Route 7 on the 1-66 Route 

of the Adopted Regional System to the Dulles International Airport.” He said, “this is an attempt 

to salvage a little something out of this bill if it is passed, and I hope it will not be passed.” He 

thought they should wait until the bobtail system was completed “and see how it operates before 

sinking hundreds of millions of dollars” into extending the system: 

Taxpayers have already been hit with a huge bill to provide for a four-lane highway from 

Dulles to the beltway. Ever since that highway was completed it has carried almost no 
traffic. I do not know why the taxpayers should be called upon to spend another 

$150,000 to find out what use is proposed to be made of this highway. 

It is already there. It is usable. What else do they want? It is a mystery to me and I will 

be glad to yield to anyone right now to tell me why a $150,000 study is needed when 

there is a superhighway already running from Dulles to at least the beltway.

Representative Broyhill pointed out that the study was about extending Metro to the airport. The 

airport, he added, was not for Virginia or Maryland. “We built it for the Federal Government.” 

Representative Gross was not impressed. “I do not know for whom Dulles Airport was built but 

it is still losing $7 million a year.” He had thought Friendship International Airport near 

Baltimore could have been expanded for Federal needs at a fraction of the cost of building Dulles 

International Airport. “Now you have a white elephant that is costing the taxpayers $7 million a 

year and no evidence . . . as to when it will break even, much less pay a dime on the $100 million 

dollar investment.” 

Representative Broyhill countered that “many of us in northern Virginia opposed the airport 

being constructed.” Nevertheless, Congress had insisted on the airport. He did not deny it 

benefited people in northern Virginia, “but you did build it.” Representative Gross interjected, 

“No; I did not.” 

Chairman Fuqua pointed out that the study had been initiated by the Senate bill. He did not 

know if extension of the system to the airport would ever be feasible, but it was widely supported 

among airport-related agencies and interests.

Representative Gross responded, “I do not doubt that every agency that spends money around 

here, and can put some more people on the payroll, are for this so-called study. There is nothing 

easier than the spending of other people’s money.” 

Representative Dowdy interrupted the discussion to point out that Representative Gross may 

have misunderstood the purpose of the study. It had nothing to do with the Dulles access road. It 

was about extending Metro to the airport. 

Representative Gross thought that subject had been studied already under the $41 million 

expended thus far. “In other words, do we not have to spend another $150,000 to tell us what to 

do with a super highway?” 

Representative Dowdy again pointed out the study had nothing to do with the access road. He 

said, “this has to do with extending this subway another 25 miles in addition to the 97 miles.” 

Representative Gross, who apparently had misunderstood the provision, said, “This gets worse 

by the minute. Someone got away with a lot of money in the $41 million study if that is the 

case.”

Representative Broyhill agreed that the airport was “somewhat of a white elephant.” The study 

was an effort to see if “we can make the airport more successful and more convenient insofar as 
getting more people out to the airport, and in the long run maybe we can get back that $150,000 

through making the airport a going proposition.” 

Finally, the House rejected Representative Gross’s amendment by a vote of 52 yeas and 256 

nays. The House then voted in favor of the bill, 286 to 23. [National Capital Transportation Act 

of 1969, Congressional Record-House, November 24, 1969, pages 35511-35526] 

Later in the day, Chairman Natcher introduced the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for 

FY 1970. He discussed the many aspects of the bill, including the provisions covering the 

District’s matching funds for Metro. After reciting the history of the impasse, including the 

assurances he had received from President Nixon, Secretary Volpe, Director Mayo of the Bureau 

of the Budget, and Director Airis, he said: 

All these acts indicate clearly that we are in complete agreement that freeway 

construction as provided under the Highway Act of 1968 must proceed with rapid rail 

transit construction. 

I will now recommend that the $18,737,000 deleted from the supplemental appropriations 

bill together with the $21,586,000 in the regular appropriations bill for the District of 

Columbia for fiscal year 1970 be appropriated for rapid rail transit construction. I will 

further recommend that the Federal share for rapid transit construction appropriated for 

fiscal year 1969 totaling $43,772,000 be released. 

He made one point very clear:

The Highway Act of 1968 must be complied with and as long as the freeway system 

proposed in this act continues underway we will, at the proper time, appropriate funds for 

continuing the construction of this rapid rail transit system. Mr. Chairman, both systems 

must continue underway, and if this takes place we are definitely of the opinion that this 

will be in the best interest of the Nation’s Capital.

Representative Davis joined several colleagues, including Chairman Mahon, in complimenting 

Chairman Natcher for the bill he had introduced: 

I can assure my colleagues that no man worked more carefully or more effectively in 

order to assure a balanced transportation system for the District of Columbia than has the 

chairman of our subcommittee. Sometimes it has been necessary for him to be very firm, 

but anyone who is familiar with the legislative process and who is familiar with the 

approaches that are taken by people in and out of Government on some matters of this 

kind, will recognize that only through that kind of firmness, and a great deal of patience 

that went with it, has the goal and expressed desire of the President for a balanced 

transportation system for this metropolitan area come into being. I think this is a 

contribution for which history will properly reward the gentleman from Kentucky for his 

leadership in this area.
Following discussion of other provisions in the bill, the House voted 305 to 9 to approve it. 

[“District of Columbia Appropriations, 1970,” Congressional Record-House, November 24, 

1969, pages 35527-35529] 

Jack Eisen wrote of House approval of the National Capital Transportation Act of 1969: 

The action, so unexpectedly emphatic that it surprised even ardent subway backers, 

expands the 25-mile rail system, mainly within Washington, that was approved by 

Congress in 1965. 

Because of some technical variances from the Senate bill, the Senate would have to concur 

before the bill went to the President for signature. “This is only a formality since the bill’s 

Senate managers already have agreed to them.”

In addition to discussing approval of Chairman Natcher’s appropriation act, and the threat posed 

by Senator Proxmire, Eisen wrote, “Groundbreaking is scheduled for Dec. 9 in Lafayette Park.” 

[Eisen, Jack, “House Approval Clears Way For Area Rapid Transit Net,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, November 25, 1969] 

In a statement issued by the Department of Transportation, Secretary Volpe said he was 

“absolutely delighted by the emphatic support” for Metro by the House of Representatives. 

Coupled with previous Senate action, the House gave “a hearty impetus to a project which is vital 

to the well-being of the Washington metropolitan area and I am grateful to those who supported 

the program.” Metro, he said, would “pull this city together”: 

Cities originally evolved to provide opportunities for their citizens. Today, because they 

lack good public transportation, most of our cities isolate people from jobs, education, 

entertainment, cultural activities and community affairs. With the start of the Metro 

system, Washington begins the road back. 

A dream of nearly half a century is now to be a reality.

The Senate acted on the bill on December 2. In a floor speech, Senator Tydings explained, “Now 

that the controversies and delays are past history, it is time to go full speed toward completion of 

the full 98-mile system at the earliest possible date.” To complete action, Majority Leader

Mansfield requested Senate concurrence in the bill; the Acting President pro tempore stated “the 

motion was agreed to” without a discussion or vote, reflecting its noncontroversial nature. 

As the Star reported, the last obstacle was Senator Proxmire’s vow to reduce spending for the 

system. [National Capital Transportation Act of 1969, Congressional Record-Senate, December 

2, 1969, pages 36313-36314; Grigg, William, “98-Mile Metro Is Authorized By Congress,” The 

Evening Star, December 2, 1969] 
Considering the Freeways

Although Mayor Washington had rejected the U Street/Florida Avenue corridor for the North 

Leg Freeway, Post editors were skeptical. Comparing the route to “a cat with nine lives,” the 

editors wrote that the “controversial ghetto route” kept “reappearing to cloud public discussion as 

an alternative to “the officially favored K Street tunnel as a means of bringing freeway traffic 

across town.” By confirming the study, DeGast had inadvertently confirmed “the charges of antifreeway forces that more than 2,000 homes in the inner city would be destroyed by completion of 

the freeway program.”

The editors thought that if District Highway Department officials were left to their own devices, 

they “would prefer to use the U Street route because it would be more easily engineered and 

would cost less than K Street.” Mayor Washington had emphatically rejected the route, calling it 

“unacceptable to the city.” He even ordered that the routing be removed from official highway 

planning maps. 

“Unfortunately,” the editors speculated, “we have not heard the last of the U Street proposal.” 

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 had ordered a study of the U Street routing along with the 

K Street tunnel and “other alternatives.” The editors urged Mayor Washington to “make it clear 

to the consultants doing the study that they must find a route other than U Street if they hope to 

get the North Leg built.” [“The North Leg Again,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

November 25, 1969] 

City officials had still not decided how to comply with the requirement in the 1968 Act for a 

study of the North-Central Freeway. With 15 months elapsed since the 1968 Act started the 

clock ticking on an 18-month study, the city was still planning how to meet the deadline of 

February 23, 1970. Although the city had solicited bids for consultants to conduct the study, the 

Post reported on November 27: 

No decision has been made on the form the report will take, although several private 

consulting firms have proposed to undertake a feasibility study of the route. 

But one city official hinted Sunday that the city may decide not to make a feasibility study 

at all, but merely report on the freeway to Congress. 

One consultant proposal under consideration, by Wilbur Smith and Associates and Alan M. 

Voorhees, “pledged to examine the location of the route, its cost, its effect on the surrounding 

community, the displacement of homes and its engineering implications.” Both consultants had 

been involved in previous studies of the North-Central Freeway:

Some city officials favored the study, while others argued for an in-house study: 

But as one federal officials said, having an in-house study would be “like having 50 other 

children tugging at our coattails. The way it’s being approached here is that we’ll have 

outside technical assistance.”
City officials recognized that anti-freeway forces considered the Smith and Voorhees firms as 

pro-highway and, therefore, would consider any study they conduct to be suspect. 

Mayor Washington and Secretary Volpe would, in the end, decide whether to hire a consultant or 

conduct an in-house study. 

Appearing on WTOP-TV’s “Washington News Conference” on Sunday, November 30, Deputy 

Mayor Fletcher said that with time so short, “We may well have to do an in-house study with our 

own people and with the Bureau of Public Roads.” The city would have to hold public hearings 

before submitting its report to Congress by the February 23 deadline. The city, he said, also had 

to report on the North Leg and South Leg segments of the Inner Loop Freeway. [Price, Richard 

E., “NE Route Feasibility Study May Be Undertaken,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

November 27, 1968; “3 Controversial Freeways May Be Studied by District,” City Life, The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, December 1, 1969] 

On December 3, Mayor Washington and Chairman Hahn announced that the District Department 

of Highways and Traffic would prepare a study of routes, inhouse, for the North-Central Freeway 

and the South Leg Freeway. The study had to be completed by the February 23 deadline or, 

under the 1968 Act, the approved corridor for the North-Central Freeway would be mandated for 

construction. The scope of the study was uncertain, prompting Director Airis to say: 

We’ll have to get busy immediately; we don’t have much time. Anything we do will have 

to be quick. We simply don’t have time to look at it in depth. 

The study would necessarily rely on existing reports, although Airis said the department might 

hire consultants for small segments of the study. 

Airis promised that the city would hold public hearings between January 12 and February 23 

before submitting its report to Congress. The hearings would ensure “local participation” in the 

study while the city provides the “technical end.” 

At the same time, Mayor Washington and Chairman Hahn announced that they would ask 

Congress for an 18-month deadline of the time for a study of the North Leg of the Inner Loop. 

They needed the time because there had been “no thorough studies and no public hearings” on 

the route. [Green, Stephen, “Delay Asked on North Leg Planning,” The Evening Star, 

December 5, 1969; Prince, Richard E., “Deadline Is Pushed On Freeway Study,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, December 5, 1969] 

Launching Metro

On December 2, WMATA announced that the groundbreaking ceremony for the start of Metro 

construction had been moved from Lafayette Square to Judiciary Square at the request of the 

Nixon Administration. Neither the White House nor WMATA explained the move, but the Post 

speculated that the security of the White House, across Pennsylvania Avenue from the park, may 

have been a factor. The capacity of the park may have been another factor. WMATA expected a 

crowd of about 2,000 people; U.S. District Court Judge George L. Hart, Jr., had limited the park 

to 500 people in advance of antiwar demonstrations in November. 
Whatever the reason, the ceremony would be held in Judiciary Square at 2:30 p.m. Officials did 

not know if President Nixon would attend, but were hopeful he would. If so, his role would be 

different. Instead of throwing a switch to start an auger, as was planned at Lafayette Park, he 

would participate in the more traditional turning of shovelfuls of earth. [“Metro Ceremony 

Shifted to New Plot,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 3, 1969] 

The day of the announcement, WMATA opened the first construction bids for the G Street 

section of the subway. An Ohio construction contractor submitted a low bid of $12.3 million, 

which was 19 percent above the engineers’ estimate. The bid came from the joint venture of 

American Structures, Inc., and the Mining Equipment Manufacturing Corporation, both of 

Youngstown, Ohio. A New York firm submitted the high bid of $17.4 million. 

WMATA’s chief engineer, Roy T. Dodge, said he was “disappointed” by the low bid. All the 

bids would be studied to ensure the contract was awarded not only to the lowest bidder but the 

most responsive bidder. The fact that the bids came in higher than expected raised an initial 

concern that the estimated cost of Metro, on which the financial plan was based, might have to be 

increased. Dodge said, “We’ll have a better idea after our first year of awarding contracts.” 

[Eisen, Jack, and Fiske, Phineas R., “$12.3 Million Metro Link Bid Submitted,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, December 3, 1969; Green, Stephen, “Officials Fear 20% Increase in 

Metro Cost,” The Evening Star, December 3, 1969] 

On December 3, the Senate Committee on Appropriations released the FY 1970 Department of 

Columbia Appropriations bill as prepared by Chairman Proxmire’s subcommittee. The bill cut 

requested funds across the board for the city. With only 7 months left in the fiscal year, he said, 

“I feel it is unnecessary to fund this bill in full.” In his view, the amount the city requested and 

included in the approved House bill was inflationary. The Proxmire bill appropriated 

$645 million or $37.7 million less than the House had approved and $107.6 million less than the 

city had requested. The bill also cut $29.7 million in new construction projects from the House 

plan and $7.8 million in operating funds. The bill called for a Federal payment of $100 million. 

The report noted that the District of Columbia would receive an estimated total of $210,328,000 

under Federal grant programs. Many other jurisdictions also receive funds under these programs, 

but “the District fares exceptionally well in almost every category.” The District and capital 

region also received Federal assistance, other than grants, totaling $239,414,308. A study of this 

assistance “indicates that almost without exception it again does extraordinarily well either as to 

size, scope, or level of funding.” The report cited as an example the difference in Federal-aid for 

the BART system (8.4 percent of a total estimated cost of $1.3 billion) and aid for Metro 

(46 percent of $2.5 billion). 

The report discussed the concern about inflation as reflected in President Nixon’s September 4 

message calling for a reduction in Federal construction and for State and local governments to 

reduce their public works projects. The next section in the report discussed the Metro system, 

providing a straightforward summary of its history, estimated cost, and financing plan. Although 

Chairman Proxmire told reporters the project “flies in the face” of the fight against inflation, his 

subcommittee and the full committee had outvoted him on reductions in appropriations for Metro 

construction. [District of Columbia Appropriations Bill 1970, Committee on Appropriations, 
United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report No. 91-564, December 3, 1969, 

pages 50-51; Levey, Robert F., “Budget Cuts Explained,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, December 5, 1969; Grigg, William, “D.C. Budget Slashed by Senate Unit,” The Evening 

Star, December 3, 1969] 

Although Congress would not complete the appropriations process for several weeks, the Senate 

Appropriations Committee’s action ensured appropriation of the District share of construction 

funds. 

On December 9, officials and a crowd of about 2,500 gathered in Judiciary Square at 4th and 

E Streets, NW., for the groundbreaking for Metro construction. President Nixon, who had gone 

to New York City to attend the National Football Hall of Fame Dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria 

Hotel, did not participate. (At the hotel, he entered through a garage entrance and did not see the 

shouting, window-smashing mob demonstrating against the Vietnam War.) Secretary Volpe, 

representing him, announced that earlier in the day, President Nixon had signed the National 

Capital Transportation Act of 1969 (P.L. 91-143), making official the full 97.7-mile Metro 

system.

Four hours before the ceremony, WMATA awarded the first construction contract to a joint 

venture of Gordon H. Ball, Inc., Danville, California; J. F. Shea Company, Inc., Oakland 

California; and Norair Engineering Corporation, Washington. The contract involved threequarters of a mile of subway tunnel from 4th and E Streets to 9th and G Streets, NW. The winning 

bid was for $33.7 million. The joint venture also was a major contractor on the BART line.

Participants in the 45-minute ceremony outside the D.C. Juvenile Court building at Judiciary 

Square included Secretary Volpe, Mayor Washington, Governor Mandel, U.S. Park Police Chief 

Grant Wright, and area officials and Members of Congress. Chairman Babson, who planned to 

retire from public service at the end of the year, was master of ceremonies for the event. Jack 

Eisen reported: 

The ceremony was marked by restrained oratory in which speakers noted the decade of 

efforts to get started on the rail system and its bright potential, chiefly as an instrument 

for the region’s social and economic advancement. 

The unintentional high points were a side comment by Mayor Washington and a slip of 

the tongue by Gov. Mandel, accompanied by a slip of technology. 

The mayor smilingly began his talk by noting, “I am delighted to be here to cut another 

ribbon.” This was an obvious reposte to public remarks by Rep. Joel T. Broyhill (R-Va.),

a key House sponsor of rapid transit legislation, who called the mayor a fine ceremonial 

ribbon-cutter but a poor administrator. Broyhill grinned broadly at the mayor’s comment. 

Mandel’s prepared speech said he was proud to help “illuminate” a map showing the 

Maryland part of Metro, but his tongue slipped and he said “eliminate” – and sure 

enough, the map failed to light when he and Mrs. Spellman threw the switch. An 

electrician later came successfully to the rescue amid audience applause.
Secretary Volpe said construction of Metro would be a model for cities around the country. 

President Nixon, he said, had instructed the Department of Transportation to establish a 

computer databank on construction of Metro to be available to help other cities plan subway 

systems. He predicted that Metro would “bring new life to Washington, new growth, new 

development, new improvement, much greater than any of us have realized.” 

Those shoveling pre-softened earth were Secretary Volpe, Mayor Washington, Governor Mandel, 

Chairman Hahn, Chairman Babson, Prince George’s County Commissioner Spellman, and Falls 

Church City Councilman Lee M. Rhoads. All but Secretary Volpe used traditional shovels: 

Volpe used a simple garden spade donated to the old National Capital Transportation 

Agency in 1965 by local units of the American Automobile Association with the advice 

to stop talking and start digging. The donation marked an about-face by an organization 

previously critical, along with others in the highway field, of the subway plan.

“Not content with a single spade full,” Eisen added, “the seven officials dug in time and again, 

mainly for the benefit of photographers.” 

Senator Spong, representing Virginia, and Broyhill had attended the event but had to return to the 

Capitol before the groundbreaking. 

WMATA had lined up 34 gold-painted shovels for the event. Cody Pfanstiehl, WMATA’s 

director of community relations, shouted, “It’s a do-it-yourself subway,” as he handed shovels to 

members of the audience. The Star reported, “One after another they shoveled to the strains of 

march music from the U.S. Navy Band.” 

Asked about the map glitch, Pfanstiehl said, “I don’t know how much the map cost. I haven’t 

received the bill yet.”

The ceremony ended as rush hour was beginning, leaving many members of the audience unable 

to find a taxi. One woman said, “I wish we had the subway now.” [Eisen, Jack, “Ground is 

Broken on Metro, Job Let,” The Washington Post, December 10, 1969; “Angry Mob Mars Nixon 

Visit to N.Y.,” The Washington Post, December 10, 1969; Green, Stephen, “’Do-It-Yourself’ 

Event Marks Start of Metro,” The Evening Star, December 10, 1969] 

In a formal statement issued by the Department of Transportation, Secretary Volpe called the 

start of construction “an excellent example of a metropolitan approach to an urban issue. The 

approach which exemplified a spirit of cooperation in the highest sense, is one worthy of 

duplication by urban areas in other parts of the country.” The groundbreaking was 

“demonstrable evidence of achievement through combined efforts of men of goodwill dedicated 

to the best public interest.” 

A Departure and an Arrival 

Deputy Mayor Thomas W. Fletcher, who had been appointed along with Mayor Washington by 

President Johnson in September 1967, had announced on October 8 that he would leave office on 

December 15. He was returning to his home State of California to become city manager of San 
Jose. In July 1967, he had left his position as city manager of San Diego to drive his family 

across the country to become Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of Housing and 

Urban Development. The Post wrote:

An FBI agent stopped him along the way, put his family in a hotel and put him on an Air 

Force plane for Washington and a presidential interview. President Johnson had heard 

about him, wanted him for the D.C. job and put out a nationwide alert to find him 

On September 6, 1967, President Johnson had announced his intention to nominate Walter E. 

Washington as Mayor and Fletcher as Deputy Mayor. As city manager of San Diego from 1961 

to 1966, the President said, Fletcher had “won a national reputation as one of America’s 

outstanding city executives.” His pioneering work advancing city management-budgeting 

techniques had served as a model for other cities: 

He is an innovator. He is experienced, highly respected, and eminently qualified for his 

new job. He is a man who can make government work for the good of the people it 

serves.

During the freeway battles, Fletcher had taken the lead, allowing Mayor Washington to remain, 

politically, above the fray. But as a Post article about the resignation pointed out: 

One of the low points in his career here came last spring, when word of the negotiations 

[with staff of the House Committee on Public Works] leaked out and he faced 50 

indignant freeway opponents in the City Council chambers. 

“You’re a liar, Fletcher, and you’re yellow,” one shouted at him as the meeting broke up. 

Fletcher stopped briefly, as if to reply. Then he turned, his shoulders slumped and walked 

slowly back to his office. 

His frustrations over the freeway issue and other aspects of his job seemed to weigh 

particularly heavy on him during last March and April. He spent a week in the hospital in 

April when an ulcer he had had for several years flared up. 

While Mayor Washington was a political leader, Fletcher’s job was to modernize the city 

government: 

The D.C. government was a relic of the horse-and-buggy era when Fletcher came, a 

creaky and cumbersome bureaucracy. He brought about a difference, if not a 

transformation. 

The Star reported: 

He could not read his resignation statement yesterday for fear of breaking down, he said, 

but he did manage to tell reporters in the District building that the San Jose offer “was a 

professional opportunity that I could not resist.”
Mayor Washington, in Boston for a speech, told Fletcher and reporters via speaker phone that, “I 

regard you, Tom, as the top man in the nation in municipal management”: 

The mayor cited his right-hand man’s qualities in emotional tones: “Sensitivity, 

commitment and competency.” Asked about a successor, he said, “I haven’t gotten over 

the shock of the situation.” 

. . . Fletcher, a tall, silver-haired man of 45, stood quietly with reporters as Washington 

spoke over the phone. “This is the guy closest to me in the city,” the black mayor said of 

the white administrator before listing the crises they had been through, including the riots 

of April 1968 and Resurrection City. 

The Post reported that regarding a successor, Mayor Washington had said, “When you’ve got the 

No., 1 city administrator in the country, you usually don’t think about who’s No. 2” 

President Nixon said he would accept the resignation “with extreme regret, as he has served the 

nation’s capital with enormous distinction.” [Moore, Irna, “Fletcher Quits City Post for San Jose 

Job,” The Washington Post, October 9, 1969; Milius, Peter, “Fletcher: Man for All Cities,” The 

Washington Post, October 9, 1969; Basham, William, “D.C. Deputy Mayor Leaving Dec. 15,” 

The Evening Star, October 9, 1969] 

On November 12, President Nixon announced that he had chosen Graham W. Watt, city manager 

of Dayton, Ohio, to be Fletcher’s successor. Although a native of Elizabeth, New Jersey, Watt 

had been raised on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. He had been city manager of Alton, Illinois, and 

Portland, Maine, before taking the position in Dayton. Fletcher described Watt as a “city 

manager’s city manager – probably one of the best city managers in the country today.” He had 

recommended Watt to Mayor Washington. 

A Star profile of Watt began: 

Graham W. Watt is the man credited with changing the direction of this industrial city 

from a brick-and-mortar government to an era of social concern. 

Since coming to Dayton 21⁄2 years ago, Watt had instituted such federally backed projects 

as Model Cities and the Concentrated Employment Program, both of which he will 

encounter again as deputy mayor of Washington. 

In fact, Watt is no stranger to Washington or its programs. He probably has spent more 

time in the Capital than anyone else from Dayton except its congressman.

Most of the time, he returned to Ohio with new federal commitments for grants-in-aid. 

He is well known within the federal agencies as an administrator who can spend federal 

dollars quickly and visibly. 

Watt, the profile stated, was “regarded as a calm, efficient administrator who never lost his cool.”
During a White House press conference, Watt said he would work toward President Nixon’s goal 

of making “this city of Washington not only the first city of the nation, but one of the leading 

cities of the world.” The job was, he said, a “great challenge and more than that a great 

opportunity.” 

Mayor Washington expected Watt to play the same role as Fletcher. “We [hope to] develop the 

kind of Mr. Inside-Mr. Outside relationship based on our own personal relationships that seems 

to transcend the professional ones.” 

Watt told reporters that he realized his new job would involve more pressure than his former 

position. However, he expected “to meet the community on its terms.” He said:

I know it sounds kind of preachy, but I believe we have a tremendous job to do to make 

the cities serve today’s people. And I think that whatever it takes to do that job, we’ve 

got to do. 

Making citizen participation in government decisionmaking effective might be, he said, “the 

toughest job for a city manager in the country.” That was, however, “part of the fascination and 

the challenge of the job here.” 

He and Mayor Washington would have to work out their relationship over time. “I’m a 

successor, not a replacement for Mr. Fletcher. I couldn’t try to be anything other than my own 

man.” 

He also indicated that he was a registered independent and planned to stay that way. [Horner, 

Garnett D., “Dayton’s Graham Watt Named D.C. Deputy Mayor by Nixon,” The Evening Star, 

November 12, 1969; Goldwyn, Ronald, “Watt No Stranger in D.C.,” The Evening Star, 

November 12, 1969; Levey, Robert F., “Deputy Mayor Named,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, November 13, 1969; Moore, Irna, “Graham Watt: Cool Professional,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, November 13, 1969] 

The Senate confirmed Watt’s appointment on December 11 as Deputy Mayor Fletcher was 

saying his goodbyes to the city. The Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade honored Fletcher 

at the Mayflower Hotel on December 9.

On December 12, he joined Mayor Washington and Chairman Hahn in a farewell meeting with 

President Nixon at the White House. Before departing for the White House, Fletcher had one 

last meeting with reporters, an opportunity to fulfil a promise he had made 2 years earlier. He 

handed out six envelopes that contained jigsaw-puzzle pieces of a report he had withheld 

regarding the District’s juvenile delinquency programs. Fletcher had said 2 years earlier, that 

“before I leave office, I am personally going to hand you a copy.” It had become a standing joke 

in the District Building, with reporters periodically asking “Whatever happened to the McGee 

report?” Handing out the envelopes with the chopped up report, he jokingly told reporters to 

“work together” to reassemble it.
After leaving the White House, he got into his car for the drive to San Jose. [Sarrow, Ronald, 

“McGee Report Issued In Piecemeal Fashion,” The Evening Star, December 12, 1969; Moore, 

Irna, “Fletcher Bids Off Farewell,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 13, 1969] 

Graham W. Watt took the oath of office as Deputy Mayor on January 2, 1970. 

Watt had met his wife Mary Irish of Baltimore, known as “Bidi,” at Washington College in 

Chestertown, Maryland. They had a son and daughter, 13-year old Terry and 11-year old Laurie. 

The Watts moved into an apartment in Van Ness North at 2001 Veazey Terrace in the District’s 

Forest Hills neighborhood near Connecticut Avenue and Rock Creek Park. 

The District’s Appropriation Act, 1970 

The District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1970, had not yet cleared Congress. Chairman 

Proxmire brought the bill to the Senate floor on December 11. The Post expected a floor fight 

over several issues, including the freeway program. Senators Tydings and Eagleton of the Senate 

District Committee believed the bill intruded on their jurisdiction:

Proxmire’s budget cutting also abolished 252 jobs in the department of highways and 

traffic – all of them positions used in connection with freeway construction. 

The city has been holding those positions vacant for the time when work begins on the 

entire freeway system. Highway department officials said yesterday they planned to fill at 

least 50 of those positions in the next few months for building of the Three Sisters 

Bridge.

If other stalled freeway projects, including the North Central Freeway and the North Leg, 

are approved soon, all 252 positions would be needed, according to Deputy Highway 

Director R. Dana Wallace.

Restoration of abolished positions would have to be requested in future city budgets if the 

freeway program is to be completed. [Moore, Irna, and Jewell, David A., “Senate Floor 

Fight is Expected Over District Budget,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

December 11, 1969] 

Although several portions of the bill generated lengthy debate, provisions related to freeways or 

Metro did not. Chairman Proxmire explained that because of the delay in passing the Revenue 

Act, 5 months of FY 1970 had passed. That, plus the obligation to support President Nixon’s 

efforts to reduce inflation by curtailing new construction starts, resulted in a reduced capital 

outlay program. The bill “is $70 million below budget estimates and $30 million below the 

House bill.” 

He also pointed out that the Revenue Act had limited District jobs to 41,500, but his bill reduced 

that total by 700. The Appropriations Committee “strongly urges vigorous and inclusive study 

and critical analysis of the District’s present and future manpower needs with a first-year goal of 

reducing by at least 1,000 the total of authorized positions established in this bill.” 
He explained that the bill appropriated the full amount for WMATA. 

The Senators discussed several issues at length, but the expected floor fight over freeways or the 

unfilled positions related to the freeways did not materialize. The Senate approved the bill, 

92 to 0. [District of Columbia Appropriations, 1970, Congressional Record-Senate, 

December 11, 1969, pages 38352-39366; the brief discussion of Metro is on 38354] 

A House-Senate conference committee met to reconcile differences between the two 

appropriations bills, with the Post predicting a Proxmire-Natcher clash on several issues, 

particularly the 252 positions for freeway construction. Chairman Proxmire promised to “go to 

the mat” in conference over the personnel issue. [Moore, Irna, and Levy, Robert F., “City’s 

Budget Faces Hill Conference,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 14, 1969] 

The conference committee released a reconciled bill on December 15. As the Star pointed out, 

“In another unusual turnabout for the city’s finances, House-Senate conferees asked congress 

today to approve a final ‘compromise’ District budget that is smaller than either of the earlier 

versions passed by the House and the Senate. The bill totaled $650.3 million, including a Federal 

payment to the city of $104.2 million. Funds for FYs 1969 and 1970 for Metro construction and 

restoration of jobs in the Department of Highways and Traffic were included. [Grigg, William, 

“$650 Million District Budget Is Approved by Conferees,” The Evening Star, December 16, 

1969; District of Columbia Appropriations, 1970, Conference Report, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 91st congress, 1st Session, Report No. 91-754, December 15, 1969] 

The Senate approved the conference report the following day with brief discussion, none related 

to Metro. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1970-Conference Report, Congressional 

Record-Senate, December 16, 1969, pages 39329-39331] 

Chairman Natcher brought the conference report to the House floor later in the day. The bill, he 

explained, restored the positions the Senate bill had cut from the District Department of 

Highways and Traffic. Most of the positions were “directly connected with the Department’s 

major construction programs”: 

The freeway impasse is finally broken and these positions will be necessary to enable the 

freeway system program to get underway. The Department has over $200 million in 

previously appropriated funds and they are available to fund these positions as well as the 

contracts for actual construction. 

The House approved the conference report without a recorded vote. [Conference Report on 

H.R. 14916, District of Columbia Appropriations, 1970, Congressional Record-House, 

December 16, 1969, pages 39387-39391] 

President Nixon signed the bill on December 24 (P.L. 91-155]. 

Pondering the Bad Options

As 1969 neared an end, officials looked to February 23, 1970, as a date of reckoning for the 

North-Central Freeway and the North Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway. Section 23 of the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1968 had given the District of Columbia 18 months to study what to do 

about these two freeway segments:

The government of the District of Columbia and the Secretary of Transportation shall 

study those projects . . . and shall report to Congress not later than 18 months after the 

date of enactment of this section their recommendations with respect to such projects 

including any recommended alternative routes or plans, and if no such recommendations 

are submitted within such 18-month period then the Secretary of Transportation and the 

government of the District of Columbia shall construct such routes, as soon as possible 

thereafter, as required by subsection (a) of this section. 

The city council had spent nearly a year of that time fighting Section 23’s mandate before 

reluctantly agreeing on August 9 to comply. Several months passed while officials debated 

whether to conduct the study inhouse or by hiring a consultant. When the city decided to hire a 

consultant, Chairman Fallon of the Public Works Committee and Chairman Natcher wrote to 

President Nixon to object. They said that too much time had been spent talking: 

Testimony before the Committee on Public Works indicated that enough money had been 

spent on endless studies and that positive action was required in order to complete the 

interstate system in the District of Columbia.

They said the 1968 Act “was not intended as a vehicle for the complete restudy of half the 

District of Columbia.” As the Post put it, they “made it clear that they did not want another 

report challenging the congressional mandate. They apparently felt that a report from the D.C. 

highway department would not.” 

The city announced on December 3 that the District Department of Highways and Traffic would 

conduct the study. The announcement included the intent to ask Congress for an 18-month 

extension of the deadline for the North Leg, which had not been subject to public hearings. 

Neither Chairman Fallon nor Chairman Kluczynski was receptive. Chairman Fallon said, 

“They’ve had enough time. We gave them 18 months. That’s what they asked for and that’s 

what we gave them.” With Congress in recess, he did not expect his committee to take up the 

matter until after January 15. Committee sources told reporters that the city had virtually no 

chance of an extension, which would require a new law to amend Section 23. 

None of the alternatives the city faced was favorable. The North-Central Freeway had been one 

of the most controversial segments of the city’s Interstate System. Maryland and the District had 

agreed on the alignment along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks to reduce dislocation of 

families, but opposition to the route continued. The city’s rehabilitation and rental of some of the 

homes taken for the route had reflected the city council’s abandonment of the alignment, 

regardless of Section 23. 

As for the North Leg, two alignments had been identified to provide the link between the 

Potomac River Freeway and the North-Central Freeway. Mayor Washington had made clear the 

city would not seriously study one of them, along Florida Avenue/U Street, NW. The alignment 

had been removed from District Highway Department maps, which now showed the North Leg in 
a tunnel under K Street, NW. The city wanted flexibility to consider the best location for the 

other alternative, possibly to shift it to some other route between K and U Streets. 

Chairman Hahn said on December 23 that the city council would make a recommendation after 

holding a public hearing in January. “I believe we must comply with the law.” [Prince, Richard 

E., “D.C. Freeway Dispute Coming to Head,” News Analysis, The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, December 23, 1969; Green, Stephen, “North Leg Decision Planned by Feb. 23,” The 

Evening Star, December 24, 1969] 

The Three Sisters Bridge Battle

On January 7, Roberts Owen again asked the U.S. Court of Appeals to block further construction 

of the Three Sisters Bridge. He claimed the District and Federal governments were dragging 

their feet in U.S. District Court, which had refused an injunction on bridge construction. The 

Post reported: 

Government attorneys denied any intentional delay on their part and contended that Owen 

and his clients had swamped them with various legal motions and demands for 

documents in preparation for the court suit . . . . 

Owen argued . . . not only that the government was stalling but that it was planning to let 

contracts later this month on the east leg of the inner loop, a segment of the city freeway 

system of which Three Sisters Bridge is also a part. Government attorneys said the east 

leg has no direct connection with the bridge and should not be included in the litigation. 

The court did not issue a ruling on the request for an injunction. [“Freeway Foes Seek Halt of 

Bridge Work,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 8, 1970] 

Because plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment in their favor, the case 

never went to trial. On January 12, 1970, Judge Sirica granted the Federal and District of 

Columbia defendants’ request for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ request for an 

injunction stopping construction of the Three Sisters Bridge. 

The decision turned on the phrase in Section 23 directing that construction proceed “in 

accordance with all applicable provisions of title 23 of the United States Code.” Federal and 

District officials argued that the requirement applied only to the Title 23 provisions dealing with 

actual construction, not the planning and public hearing requirements also in Title 23. They also 

argued that the intent of Congress was to require construction of the bridge, not to impose 

additional obstacles to its construction. Plaintiffs contended that compliance with Title 23 

requirements meant the bridge project was subject to the planning and public hearing 

requirements.

Judge Sirica found that: 

The resolution of this suit thus comes down to a question of statutory interpretation. The 

court is of the opinion that the interpretation of Section 23 of the 1968 Highway Act 

proposed by the defendants is the most reasonable. The court has taken into 
consideration the fact that the Act was passed soon after the Airis decision, supra, which 

had held up the construction of the Bridge pending compliance with the planning 

provisions of the D.C. Code. That this was a factor motivating the passage of this 

legislation is shown by the opening language of Section 23(a) “[n]otwithstanding *** any 

court decision***to the contrary.” The intent of Congress is most clearly shown by the 

provision that work shall commence on the bridge “[not] later than 30 days after the date 

of enactment.” The court believes that in passing this legislation, Congress intended that 

the District of Columbia commence construction on the bridge project as soon as 

possible, and that no further planning or hearing requirements of Title 23 need be 

complied with. [D.C. Federal of Civic Associations et al., v. John A. Volpe et al., Civ. A. 

No. 2821-69, U.S. District Court District of Columbia, January 12, 1970] 

Owen told reporters he would appeal the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals. 

The following day, city highway officials submitted their recommendations in response to 

Section 23 of the 1968 Act to Mayor Washington and Chairman Hahn. 

The District Highway Department supported the North-Central Freeway to Silver Spring, but 

proposed a route that would take 54 fewer residences and 3 fewer businesses. Total 

displacement would be 223 residences and 121 businesses. The route remained in the Baltimore 

and Ohio Railroad corridor, but would be shifted further west from 10th Street, NE., in the 

Brookland area. With the shift, the alignment would not affect the homes that had been 

rehabilitated and rented.

Support for the freeway was based on relief of traffic congestion in the central city, particularly in 

the parallel 16th Street, NW., corridor: 

A point that tends to be overlooked is that change in the vicinity of the proposed North 

Central Freeway is going to occur whether the facility is built or not. The Silver Spring 

line of the Metro system is programmed for the same general location of the freeway – 

adjacent for most of the route. 

Bruce T. Weaver, president of the Brookland Civic Association, opposed the recommendation 

despite the shift in alignment to protect the rehabilitated homes. “Freeways are nothing more nor 

less than a semblance of the plantation philosophy.” 

The District Highway Department recommended building the East Leg of the Inner Loop to 

connect with the Baltimore-Washington Parkway and the South Leg, as revised in response to the 

objections of the Fine Arts Commission, to connect the Southwest Freeway with the Theodore 

Roosevelt Bridge. The department also favored construction of the South Leg Freeway with 

tunnels under the Lincoln Memorial and the north edge of the Tidal Basin, the tunnels to 

connected with a depressed roadway along Independence Avenue. Airis pointed out that this 

plan would permit the depressed roadway to be converted into a tunnel. 

Airis suggested that the city council ask Congress for an 18-month delay in submitting 

recommendations on the North Leg of the Inner Loop. 
Mayor Washington forwarded the department’s recommendations without comment to the city 

council. Chairman Hahn was doubtful that Congress would approve a request for more time to 

study the North Leg Freeway, but announced plans for public hearings to begin on January 29 

and 30, and February 3 through 9 if necessary. He added that the hearings would be televised by 

the area’s public broadcasting station, WETA (channel 26). No one, he said, would be excluded 

from the hearings. 

ECTC’s Booker told a press conference that he had not read the department’s report, but could 

tell from a summary that it did not reflect the views of citizens “because it was drawn up by a 

bunch of bureaucrats.” He joined the D.C. Federation of Civic Association in demanding that the 

hearings be held at night “so that working people will not be economically penalized for 

attendance and participation.” Booker objected to the plan to televise the hearings, claiming it 

was “a clear attempt by the D.C. government to circumvent public hearings . . . and a clear 

attempt to keep the public from voicing its opinions.” [Prince, Richard E., “New NE Freeway 

Plan Takes 54 Fewer Homes,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 14, 1970; Green, 

Stephen, “Fewer Homes Hit In North Central Freeway Revision,” The Evening Star, January 13, 

1970] 

As the Post pointed out, WETA also was concerned that the presence of television cameras 

might affect the witnesses and members of the city council: 

Channel 26 officials realize they may run into special problems at the hearing, 

particularly if those witnesses who have threatened disorder are successful in creating 

it . . . . Channel 26 may turn their cameras off if they find their presence has dramatically 

changed the nature of the hearings. [“TV Eye on the Council,” The Washington Post, 

January 26, 1970] 

Star editors considered the District Highway Department’s recommendations “a responsible 

endeavor to comply” with Section 23 of the 1968 Act. The request for an 18-month delay on the 

North Leg was reasonable because, as a practical matter, the city was nowhere near agreeing on a 

location for the link in the Inner Loop Freeway. “And the over-all transportation picture might 

well benefit by giving more study to this most complex of all the projects, while other less 

complicated projects proceed.

The editors favored the all-tunnel option for the South Leg, even though it was more costly. The 

all-tunnel option had been created to satisfy NPS officials that impacts on the surrounding park 

would be minimized. “Since federal dollars will pay the cost in either event, this is a choice 

which Congress might well desire to make itself.”

The editors also supported the North-Central Freeway routing. The highway agency’s report 

“persuasively reaffirms the need to build” the expressway.

Despite these positive thoughts, the editors realized that the report was not the final work. The 

council would hold hearings that based on experience “are not apt to produce much in the way of 

constructive suggestions about how to make freeways – any freeways – really work.” The 

proposals would be “assailed bitterly, and in some cases hysterically by critics who broadcast 
their intention before the proposals were even disclosed.” After the hearing, Mayor Washington 

would send his recommendations to Congress, which would have the final say. 

The editors hoped city officials would keep two points in mind in deciding whether the freeway 

system should be completed. First, “Congress already has decided that – in the affirmative.” 

Second, other provisions in the 1968 Act had liberalized right-of-way rules to reduce the 

hardship involved in relocation. City officials had not fully explored this liberalization, but if 

they did, they might find that they could complete their task “with less negativism – and 

considerably more hope of broader community support.” [“Highway Hysterics,” The Evening 

Star, January 16, 1970] 

The Post’s editors also were encouraged. The city council faced choices that it must make before 

submitting its recommendations to Congress by February 23. For example: 

The council must choose between reaffirming its endorsement of a freeway route out 

New York Avenue to Maryland and going back to the discarded North Central Freeway 

(and its companion Northeast Freeway) along the B. and O. railroad tracks, which both 

the Highway Department and Maryland favor. 

The North-Central Freeway, the editors pointed out, would displace more homes and businesses, 

“but New York Avenue would be much less convenient and would pour unwanted traffic on the 

Baltimore-Washington Expressway, the Capital Beltway, and a number of north-south streets in 

the District, including some that are already congested beyond their capacity.”

The South Leg could be placed in a 5,300-foot tunnel, “entirely out of sight” except for 

“unsightly ventilating towers above ground.” The editors preferred the option of two tunnels 

connected by a depressed expressway “provided the proposed landscaping is acceptable to the 

park people.” 

Clearly the North Leg “needs further engineering study” of the K Street tunnel option. The 

Florida Avenue/U Street option “has been rejected out-of-hand by the city government [and] 

should not be revived.” 

Congress, as usual, would have the last word, but the city council’s recommendations would 

receive a better hearing on Capitol Hill “if it manages to come up with a workable system for 

handling the freeway traffic” based on their merits, not “a repetition of the disorders that 

characterized the hearings last summer.” A repetition of those disorders “would play into the 

hands of those in congress who couldn’t care less what the council, or the community thinks.” 

[“The Council, the Congress and the Freeways,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

January 18, 1970] 

Before the Hearings

Although the city council’s public hearings on the freeways were expected to be a major activity, 

it was not the only problem area officials had to deal with.
In Montgomery County, officials were dealing with protests against the Northern Freeway, a 

proposed 4.9-mile freeway the Maryland State Roads Commission proposed to connect the 

Capital Beltway with the planned Outer Beltway. It also would link with the North-Central 

Freeway from the Capital Beltway and the District line.

Opposition centered on the fact that the six-lane Northern Freeway would slice through Sligo 

Creek Park and Wheaton Regional Park. Edward T. Borda, attorney for Citizens to Save Our 

Parks, referred reporters to Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, which 

generally prohibited the use of parkland for Federal-aid projects unless no feasible and prudent 

alternative was available. “It is most likely there are many feasible alternatives to this dismal 

proposal.” The freeway, he said, would destroy Sligo Creek Park and damage the larger 

Wheaton Regional Park. [“Plan for Freeway in 2 Parks Draws Fire in Montgomery,” The 

Evening Star, January 6, 1970] 

When county officials met on January 7 with the Maryland State Roads Commission and the 

county’s delegation to the Maryland General Assembly, over 200 people showed up to protest the 

Northern Freeway. The Post reported: 

Last night’s meeting . . . was intended to be a work session . . . . But several times during 

the session, opponents of the 4.9-mile Northern Freeway stood up to denounce the roads 

commission’s plans. Leading the opposition was Sammie A. Abbott, who had been in the 

forefront of the movement to kill plans in the District for the North Central Freeway and 

also the Three Sisters Bridge.

He interrupted Chairman-Director David Fisher several times “and about five police officers 

were summoned to the building.” About 2 hours into the meeting, Abbott rose to leave: 

But before doing so, he gave a short statement denouncing the commission and the 

Montgomery delegation as “criminals and racists. He was ushered from the room by 

police officers but was not arrested. [Scharfenberg, Kirk, “225 Turn Out to Fight 

Montgomery Freeway,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 8, 1970] 

The Post reported that “county and state officials have been stunned in the past month by a 

mounting public outcry against a plan to use 90 acres of parks for the North Freeway, a six-lane 

speedway for trucks and commuters traveling into and out of Washington.” The strong 

opposition included a few critics who “are calling into question the basic role of freeways and the 

automobile in urban transportation.” 

Carrying on the battle, about 1,500 protesters walked through a section of Sligo Creek Park “to 

protest the freeway and to view the parkland they say will be destroyed by it.” Although the plan 

called for replacing the parkland, critics pointed out that little land would be available in the 

congested area of the county where the park was located. [Edwards, Paul G., “Outcry Brings 

Restudy,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 19, 1970] 

On January 19, Walter Bucher of the county commission told 500 opponents that the Maryland 

State Roads Commission had deferred planning for the Northern Freeway by a year. In addition, 
when work resumed, the road would be a four-lane parkway for passenger cars only, not a sixlane freeway as presently planned. The deferral, as the Star noted, “means county officials will 

not be compelled to take action on the controversial project during the current election year.” 

[Lorman, Alvin, “Northern Parkway Deferred for Year,” The Evening Star, January 20, 1970] 

On the eve of the public hearings, the District Corporation Council Duncan raised doubts about 

the city’s authority to use air rights over freeways for housing and other buildings. Duncan, on 

January 29, issued a formal opinion that Congress would have to grant approval before the 

District could proceed with its air rights plan, including construction of housing over the 

North-Central Freeway.

As noted earlier, the city had asked Congress to pass legislation addressing air rights. Congress 

had approved a bill covering District roads and streets (the District of Columbia Public Space 

Utilization Act, P.L. 90-598), but not the bill for freeways. The House District Committee 

informed the city that it already had the needed authorization under Federal-aid highway law. 

Duncan explained that Federal-aid law allowed States to use freeway air space under State or 

local laws. The District did not have a local law covering the use of air space over or under 

freeways.

Duncan’s ruling would not affect construction of a freeway under a Labor Department building at 

2nd Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., or a major housing project planned over the Center 

Leg Freeway near H and 2nd Street, NW. Other agencies had granted easements for the air rights 

usage. Construction of a hotel over the 9th Street Expressway also would not be affected; 

Congress had authorized the project in 1961. 

Duncan’s opinion was expected to provide another basis for citizen opposition to the freeways. 

[Flor, Lee, “Air Rights Opinion Puts Housing Plans in Doubt,” The Evening Star, January 29, 

1970; Eisen, Jack, “Hill Must Approve Air Space Rights,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, January 29, 1970] 

The City Council’s Public Hearings

The city council’s transportation committee began public hearings in the council chamber at 

7:30 p.m. As planned, WETA-TV broadcast the hearings. Fourteen policemen were on hand, 

ringing the chamber. Other policemen waited outside the chamber in case of need. 

As it turned out the security precautions were not needed; the hearing was less fiery than 

expected. The audience of about 100 cheered loudly the nine speakers who opposed the 

freeways, but were orderly. 

Airis, the first witness, discussed the department’s endorsement of routes for the South and East 

Legs of the Inner Loop Freeway and its plan for the North-Central Freeway. He explained the 

routing shift that would reduce the taking of homes and businesses in Brookland. 

Regarding the North Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway, he said an additional 18 months would be 

needed. When Councilman Yeldell asked if Congress would be receptive, Airis replied that, 

“My informal advice is that an 18-month extension would be acceptable.” Councilwoman 
Shackleton asked what a new study would show in view of the city’s opposition to the Florida 

Avenue/U Street routing and the business community’s opposition to the K Street tunnel. Airis 

replied, “Maybe we could hollow out a pair of streets up there,” referring to a possible routing 

north of K Street. 

He wanted legislation that would allow the department to use highway funds to build homes 

when housing was not available for people displaced by freeway construction. “I will hold firm 

to this: Homes will be available or there will be no work.” In the case of the North-Central 

Freeway, he believed ample lots were available for replacement structures.

The evening included support for the freeways from G. Yates Cook of the Federal City Council 

and Daniel J. Hanson of the city’s Traffic Board and an executive vice president of ARBA. 

All the other witnesses opposed the freeways. “As usual,” the Star reported, ECTC’s Sammie A. 

Abbott and R. H. Booker led the freeway opposition. In the Post, Jack Eisen described Abbott’s 

speech:

Abbott’s desk-pounding, finger-pointing, 30-minute high-volume presentation was the 

highlight of the hearing. Airis was his chief target.

At the end of his testimony, Abbott read a letter from the West Montgomery Citizens 

Association, opposing construction of another beltway and bringing access roads into 

residential neighborhoods. 

“And who is the vice chairman of this organization?” Abbott asked. “None other than 

Mrs. Thomas F. Airis, the wife of the same Mr. Airis who is desecrating the city of 

Washington and doesn’t even live in this city,” he answered himself. 

The Star continued the narrative. “Even Airis and council members laughed but they quickly 

became solemn again as Abbott berated them for encouraging ‘institutional racism’ by retaining 

an all-white planning staff in the highway department.” 

Photographs accompanying the articles showed Airis grimly looking on during one of Abbott’s 

finger-pointing moments as police officers lined the chamber wall.

(Airis, like many city officials, lived in the suburbs. His address was 10119 Gary Road in 

Potomac, Montgomery County, Maryland. Harold Aitken, his predecessor, had lived at 

512 Horner Court in Fairfax, Virginia. These addresses were not secret; each annual edition of 

the Congressional Directory contained the addresses during the years they were in office.)

Channing E. Phillips of the Democratic National Committee, urged the city council to tell 

Congress that “no more freeways or bridges are warranted at this time.” George W. Brady of the 

Federation of Citizens Associations recommended halting freeway construction until the subway 

system was completed. Henry Bain of the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies warned 

that continued freeway construction would lead to the “Los Angeles-ization” of the District of 

Columbia. 
Former Councilman Nevius said that as an attorney, he did not think that recommending an end 

to freeway construction would comply with Section 23 of the 1968 Act. However, he opposed 

further Interstate highways in the city, but could support a system of small parkways. [Eisen, 

Jack, “Roads Start to Wait for New Housing,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

January 30, 1970; Green, Stephen, “9 of 12 Testifying at Hearing Strongly Oppose Freeways,” 

The Evening Star, January 30, 1970] 

On January 30, 12 speakers opposed the freeways, while 6 endorsed the District Highway 

Department’s plan. Members of the city council expressed their own reservations, but feared the 

congressional reaction. The Star summarized their view:

Chairman Gilbert Hahn, Jr., Yeldell and other council members suggested that they 

would either like to seek more time for further study, or recommend no freeways are 

needed, or implement the thoroughfare plan passed by the council in 1968. 

Councilman Yeldell put it this way, “I shudder at the thought of recommending additional study 

and then having the Public Works Committee urge Congress [to] approve the old routes.” 

Former Council Vice Chairman Fauntroy testified against construction. “We must state to 

Congress without fear what we believe. I haven’t learned to move to a position of expediency 

when a question of conscience is involved.” 

Former Chairman Hechinger urged the city council to adopt the truncated plan approved under 

his leadership in 1968 without the North-Central Freeway. He was convinced that the 1968 plan 

met the congressional mandate to build the new roads. Hahn told him, “I may, indeed, in the end 

follow your advice.” 

Jerry White, testifying for the Maryland State Roads Commission, supported the North-Central 

Freeway, but acknowledged that the route still had legal hurdles to clear in Montgomery County. 

Witnesses from Montgomery County opposed extension of the North-Central Freeway into the 

county. Irving Woloch of the Montgomery County Civic Federation said, “Thus, if you should 

regrettably decide to go ahead with the North Central Freeway, you may well find that the 

freeway will terminate at a dead end in Montgomery County and we intend to continue to exert 

every effort to keep that end dead.” Montgomery County Councilwoman Idamae Garrott said 

that during a meeting in Rockville on January 31, she would vote to remove the North-Central 

Freeway from the county’s highway program. 

Eisen summarized the day’s hearings:

From the line of Council questions, it was clear that members were searching for a way 

out of voting for the road without angering Congress. [Eisen, Jack, “D.C. Freeway Foes 

Get Backing in Montgomery,” The Washington Post and Time Herald, January 31, 1970; 

Green, Stephen, “Council Members Cool To More City Freeways,” The Evening Star, 

January 31, 1970] 
Councilwoman Garrott’s proposal to remove the North-Central Freeway extension from the 

county’s plan was put to a vote when the Montgomery County Council met on January 31. She 

said, “It’s going to result in depression of our property values, in air pollution, in diminution of 

transit ridership.” Her motion failed to secure a majority vote; the council voted 2 to 2, with 

Gleason abstaining. 

She also opposed the Northern Parkway, which would run parallel to Georgia Avenue, described 

in the Post as “the county’s most overburdened artery, now traveled by 60,000 cars daily.” The 

council members made their concerns about the parkway clear. The council voted to remove the 

parkway from the county’s 5-year program, apparently because they learned that if they deleted 

the parkway entirely, funds would not be available for studying alternatives. 

The council also approved an amendment stipulating that “Sligo Creek Park not be one of the 

routes to be considered.” They also voted against having the Maryland State Roads Commission 

to propose the route to the council within 5 years. The council indicated that the State should 

hold off until Metro was opened in the parallel Georgia Avenue corridor; Metro might lessen the 

need for the parkway. 

Councilman Feeney summarized the action: 

The Council has taken the position that, if it had the authority, it would prohibit the 

parkway through Sligo Creek Park. And in the absence of this we are strongly hinting to 

the State Roads Commission that they follow our advice. [Lorman, Alvin J., 

“Montgomery Refuses Use of Park for Road,” The Sunday Star, February 1, 1970; 

Cohen, Richard M., “Don’t Build Sligo Route, Council Says,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, February 1, 1970] 

The city council’s public hearings resumed on February 3, with all but one of the 16 witnesses 

opposing the freeways. 

Witnesses from two business groups in the vicinity of Connecticut Avenue and K Street testified 

in opposition to the crosstown North Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway. Stanley O. Sher, an 

attorney for the Connecticut Avenue Association and the recently formed Committee Concerned 

for K Street, said the proposed K Street tunnel, would be a “disruptive white elephant.” In an 

area already slated for disruption from Metro subway construction, the North Leg tunnel would 

not “revitalize, feed, or even serve downtown.” The businesses also opposed the Florida 

Avenue/U Street alignment. Sher suggested that the city council could satisfy the congressional 

mandate by advising against building the North Leg instead of suggesting an alternative route.

Former NCPC Chairman Rowe said the network threatened “the character and livability of the 

city.” She did, however, support the 24-mile system that NCPC and the city council had 

endorsed in December 1968. The pattern for that plan, she said, had been set by the roads 

already built.

Dr. Daniel B. Fisher, whose degree was in cancer research, pointed out that automobile pollution 

threatened the health as well as the safety of the community. He added that the South Leg of the 
Inner Loop Freeway could destroy the famous cherry trees around the Tidal Basin. “We must 

attack the cause, the overuse of the automobile, for access into the city.” 

ECTC’s Charles Cassell, who had just won election to the board of education, addressed the city 

council on behalf of the Capital East Citizens Organization. He called for “not another inch” of 

freeways. He said the only people who supported the freeways were business groups and 

Members of Congress. The Star reported that he “thundered” as he said, “How much more 

technical information must we give you to impress upon you that your major responsibility is to 

us and not to the Congress of the United States.” 

Eisen described a confrontation between Cassell and Councilman Moore: 

The appearance of the militant Cassell led to a verbal clash in contrast to the generally 

calm tenor of the session. 

After displaying an enlarged photograph of a freeway, Cassell refused the request of 

Councilman Jerry A. Moore Jr. that he sit down to continue testimony. Moore presided 

as chairman of the Council’s Transportation Committee. 

For 10 minutes, as tension mounted, sharp words were exchanged, with Cassell insisting 

that he be permitted to stand and demanding that six armed special guards leave the room. 

“Listen to me,” Moore said. “There are just certain things that are courteous.” In the end 

Moore relented and Cassell remained standing to finish his testimony. 

Dr. Yale Rabin, a consultant to the NAACP and the National Coalition on the Transportation 

Crisis, warned the city council that if the full freeway network were built, the city would be 

following a proven path of self-destruction. Studies of urban roadbuilding “show a consistent 

pattern of flagrant disregard for inner city minority groups and for the urban environment.” 

Displacing approximately 20,000 people was reason enough to halt freeway construction. The 

Star summarized Dr. Rabin’s testimony:

Rabin labeled as “myths” the ideas that new roads provide additional jobs for low income 

groups and revitalize the downtown area. On the contrary, he said, easier access to the 

suburbs causes both people and industry to move out of the city, leaving it to those who 

had neither the skills nor the money for mobility. 

Further, citing experience in other cities, he said no city in the country with freeways 

emptying into the downtown area has found the arrangement capable of producing 

anything but congestion. 

He endorsed the expanded rapid transit system as the only solution to the city’s transportation 

problems: 

The “balanced” transportation system – coordination of highways and subways –

envisioned by proponents of the freeways was a “deception,” he said, adding that if road 
and Metro lines run along the same right-of-way the roads would seriously undermine 

Metro patronage, particularly if they are built first.

A spokesman for the Yellow Cab Company was the lone witness in support of the freeway 

system. [Eisen, Jack, “2 Business Groups Hit Freeway,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, February 4, 1970; Holden, Constance, “Planner Warns D.C. Council Of Dangers in New 

Freeways,” The Evening Star, February 4, 1970] 

The hearing the evening of February 4 was similar to previous hearings where critics far 

outnumbered the lone supporter. The Star reported that most of the speakers “seemed impatient 

with the council for not flatly turning down the Highway Department’s plan for an Inner Loop.” 

The members of the city council should not fear congressional reprisal. “Let the blood be on 

their hands,” several witnesses said, referring to Congress. 

Several witnesses criticized Section 23 of the 1968 Act. Donald R. Allen of northwest pointed 

out that the plan required by Section 23 was based on 11-year old statistics and had never been 

subjected to cost-benefit analysis.

Merle Van Horne, representing Americans for Democratic Action, said, “It would be hard to find 

a modern urban environmental planner who could say a kind word for freeways in the core city 

today.” The Section 23 plan ignored the idea of people-oriented cities geared to pedestrians, with 

the automobile existing only by sufferance.

Leslie Logan of Preservation of the Potomac Palisades ridiculed the concept of balanced 

transportation. No such balance could be achieved if the Federal Government would not 

subsidize the losses on subway operations. He denied that the two systems had been coordinated, 

as reflected in the absence of fringe parking that would encourage commuters to use public 

transportation for trips into the city.

William B. Middleton predicted that freeways into the city would “be obsolete in a few years 

with expansion to outlying areas.” While Metro was under construction, he suggested the use of 

express buses and commuter trains on existing rail lines. 

The Post summarized the hearing:

Last night, speakers opposing further freeway construction here attacked freeways for 

disrupting and isolating neighborhoods, polluting the air, displacing residents from their 

homes, spawning more traffic problems and creating even more reliance on the use of 

automobiles for private transportation. 

When a pro-highway witness, Washington attorney Harry Wender, pointed out that the city’s 

10 miles of freeways were already proving to be safer than its 1,070 miles of surface streets, 

members of the audience heckled him. [“Foes Heckle Advocate of Freeway,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, February 5, 1970; “Freeway Proposals Draw More Public Criticism,” 

The Evening Star, February 5, 1970] 
Newspaper coverage of the hearings was shrinking as the next-to-last hearing took place on 

February 5. In a four-paragraph summary, the Star reported that “some speakers began to show 

impatience with the procedures used by the council.” Councilman Moore argued with 

Wendell A. Daniel of the Plymouth Congregational Church when he complained that only two 

members of the city council were in attendance. (Chairman Hahn was present along with 

Moore.) Another witness, Johnnie D. Wilson, criticized the city council for favoring the rich 

over the poor. “I think this [hearing] is an exercise you’re going through that doesn’t mean a 

thing. Chances are you’ve already made up your minds.” [“Freeways Opponent Criticizes 

Hearing,” The Metro Scene, The Evening Star, February 6, 1970] 

On the final day of hearings, February 6, Montgomery County Councilman Kenney said the 

county supported completion of the North-Central Freeway from the District line to the Capital 

Beltway. It was “absolutely vital,” no matter what opponents said. He had “no doubt” that the 

county was “fully prepared to support” the freeway. He did not endorse a specific route. He 

recognized that any freeway route would be controversial, but he was certain the North-Central 

Freeway would “be of significant economic and social value to the residents of both our areas.” 

His views were contradicted by recent actions by other county officials. On February 2, 

Montgomery County’s delegation to the House of Delegates voted 13 to 3 to strike the Northern 

Freeway from the State’s highway plans. They favored “immediate study” of transportation 

needs in the Georgia Avenue corridor. The vote was binding on the Maryland State Roads 

Commission.

In addition, the Montgomery County Council had voted to delay further right-of-way acquisition 

in the Northern Freeway corridor to allow study of alternatives. Chairman-Director Fisher agreed 

to participate in the study of alternative routes for the freeway and ways to alleviate congestion 

along Georgia Avenue. [“Northern Freeway Postponed,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, February 3, 1970] 

None of the final day’s witnesses supported the freeway system. Witnesses opposed the 

North-Central Freeway, the route of the South Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway, and called for a 

moratorium on all new freeways pending further study. 

ECTC’s Sammie Abbott attended the hearing. Despite being warned that he would be thrown 

out if he said anything, he spoke up when someone else had the floor. The Star reported: 

Sammie A. Abbott . . . was lifted out of his chair by two policemen and removed from the 

room . . . . Until he was allowed to return several minutes later, Abbott’s supporters 

shouted at the councilmen and the police. 

Abbott . . . said later that he had been warned . . . [but] “sometimes I find it necessary to 

comment,” he said.

It was “the first time [the council] had to call upon security forces that have been on hand at all 

nine sessions.” [“Central Freeway Called Vital,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 
February 7, 1970; Robinson, Alma, “Freeway Foe Ejected From Council Hearing,” The Evening 

Star, February 7, 1970] 

Summing up the hearings, the Post’s Wolf Von Eckardt noted, “Freeway proponents have lately 

become as scarce as hawks.” City council staff had invited freeway advocates such as AAA and 

the Rubber and Tire Manufacturers to testify, but they did not appear: 

Only the Bethesda Chamber of Commerce, the truckers and spokesmen for several 

downtown business organizations, notably Yates Cook of the Federal City Council, still 

favor the freeway “system” this city officially rejected over a year ago.

The community did not want the freeway system that Chairman Natcher was insisting be built, 

“as some 200 citizens, representing all kinds of persuasions and organizations, patiently told the 

City Council once more last week in the course of nine sessions of public hearings”: 

They were not just the urban proletariat, supported by a few intellectual snobs who hate 

automobiles. The freeway opponents included city planning experts and environmental 

scientists, and some of them were even more respectable than that. They were suburban 

commuters.

He cited the opposition to the Northern Freeway in Montgomery County as evidence that 

suburbanites, too, were “becoming disenchanted with the notion that the way to remedy a 

mistake is to escalate it.”

The opposition also reflected the fact that we “now all know much more about what is happening 

to our environment than we did when this freeway system was conceived back in 1956.” 

Combine this knowledge with the “almost unanimous opposition” to the District’s system, and 

“it now seems politically as unthinkable for the City Council to consent to completing this 

system as it would be for President Nixon to re-escalate the war.”

Inevitably, the city was “in for a period of difficult negotiations” over a “balanced transportation 

system,” which Von Eckardt said was “about as vague a term as they come.”

Recalling that on “one hot August Saturday morning” in 1969, the city council was “forced to 

surrender,” but he argued that “this time the city seems in a much stronger position.” He 

dismissed Director Airis’s restudy of the network in support of the freeways, including the 

North-Central Freeway, as “arrogant intransigence” that would not do the highway cause much 

good on Capitol Hill and in the Department of Transportation.” Von Eckardt did not believe area 

Members of Congress would “condone blackmail again to protect suburban commuters, because 

suburban commuters, too, are turning against freeways”: 

It therefore seems time for this city to call the bluff about “balanced transportation.” We 

have paid our ransom with the Three Sisters Bridge. Now the city must speed subway 

construction, and press for better bus service, more parking, and the long overdue 

improvement of the existing street system with grande [sic] separations, synchronized 

traffic lights and more enlightened traffic engineering.
We are a big city now and need no longer be pushed around by unenlightened 

self-interests. [Von Eckardt, Wolf, “Tracing the Changing Mood of Freeway System 

Victims,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 8, 1970] 

City Councilman Yeldell agreed. Speaking to the local chapter of the American Society of Civil 

Engineers, he said that freeway advocates had not made a convincing case that the city needed 

the full 29-mile Interstate System planned for it. Some more freeways might be needed, but that 

need would be reduced by the full Metro system. “At that time we would want to discourage the 

commuter from using the roads.” [“Freeway Issue Seen Still Open,” City Life, The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, February 11, 1970] 

On February 16, the TPB of COG recommended the city support the freeway system, including 

the North-Central Freeway and I-95/Northeast Freeway. The vote was by voice, but no 

opposition was expressed. The city councilmen who serve on the board were absent. [Eisen, 

Jack, “D.C. Freeway Plan Backed by Board,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

February 17, 1970] 

The same day, Secretary Volpe announced during a press conference that “projects of the 

Department of Transportation will not be approved if they involve the dislocation of people, 

black or white, unless and until adequate replacement housing has already been built or provided 

for.” He added, “All replacement housing must be fair housing – open to all persons regardless 

of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” The term “adequate” housing meant “decent, 

safe, and sanitary.” The new policy applied to all projects, including highways, subways, 

airports, railroads, and Coast Guard activities. (The United States Coast Guard, in those days, 

was in the Department of Transportation during peacetime; it would join the Department of 

Defense during war.) 

Secretary Volpe said the policy clarified compliance with the provision in the 1968 Act requiring 

the government to provide housing for displaces “to the extent that can reasonably be required.” 

Now, if adequate replacement housing did not exist, the sponsoring agency would have to build 

it. “In every case where a family desires housing, they are now absolutely assured of it.” 

Highway officials in Maryland and Virginia endorsed the policy, but Secretary Volpe could not 

predict how it would affect specific projects. He said he had met with Mayor Washington and 

Chairman Hahn to discuss the potential impact on District freeways. However, he emphasized 

that he intended the policy to be taken literally:

We are determined that the great demand for transportation construction capacity that 

faces this nation will be met, but that it will be met with full consideration given to the 

extremely important factors or environment and housing. [Hebald, Anne, “Volpe Ties 

Road Plans To Housing,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 17, 1970; 

Green, Stephen, “Volpe Links Road Funds to Housing,” The Evening Star, February 6, 

1970] 

The following day, the city council voted 9 to 0 to omit the North-Central Freeway, and the 

Northeast Freeway branch into Maryland from its recommendations to Congress in response to 
Section 23 of the 1968 Act. Traffic on I-95 would travel east on the Capital Beltway 4 miles to 

the Baltimore-Washington Parkway and enter the city on New York Avenue, NE., until the 

parallel Industrial Freeway could be constructed.

The Industrial Freeway would take up to 137 houses, depending on routing. The Post reported 

that, “The council suggested that the Industrial Freeway be designed in conjunction with a ‘major 

industrial park, including a center for truck operation, capable of creating new employment and a 

tax base for the District.’” 

The city council accepted construction of the Three Sisters Bridge and its approaches, but other 

elements of the plan included: 

East Leg of the Inner Loop – The highway department had proposed routing the East Leg

from the Robert F. Kennedy Stadium area to the south end of the North-Central Freeway 

near the Ivy City railroad yard. The city council rejected the freeway plan, favoring 

construction of the Anacostia Parkway from terminus of the Southeast Freeway at Barney 

Circle, through the National Arboretum, and connecting with the Industrial Freeway in an 

interchange at South Dakota Avenue. 

North Leg of the Inner Loop – The plan called for tunneling the route across downtown 

Washington under E Street, NW., or beneath K, L, or M Streets, NW. Councilman 

Moore said that the 18-month study period that Airis had requested “does not comply 

with . . . the letter or the spirit” of the 1968 Act. 

South Leg of the Inner Loop – The city council rejected both plans for the South Leg, 

including a tunnel all the way from the Lincoln Memorial to the Tidal Basin or two 

shorter tunnels connected by a depressed section. The approved plan called for a short 

tunnel beneath Lincoln Memorial Circle linking Independence Avenue with the stub end 

of the existing freeway to the north. 

Overall, the plan was closer to the plan approved in December 1968 than the plan approved in 

August 1969. 

The Post pointed out that the meeting was “marked by a bomb scare attributed to a crank and by 

unaccustomed bursts of applause from the audience.” The longest ovation from the crowd of 

about 200 came when the newly appointed Councilman, Dr. Henry S. Robinson, Jr., said that 

69 homes in Brookland that had been acquired for the North-Central Freeway should be restored.

(On September 23, 1969, President Nixon had nominated Dr. Robinson to serve the remainder of 

former Councilman Thompson’s term after he was appointed an Associate Judge. Robinson, 64, 

was a District native, an orthopedic surgeon, a Republican, and an African-American. He and his 

wife lived at 1800 Randolph Street, NE. [Griffiths, Harriet, “Nixon Picks Robinson for D.C. 

City Council,” The Evening Star, September 23, 1969] 

(Thompson’s term was to expire February 7, 1970, but on March 10, 1970, President Nixon 

nominated Dr. Robinson to a full term. At the same time, he nominated Councilman Anderson 

for a second term and the Reverend Carlton W. Veazey, pastor of the Zion Baptist Church, to 
succeed Councilwoman Shackleton. Veazey, an African-American and a Republican who 

worked as a supervisor at the Opportunity Industrialization Center in Cardozo, lived at 

230 M Street, SW. On April 10, 1970, General Sessions Court Judge Thompson, the former 

councilman, administered the oaths of office for Councilmen Anderson, Robinson, and Veazey. 

On April 23, Mayor Washington appointed former Councilwoman Shackleton to the at-large seat 

on the District of Columbia Model Cities Commission.)

Although Section 23 appeared to make construction of the North-Central Freeway mandatory, 

Chairman Hahn and Councilman Moore insisted that the decision complied with the law since 

the report contained the city’s recommendation. 

The city council was to forward the plan to Mayor Washington, who could accept it or dissent 

from it. If he accepted, it would become the city’s official plan. The Star explained that if he 

rejected the plan “he will either have to negotiate a new recommendation with the council or 

produce his own to submit to Congress along with that of the council.” Secretary Volpe had said 

he would make his recommendations after seeing the city’s plan.

Eisen reported: 

The Council’s position is almost certain to arouse substantial criticism, at the very least, 

from profreeway members of the House Public Roads Subcommittee which originated the 

1968 law. 

But it is not clear what the freeway advocates can do. They do not have the same handle 

on the issue that existed last summer when a principal overseer of the city budget, 

Rep. William H. Natcher (D-Ky.) threatened to withhold money for the Metro subway 

system if the road system and notably the Three Sisters Bridge across the Potomac, was 

not built. 

ECTC’s Booker was less enthusiastic than others in the crowd. He saw the city council’s action 

as a result of ECTC’s “unceasing struggle.” Sammie Abbott, who had slipped on ice the day 

before, could not attend. [Eisen, Jack, and Prince, Richard E., “North Central Road Barred by 

Council,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 18, 1970; Green, Stephen, “Freeway 

Veto Faces Threat By Natcher,” The Evening Star, February 18, 1970] 

Mayor Washington, Deputy Mayor Watt, Chairman Hahn, and Director Airis were among the top 

city aides who met with Secretary Volpe, Federal Highway Administrator Turner, and other 

officials for an hour and a half on February 18 about the District’s plan. The goal was to brief 

the Federal officials on the city council’s action, but Hahn acknowledged afterwards that the 

meeting was inconclusive.

Mayor Washington, who met privately with Secretary Volpe for 10 minutes, told reporters he had 

not yet read the city council’s plan. “It would be impossible for me to give an opinion until 

I read the documents.” Turner also said he had not had a chance to review the city’s plans. He 

said, “We’ve obviously got a lot of homework to do” in view of the statutory deadline imposed 
by Section 23 of the 1968 Act (technically February 23, but since that date was the George 

Washington Federal holiday, the deadline had become February 24). 

Secretary Volpe told reporters that he had not taken a position on the city’s plan, but said he 

would give great weight to FHWA’s views. Department sources told reporters that FHWA was 

almost certain to recommend construction of the North-Central Freeway and the East Leg 

Freeway north of Bladensburg Road. Although Secretary Volpe said the White House had not 

pressured him on the issue, he added that the Nixon Administration’s recent emphasis on 

environmental problems would “play a big role in the location of any highway” in the plan. 

He had received reaction from Capitol Hill. “Yes, I had a call this afternoon from the Capitol,” 

he told reporters. He refused to disclose the source, but the Congressman was reportedly 

unhappy with the city council’s action. Chairman Natcher, as usual, declined to comment on the 

city council’s decision, but congressional sources told reporters that he will again threaten to 

withhold District matching funds for Metro if the city repudiates each requirement of Section 23 

of the 1968 Act. 

The sources also cited the city council’s decision to support the Anacostia Parkway, between 

Barney Circle and the Industrial Freeway, instead of the East Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway, as 

called for in the 1968 Act. Barney Circle, which is south of Bladensburg Road, was outside the 

bounds established by the 1968 Act. 

(President Nixon had signed the landmark National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 on 

January 1, 1970, creating new environmental requirements that as of February 1970, were not 

completely clear to highway officials. A month earlier, the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) began operations. For more information, see “Addressing the Quiet Crisis: Origins of the 

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969” on the Highway History Web site.)

Officials of the Maryland State Roads Commission, meeting in Baltimore, expressed their 

disappointment with the city’s actions, particularly the decision to drop the North-Central 

Freeway. The State planned to open the eight-lane I-95 freeway linking the Baltimore Beltway 

and the Capital Beltway in 1971. Maryland, the District, and FHWA had agreed on the Y-shaped 

I-70S/I-95 link, with I-95 carried from the Inner Loop Freeway on the North-Central Freeway 

before branching off near Gallatin Street, NE., to continue on the Northeast Freeway to connect 

with I-95 at the Capital Beltway.

Walter Bucher, Montgomery County’s representative on the commission, said the city council’s 

plan would create “a hell of a mess” based on simple arithmetic. Traffic would leave I-95’s eight 

lanes to merge onto the Capital Beltway’s overcrowded six lanes, travel south onto the four-lane 

Baltimore-Washington Parkway, before reaching New York Avenue, a non-access controlled 

facility. Moreover, he said the parkway pavement, without reconstruction, could not absorb the 

increased traffic even if the NPS continued to prohibit trucks on the facility. [Eisen, Jack, “City 

Aides, Volpe Meet on Roads,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 19, 1970; 

Green, Stephen, “Volpe, Mayor Meet On Freeway Issue,” The Evening Star, February 19, 1970; 

Eisen, Jack, “I-95 Creates New Planning Crisis,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

February 22, 1970] 
Congressional concerns became clearer on February 20 when Chairman Kluczynski told Eisen 

that the city would be “in trouble” if its recommendations omitted the North-Central Freeway. 

The council, he said, would be defying the provisions of the 1968 Act. He added that Chairman

Natcher was “upset” by the council’s action. Chairman Natcher did not comment on the 

situation, but a congressional source recalled the chairman’s November 24 comment that, “The 

Highway Act of 1968 must be complied with and as long as the freeway system proposed in this 

act continues under way we will, at the proper time, appropriate funds for continuing 

construction of this rail rapid transit system.” He added that “both systems must continue under 

way . . . .” [Eisen, Jack, “Hill Opposition Expected on Freeway Plans,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, February 21, 1970] 

On February 21, Mayor Washington informed Congress that he supported the city council’s 

abbreviated highway plan, including the recommendation to remove the North-Central Freeway 

from the Interstate System. He had given “full and careful consideration” to the council’s 

recommendations before drawing his own conclusions. He had considered citizen opposition to 

the freeway, as well as “environmental, socio-economic and housing considerations,” in deciding 

to endorse the Industrial Freeway alternative parallel to New York Avenue. It would be, he said, 

“attended with less disruption to the community.” 

By then, the city council had amended its recommendations to clarify that the East Leg would be 

built near Bladensburg Road and that the Anacostia Parkway would run north in a tunnel from 

there. [“Congress Is Told Mayor Supports Freeway Deletion,” The Evening Star, February 21, 

1970; Green, Stephen, “Mayor to Support Council On Opposition to Freeway,” The Evening 

Star, February 20, 1970; Moore, Irna, “Mayor Backs Council Plan On Freeways,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, February 22, 1970] 

The Post’s editorial board was not impressed by the city council’s approved plan: 

The most that can be said for the city council’s report on the Washington freeway 

program is that it probably complies technically with the requirement of the Highway Act 

of 1968 that some such report be made. Beyond that, the alternatives approved by the 

council are essentially the same ones which the council put forward at the end of 1968 –

and which failed then to resolve the controversy over the freeways.

The council’s decision on the North-Central Freeway was particularly troubling. The 

Department of Highways and Traffic’s original plan “remains the most logical place to put the 

road since it would go in a transportation corridor already occupied by the railroad and about to 

be occupied by the subway system.” The alternative routing in the New York Avenue corridor 

was “really no alternative at all since it will not serve the same part of the city.” The council had 

also failed “to assess the impact of the proposed New York Avenue routing on the Maryland 

interstate system, particularly the Beltway.” The best option at this point was to request an urban 

design study “to permit a team of architects, engineers, urban planners and environmentalists to 

assess the implications of this route” in cooperation with Maryland and Metro officials. [“The 

Freeway Debate,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 24, 1970] 
Secretary Volpe’s Decision

The Post reported that the Assistant Secretary for Urban Systems and the Environment, former 

Seattle Mayor James D. Braman, had told the Secretary that the city council’s plans for an 

abridged freeway network were a better fit with the Nixon Administration’s environmental goals 

than the plans proposed by the District Department of Highways and Traffic. Braman said the 

Department’s concerns focused on the South Leg Freeway because of fears about pollution, 

destruction of trees and parkland, and its appearance in a park-like area.

As for other segments, Braman said, “We were concerned with disturbances to neighborhoods,” 

but thought the city council’s plan was a “reasonable response” to the demands of Section 23 of 

the 1968 Act. 

Chairman Fallon disagreed. He said the city council’s plan was “nowhere close to the action that 

Congress took in 1968.” He added, “Certainly, they’re flouting the will of Congress.” He 

expected Congress to place more confidence in Secretary Volpe’s plan than in the city council’s 

proposals. [Prince, Richard E., “Volpe Sets District’s Roads Plan,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, February 24, 1970] 

On February 22, Secretary Volpe sent his recommendations to Congress in accordance with

Section 23 of the 1968 Act. His letter to Speaker of the House McCormack and President of the 

Senate Agnew expressed general support of the city council’s decisions: 

In my opinion, the recommendations of the Government of the District of Columbia 

reflect a determined effort to comply with the requirements of the Congress as well as to 

remain sensitive to the expressed concerns of the citizen groups of the District of 

Columbia. It is necessary to remember in this connection that the time available for 

preparation of studies and for Government action was considerably reduced by the 

practical necessity last year to resolve the controversy concerning the relationship of rapid 

transit and highways in a balanced transportation program for the metropolitan area. Yet 

the completed freeway network reflected in the District Government’s recommendations 

includes in mileage over 73 percent of the network set forth in the 1968 Cost Estimate. 

With the New York Avenue addition proposed by the District Government, the total 

mileage would be 87 percent of the mileage in the 1968 Cost Estimate. 

His focus was on the three freeway projects that Section 23 of the 1968 Act had designated for 

further study, not immediate construction: the South Leg, North Leg, and North-Central 

Freeways.

He commented on each pending freeway. For the South Leg Freeway, he favored the city 

council’s proposal known as Plan C, as recommended by FHWA, to build a tunnel about 1,400 

feet long beneath the Lincoln Memorial grounds returning to the surface on Independence 

Avenue about 1,000 feet beyond the south tunnel portal. He recommended one change in the 

city’s plan. The vertical clearance in the tunnel section could be reduced to 121⁄2 feet, instead of 

141⁄2 feet, “since commercial traffic will not be permitted on this route.” That reduced height 
would “accommodate all foreseeable emergency needs and other routings are available for the 

movement of military vehicles requiring larger clearances.”

The tunnel, with a capacity of 60,000 vehicles a day, would reduce impacts on the landscape, 

avoid the Tidal Basin area, and cost about $22.5 million, much lower than the cost of alternatives

calling for a tunnel under the Tidal Basin. “This plan will do the least damage to the esthetics 

and monumental character of this area and permit its easy accessibility to visitors and city 

dwellers alike.” 

Secretary Volpe agreed with the city council that the North Leg Freeway required additional 

study that would take about 18 months. He advised that the study should not be restricted to the 

alternatives the city had specified (“4-lane tunnel along K Street, 2-lane tunnels along L and M 

Streets or some combination of these, or as an alternative, a tunnel connecting the E Street 

Expressway to ‘Downtown’”): 

There is a strong possibility that the “E” Street line extension, across the area in the rear 

of the White House and extending beyond Pennsylvania Avenue, perhaps ultimately to 

the Center Leg Freeway, can be accomplished. This will be the “release” from the 

pressure for a traffic service line along “K” Street – and certainly would give relief to the 

present problem of “just too many cars and too much confusion in [the] area between the 

White House and the Washington Monument.” 

Secretary Volpe hoped that outreach to HUD and others would help solve the relocation 

problems while the 18-month study was underway. He recommended that “there be prepared 

within 18 months, in cooperation with the District Government, a final action plan on this 

segment of the Interstate System in the District.” The key was that the study must not be limited 

to the city’s proposed alternatives.

He did not adopt the city’s proposal to remove the North-Central Freeway from the city’s 

Interstate System. “In my opinion, any judgment requiring or precluding this segment is 

premature.” This section of the city was one of the most heavily traveled, and traffic was bound 

to increase. The city’s Industrial Freeway alternative in the New York Avenue corridor was not 

an actual alternative:

The New York Avenue freeway proposed by the District Government as a substitute is 

not in fact an alternative; it is primarily an east-west corridor and offers little relief to 

north-south traffic. Nor can possible improvements in managing traffic arterials as 

suggested by the District Government meet but a part of the problem. 

The concept of the North-Central Freeway was to combine northwest, central, and northeast 

corridors into one central route. As such, it would require “an exceedingly high capacity, 

4-2-4 lane freeway with reversible express center lanes”: 

The wide swathe needed for such a cross-section with extreme traffic concentrations in 

the vicinity of the Capitol dictated an arbitrary cutback to a 4-4 lane proposal. 
This cutback was “generally recognized as inadequate for future needs,” but two considerations 

made it acceptable:

First, another outlet to the northwest will eventually be supplied upon completion of the 

George Washington Memorial Parkway on the District side of the Potomac River from 

the Three Sisters Bridge to the Beltway, Interstate 495. Although commuter travel over 

parkways is generally undesirable, it would seem the river valley is too important a 

resource to be devoted solely to “pleasure” driving. 

Second, an outlet to the northeast is possible in two ways. The proposed New York 

Avenue Freeway via the Kenilworth Interchange and northward on the BaltimoreWashington Parkway to the Beltway may be built. The northeast branch from the North 

Central corridor to meet Maryland’s Interstate 95 at the Beltway would provide similar 

service.

Housing had always been a factor in discussing the North-Central Freeway. Ongoing work with 

HUD might establish new methods of helping relocates. “One possibility is a new goal to 

provide replacement housing while reconstructing the 1968 riot-damaged areas.”

Cost-per-mile was another consideration. “Coupled with incompletely satisfied capacity needs,

the price tag is inordinately high”:

Undoubtedly the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad’s presence adds considerably to the costs. 

The five underpasses are intrinsically expensive because of the angle of crossing and the 

need to maintain railroad operations by detour tracks and supports. The proximity of the 

railroad itself and the future rapid transit lines add to the costs by requiring additional 

retaining walls and other appurtenances. 

Because the railroad had an alternate connection into Washington via Laurel, Maryland, some 

consideration had been given to acquiring the railroad right-of-way in the North-Central corridor:

Removal of the operating rail line would allow joint development of the transportation 

corridor by the highway departments in conjunction with the Washington Metropolitan 

Area Transit Authority.

In addition to making joint development easier to coordinate, acquisition of the railroad right-ofway would accelerate construction plans, improve highway alinement and geometrics, eliminate 

the need for expensive retaining walls, narrow the highway right-of-way to reduce the number of 

displacements, decrease tunnel costs and construction time, and perhaps allow for extending 

I-70S along the existing railroad corridor north to an interchange with the Capital Beltway in the 

vicinity of Gaithersburg. 

Professional staff in the Department of Transportation believed that the Baltimore and Ohio 

Railroad corridor offered “the most practical and feasible alignment for freeway development in 

the North-Central area with the least disruption to the community.”

Much additional study and planning for the North-Central Freeway were needed:
• A concerted effort was needed to obtain community involvement and “meaningful citizen 

participation.” 

• Highway planning should be more closely coordinated with comprehensive land use and 

environmental planning for the community. 

• Continuing discussions with HUD were needed “to establish in advance attractive 

replacement housing alternatives for persons potentially subject to relocation,” consistent 

with his recently stated policy.

• The study also should consider the option of removing the rail line from the corridor “so 

that the most advantageous program for joint development of the corridor with the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority can be developed in order to save 

construction money and time, improve design features, and enhance appearance and 

utility.”

• The additional time and study would permit officials to clarify “the uncertainty which 

appears to have developed in Maryland regarding the Maryland connecting links.” 

Final judgment should be deferred until these issues could be resolved. He thought the work 

could be completed in about 16 months. 

Although the proposed Industrial Freeway would not serve the North-Central traffic, Secretary 

Volpe thought it had merit “as an addition or alternate routing for that portion of I-95, which is to 

be carried jointly with I-70S south of Gallatin Street”: 

This section is very heavily loaded because the design was administratively restricted to 

eight lanes despite the larger traffic load demand. It is further complicated by undesirable 

weaving movements at and between the inter-changes [sic].

He would be willing to consider adjusting the system to reroute I-95 if other adjustments are 

consistent with this option. 

Secretary Volpe also discussed the status of routes that were underway. He recounted the 

progress on the Center Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway: 

Preliminary design is underway for joint development housing and freeway facilities on a 

5-acre site between H and K Street, N.W., on the Center Leg, I-95. The segment of the 

route between the Southwest Freeway and H Street is under construction and is well 

along. The mall tunnel is about 50 percent complete. Grading walls and structure for the 

depressed section between D Street and H Street, N.W., are complete. Paving and stone 

facing operations are awaiting improved weather conditions. 

As for the East Leg Freeway, he explained that the 1968 ICE called for it to extend from I-695 on 

the District side of the 11th Street Bridge across the Anacostia River, along the river to Barney 

Circle at Pennsylvania Avenue, north past the East Capitol Street Bridge, to the south edge of the 

National Arboretum, before terminating at Bladensburg Road. As this routing was set in the 

1968 ICE, the city is “preparing for construction contract work on the south end of the line 

described.” He added that the entire segment had received clearance under Section 4(f): 
The first section from 11th Street to Barney Circle (Pennsylvania Avenue) is partly under 

construction. Detailed design work is underway for 1⁄2 mile east of Barney Circle. Bids 

were opened January 15, 1970, for a short grading project in this area.

Along the Anacostia River in the vicinity of D.C. Stadium, the alignment was going to be 

adjusted because of NPS plans for recreational development along the river. 

Progress, Secretary noted in one of the shortest sections of his letter, also had been made on the 

Three Sisters Bridge. “The Fine Arts Commission approved a single span structure design in 

September 1967.” The 1968 Act had lifted the February 1968 injunction imposed by the 

U.S. Court of Appeals. Construction of two river piers was underway. The U.S. District Court 

had rejected recent efforts to enjoin further action, with an appeal pending. 

The city had contracted for design of the Potomac River Freeway, but Secretary Volpe reported 

that FHWA thought “further consideration should be given to the design along the Georgetown 

Waterfront, particularly the area downstream from Key Bridge.” The 1968 Act had envisioned a 

tunnel for the eastbound lanes between the Three Sisters Bridge and Wisconsin Avenue, with the 

Whitehurst Freeway carrying westbound traffic at present. “It is felt that further consideration 

should be given to an earlier design concept which provided two elevated structures and reserved 

the area beneath and riverward for park and recreation purposes.” He cited the advantages:

Full development of the Georgetown Waterfront requires the removal of all commercial 

and industrial activities between the Potomac River and the C&O Canal and the 

Whitehurst Freeway. Under existing concepts for highway development, the entire cost 

of acquisition for this land can be financed from the Federal-aid highway fund. The 

National Park Service would be the logical agency for developing the park and 

recreational use.

The proposal [as] described permits full and unrestricted access from the entire 

Georgetown area to all of the Potomac River bank. The tunnel east of Key Bridge creates 

a severe barrier to access because of the approach grades towards the completed structure 

at 31st Street. The elevated facilities would obviate the necessity for the elaborate 

construction techniques, ventilation equipment and constricted operations that are the 

earmark of all highway tunnels. 

With additional study needed, the connection between the Three Sisters Bridge and the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway would have to await final decisions regarding the Georgetown 

waterfront.

The Department of Transportation issued a news release that was embargoed until noon on 

February 24 regarding Secretary Volpe’s letter to Congress, making it public. Newspapers 

reported on Secretary Volpe’s letter on February 25. 

Reaction to it was slow in coming, as officials needed time to review it. However, Chairman 

Fallon made his displeasure clear in a letter to President Nixon on February 27. The study 

undertaken by the city in late 1969 “went far afield of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968”: 
The Congress has now received from the District of Columbia and the Department of 

Transportation their respective reports as required by the act. The reports are for the most 

part in disagreement with each other and are radical departures from the 1968 act. 

[District of Columbia Appropriations for 1971, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Appropriations, Part 1, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 

2nd Session, H181-37, page 385] 

He voiced his concerns publicly in an “extension of remarks” on March 2. He said the 1968 Act 

was intended “to clarify the confusion which had reigned for so many years” regarding the 

District freeway network. By contrast, the two reports “presented a confusing set of 

recommendations” that were in “wide variance from what is contained in the 1968 Highway 

Act.” While these reports were being developed, the city’s freeway program “again showed 

signs of bogging down and for the same old reasons.” 

The Congress, he said, “cannot sit idly by and allow millions of dollars of taxpayers’ money to be 

wasted in an unending series of studies” that would never result in agreement, much less 

construction, among the public bodies involved. “Nor can they permit projects to proceed which 

have only had superficial examinations, and little, if any, factual basis.” Even the Metro system, 

after “such painstaking effort” to get construction underway, “is subject to delays by the various 

recommendations.” Reluctantly, he concluded, “it is imperative that the Congress act to insure 

the Nation’s Capital a proper transportation system.” [The Interstate Highway System in the 

District of Columbia, Congressional Record – Extension of Remarks, March 2, 1970, 

pages 5554-5555] 

The Star reported that the city’s recommendations and Secretary Volpe’s report were “unlikely to 

be taken seriously by the public works committee.” Whether in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 

1970 or a separate bill, “The committee will give the city its marching orders” based on the four 

freeways that Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 had ordered the city to build. 

In specifying the four freeways to be built, the “city was given no other option for these roads.” 

Secretary Volpe’s comments on the Potomac River Expressway, one of the four Congress had 

ordered built immediately, were singled out for criticism:

Volpe, according to congressional sources, suffered a serious loss in credibility by 

offering advice on the building of the Potomac River Freeway – a road that the city 

already has been ordered to build, with its route spelled out in the 1968 legislation . . . . 

The FHA [sic] had long opposed plans – endorsed by Congress – to place the east bound 

lanes in a tunnel, permitting renewal of the waterfront, including the tearing down of the 

Milton Hopfenmaier Co. rendering plant. 

Even President Nixon, in order to insure subway funds would be released, assured 

Congress the District would build the Potomac River Freeway and the three other projects 

ordered in the 1968 law. 
Volpe, Congressional sources believe, never would have commented on the Potomac 

River Freeway, had he realized the full political meaning of his statement. They believe 

he was the victim of poor staff work. [Green, Stephen, “Congress to Draft Freeway 

Orders,” The Evening Star, March 2, 1970] 

On February 26, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals heard arguments in the Three 

Sisters Bridge suit. Roberts Owen, representing the anti-bridge groups, argued that public 

hearings and other steps required to comply with Title 23, as required by the 1968 Act, had been 

skipped. He added that Secretary Volpe had never approved the bridge as required by Federal 

law.

Thomas L. McKevitt of the Justice Department told the panel that the Johnson Administration 

and Secretary Boyd had opposed the bridge. However, as reflected in the 1968 Act, Congress 

supported it. “The administration changed and the whole [attitude] in the Department of 

Transportation changed . . . . We finally had the administration back in tune with Congress, 

that’s all that happened.” He pointed out the “notwithstanding” provision in Section 23 that 

made clear the congressional intent that construction of the bridge begin immediately regardless 

of any other law, court decision, or administrative action. 

At the same time, 10 national and local environmental groups filed a friend of the court 

memorandum in the case. They contended that the Three Sisters Bridge “threatens to destroy for 

all time the scenic and recreational values of the Potomac River Gorge. The bridge would harm 

parks, traffic, recreational facilities, air quality, and the Georgetown Historic District. [Eisen, 

Jack, “Environment Groups Ask Bridge Halt,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

February 26, 1970; “Bridge Suit Sent to Court of Appeals,” The Evening Star, February 26, 

1970] 

The Washington Plan 

WMATA, on January 22, announced that because of the 14-month delay in securing the 

District’s matching funds from Congress, the opening of the first section of Metro would be 

delayed about 7 months. Instead of opening in December 1972, WMATA now hoped to open it 

in July 1973. Other sections of the original bobtail Metro would be delayed for several months, 

but extensions to complete the 97.7-mile system were on schedule.

James Gleason of the WMATA board commended WMATA staff for the “great achievement” of 

cutting down the 14-month delay to a 7-month lag in the opening. Lee Flor reported: 

Roy Dodge, chief of engineering and operations for the agency, said construction 

schedules could not be shaved in any other place and said any further delays in 

appropriations, labor strikes or other delays could not be accommodated by 

reprogramming to meet the completion date. [Flor, Lee, “Funds Lad To Delay 

D.C. Metro,” The Evening Star, January 22, 1970] 

On January 26, a new coalition called the Washington Area Construction Industry Task Force, 

held a press conference at the District building to announce a drive to put black workers into 
construction jobs in direct relation to the city’s percentage of black population, then at 74 

percent. The so-called “Washington Plan” differed from the approved “Philadelphia Plan,” 

which called for an agreed percentage of black workers, not the equivalent of black population in 

the city.

Clifford L. Alexander, counsel for the coalition and BUF, said, “In a city where the population is 

three-quarters black, the first two contracts let by Metro to white contractors asked only that they 

present a plan for the training of 5 percent of the total work force.” Calling this percentage a 

“manifest absurdity,” he pointed out that the contracts did not require the contractors to hire 

black workers who already had the needed skills, that training must cover every skilled craft, and 

increased involvement of black contractors. 

Marion Barry, Jr, of Pride, Inc., said the 20 organizations in the task force concluded that 

immediate action was needed to ensure hiring of black people. The task force, which he said 

would monitor Metro projects on a daily basis to ensure its goals are met, was not focused 

exclusively on the subway work. Barry said the task force’s aim was equal employment 

opportunity in “all of the building trades,” including “federal construction projects, FHA and 

HUD housing projects, those of the District and the work of independent agencies such as the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.” 

Alexander agreed that Metro was “only a part of the over-all picture.” The task force would 

“press for the implementation of its objectives on every construction project in this city. The 

time has come, and long since passed, for the full and fair participation of the black man in every 

aspect of construction work in this city.” Although Alexander threatened court action, the 

Reverend Douglas Moore of BUF called on black residents to mobilize and “use any damn 

means necessary” to block Metro if the task force’s goals were not met.

The next day, the Star reported that the “broadside attack yesterday on alleged racial

discrimination in the District’s building trades by a new coalition has taken aback the leadership 

of the city’s unions . . . .” City Councilman Yeldell, WMATA’s chairman in 1970, said the 

coalition’s objections “already are the stated objectives of Metro.” He said WMATA was 

working on programs to hire and train the hard-core unemployed and expected the workforce to 

include about 70-percent minority workers. 

Former Councilman Turner, president of the Greater Washington Central Labor Council, 

AFL-CIO, considered the task force’s attack “just undeserved.” He said that organized labor in 

Washington had the best anti-discrimination record in the country. He also pointed out that 

Metro was a regional project, not a Washington project. Using the task force’s logic, Metro 

contractors should employ about 22 percent minority workers because minorities constituted 

22 percent of the area’s population. [Basham, William, “Blacks Ask 74% of Building Jobs,” 

The Evening Star, January 26, 1970; Basham, William, “Black Demands For 74% of Jobs ‘Stun’ 

Unions,” The Evening Star, January 27, 1970] 
WMATA and the Department of Transportation negotiated with the task force after rejecting the 

initial proposal to require contractors to hire a workforce that included 74/26 percent black/white 

ratio. 

Secretary Volpe, who had taken aggressive steps from the start of his tenure to increase AfricanAmerican participation in the upper ranks of the Department of Transportation, announced on 

February 17 that his department would assume compliance responsibility to assure equal 

employment opportunity on Metro construction projects: 

Metro contractors and subcontractors will be required to take affirmative action which 

will result in employment of minority group persons throughout their work force. This 

means that contractors and subcontractors will have to provide for employment of 

minorities in high-paying, skilled jobs as well as unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. If 

minority persons are not available for the skilled jobs, programs will have to be 

developed to train them. 

UMTA would work with WMATA to spell out equal opportunity obligations in bid 

specifications. Secretary Volpe expected UMTA to ensure full compliance:

We expect to have 100 percent cooperation in this effort from all parties interested and 

involved, including WMATA, the contractor organizations, labor unions, and community 

organizations concerned with equal employment opportunity. This is a truly metropolitan 

undertaking and we want cooperation from all quarters. 

He expected WMATA to ask contractors already at work to comply with the program voluntarily 

even though it was not part of their contracts. 

WMATA’s board of directors agreed to consider adopting an affirmative action plan on its 

construction contracts. General Graham had suggested that his staff draft a plan, but the board 

established a committee of its members to do so (Yeldell, Spellman, Councilman Moore, and 

Carlton Sickles). Gleason expressed concern that an affirmative action commitment might raise 

the costs of the contractors with the first two contracts who had bid on the basis of specifications 

that called on them to design their own minority hiring plan. 

The authority asked the first active contractor, Gordon H. Ball, Inc., to suggest a more detailed 

plan than the 5-percent requirement in the contract. The Star reported that at the time, Ball had 

17 employees on the project in the Judiciary Square area, all African-Americans. He expected to 

hire approximately 300 workers, and planned to work with Project BUILD, Inc., on its minority 

hiring plan. [“Subway Agency to Consider Minority-Hiring ‘Action’ Plan,” The Evening Star, 

February 19, 1970] 

On March 3, Harold D. Williams, director of UMTA’s Office of Civil Rights, ordered a halt to 

the awarding of further WMATA contracts until the Department of Transportation approves a 

minority employment program. The order did not apply to the first two contracts, already 

awarded, or a third contract on which WMATA had just opened bids. It would take effect with 
the next bid opening, scheduled for March 18, for construction of the subway between Judiciary 

Square and Union Station. 

General Graham announced the freeze to construction industry representatives after opening bids 

for the third construction contract. He said there was “no justification for holding up the Metro 

program for the National Capital Region at this early stage of a 10-year construction program. 

Last week there were 17 metro construction workers, incidentally all black. By July, there will 

be only 100 workers total and by a year later 1,000. The maximum employment of 5,000 will not 

be reached until 1973,” he said, adding that WMATA had 238 additional contracts to award. 

WMATA was working on its affirmative action plan, but wanted to canvass all of its political 

jurisdictions and community organizations before presenting its plan to UMTA. General Graham 

said, “We recognize the authority of the Department of Transportation in this matter, and are 

proceeding to develop an acceptable program as rapidly as possible.” 

Gleason called UMTA’s action “irresponsible” in view of WMATA’s assurance that it would 

comply with all fair-employment requirements. WMATA Chairman Yeldell conceded the 

department’s authority and said “the board has no choice but to abide”:

It would appear to me that there is no insurmountable barrier because the affirmative 

action program must be worked out anyhow. Perhaps this will put an added spur to get 

this worked out soon. 

Clifford Alexander declined to comment until WMATA’s rules were ready for adoption. He did 

say, however, that, “We don’t want any delays” on the subway, “but we do want it built with 

black hands and white hands.” [Green, Stephen, “U.S. Halts Metro Contracts Pending Minority 

Job Plan,” The Evening Star, March 4, 1970; Eisen, Jack, “Metro Told to Halt Bids, Await Fair 

Hiring Rule,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 4, 1970] 

With negotiations deadlocked, WMATA’s directors met with Secretary Volpe on March 11 to 

ask him to end the freeze. Chairman Yeldell told reporters that WMATA agreed that an 

affirmative action program was needed and should be drafted quickly. However, the directors 

did not believe a freeze that could delay the construction timetable was needed. “We hope that 

we will be able to resume awarding contracts by March 25,” the date set for bid opening on the 

postponed contract. 

Meanwhile, the task force sent a telegram to Secretary Volpe asking to inspect the plan before it 

could be approved. “We stand ready at any time to meet with you and consider what you may 

have developed to meet our stated goal of 70-80 percent minority employment in each tract [sic] 

having any responsibility with the construction of Metro.” [Green, Stephen, “Volpe Asked To 

End Metro Bid Freeze,” The Evening Star, March 12, 1970] 

On March 16, Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz announced that his department would hold 

hearings on a “Washington Plan” on April 13 and 14. He said his department has been “actively 

promoting hometown solutions of matters like this and we hope the information we develop will 

prove useful for such a solution in this area.” 
In view of Secretary Schultz’s announcement, Secretary Volpe lifted the freeze on Metro 

contracting on March 17. The Labor Department’s proposal to develop a Washington Plan 

offered “the best answer not only to minority employment problems in the area but also to the 

critical need for skilled manpower in the construction industry.” Another factor in his decision to 

lift the freeze was WMATA’s plan to hire “an equal employment opportunity officer oriented to 

the interests and problems of minority citizens in the Washington area.” The new officer would 

ensure compliance by contractors and subcontractors with their obligations to make maximum 

use of minorities in the Metro construction program. The officer also would be responsible for 

equal opportunity hiring within WMATA and would solicit participation by minority contractors. 

With the freeze lifted, WMATA opened the bids for the contract that had been postponed from 

March 25 because of the freeze. [“Hearings Orders on D.C. Hiring,” The Washington and Times 

Herald, March 17, 1970; “Volpe Lifts Metro Pact Ban While Job Plan Is Devised,” The Evening 

Star, March 18, 1970; Carter, Philip D., “Ban Lifted On Metro Contracts,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, March 18, 1970] 

Potomac Watch’s African-American columnist, William Raspberry, pointed out that although 

Secretary Volpe said he was lifting the freeze because of the Labor Department’s announcement, 

that announcement offered “a good deal less” than what Secretary Volpe implied. Hearings 

could be useful, but Raspberry warned against confusing the gathering of information “with the 

development of a plan, nor even with any real intention of developing a plan.” He doubted 

Secretary Volpe’s stated motives. “The suspicion is that Volpe’s recantation had nothing to do 

with Labor’s announcement but was a result of pressure from the White House, the Transit 

Authority and, indeed, from members of his own staff.” [Raspberry, William, “U.S. Backs 

Down On Metro Hiring,” Potomac Watch, The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 22, 

1970] 

In any event, the lifting of the freeze was short lived. On April 8, Secretary Volpe ordered 

WMATA to stop awarding construction contracts in view of the Labor Department’s 

commitment to approve a Washington Plan for minority employment by June 1. Assuming the 

Labor Department met its new schedule, WMATA faced a 2-week delay in awarding a contract, 

estimated at $30 million, for construction of the Metro Center station and a smaller contract for 

work in the Union Station yards. 

Secretary Volpe expected the freeze to cause “minimal disruption to the construction schedule, 

but WMATA’s board members were not happy about this second freeze. Fairfax County 

Supervisor Herbert E. Harris II responded angrily, “I’m having the worst time understanding this 

situation. At what point does [WMATA] act like an independent authority and stop acting like a 

federal agency?” Chairman Yeldell asked staff to reply to Secretary Volpe informing him that 

the delay in awarding contracts would not only increase the cost of the subway but could hinder 

WMATA’s ability to sell construction revenue bonds. Moreover, WMATA was developing its 

own affirmative action program to be written into contract specifications. That plan would be 

used if the Labor Department did not meet its schedule for developing a Washington Plan. 

That same day, WMATA announced the hiring of Pete Brown, described in the Post and Star as 

“a Negro who lives in Takoma Park” as the first equal employment officer for the agency. At the 
time of his hiring, he held a similar job with the Labor Department. [Green, Stephen, “Volpe 

Again Halts Metro Contracts,” The Evening Star, April 9, 1970; “Volpe Clamps New Freeze On 

Metro Jobs,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 10, 1970] 

One question that WMATA’s directors had was whether the freeze applied to any other Federal 

contracting in the Washington area. Staff said the freeze applied only to WMATA. On April 13, 

the Department of Transportation ordered a freeze on the award of Federal-aid highway and 

airport construction contracts in the Washington area pending imminent completion of the 

Washington Plan. Richard F. Lally, the department’s civil rights director, issued the order while 

asking the Labor Department to extend the freeze to other federally funded projects in the area. 

“This is the Nation’s Capital,” he said. “We should set an example here.” The freeze was 

expected to delay contracts for widening portions of Maryland’s Capital Beltway, rebuilding 

parts of the Shirley Highway, and several non-Interstate roads in the area, as well as two airport 

projects. [“U.S. Orders Area Freeze on Highway Contracts,” The Evening Star, April 13, 1970] 

After the first day of the Labor Department’s hearings, Jack Eisen described the day: 

In contrast with similar hearings on a job plan for Chicago last September during which 

the federal building was ringed by angry white union members who clashed with police, 

yesterday’s session in the department auditorium was so subdued that it verged on the 

ponderous. 

William D. Wright, a vice chairman of the Washington Construction Industry Task Force, 

walked out after saying he would “disregard these hearings as a useless and invalid 

attempt to pacify the black community.” He did so after his group was denied its request 

to cross-examine witnesses.

Wright had given Assistant Secretary of Labor Arthur D. Fletcher, the presiding officer, a letter 

signed by eight black Democratic members of Congress describing cross examination as critical. 

 “What we have here is simply government witnesses talking to each other in public”: 

Only if the advocates for the community have a right to cross examine and question . . . 

can we begin to hope that this hearing can result in a complete and accurate picture of 

employment practices in the construction industry. 

Fletcher denied the request, prompting Wright’s walkout. 

(The eight Democratic signers of the letter were Shirley A. Chisholm (NY), William L. Clay, Sr. 

(Mo.), John Conyers, Jr. (Mi.), Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (Mi.), August F. Hawkins (Ca.), Robert N. 

C. Nix (Pa.), Adam Clayton Powell (NY), and Louis Stokes (Oh.)) 

During the hearing, HUD Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity, Samuel J. Simmons, 

testified that 19 of 28 contractors working on HUD-financed projects in the area were violating 

anti-discrimination rules. He also said his recent study showed that in 10 skilled trade unions in 

the area that included 11,700 craftsmen, “fewer than 12 percent were Negro, and the opportunity 

to enter any of the trades for minorities remains severely restricted.” He urged the Labor 

Department to crack down on such practices. 
Chairman Yeldell testified about his concerns that the Labor Department’s schedule for 

producing the Washington Plan would slip, causing delay in construction of the critical Metro 

Center station. In reply, Assistant Secretary Fletcher promised that if the plan was delayed, the 

Labor Department would work with Metro “to see if we can’t take the pressure off” by helping 

complete a minority employment action plan to include in the contract so it could be awarded on 

June 2 in the absence of an approved Washington Plan. 

Labor representatives, including former Councilman Turner, defended the unions against 

discrimination charges. Turner touted Project Building, which he said would train young 

Negroes and other minority groups to help break down job barriers. [Eisen, Jack, “Area Projects 

Frozen To Push Black Hiring,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 14, 1970; Green, 

Stephen, “Negroes in House Press Quizzing of Hiring Witnesses,” The Evening Star, April 14, 

1970.] 

On the second day of the hearings, ECTC’s Booker, now also chairman of the Washington Area 

Construction Industry Task Force, staged a demonstration outside the Labor Department. 

Protestors, totaling between 20 and 40, circled the sidewalk for more than an hour. They 

criticized for the Labor Department for refusing serious consideration of the task force’s demand 

that minorities receive 70-80 percent of Metro construction jobs. Accompanying Booker, 

Sammie Abbott explained the relationship between the task force and the “transportation crisis” 

saying, “To get the subway built, we’re going to have to get jobs for blacks.” 

Assistant Secretary Fletcher invited Booker to testify. Booker declined in the absence of a 

written invitation and approval of the task Force’s executive committee. He added that the task 

force had not submitted a detailed proposal because its spokesmen were not permitted to cross 

examine witnesses. “This is just the beginning,” Booker said. “Next time we’ll be back with 

500 people . . . we want you to know we’re serious,” he told the Labor Department officials who 

extended the invitation. 

Chairman Yeldell sent a telegram to Secretary Volpe warning that the freeze could cost the 

agency $84 million in Federal funds. “The June 1 target date may be too late for the Senate to act 

favorably on our supplemental money request. This . . . could result in Metro having no federal 

funds, thereby running the risk of the entire transit program being scuttled.” 

On May 6, Clifford Alexander called for an end to the contract freeze. To avoid peril to the 

subway, he recommended that the Transportation and Labor Departments allow WMATA to 

resume awarding contracts that “put the burden on the contractors” to hire minorities while the 

Washington Plan is completed. The task force would keep a close watch on hiring. [Green, 

Stephen, “Metro Says Contract Freeze May Bridge $84 Million Loss,” The Evening Star, May 4, 

1970; “Freeing of Funds For Subway Asked,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 7, 

1970] 

The pending contract for the Metro Center Station was described at the time as the largest single 

contract in the construction program. The opening of bids was scheduled for June 3 if the Labor 

Department released the Washington Plan on June 1 and Secretary Volpe lifted the freeze. 

WMATA’s problem was that to include the plan in the Metro Center Station bid documents, the 
plan had to be available by May 21. WMATA had a backup plan to include the new WMATA 

affirmative action plan if it did not have Labor Department’s plan by then. [Green, Stephen, 

“Metro Awaits Green Light on Pact,” The Evening Star, May 18, 1970] 

Secretary Volpe did not appreciate the criticism he was receiving for the freeze. The final straw 

was an article, labeled “an editorial,” in WMATA’s staff publication Metro Memo. It stated that 

“assurance that Metro will continue to move ahead will require almost immediate action by the 

Departments of Transportation and Labor on the issues of minority hiring.” It added that, “any 

slight delay at this time would place serious strain on the delicately balanced plan for financing 

the construction of Metro. Substantial delay would render the financial program inoperable.” 

After seeing the article, Secretary Volpe called Chairman Yeldell. As described in the Star: 

Volpe . . . said he had been hurt over the criticism of the freeze voiced by area 

newspapers and radio and television stations. 

Volpe said he does not believe it is fair for the authority to promote critical remarks of his 

order, since he helped the subway agency obtain release of construction funds from 

Congress last year.

In a letter to Secretary Volpe, General Graham wrote:

WMATA has neither fed self-serving information nor has it promoted for selfish reasons 

any editorial comment on the existing freeze . . . . Because of my high personal regard 

for you, I have been distressed at some of the more intemperate criticism, but I am also 

distressed that you feel WMATA is culpable in this regard. [Green, Stephen, “Volpe 

Assails Metro On Criticism of Freeze,” The Evening Star, May 27, 1970] 

As promised, Secretary Shultz issued the Washington Plan on June 1, with the plan going into 

effect immediately. It imposed mandatory quotas for the hiring of minorities on Federal and 

Federal-aid construction projects in the Washington area. As the Post described it:

Under the plan . . . approximately 3,500 minority-group workers must be hired in 

11 skilled construction trades here by employers on such federal jobs as construction 

of the Metro subway system, highway building and federally subsidized housing 

projects . . . . 

The Washington Plan will cover all construction contractors with federal jobs of 

$500,000 or larger in the entire Washington Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area . . . . 

The contractors will be required, by the end of the fourth year of the plan in 1974, to 

employ between 25 per cent and 43 per cent minority workers, with the percentage range 

varying from trade to trade. 

Secretary Volpe released the freeze on contracting by WMATA, which scheduled bid opening for 

the Metro Center Station contract for June 16. 

On behalf of the task force, Booker termed the plan “unacceptable”:
We can’t support any plan that doesn’t guarantee us at least 90 per cent of all jobs on all 

levels – 70-to-80 per cent because of population and 10 per cent for reparations. This 

“Washington Plan” is an insult to the intelligence of the black community. 

The Washington Building and Construction Trades Council, representing 20,000 union members, 

denounced the plan, saying the percentages were unattainable. It was “further evidence of the 

determination of the Nixon administration to continue to make a whipping boy of the 

construction industry . . . . We do not see the administration requiring 40 per cent minority 

employment in any other industry or institution of our society.” Nevertheless, the council 

committed to complying “to the best of our ability, if we can get the people. We must comply.” 

The Construction Contractors council agreed that meeting the targets would “be a problem,” but 

Executive Secretary John S. Oldfield said, “I think we’ll be able to surmount it.” The council’s 

Project Building, which had been established in 1967, planned to place more than 500 minority 

workers in the industry over the next year. “The doors to union membership for qualified 

workmen in the building trades of this area are open and have been open. What we need is more 

jobs!” 

The task force held a press conference at the Labor Department to denounce the plan. Booker 

wanted to hand the letter to Secretary Shultz, but he designated Fletcher, the department’s highest 

ranking African-American, to receive it. The letter claimed the plan was diluted because it 

included the white Maryland and Virginia suburbs: 

It serves little purpose to offer an unemployed but eligible black construction worker 

residing in D.C. a job in Reston, Va. or some other remote construction site when in his 

own city the overwhelming majority of jobs will continue to go to whites.

The plan, Booker said in the letter, “appears to reward unions such as the sheet metal workers, 

which have historically been guilty of the most discriminatory conduct, by applying its lowest 

ranges to the worst offenders.” Further, the plan contained “an abundance of escape clauses” and 

probably was “unenforceable.” 

The letter repeated the task force’s demand for 70 to 80 percent in all crafts for minorities, plus 

10 percent for reparations for past discrimination in the construction industry. He was not 

concerned that the workers might lack the needed skills. “We’re talking about black people right 

off the streets, skilled or unskilled. If they’re unskilled, they can be given on-the-job training 

after being hired. We see no reason why the quality of work would suffer.” That fear was a 

“smokescreen used by unions and the Labor Department to keep blacks out.” The demands were, 

he said, nonnegotiable and warned that Washington blacks “will use whatever means are at our 

disposal” to meet them.

[Downie, Leonard, Jr., “U.S. Sets Quotas for Area Jobs,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, June 2, 1970; Green, Stephen, “Shultz Issues Minority-Hiring Order,” The Evening Star, 

June 2, 1970; “Agencies Laud, Task Force Scores Labor Plan on Area Minority Hiring,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, June 3, 1970; Meyer, Eugene, “Washington Plan Goals 
Criticized,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 4, 1970; “D.C. Group Demands 

Construction Jobs,” The Baltimore Afro-American, June 13, 1970] 

On June 17, WMATA opened the five bids for the Metro Center Station contract, “the single 

biggest construction contract in the area’s rapid-transit building program,” as the Star described 

it. The apparent lowest, responsive bid, from Peter Kiewitt Sons Inc., of Omaha, Nebraska, was 

for $37.9 million, 17.8 percent above the engineer’s estimate. WMATA had been concerned that 

the first contract awarded had been 17 percent above the estimate, while the second had been 

20 percent over. When the third and fourth contracts were awarded below the engineer’s 

estimate, WMATA’s fears of price escalation had subsided somewhat.

Despite the concern about the bid being nearly 18 percent above the estimate, WMATA awarded 

the contract to Kiewitt, bringing total construction contracts to $100 million:

Of 261 workers to be employed for three years on the Metro Center job, 48 iron workers, 

9 pipe fitters and 14 electricians will be covered by an affirmative-action plan for 

minority hiring ordered by the Labor Department. 

The Metro Center station will be a double-level, subterranean structure with the G Street 

subway line to Maryland on the upper level and the 12th Street line to Virginia on the 

lower level. [Green, Stephen, “Bid on Station For Metro 17% Over Estimate,” The 

Evening Star, June 18, 1970; “Extra Metro Costs Seen on G Street,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, July 3, 1970] 

(Professor Schrag described the origins of the station’s name. “Graham held that it was better to 

make an imperfect decision than to tolerate delay”:

In one extreme case, WMATA planner William Herman complained that the system’s 

main transfer station was badly named. He argued that “12th and G” was both confusing 

(several entrances would be on other streets) and too undistinguished for so important a 

station. Ever reasonable, Graham agreed to let Herman choose a better name. “I’ll let 

you know,” responded a relieved Herman. “No,” Graham explained, “I’ll give you 

twenty seconds.” Stunned, Herman blurted out the first words that came into his head: 

“Metro Center.” “Fine, that’s it, go on to the next one,” replied the general. And they 

did. [Schrag, page 153]) 

On Appeal

On April 7, the three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled, 2 to 1, that the District must 

comply with Federal requirements in Title 23 on community participation. The ruling reversed 

Judge Sirica’s finding and returned the matter to his court to ensure compliance with the Appeals 

Court’s ruling. 

As discussed earlier, Judge Sirica had found that in the 1968 Act, Congress had waived the preconstruction requirements of Title 23, including Section 134 (Title 23’s version of Section 4(f)) 

and public hearing requirements, because it ordered work to begin as soon as possible, but not 

later than 30 days from enactment of the 1968 Act. 
Federal and city attorneys had restated that argument before the three-judge panel, but they 

disagreed. Circuit Judge Wright wrote: 

If we were to accept appellees’ interpretation of Section 23, we would be confronted with 

difficulties possibly of constitutional magnitude.

They did not believe that Congress had “intended to deny the residents of the District of 

Columbia the protections accorded all United States citizens by Title 23.” The environmental 

provisions “are the essential safeguards which Congress has established, on a nationwide basis, 

to ensure that massive freeway projects are not constructed unless there has been a good faith 

effort on the part of the state and local planners to take community needs and resources into 

consideration.” 

If the District’s and the Justice Department’s arguments were valid, citizens affected by road 

projects would be divided into two classes: 

One small group of citizens, the residents of the District of Columbia who will be 

affected by the Three Sisters Bridge, is deprived of these important rights to participate in 

planning the future of the community. The other class, consisting of all residents of the 

50 states, still retains these federally guaranteed rights to influence all federally assisted 

road building. 

This discrimination was only the starting point of the inquiry. Under the Constitution, many 

discriminations “are simply benign.” The question, then, was “whether this discrimination is 

based on an invidious classification between groups of citizens which rises to the level of a 

violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.” Appellees’ interpretation “would 

endanger its constitutionality.” Therefore, “We reject that interpretation to save the statute.”

Since the city and the Department of Transportation conceded that they had not held a design 

hearing, Judge Wright wrote that “the District Court should enjoin further action on the bridge 

project until (the government) has complied.” The ruling also called on Judge Sirica to 

determine what other requirements were still to be met.

Judge Wright summarized the history of the Title 23 provisions intended to “keep federally 

assisted highways from encroaching on local parks, from being located except in accordance with 

an intercommunity scheme of comprehensive planning, and to make sure that state planning 

officials are apprised of the nature and depth of local residents’ feelings about the wisdom of a 

particular project.” The 1968 Act had broadened the hearing requirement, which now involved 

location and design hearings, and required consideration of economic, social, and environmental 

impacts. “According to appellees, however, Congress, while broadening (in the Highway Act of 

1968) this federally enforced right to a hearing, has at the same time deprived one small group, 

the citizens of the District of Columbia, of this right to be heard.” 

Congress would not have insisted on broader citizen participation “unless it intended to expose 

the road builders quite closely to the direction of participation of citizens in the formulation of 

their decision.” Appellees argued that Section 23 directed District officials to bypass the hearing 
process, which would again only “expose community sentiment adverse” to the bridge and that 

Congress intended construction to begin “irrespective of the wishes of the citizens of the District 

of Columbia.” Further, a public hearing would delay the start of work that Congress wanted to 

begin within 30 days, with construction to follow in 90 days: 

Such a reading of the statute would condemn it as unconstitutional. A legislature may not 

constitutionally disenfranchise a group of citizens because of their expected views . . . . 

If we were to accept appellees’ reading and interpretation of Section 23, congress would 

have excluded from the statutory protection only one group, a totally unrepresented and 

voiceless minority of citizens. Any legislative classification which singles out for 

invidious treatment a small group of citizens totally excluded from the political process 

does not meet the usual deference from this court. The usual deference which courts 

accord legislative and administrative judgments stems from the confidence which courts 

have that these judgments are just resolutions of competing interests . . . . 

Because the resulting classification would deprive only an already voiceless minority of 

its important personal right to contest disruptive highway projects enjoyed by citizens 

generally, we conclude that we would be hard pressed to find on this record reasons 

adequate to sustain the “heavy burden of justification” necessary to support the 

discrimination which would result from appellees’ interpretation of Section 23. 

The panel rejected the argument that this classification was justified by the congressional desire 

to avoid delay. If that were the intent, Congress could have found a “less burdensome path,” 

such as directing that the hearings be held “with reasonable promptness.” Whatever the 

justification or alternatives, “we are convinced that appellees’ position that Congress intended 

such discrimination is unsupported by the language and history of the statute.” 

The panel also rejected the argument that Congress intended Title 23 to apply only to the 

project’s construction stage, such as the provisions on competitive bidding. The legislative 

history, including the Senate and House reports and the floor debates, contained no statement by 

advocates of Section 23 that the planning requirements of Title 23 did not apply to the Three 

Sisters Bridge or the other three projects mandated for construction. In fact, Judge Wright wrote, 

the only discussions were to the contrary: 

For example, Representative Cramer, a leading proponent of Section 23, explicitly stated 

that the City Council could hold further hearings to determine route locations and 

designs, within the broad “corridors” established by Congress. Senator Randolph gave 

his word to the Senate that Section 317 of Title 23 would be in effect for a specific 

project mentioned in Section 23(d) of the Act. We also take note of the fact that when the 

bill was passed the Secretary of Transportation also interpreted Section 23 as we do 

today. The contemporaneous construction of a statute by one charged with its 

enforcement is entitled to great weight from this court.

Appellees had argued that hearings would be futile because the statute had prescribed the 

locations and design plans for the four routes. Congress, Judge Wright pointed out, had referred 
to the routes as set forth in the 1968 ICE. “These cost estimates by their own terms did not 

constitute final route placements. They only located a ‘corridor’ within which roads were 

proposed.” Therefore, the panel found nothing in the record indicating that a public hearing or 

other actions required by Title 23 would not serve a useful purpose. Moreover, Section 101 of 

Title 23 defined “construction” to include many pre-construction stages, including planning, not 

just physical construction. 

In short, Congress had directed construction to begin on a bridge following a general 

configuration used in the 1968 ICE. In a public hearing forum, “citizens may well be able to 

offer constructive alternatives” for bridge design and location, including placement of access 

ramps, that could be adopted. Similarly, the Secretary of Transportation might find “other 

feasible routes, or a tunnel, [would] destroy fewer acres of valuable park land.” 

As for the “notwithstanding” clause, Congress intended to counter the prior ruling by the U.S. 

Court of Appeals that the District was developing Interstate freeway projects in violation of the 

1893 District highway statute. The city, Judge Wright wrote, could have gone back and 

complied with that 1893 statute’s provisions for the Three Sisters Bridge. Instead of doing so in 

the case of the Three Sisters Bridge, the city abandoned the project, NCPC disapproved the 

bridge, and the Secretary of Transportation removed it from the Interstate map. The panel 

recognized that Congress intended by the “notwithstanding” clause to exempt the four projects 

from the Appeals Court’s ruling as well as the administrative actions of local and Federal 

agencies:

But nothing in the statute indicates that Congress intended the Bridge to be built contrary 

to its own laws. In essence, then, Section 23 amounts to a direction from Congress to the 

relevant District and federal officials to continue with the bridge and highway plans they 

had been formulating prior to the Airis decision.

Therefore, the panel held that the Three Sisters Bridge project must comply with all applicable 

provisions of Title 23. Because Judge Sirica had ruled otherwise, “we remand the case to the 

District Court for an expedited evidentiary hearing to determine whether appellees have in fact 

complied with the provisions of Title 23.” 

To aid in the District Court review, Judge Wright observed that Judge Sirica, after hearing the 

evidence, could determine whether the 6-year old hearings, which appellees had referred to, 

satisfied 23 U.S.C. 128: 

The basic requirement is that both a location hearing (held “before the State highway 

department is committed to a specific proposal) and a design hearing (held “after the 

route location has been approved, but before the State highway department is committed 

to a specific design proposal”) must be scheduled. The regulations make specific 

provision for projects like this one on which some hearings have been held before the 

effective date of the regulations. Since the regulations apply by their terms and since in 

promulgating the regulations the Secretary made reasonable provisions for those projects 

which had been the subject of hearings before the effective date of the regulations, we see 

no reason not to apply these regulations to this case. 
Chief Judge Bazelon, a member of the three-judge panel, concurred “that the case must be 

remanded to determine whether there has been compliance.” His views were based on the 

statutory language and legislative history. Therefore, he did not find it necessary “to reach the 

constitutional questions.” The statutory history revealed “a fundamental conflict”: 

Undoubtedly some legislators thought that a statute ordering immediate construction of 

the Bridge would eliminate the necessity for at least some preliminary procedures. Others 

contemplated that the statute would simply reverse the District government’s inaction and 

compel the government to recommence work on the bridge in compliance with the 

procedures of Title 23. The conflict produced an ambiguous statute, compelling the court 

to resolve the disagreement.

The plain language of Section 23 directed the city to begin work on the bridge in accordance with 

all applicable provisions of Title 23 within 30 days. Congress could have expressly exempted 

the bridge project, and the other three projects cited, from the planning and hearing provisions of 

Title 23, but did not. 

The panel’s interpretation was “further fortified” by avoiding treatment of “District residents less 

favorably than all other citizens with respect to the federal highway system.” Aside from 

constitutional or other considerations, “we should not lightly presume that Congress has deprived 

District residents of an opportunity afforded to all other citizens, at least in the absence of the 

clearest legislative mandate, which is lacking here.”

In dissent, Judge George MacKinnon disagreed with the majority’s description of the legislative 

history. A reading of the entire record convinced him that “Congress clearly directed that the 

Three Sisters Bridge be built immediately and I do not find that such direction was improper or 

invalid.” 

The majority had not found any support in the legislative history for exempting the District of 

Columbia from complying with the pre-construction phases of “construction.” On the contrary, 

Judge MacKinnon cited Chairman Randolph’s remarks during Senate consideration of the 

conference report on July 29. Despite reservations, especially about the Three Sisters Bridge, he 

said the Senate conferees had agreed to construction of the bridge as long as the project protected 

Glover-Archbold Park. He also referred to the fact that “design of the bridge” would not intrude 

on the park. Judge MacKinnon asked, “Does this sound as though the ‘design of the bridge’ was 

still an open question?” He answered, “Obviously, it was not and Senator Randolph so 

recognized.” 

He dismissed the individual views of members of the House and Senate because what matters 

was the intent of Congress as reflected in the words of the law. “No disclaimers by individual 

Senators or Representatives can effect [sic] what the two houses did collectively by adopting the 

bill with the D.C. highway provisions.” Moreover, all discussion of the matter assumed 

construction of the bridge in the current location and design. 

The legislative history cannot be “twisted,” as the panel had, to argue that the Three Sisters 

Bridge required additional design. Other projects, particularly the Potomac River Freeway, did 
require design work, but the bridge “had an approved design” that would affect the design of the 

freeway.

He also disputed interpretation of Representative Cramer’s comment cited by Judge Wright: 

Congressman Cramer said in effect that the D.C. City Council could still hold hearings as 

to location within the corridors of the interstate highways to be constructed. His remarks 

were directed generally to the House bill at that time which directed that “all routes” of 

the Interstate Highway System in the District be constructed – not just the four projects 

now contained in section 23. 

His comment applied to the Interstate highways generally, not specifically to the bridge. Neither 

the conference report nor the final version of Section 23 existed at the time he addressed his 

colleagues on the House floor; his comment could not have general application to interpretation 

of the enacted provision. 

Judge MacKinnon also cited the statement of the House managers contained in the conference 

report, which Judge Wright had cited but not quoted. The managers had cited NCPC’s prior 

action, but did not require further action by that agency. The managers clearly were not ordering 

extensive hearings to be held on location and design, “pre-construction requirement preliminaries 

which had already been satisfied as the statement observed” by referring to the agreement in early 

1966 by all parties as to the location of the Three Sisters Bridge. The statement also pointed out 

that consultant engineers had completed design, which had been approved by the Commission on 

Fine Arts on September 20, 1967. 

The majority’s remarks referring to all applicable provisions of Title 23 reflected confusion. 

They failed to understand that the reference to Title 23 applied to four projects in different stages, 

not just to the Three Sisters Bridge. He summarized the status of the four projects. As reflected 

in the House statement, Congress directed the city to begin work within 30 days so that the 

construction contract could be advertised within 90 days. 

“Now it is perfectly obvious from this factual situation that nobody in Congress was going to 

designate what provision of Title 23 did not apply to any particular project because all provisions 

applied to some of the projects.” Instead, Congress referred to each project advancing with 

applicable provisions of Title 23. If the intention had been that all four projects must comply 

with all provisions of Title 23, Congress would have deleted “all applicable provisions of” from 

the statute.

That it did not do so resulted in the logical conclusion that different provisions applied to each 

project. To test this logic, Judge Wright applied it to the Center Leg Freeway, which was under 

construction. Applying all Title 23 requirements, including the public hearing requirement, to 

this project “would be an absurdity and hence the rigid application of all Title 23 provisions to 

all the projects must be rejected as unreasonable and obviously not intended.” 
He also rejected Judge Wright’s application of the U.S. Court of Appeals’ decision related to the 

1893 law in the District code. Section 23 clearly was intended to “supply the congressional 

directive to the projects that the court had found to be absent in the first case”: 

So to permit the same plaintiffs, with the court’s concurrence, to obstruct the second 

congressional directive on grounds they failed to allege in their first action, and to do so 

under the guise of carrying out the intent of Congress, is not a result that commends itself 

to sound judicial administration. 

As for 23 U.S.C. 128, it requires the State highway agency to certify that it has had public 

hearings or offered the opportunity for them. FHWA had submitted an affidavit on October 16, 

1969, that “is substantially uncontroverted,” stating that public hearings had been held on 

November 22, 1961, and November 24, 1964, and asserting that the city requested project 

approval on September 21, 1966, within 3 years of the hearings. The affidavit also stated that 

planning requirements had been satisfied along with consideration of social, economic, and 

environmental impacts as required by Section 128. Based on the uncontested record, “there is no 

basis for sending the case back for section 128 compliance hearings. Full compliance shows 

from the record.” 

Further, the affidavit demonstrated that in approving the project on August 12, 1969, Secretary 

Volpe had determined that under Section 4(f), no prudent or feasible alternative existed to the 

taking of parkland and that all planning had taken place to minimize harm.

Regarding hearings, the majority called for location and design hearings, a requirement contained 

in the PPM of January 17, 1969, “some five months after congress passed the law directing that 

work begin on the Three Sisters Bridge within 30 days and that within 90 days ‘substructure 

contracts be advertised for construction.’” Clearly, Congress would not require public hearings 

to change the location and design of a project that it expected to be advertised for construction 

within 90 days. As a result, the panel’s opinion directing such hearings “creates a monstrous 

result and completely frustrates the express will of Congress.” 

Further, Congress intended that the only applicable provisions of Title 23 that applied to the 

Three Sisters Bridge related to physical construction. “Such interpretation of the sentence would 

be reasonable and would not attribute to Congress an intention to require duplication of prior 

planning that had already been completed with respect to the Three Sisters Bridge when 

Congress enacted section 23.” 

Judge MacKinnon rejected the majority’s characterization of the District’s residents as a 

“voiceless minority” being abused by Congress. Their success “in obstructing this project now 

for onto four years is mute testimony that they are not ‘voiceless.’” They had access to the press 

as well to Members of Congress who lived in the District and nearby suburbs, giving “them more 

actual influence in Congress than citizens of states.”

In fact, the District had developed the Interstate projects in accordance with the same Title 23 

provisions that the State highway agencies used in developing their Interstate projects. The 

District and State highway officials complied with the provisions in existence at the time of their 
actions. “There is no showing that amendments to the Federal highway laws were made to apply 

ex post facto to highway projects that had previously passed through particular stages before new 

provisions were added.” He concluded: 

I do not consider that the 1968 amendments to title 23 or the 1969 PPM require any 

project to be backed up for different consideration of planning or construction phases that 

it had previously passed through. I would affirm. [D.C. Federal of Civic Associations, 

Inc., et al., v, John A. Volpe et al., 434 F2d 436 (1970), No. 23870), April 6, 1970. Italics 

in original.] 

The same three-judge panel was considering other freeway suits involving the East Leg of the 

Inner Loop Freeway and the Potomac River Freeway. On April 7, the panel ordered the city not 

to approve contracts for construction of the East Leg Freeway pending a decision in the case, 

which plaintiffs had based on the same objections as their case against the Three Sisters Bridge. 

The Center Leg Freeway, which was under construction, was not subject to litigation. 

[Bernstein, Carl, “Review Eyed Of Court Rule On 3 Sisters,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, April 8, 1970] 

Reaction to the Decision on Appeal

How long a delay would be needed to comply with the ruling was unclear. 

After reading Judge Wright’s ruling closely, city officials concluded that the delay in 

construction would not be lengthy. Judge Wright had not specifically stated that proper hearings 

had not been held; the court’s majority simply asked Judge Sirica to make that determination. As 

Judge MacKinnon had stated, two hearings had been held that, in FHWA’s view, satisfied the 

requirement. For that reason, the three-judge panel had not ordered work on the bridge to stop. 

That would be Judge Sirica’s decision. If he concluded that needed hearings had been held, as 

Judge MacKinnon had found and as the city believed, the bridge project could proceed under the 

current contract.

The city’s concern was stated by Assistant Corporation Counsel Richard Barton, who said “the 

Court’s language would appear to apply to all other segments of the freeway system. For that 

reason, he said, the city would seek an en banc review (by the nine judges of the U.S. Court of 

Appeals) of the panel’s decision because “the whole freeway program now is in doubt.” 

Attorney Owens said he would seek a preliminary injunction to halt construction of the Three 

Sisters Bridge if the city did not voluntarily stop work. He declined to say whether he would 

seek injunction to halt the three other freeway projects that city officials conceded had advanced 

without design hearings. However, a city “source noted ruefully,” according to the Post, “that 

once the freeway program is enjoined, citizens groups will do everything within their legal power 

to keep the projects from being built.” [Osnos, Peter, “Hearings Ordered on Three Sisters,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, April 7, 1970; “D.C. Aides Don’t Expect Long Halt on 

3 Sisters,” The Evening Star, April 8, 1970; Bernstein, Carl, “Review Eyed Of Court Rule On 

3 Sisters,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 8, 1970] 
The Star agreed with Judge MacKinnon that the Wright ruling was a “monstrous” distortion of 

the clear intent behind Section 23. The question was “whether Congress meant what it said.” 

Chief Judge Bazelon, in a brief concurring opinion, had said the congressional intent was 

“ambiguous,” but the Star said:

It seems inconceivable that any such ambiguity existed in the minds of the members of 

Congress. Public hearings on this project, as Judge MacKinnon noted, had previously 

been held. There was no serious evidence of congressional uncertainty or dissension as to 

the location or design of the bridge. Congress directed that construction proceed 

“notwithstanding any other provision of law, or any court decision or administrative 

action to the contrary.” And it specifically set 30-day and 90-day deadlines during which 

various stages of progress were to be achieved.

The editors suggested that it was “at least conceivable . . . that in the course laid out by the 

Wright-Bazelon ruling the situation might work itself out.” They cautioned: 

But no one should bank on it. The history of this long dispute has been chiefly 

distinguished by cleverly orchestrated delays, one leading to another, stalling not only a 

rational transportation system for the Washington area but jeopardizing the city’s fiscal 

relationship with Congress as well.

Congress thought it had “broken the stalemate,” but additional congressional action might be 

needed. In the meantime, the Star recommended an appeal to the full Court of Appeals “in the 

hope of a swift, reasonable redress through legal means.” [“Three Sisters Showdown,” The 

Evening Star, April 10, 1970] 

Superhighway-Superhoax

Helen Leavitt, mentioned earlier, was a free-lance writer and civic activist who lived in the 

Dupont Circle area. She found that her home was in the path of the North Leg of the Inner Loop 

Freeway, then proposed to run along R or S Street off Connecticut Avenue, NW. What 

particularly incensed her was the claim that the freeway would help the neighborhood’s 

development. “I’ve never seen a freeway revitalize a neighborhood,” she told a Post reporter, 

Judith Martin, shortly after her book, Superhighway-Superhoax was published in April 1970 

(Doubleday and Company). 

The book, which she had begun working on in 1967, was a denunciation of every aspect of the 

Federal-aid highway program, including urban Interstates, the highway lobby, road officials, and 

the Highway Trust Fund. The “never ending flow of Highway Trust Fund money,” she said, had 

created “the vast imbalance in our transportation situation.” As a result, “the highway program is 

simply not subject to the same competitive pressures as other programs.” The Highway Trust 

Fund and its State counterparts “must be eliminated as an exclusive conduit of money for 

highways.” [Leavitt, pages 277-278] 

One of her central ideas was that transportation “planning” was “guided by funding, not the other 

way around,” since “there was no money available for alternatives.” [page 277] 
As for the since-abandoned route of the North Leg, she said it “would wipe out the core of this 

neighborhood of people of mixed ethnic, racial, and economic backgrounds. It would not, 

however, provide any funds to redevelop the blight that exists in the area. [page 18] 

Although the book was a denunciation of the national highway program, Leavitt often illustrated 

her thesis by discussing the District’s freeway program. For example, she discussed 

Commissioner Duke’s deposition, January 3, 1967, in the lawsuit arguing that the city had not 

complied with the 1893 highway law. Responding to questions shortly before leaving for 

Vietnam, General Duke “admitted that no public hearings had been held on the latest alignment 

of the North Central Freeway.” BPR, he said, had assured him all requirements had been met: 

The funds would not be given if they had not met the requirements established by the 

Bureau of Public Roads . . . . I am confident as I am sitting here that not only have the 

requirements of the BPR been met with respect to all of these projects, but the interest of 

the citizenry has been met at the same time.

He explained that if officials believed they could further improve the location of the 

freeway and reduce adverse effects of the freeway, then they held public hearings. But if 

they felt that the changes that had been made and the appearance of the freeway 

represented the best possible location and that further public hearings would not result in 

improvement, then no further hearings would be required. “If we don’t think that 

constructive suggestions with respect to the improvement of the facility would be 

forthcoming from a public hearing, we would not hold one.” 

Leavitt noted, “That the law required the hearings seemed to elude him.” In any event, he 

admitted that neither he nor his fellow commissioners read the transcripts of the public hearings. 

General Duke was asked if he consulted with Chairman Natcher about withholding funds for 

Washington’s rail rapid transit system. He replied “. . . I certainly would not deny that in the 

course of our discussions this problem came up.” [pages 94-96] 

BPR and Members of Congress, she wrote, did not admit that freeway opponents had “an 

intelligent point of view to get across – that highways can do more harm than good.” She 

pointed out that ECTC’s Sammie Abbott “is summarily dismissed at the Bureau as a fanatic.” 

[page 182] 

She also narrated the history of Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. After 

Congress completed work on the legislation, President Johnson had been “deluged with letters 

and telegrams urging him to pocket veto the bill: 

On the very day the pocket veto would go into effect if the bill was not signed, Senator 

Randolph, fearing the President would allow it to expire, hustled to the White House and 

pleaded with Mr. Johnson to sign the bill. The President went to the Texas White House 

that night at ten P.M. and took along the unsigned bill. By midnight, Texas time, he 

signed it.
She quoted President Johnson’s statement on why he signed the bill despite his reservations, 

particularly about Section 23. [pages 222-223] 

While writing about the period when Chairman Kluczynski was developing the freeway 

provision for the 1968 Act, she wrote: 

In light of the attitude the newspapers have taken on the freeway issue, it is interesting to 

note that Washington Star vice president John W. Thompson, Jr., and Washington Post

board vice chairman John W. Sweeterman and vice president Gerald W. Siegel are 

members of the Federal City Council and weekly receive their dose of freeway promotion 

to crank into their editorials. [page 107] 

She ended her book, which was completed as Owen was going to court for the case that Judge 

Wright ruled on in on April 6, by recalling President Eisenhower’s comments on seeing the plan 

for the District of Columbia. She recommended strict conflict of interest laws to avoid “the 

kinds of commingling of interests between public officials and representatives of private interests 

so prevalent in such organizations as ARBA and the Road Gang.” In a discussion that contains 

material quoted earlier regarding President Eisenhower, she wrote:

In this manner, highway boosters in both private industry and public offices will no 

longer be able to mislead the public, a feat which they managed to accomplish with 

President Eisenhower at the time he endorsed the Interstate System in the mid-fifties. 

This was revealed in 1959 at a White House meeting at which Washington planners 

presented their proposed regional transportation plan for the city to the President.

After perusing the plan, which contemplated extending numerous interstate freeways into 

the heart of the District of Columbia, particularly I-95, President Eisenhower commented 

that he never thought when highway advocates proposed the interstate program to him 

that freeways would be extended into the centers of cities. He said he understood that the 

Interstate System would connect to the cities but not enter them.

One of the planners who was present at the 1959 meeting recalls that the President also 

commented at that time about the heavy commuter traffic he observed during his drives to 

suburban Maryland’s Burning Tree Club for a game of golf. Mr. Eisenhower noted that a 

large number of automobiles was entering the city, but that most of these carried only one 

person. He suggested that since those automobiles clog streets and demand precious 

space for parking it might be feasible to limit the number of automobiles entering the city.

President Eisenhower’s doubts and reservations about our highway program were voiced 

many years ago. They are even more valid today. [pages 298-299] 

During an interview with a Post reporter, Leavitt pointed out that, “The birds down here look 

very, very sooty” near her home. “I don’t know why they don’t have lung cancer.” The cause: 

the automobile, a foe that she and her husband had been fighting since moving to Washington 

8 years earlier. “And when Mrs. Leavitt identifies an enemy, she goes after him.” She told the 

reporter:
The automobile just doesn’t belong in the urban scene. The time will come when people 

who feel they have to have an automobile will do what people do who feel they have to 

town a horse do – buy two-acre lots out in the country, where they can drive their 

automobiles around and around all they want. 

There is a definite policy to make the automobile and the airplane the only means of 

transportation. They cut off all the other modes, and then say, “But people just love 

automobiles.” I’d like to see the area blanketed with transportation – not just the Metro, 

but jitney service, adequate bus service in the suburbs, trains. I’d like to see the trolleys 

run again. They were sacrificed to the automobile.

Leavitt lived with her husband, their two sons who were in public school, and their dog Judy. 

[Martin, Judith, “Enemy: The Auto,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 10, 1970] 

Reviewing the book in the Post, Jack Eisen described it as “passionate in tone, selective in 

content and argumentative in thrust – so much, in fact, that it is guilty of overkill.” To accept her 

thesis, he wrote, a reader must be prepared to believe that every highway supporter “is engaged in 

one huge conspiracy, motivated by greed or stupidity.” 

Freeways in many cities, “including over-maligned Los Angeles, perform the task of skimming 

off through or crosstown traffic (including trucks) and returning the regular surface arteries to 

their neighborhood residential and commercial purposes.” Leavitt sought to dispel such a 

“notion” at every turn for “it is the automobile traffic itself that she sees as the basic villain. 

Freeways, she insists, induce unwanted travel to enter urban centers.” 

The best part of the book, Eisen wrote, is Leavitt’s dissection of the “fabled” highway lobby and 

Members of Congress who support the Federal-aid highway program. Those Members of 

Congress, working on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, were, “at this very moment, 

preparing to extend its life in a form that is not likely to be less lucrative to the builders.” 

He also commented on his discussion of the freeway battle in the Washington area: 

The analysis of Washington’s road disputes illuminates some shadows. But Mrs. Leavitt, 

in common with most local freeway foes, dismisses the very real political threat to our 

Metro system that was posed by the controversial congressional edict to build the Three 

Sisters Bridge, among other projects. [Eisen, Jack, “The Freeway Fight,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, April 20, 1970] 

Stephen Green, reviewing the book for the Star, agreed with Eisen that her chapter on the 

highway lobby was “the real blockbuster in this book.” Its members had “tried to perpetuate an 

image of the interstate highway system and its financing trust fund that is akin to motherhood and 

apple pie”:

Many of the allegations made in the book have been well reported in Washington in 

recent years: urban freeways induce more traffic instead of reducing it; they divide and 

cripple more cities instead of restoring them to economic health. 
Green predicted that when the Highway Trust Fund came up in Congress later in the year during 

development of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, “Mrs. Leavitt’s book will provide 

ammunition for those who oppose the trust fund as it now is constituted: 

Her labors may prove more fruitful than those of the city’s louder and more visible 

freeway opponents, for she has written a damning indictment of the Interstate System and 

the men responsible for it, particularly that portion which makes up our urban 

expressways. [Green, Stephen, “Foe of the System Of Building Freeways, The Sunday 

Star, May 31, 1970] 

Several other anti-freeway books would be published during the same period, usually citing the 

Washington freeway battles. For example, Ben Kelley, FHWA’s director of public affairs under 

Administrator Bridwell, published The Pavers and the Paved in 1971 (Donald W. Brown, Inc.) 

In his insider’s look at the negative world of highways, he wrote: 

No catalogue of urban highway grief would be complete without recognition of the 

District of Columbia’s years-long running war of resistance to freeways – a communitywide movement that has remained alive and vigorous despite heavy-handed maneuvers by 

road lobbyists and their congressional collaborators to put down more pavement in a city 

already crisscrossed with more freeway miles per capita and per square mile than any 

other in the United States, including symbolic Los Angeles. [page 109] 

When the city council rejected the Three Sisters Bridge in 1967, the House Public Works 

Committee reacted “with a mixture of amazement and fury,” turning “with a vengeance to the 

task of reversing the city’s disposition of its freeway problems.” [page 111] 

After quoting extensively from the minority opinion of Representatives McCarthy, Schwegel, 

and Waldie, Kelley discussed the U.S. Court of Appeals decision on February 15, 1968, enjoing 

the city for failure to comply with the 1893 District highway law. “The court’s opinion might 

have been written in vanishing ink so far as the House Public Works Committee majority seemed 

concerned.” The result was Section 23 of the 1968 Act. Kelley recalled the result from his 

insider perspective:

Secretary Boyd found himself in a string of meetings with citizen groups opposed to 

Section 23, as well as with District government officials and members of his own staff 

who were close to the issue. Finally in mid-August, pressed to give the President a 

recommendation, he called together his senior staff and top officials from the 

department’s Federal Highway Administration – including the director of the Bureau of 

Public Roads [Frank Turner] – for an informal poll. Predictably, the highway agency 

officials urged against veto, while the Secretary’s policy advisers tended to be for it. It 

was finally decided that although the District provision was profoundly objectionable, 

other provisions of the bill, including its broad reform of relocation housing assistance, 

justified the President’s signature. [pages 114-115] 

Kelley’s account ended with the city council’s report to Congress in February 1970. 
The Road Gang, which began in 1942 as an informal luncheon forum for the exchange of ideas 

by public and private executives whose interests were broadly related to highway transportation, 

invited Leavitt in 1970 to defend her book. Road Gang Goes for the Gold, published in 1992 to 

celebrate the group’s 50th anniversary. Described the event:

Another “first” was a woman guest speaker, Helen Leavitt, who not only drew a large 

attendance but sparked some of the liveliest, if not the loudest, discussion in Road Gang 

experience. In the words of Chairman [Charles W. “Bill”] Day, who even used his horn 

to help sustain order, the debate was “brisk.” 

Others remember the meeting as loud, maybe even a bit raucous. [Knight, Don, editor, 

Road Gang Goes for the Gold, A Special Commemorative Newsletter Tribute to the 

Road Gang, June 25, 1992, page 5] 

Despite the Road Gang’s views, Superhighway-Superhoax has endured as one of the best books 

of the genre. In 1996, the New York Public Library included Leavitt’s book among the Books of 

the Century. “The book’s argument and central paradox, that most superhighways bring 

increased traffic congestion rather than less, has never been effectively countered.” The citation 

noted some of her criticisms, “most notably, she demonstrates environmental degradation, 

strangled cities, and ruined public transportation systems.” [Diefendorf, Elizabeth, Editor, The 

New York Public Library’s Books of the Century, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 147]) 

Threatening Metro

Chairman Natcher made his displeasure with the court’s ruling known during hearings in April 

1970 on the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1971. On April 14, Mayor Washington, 

Deputy Mayor Watt, and other city officials testified before the Natcher Subcommittee on the 

city’s diverse financial needs.

On transportation, Mayor Washington promised that the city would “continue to take important 

steps forward toward a comprehensive transportation system,” including a contribution of 

$34.2 million in capital matching funds for the Metro system. “In fiscal 1971, contracts will be 

let for 16.1 miles of planned subway routes within the District.” 

As for the city’s freeways, he said:

The interstate highway program, which will facilitate the movement of vehicular traffic, 

will continue to be developed with substantial construction being funded for the Three 

Sisters Bridge, Potomac River Freeway, the Center Leg Inner-Loop Freeway, the East Leg 

and Interchange “C.” The total District share of this construction costs $4 million, which 

will be matched by Federal grants totaling $38 million. [District of Columbia 

Appropriations for 1971, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, Part 1, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 

H181-38, page 27]
Congressman Davis asked about the status of the Interstate System. “We keep getting reports in 

the newspapers of dissension among the officials of the District government and, of course, 

matters that are pending in the courts.” 

Mayor Washington replied that he was not aware of any dissension within the city government. 

The city was proceeding “with every element that was called for in the 1968 Highway Act.” He 

asked Hubert B. Pair, principal assistant corporation counsel, to address the court case. Pair said, 

“We feel we vigorously defended the cases to the point that we prevailed at the trial level.” A 

three-judge panel reversed the trial court, but the counsel’s office had prepared a petition for a 

rehearing by the entire court. “We are hoping to overturn the decision of the U.S. Court of 

Appeals.” Construction, which had not been enjoined, was continuing. 

Chairman Natcher questioned whether the city was in compliance with Section 23 of the 1968 

Act. Referring to Chairman Fallon’s February 27 letter to President Nixon questioning the city’s 

compliance, Chairman Natcher told the city officials that he was surprised by the claim the city 

was in compliance:

I say to you quite frankly as one member of the committee that the District building [sic] 

is not in compliance with the Highway Act of 1968. That includes the Highway 

Department of the District of Columbia . . . . That letter has not been contested and that 

is the law and that is the law under which we intend to operate. 

When Mayor Washington said he was relying on the opinion of the office of the corporation 

counsel, Chairman Natcher pointed out that the chairman of the Public Works Committee and his 

staff “who know more about this than anyone that I know, say that the District Building is not in 

compliance. They say that the recommendations from the Department of Highways and Traffic 

in the District of Columbia are not in compliance.” [pages 103-104] 

Chairman Natcher returned to the issue on April 29 when Airis appeared to discuss the 

Department of Highways and Traffic’s budget. The chairman restated his view that the city 

needed freeways and a rapid rail transit system “to meet the tremendous day-by-day growth of 

traffic.” His committee “made every effort” to keep both moving, but had been forced to 

withhold funds for Metro because of the impasse blocking freeway construction. “After the 

matter was resolved we did just exactly what we told the House and the people downtown that 

we would do,” namely release the funds to begin construction of Metro. 

President Nixon, Representative Natcher said, had taken a keen interest in the matter:

During the past several months, President Nixon has made every effort to see that this 

impasse was resolved. I want you to know, Mr. Airis, that he has done everything he told 

us that he would do. He has made a sincere effort to see that the impasse was resolved. 

And I say this to you frankly, he is the only President during the last 10 years that has had 

nerve enough to enter into this matter and try to resolve it. I know what I am talking 

about, Mr. Airis. I have served with several Presidents and I know the actions of others 

and I know what he has done. I say to you again, from the standpoint of the best interests 

of our Capital City, this matter must be resolved.
Chairman Natcher entered into the hearing record a collection of documents covering the 

attempts to end the impasse in recent years, including the President’s letter of August 12, 1969, 

Chairman Fallon’s letter to the President dated February 27, 1970, and his own statement in 

extended comments to the House. 

The chairman said that since the Metro construction funds had been released, “the terms of the 

Highway Act of 1968 have not been complied with.” He said that under no circumstances could 

he “recommend to this committee that we continue appropriating funds for rapid rail transit 

construction unless the Highway Act of 1968 is complied with in its entirety.” 

Since the submission of the reports and the letter to the President, Chairman Fallon and other 

members of the Public Works Committee had met with Secretary Volpe. “I am reliably informed 

that as a result of this meeting every effort will now be made to comply with the Highway Act of 

1968, and that this will take place before the District budget is approved for fiscal year 1971 by 

this committee.” If so, Chairman Natcher said he would recommend funding for Metro 

construction. “If not, then I do not intend to recommend construction funds for rapid transit for 

fiscal year 1971.” 

Congressman Davis agreed:

I was disappointed, as I am sure you were, to read some of the recent statements that did 

publicly appear, attributed to the Secretary of Transportation and the officials of the 

District of Columbia. I think the law is clear and unambiguous. I think the position of 

this subcommittee is equally clear and unambiguous and we have undertaken to act 

consistently with the enactments of this Congress. [pages 379-387] 

Although the hearings were closed, reporters received transcripts of earlier hearings on April 29, 

including Chairman Natcher’s warning to Mayor Washington about compliance with Section 23 

of the 1968 Act. Congressional sources told reporters that Chairman Natcher’s comments did 

not mean the city should ignore the U.S. Court of Appeals’ decision on the Three Sisters Bridge 

project. The chairman was more concerned about the city council’s recommendation to convert 

the Anacostia Freeway to a parkway on the East Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway north of 

Bladensburg Road and Secretary Volpe’s suggestion that the Potomac River Freeway should be 

built on an elevated structure along the Georgetown waterfront. The Secretary’s suggestion 

reportedly “infuriated” members of the Public Works Committee.

Jack Eisen reported:

As much as anything, however, a Public Works Committee spokesman said, there is 

concern that the city government is doing as little as it can to abide by the law, and that 

some officials quietly sympathize with delaying tactics.

The delay was symbolized by the fact that NPS had only recently provided the needed clearance 

for construction along the Anacostia River shore. [Green, Stephen, “Natcher Threatens New 

Subway Halt,” The Evening Star, April 30, 1970; Eisen, Jack, “City Warned Of 2d Metro Fund 

Cutoff,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 30, 1970] 
Learning of the latest threat to Metro funding while the WMATA board was trying to resolve the 

minority hiring issue, Chairman Yeldell said, “We had no knowledge of this before it appears in 

the papers.” General Graham pointed out that WMATA representatives had received “a fine 

reception” from Chairman Natcher when they testified.

Board member Gleason said:

I don’t know if any organization can stand to be kidnapped time after time. Each crisis 

just makes the blood pressure rise more frequently and the patient dies. I don’t know if 

transit can survive another crisis. 

Vice Chairman Sickles suggested meeting with Chairman Natcher to bolster support for Metro, 

but General Graham replied that Natcher already knew “about our problems.” [Meyer, Eugene 

L., “Metro, Warned of Fund Cut, ‘Can’t Survive Another Crisis.’” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, May 1, 1970] 

WMATA appeared before the subcommittee on May 5. Chairman Yeldell submitted a lengthy 

statement for the record in which he explained WMATA’s request for $34,178,000 to cover 

District’s matching share, complimented the political leadership that resulted in the 

groundbreaking on December 9, 1969, confirmed the cost estimate of $2,494,600 as long as 

Metro stayed on schedule, and assured that the final plan, while complex, was on schedule. 

General Graham’s statement confirmed the importance of staying on schedule. Despite the delay 

of 14 months before the groundbreaking ceremony, “we have compressed our construction 

schedule sufficiently to achieve initial train operations in July of 1973” 

Our basic problem was threefold. First, we had to minimize the effect of cost escalation 

by compressing our schedule. Second, we had to hold the number of contracts in any 

given time period to the amount which would assure the benefits of contractor 

competition. Third, we needed to assure the advantages of a stable labor force. 

We believe we have accomplished these objectives.

He outlined the work schedule for the 98.7-mile system, concluding:

The final segments will be completed and operational by December 1979 from Chillum to 

Greenbelt Station; from Silver Spring to Glenmont; from Kenilworth to Addison Road; 

from telegraph Road to Backlick Road; and along the Franconia Route. 

Chairman Natcher was complimentary of the WMATA team:

As you have heard me say, probably on the floor, Mr. Yeldell, the members of this Board, 

together with the members who occupy staff positions are doing a good job, and I say that 

to you frankly. You have a lot of good people in this organization, a lot of good people. 

Mr. Yeldell, I just hope that the future will be such that we will be able to proceed with 

the rapid transit system.
He did not imply that developments might lead to another threat to the city’s Metro matching 

funds. [Part 2, pages 1010-1026] 

Eisen, using The Perils of Pauline analogy, wrote that the freeway-subway impasse “has burst 

back upon the front pages, sending new shock waves through the metropolitan political 

structure.” He repeated Chairman Natcher’s warning, but said that this time the chairman had 

“made clear that he did not really want to use it.” Moreover, his ire was not aimed at city 

officials but at Secretary Volpe, leaving the city “caught helplessly in the middle.” This reality 

explained, Eisen wrote, “the lack of anguished howls from City Hall.” The goal was for 

Secretary Volpe and the city to agree on the East Leg Freeway and the Potomac River Freeway.

The future of the North-Central Freeway was another contentious question. “It was clearly the 

North Central that Chairman George H. Fallon (d-Md.) . . . had in mind” when he inserted his 

statement in the Congressional Record (“Even the rapid transit system which required such 

painstaking effort on the part of so many to get under way is subject to delays by the various 

[freeway] recommendations.”)

Chairman Fallon and Chairman Kluczynski were the keys to resolving the issues. Referring to 

the reports submitted to Congress by Mayor Washington and Secretary Volpe in accordance with 

the Section 23 deadline, Eisen quoted Chairman Fallon’s observation that the two reports were in 

disagreement with each other and were “radical departures” from Section 23:

These “departures” are what Fallon’s ally, Natcher, has undertaken to rectify by invoking 

the power of the purse, if need be. 

Eisen summarized:

One fact is clear: Washington is the nation’s outstanding example of blockage of 

interstate freeways in an urban area, a symbol that heartens road critics and anguishes 

proponents. [Eisen, Jack, “New Threat Rocks Road Controversy,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, May 3, 1970] 

Post editors wondered how Metro became “the king in the decade-old chess game that has gone 

on over the District of Columbia’s highway system.” The game was complex, the players 

changed regularly, and much of it was taking place behind closed doors. If the game did not end 

soon, one thing was certain: 

The king is going to be dead and with the demise of the subway will die the last best 

chance to make this metropolitan area a decent place to live in the future.

As for Chairman Natcher’s threat, “If those funds are withheld, you can kiss the subway system 

good-bye.” 

Chairmen Natcher and Fallon did not seem to grasp, the editors wrote, that Metro is not an 

ordinary public works project: 
It has to sell $880 million in revenue bonds to complete its financing. What investor in 

his right mind is going to recommend or buy these bonds if the project is turned on and 

off as part of a political power play? 

Congress was at fault, but “the anti-freeway lobby” also deserved some of the blame. Eventually 

the freeways would be built: 

Those who fight against them so adamantly only succeed in depriving the city of a chance 

to use things like the north central freeway and the northern leg in a way that can help the 

city’s economic and social development. 

Others were at fault as well:

Neither the Mayor nor the City Council has been a tower of strength. The city’s move 

towards a compromise last winter was made grudgingly, by the best interpretation that 

can be put on it, and deviously, by the worst. Secretary of Transportation Volpe then 

stuck in his two cents worth by tacking more ideas on the city’s proposal and sending the 

Congressmen up the wall in rage. 

To further complicate the situation, the District’s freeway program has become the 

symbol of resistance of cities across the country to the use of freeway construction 

standards more appropriate in [a] rural area . . . . While it is one thing for the District to 

be a test case on such a major issue, it is quite another for the subway system to go down 

the drain while the battle is fought out. 

The impasse could be “worked out fairly easily” by negotiation “if the game hadn’t been played 

out so bitterly for so long”: 

It needs action, quickly – and not from men who are acting to please constituencies or 

pressure groups or to show that they have been right all along, but from men who are 

acting as responsible citizens trying to solve a difficult problem. 

Congressional action to ram freeways through by threatening the subway was “the worst kind of 

demagoguery,” but the city’s and Secretary Volpe’s actions were “insane” because they “put 

Congress in the position where it thinks this is the only course of action it has open to justify its 

past performances.” The editors called for “some sanity and common sense” before the next 

moves. Otherwise, “the game is likely to end in total disaster.” [“The Game Called Freeways,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 3, 1970] 

Star editors saw a way out of the impasse. The city needed to overcome two hurdles. If the good 

faith efforts to overcome the court challenge failed, the city should hold hearings to dispose of 

the problem. In addition, the differences between the ideas the city and Secretary Volpe 

submitted to Congress should be reconciled. This hurdle was more complex than the first one. 

“The House Public Works Committee, in fact, was sufficiently infuriated by the snarl some 

weeks ago to lodge a written protest with the President.” Chairman Natcher, while issuing his 

threat, reported that efforts were underway to work things out. “We trust he is right.” 
The region could not afford another subway setback. “And the gravest mistake which Secretary 

Volpe and Mayor Washington could make would be to ignore the prodding which Natcher is 

giving them, at this point, in relatively gentle terms.” [“A Word to Wise,” The Sunday Star, 

May 3, 1970] 

On May 6, Judge Sirica rejected plaintiffs’ request for a temporary injunction to halt construction 

of the Three Sisters Bridge. After what the Post characterized as “the judge’s rapid-fire rulings,”

he cut off Owen’s arguments: 

Suddenly, Sirica stopped Owen’s argument to ask whether the civic groups would be able 

to post a bond in the amount of contracts already let for bridge construction “to protect 

the government and taxpayers of the District of Columbia. 

He concluded that even if he issued the injunction, the plaintiffs would be unable to post the 

bond, as commonly done. The bond would be an estimated $1.5 million. 

Owen said he would immediately appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals. 

Judge Sirica set June 11 for the start of the trial. [“Judge Refuses to Halt Bridge Construction,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 7, 1970] 

Eisen reported on May 12 that the plaintiffs were seeking to halt construction at least in part on 

the basis of a deposition that attorney Gerald P. Norton had taken with Charles E. Hall, FHWA’s 

Division Engineer in the District of Columbia. During an April 28 deposition, Hall said FHWA 

had not yet approved the design for the bridge, which was being reviewed on orders of 

Administrator Turner. 

Turner, in a March memorandum, had written: 

[We are] still concerned that the combination of the adverse geometry of the 

superstructure, the unconventional design details, the extreme lack of design experience 

of a structure of this type and the complete absence of this construction experience in this 

country makes the undertaking extremely hazardous and fraught with danger. 

To the best of our knowledge, very little has been accomplished to alleviate this concern. 

Hall expressed doubts about whether the graceful, single-span bridge that the Commission of 

Fine Arts had approved could be built. Instead, he opened a consultant study to display an 

illustration showing a multi-span design and said that if the design were rejected, the bridge 

“could look like the pictures we had in this book.” 

In a second deposition on May 5, Hall said he understood that Turner was firmly committed to 

the present design. 

Robert Kennan, roads committee chairman of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City, argued 

that the questions Hall raised about the design were serious enough to justify a halt in 

construction. John L. Hess of the District’s corporation counsel’s office dismissed plaintiff’s 
concern. “Everybody is now agreed, including Mr. Hall, that the bridge approved by the Fine 

Arts Commission is the one that is going to be built. No question about it.” [Eisen, Jack, 

“Approved Design of Three Sisters Bridge Is Challenged,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, May 12, 1970; quote from Turner memorandum in Green, Stephen, “New 3 Sisters 

Bridge Design Weighed,” The Evening Star, September 2, 1970] 

Appropriations Action, 1971 

On June 1, the House Committee on Appropriations approved the FY 1971 District of Columbia 

bill drafted by Chairman Natcher’s subcommittee. The report explained that the committee was 

“still of the opinion that there is a place for both a freeway system and a rapid rail transit system 

in our Capital City.” However, freeway construction “must be carried out along with the rapid 

transit system.” After summarizing the reports submitted in February that contained “certain 

proposals that are not in compliance with the intent of the law,” the report concluded: 

Another impasse has evolved. Until the current impasse on freeway construction is 

resolved no funds will be recommended for the District’s share of the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s fiscal year 1971 construction program. 

At the time, the city’s authority to borrow from the U.S. Treasury had expired, requiring 

congressional action that had not yet occurred. Because the loans were used as an advance on 

payment for highway projects, the city had not requested appropriations for matching funds for 

highway development. In the absence of loan authority, the committee recommended 

appropriating only $500,000 for construction. It was for the Three Sisters Bridge to “complete 

the financing of that structure and is available from existing resources.” [District of Columbia 

Appropriation Bill, 1971, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 

91st Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 91-1135, June 1, 1970, pages 4-5, 17] 

WMATA saw the refusal to appropriate the requested $34.2 million in District matching funds 

for Metro as a long-term peril if it prevented future contract awards. In the short term, the delay 

would be less of a problem because construction could continue. 

Mayor Washington responded to the report by saying, “I am hopeful that the current impasse can 

be resolved quickly so that the much-needed subway program can proceed.” General Graham 

said WMATA had enough funds available to “keep Metro on schedule until the new freeway 

impasse can be resolved.” He added that the Senate had a pending supplemental appropriations 

bill that contained $84 million in Federal funds for Metro. Approval of that bill was “absolutely 

crucial.”

Secretary Volpe was out of town and could not be reached for comment. Chairman Natcher, 

asked by Eisen for comment, said, “I have no additional comment other than what’s in the 

report.” [Eisen, Jack, “House Panel Again Refuses Metro Funds,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, June 2, 1970] 

On June 4, the Star reported that Secretary Volpe had reversed his position on the Potomac River 

Freeway. In a letter to Chairman Fallon, Secretary Volpe said he now favored building the 
freeway in a waterfront tunnel, as anticipated in Section 23 of the 1968 Act, instead of on an 

elevated structure. The freeway would be an eight-lane split-level facility, with the tunnel 

carrying the eastbound lanes while westbound traffic used the elevated Whitehurst Freeway: 

The eastbound lanes will be built from an expressway stub, now running from 31st Street 

NW to 27th and K Streets NW. It will proceed parallel to and just south of the existing 

Whitehurst Freeway into a more than 4,000-foot-long tunnel starting between 400 and 

650 feet west of Wisconsin Avenue. 

From beneath the waterfront, the tunnel will continue under the C&O Canal, surfacing on 

the north side of the canal between Georgetown University and Canal Road. From there 

it will connect with the eastbound lanes of the Three Sisters Bridge.

From the present Whitehurst Freeway, the westbound lanes will go into a tunnel just west 

of Key Bridge and run for 1,750 feet to surface north of the C&O Canal. From there it 

will proceed west past the intersection of Foxhall Road and MacArthur Boulevard to join 

the westbound lanes of the Three Sisters Bridge. 

The Star noted that FHWA had favored Secretary Volpe’s proposed elevated structure, which in 

a joint use venture would have a park beneath the freeway. “But plans for redevelopment of the 

Georgetown waterfront, that include demolition of the Milton Hopfenmaier Co. rendering plant, 

have hinged on construction of the tunnel.” 

Secretary Volpe’s letter to Chairman Fallon expressed the hope that the “clarification” would 

help resolve the city’s transportation tangle. However, it addressed only one of the issues that 

Chairman Natcher had cited as the basis for withholding Metro funds. [Green, Stephen, “Volpe 

Switches on Freeway, Backs Georgetown Tunnel,” The Evening Star, June 4, 1970] 

Chairman Natcher brought the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1971, to the House floor 

on June 4. He explained the committee’s support for a balanced transportation system that 

required construction of freeways at the same time as Metro:

Until the current impasse on freeway construction is resolved no funds will be 

recommended for the District’s share of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority’s fiscal year 1971 construction program. For this reason, Mr. Chairman, we do 

not recommend at this time the sum of $34,178,000 for the District’s share of the rapid 

transit construction program costs. 

He once again went through the history of efforts to force the District to comply with Section 23, 

inserting into the record his summary from the April 30 hearing. 

In the time since he had last recommended the appropriation of District matching funds for 

Metro, he said, it was clear “that the terms of the Highway Act of 1968 have not been complied 

with, and this is the situation we are confronted with today.” When the city complies with 

Section 23 of the 1968 Act, he would recommend the funding. 
Virginia’s Representative Scott pointed out that his constituents depended on construction of 

Metro in the city. How, he asked, can the impasse be cleared?

Chairman Natcher again summarized the basis for the impasse, emphasizing that his decision 

would not affect current construction: 

If between now and the time the bill passes the Senate, or at any time the District officials 

and the Department of Transportation comply with the Highway Act of 1968, I will 

recommend to the members of our subcommittee, to our Committee on Appropriations 

and to the full House that we appropriate the $34,178,000 requested . . . . 

But I must say this: As long as there is not compliance with the law passed by this House 

and the Congress of the United States I will never come to the floor of the House and ask 

for money to continue construction. 

Representative Gude of Maryland said he understood the complexity of the impasse, but added, 

“I realize that I am one of a very small handful of Congressmen who take exception to a 

deepseated [sic] feeling in this House that we should not go ahead with funding the transit system 

unless we have corresponding progress in the expressway system.” The freeway system and 

Metro should each be judged on its own merits. “I do not feel that we should hold one program 

hostage to the other.” 

Chairman Natcher simply thanked Representative Gude “for his statement.”

Chairman Kluczynski took this opportunity to explain that as chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Roads, he had included Section 23 in the 1968 Act “to put an end to the years of unnecessary and 

ridiculous bickering which has gone on in the District of Columbia concerning interstate highway 

routes for the Nation’s Capital.” With just a few miles remaining to be built, “It is just 

intolerable that the city government continues to obstruct and delay and drag its feet on this vital 

project.” He continued: 

Where positive action is required all that can be seen is negativeness coupled with a 

cowering every time a militant voice is raised to object. I read recently that the great 

Roman statesman and philosopher, Seneca remarked long ago, “that government is 

ill-conducted, when the mob rules its leader.” . . . . 

Earlier in the day, Chairman Mahon had said the country must have a National Capital we can be 

proud of. Chairman Kluczynski said, “We can hardly be proud of unfinished freeways and 

intolerable congestion which has resulted from a government of indecision.” 

Representative Broyhill also was concerned about deletion of the Metro funds. “We are all 

aware of the seriousness of traffic congestion and have agreed to the necessity of a subway 

system. The more we delay doing something about it, the more it will cost to solve the problem.” 

Chairman Natcher went through the provisions of Section 23 to demonstrate the city’s lack of 

compliance:
First. Not later than 30 days after enactment of the law, which was signed on August 23, 

1968 – almost 2 years ago, work was to be commenced on four specific projects – the 

Three Sisters Bridge, the Potomac River Freeway, the center leg of the inner loop, and the 

east leg of the inner loop. 

Second. The remainder of the projects would be studied for a period of 18 months and 

reported back to Congress by February 23, 1970. 

With regard to the first step of the act the District government proceeded not only to 

completely ignore the law but within a period of about 4 months proceeded to remove 

from the plan three of the four required projects as they were designated by the Congress. 

Most of the remaining study projects were changed completely from what was indicated 

in the act.

The District’s report to Congress in February, the second step, had been “a warmed over version 

of the plan which was rejected by the Transportation Planning Board over a year earlier.” The 

Department of Transportation’s report to Congress “proposed a still different plan than either that 

of the District of Columbia or that proposed in the 1968 Act.” He continued: 

It is my understanding that the Secretary of Transportation has now agreed to conform to 

the first step of the act but has retained his original position on the study projects. 

This appeared to be a reference to Secretary Volpe’s support for the tunnel option along the 

Georgetown waterfront. 

We have now reached the point wherein the only thing that has been accomplished since 

the 1968 Highway Act was passed is to let one small contract on the piers of the Three 

Sisters Bridge and to begin the design of the Potomac River Freeway. Aside from that all 

is again in confusion. 

In conclusion, he said he would like to recommend “tomorrow, next week, next month” to 

restore Metro construction funding, but that could happen only when the District and the 

Department of Transportation are in compliance with Section 23. 

Of course, the floor discussion covered many other topics, but in the end, the House passed the 

bill, absent Metro funding, without a recorded vote. [District of Columbia Appropriations, 1971, 

Congressional Record-House, June 4, 1970, pages 18358-18370] 

Star editors appreciated the efforts of Representatives Broyhill and Gude, both freeway 

supporters, to separate the freeway fight from Metro construction. “But what their pleas did 

reflect was a recognition that the transit program now has reached the critical stage in which a 

prolonged delay in appropriations could sink the whole business, probably permanently.” 

The editors could not contest Chairman Natcher’s recitation of the history of “broken promises 

which have left the highway program once again ‘in confusion.’” Secretary Volpe and Mayor 

Washington “should be hammering on Natcher’s door in search of an agreement.” 
In 1969, the impasse had been broken only by President Nixon’s intervention. “We see no way 

out of the present mess short of a repetition of this action, in which a new agreement could be 

reached in terms of the conditions that exist today.” Sadly, Secretary Volpe and Mayor 

Washington do not seem able, “of their own volition,” to reach such an agreement. “But there is 

no reason to anticipate that they will do so in the absence of a strong push from the boss.” 

[“Those Subway Funds,” The Evening Star, June 12, 1970] 

The Senate Committee on Appropriations approved its bill for the District of Columbia on 

June 18. Working from the House bill, the Senate committee deleted the $500,000 appropriated 

for the Three Sisters Bridge, but recommended appropriating $34.2 million for Metro 

construction. Chairman Proxmire realized changes would be a major issue during the HouseSenate conference, but said, “It seems to me we have a clear commitment to move ahead with the 

subway. Once you start work on it, it’s bound to be wasteful and increase the cost if you 

interrupt it.” He added, “I think Mr. Natcher and I will be able to arrive at a fair settlement.” 

[District of Columbia Appropriations Bill 1971, Committee on Appropriations, United States 

Senate, 91st Congress, 2d Session, Calendar Nol 939, June 18, 1970; Moore, Irna, “Metro Funds 

Put Back in Budget,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 18, 1970] 

On June 26, Chairman Proxmire brought the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1971 to 

the Senate floor. Referring to the Metro funding, he told his colleagues, “This is the principal 

difference between the House and the Senate. They did not fund the subway, we did.” The 

Senate approved the bill without discussion of the Metro funding or the freeway impasse. 

[District of Columbia Appropriations, 1971, Congressional Record-Senate, June 26, 1970, 

pages 21686-21689] 

In conference, Representative Natcher prevailed, as explained in the conference report:

The list of projects approved does not include funds for the District’s share of the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s construction program. The managers 

on the part of the House reiterate their opinion that there is a place for both a freeway 

system and a rapid rail system in our Capital City. In order to meet the tremendous 

day-by-day growth of traffic, the freeway program must be carried out along with the 

rapid transit system. There is no desire on the part of the House managers to halt the 

subway program and the denial of funds at this time will not stop construction already 

underway and the managers are determined to do everything they can to enable the 

Authority to maintain its construction schedule and the integrity of the financial plan. 

When the current impasse on highway construction in the District of Columbia is 

resolved, every consideration will be given to a supplemental request for the District’s 

share of the cost of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s fiscal year 

1971 construction program. [District of Columbia Appropriations, 1971, Conference 

Report, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 91-1267, 

June 30, 1970, page 4] 

According to the Star, the phrase beginning “are determined to do everything” was included in 

the report language at Chairman Proxmire’s request. He told reporters 
Conferees also retained the appropriation of $500,000 for the Three Sisters Bridge. 

Chairman Proxmire told reporters that Senate conferees understood Chairman Natcher’s view on 

the importance of developing Metro and freeways at the same time. “Proxmire said the Senate 

conferees felt that unless they took the position they did, a bill might not have been reported out 

until fall. [James, Betty, “D.C. Budget Cleared by House,” The Evening Star, July 1, 1970] 

On the House floor, Chairman Natcher explained the decision by conferees to remove the 

Senate’s appropriation for Metro. Referring to the language quoted above, he said, “It clearly 

shows that the other body and this body, and especially the Committee on Appropriations in the 

House, believes that we must have both a rapid transit system and a freeway system in our 

Capital City.” On June 30, the House approved the conference report without further discussion 

of the subway funding. [Conference Report on H.R. 17868, District of Columbia 

Appropriations, 1971, Congressional Record-House, June 30, 1970, pages 22158-22156] 

Senator Proxmire introduced the conference report in the Senate on July 1. After the report was 

read into the record, Senator Tydings said he opposed the report because it denied funds for 

Metro construction. In so doing, he said, “it insults the citizens of the sovereign States of 

Maryland and Virginia and the District of Columbia; and because it represents an unprecedented 

and intolerable interference in the local affairs of these States.”

He recognized that Senator Proxmire had tried his best to retain the funds, and that the House 

conferees had forced the deletion:

Mr. President, speaking for the government and the citizens of Maryland, I deeply resent 

this continued interference with our purely local questions. Nowhere else in this Nation 

has Congress so abused local governments than as in this case of stalling subway 

construction for the Washington Metropolitan area. Never has Congress blackjacked 

local governments as it has attempted to in this case.

What business is it of Congress where Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia 

decide to put their highways and subways? What right has Congress to jeopardize the 

Metro program? By what authority does Congress tell the people of Maryland to go 

without their vital Metro mass transit system because of a highway mess in the District of 

Columbia? 

He hoped the House would “reconsider its strategy of holding the subway hostage for 

construction of a few particular, highly controversial freeway routes.” He did not intend “to 

stand idly by” in the face of this “gross insult to the people and governments of this area.” He 

would not try to block the pending bill, but if the impasse were not resolved by the fall, he would 

have to “recommend that we amend this highway financing authority to make it clear that the 

Metro and the freeway program must be constructed together; that one will not be held hostage 

for the other; and that funds for the Metro system will be appropriated together with funds for 

freeway construction” to free both systems “to proceed in accordance with the desires of the 

people and governments of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.” He introduced 
letters, resolutions, and statements from Maryland State and local officials in support of breaking 

the impasse holding up Metro funding. 

Several Senators, knowing the conference report would be approved without a recorded vote, 

voiced that agreement with Senator Tydings. Senator Spong and Byrd of Virginia and Senators 

Eagleton and Clifford Case applauded the Tydings comments. 

Senator Proxmire responded that “I agree with virtually everything he has said in his statement. I 

agree enthusiastically.” He explained:

Again and again in the conference I brought up the point that while there had been some 

reluctance on my part last year to fund the subway because of the inflationary tendency 

involved in starting the biggest construction project in the history of the country, it would 

be enormously expensive to halt it. And for that reason they agreed. And they realize 

that it would be a disaster if we had to stop construction on it. 

We have to be realistic and realize that they can always stop anything we do over here. 

But there is every likelihood and every expectation that we will be able to resolve that 

impasse by mid-September.

House conferees were “adamant in reasserting the position advanced by Chairman Natcher.” The 

Senate conferees countered that maintaining the continuity of Metro construction was vital and 

that “it was both unreasonable and unrealistic to delay construction during the critical first phase 

of the project’s construction schedule.” Given the House insistence, the Senate conferees either 

had to yield or face the prospect of “ending up in a stalemate.” 

The Senate approved the conference report with a recorded vote. [District of Columbia 

Appropriations Bill, 1971-Conference Report, Congressional Record-Senate, July 1, 1970, 

pages 22488-22495] 

President Nixon signed the legislation on July 16, 1970 (P.L. 91-337). 

Volpe Before the Subcommittee on Roads 

On June 10, 1970, Secretary Volpe appeared before the House Subcommittee on Roads to testify 

on plans for the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970. During the question period after Secretary 

Volpe testified about the needed 2-year reauthorization bill, Chairman Kluczynski asked about a 

letter the Secretary had sent to Chairman Fallon on May 4. (He sent a similar letter to Chairman 

Randolph.) It stated: 

In the review of the individual State estimates by the Bureau of Public Roads there were 

identified several system segments on which question exists as to whether the highway 

can be built. In some cities the responsible officials have declared the highway is not 

wanted and will not be constructed. In certain instances the Governors have made similar 

declarations. The cost of completion reported for some sections is so great as to warrant 

bringing to the attention of the congressional committee.
The letter listed 13 areas with controversial Interstates totaling $3.9 billion. The areas included 

Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Hartford, New York City, Philadelphia, Providence, 

Seattle, Shreveport, and the District of Columbia. The list also included I-93 through Franconia 

Notch in New Hampshire and the adjoining segment in Vermont. Secretary Volpe explained that 

the list provided to Chairman Fallon included “projects on which there has been little or no 

progress in recent years.” He added:

They cannot be completed if we continue to procrastinate, as is the case in some of the 

projects, and defer decisions which we believe must be made in the very near future if we 

are to complete the Interstate Highway System in the time frame which we have been 

talking about. 

The implication was that while the Department of Transportation had included the projects in the 

latest ICE, Congress may wish to consider removing them. None were “completely essential to 

an integrated national system.”

Chairman Kluczynski was particularly concerned because the list included the Crosstown 

Expressway in his hometown of Chicago, a freeway the city and Governor wished to complete. 

Similarly, Chairman Fallon was concerned about routes in his hometown of Baltimore. 

Chairman Kluczynski noted, however, that the list included proposed freeways in the District of 

Columbia. The letter estimated that completing the District segments (Three Sisters Bridge, 

North-Central Freeway, Potomac River Freeway, the North and South Legs of the Inner Loop 

Freeway, and the East Leg, north of Bladensburg Road) would cost $650 million from the 

Highway Trust Fund. If these and other controversial routes were not going to be built, or 

indefinitely delayed, Secretary Volpe thought the apportionment factor resulting from the ICE 

should be recalculated with these costs deleted. [“Federal-Aid Highway Act-1970,” Hearings, 

Subcommittee on Roads, Committee on Public Works, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st

Congress, 2nd Session, Report 91-35, pages 954-956; Green, Stephen, “Volpe Casts Doubt on 

Freeway Future,” The Evening Star, June 11, 1970; Secretary Volpe’s letter appears on pages 

1038-1039 of the hearing record.] 

(Helen Leavitt appeared before the subcommittee on May 12 to testify against the highway 

program and the Highway Trust Fund. She also opposed a Transit Trust Fund because of her 

view that transportation decisions should be based on needs, not funding source. 

(Representative Harsha questioned her qualifications. He had a copy of her book, which he said 

provided an incorrect name of his law firm. He asked if she drove an automobile. “Yes,” she 

answered, “occasionally.” He told her, “Then you contribute to all this pollution you are 

complaining about.” 

(Who supported her study of highway programs? She did not understand, replying, “Who, if 

any? My husband.” He clarified that he was asking if she received money from any foundations. 

No, she had not, although she received an advance of $2,000 from Doubleday. 
(As for her criticism of the safety record on the Nation’s highways, he said, “taking your 

suggestion to maybe the ridiculous point, if we did away with all highways, we would not have 

any accidents.” She replied, “Well, we would not have any automobile accidents.” He 

concluded, “Okay. That is all I have.” 

(Chairman Kluczynski admitted he did not have a copy of her book but would get a copy and 

read as much as he could before the next day’s hearing. “This is one time Big Klu is happy he is 

not a lawyer, because you would have me quoted in that book of yours, too. [Laughter]” He 

said, “I admire you for your courage, fighting spirit, and it has been a pleasure to have you before 

the committee.” If she had any more testimony, he encouraged her to send it in. [pages 411-416] 

(If he did read Superhighway-Superhoax, Chairman Kluczynski would have found that he was 

mentioned and quoted several times, initially via a quote defending the Public Works 

Committee’s wisdom in promoting the Interstate System in 1955-1956: 

When the pressure was at its heaviest, one of the committee members made this remark, 

“We have heard from everyone except the public.” No one can speak adequately for the 

public except their representatives in Congress. The public has no organized lobby or 

pressure groups and I am confident that we will give the public proper representation in 

the consideration of . . . [the proposed highway bill]. [Leavitt, page 50] 

(She referred to or quoted him several more times, including his comment at the end of the 

December 1968 hearings on District freeway problems:

We want that bridge,” said Subcommittee Chairman Kluczynski . . . . Serving notice that 

he expected Boyd to approve the new Potomac bridge by the end of the month, the 

chairman added, “If he doesn’t act, the Congress will. That’s a mandate.” [page 98] 

(In summing up the views of Chairman Kluczynski and his Public Works colleagues, Leavitt 

wrote, “It would be difficult to describe Kluczynski’s committee as sympathetic to any criticism 

of freeways.” [page 218, italics in original.]) 

On Trial

As directed by the three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeal, Judge Sirica convened a trial to 

consider the Three Sisters Bridge lawsuit on June 8. 

In an opening statement, Owen argued that the city had violated planning requirements before 

beginning construction. He also questioned the design based on the deposition by FHWA’s Hall. 

“The fact is that the District is proceeding with the construction of a bridge which may or may 

not fall down . . . nobody knows for sure.” Construction must be stopped until the city held the 

required design and location hearings. He said the District Highway Department had signed a 

certificate approving the location belatedly in “an effort to paper over the crack in the 

government’s case.” He added that the city had approved the bridge only after “enormous 

political pressure” related to Metro funding and, therefore, should be ruled invalid. 
John R. Hess, representing the District of Columbia, and McKevitt, representing Secretary Volpe 

on behalf of the Justice Department, said they would demonstrate that project development 

complied with applicable laws and regulations. 

After the opening statements, Judge Sirica agreed that, “This is going to be a very crucial 

question, a very important question,” referring to the question of political pressures. [“3 Sisters 

Bridge Trial Opens With Accusations,” The Evening Star, June 8, 1970; “Three Sisters Trial To 

Include Politics,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 9, 1970] 

The entire second day of the trial consisted of Owen questioning two FHWA officials, Associate 

Administrator for Planning E. H. “Ted” Holmes, and Rex I. Wells of the Office of 

Environmental Policy. They had prepared a memorandum recommending approval of the span. 

That memorandum was given to Secretary Volpe, who approved it in October 1969, about 

2 months after Secretary Volpe restored I-266 to the Interstate System. Owen was attempting to 

demonstrate that the timing was intended to “paper over” legal defects in the approval process. 

On June 10, Judge Sirica asked Hess and McKevitt to provide copies of any documents reflecting 

congressional pressure of Secretary Volpe. He rejected a motion by Owen to subpoena the 

documents and questioned whether documents could prove that Secretary Volpe was reacting 

only to congressional pressure when he restored I-266 to the Interstate System.

Owen referred to Secretary Volpe’s deposition in the case, during which he acknowledged 

talking with Chairmen Natcher, Fallon, and Kluczynski, as well as Representative Cramer about 

the bridge. 

Former Administrator Bridwell testified during the day that his decision to remove the bridge 

from the Interstate System was not a result of political pressure. Eisen summarized:

He said that he gave “very much” weight to the Highway Act of 1968, in which Congress 

required building the bridge, and even sought a legal opinion on “the flexibility I had 

within the statutory language.” 

Bridwell said he deleted the bridge at Mayor Walter E. Washington’s request after the 

National Capital Planning Commission and the City Council adopted a highway plan 

omitting it.

“It only came to me a few days before leaving office,” he explained, adding. “I acted 

promptly . . . .” [Eisen, Jack, “Hill Pressure On 3 Sisters Questioned,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, June 11, 1970] 

On June 11, McKevitt told the court that no documents existed showing political pressure on 

Secretary Volpe to restore the bridge to the Interstate System. In view of former Administrator 

Bridwell’s testimony, Judge Sirica called for documents reflecting earlier political pressure by 

bridge opponents to kill the project during the 6 months between enactment of the 1968 Act and 

Bridwell’s departure from FHWA.
According to Eisen, the trial “moved slowly as lawyers for the bridge opponents methodically 

submitted evidence and questioned witnesses in an attempt to prove that federal and District of 

Columbia officials took shortcuts in required hearings and administrative procedures”: 

Charles E. Hall, division engineer for the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, acknowledged 

that the bridge now in preliminary construction stages is not the same in proposed design 

or precise location as the one considered at a public hearing in 1964. 

He also testified that he still is not sure the bridge as designed, using a single span of long 

reinforced concrete, can be built. But he said a bridge of similar design could be built of 

steel. Whatever is built, he insisted, would be safe. [Eisen, Jack, “Judge Seeks Files on 

Cancellation of 3 Sisters,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 12, 1970] 

Secretary Volpe took the witness stand for 5 hours on Friday, June 12. He testified that he 

approached the future of the bridge “with a completely open mind.” He ordered new department 

of transportation studies of the need for the bridge and its potential adverse impacts. He said that 

he met with bridge supporters and opponents and that he had considered their views. He was 

contacted by Chairman Natcher and other congressional leaders. However, he declared, “They 

know I don’t bend easily.” 

In the end, he concluded that the Three Sisters Bridge was needed and that it was essential to the 

National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. He denied that he had approved the bridge 

to secure release of the Metro construction funds. 

Owen noted that Secretary Volpe’s assertion that the bridge was essential to the Interstate System 

contradicted his May 4 letter to Chairmen Fallon and Randolph asserting that urban freeways 

were not needed for the national system although they may be of local importance. Eisen 

reported, “Questions by Roberts B. Owen . . . failed to resolve the seeming contradiction.” 

[Eisen, Jack, “Volpe Denies Hill Pressure On 3Sisters,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

June 13, 1970; Green, Stephen, “Three Sisters Bridge Vital, Volpe Testifies,” The Evening Star, 

June 13, 1970] 

The following Monday, June 15, Administrator Turner told the court that politics and pressure 

did not play a role in his decision to restore I-266 to the Interstate System. He acted on the merits 

of the bridge. He had always favored the bridge project, he said, and believed it was needed for 

traffic relief.

To make their case, Owen and Norton traced the events leading to construction of the Three 

Sisters Bridge. Bridwell, in one of his last acts, removed I-266 from the Interstate System. 

Chairman Natcher warned that he would withhold the District’s matching funds for Metro if the 

city and Department of Transportation did not comply with Section 23. On August 9, the city 

council agreed to build the bridge. On August 11, Secretary Volpe ordered Turner to put I-266 

back on the Interstate System. Turner did so the following day. The same day, Chairman 

Natcher made clear that his decision depended on actual construction, not promises. President 

Nixon’s August 12 letter to Chairman Natcher summarized the recent steps in an effort to 

convince Chairman Natcher to release the funds. “I trust these actions fulfill the criteria that you 
set forth.” Once ground was broken on the bridge project, Chairman Natcher released the funds, 

allowing for the Metro groundbreaking ceremony. 

Norton, seeking to have President Nixon’s letter entered into evidence over government 

objections, said, the letter was “the clearest evidence of the linkage between these two actions 

[bridge construction leading to subway funds] that there could be.” Judge Sirica admitted the 

letter in evidence. [Eisen, Jack, “Nixon Letter Cited as Evidence of Pressure to Build Three 

Sisters,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 16, 1970] 

Director Airis testified in the trial on June 16. He did not recall any pressure to expedite 

construction of the bridge. He said the implication was that there is something wrong with 

speeding up the job. “That has always been my goal . . . . I try to do what is in the public interest 

and is proper.” He added, “All kinds of people give me advice . . . but when something goes 

wrong, there is the damnedest scampering for cover that you ever saw . . . but I can’t dodge.” 

He acknowledged that he sent progress reports to Chairman Natcher. Norton showed Airis 

transcripts of his appearances before Chairman Natcher’s subcommittee during which the 

freeway-subway impasse was discussed. Airis, however, said he could not recall discussing the 

political link between the modes.

Norton also asked about a September 2 letter from Airis’s deputy, Gerald I. Sawyer, to FHWA 

Division Engineer Hall, reading in part, “This will confirm our mutual agreement in the project. 

This action was taken due to urgency in getting the contract under way.” The copy in Norton’s 

hand had Hall’s initials and Hall’s notation: “This was to provide a two-week [contracting] 

period because of the urgency of starting construction at the behest of Congress and the need of 

D.C. for [Metro] construction money.” Asked about this exchange, Airis replied, “I have no 

idea . . . I don’t know what he’s referring to.” 

Airis returned to the stand the following day, June 18. He testified that he had adhered to all 

requirements for public hearings and had considered possible social and economic impacts prior 

to approval. He said he had always acted in “a meticulous manner” in carrying out project 

development. 

Judge Sirica recessed early for the week, at plaintiffs’ request, until Monday, June 22. [Eisen, 

Jack, “Outside Pressure on Bridge Denied by D.C. Road Chief,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, June 17, 1970; “Bridge Plan Legal, Airis Tells Court,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, June 19, 1970] 

The trial lasted 11 days. As Professor Schrag explained, Owen had a unique strategy: 

He had learned that a completed Three Sisters Bridge, with its approaches, would block 

Sirica’s own commute down MacArthur Boulevard. He could hardly make that argument 

in open court, so instead he simply laid out the maps, saying, “Judge, I think you need to 

understand this.” One of the government lawyers broke in, saying, “Ha, ha, ha. Judge, I 

see what he’s trying to do. He’s trying to persuade you that you will not be able to drive 

to work if the bridge is built.” Sirica looked stunned, then announced a twenty-minute 
recess, during which he scrutinized the maps in the privacy of his chambers. Returning to 

the courtroom, the judge was much more sympathetic to the plaintiffs . . . . [Schrag, 

pages 136] 

The final day of the trail was June 24. The key issue had been whether Secretary Volpe, Director 

Airis, and others had skirted statutory and regulatory requirements in moving ahead with the 

bridge to obtain Metro construction funds that Chairman Natcher had bottled up. At one point in 

the trial, Judge Sirica had said the issue was not whether political pressure had been applied, but 

whether the pressure was improper. 

With the trial nearly over, Owen said he would ask for a preliminary injunction on the grounds 

that the safety of the bridge design had not been established. Jack Eisen reported that Judge 

Sirica said that the legal issues involved were complex and confusing, calling the case “highly 

emotional . . . on both sides.” Eisen continued, “Sirica, in an informal reply from the bench not 

included in the trial transcript, said: ‘I’m not going to act on any injunction in this case until 

I decide it . . . . I’m going to decide it at one time.’” [Eisen, Jack, “Bridge Work Halt Refused,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 24, 1970] 

On August 3, Judge Sirica announced his decision. He did not question the legality of the bridge, 

which Congress had ordered to construction. “It is not for this court, or for any court to decide 

whether a bridge across the Potomac in the vicinity of Three Sisters Island is needed, or if the 

bridge as presently planned is a worthwhile project . . . .” The court’s role was limited to 

determining if all legal provisions had been followed. 

As for political pressure, he found that plaintiffs had not demonstrated “that the actions of 

Mr. Natcher or any other individuals were in any way dishonest, illegal or unusual under the 

circumstances . . . . But if these actions had the effect of causing officials to disregard 

obligations imposed on them by statute, then this court must halt construction of the bridge 

until . . . statutory obligations [have been met].” 

He concluded that Secretary Volpe had approved the bridge “on the merits of the project and not 

solely on extraneous political pressures.” Moreover, the city and Secretary Volpe had complied 

with Section 4(f) and other issues plaintiffs had raised, but with one exception. He found that 

city officials had overlooked the design hearing and acted too quickly in hopes of freeing funds 

for subway construction: 

The court finds that the present design of the bridge is so substantially different from that 

proposed in 1964 that the public should be given an opportunity to present their views on 

the project as presently planned. 

Last but not least, the cost of the present project is estimated at $20 million as compared 

with an estimate of $6 million in 1964. 

He also ruled that no Federal-aid highway funds could be used for preliminary construction work 

on the bridge until tests took place to determine whether the design was structurally sound. 
District officials indicated they were considering an appeal of the ruling; some said they would 

move fast to an appeal.

Eisen noted that the decision, while based on procedural issues, was a major victory for project 

opponents. ECTC’s Abbott said that the lawsuit had been helpful because opponents “have 

gained valuable time to marshall their forces and to move on . . . the battle against air pollution.” 

[Eisen, Jack, “Judge Delays Construction of 3 Sisters,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

August 4, 1970; Green, Stephen, and Hirzel, Donald, “D.C. Aides Indicate They’ll Appeal Halt 

to 3 Sisters Span,” The Evening Star, August 4, 1970] 

The Star said of the decision that another “knot has been added to the District’s transportation 

tangle.” Nevertheless, the editors hoped “that the legal twists can be unwound this year and that 

neither the freeway nor subway projects will be thwarted.” The call for public hearings on the 

bridge project “does not raise an insuperable barrier,” but it would delay construction and “that is 

distressing.” 

The editors were encouraged that Judge Sirica had not ruled on the merits of the bridge or 

challenged Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. Section 23’s “nevertheless” 

phrase was “a stern command that has been tortuously circumnavigated in the drawn-out legal 

hassle over the project.” 

Regardless, the editors hoped that Chairman Natcher would note that “Judge Sirica is not 

attempting to foreclose the Three Sisters span, and will move to prevent the Metro from grinding 

to a halt in its infancy”:

He and his committee should take into account that District officials and the Nixon 

administration both have striven in the best of faith to break the bridge-freeway impasse. 

The new Potomac crossing, the expressways, the subway are all vital components of a 

balanced system that is needed to rescue the Nation’s Capital from traffic chaos. One 

component shouldn’t be scuttled because another has suffered a temporary setback. 

[“Three Sisters Delay,” The Evening Star, August 5, 1970] 

After attorneys for the plaintiffs and defendants could not agree on the terms of an injunction, 

Judge Sirica wrote it himself on August 7. When the city asked for permission to complete the 

pier contract, Owen pointed out that the U.S. Court of Appeals had ruled that work must be 

halted unless Judge Sirica found that all legal requirements had been satisfied, and he had not 

done so. Judge Sirica signed the injunction halting work on the bridge, but included a phrase 

delaying the effect of the injunction for 20 days to give the city time to appeal regarding the 

existing contract. [“Bridge Injunction Delayed 20 Days For Appeal by D.C.,” The Evening Star, 

August 8, 1970] 

After the hearing, Airis told reporters that a 6-month delay in the contract would add $384,000 to 

the cost of the bridge; a year delay, $650,000. The city would reimburse the contractor for 

expenses at the bridge site. [Eisen, Jack, “Bridge Project Halted—Court Orders Three Sisters 
Design Hearing,” The Washington Post, August 8, 1970; “Bridge Injunction Delayed 20 Days 

For Appeal By D.C.,” The Evening Star, August 8, 1970] 

When the 20 days expired, the city was still deciding on an appeal. The city halted construction 

of the Three Sisters Bridge on August 27 in compliance with the injunction. Workers left behind 

two excavation holes they had drilled in the rock bed for support piers for the bridge. [“Work 

Stops on 3 Sisters Bridge Job,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 28, 1970; 

Green, Stephen, “Work Halting on 3 Sisters Bridge Today,” The Evening Star, August 27, 1970] 

The Justice Department and the District’s corporation counsel advised the city to appeal Judge 

Sirica’s ruling, but on August 28, Mayor Washington and Secretary Volpe announced they would 

not do so. Although the decision was in contrast to President Nixon’s assurance to Chairman

Natcher that court challenges would be fought vigorously, they concluded that complying with 

the Judge’s condition was the “most expeditious” way to get back to construction: 

Officials said that by going ahead with hearings now, the city and DOT believe they will 

show Rep. William N. Natcher, D-Ky., that they are attempting to follow his wishes in 

building the bridge that is opposed by many individuals and civic groups. 

City officials said they would let the Department of Transportation handle sensitive negotiations 

with Congress on how the decision to hold the hearing would affect Metro funding. Reporters 

called Administrator Turner, who had been designated to negotiate with Chairman Natcher. 

Turner said, I tried to call him but couldn’t reach him. “I don’t know what his reaction was.” 

Turner added, “It was the mayor’s decision to go ahead.” 

Mayor Washington and Secretary Volpe announced that a hearing on design of the Three Sisters 

Bridge had been tentatively scheduled for November 17. The goal was “early completion of the 

Three Sisters Bridge.”

Kennan, speaking for plaintiffs, said they would appeal Judge Sirica’s August 3 ruling. 

[Green, Stephen, “November Hearing Set on Three Sisters Bridge,” The Evening Star, 

August 19, 1970; Meyer, Eugene L., “No Appeal Planned On Bridge,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, August 29, 1970] 

Robert L. Asher of the Post editorial page staff, published a lengthy article about the history of 

the Three Sisters Bridge on August 22, 1970. He began: 

For something like 13 years, it has been possible in this town to say two words that can 

stop, start or totally destroy a conversation about local affairs: “Three Sisters” . . . . For 

when you see “Three Sisters” in the page one headlines, it refers to a bridge that one 

cannot see but which one can feel very strongly about. And its implications touch 

politics, home rule, money, planning, conservation, freeways, subways, housing and 

Presidents of the United States – among other things. 

Asher traced the history of the bridge from the Mass Transportation Survey of 1959 through 

Judge Sirica’s injunction. After that decision, “Bridge foes and anti-freeway forces cheered, 
vowing to renew their battle with vigor – and that’s where Three Sisters sits today, with some 

early construction equipment idling out there on the old rocks.” 

He also pointed out that the North-Central Freeway had seemingly been put on a back burner: 

That freeway, once planned through the predominantly white Wisconsin Avenue corridor, 

had been shifted on the drawing board to a mostly black area of Northeast Washington, 

running along the B&O railroad tracks through the Brookland-Catholic University area 

out to Silver Spring. 

Leaders of ECTC led the fight against the freeway because they saw it “as destroying 

communities, removing houses, encouraging more cars, polluting the air and necessitating still 

more land clearance to park a new onslaught of autos.” They also “decried the action of 

Congress in doing unto a voteless city what a voteless city was legally powerless to undo: set a 

local policy and make it stick.”

At least Section 23 of the 1968 Act had called for a study of the corridor, not its immediate 

construction. Now, in the wake of Judge Sirica’s injunction, the North-Central Freeway was 

“something that Congress has not forgotten but that city officials would like to.” Congress could 

insist on its construction, as it did the bridge, whether city officials want to build it or not. Once 

again, however, the “subway is in new jeopardy with the old Natcher warning . . . . And again, 

the Metro faces serious construction troubles. And the bleat goes on.” 

The White House, Asher wrote, was well aware of the situation “and of the need to do something 

very soon.” In that regard, he wrote: 

There are rumors that (1) the White House will simply announce to Natcher, the city and 

everybody else that the North Central Freeway is going to be built; (2) that the 1970 

Highway Act will emerge with language geared to accelerate the bridge, the freeway and 

any other problems that the public works committees see in their way; and (3) that the 

makeup of the city council may in time be changed, by moving some members into 

judgeships and replacing others when their terms expire.

Yet in this apparently endless, multimasterminded [sic], emotional set of developments 

over the years, rumors – like real reports – tend to be shortlived and shaky. In this 

newspaper’s library of clippings, for example, there is one dated Nov. 8, 1967, that 

begins: “The Three Sisters Bridge is Out.” An astute library assistant has added a 

succinct commentary in large, red letters all across the item: “DO NOT USE.” [Asher, 

Robert L., “The Three Sisters—and How They Grew,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, August 22, 1970] 

The Road To Somewhere

In November 1968, the Star reported that a few frustrated motorists, tired of “double crossing,” 

were using the so-called “road to nowhere” – the unpaved extension of the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway from the District line to Canal Road at Chain Bridge. NPS refused to pave 

the road until the District decided on the traffic network around Key Bridge: 
Some time ago, some brave souls decided to just drive on the dirt and cinder roadway 

between the District line and Canal Road, taking a chance they will not be stranded. And 

since the impasse over completing the road still exists, they are still [driving] over the 

road in unfinished form. 

The dirt road is very dangerous in wet weather, of course, and the deep potholes and tire 

marks give evidence of many stuck cars.

The report described what city-bound motorists experienced after reaching the District line: 

After driving for about a mile after the pavement ends, the motorists come up a slight hill 

and have to wait for an opening in the stream of cars on Canal Road. Then they have to 

gun their motors and dart across to continue east on Canal Road NW. 

Heading home in the evening, the motorists have little danger from the traffic because 

they just keep going west at the entrance to Chain Bridge, instead of turning south with 

the normal stream of traffic.

Commuters using the road were greeted by two signs. One read: “Rough Road, Proceed at Own 

Risk.” The other read, “No Through Traffic, 7-9 a.m.” [“It’s a Rough Road, But Many Take It,” 

The Sunday Star, November 3, 1968] 

To dramatize the need to complete the parkway, Representative Gude joined officials of the 

Washington Aqueducts Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on September 11, 1968, in 

“an eels-eye tour” of the conduits under MacArthur Boulevard. “We are having this tour,” he 

said, “because we just have to keep hammering away at the need to get the traffic off the 

conduit.” Officials came equipped with hip boots and long rain slickers for the visitors. 

Once in the 9-foot conduit, the visitors walked through about 6 inches of murky, muddy water 

and a slippery surface. Using his flashlight, Representative Gude pointed at crevices in the 

ceiling. “These pieces of stone are about to fall.” He poked them with a ruler and hunks fell. 

Colonel William J. Love said, “Traffic on the surface has caused the top to deteriorate and settle 

so that now it is only about 8 feet 7 inches in some places.” Daniel W. Watt, chief of the 

Aqueduct Division, told the Congressman that a new road had been built to route traffic away 

from the most seriously damaged portion. [Christmas, Anne, “Guide Leads Tunnel Tour,” The 

Evening Star, December 12, 1968] 

The problem had persisted for several years, but an end came in view less than a year later when 

NPS Director Hartzog and Director Airis of the District Highway Department reached agreement 

on a solution. On August 19, 1969, Airis told reporters that he had been reluctant to proceed 

given the uncertainty of the location of the Three Sisters Bridge, Potomac River Freeway, and 

Palisades Parkway. The agreement became possible when the city council agreed to proceed 

with construction in accordance with Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. 

According to the Star: 
Only a short distance from the unpaved section Chain Bridge empties Virginia traffic 

onto Canal Road which runs for three lanes between the bridge and Arizona Avenue. 

Two lanes are used for District-bound traffic in the morning and two lanes for traffic 

leaving the city in the afternoon. 

Under the agreement between the city and the Park Service, a traffic light will be placed 

at Canal Road and Chain Bridge. 

NPS expected the paving to be completed early in 1970 at an estimated cost of $100,000, but no 

one could be certain how much traffic would use the paved parkway segment. Airis said, “We 

have to be careful that the parkway does not remain the only limited access road to the District 

from that part of Maryland.” 

At that point, about 200 motorists a day were taking the risk of using the unpaved roadway. The 

Post reported: 

The rutted gravel road to Canal Road is used by some motorists except during the 

morning rush hour, when it is closed. Most traffic switches over to MacArthur Boulevard 

at a temporary ramp near the old Glen Echo amusement park.

Closing the “road to nowhere” promised some improvement, as a Post columnist explained, but 

was only a step to a completed network: 

When the quarter-mile missing link has been added, this limited-access parkway will 

carry a heavy stream of traffic between the beltway and Georgetown. Full usefulness of 

the route will await, however, construction of the Palisades Parkway to carry traffic 

through Georgetown and into the downtown area. If the Three Sisters bridge controversy 

has at last come to an end, the construction of the Palisades Parkway and completion of 

Maryland’s connecting Memorial Parkway (some of which is now only two lanes) should 

be among the first fruits of settlement.

[Green, Stephen, “Bids Sought to Link Parkway to D.C.,” The Evening Star, August 20, 1969; 

Eisen, Jack, “Park Service To Close Gap In Parkway,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

August 21, 1969; Around Town, The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 25, 1969] 

On October 22, Representative Gude announced that NPS had awarded the $98,000 contract for 

the paving. Work was to begin on November 17, with construction expected to take 3 months. 

[“Contract Let In Last Link Of Parkway,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 23, 

1969; “Work Slated To Pave Link Of Parkway,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

November 13, 1969] 

The paving took longer than expected, but at 9:30 on June 16, 1970, Representative Gude cut a 

ribbon and lead a caravan of cars into the city. The opening was expected to reduce traffic on 

MacArthur Boulevard, a long-sought goal of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that was still 

concerned about the conduit under the pavement. The newly paved roadway also was expected 

to reduce traffic on the Virginia section of the George Washington Memorial Parkway with the 

end of double crossing by Maryland residents bound to or from the District of Columbia. 
[Hebald, Anne, “GW Parkway Is Completed, Last Section Paved to D.C.,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, June 16, 1970] 

June 17 was the first day that morning commuters had the full use of the road, but as the Star put 

it:

Motorists on the old “road to nowhere” this morning at last found themselves going 

somewhere – but very, very slowly.

By 8 a.m., traffic on the parkway had backed up a mile: 

Angry drivers had to wait nearly 15 minutes before they were able to go through a new 

traffic light at Chain Bridge and Canal Road.

Chain Bridge motorists, who usually have a clear shot across the Potomac River, found 

their progress slowed to a crawl, as, for the first time, they had competition for Canal 

Road from the parkway motorists . . . . 

“It’s just not going to work,” said Officer A. D. Kidwell of the Park Police. He could tell 

from first-hand experience since he rapidly was becoming the most unpopular man at the 

intersection.

Working the traffic light manually, Kidwell kept pushing a little brown button that 

changed the light from green to yellow to red and back again. All it brought him was 

verbal abuse from motorists who didn’t make it through. 

“Give us a break!” shouted one driver who at last managed to go on Canal Road from the 

parkway. [“Road Goes Somewhere—But at a Snail’s Pace,” The Evening Star, June 17, 

1970] 

Evening flow out of the city on the former “road to nowhere” went smoothly because motorists 

could turn onto the paved parkway without crossing a line of traffic. 

By the end of June, the District Department of Highways and Traffic made some adjustments to 

operating rules. Left turns were prohibited from Arizona Avenue, NW., to inbound Canal Road 

between 7 and 9:30 a.m., Monday through Friday. The left turn also was prohibited from 4 to 

6:30 p.m. because Canal Road was made one-way outbound from Foxhall Road to Arizona 

Avenue. Further, the newly paved segment was made a one-way road outbound during the 

evening peak period. Traffic moving from Montgomery County into the city would have to use 

alternative routes. [“Rules Revised To East Traffic,” The Evening Star, June 25, 1970; “OneWay Rules Set For Section Of GW Parkway,” The Evening Star, June 29, 1970] 

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 

In general, Congress authorized funds for the Federal-aid highway program every 2 years. As 

Congress began working on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, many issues were 

controversial, including efforts to divert Highway Trust Fund revenue to transit, especially rail 
transit – to fund their construction and subsidize operations. Members of Congress from large 

cities and those with existing or perspective rail transit systems strongly advocated diversion. 

They also were seeking ways to resolve controversies over urban Interstate segments. Often, 

local officials did not want to build them, but if they did not proceed, they would lose hundreds 

of millions of dollars in economic stimulus. They would have preferred to keep the funds for use 

on other projects, particularly rail rapid transit in the larger cities. 

The District of Columbia’s failure to comply with Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 

1968 also was a concern, especially in the House of Representatives, as reflected in the action on 

the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1971. In considering the biennial highway bill, 

the Senate and House took different approaches. 

On July 20, 1970, Sammie Abbott was the next to last witness to testify before the Subcommittee 

on Roads, with only Chairman Randolph in attendance; Senator Cooper joined shortly after the 

start. Abbott began with an insult: 

The cold climate in this room, Mr. Chairman, does not have as much of a chilling effect 

on me as the absence of Senators who should be sitting up there listening to testimony in 

order to arrive at a judgment . . . 

Abbott was interrupted regularly as he attempted to present his statement. For example, Senator 

Cooper asked if Abbott “had experience in this field.” Abbott responded: 

I don’t know. I studied architecture. My experience came in fighting a freeway now for 

about 10 years. I have read every book on the subject. I think I am an expert, because 

nobody in the District of Columbia Highway Department or at any level will debate the 

issue in front of the media or in public. I consider myself an expert; yes. 

He referred to an article in that day’s Post, “20 Billion Dollars a Year for Highways.” He said, 

“The Post belatedly has come around to a realization that the highway trust fund has to be put to 

solving the problems of the abuses that it has caused.” Chairman Randolph interrupted. “Just a 

moment. You speak very fast, Mr. Abbott. Sometimes it makes it difficult for us to interrupt.”

(After Abbott made a fairly long statement about the negative impact of Interstate freeways on 

cities, especially in Washington, including congestion and pollution, Chairman Randolph asked: 

The Chairman. Do you own a car, Mr. Abbott? 

Mr. Abbott. Yes; and I was asked once by Congressman Pucinski [sic, actually 

Congressman Clark], how did I get to a hearing. 

The Chairman. I didn’t ask you that question. I just asked if you own a car.

Mr. Abbott. Yes, I do. 

The Chairman. Do you use the car? 

Mr. Abbott. Yes, I do, because I have no other means afforded me, Senator, for 

transportation. 

The Chairman. If you had other means, you would not own a car? 
Mr. Abbott. I would do nothing in the conduct or my personal life to visit pollution on 

somebody else. My liberty to drive a car is being conditioned by the roads upon which it 

has to travel.

Chairman Randolph was increasingly annoyed by Abbott’s testimony. He told him: 

I hope you will, as a part of your day-to-day existence, say something good about 

something, or say something where some person has done something good. 

He added:

I think, Mr. Abbott, that you perhaps should take a short course, or a long course, in how 

to influence people. I think that might be advisable. 

Abbott was not deterred. As he ranted against the committee’s role in favoring the automobile, 

he said, “You have made the automobile the master instead of the servant of the people.” 

Chairman Randolph interrupted, saying “I think that is a good point for you to stop,” but Abbott 

continued his denunciation, concluding: 

There is a so-called highway lobby . . . . I think that lobby determines the policy of the 

present Congress in that respect. I am blunt about it, and I think that Senators and 

Congressmen have to be servants of the people rather than servants of a lobby. 

When the committee of the House met – Congressman Kluczynski’s committee – every 

member of that committee was up there when we testified. And they never saw an 

unfilled chair in the days that those hearings were conducted, and four key members of 

that committee received $43,000 in campaign contributions from the Truckers 

Association. 

How else can we characterize it except by “bribery”? I am blunt about this thing.

The same chairman of that committee, who now has, I think, three members of his 

committee, working, running his restaurant in Chicago – that is the kind [of] stuff with 

which I will terminate my testimony in this hearing.

That is the problem we face in this country – this problem and everything else – whether 

or not the Senate is going to be responsive to deal with the issue, the way the people feel 

it should be dealt with, and not with special interests. 

At one point, Chairman Randolph urged Abbott to continue his testimony with propriety and 

good taste. Abbott replied, “The manner in which I decide to testify is of my own concern, 

because nobody was more decorous than I, or soft spoken, until they tried to ram a freeway 

through my mother-in-law's home, and my own home. In these intervening 10 years, sir, I have 

lived with this issue night and day.”

Earlier, in an exchange with Senator Cooper, Abbott had said:
I am devoting myself to the problem, Senator. You are talking to a man who is devoting 

himself to the problem, who is working as a citizen, unpaid. I lost one-third of my 

income last year fighting the freeways. So you are dealing with a man who is devoting 

himself to the problem on the basis of experience.

[Federal Highway Act of 1970 and Miscellaneous Bills, Part 2, Hearings Before the 

Subcommittee on Roads, Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 

2nd Session, Senate Report 641-36, pages 1039-1052] 

Without further comment on Abbott’s denunciation, Chairman Randolph simply introduced the 

final witness, John Carter of the Citizens’ Coalition Against D.C. Transit. Carter, an AfricanAmerican, was there to suggest that the District be allowed to use its Highway Trust Fund share 

to buy the D.C. Transit System and run it as a nonprofit corporation. However, he immediately 

antagonized Chairman Randolph by claiming that when a delegation from Charleston, West 

Virginia, appeared before the subcommittee just before Sammie Abbott, Chairman Randolph had 

addressed all his questions to white members of the delegation, not to the sole black member, 

Mrs. Ruth Robinson, chairman of the Save the Triangle Committee. Mrs. Robinson was 

attempting to save her black community, located between the Elk and Kanawha Rivers, from 

destruction by construction of a six-lane combined section of I-64 and I-77. 

Chairman Randolph denied the claim and suggested, “you would better serve your cause if you 

gave testimony on the matter about which you came to appear than to –” but Carter interrupted to 

accuse committee leaders of not conducting the hearings fairly. (The transcript shows that 

Chairman Randolph asked Mrs. Robinson several direct questions about her rental home at 

719 Young Street, her work, and family, but that the other white witnesses provided most of the 

information about the situation facing residents of her neighborhood.) [pages 1052-1061; The 

testimony by Mrs. Robinson’s panel is on pages 973-1039]) 

The resulting discussion and the Abbott exchanges prompted the Post to describe the 

appearances as being “sometimes acrimonious.” [Weil, Martin, “Roads Funds Urged for Mass 

Transit,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 21, 1970] 

Secretary Volpe and Administrator Turner testified before the subcommittee on July 16, but 

issues related to the District freeways were not part of the discussion. Director Airis did not 

testify.

The Senate Public Works Committee reported its bill on September 30. It contained a provision 

repealing Section 23: 

The effect of the enactment of this section would be to place the implementation of the 

interstate highway program within the District of Columbia on the same basis as in any 

other State. Repeal would constitute neither approval nor rejection of any particular 

Interstate System segment in the District.

Senator Cooper, the Ranking Republican on the Public Works Committee, had opposed the 

provision in 1968. As one of the conferees resolving differences between the House and Senate 
bills, he had refused to sign the conference report on the bill because of Section 23 and had voted 

against the conference report in the final Senate consideration of the 1968 Act for the same 

reason. Now, he added “Individual Views” to the committee report on its bill. He was, he said, 

“very pleased” that the bill repealed Section 23, which he believed “contradicted the principles of 

federalism underlying the Federal-aid highway program.” He explained: 

In section 23 the Congress for the first time – and the only time to my knowledge –

directly interceded in the process of planning and approving specific projects in the 

Federal-aid highway program . . . . Local initiative and execution is essential. I said in 

1968 that I believed Members of Congress lacked the expertise, experience, and authority 

necessary to determine the need, desirability, location, and design of specific highway 

projects. The major objection which I raised was that the section effectively superseded 

local responsibility and initiative in the District of Columbia and created a dangerous 

precedent for similar action with controversial highways in the several States.

Section 23 had caused “confusion and dismay” in the District and had been misinterpreted to 

mean that construction had to proceed “without regard to any local or Federal laws.” Senator 

Cooper agreed with Judge Wright’s view that the provision caused “discrimination between 

District residents . . . and all other residents affected by highway projects in their localities.”

Instead of resolving the District controversy, “section 23 has inflamed it.”

He appreciated Secretary Volpe’s February 24 report, but the Department of Transportation had 

not considered the Interstate segments in accordance with its own requirements under Title 23. 

“They have, rather, accepted the judgment of Congress, which in this case, in my judgment, is 

neither qualified, nor authorized by law, to make such decisions.” The committee’s bill, in 

repealing Section 23, “expresses the principle . . . that it is not the function of the Congress to 

prescribe and force upon the citizens of a State or the District of Columbia a particular highway 

construction program.” [“Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970,” Report of the Committee on 

Public Works, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 91-1254, September 

30, 1970, pages 25-26, 33-35] 

The House Committee on Public Works addressed the District of Columbia’s freeway impasse in 

Section 129 of the bill, adopted October 2. Section 129 directed the District of Columbia to 

begin work within 30 days of enactment on (1) the East Leg of the Inner Loop, beginning at 

Bladensburg Road, I-295 (section C4.1 to C6); and North-Central and Northeast Freeways, I-95 

(section C7 to C13) and I-70S (section C1 to C2). It repealed authorization for the South leg of 

the Inner Loop past the Lincoln Memorial and the Tidal Basin and removed its designation as 

part of the Interstate System. In addition, the bill called on the District and the Secretary of 

Transportation to study and report to Congress on the North Leg of the Inner Loop in the vicinity 

of K and U Streets, NW-NE., “with respect to that project including alternative routes or plans.” 

The bill also included $65 million for reconstruction of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway to 

Interstate standards, including six lanes. “The Committee expects that the BaltimoreWashington Parkway will be turned over to the State of Maryland after the authorized 

improvements are accomplished.” 
The committee explained in its report that “a balanced transportation system including a rapid 

transit system and a cohesive freeway system is an absolute necessity for the continued viability 

of this community.” The “morass of public agencies and diverse authorities in the city” held 

such divergent views that “meaningful progress” appeared “highly unlikely.” The four projects 

that Section 23 of the 1968 Act directed the District to build “have for the most part been tied up 

in court actions and administrative foot dragging in the District government.” 

Of those projects, the District and the Department of Transportation agreed on only one of them, 

namely the South Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway – the Plan C tunnel link to Independence 

Avenue. For that reason, the committee bill directed deletion of the segment from the Interstate 

System. “The effect of this action is to allow the plan agreed to by the District government and 

the Department of Transportation . . . to be built as a part of I-66 in the vicinity of the Theodore 

Roosevelt Bridge and the Lincoln Memorial.” 

As for the North Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway, the report said, “There should not be any 

limitations on the area to be studied . . . . The potentially disastrous effects on many of the 

businesses on K Street should be given careful consideration . . . .” Joint development of 

housing above the freeway was also to be considered.

Representatives Schwengel and McCarthy, who had objected to Section 23 of the 1968 Act, also 

objected to the provision in the new bill. In “Additional Views,” they said that: 

1. Section 129 violates the House rules governing the jurisdiction of this committee and 

creates a precedent that could be used to attempt to compel the construction of interstate 

highways in cities throughout the United States in the face of citizen opposition. 

2. Section 129 attempts to deprive the District citizens of the right to participate in deciding 

whether interstate highways that drastically affect them should be built.

3. The interstate highway program in the Nation’s Capital will desecrate the city and gravely 

harm its business [sic] and its people. 

4. The interstate highway program in the Nation’s Capital is totally lacking in planning 

justification and is overexpanded [sic] and unnecessary. 

5. Section 129 will provide a basis for continuing to impose upon District citizens an 

interstate highway system they do not want as the price for their support of rapid transit. 

In the course of elaborating on these five points, they urged that, “Congress should not become a 

party to urban suicide in the Nation’s capital.” They cited the Little Report of March 1966 as 

“the only independent review of transportation planning in the District” and it “found pervasive 

shortcomings” in the planning process: 

The recommendations of the Arthur D. Little Report should have been followed. They 

were not followed. There was no valid reason or justification for not following them. 

Imposing these freeways on the District was “a national disgrace.”

Representatives Schwengel and McCarthy also denounced the way the Metro system had been 

“held hostage” for the freeway network. They went through the history of how the city council 
had little choice but to approve the freeway network. The comments at the time of those who 

voted for the resolution “reflect the tragic absence of democracy in the Nation’s Capital.” After 

quoting several of the comments, the Congressmen said of Section 129: 

The blunt truth is that Section 129 of the present bill provides the basis for continued 

blackmail of the District of Columbia. It directs the District to “commence work” on the 

north section of the East Leg of the Inner Loop and the North Central-Northeast Freeway 

within thirty days, regardless of the law and regardless of the needs and wishes of the 

District citizens. It will be the mechanism for holding the Metro System hostage for the 

completion of these destructive freeways. Even if there were a demonstrated need or 

public support for the District Highway Department’s interstate highway program (and 

there is not), we dissent against this disgraceful blackmail of voteless American citizens.

They concluded their dissent: 

Section 129 of H.R. 19504 would impose upon the people of the District of Columbia an 

overexpanded [sic] interstate highway program that is harmful socially, economically and 

esthetically, a highway program that lacks both planning justification and essential 

community support. Section 129 may provide a precedent for equally arbitrary action 

elsewhere in the country. Worst of all, it will provide a basis for the continued blackmail 

of the District by imposing this highway program on its people as the price for rail rapid 

transit. We dissent. [Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Report of the Committee on 

Public Works, House of Representatives to accompany H.R. 19504, 91st Congress, 2d 

Session, House Report No. 91-1554, October 2, 1970, pages 23-24, 94-108] 

Congressional Action on the 1970 Act 

The Senate took up the 1970 Act on October 1 and 2. In describing the provisions of the bill, 

Chairman Randolph came to Section 34 repealing Section 23 of the 1968 Act. Noting that his 

colleagues were well aware of the District’s freeway controversy, he said, “The committee hopes 

these problems can be resolved, and interstate construction can be completed in this growth 

area.” Instead of requiring freeway construction, the committee decided that “highways in the 

District of Columbia should be considered as highways in States in matters of this type, and there 

should not be a mandate by Congress that a road go here or there.” Senate conferees to the 1968 

Act had yielded on Section 23 because if they had not “we would have had no Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1968.” 

Chairman Proxmire of the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia commended Chairman 

Randolph on inclusion of Section 34. Residents of the District should enjoy “the same 

prerogatives with respect to highway construction enjoyed by residents in other localities.” 

Senator Cooper said he recalled the lengthy conference on the 1968 Act and the reason the 

Senate conferees had gone along with Section 23 against his better judgment. Now, the Senate 

had an opportunity to correct that mistake: 
In doing so, we are not attempting to approve or disapprove any segment of a highway 

system in the District of Columbia. We are saying that as a matter of law, as a matter of 

principle, and as a matter of justice to the people of the District of Columbia, Congress 

should not attempt to become highway engineers and impose on the District of Columbia, 

or any State, its idea of a highway system . . . . 

I foresee a very controversial conference with the House. I do not know what will be 

worked out there, but I am very glad that the Senate at least, has expressed its will on this 

subject.

The Senate, on October 2, approved the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, 51 to 0, with 49 

Senators not voting – probably because they were on the campaign trail. [“Federal-Aid Highway 

Act of 1970,” Congressional Record-Senate, October 2, 1970, pages 34732-34733, 34750] 

While Waiting for the 1970 Act 

Stephen Green, writing in the Star, discussed the future of Metro on August 5. He began:

Unless the District freeway controversy is resolved, the Washington area may be left with 

a subway system that served the downtown commercial area but will not reach many 

people. 

Based on available funds, WMATA could build only about 7 miles of the planned Metro system, 

“a far cry from the planned 98-mile regional system.” The funds available included $245 million 

in Federal funds appropriated for FY 1970 and $85 million in local matching funds. “The cost of 

the entire regional system is estimated at $2.5 billion.” 

Judge Sirica’s injunction just 2 days earlier delaying the Three Sisters bridge at least until a 

design public hearing could be held “clouds the freeway picture and contributes to the 

uncertainty over the release of subway money.” Chairman Natcher had not made clear which 

projects the city had to advance before he would release appropriations for the city’s matching 

funds, but “Capitol Hill sources say the required freeways include the bridge and the 

controversial North Central Freeway,” as ordered by Section 23 of the 1968 Act. Observers 

expected the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 to order the city to build the roads. 

Green described the status of Metro construction: 

With contracts already awarded and several to be awarded shortly, the area will have six 

miles of rapid transit line running in a semi-circle between Dupont Circle and Rhode 

Island Avenue NE and an extension running west from Farragut Square, under the 

Potomac River to Rosslyn. 

This network would “provide access between different parts of the commercial area and a 

relatively small . . . residential section of Northeast, [while] hundreds of thousands of commuters 

would be left without rapid transit service.” 
WMATA said it would not advertise additional contracts after August unless Chairman Natcher 

released the city’s matching funds. [Green, Stephen, “7 Miles of Metro Money,” The Evening 

Star, August 5, 1970] 

On August 6, General Graham updated the WMATA board of directors during their weekly 

meeting. Outlining recent events, he said that “one or two or three people [at the White House] 

are working on this actively.” Other sources informed Jack Eisen that “the President’s advisers 

are reluctant to involve Mr. Nixon prematurely.” 

Later in the day, General Graham and Chairman Yeldell appeared before Senator Bible’s 

Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee. Eisen reported that Yeldell and Graham “were 

scarcely settled in their chairs at the Senate hearing before the question of the road impasse was 

raised.” Although the subcommittee was not directly involved in WMATA appropriations, 

Chairman Bible, as one of the authors of the original legislation authorizing rail rapid transit, 

asked about the stalemate. Chairman Yeldell said:

Being a member of the District government, I feel we have complied with the 

’68 Highway Act. It’s well above our heads to handle . . . . The move to break the 

impasse will have to be . . . between the President and the chairman of the House 

Appropriations Subcommittee. 

Chairman Natcher’s decision to withhold District matching funds affected matching funds from 

other sources, with the result that WMATA would have to halt contracting in September. 

They also explained, as Eisen reported, that “on-and-off financing of the subway by Congress 

imperils the sale of $835 million revenue bonds that form a major feature of the 98-mile system’s 

financial plan” for the $2.5 billion system. [Eisen, Jack, “Need for Nixon’s Help On Metro 

Funds Seen,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 7, 1970] 

On September 4, Representative Gude sent a telegram to President Nixon urging him to 

intervene to secure release of the Metro funds. Referring to “continued obstruction” and the 

city’s failure to resolve the impasse, Representative Gude said the situation required White 

House intervention. “I strongly urge such action in order to assure commitments of subway 

money and to prevent further delays and escalating construction costs, if not the total loss of our 

rapid transit system.” [Green, Stephen, “Nixon’s Aid On Subway Fund Asked,” The Evening 

Star, September 5, 1970] 

With Congress planning to recess in October for election campaigning, WMATA officials and 

city officials saw no solution for the funding impasse in the near future. Unless Chairman 

Natcher released the District matching funds by October, the Metro construction schedule would 

have to be revamped. “It’s critical now,” a spokesman said. 

Sources reported that if the city had really wanted to satisfy Chairman Natcher, they would have 

begun construction of the North-Central Freeway. That would, however, have been contrary to 

their own judgment and local opposition. 
City Council Chairman Hahn said he Was “still optimistic” that a solution would be found, 

although he did not know what Chairman Natcher wanted done. Deputy Mayor Watt agreed that 

the city did not know what steps were needed to satisfy the chairman. Mayor Washington 

speculated that Chairman Natcher wanted construction of the freeways to begin “expeditiously.” 

Capitol Hill sources indicated that the price for $34.2 million in Metro matching funds was 

construction of the North-Central Freeway and the East Leg of the Inner Belt Freeway north of 

Bladensburg Road, not the city’s planned parkway. Green explained: 

The city’s recommendation to scrap the North Central has been especially galling to profreeway forces because the construction of it and its Northeast Freeway branch are 

considered essential to Maryland’s plan to build Interstate Route 95 inside the Capital 

Beltway . . . . 

Pro-freeway forces want the East Leg built north of Bladensburg Road and connected 

with the Northeast Freeway to provide a complete express route through the city for 

Interstate Route 95 traffic.

Chairman Natcher, as usual, declined to speak with reporters about the impasse. His 

acquaintances told Green that Chairman Natcher was not allied with the highway lobby, but 

believed the city had an obligation to obey congressional wishes. “He also is reported to feel the 

city misrepresented its intentions about building freeways last year when he agreed to release 

subway funds” after President Nixon assured him the city and the Department of Transportation, 

with help from the Justice Department, would defend freeway construction vigorously in court. 

Pro-freeway forces also were antagonized by the city’s decision to hold a design public hearing 

instead of appealing Judge Sirica’s decision. “They fear freeway foes will take advantage of the 

hearings to interject other issues, besides the design of the bridge, that would delay resumption of 

construction.” Green concluded: 

With no sign of a breakthrough in view, the intervention by Nixon may be the only way 

to obtain release of money and keep subway construction rolling before current financial 

and building plans are doomed. [Green, Stephen, “Metro May Again Be Derailed,” The 

Sunday Star, September 6, 1970] 

Jack Eisen confirmed that chances were “fading fast that Congress will provide the money this 

year to keep Metro construction on schedule,” according to “a key Capitol Hill source.” The 

source thought the impasse could be broken only by presidential intervention. 

Another anonymous Federal official who was trying to break the impasse thought the city might 

try convincing Chairman Natcher that it is vigorously trying to build the freeway network. The 

official added, “That would be uphill sledding.” 

Secretary Volpe, the Capitol Hill source told Eisen, “made the subway financing less likely by 

deciding not to appeal the recent court-ordered halt of work on the Three Sisters Bridge.” City 

officials agreed to the hearing, resulting in a halt to construction: 
This decision opened an unexpected rift between profreeway lawmakers on Capitol Hill 

and equally profreeway officials in the Department of Transportation. 

Although Secretary Volpe’s advisers agreed with his decision, the lawmakers thought the case 

should have been appealed and taken to the Supreme Court if necessary. “They see the case as a 

test of the constitutional role of Congress as the lawmaking body for the District of Columbia.” 

The anonymous source added: 

Moreover, Natcher is understood to feel that President Nixon violated his public pledge 

of last year to provide[a] full and vigorous defense of all lawsuits challenging the road 

system. This, according to his purported view, would include full appeal. 

The result was “a backstage debate among prohighway officials over the best strategy to get the 

road program moving again.” 

If the impasse could not be broken, WMATA would have to drop its program from the planned 

$376 million in FY 1971 to $178 million: 

Of this drop, $135 million would be in revenue bonds that the Metro hopes to sell and 

repay from future fare collections . . . . Metro officials privately acknowledge that they 

are nervous over their ability to market these bonds if the uncertainty over congressional 

appropriations persists. 

The only remaining legislative vehicle for the $34.2 million in District matching funds was the 

supplemental appropriation bill, but if it were not passed by the current Congress, the bill would 

die, and the next Congress would have to decide whether to pursue it and how to address the 

freeway-Metro impasse. [Eisen, Jack, “Construction Delay Likely On Subway,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, September 11, 1970; Eisen, Jack, “Natcher Holds D.C. Subway Hostage 

to Freeway Program,” News Analysis, The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 13, 

1970] 

As noted earlier, the House Subcommittee on Roads approved its bill on the Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1970 on September 16. Section 129 ordered the city to build the North-Central 

Freeway and the East Leg Freeway north of Bladensburg Road, as well as deleting the South Leg 

from the Interstate System and ordering a study of the North Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway. 

Chairman Kluczynski said the city must build the North-Central Freeway if it wanted Congress 

to approve appropriation of $34.2 million for Metro construction: 

If the District government doesn’t want to do it, there won’t be any subway system. 

I love this city and I’m trying to do what’s best for it. I can’t understand why the city 

council and mayor have listened to a Communist like Sammie Abbott and refused to 

build the freeway. [Green, Stephen, “Order Central Freeway Built, Hill Unit Asks,” The 

Evening Star, September 16, 1970] 

Councilman Yeldell, chairman of WMATA’s board of directors, was asked about the NorthCentral Freeway while appearing on WTOP’s “Washington News Conference” to be broadcast 

on September 20. He said that if the city council had no choice but to vote for the freeway to 
obtain subway funds, he would resign. If that situation arose, the local government would cease 

to exist. “It’s just not a matter of a freeway anymore . . . the people of D.C. are very tired of 

getting pushed around by whims of Congress.” The government would no longer be “viable” if 

ordered to build the freeway. “I made my capitulation on August 9, 1969 . . . . I don’t plan to 

again.” As for the possibility that the impasse might scare off investors in Metro bonds, he said, 

“If I were an investor, I wouldn’t buy the bonds under the present circumstances.” [Green, 

Stephen, “Yeldell Says He’ll Resign If Forced to Vote Freeway,” The Sunday Star, 

September 20, 1970] 

Secretary Volpe was in Boston on September 21, 1970, for the annual meeting of the American 

Transit Association. In response to a question during a press conference, he revealed that he was 

again acting to break the impasse over Metro funding. In his first comments since the House 

Subcommittee on Roads approved its bill with Section 129, he said he and Administrator Turner 

had met on September 18 with Mayor Washington and other city officials in an attempt to 

resolve differences between the subcommittee and the city on the North-Central Freeway. He 

also was reaching out to members of the Committee on Public Works. 

Eisen reported that Secretary Volpe ruled out dropping the North-Central Freeway from the plan, 

but thought there might be room to change its route or design. “It’s got to be built somewhere,” 

he said, “but you just can’t slam it through without proper consideration.” 

Given the “delicate stage of the negotiations,” Secretary Volpe was hesitant to get into details. 

“It would do little good to comment . . . on how and what we’re coming up with.” 

In a Washington press conference the same day, Chairman Hahn said the city had complied with 

Section 23 of the 1968 Act. As far as the city council was concerned, the North-Central Freeway 

was dead. If Congress ordered it built, he would not even call for a vote; it could not be 

approved. The city, he said, already was in compliance with Section 23, having recommended 

deleting the North-Central Freeway from the Interstate System and replacing it with the Industrial 

Highway.

As he spoke, Sammie Abbott took over the microphone to tell Hahn that “no freeways can be 

built in the District of Columbia without Council approval. They have the power to tell Congress 

you can’t build these freeways.” He also took the opportunity to challenge Councilman Yeldell’s 

statement that he would resign before he would vote for the North-Central Freeway even if it 

meant securing the subway funds. “He should not say that he is going to resign. He should say 

we are going to mobilize . . . the council members should fight or get out.” ECTC was planning 

a rally at noon on Saturday, September 26, to protest Section 129. The rally was part of ECTC’s 

efforts to “force the City Council to catch up with the city.” 

Chairman Hahn did not respond to Abbott, but after the press conference told reporters that under 

the 1968 Act, the city council had to vote on the freeway plan. He added, “If Congress wants to 

build a freeway, the Council is powerless to stop it.” [Eisen, Jack, “Volpe Seeks to Break 

Roads-Metro Impasse,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 22, 1970; Basham, 

William, “Can’t Stop Freeway, Hahn Says,” The Evening Star, September 21, 1970] 
Broyhill and the 1970 Revenue Act 

Mayor Washington, Deputy Mayor Watt, and other city officials testified before a subcommittee 

of the House District of Columbia Committee on September 22 to discuss the city’s revenue 

proposals. The proposals included an increase in the city’s gas tax to help pay for the freeway 

program. (The official titles of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner were used throughout 

the hearing rather than the informal Mayor and Deputy Mayor.) 

In a discussion of sewage disposal, Representative Gude observed that “this upper Potomac 

intersection relief sewer is not going to be finished, and we are going to get raw sewage 

overflows in the Georgetown area, until we have the completion of the Potomac River Freeway 

plans.” He added that at the rate of freeway construction in the city, “that sewage overflow is 

liable to go on for a number of years.” 

Representative Broyhill took this opportunity to ask if Commissioner Washington was required 

by the 1968 Act to secure city council approval to comply with Section 23. The commissioner 

explained that the city was in compliance with Section 23, having acted on every freeway cited in 

the legislation: 

[E]very link that is in the 1968 act is being acted upon except those that are constrained 

by litigation, the bridge itself, the Three Sisters Bridge, and we have a contract ready for 

the east leg, which we have been enjoined from moving on. The matter of the north 

central, which has come forward, is one that was not in the 1968 act in the sense of it 

being built. The Congress asked us to “study an alternative.” We did present an 

alternative, which was one that involved a link going from the east leg presumably under 

or at some point developed under the arboretum into New York Avenue, with existing 

street lines going as an alternative.

He recognized that the House Committee on Public Works was working on a bill that would 

require construction of the North-Central Freeway, and that litigation was involved, “but I think 

we have to distinguish between whether we are in compliance, which I think we are, and our 

lawyers indicate we are, as between something else that the Congress may wish.”

Representative Broyhill pointed out that Chairman Natcher did not agree with the city’s 

interpretation. Further, the Virginia Congressman was sympathetic to people, whether in the 

District or his own district along I-66, who have to move to make way for a freeway, but “at 

some point the Congress feels that this should move.” He asked what Commissioner 

Washington thought Congress should do “at this point, in order to move this freeway along? 

Should they let Interstate 95 just die and not come into the Nation’s Capital?” 

Commissioner Washington replied that, “We talked on the one hand about not driving people out 

of the City, and where we take a route that goes right through one of our better tax paying 

neighborhoods.” Without going into the history, he noted that the freeway “ended up over in an 

area that happened to be primarily black, of substantial homeowners.” As required by the 1968 

Act, the city made a study, found a viable alternative to the North-Central Freeway, and offered it 
to Congress. “What I am trying to say is that the difference is the difference in terms of what the 

Congress wants now, not whether or not we have complied.” 

Chairman Fuqua asked what the city was doing to expedite judicial review. Commissioner 

Washington explained that Judge Sirica had issued an injunction until the city complied with the 

public hearing requirements on the design and addressed the questions about the safety of the 

approved design. The city decided to hold the hearing, tentatively scheduled for November 17, 

instead of going through “a long process of appeal to the Court of Appeals.” The city “felt the 

straightest way here is to follow what the Court has suggested.” 

The current city government, he said, inherited the freeway map and the attendant problems. 

“There is a problem . . . about protecting the local interests based on what local determination 

amounts to. That is inherent, and in my opinion something that locally we ought to have some 

arm room on.” If Congress determines by statute that the city must do something, “then I think 

the question is no longer relevant. We do that, but until that point, Mr. Chairman, I am saying 

that there has to be some kind of local consideration.” Every other district in the country has 

some say in where roads are built.

Representative Broyhill disagreed that the city had not been given adequate consideration. 

Congress recognized the relocation problem by including a major provision in the 1968 Act on 

that subject. That same legislation asked the city to consider alternative locations for the NorthCentral Freeway. “You say you complied with it, but you actually came up with the same plan 

that had been previously rejected prior to 1968, and thus found unacceptable as a part of the 

Interstate System.” The Transportation Board of the COG had turned down the Industrial 

Freeway “and I understand that the Bureau of Public Roads does not feel that it is either 

economically feasible or practical to build it where you had selected.”

When Commissioner Washington disagreed, Representative Broyhill said he had talked with 

Chairman Natcher and members of the Committee on Public Works about the suggested 

alternative. He would think that Commissioner Washington or other city officials would be in 

“constant communication with Mr. Natcher” to “find out where the misunderstanding happens to 

exist, because we are not getting anywhere by you and your advisers saying, ‘Well, I have 

complied’ and yet the Congress says you have not complied.” He added, “In the meantime, we 

don’t have any highways.” 

Commissioner Washington, clearly annoyed, replied: 

Mr. Broyhill, don’t you think we have done just that, tried to find out, where no one has 

told us, specifically now where we are not in compliance, and I say that today no one in 

this Congress or any place else has told us where we are not in compliance.

Representative Broyhill said that the Public Works and Appropriations Committees indicated 

that the city had not come up with an alternative that is satisfactory.

Commissioner Washington thought that observation proved his point: 
Oh, that is different. That is different. Isn’t that different than not complying? What 

they are saying is that that alternative which was written into the bill is not the one that is 

acceptable to the Congress.

They disagreed about whether the Industrial Freeway had been rejected before 1968, but 

Representative Broyhill moved on by disagreeing with the idea that the District of Columbia was 

not being given the same consideration as other communities. Congress, he said, would have 

moved on the freeway issue “long ago if they were not very much concerned with the interests of 

the property owners of the District of Columbia.” 

Commissioner Washington said again that it was a matter of local determination. The city came 

up with an alternative to the North-Central Freeway along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, but 

Congress apparently does not agree with that alternative. “You say it isn’t acceptable, and that is 

a different point than whether we are complying.” He added that the people in the path of the 

North-Central Freeway “were hard-working taxpayers with small houses which they could not 

easily replace, who had been there for some years, and they are the bone of the entire city, and 

this was the interest here.”

Representative Broyhill said that every city was in the same situation as the District of Columbia 

because BPR “had to be satisfied with the proposed locations.” The plans had to meet 

engineering and cost standards, leading to continuous back-and-forth adjustments. “We are just 

far behind, that’s all.” 

Commissioner Washington reiterated his point about the difference between compliance and 

disagreement. He said, “You may disagree with my kind of statement but here is the kind of 

thing that always hits the voteless.”

When Representative Broyhill disagreed that a misunderstanding had occurred, Commissioner 

Washington asked: 

Then what are we faced with? Everything that we have going, including the subway 

which all of us need, is held hostage. The Revenue bill you are talking about is holding 

that hostage. Now, where else do you apply that standard in America? 

Commissioner Washington was referring to Representative Broyhill’s introduction of an 

amendment to the bill to prohibit release of the Federal payment to the city until it complied with 

Section 23 of the 1968 Act and any other conditions Congress may impose, starting with 

construction of the North-Central Freeway.

Representative Broyhill observed, “Well this, of course, is the Nation’s Capital,” to which 

Commissioner Washington said, “I know that.” The Congressman continued by pointing out 

Federal funds going to the city, adding, “and, of course, we are financing a subway system at a 

much higher Federal contribution rate than in any place else in the United States.” Meanwhile, 

the city was lagging behind other jurisdictions. “How much longer do you think the Congress 

should wait before they commence?” 
Commissioner Washington suggested “we should work together” because they “want the same 

things . . . and hold out for this partnership to be all-embracing.” If there are differences, they 

could work them out. “I am for that,” but the Congressman replied: 

We have the plan that you submitted that was rejected prior to 1968, and the North 

Central Freeway plan that you rejected, so we have those two extremes. That is all we 

have. We have nothing in between, so at what point do we move forward? 

The commissioner said the city was moving forward on every section of freeway it could, subject 

to litigation, except for the North-Central Freeway.

Representative Broyhill pointed out that neither the Public Works Committee nor the 

Appropriations Committee thought the city had complied with Section 23. Commissioner 

Washington pointed out that the city was talking with Secretary Volpe, who would help answer 

some of the questions. “I don’t know whether they will fully resolve it,” but the commissioner 

was hoping for more of a partnership to come out of the discussions. “My concern is that I still 

don’t know where we are not complying.” 

Then, Representative Broyhill observed, since the city felt it had complied, the city should not 

object to his amendment holding up the Federal payment pending compliance with the 1968 Act. 

 “You feel that you should comply with that Act, don’t you?” 

Commissioner Washington said: 

I think not only should; would. I have questions just like the President of the United 

States may have questions, but when an Act is passed we intend to comply. 

As the discussion of the freeway impasse neared an end, Representative Broyhill talked about his 

amendment. No one wanted to hold up the Federal payment to the city, and maybe his 

amendment would not be adopted in the final revenue act: 

We are going to authorize a payment because we feel it is needed, but maybe what will be

accomplished by this type of amendment is to give a little higher priority to this freeway 

construction and thus to clear up this confusion. There is no question in my mind but 

[that] reasonable men can get together and work out a solution. So, it is not that we want 

to hold up the Federal payment, nor that we want the District Government to do 

something that is improper or unfair, but we must bring this deadlock to an end. That is 

where we stand right now and it is not good. You don’t like it, and the committee doesn’t 

like it.

He asked if the commissioner wanted to place a bet on whether the language would end up in the 

bill. The commissioner declined to bet, although he would prefer the language not be included 

“and depend upon good faith between partners.” But, the Congressman pointed out, since the 

city was going to comply, what difference would it make if the amendment were enacted. In that 

case, the commissioner said, “I could just reverse the question and say if I am going to comply 

why do you put it in there.” The Congressman answered: 
Because you haven’t complied yet. I think, frankly, that between you, the Secretary of 

Transportation, and Mr. Natcher and Mr. Kluczynski, this thing will be resolved in the 

not too distant future. You have some people in the District of Columbia who don’t want 

a highway at all. You are not going to please everybody, I can’t do it in my District and 

nobody else can either, but at some point we are going to have to do what we feel is right, 

and if you feel that way also . . . . We just have to resolve this problem and we should do 

it right away. This is all we are trying to do. [Revenue Proposals, Hearings Before 

Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the District of Columbia, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 91st Congress, 2d Session, September 17, 22, 23, and 28, 1970, 

pages 143-150] 

When Chairman Hahn appeared before the subcommittee on September 23, Representative 

Broyhill raised the freeway issue again. They went through some of the same issues as the day 

before with Mayor Washington, but the Congressman said he disagreed with the mayor that the 

city had complied with the 1968 Act. Further, in view of Mayor Washington’s claim that no one 

had told him how the city had failed to comply, Representative Broyhill had compiled a list of 

the ways:

Since the Commissioner doesn’t seem to agree that you are in noncompliance, and says in 

fact that you are in compliance, and yet the Congress does not agree, I felt that somebody 

had better put these facts together so we could use this as a working paper, a fact sheet, 

and he can check it right back or you can check it back with the Appropriations 

Committee and Public Works Committee and see if this is in accord with what they feel 

is noncompliance. 

He provided the list to Chairman Hahn: 

The District of Columbia has not been in compliance with the 1968 Highway Act at any 

time since passage of the Act.

From August, 1968 to August, 1969 the District Government position was outright 

refusal to comply. 

From August, 1969 when actions of the D.C. Government and written assurances from 

the President of the United States implied that the freeway system would proceed, to early 

in June of 1970 (when House action again deleted transit funds) the D.C. Government has 

been in non-compliance in the following areas:

Feb, 1970 – D.C. adopted and submitted to Congress a plan which had been rejected 

in its most essential points by the Transportation Planning Board in February, 1969. 

Such a plan requires approval of that Board under Section 134 of Title 23, United 

States Code. D.C. Government never submitted its 1970 plan to the Board and made 

no attempts to coordinate its plan with the areas outside the District of Columbia 

boundary. 
Feb. 1970 – The D.C. plan for the East Leg of the Inner Loop recommends a tunnel 

through the Arboretum which is in direct conflict with the direction in Section 23(b) 

of the 1968 Highway Act to construct the East Leg as far as Bladensburg Road in 

accordance with the plan contained in the 1968 Interstate Cost Estimate. There has 

never been any engineering study whatsoever of the route recommended by the D.C. 

Government for this East Leg routing, and it was further quite obviously never the 

intent of Congress that the route should penetrate the Arboretum in such a manner.

Feb.-March, 1970 – D.C. Government after advertising a contract and receiving 

proper bids with an acceptable low bidder for the East Leg of the Inner Loop north of 

Barney Circle refused to award the contract during a 60-day period when award could 

have been made. At the end of the 60-day period the courts stopped any contract on 

the project.

May, 1970 – D.C. Government still had not begun design work on the East Leg 

between Benning Road and Bladensburg Road. Section 23(b) of the 1968 Act 

required this work to start within 30 days of the August 23, 1968, enactment date. 

(This work has subsequently started). 

May, 1970 – D.C. Government was still seeking agreement with the National Park 

Service on the plan for the East Leg between Barney Circle and Benning Road which 

was directed to be under design by the 1968 Act. 

An additional item which begs the question of whether the D.C. Government has any real 

intent to carry out in its entirety Section 23(a) of the 1968 Highway Act lies in the fact 

that the reports of the Department of Transportation and the District Government are 

completely different except for a single project, the South Leg. There was obviously no 

cooperation between the two as was anticipated in the Act.

The most recent occurrence of bad faith on the part of the District of Columbia was the 

failure to appeal the Court [decision] on the Three Sisters Bridge. Written assurances to 

the Congress from the President indicating that all would “vigorously defend” any lawsuit 

have certainly not been complied with. 

In summary, the District of Columbia Government has obviously not made any attempt to 

vigorously pursue the construction of the Interstate System in the District of Columbia as 

spelled out in the 1968 Act but has rather taken reasonable opportunity to either drag its 

feet or inject confusion into the issue. Any reasonable definition of conformance with the 

Act would begin with a sincere effort to undertake all elements outlined in the Act until 

they are carried out – this the District has not done. 

Chairman Hahn took issue with the list, which he was seeing for the first time. They discussed 

some of the points, but Representative Broyhill concluded the discussion because other 

scheduled witnesses were waiting to testify. He summarized:
I just want the subway started now instead of next year. I think every month or every day 

we delay this project will cost us a great deal more money. It is not my intention nor the 

intention of any Member of this committee that the District Government be denied any 

funds for any purpose for which it really needs them. We just want to accelerate – and 

I am repeating this for emphasis – that getting together that you are going to have to do. 

I want to be your “squeakiest” axle, so that you will get together and resolve these 

differences, because I bet you the greater part of this misunderstanding is due to lack of 

communication. I don’t think contact has been to the extent that the Commissioner 

pointed out yesterday. 

Chairman Hahn offered to answer each point, adding, “If I paid as much attention to my practice 

[of law] as I have to studying this freeway situation I am sure I would be a wealthier man.” 

Representative Broyhill declined the offer, saying he preferred that the city address the points 

with the Committee on Public Works. [pages 153-176] 

Not Quite Finishing The 1970 Act

On September 2, 1970, the Star’s Stephen Green reviewed the question that had been raised 

about the safety of the design chosen for the Three Sisters Bridge. He reminded readers that 

Administrator Turner had “expressed doubt as to the safety of the present design planned for the 

bridge that calls for the main span to run suspended in air for about 740 feet between two 

supporting piers near each bank of the river.” 

As noted earlier, FHWA’s concerns had been addressed. Officials pointed out that similar 

structures had been built in other countries. The New York firm that designed the bridge said 

that Europeans had “built many such structures and have indicated they will offer their 

construction expertise to contractors if they’d desire it.” 

Director Airis also was satisfied that the design was safe:

But he said one or more alternate designs, possibly calling for more than two supporting 

piers, may be presented at the hearing now tentatively scheduled for Nov. 17 . . . . 

Turner’s office will have to give its approval to any bridge design selected by the highway 

department after the public hearing. [Green, Stephen, “New 3 Sisters Bridge Design 

Weighed,” The Evening Star, September 2, 1970] 

On September 23, the Star reported that President Nixon had designated Secretary Volpe to seek 

a settlement to obtain release of $34.2 million in District matching funds for Metro. As noted 

earlier, Secretary Volpe had already entered into behind-the-scenes discussions with the city and 

on Capitol Hill. According to an aide to Secretary Volpe, he had been in regular contact with the 

White House to discuss the impasse. [Green, Stephen, “Nixon Asks Volpe to Act in Metro 

Row,” The Evening Star, September 23, 1970] 

On September 24, the House Committee on Public Works approved a bill for the Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1970. It included a provision requiring the city to build the North-Central 

Freeway and the I-95/Northeast Freeway, with work to begin on both freeways “not later than 
30 days after the date of enactment of this act.” As discussed earlier, the bill also eliminated the 

South Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway and called for a new study of the North Leg. [Moore, Irna, 

“House Unit Backs City Freeway Bill,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 24, 

1970] 

Mayor Washington and City Council Chairman Hahn held a joint press conference on 

September 25 to clarify their views on the North-Central Freeway. In a joint statement, they 

argued: 

The City Council . . . and the mayor have approved a comprehensive freeway system for 

the District [that] is acceptable to its citizens and approved by the officials appointed to 

direct them. This system does not include a North Central Freeway. 

Hahn said, “Freeways exercise such a dominating influence on the life of the city that the choice 

of location of freeways must be in the hands of the people who live in those cities and those 

governing officials who direct them.” 

The two leaders were, they said, unalterably opposed to the project. At best, Congress should not 

force construction until the study recommended by Secretary Volpe had been completed. Mayor 

Washington declined to say what he would do if Congress required construction with subway 

funds at risk. Such a question was, he said, “speculative.” 

Shortly after the press conference, they learned that the Senate Committee on Public Works had 

acted on its 1970 Act bill that included a provision repealing Section 23 of the 1968 Act. Senate 

committee members understand that their House counterparts had included a measure in their bill 

calling for construction of the freeway network. The Post reported: 

Yesterday’s decision by the Senate Committee was seen as an attempt to prevent a 

recurrence of the 1968 conference by providing ammunition that the Senate conferees 

could bring to this year’s negotiations with the House. [Green, Stephen, “Don’t Demand 

Freeway, D.C. Asks Congress,” The Evening Star, September 25, 1970; Moore, Irna, 

“Road Act Repeal Backed,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 26, 

1970] 

ECTC staged a protest on the east steps of the Capitol on Saturday, September 27, urging citizens 

to engage in civil disobedience to block the North-Central Freeway. Stephen Green described the 

scene:

More than 150 freeway foes sat on the east steps of the Capitol for two hours. They were 

told they may have to be willing to break laws and face jail to prevent city officials from 

agreeing to build the freeway, which would run through Northeast Washington to Silver 

Spring. 

As curious tourists watched, the freeway foes waved signs and sang protest songs in the 

hot sun . . . . 
Julius Hobson called Mayor Washington “a make-believe mayor” and called the city council 

“spineless.” He predicted they would “knuckle under to Congress.” Freeway foes would “have 

to go to jail to show it’s not a game.” Charles Cassell added that they must “demonstrate a lack 

of respect for the fascist system.”

Sammie Abbott told the crowd, “It will have to be the power of the people in the streets” if the 

city council did not prevent freeway construction.” He announced that ECTC planned to lobby 

Congress on October 7. 

Representative Gude said in a statement that he opposed holding District revenue “hostage to 

construction of the North Central,” calling Representative Broyhill’s amendment to that effect 

“blackmail.” Congressional action, he added, to force construction of the North-Central Freeway 

was “impractical” in view of uncertainty about the Maryland portion of the road. 

The night before, appearing on WRC’s “Community Timeline,” Representative Broyhill had said 

that he and other area representatives would send a letter to President Nixon requesting a meeting 

to discuss the situation. “We’re at an impasse, obviously,” he said. [Green, Stephen, 

“Resistance Urged to Bar Freeway,” The Sunday Star, September 27, 1970] 

When Congress adjourned on October 14 for the 1970 mid-term elections, the House had not 

acted on its bill, H.R. 19504. Unless Congress returned after the election for a lame-duck 

session, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 was dead. 

Trying to Advance Metro

Within an hour after Congress adjourned on October 14, 1970, Secretary Volpe announced that 

he was offering a 6-month loan of $57 million to keep Metro construction moving forward 

despite congressional efforts to delay appropriations because of the freeway impasse. In a 

statement, he said:

I am today directing the urban mass transportation administrator, Carlos C. Villarreal, to 

entertain an application for an emergency loan . . . to enable the Metro program to go 

forward uninterrupted by confusion and controversy over particular freeway projects.. 

The loan would allow Metro to stay on schedule while, city officials hoped, the congressional 

fund impasse was resolved in a lame-duck session after the election. With the loan, WMATA 

would be able to continue awarding construction contracts through November. 

Secretary Volpe said that he was acting “at the personal direction of President Nixon” to resolve 

the impasse. President Nixon had not personally approved the loan, but Secretary Volpe had 

cleared the plan with OMB. Although the Secretary’s aides said they had checked with key 

Members of Congress prior to the announcement, Chairman Natcher “was reported to be angry 

over the arrangement.” Before leaving Washington, he had called OMB to lodge a sharp protest, 

but had not connected with a ranking official. 

The offer came after secret talks between Metro Board Chairman Yeldell and Secretary Volpe. 

Yeldell told the board that the loan would be repaid at 6-percent interest. He added, however, 
that the interest could be wiped out if the board invested the principal at a 7-percent annual rate 

until it was needed to pay contractors. 

Metro General Manager Graham had not been informed of the talks because, as Jack Eisen 

reported, his “long service as an Army Corps of Engineers general and his continuing ties with 

key lawmakers imbued him too closely with the congressional view of political wisdom.” In 

fact, Graham would have recommended that the board reject the offer, but he was not asked for 

his views: 

The political risks in the loan scheme were not even discussed by the board until a 

reporter asked a question and Metro director Carlton R. Sickles, a former Maryland 

congressman, acknowledged that they existed. 

The main risk is that Congress, ever jealous of its prerogatives, will respond to Volpe’s 

end run by stiffening its refusal to grant the funds that are now being withheld from the 

Metro. It could also bedevil some programs in Volpe’s Department of Transportation. 

Should this occur, the Transit Authority might find itself in the predicament of owing 

$57 million plus $1.7 million interest to the Department of Transportation next spring but 

having no money to repay it.

On October 15, WMATA approved acceptance of the loan and directed General Graham to file 

the application with UMTA. Yeldell cautioned, “We all think this will be a key to the resolution 

of the impasse, but it shouldn’t be mistaken for a resolution of the impasse.” 

Later in the day, President Nixon’s press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, announced that OMB had 

approved the loan. 

[Valentine, Paul W., “Subway Funds Offered,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 

15, 1970; Eisen, Jack, “Subway Loan Is Accepted,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

October 16, 1970; Green, Stephen, “Subway Board Accepts Offer Of U.S. Loan,” The Evening 

Star, October 15, 1970; Green, Stephen, “White House Approves $57 Million Metro Loan,” The 

Evening Star, October 16, 1970; Eisen, Jack, “Volpe Gambles on Metro Loan,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, October 19, 1970] 

Election Transitions 

Part of the city’s optimism stemmed from the fact that on September 15, 1970, Chairman Fallon 

had lost his primary election to State Delegate Paul S. Sarbanes and would be leaving Congress 

in January 1971. 

Following the first Earth Day in April 1970, environmentalists had compiled a list of “The Dirty 

Dozen” Members of Congress based on their environmental records. Chairman Fallon was the 

most prominent name on the list. He had been Chairman since January 1965 of the Public Works 

Committee, which the environmentalists referred to as the Pork Committee. His hometown of 

Baltimore had long-running controversies over its Interstate routes, including I-70 through 

Leakin Park and a stable minority community and a planned I-95 bridge across the Patapsco 
River overlooking historic Fort McHenry. The environmentalists cited his opposition to the use 

of Highway Trust Fund revenue for mass transit as one example of why he was a “tool of the 

highway lobby.” 

In the Democratic primary, Delegate Sarbanes attacked Fallon for his age, 68, and health, 

remoteness from his constituents, close ties with the highway lobby, and support for the Vietnam 

War. After losing the primary, a bewildered Fallon said, “I used to be complimented on the great 

job I was doing for the highway program. Now that is the thing that is used against me.” As 

Fortune magazine pointed out: 

Flushed with their success at knocking off the powerful Fallon, environmentalists have 

gone on to organize the Highway Action Coalition at the national level to eliminate the 

federal highway trust fund or stretch the uses to which it can be put. [Cameron, Juan, 

“How the Interstate Changed the Face of the Nation,” Fortune, July 1971, p. 31] 

Further, the ranking Republican on the Public Works Committee, Representative Cramer, who 

had worked closely with Chairmen Fallon and Natcher on District freeway issues, had not run for 

reelection. Instead, he ran for the seat held by retiring Senator Spessard Holland, but lost in the 

general election.

In Maryland, Democratic Senator Tydings lost his reelection bid to Republican Representative J. 

Glenn Beall, Jr., whose father had held the seat before Tydings. As the Star put it:

Beall, 43, received massive aid from the Nixon administration including campaign visits 

by both the President and Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. 

“I think the White House helped – considerably,” Beall said in his victory statement.

But the deciding factor, it appeared, was the degree of anti-Tydings sentiment in 

Maryland – antagonism toward the outspoken 43-year-old liberal which did not show up 

in pre-election polls that consistently showed Tydings out in front of Beall. 

Other Maryland Democrats, including Governor Mandell, won reelection. Senator Tydings 

conceded, “I guess I was just too liberal . . . or at least they thought I was.” Much of the 

opposition came from gun rights advocates who opposed his efforts to tighten gun controls. Gun 

groups had distributed bumper stickers reading: “If Tydings Wins – You Lose.” As a result, the 

worst thing about his loss was, he said, that, “I suppose it will discourage others from taking on 

the gun lobby.” [Angle, Martha, “Beall Brings Home the Seat His Father Lost to Tydings,” The 

Evening Star, November 4, 1970] 

Among the Senators who also lost their reelection bids was Democratic Senator Albert Gore, 

who had collaborated with Representative Fallon in crafting the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 

1956 that launched the Interstate program. Senator Yarborough, the father of Section 4(f), lost 

his reelection bid in Texas.

Speaker of the House McCormack had not sought reelection. He wanted to spend time with his 

ailing wife of over 50 years. They had lived in a three-room apartment in the Hotel Washington 
at 515 15th Street, NW., but he would stay with her in Washington’s Providence Hospital until 

her death a year later.

Majority Leader Albert of Oklahoma would become Speaker of the House in the 92nd Congress. 

In 1968, Montgomery County, Maryland, had approved a change in the county charter to create a 

position of county executive whose powers would be similar to a mayor. County Councilman 

James P. Gleason, who had been WMATA’s first chairman, announced his candidacy for the 

post. In late September 1970, he announced that he would remain on the council, but would 

resign from several posts, including the WMATA board, to devote more time to his campaign. 

In a letter to County Council President Avis Birely, Gleason wrote, “I do not want this action to 

be construed . . . as lessening my complete dedication and support of the implementation of the 

mass transit system.” However, the post of county executive was “far too important to give less 

than my full attention to the campaign other than my regular county council responsibilities.” 

On September 23, the Montgomery County Council elected President Birely to replace Gleason 

on the WMATA board. 

Now, in the first county executive election, Gleason was the victor in a tight race. He took office 

on December 7. The county council consisted entirely of Democrats. [Taaffe, William, 

“Gleason Quits Transit Posts To Campaign,” The Evening Star, September 23, 1970; 

“Mrs. Birely Gets Transit Job,” The Evening Star, September 24, 1970; Greenhalgh Concedes in 

Montgomery,” The Evening Star, November 9, 1970] 

Another election affecting the District would not take place until March 1971. On September 23, 

1970, President Nixon had signed a bill giving the District its first elected congressional 

representative since 1875 (P.L. 91-405). The winner of the election would be a nonvoting 

delegate to the House of Representatives. President Nixon had proposed the arrangement in 

April 1969, when he called it a step in an “orderly” road to self-government. 

Ultimately, it was thought, an amendment to the Constitution would be needed to give the city a 

vote in Congress or change the concept that Congress was the city’s legislature. The bill 

President Nixon approved also authorized establishing a 12-person commission on organization 

of the District’s government. The commission would study the arrangement of the present city 

government to “determine what changes are necessary” to “promote economy, efficiency, and 

improved service in the transaction of the public business in the departments, bureaus, agencies, 

boards, commissions, offices, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the District of 

Columbia.” 

The commission was nicknamed a “Little Hoover Commission,” after a commission headed by 

former President Herbert Hoover that had advised Presidents Truman and Eisenhower on 

government organization. Although District officials were not enthusiastic about the Little 

Hoover Commission, they were elated about the provision establishing a nonvoting House 

delegate – as a first step. 
Mayor Washington was initially seen as the leading candidate for the District’s first delegate, but 

in November he announced he would not run. In announcing his decision on November 14, he 

cited the District’s fiscal condition as the reason. He was focused on working with Congress to 

secure additional funds for the city; he did not want to divert attention to raising funds for an 

election campaign. He did not endorse anyone for the position, but said, “He should be someone 

who is committed, who understands the dynamics, who is going to work as a team.” 

With the mayor out of the running, Councilman Yeldell, chairman of WMATA, became the 

leading candidate. He had not announced his candidacy, but was seeking financial backing for a 

run. 

On November 30, Yeldell announced his candidacy for delegate while submitting a letter to 

President Nixon resigning from the city council. He said that home rule would be one of his top 

priorities as delegate. He had some connections on Capitol Hill, but said, “it makes [no] sense 

for the District’s delegate . . . to march to the Hill boasting of a host of friends in Congress.” The 

District’s congressional friends were in the minority. “Look at our schools, our housing, our 

unemployment, our public services, our courts, our crime rate, our revenue . . . and I’m sure you 

will agree with me that the District needs many, many new friends.”

His resignation from the city council automatically removed him WMATA’s board of directors. 

On December 3, Councilman Moore took over for Yeldell on WMATA’s board. Because the 

District had the chairmanship in 1970, the board elected Councilman Moore its chairman for the 

remainder of the year.

[Prince, Richard E., “D.C. Delegate Bill Signed by Nixon,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, September 23, 1970; Grigg, William, “District if Cool to Prospect Of Little Hoover 

Commission,” The Sunday Star, September 13, 1970; Kalb, Barry, “Mayor Won’t Be a 

Candidate For Delegate, Yeldell to Run,” The Sunday Star, November 15, 1970; Anders, 

Michael, “Yeldell Quits Council, Enters Delegate Race,” The Evening Star, November 30, 1970; 

Grigg, William, “Moore Follows Yeldell As WMATA Chairman,” The Evening Star, December 

3, 1970] 

The 1970 Lame Duck Session

Congress returned to Washington for a lame duck session on November 16, the first held since 

the early 1950s. Most of the members who had lost their reelection bids returned to complete the 

91st Congress. A few who lost or retired resigned to allow their successors to fill out the term, 

thus gaining credit toward seniority in the next Congress. 

The Washington area had its share of pending bills, but overall, Congress would be focused on 

other issues. The Star listed the top issues:

Senators first plan to tackle three difficult issues left hanging when they adjourned in 

October: The women’s rights constitutional amendment, the farm bill and a labor-sought 

industrial job safety measures.
In the House, a restrictive trade bill and a manpower training bill which includes a big 

program of public service jobs are expected to trigger floor fights. 

With the session expected to last about 5 weeks, Congress would have time to consider the 

District freeway-subway impasse, but it was not most urgent business. [Bullen, Dana, “Party 

Line Battles Set In Congress,” The Sunday Star, November 15, 1970] 

On November 13, 1970, the District of Columbia and the Virginia State Highway Commission 

published notice of plans to hold a joint DESIGN PUBLIC HEARING on proposed Interstate 

266 (capitalization in the original) in the Department of Commerce Auditorium on 14th Street, 

NW., on December 14 beginning at 10 a.m. and continuing into the evening: 

The hearing will be conducted to consider alternative designs for proposed Interstate 

Route 266 between a point near the intersection of Canal Road and MacArthur Boulevard 

in Washington, D.C., and a connection with the proposed Interstate Route 66 near 

Lorcom Lane in Arlington, Virginia, including a proposed bridge across the Potomac 

River in the vicinity of the Three Sisters Islands.

Additional sessions were tentatively scheduled for December 15 and 16 “if necessitated by a 

larger number of witnesses than can appear on December 14, 1970.” [Notice of Joint Design 

Public Hearing – Proposed Interstate 266, The Evening Star, November 13, 1970] 

District officials said they would offer two designs for the bridge at the public hearing. One 

would be the suspended span of 740 feet between piers near the banks that the Commission of 

Fine Arts had approved. The other would be a more traditional steel box girder bridge supported 

by three piers, including one in the middle of the Potomac River. 

The purpose of the hearing was to receive comments, oral and in writing, on the two designs, but 

as the Star pointed out, “freeway opponents have indicated they will use the session to voice 

opposition to any bridge.” They would argue that the bridge was not needed and would increase 

air pollution and harm nearby neighborhoods. [Green, Stephen, “District Highway Officials to 

Offer 2 Plans at 3 Sisters Bridge Hearing,” The Sunday Star, November 15, 1970] 

While the House Rules Committee was deciding the terms of debate on the Committee on Public 

Works’ version of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, the House District subcommittee 

headed by Representative Fuqua was considering the Broyhill amendment to the revenue act to 

withhold the proposed Federal payment of $120 million to the District, increased by $15 million 

from the previous year, until the city complied with Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act 

of 1968 or any subsequent legislation mandating freeway construction. On November 23, the 

subcommittee voted 7 to 3 for the measure. 

Representative Gude voted against it. The newly elected Montgomery County Council had urged 

him to oppose any legislation that would force construction of the North-Central Freeway. The 

council’s telegram to the Congressman stated that the freeway would be “more destructive than 

beneficial” to the city and its suburbs. The council favored the provision in the Senate’s FederalAid Highway Act of 1970 that would repeal Section 23 of the 1968 Act. Without mentioning 
Chairman Natcher, the telegram asserted that attempts to link Metro funding to highway 

construction were “unwise and unacceptable.” The telegram added, “This is particularly true in 

this period when Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe has called for an 18-month study of 

this freeway proposal.” 

That same day, Representative Gude testified before the Rules Committee in opposition to the 

District provision in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 because it required the District to 

build the North-Central Freeway to the District/Montgomery County line. Given the growing 

opposition to the Maryland segment, especially in the county, Representative Gude argued that 

the District provision could result in “Congress . . . directing the construction of a road to 

nowhere.” 

The District revenue authorization bill included provisions to transfer the District’s prison 

complex in Lorton, Virginia, to Federal control and to renew the city’s authority to borrow 

money for construction projects. The subcommittee dropped the city’s request to increase its gas 

tax by a penny from 7 cents to 8 cents. Representative Fuqua explained that the subcommittee 

rejected the plan because the members thought the gas tax should be the same as in the 

surrounding jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia, which charged 7 cents a gallon. [Taaffe, 

William, “Fight Against Freeway, Councilmen Urge Gude,” The Evening Star, November 16, 

1970; Green, Stephen, and Grigg, William, “House Panel Oks Bill Tying D.C. Funds to Freeway 

Action,” The Evening Star, November 23, 1970; Moore, Irna, and Eisen Jack, “Build Freeway or 

Lose Extra Cash, City Told,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 24, 1970] 

In the House, Chairman Kluczynski brought the 1970 Act to the floor on November 25. In his 

overview of the legislation, he said of Section 129: 

Contrary to what some people might say this is not setting a precedent for this kind of 

action in other States, nor is it an attempt to substitute congressional action for sound 

engineering judgment. The committee has heard the testimony and received the reports 

of the District of Columbia and the Department of Transportation over the last few years 

and is only acting within the responsibility of the Congress toward the District of 

Columbia. I hope this body will support this section as it has been reported as you did in 

1968, because I assure you gentlemen it is the only way your Nation’s Capital will ever 

have an adequate transportation system. 

Because of the limited time available for debate on the House floor under the House Rules 

resolution, several Representatives who objected to Section 129 submitted comments to be 

inserted in the record. Representative Emilio Q. Daddario (D-Ct.), an attorney who had won 

election to the House in 1958 and was serving his final term after losing his bid to become 

Governor of Connecticut, objected to Section 129. He recalled that in 1960, Congress had 

rejected the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey, “plans which are similar to those which would be 

forced upon the people of the District of Columbia under section 129”: 

The plans were unacceptable then and are unacceptable now for the very same reasons: 

high cost, destructiveness, and lack of demonstrated need for added arterial highway 

capacity.
He said that rarely had legislation “brought a more vehement and united outburst” from District 

residents. Forcing these freeways on the people of the District, “without fair and proper hearing, 

is to deny them the privileges enjoyed by the citizens of the 50 States.” 

Representative Edward I. Koch (D-NY), the future Mayor of New York City who was a strong 

advocate for transit and bicycling while in Congress, mentioned the opposition to the freeways 

covered by Section 129. He preferred to delete the provision from the bill but offered a reductio 

ad absurdum solution: 

I would suggest that if this body insists on retaining it, fairness and consistency demand 

that we add a provision . . . stating that all expenditures authorized by the Federal 

Highway Act will be suspended until construction on the District of Columbia system 

commences. [Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970, Congressional Record-House, 

November 25, 1970, pages 38938, 38958-38959, 38962-38963] 

Representative Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota (Democratic-Farmer-Labor), a member of the 

District of Columbia Committee, introduced an amendment to delete Section 129. The 

amendment initiated a lengthy discussion. Despite opposition within the city, he said, “now 

comes Congress saying, ‘Well, the City Council does not know what they are doing,’ and in 

effect it says ‘No matter what they think or how much they know, we know best what is good for 

. . . the 700,000 or 800,000 people who live in the District of Columbia.’” At some point, “the 

District of Columbia ought to be given a voice in what happens to this city.” 

This was not the first Congress, he said, that had overruled the city government. The District had 

complied with Section 23 of the 1968 Act “because we blackjacked them into it” by withholding 

funds for the subway. “Now we want to add another injustice to this unfortunate relationship 

between the Congress and the District.” 

Another member of the District committee, Representative Brock Adams said, “I cannot stress 

how unhappy I am. I would use the word ‘bitter’ but probably that is not the proper word to use, 

but somehow I must manifest my terrible unhappiness over what has happened with this bill.” 

He recalled the compromise that allowed release of the subway funds. The city complied and the 

funds were released. “I stand with it as I have stood with it on platforms in this city where my 

skin has been taken off in strips because many people of the District have said, ‘We do not want 

any more highways under any circumstances.’” 

Regarding the North-Central Freeway, the city had studied the project in accordance with the 

compromise and concluded that it should not be built and that the Industrial Highway should be 

constructed instead. He explained the key difference between the North-Central Freeway and the 

Industrial Highway: 

The difference in the two areas where you build the freeway, one goes through industrialtype lands, and lands that are not homes, and the other goes through a series of homes in 

the north end. This goes clear back to 1960. This route was shifted from one side of 
Rock Creek over to the other side of Rock Creek, and it has been shifted back and forth 

for years and years.

Now, he had just learned that the District Appropriations Committee was working on a bill that 

would prohibit appropriation of any funds to the District unless the city complies with the 1968 

Act or the present provision: 

I just plead with you in the name of common decency that we keep our word as we have 

required the government of the District of Columbia to keep its word. 

If Congress did not approve the Fraser amendment, “we will simply have broken our word” that 

was given under the previous compromise. 

Representative McCarthy concurred, saying:

If you can mandate the construction of controversial highways in the District of 

Columbia, then you can do it in any State in the Union and in Puerto Rico. 

District residents had made their views clear “with virtual unanimity.” He concluded that, “I 

think it is a basically undemocratic thing for us to force these highways on people who have said 

they do not want them.” 

Chairman Kluczynski responded that the Committee on Public Works “has no intention of 

dictating to the various States what kind of a highway program it should have or where 

individual routes should be located.” Congress acted only after the courts had declared that the 

planned freeways violated the 1893 District highway code. Because only Congress could change 

the code, Congress acted in 1968 to require the District to build a freeway system that had been 

developed over a 20-year period and included in the 1968 ICE. “It was sound and was the 

product of local study and determination. It was not a creature of the Congress as some would 

have you believe.” 

He would not want Congress to dictate highway locations in Illinois or any other State. “But in 

this case, in the District of Columbia . . . the Congress has the right and the Congress should 

designate the highways.” He did not mention the Constitution, but he was saying that it gave 

Congress a unique legislative role in the District that it did not have in the States.

Representative Gude and his Maryland colleague, Representative Hogan, took opposite positions 

on the Fraser amendment. Representative Gude pointed out that Maryland officials were in 

doubt about the North-Central Freeway:

At this time the State of Maryland and local government officials in Montgomery County 

have indicated that they are in doubt or in opposition to building a North Central 

Freeway. For us to order the immediate construction of a highway to the border of a 

jurisdiction that has indicated it does not intend to build it is ludicrous. 

After discussing the history of the North-Central Freeway, he concluded that for Congress to 

order its construction in the District would be “sheer folly.” 
Representative Hogan appreciated the provision in the bill providing for reconstruction of the 

Baltimore-Washington Parkway to meet Interstate standards as well as Section 129, which 

required construction of the North-Central Freeway:

If at this time we change the route of the North Central Freeway, as some are urging, 

further delays will result. The right-of-way has already been acquired for the proposed 

route, whereas any change of route will result in additional costs for this purpose. We 

can probably assume that any alternate route will also be objected to by elements of the 

community.

Chairman Natcher wanted to make clear to his colleagues that his committee supported a freeway 

system and a rapid rail transit system in the Nation’s capital. He said, “we not only believe this 

to be true, but are willing to make any and all recommendations which will bring about a proper 

rapid rail transit system and freeway system for the District of Columbia.” He summarized the 

years of effort to secure this outcome and cited editorial support from the city’s newspapers. The 

Chamber of Commerce and the Board of Trade, he said, supported congressional intervention: 

The majority of the people who pay the taxes necessary to operate our Capital City are for 

a balanced system of transportation. Those people who love and respect this city want 

this impasse settled and they want it settled now. They do not agree with the statement 

made several years ago by one of the dissidents that there shall be no more exists [sic] or 

entrances into our city. 

The House defeated the Fraser amendment, 26 to 101. Later that day, the House approved the 

committee bill, including Section 129, without a recorded vote. A conference committee would 

be convened to resolve differences between the House and Senate bills. [pages 38978-38990, 

38997] 

Even as the House approved its version of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Maryland 

opposition to the North-Central Freeway was growing. Governor Mandel wrote to 

Representative Gude, who had requested clarification of the State’s position: 

I have no intention to force an expensive improvement on an unwilling community, but 

before we abandon the North Central Freeway, we should be very certain that there is a 

real consensus in opposition . . . and that the local spokesmen really appreciate . . . the 

utter finality of such an action. 

At the same time, Delegate Martin S. Becker (D), chairman of the Montgomery County 

delegation to the Maryland General Assembly, had written to Chairman Natcher. “Our 

delegation will exert all of its efforts to assure that [the North-Central Freeway] will become a 

‘no thru street’ at the District of Columbia line.” Becker urged Chairman Natcher to drop his 

efforts to force the city to build the freeway. [Eisen, Jack, “House Votes for Disputed 

N. Freeway,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 26, 1970] 

On November 28, Post editors took a dim view of congressional actions in an editorial titled 

“Making the Colony Step and Fetch.” The House District Subcommittee, which had increased 
the Federal payment by $15 million, had “reckoned in its wisdom that, sure enough, we probably 

are entitled to a bit of extra change for the last six months of the budget – that is, ah, if we’re 

willing to do a few extra favors for it.” 

The question was how many favors “because there are so many congressional overseers with so 

many pet projects.” In return for the additional $15 million, all the city had to do was build all 

the freeways in Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 and whatever ended up in 

the 1970 Act; abandon the penny gas tax increase but impose a 2 percent sales tax on linen 

services; turn over its Lorton prison complex in Virginia against its wishes; and so on. 

While the House and Senate District authorizing committees fought over “the hostages and 

paraphernalia,” other committees were at work. Of course, the House Committee on Public 

Works was trying to force the city to build the North-Central Freeway, despite the city’s 

preference for an Industrial Highway in the New York Avenue corridor and growing opposition 

in Montgomery County. Meanwhile, Chairman Natcher’s District appropriations subcommittee 

was withholding Metro funds until the city built all the roads required by the 1968 Act. The 

Senate opposed the measures favored by the two House committees “but it hasn’t succeeded in 

getting that subway money for us either.” The editorial concluded: 

All this is simply to give you a little peek (or is it pique?) at why the coffer’s a little 

hollow along about now. It seems like an awful lot of exercise for very little fiscal 

fitness. [“Making the Colony Step and Fetch,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

November 28, 1970] 

On December 10, Jack Eisen reported that the House insistence on retaining Section 129 was 

weakening in conference. After five negotiating sessions, some conferees had told him “that 

negotiations on the national measure produced enough victories for the House version where its 

conferees became willing to give up their insistence on an early start of construction on the 

North-Central.” In return, some Senate conferees (“but not all,” Eisen emphasized) were willing 

to give up their efforts to retain the provision in the Senate bill repealing Section 23 of the 1968 

Act. [Eisen, Jack, “Lawmakers Reported Wavering on Freeway,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, December 10, 1970] 

As Chairman Natcher had mentioned, the District’s business community supported the freeway 

network. On December 10, the Federal City Council assembled businessmen representing the 

Board of Trade, Board of Realtors, D.C. Chamber of Commerce, the Washington Savings and 

Loan League, and many others to support the proposed freeways, including the North-Central 

Freeway. The Post explained:

They acted yesterday after it had been learned that a compromise may be reached on 

Capitol Hill that would delay a congressional order to build the North Central Freeway at 

least another year . . . while additional studies are made . . . . 

The House Appropriations Committee, at Natcher’s request, is now refusing to grant 

$34.2 million to continue building the subway system until the city complies with present 

highway legislation.
The business groups, which had supported freeways and rail rapid transit since the mid-1950s, 

blamed Mayor Washington and the city council for stalling freeway construction and thereby 

blocking progress on the subway: 

The businessmen said they support both the pending House version of the Highway Act 

of 1970, which would require construction of the freeways, and a rider placed in the D.C. 

revenue bill Nov. 23 that would withhold $15 million in city revenue until it complies 

fully with present and pending highway legislation. [McCombs, Philip A., “Merchants 

Push City Freeways,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 11, 1970] 

(The article in the Post about the event prompted Merle J. Van Horne of Americans for 

Democratic Action to write a letter to the editor. This coalition of business representatives “has 

consistently sought to inflict the monstrous William H. Natcher Memorial Freeway System on an 

unwilling city.” In view of polls and reactions at public hearings showing “clear and massive 

opposition,” the businesses “cannot plead ignorance or misunderstanding.” Any attempt to 

“inflict such a profound environmental and social change on any city in the face of overwhelming 

citizen opposition is a despotic act of mind-boggling enormity.” It is “more cynically destructive 

of public faith in the American system than a hundred flag-burnings.” Their actions, accordingly, 

could be attributed only “to malevolence and greed.” They “have clearly established themselves 

as an alien, hostile, pernicious force in this city.” 

(Mr. Van Horne was one of those arrested on August 9, 1969, during the protest of the city 

council’s approval of the Three Sisters Bridge to secure release of the Metro matching funds. At 

the request of Chairman Hahn, the U.S. Attorney’s office dropped unlawful entry charges on 

October 9, 1969, in the cases of 14 of those arrested, including Van Horne. [Van Horne, Merle 

J., “The Freeway Struggle,” Letters to the Editor, The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

December 17, 1970; Curry, Willian N., “Illegal Entry Charges on 14 Dropped,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, October 10, 1969]) 

The following day, December 11, the House District Committee dropped the provisions linking 

the Federal payment for the city to construction of freeways and transfer of the city’s prison 

complex in Lorton to the Federal Government. Committee leaders decided to drop the measures 

when a coalition of liberals and conservatives, which one committee member called “an unholy 

alliance,” threatened to defeat the bill:

A group of liberal, Northern Democrats and Republicans on the District Committee 

planned to fight the freeway and Lorton provisions on the House floor. The freeway 

section, sponsored by Rep. Joel T. Broyhill (R-Va.), would prevent the city from 

receiving the additional $15 million until it agreed to build all congressionally ordered 

freeways, including the North Central freeway called for in the House version of the 

1970 Highway Act. 

Representative Brock Adams (D-Wash.), a leader of the liberal group, planned to offer a 

substitute bill that would not include the freeway and Lorton sections. 
Conservatives opposed a provision, strongly supported by Committee Chairman McMillan, 

authorizing a Federal subsidy of up to $62 million for Georgetown and George Washington 

Universities’ “troubled medical and dental schools.” Representative Abernethy, “usually a 

powerful member of the Committee’s Southern conservative leadership,” strongly opposed the 

provision: 

Abernethy reportedly offered to support a substitute bill that did not contain Lorton, the 

freeway provision or the medical school section . . . . According to Broyhill, it began to 

seem that the bill contained so many controversial sections that a number of congressmen 

were willing to “burn down the whole barn just to get at their particular rat.” 

When House members of the conference committee on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 

decided on December 9 to substitute a study for their prior insistence on construction of the 

North Central Freeway, Representative Broyhill offered to withdraw his amendment. Given the 

conferees’ compromise, withholding $15 million, he said, “would have been superfluous.” Once 

Chairman McMillan agreed to drop the Lorton provision, Broyhill said, “there would be no 

opportunity for a general indictment of the bill from both liberals and conservatives.” He 

expected that agreement by the conference committee on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 

would result in release $34.2 million for the subway, but Chairman Natcher declined to 

comment. [Moore, Irna, “Roads, Lorton to be Deleted in Money Bill,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, December 12, 1970] 

The provision, Title VIII (“Interstate Routes and the Federal Payment”) remained in the District 

revenue bill until it reached the House floor on December 14. During the debate, Representative 

Broyhill explained that he had no desire to withhold funds from the District. He had introduced 

the measure to ensure District compliance with Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 

1968 and Section 129 of the 1970 Act, but now a compromise appeared to have been reached by 

conferees on the 1970 Act that would bring the District into compliance with the law. “If they 

are in compliance with the law, then this title of the bill becomes unnecessary.” In accordance 

with the agreement reached with Chairman McMillan, the House dropped Title VIII before 

passing the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1970. [District of Columbia Revenue Act of 

1970, Congressional Record-House, December 14, 1970, pages 41399, 41403-41404, 41409, 

41415] 

Design Hearing on the Three Sisters Bridge

In compliance with Judge Sirica’s ruling, the District, in cooperation with the Virginia Highway 

Department, held 3 days of hearings on the Three Sisters Bridge, which would carry I-266 traffic, 

including the trucks barred from the I-66/Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, across the Potomac River. 

The District indicated that 107 witnesses had been scheduled for the marathon sessions 

scheduled to run from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. [Eisen, Jack, “3 Sisters ‘Trial’ Will Start Today,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, December 14, 1970] 

Even before the hearing on the Three Sisters Bridge, ECTC protested the appointment of 

Julian R. Dugas, the District’s Director of Economic Development, as the hearing officer. ECTC 

argued that the District’s 1967 reorganization plan required the mayor and city council to conduct 
hearings on bridges and freeways. That meant, ECTC argued, personal participation by the 

mayor and the city council, not delegation to a representative. [“Group Raps Hearing On 3 

Sisters Bridge,” The Evening Star, February 8, 1970] 

Jack Eisen reported that in the 600-seat Commerce Department Auditorium, the hearing “moved 

briskly, sometimes as much as 45 minutes ahead of schedule.” He characterized the day’s 

presentations: 

Many witnesses, as expected, expanded their statements into arguments on whether the 

Georgetown-to-Arlington span should be built. There were 14 presentations in favor, 

28 against. 

Generally, support came from business, professional and economic development groups 

and opposition from citizen and environmental protection organizations. However, a 

downtown organization of small businessmen was among the foes. 

Leslie Logan, president of Arlingtonians for Preservation of the Potomac Palisades, was one of 

the first witnesses. He challenged the legality of the hearings, arguing that they were being held 

too long after the location hearing in 1964. Since then, Section 4(f) had been enacted to preserve 

the very resources the bridge threatened. He said it was ridiculous to “erase 31.6 acres of 

national parkland on the Virginia side . . . and impair the remaining acreage of the Spout Run 

Parkway.”

The hearing before a crowd that varied during the day and night from about 75 to 150 people was 

orderly for the most part. What little drama took place followed the decision by Dugas not to let 

William Buchanan of the Foggy Bottom Association testify when he arrived for his scheduled 

11:35 appearance. Because the hearing was ahead of schedule, Dugas had called Buchanan’s 

name earlier and passed over him:

Sammie A. Abbott . . . loudly protested Dugas’ refusal to hear opposition testimony by 

William Buchanan . . . . 

He yelled, “We’ll get to you, Dugas.” Four guards approached to warn Abbott to remain silent. 

He did so, but sat quietly with his arms folded. 

Buchanan was called to speak a half hour later:

Both he and Abbott were among several who insisted that the hearing and the manner of 

its conduct were illegal. They claimed a hearing is needed on whether and where the 

project should be built, and they said they expect the U.S. Court of Appeals to uphold that 

view in a forthcoming appeal 

Robert M. Kennan, transportation chairman of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City 

College, urged Dugas to call off the hearing on these grounds. 

Dugas refused, having previously cited Judge Sirica’s ruling: 
After an extended trial, Sirica ordered construction of the bridge piers suspended pending 

a design hearing but said that Congress in its 1968 law took the question of whether to 

build a bridge out of the court’s hands. 

Only one neutral presentation, by Arthur H. Fawcett, Jr., of the Potomac Boating Club, 

concerned the design of the Three Sisters Bridge:

If the bridge must be built, Fawcett said, the club wants the single overwater arch that has 

been approved by the Fine Arts Commission, omitting a mid-river pier he called a hazard 

to boat racing crews.

The plan that includes the midriver pier drew no support. Several opponents of the bridge 

said the arched design is attractive – one called it a work of art – but claimed it is 

unnecessary.

The safety of the bridge design came up during testimony by James O. Granum, president of the 

National Capital Section of American Society of Civil Engineers, which supported the project. 

Director Airis asked him if he had any concerns about the safety of the approved design. 

Granum replied, “No, sir.” 

ECTC’s John Carter was the day’s 42nd and final witness. He predicted that “turmoil and uproar” 

would occur if the bridge were built. [Eisen, Jack, “Bridge Hearing Called Illegal,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, December 15, 1970; Grigg, William, “Legality of Hearing 

On Span Disputed,” The Evening Star, December 14, 1970] 

On December 15, the second day of the hearing, Dugas reminded witnesses that under Judge 

Sirica’s ruling, design of the bridge was the only issue to be decided. Judge Sirica had found that 

under Section 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, whether to build the bridge was a 

settled point. As a result, the testimony thus far relating to whether the bridge was needed would 

prove useless to District and Virginia highway officials as they consider comments on design 

issues before advising FHWA and reporting their joint decision to the court. 

Nevertheless, as the Post put it, the majority of the 38 witnesses “charged yesterday that the 

Three Sisters Bridge project is unnecessary, will cause pollution and disrupt neighborhood life in 

Washington.” Most of these opponents also contended that the hearing was illegal because 

Mayor Washington and the city council did not conduct them in person. By the time the hearing 

ended at midnight, another seven witnesses had supported the bridge while four did not take a 

position. 

Two former members of the city council were among the witnesses who ignored those words of 

warning. Polly Shackleton said the council had “lost its soul” when it gave in to Congress by 

approving the Three Sisters Bridge against its better judgment. “The mayor and Council have 

ceased to be the heartbeat of the citizens of the District.” Most opposed the bridge, but in 

reversing course had lost the city council’s credibility. Instead of discussing design of the bridge, 

she said the city should forget about building it. 
The Reverend Fauntroy, a candidate for District delegate to Congress, agreed. “This bridge will 

function only if we pave the whole city. No design of a Three Sisters Bridge can increase the 

capacity of Arlington or D.C. streets to efficiently carry more traffic.” In short, “Design cannot 

fit a bridge where it should not be.” 

The Reverend Channing Phillips of the District Democratic Central Committee, also a candidate 

for delegate, said the city council had approved the bridge only because of congressional 

“blackmail.” Mayor Washington “should take leadership of the District government on this vital 

issue, stop freeway construction and stop these hearings.” When Dugas asked if he had a 

preference on the bridge’s design, the Reverend Phillips said he preferred the view of the river 

and three small islands without a bridge. 

A third candidate for delegate, Democrat George Mitchell, said the money that would be used for 

the bridge “should be spent on people who are going hungry instead of getting commuters in and 

out of the city faster.” 

Former NCPC Chairman Rowe opposed the bridge. It would, she said, encourage trucks to go 

through the city instead of circling it on the Capital Beltway. The result would be more freeways 

that would “make North Central Freeway look like a community blessing.” 

Harold O. Miller, vice chairman of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors in Virginia, which 

supported I-66, pointed out that the Arlington County Board, which opposed I-66, might reopen 

discussions to cancel the Interstate in the county. “We shouldn’t proceed until we see if a road is 

going to be attached to it.” 

The supportive witnesses cited the benefits of the bridge to Washington economic development. 

Supporters included representatives of Downtown Progress, the Institute of Traffic Engineers, 

Loudoun County Board of Supervisors in Virginia, the Virginia Automobile Dealers Association, 

and the D.C. Metropolitan Subcontractors Association. General Quesada of the Dulles 

International Airport Development Commission, who had helped pick the location for the new 

airport, said that a key factor in selecting the site was the expectation that the Three Sisters 

Bridge would be built. It would allow traffic to drive between downtown and the airport in about 

30 minutes. 

During the third day of hearings, most witnesses again addressed whether to build the bridge, not 

its design. Lawrence N. Bloomberg of the Palisades Citizens Association said the bridge would 

“distract from an open and uncluttered natural view of the Potomac valley and will increase and 

aggravate the pollution problems now facing Washington and its environs.” 

By the time the hearings ended on December 16 at 3:40 p.m., Dugas had heard 130 witnesses. 

What the Post characterized as a “lopsided majority” of the witnesses recommended dropping the 

Three Sisters Bridge project. Many also questioned the legality of the hearings. 

The Post reported that Federal rules for design hearings did not require clearance by the mayor or 

city council. District highway officials could report directly to FHWA. “Airis told a reporter, 

however, that he plans to clear his recommendations with those officials before transmitting them 
to Charles E. Hall, the road bureau’s D.C. division engineer.” Division Engineer Hall had 

attended most of the sessions. 

[McCombs, Philip, “Hearing for 3 Sisters Soan Develops Into Verbal Battle,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, December 16, 1970; Grigg, William, “Ex-Councilmen Regret Vote for 

3 Sisters Span,” The Evening Star; “3 Sisters Span Called Stimulant for Dulles,” The Evening 

Star, December 16, 1970; “Hearing End On Design For Bridge,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, December 17, 1970] 

Approving the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 

Although the House-Senate conferees on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 had agreed on a 

study of the North-Central Freeway, instead of construction, one of the unwritten rules of 

conference committees is that nothing is final until everything is final. On that basis, despite 

earlier signs of agreement, conferees abruptly adjourned on December 14, unable to resolve 

differences related to the North-Central Freeway.

In return for agreeing to the study, House conferees asked the Senate conferees to delete the 

provision in their bill repealing Section 23 of the 1968 Act. The Senators said they would delete 

the provision if the House would agree to leave all language about District freeways out of the 

bill. If agreed to, the Senate-proposed compromise would leave the situation where it was, with 

the city refusing to build the freeway, a study underway on the North-Central Freeway, and 

Chairman Natcher withholding subway matching funds. [Green, Stephen, “Conferees Snagged 

On Freeway, Quit,” The Evening Star, December 15, 1970] 

On December 16, after the conferees met again, Chairman Fallon told reporters, “we’re still hung 

up” on the District provisions. Senator Cooper said the Senate conferees were united in offering 

to drop its repeal of Section 23 if the House would drop the order for construction of the NorthCentral Freeway. The House was insistent on including a 1-year study of freeway, but the Senate 

conferees wanted no District of Columbia provisions in the conference report. That would leave 

Section 23 of the 1968 Act in place. “We’ve had enough studies,” Senator Cooper said of the 

House offer of the new study. [“Conferees Stalls on Freeway,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, December 17, 1970] 

On December 17, House and Senate conferees completed work on the conference report for the 

1970 Act. Section 129 now read: 

District of Columbia

Sec. 129 (a) In the case of the following routes on the Interstate System authorized for 

construction by section 23 of the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1968, the government of the 

District of Columbia and the secretary of Transportation shall restudy such projects and 

report to Congress not later than 12 months after the date of enactment of this subsection 

their recommendations with respect to such projects, including any alternative routes or 

plans: 
(1) East Leg of the Inner Loop, beginning at Bladensburg Road, I-295 

 (section C4.1 to C6), 

(2) North Central and Northeast Freeways, I-95 (section C7 to C13) and I-70S 

 (section C1 to C2). 

(b) The government of the District of Columbia and the Secretary of Transportation 

shall study the project for the North Leg of the Inner Loop from point A3.3 on I-66 to 

point C7) on I-95, as designated in the “1968 Estimate of the Cost of Completion of 

the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways in the District of Columbia”, 

and shall report to Congress not later than 12 months after the date of enactment of 

this subsection their recommendations with respect to such project including any 

recommended alternative routes or plans. 

Under the compromise, the South Leg of the Inner Loop remained designated as part of the 

Interstate System. [Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Conference Report, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 91st Congress, 2d Session, House Report No. 91-1780, page 54] 

The final bill also retained the authorization of $65 million to reconstruct the BaltimoreWashington Parkway to Interstate design standards. Under Section 146, no funds could be 

expended until the Secretary of the Interior entered into an agreement with Maryland highway 

officials to convey the parkway to the State “without monetary consideration” and the State 

placed the parkway on the Federal-aid primary system under State responsibility.

The following day, the House approved the conference report, 319 to 11. The floor debate on the 

report did not include discussion of the District freeway provision. [Conference Report on 

H.R. 19504, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Congressional Record-House, December 18, 

1970, pages 42514-42518] 

The Senate, considering the bill on December 19, did discuss the District’s freeway 

controversies. Reviewing the conference report, Chairman Randolph said that the “most 

controversial sections” of the House and Senate versions of the 1970 Act concerned the 

construction of Interstate highways in the District of Columbia. Reconciling the two provisions 

“occupied considerable time and discussion”: 

Behind the original positions of both Houses were strongly held convictions: the Senate 

– that the District of Columbia should be treated as a State, as the highway law provides, 

in determining the construction of highways; the House – that nonconstruction in the 

District of Columbia has seriously delayed completion of the Interstate System.

The conference decision, I believe, was the only one we could reach to avoid an impasse 

that would have imperiled the national highway program. It is a reasonable compromise 

in that there is no mandating of freeway construction in the city. The studies which the 

bill directs in an effort to determine the best way to resolve this very difficult program 

[sic] could be carried on without specific authorization. 
He endorsed the Baltimore-Washington Parkway provision because the parkway “carries a heavy 

load of traffic, far beyond that which it was originally designed to accommodate” and “is in 

urgent need of improvement.” 

Senator Cooper discussed some of the controversial measures in the conference report, including 

the question of the District’s highways: 

I still consider, as I have for years, that the Congress should not attempt to lay out a 

highway system in the District of Columbia. On our side, we strove diligently to bring 

some order to this problem; to put full responsibility back where it belongs, with officials 

and people of the District of Columbia. We held out as long as we could for the Senate 

provision, to repeal section 23 of the 1968 act. There was no sign by the House of 

accepting the Senate provision, and we have ended our work. Perhaps the courts will 

now look at the proposed District of Columbia highway system. We cannot do it 

legislatively with any success.

He recalled that he had voted against the 1968 Act because of Section 23. The Senate provision 

was “especially important” because the House Public Works Committee “went even further than 

in 1968 in attempting to require the construction of interstate highways within the District – and 

without the fundamental provision which we were able to attach in 1968, so often overlooked, 

that all construction must be carried out according to all applicable provisions of title 23 of the 

United States Code.” The conference report rejected “any mandate for any new highway 

construction, or for designation or removal of designation of interstate routes” in the District: 

The conference agreed to no more than another study by the District of Columbia 

government and the Department of Transportation of the North Central Freeway, and also 

of the East and the North Legs. Of course, these routes have been studied before, and a 

study of the North Central Freeway is now being carried out, and the administration 

supported the Senate position in this matter. 

He introduced a letter dated December 15 that he had received from Secretary Volpe, who said 

he supported a balanced transportation program for the District, including necessary freeway 

projects and the subway: 

I would prefer that specific highway projects be planned, designed, and constructed in 

accordance with the same procedures as apply to other cities and states under the 

interstate program.

If Congress “in its wisdom” repeals Section 23 of the 1968, Secretary Volpe said: 

I would nonetheless assure the Committee that work on the construction of the Three 

Sisters Bridge will proceed as expeditiously as possible within the requirements of the 

law and the decisions of the courts – both because this Department and the District 

government are already committed to this project and because I believe it is necessary for 

a balanced transportation system for the area.
If Congress did not repeal Section 23, Secretary Volpe hoped that Congress would not require 

any further construction or studies. “As you know, my Department is already engaged in a 

16-month study of the North Central Freeway which, again, will continue no matter what the 

Conference action is because I believe such a study to be needed.” 

Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tn.) referred to the District provision as “a highly volatile issue, 

I dare say as emotional as almost any other issue, if not any issue that has been before the Senate 

in the past several days.” It was, however, worked out in accordance with “an old Tennessee 

adage that if no one is really happy with it, therefore it must be very good.” 

The Senate approved the conference report without a recorded vote. [Federal-Aid Highway Act 

of 1970—Conference Report, Congressional Record-Senate, December 19, 1970, pages 42714-

42723] 

President Nixon signed the bill on December 31, 1970, without comment or a ceremony 

(P.L. 91-605). Secretary Volpe agreed with many observers who considered it the most 

significant highway legislation since the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. He praised its 

extension of the Highway Trust Fund, the assurance it provided that the 42,500-mile Interstate 

System would be completed within the decade, and extension of the Highway Trust Fund 

revenue to “the very important areas of highway safety and access roads to national forests and 

public lands.” He added, “It gives the Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway 

Administration many of the tools we need to tackle the growing social challenges of our nation, 

especially in our urban centers.” He concluded: 

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, in short, is designed to give Americans better and 

safer transportation in a manner that will not degrade our environment or threaten our 

health and welfare.

It indicates a strong awareness of the nation’s transportation needs and demonstrates an 

ability to approach them in a sane and reasonable manner. 

Secretary Volpe did not mention the provision on District freeways, but influential columnist 

Tom Wicker of The New York Times took note. The “magnificent American interstate system” 

was now “nearing completion”: 

On any rational timetable, this is about 10 years behind time, since these great highways 

essentially were the transportation system most required for the Forties and Fifties. 

Consequently, the nation also is running 10 or more years behind in developing the 

modern urban transit and rapid intercity transit systems that are the next necessary stage 

in American transportation. 

Standing against this evolution was “a political juggernaut” that had formed during the Interstate 

years, namely the “highway lobby,” a phrase he put in quotes, and said it was “a shorthand way 

to describe the conglomerate of industrial, commercial, construction and political interests that 

have a big stake in building highways,” despite “a steady building of consumer resistance.” That 

resistance was nowhere more evident than in and around Washington: 
The issue here ranges a high proportion of the voteless and mostly black citizens of the 

District of Columbia against the white Congressional masters of the District, most of 

whom represent largely white suburban or rural areas. 

In 1969, Wicker continued, Congress had authorized funds for a 98-mile regional subway 

system, but the House District appropriations committee forced through legislation to force the 

city to build the freeways:

No one, for instance, has ever demonstrated a clear need for the Three Sisters Bridge over 

the Potomac to Virginia – the eighth such bridge in this area – but as a condition of letting 

subway construction begin, the House group forced the District to begin building the 

bridge. It also insisted on a route called the North Central Freeway, running through the 

inner city to the Maryland suburbs. By every conceivable gauge of public opinion, the 

people of the District are overwhelmingly opposed to the North Central Freeway. 

In 1970, Congress adjourned without appropriating the District’s $34.2-million share of subway 

construction costs: 

That has the effect of holding up the Federal matching grant of $68-million, whereupon 

the State of Maryland refused to put up the $10-million it owed the project. Almost 

simultaneously, the subway authority announced that due to inflation, higher interest and 

Congressional delays in providing promised construction money, the estimated cost of the 

system had risen by $510 million to $2.98 billion. And as if that weren’t enough, such 

uncertainties and setbacks mean that there is little hope of selling this year the first batch 

of $835 million worth of subway revenue bonds. 

Secretary Volpe, “who bailed out the subway last fall with a $57 million loan from the mass 

transit fund,” was trying to resolve the problem, but the District was going to have to go back to 

Congress. “And it is clear that the Congressional purse-holders are going to demand final 

compliance with their highway mandate – building the North-Central Freeway – as the price for 

financing the subway.” 

District officials were divided. Some were proposing a commuter payroll tax for area residents, 

including those in Maryland and Virginia, to pay for the subway, while others, “including 

downtown merchants’ groups, now want to build the freeway and end the fight, however 

ignominiously.” Wicker concluded: 

Washington is, of course, easier prey for the highwaymen than most communities, having 

no real vote. But other cities planning to upgrade their transit systems had better take 

note. The highway juggernaut is not easily stemmed. [Wicker, Tom, “The Highway 

Juggernaut,” The New York Times, January 10, 1971] 

Metro Wraps Up 1970 

On December 14, the House approved the District Revenue Act with the additional $15 million 

in Federal payment without strings. The Post described the approval as “an anti-climax” because 

the House District Committee had dropped the controversial provisions, including Representative 
Broyhill’s penalty for not complying with Section 23 of the 1968 Act. The Post reported an 

exchange when Representative Abernethy of the District committee talked about the Broyhill 

provisions that had been dropped: 

“We accommodated Broyhill by putting Lorton in this bill, but he chickened out,” 

Abernethy said. “And he chickened out on the highways. So he’s just a chicken, and he 

knows it.” 

When Broyhill interrupted to protest that he did not chicken out, Abernethy shot back: 

“Then you copped out.” 

This exchange was deleted from the Congressional Record. [Moore, Irna, “House Votes D.C. 

$15 Million,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 15, 1970; District of Columbia 

Revenue Act of 1970, Congressional Record-House, December 14, 1970, pages 41380-41418] 

The bill would now go to a House-Senate conference to resolve differences. Conferees 

completed work on December 19, including a compromise on the Federal payment. The Senate 

had voted to calculate the payment to equal 30 percent of the District general fund revenue 

derived from taxes, charges, and miscellaneous receipts. This calculation would have resulted in 

a payment of $132 million in FY 1971. The House had rejected the percentage idea and 

authorized a flat $120 million, an increase of $15 million over FY 1970. Conferees agreed on a 

flat payment of $126 million, for an additional $21 million: 

It is the position of the managers on the part of the House that the Federal payment 

authorization provided in the conference substitute is sufficient to cover any expense to 

the District of Columbia government which may accrue as a result of salary increases for 

D.C. government employees during the present fiscal year. [District of Columbia 

Revenue Act of 1970, Conference Report, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 

2d Session, Report No. 91-1789, December 19, 1970, page 13] 

The House and Senate agreed to the conference report on December 21. President Nixon signed 

the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1970 on January 5, 1971 (P.L. 91-650). 

Freeway advocates and motorists received good news on December 23 when District highway 

officials opened the new extension of the Southeast Freeway to the 11th Street Bridge across the 

Anacostia River at 9:30 a.m. Motorists would no longer have to leave the freeway at 8th Street, 

SE., and drive through narrow streets and stop lights to reach the bridge. The extension was the 

first part of Interchange “C” to open. The last two segments of the interchange were scheduled to 

open in early 1971, giving motorists a direct connection with the Southeast Freeway on their trips 

to or from downtown. 

Unfortunately, according to the Star’s Stephen Green, the city forgot to let motorists know about 

the opening: 

A sign at the beginning of the extension said “Merry Christmas” from the highway 

department.
Highway department employees stood in the roadway and waved to motorists. 

But most drivers just zoomed right by the extension and as usual left the freeway at 

8th Street SE . . . . 

Thomas Airis, highway department director, said that he expected that the extension will 

be used more in the afternoon rush hour today. “We’ll have to do some missionary work 

in the next few days,” he added. [Green, Stephen, “Drivers Ignore D.C. Yule Gift,” The 

Evening Star, December 23, 1970] 

Although the District’s freeway impasse was causing WMATA problems, that was only one of 

the problems Metro construction was facing as the year ended.

The governmentwide supplemental appropriations act was in conference. The Senate had 

completed work on its bill on December 14, including a unanimous vote to include $34.2 million 

for the District’s share of Metro construction. However, on December 17, the conferees agreed 

to delete the $34.2 million the Senate had approved. Chairman Byrd told reporters, “We just 

couldn’t prevail. There was just no way of persuading the House.” 

As news accounts explained, the decision would not halt subway construction, thanks mainly to 

Secretary Volpe’s loan that allowed WMATA to continue about $100 million in construction 

contracts. However, it would affect new contracts in 1971, might cause local jurisdictions to 

withhold their contributions to WMATA, and raise doubts among potential investors when 

WMATA began issuing bonds to support construction. WMATA, reporters suggested, would 

have to delay the $105 million bond sale planned for the spring. [“Hill Rejects $24 Million 

Metro Fund,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 18, 1970; “Congress Tightens 

Grip On D.C. Subway Funds,” The Evening Star, December 18, 1970] 

Knowing that nothing is final until everything is final, Star editors appealed “to the conferees to 

have another go at this dilemma before it’s too late.” They acknowledged Chairman Natcher’s 

dissatisfaction with the pace of freeway development in the city. “And indeed, the transit money 

had been placed in even greater political jeopardy by a recent Senate attempt to strike any 

reference to District freeways from national highway legislation.” The editors hoped that before 

the conference report was drafted, conferees would reconsider in view of the compromise 

language another conference had adopted for the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970. The editors 

agreed with Chairman Natcher about the need for the freeways, “but it is amply clear that holding 

the transit funds hostage will not advance that goal.” [“Natcher’s Choice,” The Evening Star, 

December 19, 1970] 

Editors at the Post were even more blunt, saying Congress “has, in effect, doublecrossed the two 

million people who live in the suburbs of this city and has seriously jeopardized the future of 

rapid transit in the whole area.” Congress had been “hornswaggled [sic] by Representative 

Natcher and his friends, a band of men who are so angry about the freeway situation here that 

they are willing to dishonor commitments and themselves and Congress in order to demonstrate 

their power.” True, Congress was providing the Federal funds for Metro, but not the other part 

of its commitment in the form of the District matching funds. It withheld the funds “because a 
group of spiteful men can find no other way in which to impose its wishes on the unrepresented 

citizens of the Nation’s Capital.” [“Default on the Subway,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, December 20, 1970] 

Conferees did not reconsider; the matching funds were not restored. President Nixon signed the 

Supplemental Appropriations, 1971, on January 8, 1971 (P.L. 91-665). 

With agreement of conferees on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 to include a study of the 

North-Central Freeway, Representative Broyhill said the District would be in compliance with 

Section 23 of the 1968 Act and Section 129 of the 1970 Act. Chairman Natcher refused to 

comment.

The uncertainty prompted Maryland officials to say on December 19 that they would hold up the 

State’s $10 million contribution, due January 2, 1971, for Metro construction until they were 

certain Congress would release the District’s matching funds. Governor Mandel said the 

conferees acted “at a very inappropriate time.” He explained, “Maryland has an obligation and 

intends to fulfill its commitment to mass transit but before we proceed with such a huge outlay 

we want to get concrete assurances from the federal government that its money will be 

forthcoming.” 

As for the optimism about the 1970 Act compromise, Comptroller Goldstein said, “We’ve heard 

that story before and I don’t want to take any more chances.” [Rowland, James B., and Green, 

Stephen, “Maryland to Tie Metro Fund To Release of District Share,” The Sunday Star, 

December 20, 1970] 

On December 29, Goldstein announced that the State would not provide $10 million to 

Montgomery and Prince George’s County for their Metro share. Goldstein said congressional 

action in holding up the District’s share raised concerns about the viability of Metro; he feared 

that the two States might be asked to pay the District’s share.

As Tom Wicker had stated, the estimated cost of Metro had increased 29 percent to nearly 

$3 billion. This change was revealed with release on December 7 of the report of General 

Graham’s testimony in a closed hearing on November 24 before Chairman Natcher’s 

subcommittee.

General Graham testified that the uncertainty about funding was causing planning problems: 

Because of the uncertainties with regard to our funding, the initial sale of revenue bonds 

next year has been seriously jeopardized. In fact, we may find it impossible to issue 

bonds without additional federal support. We are now exploring this matter further with 

our financial advisers. 

So, it is my painful lot to tell you today, Mr. Chairman, that we are in trouble with our 

financial plan because of the delays which have beset the transit program.

Our construction and financial schedules are stretched to the breaking point. The 

off-again, on-again appropriation experience has not been going unobserved. 
Consequently, potential contractors are not sharpening their pencils as they develop their 

bids. We are not able to assess the effects upon the ultimate system cost at this time.

He recognized “that strongly held and divergent position” were delaying resolution of the 

highway impasse. “But while they are being reconciled, Mr. Chairman, collapse of many years 

of transit planning can serve no purpose.” He pleaded for a solution 

We all seek a balanced transportation system for the National Capital area. In that 

common purpose, there is no profit or reason in the sacrifice of one element for the 

other . . . . 

Chairman Natcher summarized the subcommittee’s support for balanced transportation and its 

efforts to secure that balance. He asked if WMATA still believed in its estimate of $2.5 billion 

for the 97-mile Metro system.

General Graham replied that WMATA had been engaged for several months in new capital cost 

studies. Because the studies had not been concluded, he could not provide a precise figure, “but 

it appears that it will be substantially higher than the $2.5 billion of costs.” 

Chairman Natcher pointed out that he had said all along that Metro would cost more than 

$2.5 billion. “General, in all fairness to this committee and to the Congress and to the District of 

Columbia, won’t this system come nearer $4 billion than it will $2.5 billion?” 

General Graham explained the assumptions behind the estimate of $2.5 billion: 

We could not foresee at that time that construction costs would go up in this inflationary 

spiral, largely due to the wage agreements that were not for just one year but extending 

into the future for two or three years. We could not foresee the rise in the interest rates.

He expected the cost studies to raise the estimated cost by “some few hundreds of millions of 

dollars.” WMATA was “a long ways from being able to say that some day this may cost 

$4 billion.” Ultimately, he hoped the Nixon Administration would “get the rate of escalation 

under control so we never go anywhere near that figure.” 

If, Chairman Natcher pointed out, the estimate went above $2.5 billion, WMATA would have to 

come back to Congress for additional authorizations. General Graham agreed. Chairman 

Natcher summarized the cost estimate increases over the years and the reasons for those 

increases. However, he favored a balanced transportation system that included the planned 

freeways:

General, I hope this matter can be resolved. I know you do, and all of your people and 

associates do, because when you come back for more money, unless there is a change in 

the over-all situation as I see it today, we may end up with about a 45- or 46-mile rapid 

transit system, not 97 miles.

If the Congress should simply say with all of the demands that are confronting the 

American people, we are not going to carry the amount up any more at this time, then we 
would have to cut it back. I am hoping that we can resolve this problem and move it on 

and build this system . . . . This is a serious matter, and one that it will be right hard to 

take back to the Congress. I would like to have it all settled. It is a serious mistake for 

anyone to try to block a balanced transportation system . . . . Let me say to you again, 

I am going to travel the road with you. We are going to solve this matter.

General Graham said, “That sounds great.” [Eisen, Jack, “Metro Cost Rises, Could Cut System,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 8, 1970; “Capitol Hill Testimony on Metro’s 

Fate,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 13, 1970] 

On December 31, WMATA released the results of the cost studies. A 10-page white paper 

explained that the estimated cost of the nearly 98-mile system had increased by $400 million, a 

19 percent increase to $2.9 billion. WMATA attributed the increase to inflation in construction 

costs, higher interest rates, and delays in securing the District’s share of funding as a result of the 

freeway-subway impasse. Under the existing cost-sharing formula, the contribution from area 

governments, including the District, to the total system cost would increase by $150 million to 

$725 million and the Federal contribution would grow by $300 million to nearly $1.5 billion. 

Bonds would make up the difference between contributions and costs, but Metro staff suggested 

that a Federal guarantee of repayment would probably be needed to convince investors to buy the 

bonds. 

The WMATA Board of Directors rejected cost-cutting measures, such as smaller stations, 

curtailed air conditioning, and fewer escalators, saying they were a “backward step.” Instead, the 

directors vowed to find $510 million in local tax revenue and congressional contributions to meet 

the new budget. 

Staff also had revamped the 10-year construction schedule. The new schedule projected 

completion of Metro construction by December 1979, but staff cut the initial section to 41⁄2 miles 

(Rhode Island Avenue and Eighth Place, NE., through Union Station beneath G Street to the 

Farragut North terminal at Connecticut Avenue and K Street, NW., instead of continuing to 

Dupont Circle). It would begin operating in December 1973. [Eisen, Jack, “Metro Costs Rise 

19% to $2.98 Billion,” The Washington Post and Time Herald, January 1, 1971; Grigg, William, 

“Metro Costs Up, 1st Segment Is Cut,” The Evening Star, December 31, 1970] 

The cost increase and contribution problem prompted the Post editorial board to state that the 

optimism inspired by the groundbreaking a year earlier “has been drained from us.” An editorial 

on January 2 explained: 

Indeed, the dream has become a nightmare, full of mischievous and narrow-minded men 

who care not for the Nation’s Capital, for the people who live in its environs, or for the 

commitments they have made in the past.

The only people happy about the bad news were “Congressman Natcher and his friends on 

Capitol Hill . . . because these two things complicate enormously the financing of Metro and that, 

after all, is what Mr. Natcher has been busy doing for the past two years.” WMATA should 

present Congress with a bill for the increased costs that the games Representative Natcher has 
played have added to the cost “and see whether Congress has the moral courage to pay for the 

damage it has caused.”

Maryland Comptroller Goldstein’s stance was understandable, if regrettable, in view of 

Chairman Natcher’s actions:

This whole mess, of course, grew out of the fight over freeways in the District and the 

feeling of Mr. Natcher and the House Public Works Committee that they had been 

doublecrossed on the freeway program. As far as we can tell, the legislation passed this 

year [1970] has mollified the Public Works Committee. But it seems to have had no 

impact on Mr. Natcher. It is beginning to look more and more as if he doesn’t want a 

rapid transit system built at all, despite his often repeated remarks that he’s all for it.

The damage was not limited to the District since it affected Maryland and Virginia as well.

The editorial concluded by listing the other members of the District appropriations 

subcommittee, “a majority of whom seem eager to strangle this community’s rapid transit system 

in its crib.” The list:

They are William H. Natcher of Bowling Green, Ky.; Robert N. Giaimo of New Haven, 

Conn.; Edward J. Patten of Perth Amboy, N.J.; David Pryor of Camden, Ark.; David R. 

Obey of Wausau, Wis.; Glenn R. David of Waukesha, Wis; Donald R. Riegle, Jr. of Flint, 

Mich.; and Wendall Wyatt of Astoria. Ore. 

Messers Natcher, Giaimo and Patten have residences in the District; Mr. Wyatt lives in 

Fairfax County, Mr. Riegel [sic] in McLean, and Messrs. Obey, David, and Pryor in 

Arlington. [“Strangling Metro in Its Crib,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

January 2, 1971] 

On January 2, after WMATA released its new estimate, Secretary Volpe wrote to General 

Graham to ask the Metro Board to take no action on its budget until he had a chance to review it 

and offer possible alternatives for finding the extra $510 million. He was concerned about “the 

mounting jeopardy into which the long-range financial plan . . . appears recently to have fallen.”

An aide said the Secretary’s goal was to expedite construction. WMATA officials were 

encouraged by his involvement since Nixon Administration support was essential to finding a 

way of keeping the project moving forward. [Eisen, Jack, “Volpe to Review Metro Cost Crisis,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 5, 1971] 

When a jurisdiction did not make its contribution on time, WMATA assessed a penalty. With 

the District share on hold, other jurisdictions were hesitant to make payments that would end up 

idle and kept in an account earning 6 percent interest. As of January 1971, penalties totaled 

$590,000. The District was incurring a penalty of $2,000 a day. 

In Maryland, the State and counties were arguing over whether the $10 million payment was a 

grant or, as the State maintained, a loan. In addition, Governor Mandel, who chaired the threemember State Board of Public Works, added. “Our sources in Washington tell us the price will 
be closer to $4 billion than $2.9 billion, and this will require a tremendous amount of money 

from within the State somewhere.” Maryland was not willing to make further payments until 

WMATA released a long-range spending plan that covered the likely cost of $4 billion. The 

public works board, which had to approve all such expenditures, had refused to release the funds 

without the long-range plan. Comptroller Goldstein, a member of the board, said, “We got to 

have that information because otherwise our contribution will be a shot in the dark.” [Rowland, 

James B., “Subway Funds Hit New Snag,” The Evening Star, January 24, 1971; Kneece, Jack, 

“A Way Out of Subway Fund Crisis Proposed,” The Sunday Star, January 31, 1971] 

The immediate problem was Chairman Natcher. As Professor Schrag pointed out, “Natcher’s 

thinking remained mysterious” even as he once again withheld subway construction funds: 

He refused to talk to reporters, and in both his public statements and private journals he 

gave shifting, contradictory reasons for withholding the appropriation. At times he 

expressed concern about cost overruns, predicting a total cost of more than $5 billion, 

rather than the $2.5 billion then projected by WMATA. At other times, he claimed that 

“there is not a man, woman or child in the city of Washington that is stronger for a rapid 

rail system than I am,” but he simply felt obliged to defend the honor of the House of 

Representatives. By 1971, Natcher had convinced himself that support for Metro came 

mainly from “big banks, large brokerage firms and big law firms,” or possibly the Mafia, 

who presumably were seeking illicit gain. Daniel Inouye, Natcher’s counterpart in the 

Senate [having replaced Senator Proxmire as chairman at the start of the 92nd Congress], 

speculated that Natcher simply feared the shame of a headline reading “Natcher Gives 

In.” Perhaps most of all, Natcher wanted the highway acts enforced as a matter of law 

and order. He was an old-time southern Democrat, increasingly uneasy in a majorityblack city whose residents were gaining political power by the day. Building the 

highways would prove that “our Capital City is under the jurisdiction of the Congress of 

the United States and not under the jurisdiction of the looters and the burners who have 

no respect for this city.” [Schrag, pages 136-137] 

Funding aside, WMATA was still trying to resolve concerns about minority contracting, hiring, 

and training. On September 4, 1970, Jack Eisen had reported that, “Washington’s Metro subway 

agency and Project Build, a union-sponsored manpower training program, have reached a 

preliminary agreement on the training of unskilled workers for craft jobs on the subway.” Jack 

Brown, WMATA’s equal employment opportunity officer, disclosed the plan to the board on 

September 3. Project Build would provide an 8-week pre-apprenticeship program for 40 workers 

in skills needed on the project. Contractors would then hire the trained workers. Crafts were 

carpenters, cement masons, electricians, operating engineers and iron workers. The Department 

of Labor was providing funds for the training. Under the Washington Plan agreed to with the 

Labor Department, the hard-core unemployed were to comprise at least 5 percent of the subway 

work force. [Eisen, Jack, “Unskilled Training Plan Set,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, September 4, 1970] 

On October 22, WMATA Chairman Yeldell told Brown, “I’m totally dissatisfied” with the lack 

of progress in involving minority groups in the project. Brown informed the board that only one 

minority firm had received a subcontract and that was for $20,000. Further, WMATA did not yet 
have final agreement on training of the hard-core unemployed. Contractors were to submit 

employment plans within 90 days of signing their contract, but none had yet done so. Stephen 

Green reported:

Yeldell said that unless the minority work situation changes, the entire metro program 

will be committed to contractors before minorities are involved at all.

Herbert E. Harris of Fairfax and Charles Beatley of Alexandria, members of the subway 

board, said they “applauded” Yeldell’s position. 

“There’s only so much one man can do,” Brown said. Yeldell and Carlton Sickles, 

authority vice chairman, suggested that Brown ask the directors for help if it is needed. 

He said the reason minority firms had difficulty securing contracts or subcontracts was their 

difficulty obtaining bonding and insurance: 

Jackson Graham, general manager of the authority, said that “historically” minority 

contractors are not interested in heavy construction work. Yeldell replied that they are 

interested but have been barred from obtaining contracts. [Green, Stephen, “Subway 

Minority Hiring Inadequate, Yeldell Says,” The Evening Star, October 22, 1970] 

A week later, Chairman Yeldell had confirmation of the problem for minority contractors. 

Minority Truckers, a combine formed a few weeks earlier by 21 minority-owned trucking firms 

to secure contracts on the Metro construction work, informed him that it could not obtain a 

multi-million subtract because it was unable to secure bonding within 5 days, as required by the 

prime contractor, Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc., on a $38 million contract to build the station at Metro 

Center. Kiewit replaced Minority Truckers with a white-owned firm that was able to secure 

bonding. The experience suggested to Chairman Yeldell that WMATA would have to get 

involved in bonding issues to “break the cycle” that had frozen minority contractors out of the 

work. [Eisen, Jack, “Bond Blocks Black Group In Metro Job,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, October 30, 1970; Green, Stephen, “Blacks Lose Metro Pact Over Bonding,” The 

Evening Star, October 29, 1970] 

On November 5, WMATA’s board considered the agreement provided by the U.S. Department 

of Transportation to make the $57 million loan official. The agreement required development of 

a far-reaching plan for involving minority groups in the construction work, as described by 

Stephen Green:

The department’s plan would have the transit authority train persons to qualify as 

journeymen in skilled crafts “through appropriate on-the-job and other training in 

connection with the construction of the Metro subway system.” 

It also would have the transit authority work with minority businesses to aid them in 

obtaining subway contracts. 
It also would have the transit authority submit to federal officials a program for the hiring 

of minority group members on the subway agency staff. [Green, Stephen, “Area Subway 

Panel Is Told to Develop Minority Job Plan,” The Evening Star, November 5, 1970] 

The Washington Area Construction Industry Task Force, which had focused on hiring for 

construction work, filed a suit in U.S. District Court charging that WMATA had discriminated in 

staff hiring and promotion. Joined by black engineer James Samuda, the task force alleged that 

WMATA “discriminated on the basis of race with respect to the hiring and promotion of 

professional and nonprofessional members of the staff.” Attorney Clifford Alexander called it 

“outright discrimination” in staff hiring and promotion policies.” 

WMATA had 236 authorized staff positions. Only 205 were filled at the time of the suit, but of 

130 professional positions, blacks held fewer than 10 positions. Of the 75 nonprofessional jobs, 

blacks held 35. Further, of the 70 staffers earning more than $20,000 a year, only one was black. 

Figures from WMATA identified 20 of 142 professional jobs and 35 of 63 nonprofessional jobs, 

but defined “minority group members” to include Oriental and Spanish-speaking employees.

Samuda claimed he had been approached in June and asked to apply for a position. He was, the 

suit claimed, “led to believe that he would shortly be offered a specific position on the authority 

staff.” However, on June 29, his application was rejected “without adequate explanation.” 

The Star reported: 

The suit asks for a ruling that WMATA has infringed the rights of the plaintiffs and for 

an injunction against future such infringement. It also asks the court to order WMATA to 

submit an affirmative action plan for hiring blacks to the staff in numbers “which shall 

reflect approximately the percentage of black residents of Washington, D.C. 

The suit also sought an order that Metro establish a program to “actively and in good faith . . . 

seek out and recruit black residents of Washington” until their percentage equaled the black 

population of the city, about two-thirds of all residents. Plaintiffs also asked the court to prohibit 

Metro from hiring or promoting any white employees “to eliminate the effects of past racial 

discrimination.” [Kalb, Barry, “Metro Accused of Bias In Hiring for Subway,” The Evening 

Star, December 12, 1970; Eisen, Jack, “Suit Assails Metro On Staff Job Bias,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, December 12, 1970] 

A few days later, the Star reported that WMATA was working on a plan to set up a special panel 

of consultants to help black-owned businesses secure contracts. WMATA, by law, had to treat 

all bidders equally, but by setting up the separate panel, the agency could provide help black 

contractors overcome obstacles such as submitting competitive bids and securing bonds. “Blackowned firms, so far have received only $300,000 in contracts from WMATA, compared with a 

total of more than $18 million in subcontracts let.” WMATA expected that funds for the panel 

might come from the Federal government or a private foundation. [“Metro Maps Steps to Aid 

Black Firms,” The Evening Star, December 19, 1970] 
The Metro Revolt Begins

At the end of 1970, Star editors described Metro as being at a critical junction. Virginia’s 

Alexandria, Arlington, and Fairfax Counties had delivered checks to WMATA for their 1971 

share. Nevertheless, they shared Maryland’s concern about “the incredible performance of 

Congress” in holding District matching funds “hostage.” The editors feared, “The whole subway 

endeavor could soon come to a standstill.” 

Only Chairman Natcher can shore up the project. “Surely he perceives the intolerable losses – 

possibly fatal to the undertaking – that could result from a delay at this critical point.” Although 

Congress had authorized $68.4 million for the Federal share, the funds could not be used without 

the District’s match. “Success of the program depends on continuance of the finely balanced 

multi-jurisdictional participation that has been worked out, on keeping ahead of inflationary 

erosion and avoidance of contracting delays.” 

Congress had postponed a decision on the North-Central Freeway by ordering a study. “We hope 

that Natcher will ascertain that there is some motion on the freeway question – all that is 

immediately attainable – and will turn the subway money loose.” [“Critical Subway Juncture,” 

The Evening Star, December 30, 1970] 

As the 92nd Congress arrived in Washington to organize, District officials could contemplate the 

possibility that Chairman Natcher would leave the District appropriations subcommittee for 

chairmanship of another subcommittee. Following the 1970 election, rumors had suggested he 

would do so, thus leaving the post where he had caused so many problems by withholding 

District funds for the subway to force the city to build its freeway system. However, as 

committee memberships changed, his retention of his position became clear in early February. 

He refused to comment.

Representatives Patten and Riegle left the subcommittee, which gained several members: 

Representatives Louis Stokes (D-Oh.), K. Gunn McKay (D-Ut.), Robert C. McEwen (R-NY), 

John T. Myers (R-In.), and William J. Scherle (R-Ia.). [“Natcher To Stay As Chairman of D.C. 

Panel,” The Evening Star, February 9, 1971; “Natcher Retains Unit Chairmanship,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, February 10, 1971. 

By 1971, Chairman Natcher saw his support lessening in Maryland and Virginia. Both States 

supported Metro, but the congressional insistence on construction of the North-Central Freeway 

in the District implied that Maryland would build the increasingly unpopular link between the 

District line and the Capital Beltway:

As suburbanites turned against that project, their elected representatives turned against 

Natcher. The vast majority of the Montgomery County delegation to the Maryland 

legislature proclaimed that the North Central Freeway “involves directly the interests of 

Maryland and her citizens, more particularly those residing in Montgomery County, and 

the decision should be made at the state and local levels,” not by congressmen from 

Kentucky and Illinois [Chairman Kluczynski]. One Prince George’s County state senator 
wondered if it wasn’t time for local congressmen to start blocking federal projects in 

Natcher’s home district. [Schrag, page 138] 

As Professor Schrag added, the difference between the District of Columbia and its neighboring 

States was that unlike the District, they, then as now, had representatives in the House and Senate 

who could vote the interests of their constituents. Representative Gude, recognizing that his 

constituents had turned against I-70S inside the Capital Beltway, encouraged his colleagues on 

the District Committee to judge each program on its merits. In Virginia, Representative Broyhill 

had supported construction I-66 inside the Capital Beltway and the I-266/Three Sisters Bridge:

Through 1970 Broyhill continued to scold the District government for not building 

freeways, but Broyhill had been burned by Natcher’s caprice, and by a close reelection 

that November in which the freeway issue cost him some votes. Now, in the spring of 

1971, even he wanted to separate the issues of subway and freeway construction. 

[Schrag, page 138] 

At the same time, the White House was increasingly frustrated with the stubborn Congressman: 

Nixon himself had no desire to get entangled in what he saw as a local issue. But daily 

liaison between the White House and the District was handled by Egil Krogh, Jr., a young 

lawyer from Seattle who had taken over D.C. duties from Moynihan. Krogh had fallen in 

love with the city and had been impressed by the demonstrations against the Three Sisters 

Bridge. He did not want to see the District surrender to blackmail. [Schrag, page 137] 

Moynihan left his post as counselor to the President on December 30, 1970, to return to Harvard. 

Within Chairman Natcher’s subcommittee, Representative Giaimo, the second ranking 

Democrat, and a new member, Representative Obey, were planning a revolt. Representative 

Obey had been a State legislator when President Nixon, in December 1968, selected 

Representative Melvin R. Laird (R-Wi.) to be Secretary of Defense. In the special election to 

replace Representative Laird, the 30-year old Obey won. When he took the oath of office on 

April 1, 1969, he was the youngest Member of Congress and the first Democrat to represent his 

northwestern Wisconsin district, which included Superior and Wausau. He and his wife Joan, 

along with their young son, moved to the Washington area where they rented a home in 

Arlington. 

After an initial stint on the Public Works Committee, he was assigned to the Appropriations 

Committee at the start of the 92nd Congress and to Chairman Natcher’s District Appropriations 

Subcommittee. In his autobiography, Representative Obey described the chairman as a 

“respected, courtly, tough-minded Kentuckian.” Although new to the Washington area, 

Representative Obey quickly sided with subway advocates and those who opposed the Three 

Sisters Bridge:

Georgetown was already strangling in traffic, and the District Government was resisting 

the construction of the new bridge . . . . It was also obvious to me that obliterating the 
beauty of Spout Run by adding more lanes to the traffic and dumping even more cars into 

Georgetown’s clogged streets was the wrong thing to do. 

Representative Obey did not agree with Chairman Natcher’s decision to withhold subway funds: 

As the most junior member of the subcommittee, I reluctantly acquiesced in Natcher’s 

decision because I felt there was no way I could change the outcome. But when the 

dispute spilled over into another year [1971], it became apparent that further delay would 

raise construction costs due to inflation . . . . When Natcher made clear that he intended 

to continue denying funds for the desperately needed subway system, I decided that, win 

or lose, I was going to start a fight by offering an amendment to the D.C. Appropriations 

bill restoring the needed funds. 

He decided to approach Representative Giaimo, an attorney who had won election to the House 

in 1958 and was a strong supporter of Metro. Professor Schrag said of Representative Giaimo:

Giaimo knew full well the customs of the committee. “You be quiet,” he was told, ‘you 

get along, you go along, you don’t make any waves, you certainly don’t challenge your 

sub-committee chairmen and your committee chairman with amendments.” Only 

gradually did Giaimo emerge as a rebel. In August 1969 he wrote a constituent that “the 

anti-highway people blithely ignored the will of Congress,” and that “Congress, not 

Mr. Natcher,” had withheld the Metro funds as a means of overcoming “a noisy militant 

minority.” A year later, at the beginning of the second impasse, he began to tilt. While 

highways had their place, he wrote, “the citizens of the District ought to be able to set 

their own public policy – making these crucial decisions in accordance with their own 

view of their best interests – even if they have to make their own mistakes.” And by the 

spring of 1971, with Metro’s future obviously at risk, he was fed up with Natcher’s 

blackmail. “Bill,” he told his chairman, “it’s unconscionable. We can’t hold up the 

Metro. We’re going to need Metro in this town.” [Schrag, pages 138-139] 

Representative Obey described his discussion with Representative Giaimo: 

I called Giaimo and told him that I could not continue to allow Natcher to go 

unchallenged on the issue. “I intend to offer an amendment unleashing the subway if 

I have to, Bob,” I told him, “but the amendment should really come from you. People 

will listen to you who don’t even know who I am,” I told him. 

“God, I agree with you,” Bob said, “but taking on Natcher is damn near death defying in 

this place. You don’t know him like I do. He never forgets who crosses him, and we will 

pay a hell of a price if we take him on – especially if we lose – and the odds of our 

overturning him are damn slim.” “I know that,” I told Bob, “but a few years from now if 

Spout run is destroyed and Georgetown is a mess, I will wish to hell I had done 

something.” 
They agreed to act fast. Representative Giaimo was leaving for Connecticut, but suggested that 

Representative Obey arrange a meeting to work out a plan with other members of the 

subcommittee, the Mayor’s office, WMATA, and the White House: 

When I made my calls, I found little interest from other subcommittee members. When 

I called the office of deputy mayor Graham Watt to ask them to send someone to a 

strategy meeting, they reacted like I had leprosy. “Oh no, we can’t send anybody,” they 

said. “We can’t risk antagonizing the chairman.” 

“You have to be kidding,” I said. “You want the money; the Subway Authority wants the 

money; you expect us to antagonize Natcher, but you don’t have the guts to do the same 

thing?” I asked. Then I told them, “Look, the meeting is going to be held whether you 

come or not. We’re sticking our necks out whether you do or not, but if you don’t come, 

I will tell a press conference that the mayor’s office is an Uncle Tom operation.” The 

next week they showed up at the meeting. 

The White House agreed to send their District liaison, Krogh, and convinced Speaker of the 

House Albert, who persuaded Chairman Mahon of the Appropriations Committee, regarding the 

revolt. Representative Giaimo, Obey, and their coconspirators had to await their moment. 

[Obey, David R., Raising Hell for Justice: The Washington Battles of a Heartland Progressive, 

The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007, pages 136-137]