SYRIA 

 

 

 

 Report Special 

April 2013 

THE U.S. 

COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL 

RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM 

was created by the 

International 

Religious Freedom Act 

of 1998 to monitor the 

status of freedom of 

thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief 

abroad, as defined in 

the Universal 

Declaration of Human 

Rights and related 

international 

instruments, and to 

give independent policy 

recommendations to 

the President, 

Secretary of State, 

and Congress.

732 N. Capitol St. N.W. , 

Suite A714 

Washington, D.C. 20401 

Phone: (202) 786-0613 

Communications@uscirf.gov

www.uscirf.gov 

April 2013 

 Protecting and 

Promoting 

Religious 

Freedom in Syria 
 April 2013 

Report 

Special 

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Due to the intensifying conflict between government forces and affiliates supporting Bashar alAssad’s regime and anti-government elements seeking his overthrow, the Syrian people have 

experienced egregious violations of human rights, including freedom of religion or belief. 

Government forces and affiliated militias have perpetrated religiously-motivated attacks against 

Sunni Muslim civilians and members of religious minority communities, and have increased 

sectarian divides through rhetoric and religiously-motivated violence. In this context, USCIRF 

has become increasingly concerned about religious freedom conditions in Syria, both during the 

current crisis and in its aftermath. This report provides USCIRF’s preliminary findings and 

recommendations. Over the coming months, USCIRF will continue to monitor the situation, and 

expects to issue additional reports and recommendations. 

The escalating violence and humanitarian crisis impacts members of all religious communities, 

including their religious freedom. Syria has historically been a religiously diverse country with a 

pre-conflict estimated population of 22 million, who traditionally lived together without religious 

or sectarian animosities. The largest religious community is Sunni Muslims, who constitute 

roughly 75% of the population. Alawites, who follow an offshoot of Shi’i Islam, are 

approximately 12%, and various Christian denominations are 10%. Other religious communities 

in the country include Druze (4%); Yezidis (1%), who the government categorizes as Muslims; 

and a very small Jewish community found in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo. 

The Syrian conflict, which began in March 2011, was declared by the International Committee of 

the Red Cross (ICRC) on July 15, 2012 as a “non-international armed conflict,” the legal term 

for “civil war.” The fighting has caused a humanitarian disaster, with over 70,000 people dead 

(February 2013 estimate), at least 3.6 million internally displaced, and approximately 1.3 million 

as refugees in neighboring countries. The international community, including the ICRC, the UN 

Human Rights Council’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 

Republic, and numerous NGOs, agree that the al-Assad regime has violated its obligations under 

the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, including committing crimes against 

humanity, such as extrajudicial killings, rape and torture. They have also found that groups 

seeking the overthrow of the al-Assad regime have committed similar acts, but on a lesser scale. 

The increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict has created a climate where the human rights of 

all Syrians, including religious freedom, have been violated. The conflict also threatens Syria’s 

religious diversity, as members of the smallest minority communities are either fleeing the 

country or face an uncertain future in a post al-Assad Syria. 

 

Syria’s transition from armed conflict to a representative democracy under rule of law will be 

difficult, arduous, and remains uncertain. U.S. leadership is vital, both to press the al-Assad 

government to cease its severe human rights violations and to ensure that any future government 

protects human rights and religious freedoms for all Syrians. The United States should, along 

with its other efforts during the conflict, highlight the importance of respecting religious freedom 

and the rights of minority religious communities. The United States and other donor nations 

should target assistance to civil society actors, opposition members, and religious groups that 

espouse the rule of law, human rights, including religious freedom, and a pluralistic Syria. 

Additionally, the United States and other donor counties should prioritize programs that promote 

minority rights, interfaith cooperation, peace-building, and legal and human rights education and 

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training, as well as a robust and transparent program that documents human right violations. If 

the United States concludes that particularly severe violations of religious freedom are engaged 

in or tolerated by the Syrian government, the Secretary of State should consider designating 

Syria a CPC and modify existing targeted sanctions to reference religious freedom violations. 

The United States should increase efforts to assist Syrians who are internally displaced or have 

sought refuge in neighboring countries. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy toward 

Syria can be found at the end of this report. 

BACKGROUND

The al-Assad family’s brutal authoritarian rule for over 40 years created the political conditions 

for the current conflict. Under both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, no political opposition was 

allowed and Syrian security forces were permitted to perpetrate egregious human rights abuses to 

oppress anyone critical of the government. An adherent of the minority Alawite community, 

which is affiliated with Shi’i Islam, Hafez al-Assad named himself president in 1970. To 

maintain control over all aspects of Syrian society, he placed Alawites loyal to him in key 

positions of his government, army, and security forces and oppressed political opposition from 

the majority Sunni Muslim population. 

Following Hafez’s June 2000 death, he was succeeded by his son, Bashar. While there were 

hopes that Bashar al-Assad would usher in a new political openness, he maintained his father’s 

status quo of strict political restrictions to oppress any opposition. 

Prior to the current war, Syria offered a modicum of freedom of religion, including worship, 

particularly for Syria’s smallest religious minority communities, including Christians. However, 

the government controlled the selection of Sunni Muslim imams and limited their religious 

freedoms. According to the 2012 constitution, while there is no official religion, Article 3 

requires that the president be a Muslim and declares that “Islamic jurisprudence shall be a major 

source of legislation.” Article 3 also states “the State shall respect all religions, and ensure the 

freedom to perform all the rituals that do not prejudice public order; The personal status of 

religious communities shall be protected and respected.” Article 33 states that Syrian citizens 

shall not be discriminated against based on religion or creed, among other grounds. 

ESCALATING SECTARIANISM

The initial peaceful protests in March 2011 by disenfranchised, largely Sunni Muslim opponents 

of the al-Assad regime had no religious or sectarian undertones. Protestors called for the repeal 

of the abusive emergency law, space for political parties, and the resignation of President Bashar 

al-Assad. As the protests grew, President al-Assad ordered an increasingly violent crackdown 

and he and his regime played on sectarian fears, repeatedly stating it was fighting “extreme 

Islamist factions” that were acting to increase sectarian tensions. The use of sectarian and 

religiously-oriented language by al-Assad and his supporters has continued throughout the 

conflict. Most recently in March 2013, the government backed Supreme Iftaa Council issued a 

fatwa (religious edict) calling for “jihad” to defend al-Assad’s government. 

The regime’s 40-plus years of repressing the Sunni majority and its policy to exacerbate 

sectarian tensions before and during the current conflict has deepened the hostilities among all of 

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Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic communities. The government’s language and violence have 

caused protesters and opposition forces to increasingly view the violence as an Alawite-led 

attack on Sunni Muslims. Many minority religious communities have tried to stay neutral in the 

conflict, but opposition forces increasingly see their non-alignment, or perceived non-alignment, 

as support for the al-Assad regime. Minority religious communities thus have been forced by 

circumstances to take a position either in favor of the al-Assad regime, which historically 

provided them some religious freedom protections, or in favor of the uncertainties of the 

opposition. As these sectarian fissures deepen, it is increasingly likely that religious 

communities will be targeted not for their political allegiances, but solely for their religious 

affiliation. 

The December 2012 report of the UN Human Rights Council’s Independent International 

Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic noted the increasingly sectarian nature of 

the conflict. It found that “[a]s battles between Government forces and anti-Government armed 

groups approach the end of their second year, the conflict has become overtly sectarian in 

nature.” The Commission of Inquiry also found that regime forces and their militias have 

attacked civilians because they were Sunnis. One interviewee stated a pro-regime militia told 

her that “they would kill all Sunnis in the region and that the area belonged to them.” The 

Commission of Inquiry also received “credible reports of anti-Government armed groups 

attacking Alawites and other pro-Government minority communities.” 

The Commission of Inquiry concluded that “[e]ntire [religious] communities are at risk of being 

forced out of the country or of being killed inside the country,” adding that these communities 

believe “not without cause, that they face an existential threat.” Because of this fear, minority 

communities are increasingly becoming parties to the conflict, forced to choose sides, which 

leads to armed clashes and exacerbates sectarian divisions. The Commission of Inquiry also 

noted that “[s]ome minority communities, notably the Alawites and Christians, have formed 

armed self-defense groups to protect their neighborhoods from anti-Government fighters.” 

Regime Supporters 

The Syrian government has a large army and sophisticated security apparatus, although its size 

and strength has considerably decreased from deaths and defections. In addition, Syrian 

government forces are supported by various pro-regime militias, most of which are directly 

funded and armed by the regime or its foreign government allies, and have a sectarian character. 

In part because of the actions of these militias, minority communities increasingly believe they 

are targeted for their religious or ethnic affiliation. 

The most notable domestic militias are the U.S. designated terrorist organizations, Jaysh alSha’bi and Shabiha. The Jaysh al-Sha’bi is a militia of Syrian civilian volunteers, the vast 

majority of whom are Alawite or Shi’a. While the group operates under the Syrian regime, it is 

also supported by Iran and Hezbollah. Shabiha, which loosely translates to “thugs,” are smaller, 

regime-funded groups, with less organization and training. The Shabiha are primarily drawn 

from the Alawite and Shi’i communities, but Sunni Muslims loyal to the regime are also believed 

to participate. 

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In August 2012, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 

Republic found “reasonable grounds to believe that Government forces and the Shabiha had 

committed the crimes against humanity of murder and of torture, war crimes and gross violations 

of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including unlawful killing, 

torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual violence, indiscriminate attack, pillaging and 

destruction of property.” 

Opposition Forces 

Over the last two years millions of Syrians have risen up against the al-Assad regime. Dozens of 

groups, domestic and foreign, have emerged in opposition to the regime, varying widely in 

composition, where they are drawn from, and goals. Some of these groups, including the 

internationally-recognized Syrian Opposition Council, espouse democratic reform. Others, 

however, are motivated by religious ideologies espousing violence, such as the U.S-designated 

terrorist organization al-Nusra Front. The varied nature of these groups affects their ability to 

find consensus and work together, further complicating the current and future situation for 

human rights and religious freedom in Syria. 

The Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) is recognized by the United States and over a hundred 

other countries as the legitimate representative body of the Syrian people. According to the State 

Department, the SOC “includes opponents of the al-Assad regime from across the political and 

ethno-sectarian spectrum, has made real progress since its founding, and is stepping up its 

outreach to women, minorities, religious leaders and civil society.” The SOC is led by a 

president, a prime minister, two vice presidents and a secretary general. Elements of the Free 

Syrian Army report to this structure. 

Additionally, localized councils and courts have been established in areas controlled by the 

opposition. NGOs report that several different anti-government opposition groups have 

established Shari’ah courts in different liberated areas of Syria. These generally operate in areas 

where civil law systems have not been reestablished, after the regime system of governance was 

removed. 

In addition to the SOC, there are other movements and groups opposing the al-Assad regime. 

The most violent and well-armed militant opposition group is considered to be the al-Nusra 

Front, also known as Jabhat al-Nusra, which is responsible for the worst sectarian violence and 

religiously-motivated rhetoric. Al-Nusra has claimed responsibility for several high-profile 

opposition bombings since the start of the crisis. In February 2012 Aleppo bombings that killed 

over 25 people, both military and civilian, and injured 200 more, and the January 2012 al-Midan 

bombing that killed 26 and injured dozens more civilians. 

In December 2012, the State Department included the al-Nusra Front as an alias to al-Qaeda in 

Iraq (AQI), in effect listing al-Nusra as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Executive Order 

13224. It has no history in Syria, and aims to overthrow the al-Assad regime and replace it with 

an Islamic state based on its understanding of the Qur’an and Shari’ah law. In April 2013, Abu 

Mohammad al-Golani, leader of al-Nusra, publicly pledged the group’s loyalty to al-Qaeda 

leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and acknowledged the group receives logistical support and training 

from AQI. In addition, AQI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced that AQI and al-Nusra 

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were forming a new entity called “The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.” The declaration 

suggests that al-Qaeda and al-Nusra view areas of Syria they control as part of an Islamic “state” 

to be governed by their understanding of Islamic law. The SOC leadership rejected this 

announcement, and these recent developments deepen divides between moderate opposition 

forces and ideologically extremist groups that are infiltrating Syria. Efforts by Al-Nusra, alQaeda and other domestic and foreign groups to force their extremist political ideologies based 

on their interpretation of Islam onto the population threatens the future for human rights and 

religious freedom in a post-Assad Syria. 

Various countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, reportedly are actively supporting 

various opposition groups, sometimes doing so in competition with each other. These nations 

provide funding, technical support or fighters, or are complicit by allowing their traffic routes to 

be used to get support to the opposition. Observers have accused these countries of interfering in 

the formation of the SOC and its elected leadership. 

Al-Assad and his most loyal supporters, predominately Alawites associated with the Ba’athist 

political party, appear to see opposition forces, predominately Sunni Muslims, as a threat not 

only to their ability to remain in power, but also to the very existence of their religious 

community in Syria. However, the Alawite community is not monolithic. Some Alawite elites 

have abandoned the al-Assad regime for the opposition and denounced the violence perpetrated 

against civilians. In March 2013, a group of Alawites opposed to al-Assad and supporting a 

democratic alternative met in Cairo to discuss a declaration supporting a united Syria and 

preventing sectarian revenge attacks. 

INCREASING RHETORIC AND VIOLENCE ALONG RELIGIOUS LINES

Over time, the Syrian conflict has become increasingly polarized and violent, not just between 

pro-Assad and opposition forces but also along sectarian religious and ethnic lines. Political 

rhetoric with religious and ethnic undertones has increased, as has the inflow of foreign elements 

with sectarian and extremist agendas. Given the current state of the civil war, it is often difficult 

to ascertain if violent attacks are due to a group’s particular religious or ethnic background or its 

allegiance to a specific side. Religious and ethnic identities are interwoven into the political 

aspects of the conflict, and city suburbs and neighborhoods tend to be dominated by specific 

religious or ethnic groups. Nevertheless, it is clear that sectarianism is increasing and 

religiously-motivated attacks are being perpetrated by the al-Assad regime and its proxies, as 

well as at times by opposition forces seeking his overthrow, resulting in severe violations of 

religious freedom. These violations also threaten Syria’s religious diversity by increasing the 

likelihood of religiously-motivated violence and retaliation continuing in a post-al-Assad Syria, 

where religious minorities will be particularly vulnerable. 

 

Sectarian Rhetoric 

Prior to and during the current conflict, the al-Assad regime continuously labeled the opposition 

as terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists intent on turning Syria into an Islamic state. In 

speeches before the Syrian parliament and in other settings, Bashar al-Assad stoked fears about 

sectarian differences in Syria and evoked the plight of Christians and other smaller religious 

communities in Egypt and Iraq as an example of what will happen to them if the opposition takes 

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control. In addition, anti-regime activists have reported that the al-Assad regime plants 

individuals within refugee camps and in key localities within Syria to play on sectarian fears. In 

late December 2012, Time Magazine reported allegations that the al-Assad regime and local 

government officials provide up to $500 per month to individuals to pose as opposition 

supporters and graffiti buildings or chant slogans at protests including “The Christians to Beirut, 

the Alawites to the grave.” 

While it is the policy of the al-Assad regime to use sectarian language, it is not the policy of the 

SOC. However, opposition elements have used rhetoric and extremist iconography to rouse 

Sunni Muslims in the country and abroad. Fighters describing themselves as part of the Free 

Syrian Army released several videos on YouTube claiming Alawites are “dogs” responsible for 

the “massacre of Sunni Imams.” Additionally, in late December 2012, a rebel force believed to 

be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood released a video titled “Warning mainly Christian 

cities in the province of Hama.” The video threatened attacks on the Christian towns of Mahrada 

and Sqaulbiyeh if they continue to support and house pro-al-Assad forces. 

 

Targeted religiously-motivated attacks 

As previously discussed, the nature of the conflict in Syria makes it difficult to determine 

whether attacks are based on political, ethnic, or religious affiliation, or some combination 

thereof. Nevertheless, both pro- and anti-government forces have been accused of perpetrating 

religiously-motivated attacks. Religious communities have cited the large number of civilians 

killed in certain attacks as evidence that some violence is due to religion and not connected to a 

specific side of the conflict. In September 2012, the London-based Syrian Network for Human 

Rights reported that the al-Assad regime and its militia affiliates had destroyed more than 

500,000 buildings—including homes, schools, mosques, churches, and hospitals—with 

thousands more severely damaged. 

The al-Assad regime, including its army, security forces and related militias, allegedly has 

targeted Sunni Muslims in an attempt to quell the political opposition. On May 25, 2012, in 

what has become known as the Houla massacre, 108 Sunni Muslims, including 49 children, were 

killed in two opposition-controlled villages in the Houla region of Syria just north of Homs. In 

the aftermath, the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) determined that most 

of the victims had been “summarily executed” and “entire families were shot in their houses,” 

and that regime-supported Shabiha were the most likely perpetrators. Reportedly some victims 

had pro Shi’a or regime slogans carved into their foreheads. In June 2012, in the al-Qubair 

massacre, regime supporters allegedly killed 78 Sunni Muslims, including many women and 

children. When UNSMIS tried to enter the village to confirm the incident, they were fired on by 

regime supporters and had to withdraw. In July 2012, more than 200 Syrians, mostly Sunni 

Muslim civilians, were killed in a village in the opposition-held Hama region. The Syrian army 

attacked the village with helicopters and tanks, followed by militia forces reportedly killing 

civilians including women and children “execution style.” In January 2012, in Karm al-Zeitoun, 

Homs, a Shabiha group either shot or hacked to death 14 members of the same Sunni Muslim 

family, including eight children. 

In February 2012, the newspaper al-Arabiya reported that al-Assad security forces raided the 

historic Syriac Orthodox Um al-Zennar Church in Homs and confiscated property. In September 

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of 2012, a Sunni mosque was destroyed in Aleppo. In October 2012, a car bomb targeted 

civilians gathered outside the al-Zaitoona mosque in a Damascus suburb. Scores of individuals 

participating in a funeral procession and protesting the torturing to death of a civilian were killed. 

Non-state actors, particularly the foreign elements that have flowed into Syria, also have 

perpetrated religiously-motivated attacks, although to a lesser degree than the regime. A 

December 2012 video released by Saudi-sponsored Takfiri Wahhabi, a Sunni opposition group, 

shows a Shi’i mosque that was burned down and dozens of individuals congratulating each other. 

Also in December, a suicide bomber detonated explosives in a Damascus suburb wounding 14 

people and damaging one of Shi’i Islam’s holiest shrines, a mausoleum of the Prophet’s 

Muhammad’s granddaughter. In January 2013, the NGO Human Rights Watch reported that 

opposition forces destroyed and looted minority religious sites in northern Syria. Human Rights 

Watch also reported that two churches were stormed and ransacked in the villages of Ghasaniyeh 

and Jdeideh, in the region of Lattakia, in November and December 2012. In January 2013 the 

NGO Shi’a Rights Watch reported that Saudi-supported opposition forces burned down the 

shrine of Lady Sakina, the daughter of Shi’i Islam’s first Imam, Imam Ali, in Daraya. 

There are also several alarming incidents where neither the opposition nor the regime claimed 

responsibility, and blamed the other side for the act. In late March 2013 a suicide bomber 

detonated a bomb inside Iman Mosque in Damascus where a senior pro-government Sunni 

Muslim cleric, Sheik Muhammad Bouti, was giving a lecture. Bouti and 42 other people were 

killed and over 80 individuals were seriously wounded. The Free Syrian Army denied that it or 

any of its affiliates were responsible for the attack. Some independent Syrian bloggers posited 

that the act was a covert action by the al-Assad regime to further portray opposition fighters as 

terrorists. 

Also in late March, the 2,000-year-old Jobar Synagogue in Damascus was looted and damaged. 

According to press accounts, the Syrian army and opposition forces each blamed the other for 

destroying the ancient religious site. 

Various reports indicate that the Christian population of the city of Homs—approximately 

160,000—has almost entirely fled for safety, with reports suggesting that only 1,000 Christians 

remain. In late 2012, opposition forces reportedly attacked churches and occupied as safe houses 

an evangelical school and a home for the elderly in Homs. 

There also have been attacks against Christian clergy, including murders and kidnappings, as 

well as attacks and desecrations of churches. However, neither the al-Assad regime nor the 

opposition took credit for these attacks and no clear motive is known. In September 2012, Greek 

Orthodox priest Fadi Jamil Haddad was found killed outside of Damascus, where he had been 

trying to secure the release of a kidnapping victim. In February 2013, Armenian Catholic priest 

Michel Kayyal and Greek Orthodox priest Maher Mahfouz were kidnapped by a group described 

as “armed rebels” when the bus they were riding from Aleppo to Damascus was stopped. They 

were the only two hostages taken. Also in February 2013, the historic church of Saint Maroun 

in Barad village, Aleppo was vandalized. 

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HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

The conflict in Syria has created a humanitarian crisis for the country and the region. UNHCR 

reports that there are at least 3.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and almost 1.3 

million registered and unregistered refugees in neighboring countries, including Turkey, Jordan 

and Lebanon. With the conflict breaking along religious and political lines, it is unclear how 

many of these displaced persons and refugees fled because they were targeted specifically 

because of their religious faith or perceived religious identity. With the numbers continuing to 

swell, Syria’s religious diversity risks being lost. In addition, the possibility of inter-religious 

violence in refugee camps increases, as these communities increasingly intermingle in the 

overpopulated camps. In response to this fear, Turkey announced plans to build a refugee camp 

specifically for Syriac Christians and other Christians, and a second one for Kurds and other 

minorities. 

Many of the IDPs have been forced to move multiple times. Some are living with family and 

friends, but most are seeking shelters in abandoned schools and other buildings in overcrowded 

and unsanitary conditions. These poor living conditions are compounded and worsened by 

increased poverty; infrastructure damage to housing, medical facilities, and water and power 

utilities; fuel shortages; telecommunication disruptions; closed or unsafe transportation routes; 

and shrinking private and informal sector employment opportunities. Food shortages abound. 

Reports of disease are rising due to lack of access to medical care and contaminated water. 

According to UN officials, more than half of all hospitals are damaged (a third are completely 

closed), 40 percent of ambulances are destroyed, many doctors have left the embattled cities, and 

medication is rarely available. The UN does not expect IDPs to return to their homes in the near 

future, even if their homes have not been destroyed. 

Among the more than one million people estimated to have fled the conflict in Syria to 

neighboring countries are Iraqi refugees who fled religious and ethnic persecution in that country 

post-2003. At the peak of the Iraqi refugee crisis, 310,000 Iraqis were registered with UNHCR 

in Syria, many of whom were non-Muslim minorities. At the end of 2012, that number was only 

63,000. At least 57,000 Iraqis are known to have returned to Iraq from Syria in 2012, although 

UNHCR believes the number to be much higher. The Iraqi government has organized several 

trips both by air and bus to repatriate their citizens from Syria. Because of the violence, the 

United States has stopped accepting resettlement cases from Syria. 

U.S. POLICY

U.S. Government Relations with Syria 

Since he came to power in 2000, Bashar al-Assad’s foreign policy, like that of his father, has 

been oriented against the United States and its Arab and non-Arab allies. Syria’s main 

international partners include Iran and Hezbollah. The Russian Federation also has been a 

steadfast supporter of the regime, and the Syrian government has worked with North Korea to 

attempt to acquire nuclear arms. Since the protests began and violence escalated, the U.S. 

government has worked through the UN Security Council to condemn the violence and seek 

increased sanctions against the regime. On August 18, 2011, President Obama stated that 

President al-Assad should “step aside” to make way for a Syria that is “democratic, just, and 

inclusive for all Syrians.” In response to the increasing violence, the United States closed its 

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embassy in Damascus in February 2012, and withdrew all American diplomats, including 

Ambassador Robert Ford. 

The U.S. government has implemented a range of sanctions against the Syrian government. 

Since 1979 the United States has designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism for its 

longstanding support for Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. In addition, the U.S. government 

has levied sanctions against Syria via the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 

Restoration Act of 2004, has specifically sanctioned the Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006 as a 

result of the USA Patriot Act, and has denied, through many Executive Orders, specific Syrian 

citizens and entities access to the U.S. financial system due to for proliferating weapons of mass 

destruction, associating with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden, or destabilizing 

activities in Iraq and Lebanon. 

Through a series of Executive Orders, President Obama blocked all assets of persons responsible 

for, complicit in, or supporting the commission of human rights abuses in Syria. This included 

the freezing of assets of the Syrian government and regime officials, as well as any other 

individual found to be responsible for or complicit in human rights violations. In April 2012, the 

administration established new sanctions and related visa bans for persons who are found to 

commit or facilitate grave human rights abuses via information technology (GHRAVITY 

sanctions), which allowed the U.S. government to penalize governments and companies that 

provide technology leading to serious human rights abuses. In December 2012, the State 

Department designated the pro-al-Assad militias Jaysh al-Sha’bi and Shabiha as terrorist 

organizations, as well as the al-Nusra Front as an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The European 

Union has also imposed sanctions, including asset freezes and travel bans, and called on 

President al-Assad to step down. 

U.S. Government Assistance 

U.S. government assistance comes in various forms, including humanitarian assistance and 

support for local opposition councils and civil society. The Obama administration remains 

opposed to U.S. military intervention in Syria. Regarding humanitarian assistance, the U.S. 

government has provided approximately $385 million to aid individuals negatively impacted by 

the conflict, including IDPs within Syria and refugees outside the country. This amount includes 

the $155 million announced by President Obama on January 29, 2013. The State Department 

reports that the aid is not branded as coming from the U.S. government and is provided 

throughout the country via the UN, NGOs, and the SOC’s Assistance Coordination Unit. 

The United States also has provided more than $54 million in non-lethal support to the Syrian 

opposition. In early March 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry announced an additional $60 

million in direct, non-lethal aid to the Syrian opposition during a “Friends of Syria” conference 

in Rome. The government of Syria receives no direct U.S. foreign aid, which is prohibited under 

the FY2012 foreign operations appropriation act. According to the Congressional Research 

Service, “notwithstanding” language under other provisions in that law could allow the provision 

of funds for non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs, foreign military 

financing as it applies to demining, contingency funds, and democracy promotion. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS

USCIRF is deeply concerned about the increasing sectarian nature of the conflict and mounting 

violations of freedom of religion or belief. While it is difficult to ascertain if individuals or 

groups are targeted for their religious affiliation or because of their allegiance or perceived 

allegiance to one side of the conflict, it is clear that religious freedom for all Syrians is threatened 

and will be in jeopardy in a post al-Assad Syria. The indiscriminate use of military force and 

sectarian tactics of the al-Assad regime, government proxies, and some non-state actors seeking 

the regime’s overthrow are creating deep sectarian fissures among Syria’s diverse religious 

communities. These cleavages will not be easily overcome, and the threat of religiouslymotivated reprisal attacks in a post al-Assad Syria is real. The humanitarian disaster, including 

the vast number of IDPs and refugees, and the scarce resources available to Syrians will further 

exacerbate sectarian divides. 

U.S. leadership is essential to ensuring the full transition to representative democratic rule, 

ending human rights violations, and advancing religious freedom and the rule of law in Syria. 

U.S. government efforts in coordinating diplomatic actions of regional allies—particularly 

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—will be critical to provide Syrian leaders with incentives to 

ensure that political reforms protect human rights and religious freedoms for all. The escalating 

conflict provides openings for terrorists to operate in Syria, and anti-government elements may 

splinter along religious and secular lines after al-Assad steps down or is removed. The United 

States should take steps to ensure that the post-al-Assad Syrian government does not harbor 

violent religious extremists, and supports religious freedoms and international human rights 

standards. To ensure an orderly transition of power, all perpetrators of human rights violations 

should be held accountable, whether Syrian forces, non-state actors affiliated with the regime, or 

anti-government elements. 

I. Promoting Protection of Religious Freedom in Syria 

The U.S. government should: 

• prioritize human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, in any required dealings with 

the al-Assad regime, and increase U.S. government advocacy on the need for the regime to 

protect civilians affected by the armed conflict; and 

• consider designating Syria a CPC, if the United States concludes that the Syrian government 

is engaged in or tolerating particularly severe violations of religious freedom, and modify 

existing targeted sanctions to reference religious freedom violations. 

The U.S. government should urge, and where appropriate assist, the Syrian Opposition Coalition 

(SOC) and future post-al-Assad government to: 

• provide security to protect likely targets of sectarian or religiously-motivated violence, 

including areas where religious or minority communities live or congregate, such as 

neighborhoods, religious sites, and places of worship; 

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• provide technical training and support to local councils, courts, lawyers and judges on 

domestic laws and international standards relating to human rights and religious freedom; 

• undertake prompt, transparent, and effective investigations of all incidents of sectarian or 

religiously-motivated violence and bring the perpetrators to justice consistent with due 

process of law, regardless of whether they are former regime agents or members of the 

opposition; 

 

• ensure that they neither directly nor indirectly support any militia, non-state actor, or other 

organization credibly charged with involvement in sectarian or religiously-motivated 

violence; 

• work to see a future constitution that respects freedom of religion or belief in full, not just 

freedom of worship, as well as minority rights, women’s rights, and freedom of expression; 

• include religious minorities in key leadership positions and work to see religious minorities 

represented in parliament, either through their prominent inclusion on party lists and/or by 

establishing reserved seats in their parliament; and 

• work with Syria’s diverse religious communities, including the smallest minority 

communities and their political and civic representatives, to help them reach agreement on 

what measures are needed to ensure religious freedom and security for all communities in the 

country. 

II. Prioritizing Human Rights, including Freedom of Religion or Belief, in U.S. 

Relations with the “Friends of Syria” Group 

The U.S. government should: 

• work with like-minded partners among the Friends of Syria to fund and develop efforts to 

promote intra- and inter-religious tolerance and respect for religious freedom and related 

rights, and ensure that all international cooperation with the SOC emphasizes the importance 

of ensuring the rights to freedom of religion or belief and freedom of opinion and expression, 

as well as protection of minority religious communities; 

• create a working group among the Friends of Syria to focus on protecting religious and 

ethnic minorities in a post-Assad Syria and constructing a new constitution and legal system 

that protects freedom of religion or belief and associated human rights for all Syrians; 

• engage regional partners, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, on their vision for a post-al-Assad 

Syria to reach and implement a mutually-agreed plan on how the international community 

will influence the direction of a new government and its system of law; and 

• urge regional partners, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, not to support armed groups or 

proxies promoting a religious ideology and/or a form of government that would violate 

religious freedom and other internationally-guaranteed human rights. 

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III. Promoting Freedom of Religion or Belief through U.S. Programs 

The U.S. government should: 

• direct U.S. officials and recipients of U.S. grants to prioritize projects that promote multireligious and multi-ethnic efforts to encourage religious tolerance and understanding, foster 

knowledge of and respect for universal human rights standards, and develop the political 

ability of religious minorities to organize themselves and convey their concerns effectively; 

and 

 

• ensure that U.S. development assistance prioritizes areas where Syria’s smallest religious 

minority communities are concentrated, and that the use of such funding is determined in 

consultation with these communities’ political and civic leaders. 

IV. Addressing the Situation of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees

 

The U.S. government should: 

• establish a refugee resettlement program for Syrian refugees fleeing targeted religious 

persecution from Syrian government forces, affiliated militias, or non-state actors opposed to 

the al-Assad regime; 

• continue to provide significant funding to the UN, humanitarian organizations, host nations, 

and host communities to provide essential humanitarian aid to vulnerable Syrian internally 

displaced persons and refugees, and encourage other countries to do likewise; 

• encourage UNHCR to make preparations for increased refugee flows of religious minorities, 

to develop a protection program to ensure their safety in refugee camps from reprisal attacks 

along sectarian lines, and to sponsor interfaith dialogues among the various refugee 

communities; 

 

• increase its efforts to process Iraqi refugees deferred for resettlement to the United States, 

including by moving applicants to neighboring countries or interviewing applicants by 

videoconference in locations where in-person interviews cannot be conducted for security 

reasons; and 

• ensure that Iraqi and Syrian refugees scheduled to be resettled to the United States are not 

delayed unnecessarily by providing adequate personnel to conduct background screening and 

enforcing proper application of the existing waiver of the material support bar to individuals 

forced to provide support to terrorists under duress. 

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DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS AZIZAH AL-HIBRI, MARY ANN 

GLENDON AND WILLIAM SHAW: 

We have strong and deep feelings for the sufferings currently being endured by the people of Syria. We 

dissent from the report, however, because the facts about and the relation between issues of religious 

freedom and the political dynamics of the armed struggle there are not sufficiently clear to enable us to 

draw conclusions or make recommendations regarding matters that lie outside USCIRF’s mandate to 

monitor violations of religious freedom. 

A broadening of the informational and interpretive bases regarding events in the country may help 

provide grounds for clearer and more accurate analysis and hence judgments. 

Continued monitoring of Syria should be done. Report findings should stand on the strength of the facts 

uncovered and not be influenced by descriptive words/ phrases which can be interpreted as prejudicial. 

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